

So that is why, as we look at the four issues—safety, yes, it can be done safely; the effect on the economy; the national security; and, most of all, the attitude of the people in Alaska—75 percent support it. We have Native people, Eskimos who are here in Washington, calling on Members saying: Hey, this is a personal issue. We live there. We live in the village of Kaktovik, which is in ANWR. We have a school there. We have a radar site there. There are 227 people who live there. We have a right to life and disposition on our own land and a right of expression.

So when the environmentalists say, it is an untouched Serengeti, they are misleading the public. Most of ANWR is untouched and will always remain untouched. But this little segment where the people live is the area where the oil would be drilled.

So we are disappointed with the Democratic bill because it does not include ANWR.

I have a couple more things to say, and then I will try to wind this up.

In the Democratic bill, in our opinion, there are extremely broad research and development authorizations on the issue of climate change provisions which might be dealt with better in a separate entity. We are all concerned about global warming and concerned about climate change. But the idea of drifting towards a Kyoto accord, I think most Members have indicated by that vote last year of 98-0 that the proposal before the Senate was simply unacceptable. The reason is, it would allow the developing nations to catch up with the developed nations instead of the developed nations using our technology to assist the developing nations in reducing their emissions.

Finally, the Democratic proposal has an inconsistency in one sense. It does not address, as I have indicated, looking for oil at home; namely, ANWR, even though the residents of my State support it, but it does propose lease sale 181 in the gulf right off Florida. The Democratic proposal states that we should take the lead in meeting the energy needs using indigenous resources.

What I am saying is the Democratic proposal opposes ANWR, which the State of Alaska clearly supports, but wants to force lease sale 181, which Florida opposes—the Governor of Florida and the people of Florida—which is a bit of an inconsistency. Perhaps there will be an explanation on it.

They want to shut ANWR permanently, but, by the same token, they want to accelerate the export of Alaskan natural gas. That is kind of an interesting comparison because there is a difference of how we propose to develop Alaska's gas. They propose a section 29 tax incentive for production of natural gas from Alaska.

It is interesting to reflect on what section 29 means. Section 29 is designed

as an incentive for development of unconventional sources of energy, not conventional sources.

What am I talking about? For example, overlaying Prudhoe Bay, we have what we call the West Sack Field. It is larger than Prudhoe Bay, but the oil is immersed in the sands, and the sands are in permafrost, and the technology of recovery is simply not in existence. The oil is there.

So in our bill we have a proposed subsidy for developing that technology. We have, in our bill, under section 9, an incentive for developing biomass technology, coalbed methane technology. But surprisingly enough—and I do not mean to kick a gift horse in the mouth or the teeth or the behind or wherever—they propose this section 29 in Alaska's potential natural gas development.

Under our proposal, the Alaska natural gas project would not be available for any type of section 29 subsidy. There is a reason for that. In our case, the gas has been found. We found 36 trillion cubic feet of gas associated with oil development in Prudhoe Bay. The geologists will not even get a recognition for finding a gas well. The emphasis was on an oil well.

So we found this gas. We discovered it. Furthermore, we have produced it. We produced it by pulling it out and re-injecting it into the oil wells to get greater recovery. So the gas is still there. But to suggest that Exxon, British Petroleum, and Phillips are looking for an incentive—a tax incentive under section 29—I do not mean to speak out of school, but we are just amazed they would include a subsidy to big oil for a project that is already proven, already found. The technology is available. All we need is the transportation to get it out.

So, once again, we see Members of Congress trying to determine what is in the best interests of Alaska without talking to Alaskans or understanding our point of view or giving us the courtesy.

Finally, for the record, we have had long debates on this issue of whether or not we could open ANWR safely. We have had long debates on the issue of our national security interests, of the numbers of lives we have lost over oil.

I remember Mark Hatfield, a very senior Member of this body, from the State of Oregon, saying: I would vote for ANWR any day in the world if it meant not sending another American soldier overseas to fight a war in a foreign country over oil.

Well, the final word—and this is from Representative RALPH HALL, a Democrat from Texas, who said Tuesday in a speech before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—and I quote:

I would drill in a cemetery if it kept my grandkids out of body bags.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

RESTORING A NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in his recent address to Congress, President George W. Bush made it clear that, unlike his immediate predecessor, he strongly endorses the deployment of an effective missile defense system capable of protecting the United States, its allies and its forward deployed forces from the growing threat of missile attack. As someone who has long viewed the deployment of missile defense as an urgent national priority, I look forward to working with President Bush to achieve this vital national security goal for America.

March 23 marks the 18th anniversary of President Ronald Reagan's historic speech announcing his determination to see America build a defense against ballistic missiles. It is gratifying to know that Reagan's vision remains alive today. As Reagan said in 1983:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. . . . It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs . . . as we pursue a program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.

Now, 18 years later, at the dawn of the new century, a renewed Presidential focus on missile defense is appropriate and necessary. The threat posed by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is very real and growing. And as we have seen over time, the technology to begin to meet this threat is available, if we will make the effort to aggressively develop it. Today, President Bush promises to do just that.

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration squandered most of the last 8 years, failing to build a proper foundation for the kind of robust missile defense development and deployment which the growing threat demands. Wedded to the outdated 1972 ABM Treaty, to the superstitions of arms control and to greatly reduced defense budgets, Clinton was consistently hostile to the deployment of effective missile defense. Here is a quick year-by-year review of some of the highlights of the Clinton administration's dismal record on missile defense.

1993: cut \$2.5 billion from the Bush missile defense budget request for fiscal year 1994; halted all cooperation with Russia on a joint global missile defense program; terminated the Reagan-Bush Strategic Defense Initiative program; downgraded National Missile Defense to a research and development program only; cut 5-year

missile defense funding by 54 percent from \$39 billion to \$18 billion; reaffirmed commitment to ABM Treaty, saying any defense must be "treaty-compliant."

1994: State Department official called the ABM treaty "sacred text," saying "arms control has more to offer our national security than do more weapons systems. We look first to arms control and second . . . to defenses;" declared Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) non-treaty compliant; placed self-imposed limits on THAAD testing to keep it "treaty-compliant."

1995: Placed self-imposed limits on Navy Upper Tier system to keep it "treaty compliant;" politicized National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to downplay growing missile threat; vetoed Defense Authorization bill requiring missile defense deployment by 2003.

1996: Cut funding and slowed development of THAAD and Navy Theater-Wide systems, in defiance of the law—the Defense Authorization bill—requiring accelerated development; announced fraudulent "3-plus-3" program for national missile defense: three years to develop, plus three years to deploy. (Later changed to "5 plus 3," then "7 plus 3," then dropped the "plus 3"); reaffirmed ABM Treaty as the "cornerstone of strategic stability;" opposed and helped kill legislation calling for NMD deployment by 2003.

1997: signed ABM Treaty agreements with Russia which, if ratified by the Senate, would: (1) reaffirm the validity of the ABM Treaty banning effective national missile defense; (2) sharply limit the effectiveness of theater defense systems; and (3) ban space-based missile defenses.

Clinton never submitted these for ratification, knowing they would fail to get the needed 67 votes for ratification.

1998: opposed and helped kill legislation calling for NMD deployment "as soon as technologically possible;" disputed the Rumsfeld Commission's assessment of the growing missile threat, arguing that there was no need to accelerate missile defense deployment; on August 24, Joint Chiefs Chairman Henry Shelton wrote to me affirming his assurance that U.S. intelligence would detect at least three years' warning of any new rogue state ICBM threat; on August 31, one week later, North Korea surprised U.S. intelligence by testing a three-stage Taepo-Dong I missile with intercontinental range, demonstrating critical staging technology and rudimentary ICBM capability.

1999: delayed by at least two years the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites designed to detect and track missile launches necessary to coordinate with any effective national missile defense system; emasculated the Missile Defense Act of 1999—passed by veto-proof majorities in

both houses—calling for deployment "as soon as technologically possible." In signing the bill into law, Clinton outrageously interpreted it to mean that no deployment decision had been made and that therefore he would make no change in his go-slow missile defense policy.

2000: cut funding for the Airborne Laser (ABL) program by 52 percent over 5-year period, but the cuts were later reversed by Congress; allowed Russia to veto U.S. missile defense plans by making NMD dependent on Russia's agreement to modify the ABM Treaty, but Russia would never agree; postponed the administration's long-awaited NMD deployment decision from June to September and then decided to defer any decision indefinitely to the next administration, insuring that the entire eight years of the Clinton presidency would pass without a commitment to deploy national missile defense.

The net result of this abysmal record is that America continues to remain completely vulnerable to missile attack, despite growing threats. In the 8 years of the Clinton administration, there was never a commitment to deploy national missile defense. Instead, there was a misguided ideological dedication to preserving the ABM Treaty, whose very purpose was to prohibit effective missile defense. In essence, the Clinton vision was exactly opposite of the Reagan vision.

Today, the threat grows. Proliferation of missile and weapons technology around the world proceeds at an accelerated pace. Under Clinton, weapons inspectors were kicked out of Iraq; Russia greatly increased its military assistance to China; China was caught stealing U.S. nuclear secrets; U.S. companies were given a green light to help improve the accuracy and reliability of China's nuclear missiles; China transferred missile and weapons technology to North Korea, Iran, Iraq and others; China threatened to absorb Taiwan; and China threatened to attack the United States with nuclear missiles.

The Rumsfeld Commission determined that new ICBM threats could emerge in the future "with little or no warning." The Cox Commission determined that Clinton covered up or presided over some of the most serious security breaches in U.S. history, affecting critical national secrets about virtually every weapon in our nuclear arsenal and numerous military-related high technologies.

The case for missile defense is more compelling today than it has ever been. With a new President determined to set a new course, or rather to set us back to the course first articulated by President Reagan, there is reason for hope and optimism.

I urge President Bush to move quickly in forging a national commitment to the deployment of a robust global mis-

sile defense system capable of defending all 50 States, our allies and our forward deployed troops around the world. We should appropriate the necessary budgets. We should exploit all options and technologies. We should seriously consider an initial deployment at sea, using our proven Aegis ships and complementing it with important ground and spaced based systems.

In consultation with our allies, and while maintaining our nuclear deterrent, we should break free of the constraints of the outdated ABM Treaty and begin to fashion a security regime based, as Reagan said, on our ability "to save lives rather to avenge them." This is the legacy America deserves, consistent with Reagan's vision of courage, morality and security—a vision I know is shared by President George W. Bush.

SCORECARD OF HATRED

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in just the last few weeks, two California high schools a few miles apart, suffered the same terrible fate when troubled students opened fire on both classmates and teachers. These remind of us of the many acts of gun violence committed by young people in American schools since the attack at Columbine High School almost 2 years ago. In last week's Time magazine, an article called "Scorecard of Hatred," lists in detail the many varied plans of copycat attacks since Columbine, including those planned by teenagers who, thankfully, failed in their attempts. Each of the more than 20 different attempts by young people to "pull a Columbine," the phrase that some teenagers now use to describe these acts of violence, is disturbing in its own right. As a whole, these acts are beginning to become an epidemic.

I often wonder why these acts of school violence are so uniquely American. The warning signs most commonly associated with teens who engage in school shootings—disturbing patterns of behavior, depression, increased fascination with violence, sometimes inappropriate living conditions—are no doubt experienced by teens in other countries. Yet, even though the gun shots at Columbine were witnessed by teens across the world, teens in other countries are not routinely committing terrible acts of school violence.

Last May, on the 1-year anniversary of the Columbine shootings, there was one act of copycat violence in Ottawa in the province of Ontario, Canada. According to an article in the Ottawa Citizen, a 15-year-old boy, who was teased mercilessly by his classmates, became obsessed with the Columbine school massacre and the violent perpetrators of the tragic event. He posted pictures of the young men in his lockers and began counting down the days until the