

Task Force, Baker testified that increased funding is critical to the future of these vital programs.

He testified that in the former Soviet Union "over 40,000 nuclear weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across 11 time zones, but lacks the Cold War infrastructure that provided the control and financing necessary to assure [they] remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists . . . The most urgent unmet National Security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or our citizens at home." As a result, the Baker-Cutler report called for an increase in funding for such initiatives—approximately \$30 billion over the next 8–10 years.

I urge the Senate to consider the efforts and work of Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler and provide the resources needed to fund these programs and facilities because they are vital to our national security.

Our nuclear weapons complex and infrastructure will become even more important if the president seeks to reduce our stockpile as part of a new strategic framework. I encourage President Bush to place appropriate emphasis on non-proliferation as we develop this new framework with Russia and other involved nations.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, in 1997, the Department of Energy and the State of South Carolina reached an agreement for the Savannah River Site to accept and dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. In response to an effort by the former Soviet Union and the United States to reduce weapons-grade plutonium, the Savannah River Site would accept plutonium from the Pantex Plant in Texas and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado. South Carolina was promised that this plutonium would only be treated at SRS, not stored for a significant amount of time. The disposition agreement included two types of treatment—blending the plutonium into mixed oxide fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors, commonly known as MOX—and immobilizing it in a facility known as the Plutonium Immobilization Plant. The reason for using two different treatments was simple and spelled out in the Federal Register on January 21, 1997.

Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the total quantity of plutonium (that has or may be declared surplus to defense needs) would require extensive purification to use in MOX fuel, and therefore will likely be immo-

bilized. DOE will immobilize at least 8 metric tons, MT, of currently declared surplus plutonium materials that DOE has already determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel.

Since 1997, DOE has continued on this dual-track path for disposition. That is until this year. In the administration's fiscal year 2002 DOE budget request, funds for the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, were cut by over \$100 million. Due to these budget cuts, one of the plutonium disposition programs, immobilization, was delayed indefinitely. I don't blame the NNSA for the cut to this program because I know it is their job to work within the budget they are given. However, I do blame the Administration for providing a budget that is woefully inadequate to provide for plutonium disposition activities at Savannah River. When General Gordon, the NNSA Director, testified in front of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, he stated plainly that Plutonium Immobilization was delayed because of financial reasons, not policy ones. DOE claims it can process all of the plutonium by converting it into MOX, but, when pressed on the matter they say there is no certainty in this treatment. If MOX fails and there is not a back-up, SRS will be left with large amounts of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, but without a plan to treat it.

There is an analogous situation to this one track mind set that previously occurred at SRS. To separate the sludge and liquid wastes contained in the tank farms, DOE proposed In-Tank Precipitation, ITP. After putting more than a billion dollars into this separation process, problems occurred. Excessive benzene was being produced as a by-product of the separation. As a result, the program was shut down until a new process could be found. The new process was selected last week—four years after the old process failed. Why? Because there was not an alternative to this process. Four years and a billion dollars later, the tanks are still overflowing with 60 percent of the Nation's high-level waste. This is exactly why I want to continue a dual-track disposition program for this plutonium. It was part of the original agreement and I believe that any attempt to change the agreement should be made in consultation with all the affected parties.

To date, the Secretary of Energy and the Governor of South Carolina, Governor Hodges, have not spoken about the disposition activities, which is unfortunate. In fact, Governor Hodges has said he may take steps to stop shipments of plutonium to SRS, which are scheduled to begin in August. I hope the Secretary and the Governor can come to some agreement to ensure safe and timely disposition of this surplus plutonium.

I had an amendment, which would have prohibited the shipment of plutonium to SRS until March 1, 2002 or until a final agreement could be reached on disposition activities, whichever comes first. Some say that stopping these shipments would be devastating to our clean-up efforts at other sites. I say that walking away from our commitments of safe and timely disposition of this material would be just as devastating. All I want is for the Administration to commit to me, the Congress and to the State of South Carolina on plutonium disposition. I do not want this plutonium to be shipped to SRS and then have the Administration come back and say that MOX is not going to work and they're going to study another way of disposing of the material. I fear this is the road we are going down, especially in light of a recent article in the New York Times saying the White House wants to restructure or end programs aimed at disposing of tons of military plutonium.

I have spoken to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee and we have worked out an agreement on my amendment. With this compromise, hopefully, DOE and the State of South Carolina will come together and reach an agreement to continue these disposition programs at SRS, while ensuring they're done in a timely and safe manner. If an agreement cannot be reached, you can rest assured this will not be the last time this issue is raised on the Senate floor.

I want to thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member for all their help on this amendment.

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#### ORDERS FOR THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2001

Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 10 a.m., Thursday, July 19. I further ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, immediately following the prayer and the pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate resume consideration of the Energy and Water Appropriations Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MILLER). The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.