

who served in the Korean War—nearly six million individuals. Their sacrifices and contributions for the sake of our Nation must never be overlooked or forgotten.

Earlier this year, I was very pleased to co-sponsor Senate Joint Resolution 39, a bicameral resolution that recognizes the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, and the service by the members of our Armed Forces during that conflict. Today, I am pleased to do my part to ensure that the Korean War ceases to be thought of as our “forgotten war.” There is no doubt in my mind—and there should be no doubt in anyone else’s—that the men and women who served in Korea, and particularly the 54,260 soldiers who gave their lives in Korea, deserve much better than that.

Local communities can do much to remedy the situation as well. I commend Traverse City, Michigan, for constructing this Korean War memorial, and for taking the opportunity on Sunday, June 25, 2000, to pay tribute to the men and women who served during the Korean War. We must show these men and women that we appreciate their efforts and sacrifices on behalf of our great Nation, and that we thank them for their extraordinary efforts. In doing this, we will illustrate to them that they have not been forgotten; rather, the case is far from this.

Mr. President, the men and women who served our Nation in Korea did so at a time when its very foundation—democracy—was being threatened by the terrible force of communism. On behalf of the entire United States Senate, I congratulate the citizens of Traverse City, Michigan, for recognizing and honoring this service. ●

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations and a treaty which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 1979 IRANIAN EMERGENCY AND ASSETS BLOCKING—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 116

The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:

As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
THE WHITE HOUSE, June 21, 2000.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER BLOCKING PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATING TO THE DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM EXTRACTED FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 117

The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631, I hereby report that I have exercised my authority to declare a national emergency to deal with the threat posed to the United States by the risk of nuclear proliferation created by the accumulation in the Russian Federation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material. The United States and the Russian Federation have entered into a series of agreements that provide for the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in commercial nuclear reactors. The Russian Federation recently suspended its performance under these agreements because of concerns that payments due to it under these agreements may be subject to attachment, garnishment, or other judicial process, in the United States. Accordingly, I have issued an Executive Order to address the unusual and extraordinary risk of nuclear proliferation created by this situation.

A major national security goal of the United States is to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern. The United States and the Russian Federation entered into an international agreement in February 1993 to deal with these issues as they relate to the disposition of HEU extracted from Russian nuclear

weapons (the “HEU Agreement”). Under the HEU Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU will be converted to LEU over a 20-year period. This is the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear warheads.

Additional agreements were put in place to effectuate the HEU Agreement, including agreements and contracts on transparency, on the appointment of executive agents to assist in implementing the agreements, and on the disposition of LEU delivered to the United States (collectively, the “HEU Agreements”). Under the HEU Agreements, the Russian Federation extracts HEU metal from nuclear weapons. That HEU is oxidized and blended down to LEU in the Russian Federation. The resulting LEU is shipped to the United States for fabrication into fuel for commercial reactors. The United States monitors this conversion process through the Department of Energy’s Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program.

The HEU Agreements provide for the Russian Federation to receive money and uranium hexafluoride in payment for each shipment of LEU converted from the Russian nuclear weapons. The money and uranium hexafluoride are transferred to the Russian Federation executive agent in the United States.

The Russian Federation recently suspended its performance under the HEU Agreements because of concerns over possible attachment, garnishment, or other judicial process with respect to the payments due to it as a result of litigation currently pending against the Russian Federation. In response to this concern, the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Minister Adamov, notified Secretary Richardson on May 5, 2000, of the decision of the Russian Federation to halt shipment of LEU pending resolution of this problem. This suspension presents an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security goals due to the risk of nuclear proliferation caused by the accumulation of weapons-usable fissile material in the Russian Federation.

The executive branch and the Congress have previously recognized and continue to recognize the threat posed to the United States national security from the risk of nuclear proliferation created by the accumulation of weapons-usable fissile material in the Russian Federation. This threat is the basis for significant programs aimed at Cooperative Threat Reduction and at controlling excess fissile material. The HEU Agreements are essential tools to accomplish these overall national security goals. Congress demonstrated support for these agreements when it authorized the purchase of Russian uranium in 1998, Public Law 105-277, and also enacted legislation to enable Russian uranium to be sold in this country pursuant to the USEC Privatization Act, 42 U.S.C. 2297h-10.