

rights and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well.

Even if we could put aside for a moment, Mr. Speaker, the brutal occupation of Tibet, the ongoing repression of human rights in China, the continuing proliferation of weapons, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, to Pakistan, the ongoing relationship between the Chinese and the Pakistanis in terms of missile technology transfer, same thing with Iran, more recently with Libya, since this 1999 U.S.-China trade agreement they have proliferated to Libya, the administration does not want that known, but it is in the public domain, so in any event, we have many areas of concern. But even if we were to make a determination strictly on the basis of trade alone, there is no reason for us to permanently surrender our leverage.

□ 1945

It is as if the U.S. wants to trade with China in the worst possible way, and that is exactly what the President is leading us to do in the worst possible way.

There is a better way. All the President needs to do is send a request to Congress for a special waiver for China to have normal trade relations for one more year, as he does every end of May. There does not even have to be a vote on that. We do not have to have the debate. We do not have to have a vote. No one has to go on record.

In the course of the next year, if the Chinese begin for a change, a drastic change, to start honoring the commitments, they do not have to do everything. In the agreement that would not be possible, but at least to take the initial steps to honor the agreement. Then next year around this time there should be no problem with saying, all right, they honored the commitment on trade, and the WTO is a trade regiment, so on the basis of trade alone, this might work for us.

I do not know why everybody is so afraid to do it in the normal course of events. Because if we believe that China is going to honor the agreement, they should have no problem with that.

The other reason that is important is because China has not even made its agreement with the European Union. And we are not supposed to see this arrangement, we are not supposed to even be voting on this until the Chinese reach an agreement with the other members of the WTO. So, effectively, the President is asking us to vote on something that we do not know what the terms are because they have not negotiated them with the EU yet.

What the President is asking us to do is give privileges to China permanently before they ever have to honor any commitments to the WTO. Indeed, they have not even reached the agreement to join the WTO.

What the President is asking us to do is for each of us to put our good names next to his failed China policy and try to redeem it with this rush to surrender permanently to the dictators in Beijing, thereby squandering our leverage on trade, squandering our leverage on our values, and surrendering our leverage on national security.

So I would hope that our colleagues would pay attention and ask the question, where is the implementation, where is the compliance, where is the enforcement on this, and where are our national values on this?

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSING MASSIVE REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC FORCES

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OSE). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the full hour. But I do rise to discuss a matter of vital importance, following the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), on issues relating to national security.

There are some in both parties who are concerned that, perhaps, we are rushing to try to create a new legacy for this President on foreign policies relative to our policies with China and Russia.

As someone who spends a great deal of time focusing on both of those countries as a senior member of the Committee on Armed Services and Chairman of the Committee on Military Research and Development and co-chairman of the inter-parliamentary dialogue between Russia and the U.S., I am extremely concerned about not just our relationship with China, which I will have more to say later on this week and next week relative to the NTR vote, but specifically to our relationship with Russia.

Mr. Speaker, we all know that the first week of June the President will take an historic trip to Moscow, where he has been asked to address the Duma, which is kind of an historic event, an American President being asked to speak before the lower house of the Russian Parliament.

I applaud the President for going to Moscow. I am concerned, however, that the election of Putin as the new President of Russia saw him take his first trip not to Washington, not to the West. But his first trip, in fact, is to Beijing, where he is, in fact, engaged in a series of high-level meetings with the leadership of China.

In fact, both China and Russia have talked about a new strategic partnership, one that would include China and Russia against the West and, in particular, against the U.S.

Now, it is important that we reach out to this new leader in Russia. I did

the day that he was sworn into office on January 11 in a three-page letter that I wrote in Russian to him talking about the need for us to sit down and work together to build, once again, a solid relationship between our two countries.

But I am extremely concerned, Mr. Speaker, about the President's upcoming trip in June; and I want to call my concerns to the attention of our colleagues and to the American people.

Mr. Speaker, it is not that we do not want our President to go to Moscow. We do. And we do want him to discuss issues that are important between our two countries. And, obviously, reducing the threat of the massive buildup of arms that we both engaged in during the Cold War has got to be our top priority.

But, Mr. Speaker, many of us on both sides of the aisle are equally concerned that this President not rush to a quick judgment in our relations with Russia or China that would cause America to, in the end, be more insecure and would cause more destabilizing relations between us and those two nations.

Now, why do I raise these concerns today? Because, Mr. Speaker, last week it was brought to my attention by quiet conversations brought to me from both the Pentagon and the intelligence service that the President had ordered the Pentagon to look at a massive reduction in our strategic forces.

In fact, one individual told me that the President himself had ordered a presidential nuclear initiative that would, in fact, cut our strategic forces by 50 percent and that this initiative would be announced as a part of the President's trip to Moscow.

Now, why is that critically important? Mr. Speaker, as we both know, the strategic stability between us and Russia is based on an outdated theory called "mutually assured destruction," where neither side dares challenge the other for fear of retaliation. We do not have a defensive system to defeat a Russian accidental launch. Although, the Russians do have a defense system around Moscow.

So when we negotiate with the Russians in terms of reducing arms, it is critically important that our Pentagon, that our military leaders, that our strategic thinkers in our Government, not Republican or Democrat thinkers, but career thinkers who are paid to protect America, be consulted in terms of what the final outcome of negotiations should be.

What I heard last week, Mr. Speaker, which was reported in at least three major newspapers in both Chicago, New York, and Washington on Thursday, was that the administration is, in fact, proposing massive reductions in our strategic forces in terms of our relations with Russia.

Now, why am I concerned about that? I do want to see us reduce our strategic

forces and our reliance on them, but I want to do it in a logical and methodical manner. This administration, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately does not have a good track record in negotiating treaties that can get the bipartisan support of the Congress. This administration, in fact, has a terrible reputation in terms of our foreign policy in general.

Many of our colleagues talk, for instance, frequently about the President's comments before he went into Kosovo and declared that we would see hundreds of thousands of mass graves from where Milosevic had buried the people he had murdered. Well, after that war was, in fact, wound down this year, we had the CIA before our committee and I asked the CIA how many mass graves did we find. They said well below 10,000; and some of those graves may have actually been wounds inflicted by the allied forces in their attempts to remove Milosevic from power.

So while the President said one thing to get the support of the American people to go into Kosovo, which he promised us would last only a matter of weeks and which we would win, here we are a year later and Milosevic is still in power. We spent tons of money and, in fact, we have since learned that we probably killed more innocent people with allied bombs than what Milosevic did in his reign of terror. And Milosevic, the war criminal, is still in power and, many would argue, stronger than he was before America and Britain led the NATO allies in a massive deployment in the Kosovo theatre.

Likewise, Mr. Speaker, many of our colleagues feel betrayed by this administration because of the failure of our arms control policies. In fact, in a floor speech 2 years ago, I documented 37 violations of arms control agreements by China and Russia since 1991, cases where we caught the Russians or the Chinese transferring technology illegally to states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, as well as India and Pakistan.

Mr. Speaker, in all of those 37 cases where we had evidence or inclinations that Russia and China had, in fact, violated arms control agreements, this administration imposed the requirement sanctions only two times. Once we caught the Chinese transferring ring magnets to Pakistan for their nuclear program, and once we caught the Chinese transferring M-11 missiles to Pakistan, both of which are violations of arms control agreements. Seventeen times we saw the Russians transferring technology, and 17 times we did nothing about it.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, the Congress became so disenchanted with this administration and so concerned about the flagrant ignorance of violations that were occurring by Russian entities that the Congress did something that many felt we

would never do. We passed the Iran Missile Sanctions legislation.

We passed that because Israel, just several years ago, I believe it was in 1998, told us that they had evidence that Russia was cooperating with Iran to build a new class of medium-range missiles, the Shahab 3 and the Shahab 4. These missiles could target most of Europe and all of Israel.

When the Congress heard that the Israelis had evidence, the question to our White House is, well, what are we doing to stop this transfer of technology? As we give Russia a billion dollars a year to assist them in stabilizing their economy, what are we doing to enforce the arms control agreements that require us to take actions against entities in any country that is illegally selling technology to rogue states?

The fact is, Mr. Speaker, the response by the administration when we began to get information from the CIA that Israel was correct that we had evidence that Russia was, in fact, cooperating with Iran, the response of this administration was to make life unbearable for Dr. Gordon Ehlers.

Dr. Gordon Ehlers was the Director of Nonproliferation for the CIA. Instead of being honest and candid with Members of Congress, as Dr. Ehlers was, the administration wanted to keep the evidence that we had of Russian cooperation with Iran quiet. So Dr. Ehlers was, basically, made so uncomfortable that he took early retirement from his job.

The Congress then, in response, introduced bipartisan legislation, the Iran Missile Sanctions bill, endorsed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), a Republican, and Jane Harman of California. This bill would force the administration to impose the required sanctions on Russia. Immediately it got over 200 cosponsors because Members of Congress were livid that that administration was not enforcing arms control agreements that we and Russia were supposed to abide by.

By November of that year, the House was getting ready to vote on the Iran Missile Sanctions bill. Vice President GORE called 12 of us down to the White House, Mr. Speaker. I was one of those 12 Members called down to the old Executive Office Building. Sitting in the old Executive Office Building with people like John McCAIN, Senator BOB KERREY, Congressman Lee Hamilton, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), Congresswoman Jane Harman, and Senator CARL LEVIN, we listened to the Vice President tell us that if the Congress passed this legislation, it would be devastating to our relationship with Russia.

When he finished talking to us for about an hour, the Members of Congress that were there from both parties from both Houses said, Mr. Vice President, we understand your concerns. But

it is too late. The Congress has lost its confidence in this administration's ability to enforce arms control agreements that we are a party to.

A week after the Vice President called us down, in spite of his objections and the President's objections, the bipartisan Iran Missile Sanctions bill passed the House with 392 votes.

Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we do not get those kinds of votes unless Members of Congress on both sides are absolutely upset and feel that this administration is not, in fact, living up to its requirements under our arms control treaties.

Then, Mr. Speaker, we broke for the Christmas and holiday recess and came back in February. The Senate was about to take up the same bill, the Iran Missile Sanctions Act.

The Vice President again called us back to the old Executive Office Building; and there again, the Vice President, with a member of the National Security Council, Jack Karavelli on one side, and the President's security adviser, Leon Furth on the other side, talked to us Democrats and Republicans, Senators and House Members, many of whom had been there for the earlier meeting, and said to the Senators, you cannot pass this bill. If you pass it, you will embarrass the President and you will cause us irreparable harm with the Russian leadership.

Mr. Speaker, for a second time, in spite of the personal pleas of the Vice President and the President, the Senate passed the Iran Missile Sanctions bill with a vote that included 94 Senators voting in the affirmative.

□ 2000

Mr. Speaker, you do not get 94 Senators to vote in unison to embarrass the President unless there are serious concerns about the policies of this administration. And those 94 Senators did exactly that. Mr. Speaker, the bill went to a conference. The President, as he said he would, vetoed the bill that year and we had the votes to override the veto because of a lack of confidence in this administration's policies. In fact, I was in all of those meetings where we discussed bringing the veto override up on the House floor with Speaker Gingrich one month before the Congressional elections that year in 1999.

Mr. Speaker, it was Speaker Newt Gingrich who stopped the veto override from coming up for a vote in the House. It would have passed. We would have had overwhelming numbers of Members on both sides overturning the President's veto, but Republican Newt Gingrich did not want to bring that bill up a month before the Congressional elections. So in this new Congress, without Speaker Gingrich, without Members like Jane Harman, bipartisan Members again reintroduced the Iran missile sanctions bill, and this year,

Mr. Speaker, the Iran missile sanctions bill passed the House and the Senate unanimously. This year, Mr. Speaker, the President could not veto the bill because he knew he would be overriden. So what did he do? He did what Bill Clinton does so frequently. He changed his sides, came over in support of the legislation, and signed the bill into law, even though it was a direct slap at this administration and was a direct contradiction to their policies.

Mr. Speaker, that was probably the most clear evidence of the lack of confidence of this Congress in the policies of this administration when it comes to arms control. My most glaring evidence, Mr. Speaker, was when I was in Moscow in 1996 in January, a month after the Washington Post had just reported a front page story that we had evidence that Iraq had received guidance systems from Russia illegally. While I was visiting with our ambassador, Ambassador Pickering in his office in Moscow, I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what was the response from the Russians when you told them that we caught them illegally transferring guidance systems to Iraq?" Now, the importance of these systems is that they make their missiles more accurate. As we all know, we lost 31 young Americans in 1991 because of an Iraqi SCUD missile. Any technology that would make those missiles more accurate could endanger the lives of American troops and American allies. The Post reported that we had evidence that Russia had been helping Iraq with their guidance systems. So when I asked Ambassador Pickering what the response was from the Russian side, he said, "Congressman, I haven't asked the Russians yet." I said, "Why haven't you asked them, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "Because that's got to come from the White House."

So I came back to Washington. At the end of January 1996 I wrote to President Clinton a letter saying, Dear Mr. President, we have evidence evidently, according to the Washington Post, that we have caught the Russians illegally transferring guidance systems to Iraq, in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a key arms control agreement. That is a serious violation, Mr. President, and if it is so, what are you doing about it?"

Mr. Speaker, the President wrote me back in April of that year. He said, "Dear Congressman WELDON, you are right. If the Russians did what the Post said they did, that would be a terribly serious violation of an arms control agreement, and I assure you, if we can prove that the Russians transferred those devices, we will take aggressive action, and we will take the required actions mandated by that arms control treaty."

Mr. Speaker, little did I know that at that time, agencies of the U.S. Government had well over 100 sets of the Rus-

sian guidance systems that we caught being transferred from Russia to Iraq not on one occasion, not twice, but on three separate occasions. We caught the Russians transferring guidance systems to Iraq. In fact, I have a set of these devices that I carry around when I give speeches. Yet this administration did nothing to impose the required sanctions. In fact, Mr. Speaker, when asked by Members of Congress what action we had taken with Russia, the response by the administration was, "Well, we got assurances from Russia that they'll never do it again."

Mr. Speaker, because of the continued policy of ignoring Russia's violations, the Congress lost total confidence in this administration on arms control agreements. Mr. Speaker, as an aside, I am convinced that the reason we did not call Russia on those violations was because of our policy of a friendly relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin and therefore our policy in this country was to prevent anything from surfacing that would have embarrassed Boris Yeltsin. In fact, the year of those Iraqi violations was in fact the year that Yeltsin was running for reelection. In my opinion, that is why we never surfaced those clear violations of an arms control agreement.

So, Mr. Speaker, the track record of this administration on arms control is abysmal. Many in this city, including arms control groups, maintain it is one of the worst in the history of this country in terms of letting countries get away with obvious violations of arms control treaties. That is why this administration could not get the votes for the nuclear test ban treaty. That is why this administration could not get the votes for any arms control treaty that it negotiates with any country. That is a sad state of affairs, when the confidence is so low that neither body will support arms control negotiations completed by this administration.

Now, we had a similar occurrence occur, Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago. The administration, after the Senate ratified the START II treaty with Russia, a very important START II treaty, ratified by this country in 1993, the year President Clinton came into office, because the Senate believed START II was important to reduce arms negotiated by former President Bush and before that, former President Reagan. So the Senate approved it. But then the administration did something that caused further erosion in the confidence of the Congress. The administration held negotiations with the Russians in Geneva to amend the ABM Treaty. These negotiations went on for months. They were centered around two specific issues: One was to make the ABM Treaty a multilateral treaty that would not just apply to Russia but would bring in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Now, I could not understand for the life of me why we would

want to amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it. The second issue was demarcation, a complicated issue but one that would set up a distinction between a theater missile defense system and a national missile defense system. This distinction would be based on interceptor speed, a very highly scientific development that would differentiate between the two systems. I did not understand the negotiations. Unlike our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I went to Geneva. I think I am the only Member of Congress from either body who went over there to sit in on the negotiations firsthand. I got the approval of the administration up-front. I sat down at the negotiating table with our chief negotiator Stanley Riveles on my side and I sat across from the chief Russian negotiator, General Koltunov. For 2½ hours I questioned the Russians through General Koltunov about the negotiations going on at Geneva. For instance, Mr. Speaker, I asked Koltunov, "Why does Russia want to multinationalize or lateralize the ABM Treaty?" I said, "General, you are the only country left of the former Soviet Union that has long range missiles. Why do you want to include Ukraine and Kazakhstan and Belarus? They don't have long range missiles. They have all been removed."

He looked at me and he said, "Congressman, you're asking that question of the wrong person. We didn't propose multilateralizing the treaty. Your side did." Now, for the life of me, Mr. Speaker, I could not understand why we would want to multilateralize the ABM treaty unless there are those in the White House who wanted to make it more difficult to amend the treaty after they left office. If you bring Belarus in, with an unstable leader like Lukashenko, you could have Russia and America agree on an ABM change and have the Russians quietly tell Lukashenko, "Don't support it," and have Belarus be the country that stopped the treaty from being changed. That became a very controversial item of negotiation that this administration agreed to.

Then there was a second item, and that was demarcation. The administration agreed to a number difference between theater and national missile defense systems. I asked General Koltunov, "Where do these numbers come from, General, how do you determine what is a theater versus a national missile defense system? Where is that line? How do you arrive at it? Is it some theory of physics?"

He said, "Congressman, these numbers were very carefully negotiated by our military and your military."

I said, "Well, General, I don't understand but I think it's ridiculous that we would amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it to include theater missile defense systems when you, Russia, already have some of the world's most

capable theater missile defense systems and you're selling them all over the place."

I came back to Washington not satisfied with what I heard. The administration concluded their negotiations in Geneva, and those two items became known as the protocols. I found out a year later what I think is the reason that these numbers were reached for the demarcation between these systems, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I simply want to compliment him on his fine work and to say that the bill which will be coming forward tomorrow on military construction should I think go a long way towards addressing some of the concerns that my friend has raised.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague. I thank him for his chairmanship of the Committee on Rules and look forward to his new rule, hopefully tomorrow, on the defense authorization bill for 2001.

Mr. DREIER. We are going to work on that right now.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I read an article in the Tel Aviv newspaper that documented that Russia was trying to sell Israel a brand new defense system called the Antei 2500. I had never heard of this system. I know most of Russia's systems. So I called the CIA. They were not quite sure of it either but they sent an expert over about a month later who was a missile expert for the CIA. He brought in some documents with him. I said, "Have you ever heard of this new Russian system called the Antei 2500? It is supposed to be fantastic." He said, "Congressman, I know the system." He said, "In fact the Russians have printed documents, marketing brochures," and he gave me one. He said, "This is what they were showing at the Abu Dhabi air show this year." I picked it up and looked at it. There were photographs of this new missile defense system that Russia was in fact trying to sell. I found out they were not just trying to sell it to Israel, they were also offering it to Greece. I read through the brochure. The agent and I, the CIA agent and I had a discussion about the capability. He said, "It is a very capable system, almost as capable as our PAC-3." On the back page of that document, Mr. Speaker, was a summary sheet of all the capabilities of that system. To my amazement, the interceptor speed of that Antei 2500 was right below the threshold of the demarcation that our government got sucked into by the Russians in Geneva. So in effect, Mr. Speaker, that is where the demarcation number came from. In our haste to enter into an agreement with the Russians, we agreed to an artificial number between theater and national missile defense that would let the Russians a year later market a brand new system right below that threshold but

would prohibit us from making our systems go beyond that capability.

Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence in this administration's ability to negotiate arms control agreements. It is because this administration has a terrible track record. In fact, Mr. Speaker, today the Iranians are developing the Shahab 4 system which they got help from the Russians on which has a defined capability of at least 2500 kilometers.

□ 2015

If we were to accept the administration's demarcation protocol, we could not improve our systems to defeat the Iranian Shahab-4 system which Russia helped Iran build. That is why this Congress, Mr. Speaker, has no confidence, and that is why I have no confidence in this administration in arms control negotiations.

Now, to add further insult to injury, when the administration finished their negotiations in Geneva and these two protocols were signed by the White House and by the Russian leadership, by law and by the Constitution, the President is required to submit those changes to the treaty to the Senate, because constitutionally the Senate has the role of advise and consent.

Mr. Speaker, that was 3 years ago. For 3 years Senate leadership has been asking the administration to send those two protocols up so the Senate could debate them, and for 3 years the White House has refused to send those two items up. Why? Because they know they could not get them passed, because no Member of the Senate would have confidence in those two items that we negotiated based on the outline I have just provided to our colleagues, so for 3 years the Senate held those protocols back.

Quietly, in getting the Russians to approve START II, the administration gave a wink and a nod to Russia and said, look, instead of us bringing those demarcation items up and those protocols up separately, attach those to START II. So when the Russian Duma ratified the START II treaty three weeks ago, they did not just pass the START II treaty that our Senate ratified in 1993, they added those two protocols on to the START II ratification.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this President knows that this Senate will never approve START II with those two protocols included, so now we have a case where the START II treaty is in jeopardy, and it is in jeopardy again because of the underhanded and deceitful way in which the protocols were not brought before to the Senate or to the House, but rather, forced on the Russian side as a part of the START II final passage.

The President also knows that we have a law on the books that says the President cannot go below a certain threshold of strategic weapons unless

START II is fully ratified. START II is not fully ratified, Mr. Speaker, and this President cannot get START II fully ratified under the terms agreed to by the Russians. So if we cannot get START II ratified as agreed to by the Russian side, then how are we ever going to reach below that to a START III level? In fact, Mr. Speaker, in last year's defense bill, we also put a provision in that said, in Section 1201, that not later than September 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services in the Senate and the House, in consultation with the CIA, an assessment of the strategic balance between Russia and the U.S. based on decreasing numbers of strategic weapons.

Mr. Speaker, we have been informed by the Pentagon they have not even completed the assessment for this report. They have not even completed the assessment for the further reductions that would come under START III, and here is President Clinton telling the Pentagon, "Tell me how I can cut our strategic forces in one-half."

Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence. There is no confidence because last week when I heard the administration was proposing these changes, I went to see Majority Leader TRENT LOTT. I said, "Mr. Majority Leader, have you had any consultation with the White House on what is going to be discussed in Moscow in June?" He said "none."

I went to the Speaker, I went to the Majority Leader, I went to the Majority Whip. I went to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I went to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. I said to all of them, "Have you been briefed by this administration on what they are going to offer and negotiate with Russia at the summit in June?" They all said no.

So here we have an administration that has lost the confidence of this Congress on arms control agreements for all the reasons I documented, plus many more, now proposing a major announcement of a reduction with the Russians in Moscow in June. It is not that we do not want to work with the Russians to reduce arms. I want that, Mr. Speaker, and I work at that every day. But, Mr. Speaker, I want those negotiations based on candor, I want them based on fact, I want them based on what the Pentagon feels is within our best security limitations.

I do not want the President going off to Moscow to reverse the legacy of 7½ years of helping to cause Russia to become a failure, a basket case, where in 1992 young Russians were parading in Moscow streets waving American flags, and Boris Yeltsin's first speech was declaring a new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, and, 7 years later, in 1999, having 5,000 Russians stand in front of the American embassy

in Moscow throwing bricks and cans of paint at our embassy, and one of Boris Yeltsin's final speeches declaring a new strategic relationship between Russia and China with the U.S. as the enemy.

Now, we cannot blame all of that turnaround on Bill Clinton, but, Mr. Speaker, I can tell you that we have not done well with Russia over the last 8 years, and the level of confidence from both Russia and China is at an all time low. Our concern is that this President, in his rush to repair his tainted foreign policy image, may try to come out with some grandiose scheme that does two things: It puts a new face on the foreign policy legacy of Bill Clinton; and, secondary, it gives Al Gore, who has been trailing in the polls by about 8 or 9 points to Governor Bush, a political issue to run on through the November election.

Mr. Speaker, arms control negotiations with the Russians cannot be based on what is best for a presidential campaign, and they cannot be based on trying to recreate a legacy that does not exist when it comes to foreign policy issues.

Here is my greatest fear, Mr. Speaker; that the President, in a rush to accept the advice of some of his political advisers to have some newly negotiated level of reduction in arms with the Russians, may end up reaching an agreement that the Senate will never ratify, and, therefore, again we will let Russia down, and again the Russians will lose confidence, and they will think that we did it deliberately, that the President went over to Moscow to negotiate something, announced something was potent in front of the entire Duma and the entire country, and then America did not follow through. Why? Not because of any disagreement necessarily with Russia, but because this Congress has no confidence in this administration's arms control track record. In fact, it was not until last year that the administration began to finally impose some limited sanctions on Russian entities that we, in fact, knew were in violation of arms control agreements.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I want Russia to succeed, and I work at it every day. I want them to be a stable friend of ours. Calling violations of arms control agreements into question when Russian entities do things that are wrong is no different than when we accuse a company like Loral or Hughes or some other American firm of illegally selling technology in violation of those same agreements or our own laws. And what we did for 8 years was ignore the violations of Russian entities. We did it because I think we had a failed foreign policy of not wanting to embarrass Russia's leaders. Now we are paying the price for that.

We cannot let in the matter of the last 6 months of this administration a President who, in my opinion, is des-

perately trying to reverse what will be his legacy of a failed foreign policy, to announce some grandiose plan that is not based on substance and does not have bipartisan support.

Mr. Speaker, one month ago, Secretary Cohen called six of us from the House over to the Pentagon for a luncheon meeting, three Democrats, three Republicans, and the Secretary had all of his senior staff there, and we talked about where we should go with Russia.

I told the Secretary then our policy with Russia has got to be a bipartisan policy. This administration has lost the confidence of the Congress, and the only way this administration can have any hope of a successful new relationship is to bring in leaders of both parties.

I suggested to Secretary Cohen that he lead a bipartisan delegation to Moscow to meet with Putin's people, with Republicans and Democrats sitting together, to discuss a new relationship. What do we have a month later? This President, without any consultation with the Speaker, without any consultation with the Majority Leader, without any consultation with any Member of Congress, secretly proposing a new deal, one that he could stand up before the cameras, before the Duma, bite his lip and talk about a new relationship in America's and Russia's relations, when he knows full well this Congress just does not trust his ability to negotiate successful treaties that are in America's best interests.

If this President does not take those steps, then it is wrong for him to go to Moscow and lay out a scenario to the Russians that he knows full well this Congress will not support. He may try to give Al Gore a political campaign theme, but that is not going to work, Mr. Speaker, because we caught onto this act in advance.

That is why last week the White House was in a skirmish, because the cat got out of the bag. Members of Congress were aware that there were secret discussions taking place that were leading up to a major announcement by the President in Moscow that would shake America and shake Russia.

Now, Mr. Speaker, thank goodness our leadership has responded. Only Friday Majority Leader TRENT LOTT and Speaker DENNY HASTERT announced that they are forming a bipartisan coalition that will begin to assess our defense posture, but specifically what increased threats might come about by unilateral discussions in our strategic forces.

I called former CIA director, Jim Woolsey, on the phone last Thursday and said, "Director Woolsey, would you be willing to serve on such a panel?" He said "Absolutely." People of the caliber of Jim Woolsey and Don Rumsfeld are the kind of people that this Congress has confidence in. When Don

Rumsfeld and Jim Woolsey and the other seven Members of the Rumsfeld Commission came back to this Congress two years ago with a report that said the CIA was wrong, the administration was wrong, the threat to our security from countries like Iran and Iraq and China were closer than what they were originally stated to be, the Congress responded with overwhelming bipartisan support.

We now need those same bipartisan people, who are recognized experts on defense and strategic issues, to analyze what would happen if we, in fact, agreed in Moscow to lower the number of strategic weapons and what the onus would be on our side in terms of security risk, because there are many in this country who have argued that to go too low with strategic forces coequally be destabilizing.

So, Mr. Speaker, tonight I am asking our colleagues to begin to ask the questions before President Clinton goes to Moscow. The first question is, Mr. President, why have you not involved the Congress? If you want to succeed, Mr. President, do what we suggested to Secretary Cohen 5 weeks ago; bring a bipartisan delegation together, a delegation that you have called upon when you want support for your initiatives.

I can recall in each of the past 5 years, former administration official Howard Smith calling me each year to deliver Republican votes for the administration's cooperative threat reduction program, and each year we did that. The administration has had a policy of calling us when they want our support for their priorities, but ignoring us when they tread on such delicate issues as arms control treaties and relations.

Nothing could be more devastating to our relationship with Russia than to have a President of the United States go to Moscow, make a grand appearance before the Duma and announce some grand strategy, only to have the Senate say, "We don't agree, Mr. President. You went too far."

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Right now, that is the way the Senate feels about START II, Mr. Speaker. In the words of senators like JON KYL and JIM INHOFE, senators on both sides of the aisle have questioned the two protocols that were added to the START II treaty by the Russian side. This administration needs to clear up those two protocols before it attempts to negotiate further reductions in the START III process.

Mr. Speaker, in the end I want us to reach historic new levels in our relationship with the Russians, as Ronald Reagan and George Bush did; but Ronald Reagan and George Bush negotiated with Russia with three basic conditions in mind: Strength, consistency and candor.

For the last 7½ years, Mr. Speaker, we have not seen any of those three positions used in our negotiations with

Russia. We have wavered. We have ignored reality. We have pretended things are not what they are and we have allowed Russian entities to get away with deliberate violations of arms control treaties that have undermined the confidence of the Congress in terms of a new treaty we would enter into, and that is a real sorrowful situation.

So I would hope, Mr. Speaker, that this administration and the President and his team would reach out in the last 3 weeks before the Moscow trip to the Congress to bring in Republican and Democrat leaders, to have a full and open debate and dialogue about where we are going with Russia; not to do something in secret, not to have some grand announcement, where he attempts to capture the imagination of the American people to restore a failed foreign policy legacy and not to boost Al Gore's campaign and give him an edge on defense issues.

If the President does not do that, Mr. Speaker, then this Congress will not support anything that the President negotiates and, unfortunately, we will again create more of a lack of confidence on the Russian side as to what our intentions are in our relationship.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have encouraged the President to move away from the whole theory of mutually assured deterrence where we basically dare each other to attack and build up these large missiles to attack each other and move toward what I call asymmetric deterrence, where we continue to negotiate with the Russians decreases in our offensive weapons but begin to allow in those negotiations strategic defensive systems as well, so that we focus on defending our people as opposed to threatening to attack the other side.

Mr. Speaker, if this President wants to change the legacy that he has made for himself, the best thing he could do would be to go to Moscow with a bipartisan approach. In fact, I would go even one step further, Mr. Speaker. I would implore the President in this, an election year, to invite Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore in to let each of them share in any negotiation that takes place in Moscow, because President Clinton is not going to get anything ratified that he does in Moscow, number one, because of the legacy of the failed arms control practices of the past 7½ years but, two, just because of the time involved.

The President will go in June. We will be in session the rest of June and July. We will break in August, come back in September. No arms control agreement has ever been ratified that quickly by a Senate, and the President knows that. So he will not have to get the support of the Congress in the next session. It will be either Al Gore or George W. Bush.

So my advice to the President would be, bring in Republicans and Demo-

crats, Mr. Speaker; have an honest discussion with us about our approach with the Russians; clear up the START II treaty; get rid of those two protocols that were never a part of the START II treaty that the Senate ratified in 1993 and bring in George W. Bush along with Al Gore and involve both of them in any discussions with the Russians, because if the President does not, Mr. Speaker, if he does not do that then we could only read his intent as being purely political; purely political because the President knows that his only attempt would be to, one, change his own legacy and, two, bolster Al Gore's campaign and not to a sincere effort to get this country's legislative bodies to ratify a substantive agreement with Russia, because if that were the case the President would involve this Congress and he would involve George W. Bush in this process before he goes to Moscow.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleagues to convey their concerns, as I will be doing.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4425, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001

Mr. DREIER (during the special order of Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania), from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 106-618) on the resolution (H. Res. 502) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4425) making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001 and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN HERITAGE MONTH

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, a few years back I was privileged, along with my Asian Pacific colleagues on Capitol Hill, to attend a special White House ceremony where President Clinton signed an official proclamation declaring May, this month, as it is true each year, as National Asia Pacific Heritage Month.

Tomorrow, my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Guam (Mr. UNDERWOOD), who is currently the chairman of our Congressional Asian Pacific Caucus, along with our other colleagues, will hold a special order commemorating the month of May which honors Asian Pacific Americans.

I commend and thank the gentleman from Guam (Mr. UNDERWOOD) for his

strong leadership of the Congressional Asian Pacific Caucus, which he has brought to the forefront and addressed many of the critical issues facing our Nation.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I will not be able to participate in the special order tomorrow, as I have a prior commitment to give an Asian Pacific American Heritage Month speech at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and then at Fort Hood, Texas, this coming weekend.

On that note, Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where last week I delivered addresses to our service men and women at their Asia Pacific Heritage Month programs.

I certainly want to extend my deepest appreciation to Major General William Boykin of the U.S. Army Special Forces headquarters and Brigadier General Thomas Turner of the U.S. Army 82nd Airborne, both groups at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and also my good friend Major General James Peake, the commanding general at Fort Sam Houston, for their warm and gracious hospitality and the courtesies that were extended to me when I visited them earlier this month.

Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to be here tonight to share with our great Nation a legacy of those Americans whose roots extend from the soils of nations in the Asia and Pacific region. Mr. Speaker, the Asian Pacific region is a dynamic area of the world where two-thirds of the world's population reside. Our Nation's trade with the Asian Pacific region is almost twice of any other region, including Europe.

I recall Senator DANIEL INOUE of Hawaii once elaborated or illustrated our trade with the Asian Pacific region and Europe in this fashion, he once made the comment that for every one or single 747 that flies between the Atlantic and the East Coast of our Nation four 747s fly between the Asian and Pacific region to our country.

Asians, or Americans of Asian Pacific descent, over 10.5 million strong, are among the fastest growing demographic groups in the United States today. Over the last decade, the Asian Pacific American community has more than doubled and this rapid growth is expected to continue in the 21st century. By 2050 the Asian Pacific American population is projected to exceed 40 million people.

As many of my colleagues are aware, the immigrants of the Asian Pacific countries are amongst the newest wave to arrive in the United States in recent years. However, they are merely the latest chapter in a long history of Asian Pacific Americans in our Nation.

During this time of celebration, Mr. Speaker, it is only fitting that we honor our fellow citizens of Asian Pacific descent both from the past and the present that have blessed and enriched our Nation. I submit that Asian