The bottom line is simple: either we pay for our share of nuclear test monitoring costs, or we delay significantly the work on a monitoring system that serves our own national security. If we want to catch any country that cheats and to expose that cheating, so that we can sanction a violator, then we must pay our bills.

Non-proliferation programs were not the only ones to be cut in this portion of the bill before us. The Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and its Terrorist Interdiction program are vital to the security of United States diplomatic and military personnel overseas.

The first line of defense against attacks like those on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the Khoobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, is not ours, Pakistan, it is the security of the host countries. All over the world, those countries need our assistance in border control and airport security. They need our training in spotting terrorist groups hiding behind legitimate charities, and in handling terrorist incidents—including future attacks that could use weapons of mass destruction. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program does all of this.

Right now, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program trains up to 2,000 people per year. There is so much demand for our training that we could help 3,000 a year, if only we had the funds and the facilities. An increase in training funds would make a real contribution to our security.

The State Department also runs a Terrorist Interdiction Program—known as TIP—that provides other countries the training and equipment needed for them to apprehend terrorists entering their countries. The TIP program trains countries to compare a person’s travel documents to their own data-bases. It also works through INTERPOL to link these countries and promote information sharing. Finally, it trains immigration and customs workers in interview and screening techniques.

The State Department recently began a program to provide these important capabilities to Pakistan. We all know about Pakistan, the gateway to Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and his buddies. Can anybody think of a better place to beef up border security, so that terrorists can be apprehended as they go to and from those Afghan training camps?

The first phase of the TIP program in Pakistan will be paid out of Fiscal Year 2000 funds. But the bill for the second phase will come due in Fiscal Year 2001. So will the first phase of a program in Kenya, which we know all too well was used as a terrorist gateway to Africa, and site surveys in four more countries.

The proposed budget cut in the bill before us would force us to choose between Pakistan and Kenya. It is simply contrary to our national interest to force such hard choices.

These two anti-terrorist programs are utterly vital to our security. They make foreign security services more competent in protecting our own personnel, and they also foster ties that can be crucial in crises. We should be increasing these programs, and the President’s proposed budget would do just that.

The bill before us would cut 22 percent of the funds requested. It would impose a 7-percent cut from this year’s funding for these two anti-terrorist programs. This is simply unacceptable.

Finally, the Department of State’s Small Arms program has underwritten successful arms buy-backs in Africa, notably in Mali. This is low-budget program is urgently needed in areas that are emerging from civil war and still awash in automatic weapons. A little bit of support can go a long way to drain the terrorist arsenals that otherwise end up going to drug-runners, bandits, or renewed civil strife.

The President proposed $2 million for this program. The bill before us would slice away half of that. This is, indeed, a low-budget program, but $2 million is really the floor for a workable program. To take away half of that is to throw this effort into the basement.

The bill before us, Mr. President, leaves the Senate in a nearly untenable position. It is under the budget request by fully $1.7 billion. This is no way to fulfill our obligations to world organizations or to maintain either international influence or our own national security. We must accept that there is no such thing as world leadership on the cheap.

I deeply wish that I could restore the funds that this bill cuts from the NADR account. The truth is, however, that we must wait for conferences to break the ridiculous cap on this whole bill.

With that in mind, the amendment that I am introducing simply states the sense of the Senate that the conferences should find the funds needed to make NADR whole.

We have been through this drill before. In due course, more funds for foreign operations will be found. The crucial question is how the conferences will allocate those funds. This amendment calls on the conferences to give priority to these important national security efforts.

I am pleased to report that this amendment is co-sponsored by Senators LUGAR, HAGEL, BINGAMAN, CONRAD, DOMENICI and LEVIN. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

This amendment is not certain to succeed in conference—but it surely is the least we can do. The safety of our diplomats and military personnel overseas, and the safety of all of us from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demand no less.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Senate is now considering S. 2522, the foreign operations and export financing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2001.

The Senate bill provides $15.4 billion in budget authority and $4.5 billion in new outlays to operate the programs of the Department of State, export and military assistance, bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, and related agencies for fiscal year 2001.

When outlays from prior year budget authority and other completed actions are taken into account, the bill totals $13.4 billion in budget authority and $12.9 billion in outlays for fiscal year 2001.

The subcommittee is below its section 302(b) allocation for budget authority and at its section 302(b) allocation for outlays.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the budget committee scoring of this bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2522, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS, 2001:
SPENDING COMPARISONS—SENATE-REPORTED BILL
(Fiscal year 2001, dollars in millions)

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Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Totals adjusted for consistency with scorekeeping conventions. Prepared by SBC Majority Staff, May 16, 2000.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I urge adoption of this bill.

METHAMPHETAMINE LAB CLEANUP/CHILD SOLDIERS

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I wanted to briefly discuss two important provisions regarding child soldiers and methamphetamine lab cleanup that are included in this supplemental spending package in the Foreign Operations bill before us.

Over the years, Iowa and many states in the Midwest, West and Southwest have been working hard to reduce the sale and abuse of methamphetamine. But meth has brought another problem that we must address: highly toxic labs that are abandoned and exposed to our communities.
We know that it can cost thousands of dollars to clean up a single lab. Fortunately, in recent years, the Drug Enforcement Agency has provided critical funds to help clean up these dangerous sites.

However, last year, the DEA funding was cut in half, despite evidence that more and more meth labs have been found and confiscated. Because of these cuts, in March, the DEA completely ran out of funding to provide meth lab cleanup assistance to state and local law enforcement.

Last month, the Administration shifted $5 million in funds from other Department of Justice Accounts to pay for emergency meth lab cleanup. This action will help reimburse these states for the costs they have incurred since the DEA ran out of money. My state of Iowa has already paid some $500,000 out of its own pocket for clean up since March.

However, we've got another five months to go before the new fiscal year—and the number of meth labs being found and confiscated is still on the rise.

The bill before us contains $10 million I added in Committee to ensure that there will be enough money to pay for costly meth lab clean-up without forcing states to take money out of their other tight law enforcement budgets.

If we can find money to fight drugs in Colombia, we should be able to find money to fight drugs in our own backyard. We cannot risk exposing these dangerous meth labs to our communities.

Mr. President, the Appropriations Committee also adopted an amendment I offered to provide $5 million provision in the Colombia package to address one of the most troubling aspects of the drug conflict in Colombia—the use of child soldiers.

Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 19,000 youths—some as young as eight—are being used by the Colombian armed forces, paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. Up to 50 percent of some paramilitary and up to 80 percent of some guerrilla units are made up of children. Children are used as combatants, guides, and information collectors for the military and intelligence services. They are forced to carry arms and are enticed by false promises of personal safety and a semblance of a normal life.

I am disappointed that the bill does not provide sufficient assistance in other crucial areas, such as adequate flood relief assistance to Mozambique and the Administration’s full funding request for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS.

In addition, although I am pleased with the human rights requirements included in the Colombia aid package attached to this legislation, I have grave reservations about the large military aid package to Colombia.

Colombia has been involved in a civil war for over thirty years. Over 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. In recent years, this civil war has been exacerbated by the illegal production and trade of drugs coming out of Colombia. More than 75% of this production is cocaine and heroin. Most of these drugs wind up in the United States and contribute to America’s growing drug problem. It is clear that the United States has to help Colombia deal with this volatile situation.

It is also clear that we have to do more to stop the growing demand and dependence on drugs in our own country. In my own hometown of Baltimore—out of a population of 600,000—60,000 people are addicted to heroin or cocaine. These individuals not only wreck their own lives but they also have left a horrible mark on the city—drug-related crimes are now at $2 to $3 billion a year. Drugs destroy individual lives and families and do not provide sufficient assistance in vital state and local community based programs—that are in particular to vital state and local domestic substance abuse programs—in particular to vital state and local community based programs—that are in desperate need of funding. I regret that this amendment did not pass.

I believe the best way to help Colombia is by supporting its peace process through a balanced aid package. The package before us is not at all balanced. Over 75% of this aid is military arms, equipment and training. Only a small fraction of the aid helps to fund economic alternatives to drug production, to assist the large number of civilians who will be displaced by this assistance or to address the deeper social problems that have led to Colombia’s increasing reliance on drug production and cultivation in the first place.

These funds would be better spent combating the drug problem in the United States. More funding and support is badly needed for drug treatment programs in our own country. That is why I supported Senator WELLSTONE’s amendment to reduce the military aid included in this package and re-direct that funding to domestic substance abuse programs—in particular to vital state and local community based programs—that are in desperate need of funding. I regret that this amendment did not pass.

Although I regret that such a large percentage of our assistance to Colombia is in military aid, I am pleased that...
Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. REED. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BYRD. I have an amendment on the list. I would like to call this amendment up tomorrow. I ask unanimous consent that I may be authorized to call up one of my amendments on the list tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the underlying legislation that would provide support for the country of Colombia to fight the drug problem which not only involves Colombia but involves the United States very definitely and directly.

I commend Senators McConnell and colleagues who drafted this legislative vehicle to assist Colombia.

Part of my discussion tonight is based upon a trip I made last weekend that I took with Senator Durbin to Colombia. We had the opportunity to travel to Cartagena to meet with President Pastrana and his key national security advisers. We also traveled to Bogota to meet with the Defense Minister and the chairman of their joint chiefs of staff.

But I think much more importantly, we traveled out to where the military forces are being deployed to counteract this drug problem on the town of Larandia. It is not really a town, it is a base camp. It is a forward post for the Colombians to conduct these counterdrug operations.

One of the first impressions you get when you go to Colombia and leaf through the materials provided by the Embassy is that this country has a long history of violence—or, as the Colombians say, La Violencia.

In fact, according to the Embassy, there are one kidnapping every 5 hours in Colombia. And 75 percent of the world’s reported kidnappings occur in Colombia. The Embassy points out that Bogota is the murder capital of the world. In a city of 7 million people, there are 16 murders a day and 6,000 murders a year.

This is a country that has been wracked by political and criminal violence for many decades. The political violence began with some presence back in 1940s when elements of what later became the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party literally battled for control of the country. This lasted until 1957, when both parties agreed to form a national front.

Then there was a period from 1958 until 1974 in which both parties literally transferred power each 4 years from one president to another, and there was a semblance of stability in the country. But certainly by the 1960s, the scene had been set by guerrilla forces, principally Marxist and Leninist forces—the whole spectrum—the two principals being Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or...
ruptured. The leaders of the cartels literally died in police shootouts.

We have a situation, where through support by the United States and the police forces of Colombia, we defeated a drug combination that was threatening the United States by importing vast amounts of cocaine into the United States.

Now there is a new situation and a new crisis. The new crisis is the result of two things: the collision of cocaine cultivation, coca cultivation, and these remnants of a political insurgency that has been ongoing in Colombia for decades. The FARC and other revolutionary units are in the hinterland. What has arrived recently has been the cultivation of coca. As a result, the FARC—and its other guerrilla forces—has been enlisted in the support and combat of these coca fields. They are deriving resources in doing that. They are denying resources to support their political activities.

Coca production now has been linked with armed military forces. The police of Colombia are no longer capable with their equipment and their technology to deal with this. This has become a military problem. As a result, we are in a military problem that requires military support of the United States, just as it required police support in the 1980s and the early 1990s.

Part of the reason the cultivation has come to Colombia is the fact that we have been successful. As an indication of our success, Colombian production has surged dramatically. It has surged where in other places the production has been cut back. Both in Bolivia and in Peru, we have made significant progress—again, working with local authorities, working with their counternarcotics organizations—and has been relapsing in the cultivation of coca. What has been suppressed in Peru and Bolivia has now blossomed in the southern provinces of Colombia. Again, this combination of coca production and guerrillas has produced a military crisis as well as a drug crisis.

I have heard colleagues come to the floor and talk about the situation, saying: This is Colombia’s problem, not our problem.

Mr. President, as I mentioned, Plan Colombia has many different aspects. First, it focuses on not only military operations. It focuses on the peace process, which is ongoing in Colombia today. President Pastrana, when he was elected, was elected on a plank that called for sincere and serious negotiations with the guerrilla forces. He has instituted such negotiations. In fact, what has happened in Colombia is that he has dedicated an entire government over the capitol” with the blue, in the hinterlands of Colombia, which is a DMZ area, controlled by the FARC, the principle guerrilla group. This peace process is important.
This plan is also an attempt to provide alternate development efforts for the peasants and the cultivators in a region where the cultivation is taking place. This plan calls not only for military operations but also calls for heightened sensitivity to peace, a commitment and a contribution to economic development. The United States share is just a fraction of what the Colombian Government has committed to this effort for economic development and for ways to have alternatives to the coca cultivation.

Also, quite rightly, the plan calls for reform of the justice system and protection of human rights, because, frankly, one of the most feeble institutions within Colombia, and this accounts for many of their problems, is the justice system and the penal system that is part of the government. Essentially, two significant components militarily: first, the training of counter-narcotics battalions. Also, other units of the Colombian Army have been vetted for human rights abuses. And all of them must pass.

Also, the Minister of Defense of Colombia must, every 6 months, report on the process of bringing to justice those individuals who have been accused of human rights violations. As of today, both of the counternarcotics battalions have been vetted—the 1st Battalion and the 2nd Battalion. Also, other units of the Colombian Army have been vetted. In order to receive our training, these individuals must pass this vetting. And it has already had a positive effect. But rest assured, this is a constant struggle and we must insist and ensure that this human rights perspective is one that is not lost in our efforts to aid Colombia.

There is another aspect of concern that has been raised with respect to the program that is being presented within this legislation. First of significance, one we should all be very concerned about, is human rights. There is no way we want to be involved in an operation that is not going to emphasize the appropriate treatment of human rights, not only because that is the right thing to do but because in the long run that is the most effective way to win away any type of support for drug eradication and to build respect for the legitimate institutions of government in Colombia.

We are aided in this effort by provisions that have already been included under the direction of Senator LEAHY. Essentially, under the Leahy provisions, units that receive assistance and training from the United States cannot receive the training unless an individual who faces any type of credible human rights violation has either been removed or appropriate justice has been rendered to that individual. In a practical sense, this means all the troops who are going to be trained are vetted for human rights abuses. And all of them must pass.

Also, the Minister of Defense of Colombia must, every 6 months, report on the process of bringing to justice those individuals who have been accused of human rights violations. As of today, both of the counternarcotics battalions have been vetted—the 1st Battalion and the 2nd Battalion. Also, other units of the Colombian Army have been vetted. In order to receive our training, these individuals must pass this vetting. And it has already had a positive effect. But rest assured, this is a constant struggle and we must insist and ensure that this human rights perspective is one that is not lost in our efforts to aid Colombia.

There is another point that I think is important to make. There have been many suggestions that the greatest human rights violation that the Colombian Army engages in is passive and active cooperation with armed militias, self-defense forces, or paramilitaries as they are called—the perception that they are really in cahoots with vigilante groups that are out to destroy not only leftist rebels, but anyone who seeks to express themselves or ask for their rights in Colombia. That has been the history. But at least on the surface, things are changing.

One example of that is this particular article of last week’s major paper in Bogota, Colombia. This is an advertisement that was taken out by the military. Essentially it says that 785 families will not celebrate Father’s Day. Then it lists the victims of the violence in Colombia. But I think it is significant to note that they clearly point out and against paramilitary groups. And the violence that is the result of what they determine are “autodefensas,” militias, self-defense forces. This is a result, I believe, also based on my conversations with the military authorities in Colombia. They are getting the message. They are getting the message that there is no way we will tolerate alliances with paramilitary forces who are trying to subvert our emphasis on human rights. I think this is discouraging. In the sense that it is a horrible litany of lost souls, but it is also important to note that at least the military is trying to address the issue in an evenhanded way, the violence that both sides are doing to the fabric of peace in Colombia.

There is a situation here on human rights which is serious and in which the military is, for the first time I believe, taking this responsibility very seriously. There has been vetting of these military units. We are objecting to any type of training that would go to units containing individuals who have serious human rights violations.

There is also a high level of support for the effort to improve the human rights position in the Colombian Army, both the Defense Minister, General Tapia, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the tactical level in Tres Esquinas, General Montoya. These individuals recognize that the continued cooperation and collaboration with the United States rests upon sincere and effective efforts to provide effective human rights training and effective human rights behavior in the Colombian military.

Another aspect of concern that has been raised by some of my colleagues with respect to operations in Colombia, and that is the perception that the elites of Colombia are not actively involved in this struggle. It is most significantly reflected in constitutional provisions that prevent graduates of high school from being sent into combat, where nongraduates can be drafted and sent into combat. This is an issue which is both symbolic and substantive, too.

Our discussions with the Minister of Defense suggest they are also recognizing this issue; that they are consciously moving to professionalize their force by replacing draftees with professional soldiers; and they are also proposing, according to the Defense Minister, legislation within this session of the Colombian Congress that will attempt to prevent this discrimination in favor of high school graduates against high school graduates. It does represent, once again, a perception on the part of the Colombian authorities that they must not only protect human rights, but
they must be fully committed to this struggle in order to receive the support of the United States.

There is another criticism that has been lodged by some of my colleagues, and that is that this is just another entry into an unwinnable military quagmire, like Vietnam. There are many lessons to be drawn from Viet-
nam. One lesson is that we cannot fight and should not fight someone else’s battle if they do not have the will to do it themselves.

In this particular situation, Colombia is unlike Vietnam because the Colom-
bian forces are asking for our help in terms of training, in terms of equip-
ment, but not our troops. They recog-
nize they must do that themselves. Also, their history suggests they have in the past done precisely that. They wanted to have very careful and equip-
ment for their police, intelligence reports for their police, but they went after the cartels themselves. It was their responsibility. They carried it out successfully.

The other difference between Viet-
nam and the situation in Colombia is that our focus is on drugs. Our focus is on supporting Colombian military au-
thorities to provide the security so that police authorities can destroy labs and destroy coca fields. That is a lot different from trying to win the hearts and minds, to win the political ali-
gence of a population, as we were by default forced to attempt in Vietnam.

Winning the political allegiance of the people of Colombia is strictly and only the function and responsibility of the Colombian Government. That is why President Pastrana’s peace plan represents a sincere effort to do just that. It is their plan, their peace plan. Our effort should rightfully be re-
stricted, and is restricted, to the war on drugs.

Our role is also limited operationally because, as I mentioned before, we are providing equipment, we are providing trainers, and we are providing intel-
ligence, but intelligence related only to counternarcotics operations. Again, this is very similar to what we did with the Colombian national police in their successful effort to destroy the cartel.

One cannot totally dismiss history. I believe we have to be very care-
fully and cautiously with these steps—appropriate steps and limited steps—do not lead to something more. Part of this debate then should be to not only re-
state the American public that what we are doing is appropriate, but also that we will continue to be vigilant so that any commitment we make to Colombia will be limited and will strictly be a function of their capacity and their willingness to fight their own fight and not unwittingly involve Americans di-
rectly in that fight.

There are some other differences be-
tween Colombia and those who suggest the Vietnam analogy. First of all, this is an insurgency without any signifi-
cant foreign support. With the demise of Castro as a major influence in Latin America, with the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, this is not a situation where there are indigenous forces supported by outside powers. In fact, the support the guerrillas on the left and the paramilitaries on the right are deriving is from their participation in the drug trade. There is no great popular support abroad for the leftist or for the rightist forces who are guer-
rilas or paramilitaries. Public opinion polls suggest they have very limited appeal.

Colombia is a country with strong democratic traditions. It has regular elections. Power transfers peacefully. It is a market economy, until recently it was a market economy by choice. The other difference is that our focus is on drugs. Our focus is not only to fighting the drug war, but also waging a peace process in negotiations with the insurgents.

I think we ultimately have to con-
clude that our best course of action is to provide the kind of support that is outlined in this legislation, support that goes to the military aspects that have been created by the collapse of the cocaine cultivation in the hinter-
lands, where armed bands roam and de-
rive profit from coca production, togeth-
er with a balanced approach that emphasizes economic development, particularly alternative development for the campesinos, the peasants, that strengthens the governance of Colombi-
a, with particular emphasis on the judicial system and the penal system.

This comprehensive approach, re-
presenting about $1.6 billion in Ameri-
can resources, about $4 billion of Co-
lombian resources, and hopefully con-
tributions from other countries around the world, is, I believe, at this point the best hope of significantly undercut-
ting drug production in Colombia, re-
ducing the flow of cocaine into the United States, making our streets safer, and giving Colombia a chance to move to a peaceful, stable, civil society, which has allured them for many years.

But this particular plan, if it works—
and there is a reasonable probability it will work—will work not material-
ly and, I hope, effectively lead to sincere and renewed peace discussions within Colombia.

There is also a consequence for fail-
ure if we fail to approve the resources or if the plan fails for other reasons. At least one result would be that President Pastrana, and his government, in the middle of the process, would likely also fail. That could lead to several consequences.

First, he could be replaced by some-
one who is less amenable to the peace process. Given the tides of violence in Colombia, there could be a resurgence or the surfacing of an authoritarian figure who would be much less sen-
tive to the peace process.

Another possibility would be a recur-
rence of what happened in a previous administration under President Samper, where, effectively, the Presi-
dent without our resources, would not be able to support counter-
narcotraffickers, by drug money, and the country was close to falling under the sway of narcotics dealers rather than the elected representatives of the people of Colombia. So there are con-
sequences with which we must wrestle.

All in all, our most promising option is to support this bill and support Plan Colombia. To do nothing renders a se-
vere psychological blow to the people of Colombia and to the administration of President Pastrana, who is com-
mitted not only to fighting the drug war, but also waging a peace process in negotiations with the insurgents.