

The National Flood Insurance Program is a good idea and an important program, but it is not sound because over 8,000 victims of repetitive flood loss are not required to either flood-proof their property or relocate out of harm's way. The worst example of this absurdity is the payment of over \$800,000 to the owner of a home in Houston for 16 losses over 20 years for a home that is appraised at less than \$115,000.

Communities on the West Coast should be required to upgrade seismic standards in preparation for earthquakes, to place vulnerable coastal areas off limits to development, and to carefully evaluate the long-term effectiveness of beach reconstruction and fortification.

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All of these actions should emphasize appropriate cost-sharing and environmental sustainability. If State or local governments have not or will not do their job, then Federal support should be phased down.

Davenport Iowa's mayor Phil Yerington is correct to point out that the residents of his city are not the only ones who should be subjected to scrutiny. While I appreciate FEMA director Allbaugh's tough questions, I am not convinced that flood walls are the only or even the best answer. Oftentimes structural solutions may provide local protection but only increase flooding problems downstream. Passive flood control systems using wetlands and other natural features may provide better alternatives.

But whatever the approach, people need to accept the consequences of their location and development decisions. Repetitive flood loss should not be the sole responsibility of the Federal government.

State and local governments should ensure that zoning regulations and building codes in storm-prone areas are rigorous enough to limit wind and water damage by highly predictable weather patterns.

I commend the FEMA director for his concerns, and stand ready, along with my congressional colleagues, to work with him on these difficult issues. Disaster relief should not be lost in the shuffle of must-pass emergency legislation. It must receive the scrutiny it deserves.

We ought to make sure, for example, that Federal tax dollars are not used to rebuild environmentally-damaging lagoons of hog waste in flood plains. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act was a terrific Reagan-era environmental protection embraced by Democrats and Republicans, environmentalists and business interests alike. It should be extended to all coastal areas.

Sensitive shorelines should not have private development subsidized at the Federal taxpayer expense. Government

regulations should be making it cheaper and easier for local communities to take the less intrusive greener approach to flood control than to use the more environmentally-damaging structural approaches.

Project Impact, which invested small amounts of Federal money to develop emergency management partnerships and planning in advance of a disaster, should be enhanced, not eliminated, as recommended by the Bush administration. It was an ill omen for the administration to propose Impact's elimination on the very day of the Seattle earthquake.

It is time for the administration to align its land use, disaster, and infrastructure policies to be supportive these cost-effective, visionary approaches. It is time for Congress to step up to be a full partner, rather than supporting short-term parochial interests that only encourage people to live in harm's way, waste tax dollars, and ultimately make the problem worse.

What better response to this year's Earth Day than a bipartisan cooperative approach between the administration and Congress to tackle this long-term and growing problem.

UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. BIGGERT). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE) is recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Madam Speaker, with the President making his remarks today on missile defense, I think we need to recognize unprecedented political challenges loom on the strategic horizon. Current U.S. defense force planning is set within an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Historic rivals of the United States, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations, have either disintegrated altogether or lost much of their competitive influence.

Regional state actors, particularly on the Asian continent, show signs of future ascendancy on the world political stage. Other nation states, some exhibiting anti-U.S. bent, continue to challenge American allies and interests around the world, even as U.S. peacekeeping and peacemaking commitments evolve.

The very definition of American interests is in transition as varied threats emerge in the post-Cold War world.

International corruption, organized crime, and the production, trade, and trafficking of illicit narcotics is on the rise. These transnational threats contribute to the instability of political systems abroad, the violation of U.S. borders, and often represent a threat to social conditions in the United States.

The threat of terrorism, both state and non-state sponsored, has grown in significance

and Americans have increasingly become targets for attackers abroad. According to a December 2000 unclassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, terrorist attacks against the United States, its forces, facilities, and interests overseas are expected to increase over the next decade. Additionally the report states, "Between now and 2015 terrorist tactics will become increasingly sophisticated and designed to achieve mass casualties." This potential threat is of particular concern for the United States with its open borders, emphasis on local—and perhaps uncoordinated—emergency responders, and a prevalent cultural respect for civil liberties, and, thus, freedom of movement and action. Antiterrorist measures must address all plausible attack scenarios, including the delivery of an explosive device by more traditional means, such as by ship, rail, foot, or automotive vehicle.

The availability of advanced technologies has also reached a significant level of concern as Russia, China, and North Korea, continue to exhibit ambivalent attitudes towards non-proliferation agreements.

The 2001 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress notes the spread of materials with potential applications to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and highlights the proliferation of advanced long-range delivery systems.

Another study, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group by the National Defense University laments, and I quote, "Given the diffusion of advanced military technologies and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one could envision an adversary armed with longer-range missiles and cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction, advanced integrated air defense systems, and/or sophisticated anti-ship mines and missiles by 2010, if not sooner."

U.S. military forces, then—forward deployed to temper adversarial behavior and required to provide both a credible deterrence and an overwhelming response to aggression if needed—face new and multiple challenges, not the least of which is to consider anew its role in assisting with defense of national territory.

Set within this context, U.S. strategists are challenged with questions about nuclear strategy and force posture, arms control regimes, and missile defense modernization options. Missile proliferation has introduced an immediate threat to American uniformed personnel stationed abroad, and brought to the fore the prospect of ballistic missile attack on the United States as a real possibility within the next 5 to 7 years.

China, Russia, and North Korea each have well-armed missiles capable of striking parts or all of the United States, and other nations, such as Iran, may possess similar technology in the not too distant future.

This new setting has led some to call for a new strategic synthesis and a doctrinal requirement to, in the words of Michael Krepon, and I quote, "reduce

the dangers from missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the uncertain period ahead.”

Still, the view of the threat from abroad should not create a threat from within. An effort must be made to avoid strategic decisions that might antagonize our international competitors and/or partners, leading them to adopt a posture even more belligerent in nature. Krepon suggests, and I quote, “The net effect of missile deployments should be to reinforce reductions in nuclear forces, reassure allies, support nonproliferation partners, and reduce the salience of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.”

Thus, the threat to America should be viewed holistically. It should be viewed with an eye receptive to the benefits of negotiation, diplomacy, and arms reduction possibilities, mindful of adversarial intent. The possibility of a threat does not necessarily deem it likely. Whereas missile threats to the United States and allies indeed exist and are likely to increase, other threats also remain. America, therefore, should invest in a force structure commensurate with likely threats. Above all, consideration of missile defense systems must not acquire a 21st century Maginot Line mentality.

Calls for nonpartisanship respecting an issue are generally rhetorical and strategic in nature as regards their political origin. Missile doctrine made manifest in congressional policy, however, cries out for just that approach. No other defense posture is as pregnant with controversy and potential for bitter political conflict. The costs of commitment alone set off warning bells throughout the budget spectrum. Discussion can rapidly descend into confrontation and accusation if we do not pledge to bring serious, sober consideration and resolution to the table. What is needed presently is the equivalent of a congressional deep breath.

We need to remember the various missile launch scenarios are abstract evaluations and the solutions promulgated in response are visions, for the most part, still on paper and in the mind's eye.

Missiles, offensive or defensive, are at best a technological answer to a military question, not a diplomatic answer to a question of negotiation. International diplomacy and national policy remain an art, not a science. Science is fixed and immutable in its consequence, while art, as Andy Warhol said, is what one can get away with.

Congress must guard against allowing missile defense systems becoming the policy, allowing the technology, in effect, to develop its own psychology. There is gradually being created in the United States a burgeoning military and corporate apparatus dependent in large measure on missile defense to rationalize its existence.

It is imperative, therefore, that the Congress assess the role of missile defense policy in the overall context of national security and economic stability. The issues are real. The responsibility is ours.

MISSILE DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, it is no secret that missile defense is perhaps one of the most significant national security issues facing the House this year. How our country decides to pursue reducing that specific threat affects how much we will be able to spend on other aspects of defense, how we will deal with our friends and allies, and how America participates in shaping the world.

I do not oppose missile defense. Neither do many Democrats. But I believe, as with any aspect of national security, that our expenditure should be proportional to the threat posed.

My friend, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE), has laid out some very sound principles by which I believe we should proceed in considering our system, and that is a significant one.

Reducing the missile threat should be a cooperative undertaking involving the United States, nations that wish us well, and nations that do not. Every missile not built is one we do not have to defend against.

Developing our policy should also be a cooperative process, Madam Speaker. I hope the President will work with Congress in that effort. This is an area where I can assure the President that a bipartisanship is possible.

I look forward to hearing from the expert, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT), and I also compliment the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE) on his seminal work in this area. I thank him for that.

Let me speak first about the threat as it involves military intelligence. Missile defense, if nothing else, is at the terminal end of military operations. Its use represents a failure to deter, and perhaps, more to the point, a missed opportunity to have assessed accurately intentions and activity of a potential enemy.

There is no substitute, and I will repeat it, there is no substitute for comprehensive intelligence-gathering and analysis if the preventative value of missile defense is to be maximized.

Now, there are several points that should be brought out that can be termed as principles on missile defense. The deployment of missile defense systems to protect our country and its interests is a decision that should be considered in the following context.

First, missile defense investment must be measured in relation to other military requirements.

Missile defense must counter a credible threat.

Missile defense will require an integrated, fully-funded military and intelligence effort, and I will repeat, that reliability and timely intelligence is critical to the success of any missile defense system.

Missile defense must be proven to work through rigorous, realistic testing prior to any final deployment decisions. In other words, it has to work.

Missile defense must improve overall United States national security. This is fundamentally a question as to whether deploying defenses will encourage opponents to deploy counter-offenses, encouraging in the process a global missile proliferation race.

Missile defense must be deployed with an understanding that those benefiting from its protection will share in its costs. That is, if the benefits of a missile defense system are extended to share with American allies in Europe or elsewhere, equitable burden-sharing arrangements need to be made.

Finally, deployment of missile defense will be debated in relation to the provisions of the antiballistic missile defense system.

Madam Speaker, the whole issue of missile defense will be a serious issue this year. The President is making a statement regarding that later today. It is an area where bipartisanship is needed. It is an area that I feel very certain that bipartisanship will happen, but we need to be thorough and not rush to judgment and do something that is wrong or inaccurate, or something that does not work or meets the threats that are obviously apparent.

Again, let me commend our friend, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE), on his efforts. I look forward to hearing our friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT), who has done a great deal of work in this area.

SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT'S MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) is recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the President's announced speech to move forward with missile defense for this country.

It is outrageous to me, and it should be to our colleagues, Madam Speaker, that 10 years after 28 young Americans came home in body bags from Desert Storm, that we still do not have a highly effective theater missile defense system to protect our troops.