

The bottom line is simple: either we pay for our share of nuclear test monitoring costs, or we delay significantly the work on a monitoring system that serves our own national security. If we want to catch any country that cheats and to expose that cheating, so that we can sanction a violator, then we must pay our bills.

Non-proliferation programs were not the only ones to be cut in this portion of the bill before us. The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and its Terrorist Interdiction program are vital to the security of United States diplomatic and military personnel overseas.

The first line of defense against attacks like those on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, is not ours. Rather, it is the security services of the host countries. All over the world, those countries need our assistance in border control and airport security. They need our training in spotting terrorist groups hiding behind legitimate charities, and in handling terrorist incidents—including future attacks that could use weapons of mass destruction. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program does all of this.

Right now, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program trains up to 2,000 people per year. There is so much demand for our training that we could help 3,000 a year, if only we had the funds and the facilities. An increase in training funds would make a real contribution to our security.

The State Department also runs a Terrorist Interdiction Program—known as TIP—that provides other countries the training and equipment needed for them to apprehend terrorists entering their countries. The TIP program enables countries to compare a person's travel documents to their own data-bases. It also works through INTERPOL to link these countries and promote information sharing. Finally, it trains immigration and customs workers in interview and screening techniques.

The State Department recently began a program to provide these important capabilities to Pakistan. We all know about Pakistan, the gateway to Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden and his buddies. Can anybody think of a better place to beef up border security, so that terrorists can be apprehended as they go to and from those Afghan training camps?

The first phase of the TIP program in Pakistan will be paid out of Fiscal Year 2000 funds. But the bill for the second phase will come due in Fiscal Year 2001. So will the first phase of a program in Kenya, which we know all too well has been used as a terrorist gateway to Africa, and site surveys in four more countries.

The proposed budget cut in the bill before us would force us to choose be-

tween Pakistan and Kenya. It is simply contrary to our national interest to force such a Hobson's choice.

These two anti-terrorist programs are utterly vital to our security. They make foreign security services more competent in protecting our own personnel, and they also foster ties that can be crucial in a crisis. We should be increasing these programs, and the President's proposed budget would do just that.

The bill before us would cut 22 percent of the funds requested. It would impose a 7-percent cut from this year's funding for these two anti-terrorist programs. This is simply unacceptable.

Finally, the Department of State's Small Arms program has underwritten successful arms buy-backs in Africa, notably in Mali. This is low-budget program is urgently needed in areas that are emerging from civil war and still awash in automatic weapons. A little bit of support can go a long way to drain the supply of arms that otherwise end up going to drug-runners, bandit gangs, or renewed civil strife.

The President proposed \$2 million for this program. The bill before us would slice away half of that. This is, indeed, a low-budget program, but \$2 million is really the floor for a workable program. To take away half of that is to throw this effort into the basement.

The bill before us, Mr. President, leaves the Senate in a nearly untenable position. It is under the budget request by fully \$1.7 billion. This is no way to fulfill our obligations to world organizations or to maintain either international influence or our own national security. We must accept that there is no such thing as world leadership on the cheap.

I deeply wish that I could restore the funds that this bill cuts from the NADR account. The truth is, however, that we must wait for conferees to break the ridiculous cap on this whole bill.

With that in mind, the amendment that I am introducing simply states the sense of the Senate that the conferees should find the funds needed to make NADR whole.

We have been through this drill before. In due course, more funds for foreign operations will be found. The crucial question is how the conferees will allocate those funds. This amendment calls on the conferees to give priority to these important national security efforts.

I am pleased to report that this amendment is co-sponsored by Senators LUGAR, HAGEL, BINGAMAN, CONRAD, DOMENICI and LEVIN. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

This amendment is not certain to succeed in conference—but it surely is the least we can do. The safety of our diplomats and military personnel overseas, and the safety of all of us from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demand no less.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Senate is now considering S. 2522, the foreign operations and export financing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2001.

The Senate bill provides \$13.4 billion in budget authority and \$4.5 billion in new outlays to operate the programs of the Department of State, export and military assistance, bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, and related agencies for fiscal year 2001.

When outlays from prior year budget authority and other completed actions are taken into account, the bill totals \$13.4 billion in budget authority and \$14.3 billion in outlays for fiscal year 2001.

The subcommittee is below its section 302(b) allocation for budget authority and at its section 302(b) allocation for outlays.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the budget committee scoring of this bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2522, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS, 2001:
SPENDING COMPARISONS—SENATE-REPORTED BILL

(Fiscal year 2001, dollars in millions)

	General purpose	Mandatory	Total
Senate-reported bill:			
Budget authority	13,384	44	13,428
Outlays	14,273	44	14,317
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget authority	13,385	44	13,429
Outlays	14,273	44	14,317
200 level:			
Budget authority	15,306	44	15,350
Outlays	13,527	44	13,571
President's request:			
Budget authority	15,097	44	15,141
Outlays	15,329	44	15,373
SENATE-REPORTED BILL COMPARED TO:			
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget authority	-1		-1
Outlays			
2000 level:			
Budget authority	-1,922		-1,922
Outlays	746		746
President's request:			
Budget authority	-1,713		-1,713
Outlays	-1,056		-1,056

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Totals adjusted for consistency with scorekeeping conventions. Prepared by SBC Majority Staff, May 18, 2000.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I urge adoption of this bill.

METHAMPHETAMINE LAB
CLEANUP/CHILD SOLDIERS

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I wanted to briefly discuss two important provisions regarding child soldiers and methamphetamine lab cleanup that are included in this supplemental spending package in the Foreign Operations bill before us.

Over the years, Iowa and many states in the Midwest, West and Southwest have been working hard to reduce the sale and abuse of methamphetamine. But meth has brought another problem that we must address: highly toxic labs that are abandoned and exposed to our communities.

We know that it can cost thousands of dollars to clean up a single lab. Fortunately, in recent years, the Drug Enforcement Agency has provided critical funds to help clean up these dangerous sites.

However, last year, the DEA funding was cut in half, despite evidence that more and more meth labs have been found and confiscated. Because of these cuts, in March, the DEA completely ran out of funding to provide meth lab cleanup assistance to state and local law enforcement.

Last month, the Administration shifted \$5 million in funds from other Department of Justice Accounts to pay for emergency meth lab cleanup. This action will help reimburse these states for the costs they have incurred since the DEA ran out of money. My state of Iowa has already paid some \$300,000 out of its own pocket for clean up since March.

However, we've got another five months to go before the new fiscal year—and the number of meth labs being found and confiscated is still on the rise.

The bill before us contains \$10 million I added in Committee to ensure that there will be enough money to pay for costly meth lab clean-up without forcing states to take money out of their other tight law enforcement budgets.

If we can find money to fight drugs in Columbia, we should be able to find money to fight drugs in our own backyard. We cannot risk exposing these dangerous meth labs to our communities.

Mr. President, the Appropriations Committee also adopted an amendment I offered to provide \$5 million provision in the Colombia package to address one of the most alarming aspects of the drug conflict in Colombia—the use of child soldiers.

Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 19,000 youths—some as young as eight—are being used by the Colombian armed forces, paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. Up to 50 percent of some paramilitary units and up to 80 percent of some guerrilla units are made up of children. Children are used as combatants, guides, and informants. They may be forced to collect intelligence, deploy land mines, and serve as advance shock forces in ambushes. Guerrillas often refer to them as “little bees,” because they sting before their targets realize they are under attack.

These children are forced to carry arms and are enticed by false promises or threats to their families. They are often tortured, drugged, sexually abused, and permanently traumatized by the horror and brutality of war. Children who are turned into soldiers lose their childhood.

They lose their innocence and their youth. They become instruments of de-

struction and atrocity. And the longer they remain under arms, the harder it is for them to heal and return to any semblance of a normal life.

Some of the funds included in the supplemental for Colombia are intended to support judicial reform, human rights protection and peace negotiations. Indeed, protecting human rights and rule of law is central to the overall success of Plan Colombia. The use of child soldiers is a serious human rights abuse prohibited by numerous international treaties and conventions, including ILO Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor—and by the Colombian government itself. The International Criminal Court makes the recruitment or use of children under age 15 in military activities a war crime. I can think of no better use for these funds than to assist the demobilization and rehabilitation of child soldiers.

The current generation of children in Colombia is the fourth generation to grow up surrounded by conflict. The \$5 million in the Human Rights part of the Colombia package will help some of Colombia's children regain their fundamental right to life and peace. The money will be used by NGOs working to provide humanitarian assistance to affected children and their families. These NGOs will support programs providing counseling, education and reintegration services to former child soldiers; safe houses for escaped child soldiers; and public awareness and recruitment-prevention campaigns. Although \$5 million represents less than one-third of 1 percent of the total supplemental funds for Colombia, this money may be the most well-spent of all.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, as a member for the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I've worked to enact foreign aid bills that reflect our national interests and our values. While I support the FY2001 foreign operations appropriations bill, I do have some serious concerns that I hope will be addressed during conference.

I am pleased that the foreign operations bill provides assistance to Israel, Cyprus and Armenia. I believe that its important that we stand by these friends as they make the difficult steps toward peace. I am also pleased that we support bilateral population assistance and support for micro-enterprise programs. These programs are vital in helping the world's poorest people to help themselves.

I am disappointed that the bill does not provide sufficient assistance in other crucial areas, such as adequate flood relief assistance to Mozambique and the Administration's full funding request for debt relief.

In addition, although I am pleased with the human rights requirements included in the Colombia aid package attached to this legislation, I have

grave reservations about the large military aid package to Colombia.

Colombia has been suffering through a civil war for over thirty years. Over 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. In recent years, this civil war has been exacerbated by the illegal production and trade of drugs coming out of Colombia—primarily cocaine and heroin. Most of these drugs wind up in the United States and contribute to America's growing drug problem. It is clear that the United States has to help Colombia deal with this volatile situation.

It is also clear that we have to do more to stop the growing demand and dependence on drugs in our own country. In my own hometown of Baltimore—out of a population of 600,000—60,000 people are addicted to heroin or cocaine. These individuals not only wreck their own lives but they also have left a horrible mark on the city—drug-related crimes are now at \$2 to \$3 billion a year. Drugs destroy individuals, families and communities. That's why I've always fought for anti-drug education, increased drug treatment programs and strong law enforcement.

I am not convinced that the military aid provided to Colombia included in this bill is the best way to fight drugs in the United States.

First of all, I'm concerned that we're getting dragged into the middle of a civil war. I am also concerned that there is no clear exit strategy. The aid package is open-ended. The Administration has admitted that this “two-year” package is really expected to run longer—more like five or six years. An open-ended commitment could turn into a quagmire.

I believe the best way to help Colombia is by supporting its peace process through a balanced aid package. The package before us is not at all balanced. Over 75% of this package is in military arms, equipment and training. Only a small fraction of the aid helps to fund economic alternatives to drug production, to assist the large number of civilians who will be displaced by this assistance or to address the deeper social problems that have led to Colombia's increasing reliance on drug production and cultivation in the first place.

These funds would be better spent combating the drug problem in the United States. More funding and support is badly needed for drug treatment and prevention programs in our own country. That is why I supported Senator WELLSTONE's amendment to reduce the military aid provided to Colombia and re-direct that funding to domestic substance abuse programs—in particular to vital state and local community based programs—that are in desperate need of funding. I regret that this amendment did not pass.

Although I regret that such a large percentage of our assistance to Colombia is in military aid, I am pleased that

strong human rights requirements must be met by Colombia's Government and Armed Forces before this aid is dispensed. President Pastrana has taken important steps to improve the human rights situation in Colombia by disciplining army officials who have committed human rights violations. Nonetheless, it is a well-known and well-documented fact that members of Colombia's Armed Forces continue to be linked to paramilitary groups that commit these violent acts.

The human rights requirements in this legislation helps to address this continuing problem. For example, under this legislation, the head of Colombia's Armed Forces must suspend personnel alleged to have committed gross human rights violations or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups. It also requires the Colombian Government to prosecute leaders and members of paramilitary groups as well as military personnel who aid or abet paramilitary groups. Before U.S. military aid can be dispensed to Colombia, the U.S. Secretary of State must certify that these human rights conditions have been met. By enforcing these conditions, I believe that the Colombian Government—with U.S. support—might achieve real progress on Colombia's path to peace.

I urge that Congress maintain the strong human rights requirements in this legislation. Without such checks in providing assistance to Colombia, we run the risk of further exacerbating Colombia's civil war. We must also monitor the impact this assistance will have on reducing drug production in Colombia and drug supply in the United States. By keeping this goal in mind, we can evaluate and devise the best method for combating the war against drugs in the United States which, after all, is the ultimate aim of this aid.

As the strongest nation on earth, and the world's strongest democracy, our foreign aid must be used to promote peace, stability and human rights. As a member of the Foreign Operations Conference Committee, I will work to ensure that the final legislation supports these goals and represents our national interests and our values.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I think that a brief chronology of events regarding U.S. efforts to provide assistance to Colombia would be instructive. For years, the Administration has neglected the growing narcotics crisis in the Andean Region. Funding for international interdiction declined rapidly under the Clinton Administration. For example, international counter-narcotic funding dropped 56% from 1992 to 1996. Also Department of Defense air assets for counter-narcotics were slashed 68% from 1992–1999. As a result, drug production abroad and drug usage at home increased dramatically. The statistics are devastating. From 1992 to

1999, for example, cocaine use among 10th graders increased 133%

Republicans have long argued for a restoration of balance in the U.S. counter-drug strategy: the 1980s showed that eradicating and interdicting illegal drugs outside our borders is a necessary part of a successful drug strategy that also includes strong investments in demand reduction and domestic law enforcement.

The Colombia crisis emerged as an international crisis last spring, 1999. I had the opportunity to travel to Colombia in August of 1999 to see the drug-fueled crisis first-hand. Upon my return, Senator DEWINE, Senator GRASSLEY and I introduced an assistance package, the Alianza Act, in October of 1999. The Alianza Act authorized \$1.6 billion over 3 years to support anti-drug efforts, the rule of law, human rights, and the peace process in Colombia and neighboring countries. This was, in my view, a balanced and comprehensive approach to the crisis in Colombia.

Unfortunately, the Administration was nowhere to be seen. Except for several Administration envoys who arrived to Bogota empty-handed, the White House did little. Finally, after months of delay, in January 2000 the White House announced a response to Plan Colombia, though failed to provide details until early February. The Administration plan largely mirrored the Alianza Act, though fell short in two critical areas; it failed to take a truly regional approach by providing sufficient funds for other countries in the Andean region and it also failed to adequately provide for our front-line law enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service and the Coast Guard.

In March, the House passed a \$13 billion Supplemental Package, which included \$1.7 for Colombia. The Colombia portion is a good bill that rectifies many of the shortcomings in the Administration's proposal. Then in May, the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its bill, which included almost \$1 billion for Colombia (the Milcon Appropriations Subcommittee also marked up more than \$300 million for Colombia as well).

I strongly urge passage of this assistance. There is no doubt that the crisis in Colombia is an emergency that directly affects our national security and threatens to destabilize the entire Andean region. While we may not all agree on every detail of this package, immediate passage of counter-narcotics assistance is crucial to reduce the flow of drugs onto our streets and to bring stability to the Andean Region. It's time to realize that the emergency in Colombia threatens an important source of U.S. oil, continues to fuel the flood of illegal drugs entering America's streets, and endangers our hemisphere's common march toward democracy and free enterprise.

Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. REED. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BYRD. I have an amendment on the list. I would like to call this amendment up tomorrow. I ask unanimous consent that I may be authorized to call up one of my amendments on the list tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the underlying legislation that would provide support for the country of Colombia to fight the drug problem which not only involves Colombia but involves the United States very decisively and directly.

I commend Senators MCCONNELL and colleagues who drafted this legislative vehicle to assist Colombia.

Part of my discussion tonight is based upon a trip last weekend that I took with Senator DURBIN to Colombia. We had the opportunity to travel to Cartagena to meet with President Pastrana and his key national security advisers. We also traveled to Bogota to meet with the Defense Minister and the chairman of their joint chiefs of staff.

But I think much more importantly, we traveled out to where the military forces are being deployed to counteract this drug problem, to the town of Laramia. It is not really a town, it is a base camp. It is a forward post for the Colombians to conduct these counterdrug operations.

One of the first impressions you get when you go to Colombia and leaf through the materials provided by the Embassy is that this country has a long history of violence—or, as the Colombians say, *La Violencia*.

In fact, according to the Embassy, there is one kidnapping every 5 hours in Colombia. And 75 percent of the world's reported kidnappings occur in Colombia. The Embassy points out that Bogota is the murder capital of the world. In a city of 7 million people, there are 16 murders a day and 6,000 murders a year.

This is a country that has been wracked by political and criminal violence for many decades. The political violence began with some presence back in 1940s when elements of what later became the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party literally battled for control of the country. This lasted until 1957, when both parties agreed to form a national front.

Then there was a period from 1958 until 1974 in which both parties literally transferred power each 4 years from one president to another, and there was a semblance of stability in the country. But certainly by the 1960s, there was renewed agitation by guerrilla forces, principally Marxist and Leninist forces—the whole spectrum—the two principals being *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or

FARC, and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, or ELN.

These forces, spurred on by the success of Castro in Cuba, made significant inroads in terms of establishing independent zones along with agitators who also fought for agrarian rights in the countryside.

In the 1960s, the Colombian military conducted a serious counterinsurgency operation. They were able to eliminate these zones. But in that time, they won for themselves the infamous designation of being significant abusers of human rights. That reputation—both the perception and, unfortunately, reality—continues in the Colombian military today.

But by the end of the 1960s and the 1970s, they had effectively pushed the insurgency away from the populated centers of Colombia—which are the coastline and the Andean plains—into the jungles of the Amazon, in an area which is desolate, unpopulated, and, frankly, beyond the effective control of authorities in Bogota and elsewhere in Colombia.

But in the 1970s, the drug trade began to assert itself into the life of Colombians, first with the cultivation of marijuana. It took the Colombian police authority a while to recognize the threat to them as well as to others from this cultivation.

Recognizing the problem, they began to organize themselves to conduct counterdrug operations in the police force—not the military.

Then, as we all know, marijuana was rapidly displaced in the world drug market by cocaine. The cocaine trade became a curse for Colombia.

Within Colombia infrastructure, the leadership of several major organizations—the Cali cartel, the Medellin cartel and others—set up their headquarters in Colombia and began to run worldwide operations. Most of the production was done outside in the surrounding Andean country. This map is a recent example of cultivation areas—the cultivation areas in Peru, Bolivia, which have been very successful with eradication, and here is Colombia. Cultivation was typically outside Colombia. Within Colombia, they located clandestine laboratories to convert the coca leaf into cocaine base and later cocaine. From the 1970s and through the 1980s, there was a fabulously powerful and wealthy criminal combination that was destabilizing Colombia.

The United States did not stand aside when this situation developed. The United States supported the Colombian police and insisted that the Colombian police reform themselves and throw out those who had been corrupted by the narcotraffickers. With cooperation, and with the leadership of the Colombian police and with the bravery and the sacrifice of scores of Colombian police officers, the Cali cartel was disrupted and the Medellin cartel was dis-

rupted. The leaders of the cartels literally died in police shootouts.

We have a situation, where through support by the United States and the police forces of Colombia, we defeated a drug combination that was threatening the United States by importing vast amounts of cocaine into the United States.

Now there is a new situation and a new crisis. The new crisis is the result of two things: the collision of cocaine cultivation, coca cultivation, and these remnants of a political insurgency that has been ongoing in Colombia for decades. The FARC and other revolutionary units are in the hinterland. What has arrived recently has been the cultivation of coca. As a result, the FARC—and its other guerrilla forces—has been enlisted in the support and protection of these coca fields. They are deriving great resources in doing that. They are deriving resources to support their political activities.

Coca production now has been linked with armed military forces. The police are no longer capable with their equipment and their technology to deal with this. This has become a military problem. As a result, we are in a military problem that requires military support of the United States, just as it required police support in the 1980s and the early 1990s.

Part of the reason the cultivation has come to Colombia is the fact that we have been successful. As an indication of our success, Colombian production has surged dramatically. It has surged where in other places the production has been cut back. Both in Bolivia and in Peru, we have made significant progress—again, working with local authorities, working with their counternarcotics organizations—and we have been able to suppress the cultivation of coca. What has been suppressed in Peru and Bolivia has now blossomed in the southern provinces of Colombia. Again, this combination of coca production and guerrillas has produced a military crisis as well as a drug crisis.

I have heard colleagues come to the floor and talk about the situation, saying: This is Colombia's problem, not our problem.

Mr. President, the streets of America are also the battlegrounds for this problem because the final impact of cocaine is felt—as too many Americans are subject to the ravages of cocaine addiction.

This chart demonstrates what we are talking about. As I mentioned before, Peru has shown a 27-percent reduction in cultivation; Bolivia, a 53-percent reduction in cultivation; Colombia, production has increased and will increase unabated unless we do something.

The bottom line is, from all these sources, but increasingly from Colombia, 512 metric tons a year of cocaine is directed to the United States. About

380 metric tons arrive, get through our border checkpoints, get around our intense efforts to stop it, and hit the streets of America.

In a real sense, Colombia's problem is our problem and our problem is Colombia's problem. It is the huge demand of the United States which is causing some of this instability in Colombia. So we have a rather strong national security interest in assisting Colombian forces to do the job we insist they do, which is to stop cocaine production and distribution emanating from Colombia. It is important to note we have a situation where we want to ensure that the Colombian forces help us by curtailing supply, so it does not arrive on the streets of America.

The proposal that is included in the legislation before the Senate, Plan Colombia, has been carefully worked out. Its focus is counternarcotics—not the political insurgencies that have washed back and forth across Colombia for decades. It represents the recognition by our Government and the Government of Colombia, first, that there is a significant problem in Colombia that directly affects the tranquility of peace and the security of the United States. Second, I believe it also recognizes the competence of the Colombian authorities to fight the good fight.

Again, as I indicated, it was Colombian police officials working with the United States and other international narcotics control officers that went a long way to destroy the Cali cartel and the Medellin cartel. Now this is a new phase. It is no longer simply criminal syndicates operating in the cities of Colombia. It is a situation where guerrilla forces are protecting and profiting from the cultivation of coca in the hinterlands of Colombia.

Mr. President, as I mentioned, Plan Colombia is a reaction to the recognition of a crisis. It is also proposed as a result of the confidence that has been demonstrated in the Government of Colombia, their sincere dedication to try to eradicate their own problem with drug cultivation, and also it represents, I think, and based upon my trip, a sense of a reasonable prospect for success because of their commitment and also because of the nature of the problem we face.

Plan Colombia has many different aspects. First, it focuses on not only military operations. It focuses on the peace process, which is ongoing in Colombia today. President Pastrana, when he was elected, was elected on a plank that called for sincere and serious negotiations with the guerrilla forces. He has instituted such negotiations. In fact, what has happened in Colombia is that he had dedicated an area, approximately outlined by this blue, in the hinterlands of Colombia, which is a DMZ area, controlled by FARC, the principle guerrilla group. This peace process is important.

This plan is also an attempt to provide alternate development efforts for the peasants and the cultivators in a region where coca was being cultivated. This plan calls not only for military operations but also calls for heightened sensitivity to peace, a commitment and a contribution to economic development. The United States share is just a fraction of what the Colombian Government has committed to this effort for economic development and for ways to have alternatives to the coca cultivation.

Also, and quite rightly, the plan calls for reform of the justice system and protection of human rights, because, frankly, one of the most feeble institutions within Colombia, and this accounts for many of their problems, is the justice system and the penal system that is not responsive to efficient, fair, and appropriate justice. Here, too, Plan Colombia, will call for a reform and renewal of those institutions, which are so important.

Then part of it, of course, is a military component. Without security in these areas, in these areas we have talked about—without security in these areas, there will be no way in which we can effectively conduct—“we,” meaning the Government of Colombia and its international partners—can conduct the kind of economic development and alternative development that is necessary for long-term stability.

Here is another map that focuses clearly on Colombia alone. Here are the regions where the production is significant, Putumayo and Caqueta, these provinces. Here in the pink is the zone controlled by FARC. You can see it really is in between major production areas.

In order to get into these areas, in order to provide the kind of economic development that is necessary, there has to be, first, security, and, because of the nature of the armed combatants in the area, that calls for military assistance.

This is a big part but not the only part of Plan Colombia. Within the context of Plan Colombia, there are basically two significant components militarily: first, the training of counter-narcotics troops, and, second, the provision of helicopters for their mobility, because without helicopters you really cannot be effective in this region.

The training has already been finished for the 1st Battalion and they are in Tres Esquinas. The second is up here in Larandia. They are awaiting our approval so American special forces troops can conduct the training. Without helicopters, however, none of these trained troops can effectively get to where the cultivation is taking place, where the clandestine laboratories are located, where they must go in order to upset and defeat the drug lords in this part of Colombia. So it is very critical

we move today with dispatch with this legislation, and move forward to allow the military plan to go forward as well as to provide the basis for later alternative development.

Many legitimate concerns have been raised with respect to the program that is being presented within this legislation. First of significance, one we should all be very concerned about, is human rights. There is no way we want to be involved in an operation that is not going to emphasize the appropriate treatment of human rights, not only because that is the right thing to do but because in the long run that is the most effective way to win away any type of support for drug eradication and to build respect for the legitimate institutions of government in Colombia.

We are aided in this effort by provisions that already have been included under the direction of Senator LEAHY. Essentially, under the Leahy provisions, units that receive assistance and training from the United States cannot receive that training unless an individual who faces any type of credible human rights violation has either been removed or appropriate justice has been rendered to that individual. In a practical sense, this means all the troops who are going to be trained are vetted for human rights abuses. And all of them must pass.

Also, the Minister of Defense of Colombia must, every 6 months, report on the process of bringing to justice those individuals who have been accused of human rights violations. As of today, both of the counter-narcotics battalions have been vetted—the 1st Battalion and the 2nd Battalion. Also, other units of the Colombian Army have been vetted. In order to receive our training, these units must receive this vetting. And it has already had a positive effect. But rest assured, this is a constant struggle and we must insist and ensure that this human rights perspective is one that is not lost in our efforts to aid Colombia.

There is another point that I think is important to make. There have been many suggestions that the greatest human rights violation that the Colombian Army engages in is passive and active cooperation with armed militias, self-defense forces, or paramilitaries as they are called—the perception that they are really in cahoots with vigilante groups that are out to destroy not only leftist rebels, but anyone who seeks to express themselves or ask for their rights in Colombia. That has been the history. But at least on the surface, things are changing.

One example of that is this particular section of last week's major paper in Bogota, Colombia. This is an advertisement that was taken out by the military. Essentially it says that 785 families will not celebrate Father's Day.

Then it lists the victims of the violence in Colombia. But I think it is significant to note that they clearly point out the violence that is the result of guerrilla, leftist activity, and the violence that is the result of what they determine are “autodefensas,” militias, self-defense forces. This is a result, I believe, also based on my conversations, that the military authorities in Colombia are getting the message. They are getting the message that there is no way we will tolerate alliances with paramilitary forces who are trying to subvert our emphasis on human rights. I think this is discouraging, in the sense that it is a horrible litany of lost souls, but it is also important to note that at least the military is trying to address the issue in an evenhanded way, the violence that both sides are doing to the fabric of peace in Colombia.

There is a situation here on human rights which is serious and in which the military is, for the first time I believe, taking this responsibility very seriously. There has been vetting of these military units. We are objecting to any type of training that would go to units containing individuals who have serious human rights violations.

There is also a high level of support for the effort to improve the human rights position in the Colombian Army, both the Defense Minister, General Tapias, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the tactical level in Tres Esquinas, General Montoya. These individuals recognize that the continued cooperation and collaboration with the United States rests upon sincere and effective efforts to provide effective human rights training and effective human rights behavior in the Colombian military.

There is another aspect of concern that has been raised by some of my colleagues with respect to operations in Colombia, and that is the perception that the elites of Colombia are not actively involved in this struggle. It is most significantly reflected in constitutional provisions that prevent graduates of high school from being sent into combat, where nongraduates can be drafted and sent into combat. This is an issue which is both symbolic and substantive, too.

Our discussions with the Minister of Defense suggest they are also recognizing this issue; that they are consciously moving to professionalize their force by replacing draftees with professional soldiers; and they are also proposing, according to the Defense Minister, legislation within this session of the Colombian Congress that will attempt to prevent this discrimination in favor of high school graduates and against non-high school graduates. It does represent, once again, a perception on the part of the Colombian authorities that they must not only protect human rights, but

they must be fully committed to this struggle in order to receive the support of the United States.

There is another criticism that has been lodged by some of my colleagues, and that is that this is just another entre into an unwinnable military quagmire, like Vietnam. There are many lessons to be drawn from Vietnam. One lesson is that we cannot fight and should not fight someone else's battle if they do not have the will to do it themselves.

In this particular situation, Colombia is unlike Vietnam because the Colombian forces are asking for our help in terms of training, in terms of equipment, but not our troops. They recognize they must do that themselves. Also, their history suggests they have in the past done precisely that. They wanted our training for their police, equipment for their police, intelligence reports for their police, but they went after the cartels themselves. It was their responsibility. They carried it out successfully.

The other difference between Vietnam and the situation in Colombia is that our focus is on drugs. Our focus is on supporting Colombian military authorities to provide the security so that police authorities can destroy labs and destroy coca fields. That is a lot different from trying to win the hearts and minds, to win the political allegiance of a population, as we were by default forced to attempt in Vietnam.

Winning the political allegiance of the people of Colombia is strictly and only the function and responsibility of the Colombian Government. That is why President Pastrana's peace plan represents a sincere effort to do just that. It is their plan, their peace plan. Our effort should rightfully be restricted, and is restricted, to the war on drugs.

Our role is also limited operationally because, as I mentioned before, we are providing equipment, we are providing trainers, and we are providing intelligence, but intelligence related only to counternarcotics operations. Again, this is very similar to what we did with the Colombian national police in their successful effort to destroy the cartel.

One cannot totally dismiss history. I believe we have to be very careful and cautious so that these steps—appropriate steps and limited steps—do not lead to something more. Part of this debate then should be to not only reassure the American public that what we are doing is appropriate, but also that we will continue to be vigilant so that any commitment we make to Colombia will be limited and will strictly be a function of their capacity and their willingness to fight their own fight and not unwittingly involve Americans directly in that fight.

There are some other differences between Colombia and those who suggest the Vietnam analogy. First of all, this

is an insurgency without any significant foreign support. With the demise of Castro as a potent revolutionary force in Latin America, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this is not a situation where there are indigenous forces supported by outside powers. In fact, the support the guerrillas on the left and the paramilitary on the right are deriving is from their participation in the drug trade. There is no great popular support abroad for the leftist or for the rightist forces who are guerrillas or paramilitaries. Public opinion polls suggest they have very limited appeal.

Colombia is a country with strong democratic traditions. It has regular elections. Power transfers peacefully. It is a market economy, until recently a market economy that did very well. For all these reasons, I think again we should be watchful, but the analogy to Vietnam at this juncture fails.

Let's also look ahead. There are consequences to our operations in Colombia. First of all, if there is success in Colombia, we should not be surprised that the level of violence will increase because these guerrillas and paramilitary forces depend upon support from somewhere. If they cannot sell drugs—we hope they will not be able to sell drugs—they will return to their old ways—kidnapping, extortion, et cetera. We have to recognize, ironically, if the drug war is successful, we must see escalating levels of violence.

The Colombians recognize that, but they are still willing to pay the price, fight the fight, and destroy narcotics. We have to recognize the armed opponents, FARC and others, are well off. They will resist probably, and they will resist with sophisticated weapons and technology they have acquired through their contributions to their drug tactics.

There is another consequence that might develop if this plan is approved and funds provided to Colombia. That is, if these guerrilla and paramilitary units are deprived of their resources from the drug trade to continue their operations, there will, I think, be more pressure for the peace settlement, more willingness on the part of these combatants to come to the table and try to work out an arrangement so that decisions in Colombia are decided peacefully and not through armed conflict, as it has been so long and so often in that country.

There is another aspect, of course, that would be very helpful to the peace settlements there, and that would be whether the United States could suppress its voracious appetite for cocaine. That would go a long way to assist Colombia in being a more peaceful and tranquil society.

So all of our efforts, not only to disrupt production in Colombia and elsewhere, but also to suppress demand here in the United States would, I think, be helpful.

But this particular plan, if it works—and there is a reasonable probability that it will work—could materially and, I hope, effectively lead to sincere and renewed peace discussions within Colombia.

There is also a consequence for failure if we fail to approve the resources or if the plan fails for other reasons. At least one result would be that President Pastrana, and his government, in the middle of the process, would likely also fail. That could lead to several consequences.

First, he could be replaced by someone who is less amenable to the peace process. Given the tides of violence in Colombia, there could be a resurgence or the surfacing of an authoritarian figure who would be much less sensitive to the peace process.

Another possibility would be a recurrence of what happened in a previous administration under President Samper, where, effectively, the President of Colombia was subverted by narcotraffickers, by drug money, and the country was close to falling under the sway of narcotics dealers rather than the elected representatives of the people of Colombia. So there are consequences with which we must wrestle.

All in all, our most promising option is to support this bill and support Plan Colombia. To do nothing renders a severe psychological blow to the people of Colombia and to the administration of President Pastrana, who is committed not only to fighting the drug war, but also waging a peace process in negotiations with the insurgents.

I think we ultimately have to conclude that our best course of action is to provide the kind of support that is outlined in this legislation, support that goes to the military aspects that have been created by the collision of the cocaine cultivation in the hinterlands, where armed bands roam and derive profit from coca production, together with a balanced approach that emphasizes economic development, particularly alternative development for the campesinos, the peasants, that strengthens the governance of Colombia, with particular emphasis on the judicial system and the penal system.

This comprehensive approach, representing about \$1.6 billion in American resources, about \$4 billion of Colombian resources, and hopefully contributions from other countries around the world, is, I believe, at this point the best hope of significantly undercutting drug production in Colombia, reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States, making our streets safer, and giving Colombia a chance to move to a peaceful, stable, civil society, which has alluded them for many years.

With that, Mr. President, I conclude my remarks.