

While I recognize that today, as in 1863, we live in a time of uncertainty and danger, we should all be thankful that the American people have the steadfastness and the determination to move forward.

While I recognize that many young American men and women will spend this holiday in harm's way protecting our country and protecting the values we hold dear, we can all be thankful we do have the best, the bravest, and the most determined Armed Forces—and always have had—in the world, Armed Forces that are now fighting the scourge of terrorism. I am thankful we live in a country that can confront a crisis with strength and moral certainty, without forcing us to abandon the very principles and values that we hold most dear.

Like President Washington, I am thankful for “the many favors of Almighty God,” including a government that ensures our “safety and happiness.”

Like President Lincoln, I am thankful for the “gracious gifts of the most high God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins”—and there are many—“hath nevertheless remembered mercy.”

Finally, I am thankful for those men and women, who, 381 years ago, had the courage, the faith, and the devotion to God to challenge the most difficult and dangerous of journeys and face the darkest unknown. They left friends and homes and warm hearths to launch out upon a dangerous, deep journey, led and guided only by the faith they had in a higher power and a desire to create a new home where they could go to the church of their choice. Thank God for them.

On this Thanksgiving, let us remember:

Our fathers in a wondrous age,
Ere yet the Earth was small,
Ensured to us an heritage,
And doubted not at all
That we, the children of their heart,
Which then did beat so high,
In later time should play like part
For our posterity.
Then fretful murmur not they gave
So great a charge to keep,
Nor dream that awestruck time shall save
Their labour while we sleep.
Dear-bought and clear, a thousand year
Our fathers' title runs.
Make we likewise their sacrifice,
Defrauding not our sons.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DAYTON). The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ISSUES

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished leader—and he is still my leader—the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator BYRD, on his speech and his remembrance relative to Thanksgiving.

I also rise to compliment him on his speech that I only heard in my office relating to strategic doctrine and strategic weapons. Quite frankly, I am a little embarrassed. I thought he was going to make the Thanksgiving speech first. I wished to be here for his comments on what is going on now in Crawford, TX, with President Bush and President Putin.

Today, I think we all agree we have an opportunity to reach a reasonable agreement with the Russians on the three most significant strategic issues of our day: missile defense, strategic arms reductions, and nonproliferation. Senator BYRD and I and others have had a chance to meet with Mr. Putin in a larger group. Based on private discussions with him and on reports of what he has said in his meetings with President Bush, it seems as though genuine progress has been made in the summit this week between President Bush and President Putin.

I respectfully suggest—and I believe the President would probably agree—that much more needs to be done. It seems to me that, in conjunction with what Senator BYRD said earlier, it is vital for us to continue to make progress, and it is equally vital that the United States refrain from actions that would make further agreements on these vital issues difficult, if not impossible.

President Bush has made clear—in the ten months since he has been President—his determination to proceed on the development of a limited missile defense system, despite any limitations in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Now, we have had very conflicting accounts from his representatives in the administration before the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee as to whether or not they were “prepared to break out of the ABM treaty” based on planned testing, or needed testing, to further determine the feasibility of a limited missile defense.

But one thing has come through consistently: President Bush has stated his determination to do whatever it takes to develop a limited missile defense. Obviously, Russian officials have heard him, and they understand his determination to proceed.

But—and it is a big but—President Putin, in his discussion with some of us Senators and in his public statements, has made it clear that he still considers the ABM Treaty a critical element in the agreements that govern strategic relations between the United States and his country.

President Bush and President Putin seem to have achieved a personal rapport over the last 6 months that bolsters President Putin's confidence that we mean no harm to Russia. I have said before, somewhat facetiously but only somewhat, that as a student of his-

tory—although not to the extent of my friend from West Virginia, and I mean that seriously—I cannot think of any Russian leader, other than a tsar Peter the Great, who looked further west than this gentleman, Mr. Putin, seems to be looking.

He seems to have made a very fundamental and significant decision that the future of his country lies in the West. He has taken some political chances at home. How significant they are, we do not know, but nonetheless, he has, to use the vernacular, stiffed both the browns and the reds, the nationalists and the former Communists, in making such a dramatic statement about his intentions to live and thrive in the West. He has even dismantled Russia's listening post in Cuba as a demonstration of the lack of feeling of hostility toward the United States.

I will say that President Bush has succeeded in communicating to the President of Russia that we mean no harm; that the Cold War is over. In fact, Secretary Powell said in Asia that the post-Cold War is also over. This is the opportunity for a fundamental new beginning. But the beginning does not necessarily mean the end, and clearly to Putin it does not mean the end, to the ABM Treaty. President Putin appears to have internalized President Bush's assertion that he is not an enemy and that Russia is not an enemy—but President Putin is still unwilling to bend the ABM Treaty.

He is willing, however, to let the United States proceed with the testing and development of missile defense, so long as the ABM Treaty remains in force. That seems to me to be a sensible arrangement.

The part that gets difficult is the part to which the Senator from West Virginia spoke. If, in fact, we are, in practical terms, about to amend the ABM Treaty—this is a government with equal branches—that is something about which we in the Senate get to have a say. We should be in on that deal, as Russell Long used to say. That is a deal we should be in on.

I am very happy the President appears not to be intent at this moment on withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which I think would be a tragic mistake—not only substantively as it relates to arms control but diplomatically as it relates to our relations around the world. I am anxious to hear what the President has in mind, however, in terms of how, in effect, to ratify—not in the constitutional sense, necessarily—but how to ratify whatever agreement he reaches with Mr. Putin.

If I am not mistaken, my friend from West Virginia said that President Bush said—and I recall President Bush saying this, but I am paraphrasing—we can do this on a handshake.

Handshakes are great—and I admire and I trust the President's resolve and

I trust his sense of honor and I believe he means what he says and will stick to it when he shakes hands. I am even prepared to acknowledge that is probably true with President Putin as well—but a handshake is not the stuff upon which these kinds of agreements should rest ultimately.

The goal of our policy should not be to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as some continue to urge. I think they miss the point. The goal should be to maximize our national security interests rather than to win some debating point over the relevance of arms control agreements in this post-cold-war era.

With regard to strategic weapons, President Bush announced this week that the United States will reduce its force level over the next 10 years to somewhere between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads.

The devil is in the details—for example, “deployed warheads.” To date, I have not gotten an explanation of what is going to happen with “all the other warheads,”—roughly 4,000 additional warheads, not just ours, but the Russians’ as well, because President Putin promised to do the same thing, to cut his forces as well. I assume—and this is a little premature—but I assume he is also talking about “deployed” nuclear weapons, as opposed to all the nuclear weapons in your possession.

That is excellent progress as far as it goes, Mr. President, and I do not mean to sound as if I am trying to rain on the President’s parade. I think what he is doing is very helpful. Now, though, it seems to me—and obviously to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee—Presidents Bush and Putin should agree on a means by which they can verify that each country is complying with its promise.

Even if the Lord Almighty came down and stood in the well of the Senate and said: I guarantee to all you Senators and all America and all the world that both Putin and Bush will keep their agreements, that would not be quite good enough for me. God willing, Presidents Bush and Putin will remain healthy, and I am sure President Bush expects to remain in power for 4 years beyond his term. But it may be that he will not be President in 3 years, and Mr. Putin may not be President in 3 years. For great countries to have such fundamental decisions rest upon personal assurances between two honorable men is not sufficient—not because the men are not honorable, not because they are not intent on keeping their promises, but because they are not immortal; they are not going to be around forever.

It seems to me they should make sure, whatever each side is promising, that it is able to be determined with some objectivity. This would avoid significant misunderstandings of the sort that, I remind my colleagues, have

plagued us in the past regarding the Russian promises on tactical nuclear weapons made a decade ago.

U.S. force planners benefit from predictability in Russian strategic forces. The more we know about what is going on in the Russian nuclear force posture, the easier it is to determine how we should deal with them, how we should counter them. With a handshake, all we know is what President Putin says to the press or in private to President Bush. That is all we know. With a written agreement, we have specific commitments. U.S.-Russian relations will benefit from knowing what each has promised—and what we and they have not promised.

I go back to the promises made by both Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In fact, what happened was that Gorbachev and Yeltsin made an agreement they intended to keep, and they may, in fact, have kept it.

In January of this year, I remind my colleagues, some of our friends who do not like arms control agreements and were much less trusting of Russia than they seem to be today raised questions over whether Russia had violated its 1991 and 1992 promises to cut back on tactical nuclear weapons. That was an issue before this body in the beginning of this year, discussed in this town among the nuclear theologians, discussed in this town among those interested in strategic doctrine and strategic weapons. Had the Russians kept their promise?

Part of the problem was that people were not sure what Gorbachev or Yeltsin had actually promised to do. That was part of the problem.

Verification obviously helps. Without a formal agreement of some sort, however, generally one does not get verification.

The allegation in January of 2001 was that Russia was storing nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and people wanted to inspect those sites. We heard some concern from my friends, saying the Russians have these missiles hidden in barns and they took them out of silos but they have them on rail, and on and on, trying to demonstrate a short 8 months ago that we cannot trust the Russians.

It caused a bit of a furor because one of the arguments concerning why we should do away with the ABM Treaty was that we ought to do away with this treaty because the Russians do not keep these treaties, and Lord only knows what they are doing, and we have to build this national missile defense. That was only in January of this year.

But when people suggested that we inspect those sites—because we thought, as some asserted, they had stored nuclear weapons there—there were no grounds to request the inspection, let alone demand one, because there was no agreement attendant to

the promise of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to, in fact, allow for verification.

Why do I bring this up? To say the Russians cannot be trusted? No.

What happens is that when there is doubt about issues such as nuclear weapons, people always err on the side of the worst case because we almost cannot afford not to—because if we are wrong, we are, no pun intended, dead wrong; we are really wrong.

So what happened as a consequence of the January dispute about whether or not they had kept their 1991 promise? What happened was it bred mistrust. Remember all the articles that occurred in January and February and March and actually began during the last campaign? This administration got off to an incredibly rocky start with Russia.

The President has made that right, and I compliment him for it, but now we have stalled. We have sort of stumbled through 9 months of lost opportunity.

The point is, when there is no independent means to verify—when a new President comes into office, the next President, whoever that is—how does he or she judge whether or not the commitment is being kept? I promise he or she will be buffeted on every side by those within the Defense Department, the intelligence community and the think-tanks who are whispering in his or her ear saying: Hey, they are not keeping the deal.

The same problems can and do occur regarding strategic weapons. How will we know if Russia has reduced its weapons numbers? Will it remove them from launchers and silos, or only say that certain weapons are no longer operational? How will we know? That was the basis of a big debate not too long ago, I remind my friend—although I do not have to remind my friend—from West Virginia. That was the basis of a big debate.

How are we going to know? What is Russia really promising to do? The only misunderstanding that is worse than one that was intended is one that was unintended. Maybe they are going to be keeping their word, but how will we know?

I promise, there will be many voices questioning whether the Russians are keeping the agreement, and if there is no independent means to verify it, our questioning then breeds distrust as to whether or not the Americans really are looking for a way out: Are they really with us? Did they really mean to enter into this?

What is Russia really promising to do? That, I hope, will be made clear, because even that is in question.

It is not wise to make assertions that you will reduce weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200. I guarantee there will be people in this Chamber saying the Russians really said they would be down to 1,700 by such and such a date, and there are 2,200.

I might add, what is going to happen to those warheads that are not deployed? For that matter, how will Russia or the American people know if the United States reduces its arms? What are we promising to do? Are we promising to destroy the weapons, as the START agreements require us to do, such that when we get the force numbers down, we get rid of the rest? Or are we only promising we will decommission them in the sense that we will put them in a barn, we will put them in a hangar, able to be reloaded, but we are not going to have them on station and targeted somewhere?

Will Russia change its training doctrine in the absence of a formal treaty? I remind people when Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed with the first President Bush to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, they said that without a formal agreement they could not change Russian training.

What does that have to do with anything? Rather than deciding they were going to act as if they had decommissioned the weapons, which they said they had, what did they do? They continued to train Russian forces to make war with the weapons they said were no longer deployed. So what then happened?

I am sure my colleagues from West Virginia and Montana and I must have attended intelligence meetings where we would be told the following: They said they had decommissioned these weapons, but yet look at the manual; their doctrine still says they are going to plan to use them. So that must mean they have not decommissioned them. How do we know? And yet Gorbachev and Yeltsin had said at the start, without a verifiable agreement we are not going to change our manual because we may have to pull those suckers out of storage and use them if you guys turn out not to keep your side of the deal.

What will we do? Will we, too, train our troops to make war with weapons we say are no longer deployed? Will other countries take heart because we have fewer deployed weapons, or will they look at our total stockpile and say that our reductions are a sham?

Again, I have no doubt that President Bush will keep his word and do the right thing, but we cannot, in my view, expect other countries to have as much trust in us as we have in ourselves.

I will never forget the first time I was sent by the man who is now the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and who was then the leader of the U.S. Senate—he may remember—asked me as a relatively young Senator in 1979, when the SALT II agreement was under consideration, to lead a group of new Senators who were uncertain about whether or not they were for this new arms control agreement. It was in the face of this scare that the Russians had bases in Cuba, and we

were trying to push the treaty through. The Carter administration wanted it. I led a delegation of 10 or 12 Senators—great Senators who are no longer in the Senate, Bradley, Boren, Pryor, and a number of others, because they were just elected that year. We sat down with Leonid Brezhnev, who was the Russian President at the time. Brezhnev came into their Cabinet room. We were all on one side, and Brezhnev and Kosygin on the other side, and it opened the following way: He welcomed us. We had contemporaneous translation.

Brezhnev looked at me, and he said: "Let's get two things straight, Senator. The first thing is, when I was your age I had an important job." He went on to tell me his job, along with Kosygin, was to supply Leningrad in the siege of Leningrad, making it clear "you are a young man, Senator." He wanted me to know he had been important for a long time. I got the message.

The second thing he said, and this is literally what he said: "Let's agree that we do not trust each other, and we have good reason not to trust each other."

He went on to say: "You Americans believe, with every fiber of your being, that you would never use nuclear weapons." You believe you would never use them against us first. But I hope you understand why we think you might.

Then he went on to say: "You are the only nation in the history of mankind that has ever used nuclear weapons. You used them against civilian populations."

He quickly added: "I am not second-guessing that, but you used them. So you have to understand we might think you might use them again."

A point well taken. No matter how well intended either side is, we cannot expect other nations to trust our resolve as much as we trust our resolve. So if we want others to trust us and we want to be able to trust Russia in the years to come, we should remember Ronald Reagan's advice: Trust but verify.

I am encouraged by President Bush's statement, following his force reductions announcement: If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I would be glad to do that.

He should. I hope he will. I also hope that piece of paper comes our way for us to take a look at. A new START III treaty would not be difficult to draft. It would ensure not only rigorous verification but also proper respect for the constitutional role of the Senate regarding international agreements.

There are also grounds for hope regarding the problem of proliferation and Russia's relations with Iraq and Iran. For the first time, Russians are saying there is no longer a strategic rationale for putting trade above non-proliferation in Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq. The question now is

money. It is not a question of Russia's place in the world. That place is clearly with us in the West and in opposition to proliferation.

We and our allies can provide the money that Russia needs to maintain economic growth and well-being, in return for new Russian policies and actions that refrain from proliferating weapons in that part of the world.

We can offer Russia debt relief on its Soviet-era obligations to the United States and other countries. Russia could use a significant proportion of the proceeds of that debt relief on non-proliferation programs to secure its sensitive materials and to provide new, civilian careers for its many weapons scientists who could otherwise become prey to offers from rogue states or terrorist groups.

Senator LUGAR of Indiana and I have encouraged the Administration to consider this option. We also have legislation to authorize such debt relief, which the Foreign Relations Committee has approved unanimously.

The U.N. could authorize a major increase in the Iraqi Oil for Food program—which would revitalize Iraq's oil production infrastructure—in return for devoting the proceeds to payment of Iraq's foreign debt, especially its debt to Russia. That would free Russia to pursue the issue of United Nations inspections on the basis of strategic concerns alone.

Senators DOMENICI and LUGAR propose that we provide loan guarantees to Russia in return for Russia reducing its fissile material stockpiles.

Missile defense, strategic arms and non-proliferation affect not only Russia and the United States, but the future of the whole world. The opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation—if we seize them—hold the promise of a transformed world in which international cooperation is the norm, with Russia and the United States leading the way.

But we must seize those opportunities.

And we must not waste those opportunities by engaging in purely ideological actions, like withdrawing from the ABM Treaty when there is no rational need to do that.

I conclude by saying that I compliment my friend from West Virginia who is, as usual, the first person to come to the floor and speak to this issue. It is vitally important. I hope the President and the administration listen to his advice. I think he is dead right.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for his statement. I well remember in 1987, with respect to the INF

Treaty, the Reagan administration sought to reinterpret the provisions of the ABM Treaty—to reinterpret those provisions because the Reagan administration did not want to live up to the ABM Treaty. They wanted to get away from that ABM Treaty. There were some people in that administration who sought to reinterpret the ABM Treaty. But as we prepared for the subsequent approval by this U.S. Senate of the ratification of the INF Treaty, the distinguished Senator from Delaware was adamant in insisting that there be an amendment written to provide that there be no reinterpretation of any treaty by a subsequent administration; that the treaty had to be interpreted based on the four corners of the treaty plus interpretation of the treaty as explained by witnesses of the administration in power at the time the treaty was ratified. Any new understanding would have to be agreed upon by the executive branch and the legislative branch.

The distinguished Senator from Delaware rendered a great service in that instance, as did the then-Senator from Georgia, Mr. Nunn, who was chairman of the Armed Services Committee; the then-Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Boren, who was chairman of the Intelligence Committee; and the then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Pell.

Mr. BIDEN. That is correct.

Mr. BYRD. Those three Senators and I insisted on having it in writing from the Soviets. And Secretary of State Shultz went to—I guess it was Paris—went to Europe, at least, and worked with Mr. Shevardnadze, I believe, and came back with a document in writing saying that all parties agreed that that would be the interpretation, that there would not be any subsequent reinterpretation by any administration, any subsequent President. Because if that were the case, how could we ever depend upon any treaty as having credibility, if a subsequent administration could reinterpret it according to its own wishes?

How would a subsequent administration interpret an “understanding” that was entered into by a handshake? All the more reasons for wanting to see it in writing and having it debated by the elected representatives of the people.

I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 30 seconds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to reaffirm what the Senator says, I do not think anyone should read in this that the Senator from West Virginia and I aren't happy that the President wants to bring down the number of nuclear weapons.

Mr. BYRD. No.

Mr. BIDEN. We are very supportive of that. We want to make sure when it is done, it is done.

Mr. BYRD. It is done.

Mr. BIDEN. And we know it is done.

I thank the Senator and I thank the Chair, and I particularly thank Senator BAUCUS for his kindness in allowing us to proceed.

Mr. BYRD. I join in the thanks.

Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from West Virginia as well as the Senator from Delaware. They as well as many others over the years have provided terrific service to our country, keeping their eye on this ball with respect to the former Soviet Union, current Russia, and the key question of nuclear proliferation. I thank them very much. On behalf of the American people, I thank them, too.

The Senator has done a terrific job.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me say I am deeply appreciative, and I thank the very able Senator from Montana for his observations.

WTO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the just-concluded World Trade Organization Ministerial in Doha, Qatar.

The administration has announced that WTO members reached an agreement to launch new negotiations on a number of international trade topics. Our trade negotiators hailed this as a major victory.

I recognize the considerable efforts of our trade negotiators in this process. That said, I am unsettled by the results of this session in several areas.

The agreement reached today in Doha makes it even more clear why Congress must have deeper involvement in our international trade policy.

Without a doubt, there are positive items in the documents to launch the negotiation. I am pleased that the United States was able to negotiate forward-looking language on agriculture. There are some good things there—for example, goals of improving market access and reducing market distortions, particularly export subsidies.

But these are vague commitments, and Europe and some of its allies have already demonstrated their strident opposition to meaningful progress in this area. The devil is in the details—and the details have yet to be worked out.

On the other side of the ledger, I am extremely troubled by the decision to re-open the agreements reached just a few years ago on antidumping and anti-subsidy measures. Both Houses of Congress have made it clear that they oppose negotiations to further weaken U.S. trade laws.

Let's be absolutely clear on this point. Our trading partners have only one goal here: to weaken our trade laws. That is something the administration should not tolerate—and that Congress will not tolerate.

These problems demonstrate why Congress must take a hard look at trade negotiations. The Constitution assigns responsibility for international trade to the Congress. Yet the administration is now acting without a mandate from Congress.

Congress must have a more prominent role in trade negotiations. As chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, I plan oversight hearings on these negotiations.

The problems I have outlined also make clear why any new grant of fast track negotiating authority must address the concerns of Congress on issues like preservation of U.S. trade laws. It must also ensure that Congress has an active role in trade negotiations.

I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE STIMULUS PACKAGE

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, while we are waiting for some intervening Senate business, I wish to make a couple of comments about international trade. I am inspired to do that by my colleague from Montana.

Before I do that, let me compliment my colleague, Senator BAUCUS, on the work he has done on the stimulus package. I told him yesterday in a private conversation how impressed I was with what he brought to the floor dealing with taxation and other issues to try to provide some lift and recovery to this country's economy. I think it was the right bill. It was the right thing. I commend him for his leadership, and I appreciate his leadership on that.

I was sorely disappointed that there was a point of order raised against that which prevailed last evening because I think Senator BAUCUS, along with Senator DASCHLE and others of us who were pushing very hard to get this done, had put together a piece of legislation that really would provide some boost to the American economy.

We are not in a position where we can just decide to stand around and wait and see what happens. I mentioned earlier that we had a trade history during President Hoover's period where this country seemed to be sinking into a deep abyss. And the attitude was: Well, there is not much we can do about that; we will sit around here and wait and see what happens. That is not what should have been done then, and it is not what we can do now.

What we did was positive; that is, try to put together a legislative program