LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will return to legislative session.

AUTHORIZED SENATE LEGAL COUNSEL REPRESENTATION

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 137 submitted earlier today by the majority leader and the Republican leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by Title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the resolution on

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, two Republican voters in Pennsylvania have commenced a civil action against Senator Jeffords in federal district court in the District of Columbia to challenge Senator Jeffords' new Senate position to become an independent and to caucus with the Democratic party for organizational purposes within the Senate. Specifically, this lawsuit seeks to "assert the invalidity of Senator Jeffords' change of party by mere announcement" and requests a court order requiring Senator Jeffords "to reestablish his status as a Republican Senator" particularly "during the Senate floor."

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic.]

S. 180

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Sudan Peace Act.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost more than 300,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustaining viable Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.

(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of Sudan has effectively used violence and conquer to support their political and military conquests and sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.

(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the current operations on air transport relief flights in protecting the war through selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to use the proceeds from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside of its control.

(9) Through its poacher's plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.

(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food aid to advantage to the war in Sudan.

(11) The immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.

(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the control of the Government of Sudan's control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within the international community that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, including—

(A) the multilateralism of economic and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into good faith peace process; and

through non-military support or creation of stable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside government control;