

## BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, as momentum builds for the deployment of missile defense and the abandonment of the obsolete ABM Treaty, those who oppose missile defense are getting more and more desperate in their arguments. One argument that we're hearing with more frequency is the threat of the suitcase bomb. This argument maintains that we shouldn't be spending our scarce defense dollars on ballistic missile defense when there are easier and cheaper ways a potential enemy could deliver a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. Rogue states could just smuggle a bomb in on a ship, or put it in a suitcase in New York, or drop biological weapons into our water supply. A missile defense system won't do anything to stop a suitcase bomb, so it must be a waste of money, or so the argument goes.

This argument is repeated with such frequency, it might be useful to state for the record why it misses the point.

Let me state the most obvious reason first. The presence of one kind of threat doesn't mean you shouldn't also defend against other threats. Imagine if this logic were applied consistently to our approach to national defense. Why have an army if you can be attacked by sea? Or, why have air defenses if you can be attacked by land? Such reasoning is absurd. If we refused to defend against one threat simply because other threats exist, we would end up completely defenseless.

National defense capabilities are like insurance policies: we hope we never have to use them, but the consequences of not having them could be catastrophic. No one would argue that because you have auto insurance you shouldn't also buy insurance for your house. However, opponents of missile defense argue that you don't need insurance against ballistic missiles, but that you only need insurance against suitcase bombs and other terrorist threats.

I think we would all agree that a potential adversary would likely try to exploit any perceived vulnerabilities in our defenses. This is only logical. If the U.S. forgoes the capability to repel a missile attack, that creates a powerful incentive for our adversaries to seek a ballistic missile capability. Once again, this is only logical.

I would like to emphasize that defending against the so-called suitcase bomb threats is not an alternative to defending against ballistic missiles, as opponents of missile defense assert. We must do both. We have an obligation to do both.

Keep in mind that terrorist acts, such as those that would be perpetrated by a suitcase bomb, serve purposes entirely different from ballistic missiles. The surreptitious placement and detonation of a weapon, such as oc-

curred at the World Trade Center or in Oklahoma City, is intended to disrupt society by spreading terror. Such acts depend on covert action and their goal is the actual use of the weapon. That's not why nations acquire ballistic missiles.

How many times have we heard opponents of missile defense drag out the tired cliché "Missiles have a return address!" as though that somehow devalues them. The opposite is true, missiles derive their value from the knowledge of their existence and the belief that they might be used. Of course they have a return address; their owners want to make sure we know it. The point is not, as it is with terrorist weapons, to hide the existence of ballistic missiles, but to broadcast it. The ability to coerce the United States with ballistic missiles depends on our belief that a potential adversary has nuclear missile and would be willing to use them against us. We called this principle deterrence when the Soviet Union was in existence. However, in the hands of a dictator, deterrence can quickly become coercion and blackmail.

Those who argue that missile defense is not necessary as long as a potential adversary could use a suitcase bomb erroneously assume that the goal of a rogue state in having a ballistic missile is to use it somewhere. This is not necessarily correct. These rogue states recognize that ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads provide an effective way to coerce the United States. Imagine a dictator who could stand up to the United States with a nuclear missile, knowing full well that there is nothing the United States can do to defend itself.

There is another huge difference between the terrorist act and the ballistic missile—we are actively fighting against terrorism but doing nothing whatsoever to protect ourselves against ballistic missiles. Last year, the United States spent around \$11 billion in counter terrorism programs, more than double what we spent on the entire missile defense program, including theater missile defenses. Spending this year on counter terrorism programs will be even higher. And that layer of defense is working, as evidenced last year by the successful interdiction of terrorist infiltration attempts on our northern border. Counter terrorism is an important aspect of our national security program and we need to continue to be vigilant and to dedicate the necessary resources to it. But we have no defense against ballistic missiles, and we cannot continue to have this glaring vulnerability in our defenses.

For those opponents of missile defense, I pose the following questions. Why are nations like North Korea and Iran spending billions of dollars on the development of ballistic missiles? Are

they irrational, spending money on things they don't need? I think that's highly unlikely. I think a better explanation is that the leaders of such nations see tremendous value in such weapons. They understand that the only way to counter the power of the United States and reduce its influence is to exploit its vulnerabilities. I think they have surveyed the landscape and have correctly perceived that our one glaring vulnerability is our utter defenselessness against ballistic missile attack. And I think they have realized that ballistic missiles, with their return address painted right on the side in big bright letters, can be instruments of coercion without ever being launched.

That is a purpose very different from the one served by suitcase bombs, and it is time opponents of missile defense stopped pretending otherwise.

## THE FISCAL YEAR 2002 VA-HUD AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I regret that, once again, I was compelled to oppose this appropriations bill. At the outset, I should make it clear that there are many worthwhile items contained within it. Above all, I am pleased that the committee has provided significant increases in funding for veterans' health care, veterans' medical research, State veterans home construction and other vital programs that serve those who have sacrificed for our Nation.

Nevertheless, I cannot endorse the order of priority accorded to the various programs funded within this bill. I object to leaving veterans' needs unmet while funding hundreds of earmarked projects. And I regret that our appropriations process compels Members to, in effect, choose between voting for rightly popular veterans' programs and voting against wasteful social spending.

For a number of years, I have questioned the desirability of grouping agencies with unrelated missions into omnibus appropriations bills, and I have cited the VA-HUD bill as the best illustration of the problem. Despite my strong support for veterans benefits I have, more often than not, voted against the VA-HUD bill since I came to the Senate, because I believed that the spending levels and earmarks in the HUD portion could not be defended.

We all know that HUD is a Department fraught with serious problems, as detailed repeatedly by the General Accounting Office, which to this day, classifies HUD as the only "high risk" executive branch agency at the Cabinet level. Yet the bill before us provides HUD with a robust nine percent increase, bigger than the increase provided for veterans.

The HUD title also includes eleven pages of earmarked projects, the vast