When I went to the Pentagon, I asked Mary to come with me. She was the person I turned to health issues affecting our troops, and there were many such issues. She worked with me and with a deeply talented public servant, Rudy De Leon, who also became a good friend to Mary. She didn't just know the right answers—she found out from the troops what they needed.

Even in times when her illness was sapping her strength, she was traveling to Korea, to Bosnia, to Saudi Arabia to talk to our forces and find out how the Department of Defense could serve them better.

She came with Janet and me in 1999 for our annual holiday visit to the troops, which is a very arduous trip involving several countries in just a few days and in bad weather. But she wanted to go, and she brought great comfort to the many troops she spent time with.

After I left office, Secretary Rumsfeld asked Mary to stay on, and she worked well into June before she became too weary. She loved working with the troops. In this way, she was like the father she never knew, who was a Navy recruiter and loved helping young sailors with their problems.

I mention a sampling of Mary's accomplishments for a reason—to underscore the good that can be done in a life of public service. Mary's accomplishments would be extremely impressive if they were spread over a 50 year career. She had such a short time, and she did so much.

Her accomplishments would also be impressive if they were all she did. But she saved her best energy for being a wife and a mother, as well as a daughter and a sister.

You only have to spend a few minutes with Katie and Kristen to see what kind of mother Mary has been, as well as what kind of father Ed has been. Katie and Kristen are exemplary young women—apples who have not fallen very far from the tree. And Mary and Ed had one of the best marriages I knew of—supportive and positive and loving at all times, even the bad times.

It is remarkable to reflect on Mary's degree of professional accomplishment and personal success when we consider the inescapable fact that the last ten years of her life were spent fighting an awful illness. The pain and difficulty she endured is unimaginable to most of us. Many of us would have given into despair. Mary stayed positive and productive even in the worst of times. She hated to be thought of as sick. She hated for people to cut her any slack because of her illness.

It is tempting for us all to be angry and feel cheated about a life which ended so soon and had so much suffering in the last ten years. I knew Mary for 20 years, and I wish I had 20 more with her. But we know that we were lucky to know her at all. Rarely in life are we fortunate enough to appreciate the truly special people in our lives. Mary was someone you could count on. She touched all of our lives. She made us laugh, she astonished us with her bravery and devotion to God. There will never be a day that her smile, her love, and her courage will be far from our thoughts.

On September 11, a great many friends and colleagues of ours at the Pentagon, and many more we didn't know in New York, passed from this world to a better place. Last Tuesday, they were joined by a very special angel. Mary, we will miss you.

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. STABENOW). Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended for an additional 15 minutes to accommodate my remarks this morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WYDEN. Thank you very much, Madam President. I know Senator FEINSTEIN is here. I intend to be brief this morning.

EMERGENCY TECHNOLOGY CORPS

Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, this morning I want to discuss a proposal which I think is important in light of the tragic events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

As all of us now understand, the communications infrastructure in New York, Washington, DC, and indeed the whole country, was severely challenged that day. Wireless telephone networks were severely overloaded and crashed. Wireless Internet access was suspended. Telephone lines were cut, and communications for people literally in communities around the east coast of the United States came to a standstill. Even the immediate communication needs of rescue workers, victims, families, and aid groups were a huge struggle to coordinate. Survivors often couldn't let family members know they were safe, and families of victims had no immediate central clearinghouse to find information or file missing person reports.

The hospitals were inundated with searches, requests for help, and offers of aid but with no way to match them to each other. Even some of this country's premier aid organizations that have done such a marvelous job helping rescue workers, survivors, and victims' families faced immediate and severe challenges with respect to information technology infrastructure. The New York Times drew a conclusion with which I strongly agree. They said: There needs to be new ways to set up emergency information systems.

That is what I would like to propose this morning. It seems to me that what this country needs is essentially a technology equivalent of the National Guard, an emergency technology guard—I have been calling it in my mind Net Guard, or a national emergency technology guard—that in times of crisis would be in a position to mobilize the Nation's information technology, or IT, community to action quickly, just as the National Guard is ready to move during emergencies.

It seems to me that in our leading technology companies in this Nation there are the brains and the equipment to put in place net guard, or this information technology guard, that could be deployed in communities across the Nation when we face tragedies such as we saw in New York City.

A national volunteer organization of trained and well-coordinated units of information technology professionals from our leading technology companies ought to be in a position to stand at ready with the designated computer equipment, satellite dishes, wireless communicators, and other equipment to quickly recreate and repair compromised communications and technology infrastructure.

With congressional support, the leaders of our Nation's technology companies could organize themselves, sell their employees and their resource for this purpose. Medium- and small-sized businesses would be able to contribute once a national framework is put in place. Certainly the resources from the standpoint of the Federal level need not be extensive. Individuals could be designated from existing human resource programs of major and medium-sized firms and the technology professionals would be trained to perform specific tasks in the event of an emergency.

I intend to use the subcommittee that I chair of the full Commerce Committee that is chaired by Senator HOLLINGS to initiate a dialog among congressional, corporate, military, and nonprofit leaders to begin a new effort to mobilize information technology in times of crises.

As we seek to prevent future disasters, I believe that the technology professionals of this Nation in many of our leading companies—as most Americans—want to use their skills, their equipment, and their talents to answer this call and do their part.

I propose with a national emergency technology guard—what I call tech guard—that we give to the leading information technology professionals in this country a chance to use their ingenuity and creativity to ensure that there is greater safety and stability for our communities and our citizens in the coming days.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Absolutely.

Mr. BYRD. I assure her that if she wants the opportunity to proceed, I will resist in my remarks and take my chair.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Fine. Please proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for not to exceed 40 minutes. I do so with the understanding, as I have already indicated, I will be very glad to suspend my remarks at any time the distinguished Senator from California wishes to take the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SPACE WARS

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, during the August recess, The New York Times Magazine ran a cover story entitled ''The Coming Space War'' The article caught my interest, as I am sure that it intrigued many other readers. The author's contention is that the U.S. military is considering a campaign to achieve military superiority in space similar to the kind of military superiority that U.S. forces seek in the air, on land, and from the sky. Military superiority in space is deemed critical in order to protect our increasing dependence on satellites for communications, surveillance, commercial and military purposes. On August 24, President Bush named Air Force General Richard Myers, a former chief of the U.S. Space Command and of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Myers' selection as Chairman is in keeping with President Bush's strong support for building a national missile defense, NMD, the follow-on to President Reagan's Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI.

It is certainly true that our dependence—and that of other developed and developing nations—on these winking, blinking objects winging through the night sky has increased exponentially over the last decade. It has rapidly become almost impossible to imagine a world without the Internet, the World Wide Web, electronic mail on handheld computers or cellular phones, automated teller machines, instantaneous worldwide credit card use, and other forms of global telecommunications and electronic commerce. This expansion and its dependence on satellite links will continue to increase in future decades. We are all dependent, and, therefore, we are all vulnerable, to the seamless and uninterrupted access to satellites. Most people, however, do not understand these technologies. I certainly do not. Like most people, I can understand that I may be vulnerable in ways that are new to me, a boy from the Mercer County hills in southern West Virginia. But how best to address this new vulnerability?

The author of The New York Times Magazine article describes three fundamentally different philosophical approaches to this brave new realm of space. The first is a military approach, which opens up a Pandora's box of weapons in space. The military, it is reported, has looked into the future and come to the conclusion that space represents the ''ultimate military 'high ground,' '' requiring the military to develop and deploy whatever technology is necessary to achieve what has been termed ''Global Battlespace Dominance,'' or ''Full Spectrum Dominance.'' The tools needed might include everything from National Missile Defense to antisatellite laser or high-powered microwave weapons, or clusters of microsatellites to hyperspectral surveillance satellites and other space sensors—or all of these things. Some of these systems are under development now or due for testing soon, according to the article, already undercutting the author's assertion that the weaponization of space is coming, when, in fact, it may already be upon us. Already—already—additional funding to the tune of $190 million is being sought in the defense authorization and appropriations bills for space weapons.

Now, if I, like most people, do not really understand the technologies behind satellite communications and cell phones, it is even harder to understand the technologies behind hyperspectral surveillance satellites or space-based lasers. And that lack of technical expertise means, like most Americans, I must depend on the Pentagon to explain why these new technologies are needed, why no other alternatives will work, and what new questions and challenges might be unleashed by these choices. That is not, I suggest, the best way to perform oversight, but, unfortunately, there are few good alternatives.

The second philosophical approach to space outlined by the author is that of the purist, seeking to unilaterally ban weapons from space and seeking to return the heavens to an earlier, unsullied era—an earlier unsullied era. This is not, in the author's view, a realistic hope. The final philosophical approach, the one seemingly favored by the author, is that of the ''pragmatist''—the ''pragmatist.'' This approach recognizes the inevitable migration of commerce and the military to space, but hopes to hold the line at surveillance. Weapons for space would, in this view, remain in the research and test phase, to be launched only in response to another nation's attempt to put weapons in space. This launch-on-warning approach would come in conjunction with further diplomatic efforts to establish operating rules for space modeled on those in place for blue-water ships on the open ocean.

In the pragmatist's scenario, existing space treaties would be retained: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning nuclear weapons in space and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which, in addition to establishing the surveillance system to avoid nuclear conflict, also forbids most antimissile testing. One way of reducing competition and tensions in space proposed in the article is by ''mutually assured awareness'' in space. The U.S. would develop and make globally available direct video access to space, so that anyone could confirm any hostile action in space, as opposed to mishaps from natural causes. I am not sure that this is technologically feasible, but who am I to question it. The concept of greater openness is the point. It is interesting, in this light, to note that the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, operated by the United Nations, has not been very successful. In fact, the nation with the largest number, if not percentage, of unregistered payloads is the United States. The United States has failed to register 141 of some 2,000 satellite payloads. Only one nation is in full compliance—Russia. And, of course, it is the Bush Administration advocating the abrogation of the ABM Treaty in order to commence construction on the first National Missile Defense ground site in Alaska.

I cannot say at this point what philosophical camp that I might find myself. The author, Jack Hitt, closes his article by pointing out that if the United States is not successful at holding the line at surveillance, if we ''plan, test, and deploy aggressively as the lone superpower, we make certain that after a brief respite from the cold war's nuclear competition, we will once again embark on a fresh and costly arms race. And with it, assume the dark burden of policing a rapid evolution in battlespace.'' This specter rings true. It should concern us, and it should be debated by the people and the people's representatives. As it stands now, the U.S. military is moving ahead on a trajectory that is both costly and one that carries with it a kind of philosophical imperialism with dangerous ramifications.

Now, what do I mean by philosophical imperialism? The military's plans for ''full spectrum dominance,'' and space superiority, if fully realized, would mean that in some not-so-distant future, the United States would be in a position to (in the words of the Air Force Strategic Master Plan) ''operate freely in space, deny the use of space to our adversaries, protect ourselves from an attack in and through space and develop and deploy a N[ational] M[issile] D[efense] capability.'' The U.S. would presumably, then, have information dominance in this arena as well. Thus, the U.S. would be in a position to know if a conflict between two nations, say India and Pakistan, was about to explode into open, even nuclear, warfare. The U.S. would also be in a position to act, but how? Would we shoot down the missiles from one side or the other, or both? If we shot down the missiles that each nation was firing at the other,