different from this year. In this year, we have insufficient detail from the President for the Joint Tax Committee and the Congressional Budget Office to give us an independent estimate of the cost of the President’s proposals.

Mr. KYL. That is a question. Let me answer by saying apparently the Joint Tax Committee believes it has enough information, because it has given us an estimate of the cost, both to the House and the Senate. In fact, it gave a very complimentary estimate of the part of the tax relief which I am putting forward. I might argue with what they have come up with, but apparently they believed they had enough information to do it.

We do have an estimate this year, whether it is right or wrong. We had an estimate back in 1993. We have an estimate there. We are going to live with it one way or the other. But I don’t think that should be a basis for suggesting it is improper at this point to take up the budget resolution. I think what we have established is that just as with the change of President in 1993, when you have a President in the year 2001, it is unrealistic to expect there would be the same degree of detail in the budget they send up in their very first year as there is for the remainder of their term.

But the fact is, has not stopped Congress from acting on a budget resolution at the time of year when it should do so, that we will be doing that, and that hopefully we will have an entire week next week for a continuation of this debate for proposals of amendments. I suspect we will be going very late at night next week as we consider all the different ideas different Senators have before we finally act on the budget.

I hope, to conclude the remarks here, this could be done in a bipartisan fashion and it will not be a purely partisan vote. One would hope that we will see how it develops.

Mr. CONRAD. Will the Senator further yield just for a brief question?

Mr. KYL. I would like to get on with what I started a half hour ago, if I may.

Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I rise today to express concern about the direction of Chinese military policy vis-à-vis the United States.

America’s relationship with China is one of the key foreign policy challenges facing our nation in the 21st Century. It is clear that the importance of our relationship with China. It is the world’s most populous nation, has the world’s largest armed forces, and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its economic and military strength has grown a great deal in recent years, and is projected to continue to grow significantly in the coming decades. And most significantly, it is intent on gaining control over Taiwan, even by military force if necessary.

For some time now, I have been concerned that, out of a desire to avoid short-term controversies in our relationship with China that could prove disruptive to trade, we have overlooked serious potential national security problems. As Bill Gertz noted in his book, The China Threat, and countless others like it, the United States will walk to the point where it injures others while running itself. The article went on to issue a veiled threat to attack the U.S. with long-range missiles, stating, “China is neither Iraq or Yugoslavia . . . it is a country that has certain serious potential national security problems.”

As Bill Gertz noted in his book, The China Threat, the former administration believed that China could be reformed solely by the civilizing influence of the West. With China is that the theory hasn’t proven out—the embrace of western capitalism has not been accompanied by respect for human rights, the rule of law, the embrace of democracy, or a less belligerent attitude toward its neighbors. Indeed, serious problems with China have grown worse. And continuing to gloss over these problems for fear of disrupting the fragile U.S.-China relationship, primarily for trade reasons, only exacerbates the problems.

We must be more realistic in our dealings with China and more cognizant of potential threats. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said in his confirmation hearing:

A strategic partner China is not, but neither is it our inevitable and implacable foe. China is a competitor, a potential rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where our strategic interests overlap — areas where China is doing what we can do that is constructive, that is helpful, and that is in our interest.

I believe it is in our best interest to seriously evaluate China’s military strategy, plans for modernization of its People’s Liberation Army, and the expansion of its ICBM capability, and buildup of forces opposite Taiwan. Let us not risk underestimating either China’s intentions or capabilities, possibly finding ourselves in the midst of a conflict we could have prevented.

I would like to begin by answering a seemingly obvious question: Why isn’t China a strategic partner? Among other things, China is being led by a communist regime with a deplorable human rights record and a history of irresponsible technology sales to rogue states. Furthermore, Beijing’s threatening rhetoric aimed at the United States and Taiwan, as well as its military modernization and buildup of forces opposite Taiwan, should lead us to the conclusion that China potentially poses a growing threat to our national security. While it is true that China is one of the United States’ largest trading partners, we must not let this blind us to strategic concerns.

Strategically, we must consider China a competitor—not an enemy, but certainly a cause for concern that should prompt us to take appropriate steps to safeguard our security.

Chinese government officials and state-run media have repeatedly threatened to use force against Taiwan to reunite it with the mainland; and further, have warned the United States against involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For example, in February 2000, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, a state-owned newspaper, carried an article which stated, “On the Taiwan issue, it is very likely that the United States will walk to the point where it injures others while running itself.” The article went on to issue a veiled threat to attack the U.S. with long-range missiles, stating, “China is neither Iraq or Yugoslavia . . . it is a country that has certain serious potential national security problems.”

This threat, and countless others like it, have been backed by China’s rapid movement to modernize its army. The immediate focus of the modernization is to build a military force capable of subduing Taiwan, and capable of defeating it swiftly enough to prevent American intervention. According to the Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, released in June, “A cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the dominant scenario guiding the People’s Republic of China’s force planning, military training, and war preparation.”
We should also be concerned with China's desire to project power in other parts of the Far East. According to a recent Washington Post article, China announced that it will increase its defense spending this year by 17.7 percent—its biggest increase in the last 20 years. China's publicly-acknowledged defense budget of over $17 billion for next year is higher than the defense budgets of neighboring countries like India, Taiwan, and South Korea. Most analysts estimate China's real spending on defense is at least three times as great as the publicly disclosed figure. For example, according to the Secretary of Defense's January 2001 report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, China's military funding levels are expected to average between $44 and $70 billion annually between 2000 and 2004.

Chinese military planners are working to incorporate the concepts of modern warfare and the conditions of modern technology, especially high technology.” This is consistent with the Department of Defense's assessment in the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, that "China's military planners are working to incorporate the concepts of modern warfare . . . and have placed a priority on developing the technologies and tactics necessary to conduct rapid tempo, high technology warfare . . ." Defense Department assessment, an invasion of the island would likely be preceded by “a naval blockade, air assaults and missile attacks on Taiwan.” Furthermore, it states: Airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces will conduct simultaneous attacks to the rear of Taiwan’s coastal defenses to seize a port, preferably in close proximity to an airfield. Seizing a beachhead would also facilitate a support attack, and an airborne envelopment would facilitate amphibious operations by cutting off Taiwan's coastal defenders from supply lines and forcing them to fight to two directions. China would likely seek to suppress Taiwan's air defenses and establish air superiority over an invasion corridor in the Taiwan Strait.

To solidify its ability to launch such an attack, China is expected to continue to increase its force of short-range ballistic missiles. According to an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Taiwan estimates that the Chinese Army currently has 400 short-range missiles deployed opposite that island. More recently, the Washington Times reported that a U.S. satellite detected a new shipment of short-range missiles to Yongan, in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan. The Washington Times had previously reported “China had deployed nearly 100 short-range ballistic missiles and mobile launchers” at this particular base. Bill Gertz's book, The China Threat, cites a 1999 internal Pentagon report that indicates China plans to increase its forces of medium-range and M-11 missiles to 650 by 2005. In addition, China has also deployed medium-range CSS-5 missiles, with a range of 1,800 kilometers, which cannot be stopped by Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense batteries.

China’s continued development of its ICBM force, which directly threatens U.S. cities, is also troubling. The Defense Department’s report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, states: China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads . . . While the ultimate extent of China’s strategic modernization is unknown, it is clear that the number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase during the next two decades. China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States. Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States. For example, Beijing is developing two new road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. China has conducted successful flight tests of the DF-5A. In 1999 and 2000 the DF-5A ICBM is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 kilometers. Another longer-range mobile ICBM also is under development and likely will be tested within the next several years. It will be targeted primarily against the United States.

Another study completed by the National Intelligence Council, presenting the consensus views of all U.S. intelligence agencies, echoed these concerns stating, Beijing “will have deployed tens to several tens of missiles with nuclear warheads targeted against the United States” in the not too distant future. The paper’s view is obvious—to preclude the United States from intervening in any Chinese military actions against Taiwan.

China’s advances in its air and naval forces are also weighing upon the growing threat the Taiwan Strait poses to U.S. forces. Russian transfers of military equipment and technology are accelerating China’s efforts in these areas. According to an article in Jane's Intelligence Review.

Between 1991 and 1996 Russia sold China an estimated 81 billion worth of military weapons and related technologies each year. That figure doubled by 1997. In 1999 the two governments increased the military assistance package for a five-year program (until 2004) planning $20 billion worth of technology transfers.

China’s Air Force is continuing its acquisition of Russian fighters and fighter bombers. For example, China now has at least 50 Russian Su–27 fighters, and has started co-producing up to 200 more. Furthermore, according to a 1999 Defense News article, Russia and China signed a preliminary agreement to sell China a group of approximately 40 Su–30MKK fighter-bombers, which are comparable to the U.S. F–15E Strike Eagle. According to a 1999 article in the Russian publication Air Fleet (Moscow), these aircraft will be equipped with precision-guided bombs and missiles, as well as an anti–radiation missile. Delivery has not yet occurred, but is expected within the next three years.

The June 2000 Defense Department report predicted that by 2020, the “... readiness rates, the distances over which China can project air power, and the variety of missions which China’s air forces can perform also can be expected to improve.” Furthermore, it states that after 2005, “... if projected trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China’s favor.” This shift will undoubtedly be accelerated by Russia’s assistance.

Additionally, the report estimates that, by 2005, China will have developed the capability for aerial refueling and airborne early warning. Also, the development of a next generation carrier-based radar and air-to-air missile similar to the U.S. AMRAAM for China’s fourth-generation fighters is likely to be complete.

In an effort to increase its ability to place a naval blockade around Taiwan, the Chinese Navy is in the process of acquiring new submarines, anti-ship missiles, and mines. According to the Defense Department’s June 2000 report, “China’s submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China Seas.” Furthermore, a January 2001 Jane’s Defense Weekly article states that the core of China’s future naval plans calls for the acquisition of an aircraft carrier capability and the incorporation of nuclear-powered attack submarines into its fleet. According to this article, the Chinese Navy recently acquired two Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers. China has discussed with Sunburn anti-ship missiles that were developed by Russia to attack U.S. carrier battle groups. It is also continuing to buy Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and has discussed purchasing an aircraft carrier from Russia.

Faced with China's moves to increase its ability to blockade Taiwan or to disrupt sea lanes near the island, its steps to develop the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and its moves to increase its missile force facing the United States and Taiwan, we must contend with the question of how to deter an attack on Taiwan, and how to defend our forces which would be deployed in the area.

The obvious answer is to supply Taiwan with the defensive weaponry it has long sought to buy from the United States and to be able to defend the United States against missile attack threatened by China. Taiwan has submitted its official defense request list to the
United States, and next month, the Administration will make its final decision on which items will be sold to Taiwan.

According to the Washington Times, Taiwan has requested approximately 30 different weapons systems from the United States this year. Though the official list is classified, a recently released Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report discussed Taiwan's current defense needs, mentioning some of the items that it is interested in acquiring. I would like to highlight just a few of these items.

According to this Senate report, Taiwan has, once again, expressed its need for four Aegis destroyers—a request that was repeatedly denied by the Clinton Administration. These destroyers would, according to the Foreign Relations Committee report, provide Taiwan with an increased air defense and C4I system to deal with rapidly developing [Chinese] air and naval threats.” Because final delivery will take 8 to 10 years, however, Taiwan will need an interim solution to deal with these threats. Thus it may be necessary to sell Taiwan four used Kidd-class destroyers, which do not have a radar system as capable as Aegis, but are more advanced than what Taiwan currently possesses.

Additionally, the report indicates that Taiwan has stated its need for submarines. It currently has only four, while China has sixty-five. They could prove particularly important should Taiwan need to defend itself against a Chinese blockade of the island.

Taiwan also needs our help to deal with the growing imbalance of air power across the Taiwan Strait. According to the report, Taiwan’s Air Force has indicated its need to be able to counter China’s long-range surface-to-air missiles and to counterattack its aircraft and naval vessels from long distances. In order to counter China’s surface-to-air missile sites that can threaten aircraft over the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has expressed interest in obtaining High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). Taiwan reportedly would also like to purchase Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and longer-range, infra-red guided missiles capable of attacking land targets.

The United States should approve all of Taiwan’s requests, provided they are necessary for Taiwan to defend itself, and provided they do not violate technology transfer restrictions. Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act states, “The President, and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan . . . .” (Emphasis added) Taiwan clearly needs to upgrade its capabilities in several key areas and should act to address these shortfalls.

We must also deal with a broader question. Since the approach adopted by the Clinton Administration clearly did not move China in the right direction, how can we positively influence China to eschew military action against Taiwan?

One way is to be unambiguous in our dealings with China. During the cold war, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher took a principled stand against the Soviet Union, which contributed to one of the greatest accomplishments in history: the West’s victory without war over the Soviet empire. The time has come for the United States to take a similarly principled, firm approach to our dealings with China. We should hold China to the same standards of proper behavior we have defined for other nations, and we should work for political change in Beijing, unapologetically standing up for freedom and human rights. We should begin by assuring that the United States is not susceptible to blackmail by China—to freeze the United States into inaction by threat of missile attack against the United States. In this regard, we need to work toward the development and deployment of a national missile defense system. The United States currently has no defense against a ballistic missile attack from China, or any of the countries that it has assisted in developing a long-range missile capability. Missile defense will allow us to abandon the cold war policy of mutually assured destruction.

China has threatened that NMD deployment will lead to destabilization and to an arms race with that country. I disagree. As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified to the Senate in July of last year, “I think it’s fair to say that China, irrespective of what we do on NMD, will in fact, modernize and increase its ICBM capability.”

And this is why president George W. Bush is correct to remain firm in his decision to deploy an NMD system as soon as possible.

Secondly, we need to maintain strong U.S. military capabilities in Asia and improve ties to our allies in the region. As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently said about these relationships, particularly with Japan, “Weaken those relationships and we weaken ourselves. All else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from those strong relationships.”

The United States can promote democracy, free-markets, and the rule of law by standing by our democratic allies in Asia, like Japan and Taiwan. The preparedness of Taiwan’s defense forces is questionable. Increasing this preparedness will decrease the chances that the United States will need to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, or that such a conflict will occur in the first place. As I mentioned earlier, not only do we need to sell Taiwan the necessary military equipment for defense against China, our defense officials and military personnel need to be able to work with their Taiwanese counterparts to ensure that they know how to use the equipment. Without this training, the equipment we provide will be far less useful.

As stated in the Defense Department’s report:

The change in the dynamic equilibrium of forces over the long term will depend largely on whether Taiwan is able to meet or exceed developments on the mainland with programs of its own. Its success in deterring potential Chinese aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment, and its ability to integrate and operate these systems effectively . . . .

President Bush recently stated that China, our “strategic competitor” needs to be “faced without ill will and without illusions.” Our long-term goal is to live in peace and prosperity with the Chinese people, and to promote democratic transition in that country. China’s far-reaching ambitions in Asia, coupled with efforts to modernize and strengthen its military force, however, require the United States to exercise leadership. There is no doubt that China will play a larger role on the world stage in the coming years. The challenge before us is to deal with this emerging power in a way that enhances our security by dealing candidly and strongly with some of the troubling facts and trends. It is time to take a more clear-eyed approach to dealing with China.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. KYL. Madam President, on behalf of the主席, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations: Nos. 24 through 30, 32 through 35, and all nominations on the Secretary’s desk.

I further ask unanimous consent that the nominations be confirmed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, any statements relating to the nominations be printed in the RECORD, the President be immediately notified of the Senate’s action, and the Senate then return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The nominations considered and confirmed are as follows:

AIR FORCE

The following named officers for appointment in the Reserve of the Air Force to the grade indicated under title 10, U.S.C., section 12203:

To be major general
Brig. Gen. James D. Bankers, 0000
Brig. Gen. Marvin J. Barry, 0000
Brig. Gen. John D. Dorris, 0000
Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Gallagher, 0000
Brig. Gen. Ronald M. Sega, 0000