LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will return to legislative session.

AUTHORIZED SENATE LEGAL COUNSEL REPRESENTATION

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 137 submitted earlier today by the majority leader and the Republican leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 137) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The assistants legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 137) to authorize representation by the Senate Legal Counsel in John Hoffman, et al. v. James Jeffords. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the resolution. Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, two Republican voters in Pennsylvania have commenced a civil action against Senator Jeffords in his official capacity. The action seeks to reinstate his status as a Republican Senator particularly “during the Senate polling and caucusing of its members.”

The assistant legislative clerk read the resolution. At the request of the Senate, the resolution was referred to the consideration of Calendar No. 89, S. 180. The clerks reported the resolution by title.

SUDAN PEACE ACT

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 137 submitted earlier today by the majority leader and the Republican leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 137) was agreed to.

The resolution is printed in today’s Record under “Resolutions Submitted.”

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Sudan Peace Act.”

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost more than 200,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustainability by the Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.

(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to complicate and hinder their potential peace efforts. The internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.

(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief flights in protected areas through the war through selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan’s accountability internationally.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to proceed from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside its control.

(9) Through its ploy to veto plans for air transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to subdue the areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.

(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.

(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside the control of the Government of Sudan’s control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(15) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan including—

(A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;

(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside government control;