LEGISLATIVE SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will return to legislative session.

AUTHORIZING SENATE LEGAL COUNSEL REPRESENTATION
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 137 submitted earlier today by the majority leader and the Republican leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 137) was agreed to. The preamble was agreed to. The resolution is printed in today's Record under "Resolutions Submitted."

SUDAN PEACE ACT
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 89, S. 180.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, two Republican voters in Pennsylvania have commenced a civil action against Senator Jeffords in federal district court in the District of Colombia to challenge Senator Jeffords' recent decision to become an Independent and to caucus with the Democratic party for organizational purposes within the Senate. Specifically, this lawsuit seeks "to assert the invalidity of Senator Jeffords' change of party by mere announcement" and requests a court order requiring Senator Jeffords "to reinstate his status as a Republican Senator" particularly "during the Senate polling and caucusing of its members."

Through this action, the plaintiffs seek to subject to judicial control a Senator's choice of with which Senators to caucus, as well as the process by which the Senate chooses its officers and the chairs of its committees. This attempt to question a Senator in court about the performance of his legislative responsibilities in the Senate is barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, which com-

mits such oversight of Senators to the electorate, not to the judiciary. This suit also runs afoul of the clauses of the Constitution that commit to each House of Congress the responsibility to elect officers and determine the rules of its proceedings.

Because this suit seeks to challenge the validity of actions taken by Senator Jeffords in his official capacity, representation in this case falls appropriately within the Senate Legal Counsel's statutory responsibility. This resolution would accordingly authorize the Senate Legal Counsel to represent Senator Jeffords to present to the Court the constitutional bases for dismissing this suit.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the resolution and preamble be agreed to en bloc, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc, and any statements related there to be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution (S. Res. 137) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to. The resolution is printed in today's Record under "Resolutions Submitted."

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost more than 300,000 lives and has displaced more than 5,000,000.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustained, viable Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.

(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to undermine their popular mobilization efforts and their externally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.

(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief flights in protesting the war through selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to proceed from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside its control.

(9) Through its poower veto plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to starve the areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.

(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of Government of Sudan control are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.

(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the control of the Government of Sudan has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within the recipients of a substantial state that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, including—

(A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process; and

(B) the support of or viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside government control.
continued active support of people-to-people programs and efforts in areas outside of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide humanitarian relief to those areas; and
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term “Government of Sudan” means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) OLS.—The term “OLS” means the United Nations Commission for Sudan (UNCHS), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, and participating relief organizations known as “Operation Lifeline Sudan”.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby—
(1) condemns—
(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall human rights record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; and
(D) the Government of Sudan’s use and organization of “murahalliin” or “mujahadeen”, Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al-Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY AUTHORIZED PEACE PROCESS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby recognizes that—
(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally sanctioned and supported government holds the greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and
(2) a resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 9, 1999.
(b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the support of—
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United Nations Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek to—
(A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan to obstruct relief by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of the deliver-