The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights had no such reluctance in assigning blame to the Honduran government during its adjudication of a case brought against the Government officials in Honduras by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in 1987. In deciding the case of Honduran citizen Velasquez Rodriguez the Court found that “a practice of disappearances carried out by Honduran officials existed between 1981-84.” And, as I mentioned earlier, based upon an extensive review of U.S. intelligence information by the CIA Working Group in 1996, the CIA is prepared to stipulate that “during the 1980-84 period, the Honduran military committed most of the hundreds of human rights abuses reported in Honduras. These abuses were often politically motivated and officially sanctioned.

Moreover Negroponte should have been forewarned to look for signs of government sponsored human rights abuses in light of concerns that his predecessor Ambassador Jack Binns, a career foreign service officer, had raised with the State Department concerning the mind set of the architect of Honduras’ domestic countersubversion program with respect to a willingness to extrajudicial means in the context of such programs. Ambassador Binns was speaking about General Gustavo Alvarez who became Commander in Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces in 1982, and who had been Commander of Honduran Public Security Forces, FUSEP, from 1980-82.

Based upon the Committee’s review of State Department and CIA documents, it would seem that Ambassador Negroponte knew far more about government perpetrated human rights abuses than he chose to share with the committee in 1989 or in Embassy contributions by Honduran State Department Human Rights reports. For example, a Negroponte cable summarizing meetings between Congressman Solarz and Honduran government officials in January 1985 makes note of a Honduran official’s concerns about human rights abuses due to “fears that there might still be some ‘secret operating cells’ left from the Alvarez era,” here referring to General Alvarez who had headed the Honduran armed forces until he was removed in 1984 by his fellow officers.

I don’t quite know the difference between a “death squad” and “secret operating cells”, but since Ambassador Negroponte is officially on record as saying that death squads existed in Honduras during his tenure, there must be some difference.

There are also discrepancies with respect to when he became aware of certain cases where Honduran authorities were secretly detaining and torturing Hondurans suspected of subversion. And how he chose to report those cases to Washington. The case of dual national Ines Consuelo Murillo comes most readily to mind. Her detention and torture was described in detail on April 15, 1995 in the Baltimore Sun. There are but a few examples. There were others which taken together, paint a very mixed picture of whether the U.S. embassy was doing much to discourage Honduran government practices or how comprehensively it was conducting on such human rights abuses. Having said that, there were no “smoking guns” in the documents that have been provided to the Committee.

I know that this week is not just any week. I also know that the President is anxious to have an ambassador at the United Nations is a high priority, particularly in light of recent events. I will not stand in the way of the Senate moving forward with this nomination. I believe that yesterday’s decision by the Committee on Foreign Relations to put on the public record all the additional declassified information that it has compiled in reviewing this nomination will contribute to the healing and reconciliation that is still ongoing in Honduras.

Finally I would say a word of caution to other career foreign service officers, particularly junior officers, that they not consider this nominee’s lack of candor before the committee as a model to be emulated. A United States Ambassador is a representative of the United States Government and ultimately works for the American people. That means that the ambassadors have an obligation to be truthful and forthcoming in relations with Congress as we are the people’s representatives. If they are under instruction to withhold information as a matter of policy they should say so. Then, we can take it up with their superiors if we choose to do so. In my estimation, Mr. Negroponte did neither in his dealings with the Congress. I am deeply saddened to come to that judgement. Having said that Ambassador Negroponte has had a distinguished career and on balance has discharged his responsibilities ably and honorably. For that reason, I intend to give him the benefit of the doubt in light of how extremely polarized relations between the Congress and the Executive were over U.S. policy in Central America when he was serving as Ambassador in Honduras. I will therefore support his nomination to the position of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Resolved.

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WEEK.

The Senate—
(1) designates the week beginning September 16, 2001, as “National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week”; and
(2) requests that the President of the United States, through the Secretary of the Treasury, issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States and interested groups to observe the week with appropriate ceremonies, activities, and programs to demonstrate support for historically black colleges and universities.

ORDER THE RECORD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL 3:30 P.M.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Record remain open today until 3:30 for statements and introduction of bills.

Mr. SADER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MEASURE INDEFINITELY POSTPONED—S. 1426

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that since H.R. 2888, the