

seem to want to know, who is guarding the guardians?

Lyons and Mastanduno conclude that we are likely to experience an ongoing "chipping away" at the sovereign autonomy of nations. However, they end with the following cautionary note:

The idea of state sovereignty is alive and well among both the more powerful and less powerful members of contemporary international society. Even if states increasingly share authority with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the state system endures.

So where does that leave us? For the isolationists and the unilateralists, the question of international intervention is, of course, not important for they believe that the United States should not, or need not, rely on other nations or the international community in advancing our security interests. However, as I have said in the first two of these dialogues, I do not believe the people of our country are prepared now, or in the foreseeable future, to pay the substantial—albeit quite different—costs arising out of either the isolationists' or the unilateralists' agendas.

For everyone else, including balance of power realists, Wilsonian idealists and everyone in between, they have to face the dilemma of balancing the reality of the continuing dominance of the nation state as the key player in international security affairs with the increasing transnational communications, economic forces, and values which are circumscribing national sovereignty.

In my opinion, we have no choice but to try to improve the international machinery for legitimating and, in some circumstances conducting, interventions in extreme cases where a nation's actions within its own borders necessitate such a response. To do otherwise would be to ignore the trends noted by Lyons and Mastanduno in 1995 and which have certainly considered apace since then. And whatever its shortcomings, and they are many, it is clear that the international machinery of choice, for the United States as well as for most of the world, and recognized in solemn commitments—for example including NATO's own charter—is the United Nations and more particularly its Security Council.

But it is equally clear that the UN's machinery is not now capable of fulfilling this role assigned to it by the international community. The sad current events in Sierra Leone, and previously in Bosnia, in Rwanda, in Angola, and in Somalia demonstrate convincingly that the UN cannot enforce the will of the international community unless all local parties accept its intervention. In other words, it can enforce an existing peace but cannot make peace.

And in the absence of an effective United Nations, I say to the advocates

of humanitarian intervention, we have to proceed with great caution. Furthermore, while various Western leaders and theorists have proposed standards to determine when and how national sovereignty should be overridden, such standards are neither comprehensive, nor clear, nor widely accepted.

Though I do not oppose the notion of international intervention in principle—because as I said before various global trends are moving us in that direction—in my opinion much will have to be done before we can or should stake important national interests on it. Among the steps which must be undertaken are:

Reforming the peacekeeping operations and decision-making processes within the UN and the Security Council.

Strengthening the capabilities of regional organizations, like the Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—and as I suggested earlier the European Union—to deal with regional threats to international order.

Thoroughly debating—including in this body—the proposed frameworks for intervention put forward by the Clinton Administration, the British government, and others.

None of these steps will be easy. For example, reforming the decision-making processes of the Security Council in a way that improves its ability to act would presumably involve curtailing the veto power of the permanent members. However, while such a change would eliminate or reduce the ability of China or Russia to block what we view as appropriate interventions, it would also similarly constrain our own capacity to prevent what we view as undesirable actions by the UN. Strengthening the capabilities of regional entities raises resource questions, and, as already discussed, developing a serious European defense capability raises a number of additional concerns. And developing any sort of meaningful consensus about the principles for international interventions even among NATO members—let alone among both developed and developing countries—will be an extremely long and difficult process. But for anyone who can conceive of circumstances where an international response will be in our national interest, it is the type of effort we will have to undertake.

Mr. President, that concludes my remarks in this, our third session on the US Global Role. Our next discussion will hopefully take place during the week of May 22, and in many ways is at the heart of the concerns which motivated both me and Senator ROBERTS to initiate these dialogs: the central question of when and how to employ American military forces abroad. I look forward to that debate—which will appropriately occur just before the Memorial

Day break—and I hope other Senators will participate.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Is there any time left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to commend Senator CLELAND and Senator ROBERTS for instituting this bipartisan dialogue relating to the global role of the United States. We normally only discuss these issues when a real-world contingency is looming and we do so under significant time constraints and within the dynamic of rapidly unfolding crises. This dialogue, which allows us to discuss these issues in a better setting, will hopefully contribute in a better understanding of the various perspectives on these issues and may bring us closer to a consensus on the fundamental issue of the global role of the United States.

This week's subject—"Multilateral Organizations"—is a very broad area. I will confine my remarks to those multilateral organizations that have responsibilities relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. I have in mind organizations like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the mutual defense treaties to which the United States is a party.

I would like to briefly discuss several recent international crises and the role that the various multilateral organizations played in addressing those crises. I want to note, at the outset, that sometimes they were successful and sometimes they failed.

Mr. President, I don't know how many of my colleagues have ever been to Dubrovnik. It is an ancient and breathtakingly beautiful seaside city on Croatia's Dalmatian coast. When the Yugoslav Army subjected Dubrovnik to indiscriminate shelling in October 1991, resulting in the systematic destruction in the old city and the loss of many civilian lives, the European Union or the Western European Union should have used force to end this barbarity in their own backyard. If they had, the ensuing damage and loss of life throughout the Balkans might have been avoided. Instead of acting with force, however, the European Union declined to take any forceful action. For its part, the UN Security Council imposed an international embargo on the supply of arms to the combatants, thus succeeding in locking in the advantage that the Yugoslav

Army enjoyed. It doesn't appear that NATO even considered taking action at that stage of the Balkan conflict. This was an example of the inability or unwillingness of the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and other multilateral organizations to effectively deal with a real-world crisis that had the potential of spreading.

It should be noted that NATO has substantial forces under its command but the United Nations does not have a standing UN army, nor, in my view, should it. The United Nations is dependent upon the political will of its members to supply the forces and the financial resources to take action. It is ironic that politicians of all nations feel free to criticize the United Nations for failing to successfully carry out its missions but the reality is that any failure of the United Nations is a failure of the UN member nations to provide the UN with the necessary means for its missions. We can't have it both ways—we can't refuse to provide the UN with the necessary means to do its job and then hammer the UN for its failings.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in commenting upon a December 1999 Report of an Independent Inquiry that he commissioned and that documented the UN failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda and on his own earlier report on the UN's failure to safeguard Srebrenica, stated that "Of all my aims as Secretary General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter."

Mr. President, I welcome Secretary General Kofi Annan's statement, but I recognize the reality that the UN's ability to take effective action in the future—even to prevent genocide—remains dependent upon the political will of UN member nations to provide the UN with the forces and the financial resources it needs.

Mr. President, just as the United Nations has learned some hard lessons in places like Rwanda and Srebrenica, so the United States learned a hard lesson in Somalia, where we lost 18 of our finest soldiers in a single engagement.

In response to the need for an effective peacekeeping capability in Africa, the United States, Britain and France are embarked on parallel and coordinated programs to enhance the capabilities of African countries to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Africa. The United States program, called the African Crisis Response Initiative or ACRI, has trained over 6,000 peacekeepers from the African nations of Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Uganda, and Senegal. The ACRI program, whose program of instruction has been approved by the UN Department of Peacekeeping, also promotes professional apolitical militaries and

reinforces respect for human rights and the proper role of a military in a democracy.

Mr. President, while most people only associate the UN with peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, there are other actions that it has undertaken. In December 1992, the UN Security Council, at the request of the Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, established a preventive deployment mission in Macedonia in an effort to prevent the Balkan conflict from spreading into that nation. Originally composed of a Nordic battalion, it was augmented by a U.S. Army contingent in July 1993. The conflict did not spread to Macedonia, perhaps because of this mission. It was the first deployment of an international force prior to an initiation of hostilities.

The crisis in Kosovo also produced unprecedented actions by several multilateral organizations. In 1998, amidst mounting repression of the ethnic Albanian population by the Yugoslav Army and special police, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic reached an agreement with U.S. envoy Dick Holbrooke to comply with UN demands for a cease-fire and to accept an intrusive verification regime of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Involving approximately 2,000 unarmed personnel, this was the largest, most complex and potentially most dangerous mission ever undertaken by the OSCE. Additionally, NATO deployed an Extraction Force to neighboring Macedonia that was poised to come to the assistance of the OSCE personnel if they came under attack. While the OSCE mission was not able to prevent all armed attacks, particularly the mass killing of ethnic Albanians in Racak in January 1999, it did enable international humanitarian relief organizations to provide direly needed assistance to the Kosovar population until forced to withdraw on March 20, 1999 in the face of an untenable situation, including additional large-scale deployments of Milosevic's military, special police and paramilitary forces into Kosovo.

By the time of the OSCE's withdrawal from Kosovo, repression of the ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo escalated to a full-scale attempt to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council was unable to act as both Russia and China signaled that they would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force against the security forces of Slobodan Milosevic. Despite the lack of international legitimation that a UN Security Council authorization would have provided, NATO was resolute and launched a 78-day air campaign that forced Slobodan Milosevic to accede to NATO's demands. This was the first time in its fifty-year history that NATO had embarked on a large-scale

combat operation. Following the air campaign, the UN Security Council established a UN mission to administer Kosovo and authorized an international armed force under NATO leadership to provide a secure environment. And for the first time in the 20th Century, ethnic cleansing in Europe was reversed. The United States bore the major burden in NATO's air campaign but the European Union pledged to bear the major share of the reconstruction effort and has provided most of the peacekeeping forces for Kosovo. I welcome the fact that the United States is playing a junior role in the peacekeeping effort with only about 15 percent of the troops, and I also welcome our European NATO allies' expressed determination to play a more substantial role in future conflicts in Europe, either as part of a NATO or a European Union-led effort.

Additionally, in a departure from the normal UN practice, the UN Mission in Kosovo or UNMIK has been organized into four pillars, under the overall supervision of the UNMIK head, Dr. Kouchner. Those four pillars are: civil administration under the United Nations itself; humanitarian assistance, led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; democratization and institution-building, led by the OSCE; and economic reconstruction, managed by the EU.

Despite the fact that our NATO allies would have borne the effects of a massive flow of ethnic-Albanian Kosovars, regional instability, and the potential involvement of two of its member nations—Greece and Turkey—on opposite sides of the conflict, no individual European nation had the military or political wherewithal to use force against Serbia to end its barbarous acts. I doubt that a coalition of European nations could have done so. Although the United States had the military capability to carry out such an operation, as Secretary Cohen and General Shelton noted in their joint statement to the Armed Services Committee, "Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without the NATO Alliance and without the infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions, and most importantly, political and diplomatic support provided by the allies and other members of the coalition."

Mr. President, much has been said and written about NATO's use of less than overwhelming, decisive force in the air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO's capability was limited to what I call "maximum achievable force," i.e., the maximum force that is politically achievable and sustainable. As General Wes Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander during the air campaign, testified in response to my use of the concept "maximum achievable force".

"We knew we had to avoid collateral damage, keep the allies together, do

the most we could against the targets on the ground, and avoid the loss of air crews. We had to keep it in balance. It was, as you put it, a maximum achievable force strategy."

An Alliance goes to war differently than an individual nation does. The United States clearly would have carried out the air campaign more robustly from the outset if we had been acting unilaterally.

Overwhelming, decisive force undoubtedly is the first and most preferred option for the United States in any military operation. That is the lesson of Vietnam. But if it is not possible, as it will rarely be when a coalition is considering action, then the next option is to use the maximum achievable force in an alliance setting. The question then becomes whether the greater risks entailed in using less than overwhelming, decisive force are worth taking.

If the participation of the whole NATO Alliance was both critical to the success of the military operation against Milosevic and the only politically achievable option, were we wise to proceed? If so, does this mean that we should automatically resign ourselves to using less than overwhelming, decisive force in any future conflict?

The answer is we should not resign ourselves to the use of less than overwhelming divisive force. But there will be times when because we can achieve an alliance action with maximum achievable force that it will be worth the risk, and there will be times when it will not.

An overwhelming, decisive force strategy is best when U.S. forces are involved in hostilities. In the case of Kosovo, our NATO allies were unwilling to adopt such a strategy. Our remaining options were to do nothing, to go it alone, or to use a maximum achievable force strategy, which meant a phased air campaign and no ground forces.

In my view, while there were drawbacks to going to war in Kosovo as part of a coalition, the benefits of fighting as part of the NATO coalition, under all the circumstances, outweighed those drawbacks. Napoleon said it well: "The only thing worse than fighting in a coalition is fighting against one."

If the use of overwhelming, decisive force is also not an option in some future conflict, we will once again have to make the judgment whether the risk involved in utilizing maximum achievable force, i.e. less than overwhelming, decisive force, outweighs the risk to U.S. interests of not proceeding.

Meanwhile across the globe in East Timor, the international community reacted in horror at the death and destruction wrought by pro-Indonesian militias in the aftermath of a referendum that overwhelmingly favored independence from Indonesia. The UN Security Council authorized a multi-

national force to restore peace and security in East Timor. Australia took the lead in this peace enforcement mission and the United States provided support but did not provide any ground combat forces. As Admiral Blair, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, put it in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, "East Timor demonstrated the value of having the U.S. in a supporting role to a competent ally, providing unique and significant capabilities needed to ensure success without stretching the capability of U.S. forces and resources to conduct other operations worldwide."

Mr. President, the United States cannot be the world's policeman. But we also cannot withdraw to fortress America and seek to ignore what goes on in the rest of the world. The United States possesses unparalleled economic and military strength. But no nation—no matter how strong—can go it alone. Understanding this, our forebears formed alliances many years ago throughout the globe. Our collective defense treaties with the other 18 nations of the NATO Alliance and with countries like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea are major contributors to the protection of our national security interests. Our status as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with veto power, also enables us to ensure that the actions of the Security Council are consistent with our national security interests. Our Alliances and our participation in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations also help to ensure that there is a shared responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The UN's authorization and approval of a mission adds great universal political support to the undertaking.

None of these organizations I have described are perfect and none of them will succeed in maintaining the peace if their Member nations lack the political will to provide the military forces, the financial resources, and, increasingly, the police forces to carry out the missions that are undertaken.

Mr. President, I realize that Senators CLELAND, ROBERTS and others talked about the security interests of the United States in a prior week. I don't plan to comment at length on that subject today, but I do believe that it is necessary to touch on it with respect to multilateral organizations.

The obvious point is that the extent to which the United States participates with its armed forces in a particular mission will be determined by the extent to which our national interests are involved and the degree of risk it entails, including, as noted above, the greater risks that may result from acting within a coalition.

Accordingly, the United States has made clear that it will not provide troops for the United Nations peace-

keeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the same vein, the United States will not provide troops for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, the follow-on mission to the Australian-led intervention force, but will provide a few U.S. officers to serve as observers and will, as part of their normal exercises, periodically deploy U.S. personnel to perform activities such as the rebuilding of schools and the restoration of medical services.

Mr. President, I believe that it is in the United States national interest to support the United Nations as it seeks to fulfill its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and stability. We also need to work to strengthen our alliances and to encourage our allies to strengthen their military capabilities so that they can share the common burden. We also need to utilize the various other multilateral organizations that can contribute to international peace and stability. Finally, we need to explore every opportunity to bring about actions that will serve to end conflict at the earliest possible time, as wasn't done in 1991 at the time of the initial shelling of Dubrovnik, and to prevent the spread of conflict, as was done by the UN preventive deployment mission to Macedonia in 1992.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to end in the same way that I started; namely, by commending Senator CLELAND and Senator ROBERTS for instituting this dialogue. I look forward to the continuation of this dialogue in the coming weeks and I hope to be able to participate again in the future.

I again thank our good friends from Georgia and Kansas. I add my thanks also to the Senator from Indiana for his extraordinarily thoughtful remarks this afternoon. I was not able to hear all of it. I would like to have heard all of it. But I heard enough to know that, as usual, the Senator from Indiana adds an extremely thoughtful and thorough contribution to this debate.

I commend our good friends from Georgia and Kansas for carrying on what I consider to be a very significant dialog. It takes a lot of effort and a lot of energy to do what they are doing. It is critical to this nation's security. Both of them have already made huge contributions to our Nation's security. Now, on the floor of the Senate, they are making an additional major contribution, and this country is again in their debt.

I thank my friends.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.