The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.

Mr. EDWARDS. Madam President, this is an issue on which we have consensus. The President of the United States said, "Only employers who retain responsibility for and make vital medical decisions should be subject to suit."

Our bill provides exactly as the President describes. As Senator KENNEDY has indicated, we have consensus not only with the President of the United States but in this body and in the House of Representatives based on the Norwood-Dingell bill which was voted on before. This is an issue about which there is consensus.

We are continuing to work. Senator SNOWE and others are leading that effort. We are working across party lines to get good stronger language so that employers know that they are protected without completely leaving out the rights of the patients.

I urge my colleagues to vote against the Gramm amendment, which is outside our bill, outside our position, outside Norwood-Dingell, and outside what the President of the United States has said.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, throughout this debate, those who are in favor of this bill have said our bill is just like the Texas bill. Look at Texas. No employers have been sued, and there have been a minimum number of lawsuits. Yet when you look at this bill, it says employers can't be sued. Yet when you look at this bill, it says employers can't be sued.

I urge my colleagues to look at Texas. If you want to take all the claims of the benefits of Texas, do it the way they have done. They thought you created unintended consequences by letting employers be sued. They knew that employers could not make the final decision because they had external review, just as this bill and every other bill has. By doing an employer carve-out, they guaranteed that every small and large business in the State would know they cannot be sued.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORZINE). The question is on changing amendment No. 810. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 43, nays 57, as follows:

(Roll Call Vote No. 197 Leg.)

YEAS—43

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. KENNEDY. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we were in the process of trying to propound a unanimous consent request, but all the parties are not here. We will do that at 2:15.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a roll call to determine whether the standing resolutions limiting the transaction of business for not to exceed 30 minutes with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

Under the previous order, the Senator from Wisconsin is recognized to speak for up to 15 minutes.

COLORADO REPUBLICAN CASE

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on April 2 of this year, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to pass the McCain-Feingold bill and ban soft money. Even before the roll was called on final passage and 59 Senators voted "aye," the Senate’s foremost opponent of reform declared that he relished the opportunity to bring a constitutional challenge to the bill. "You’re looking at the plaintiff," the Senator from Kentucky announced.

Opponents of reform have consistently expressed confidence that the courts will strike down our efforts to clean up the campaign finance system. They regularly opine that the McCain-Feingold bill is unconstitutional, and, despite clear signs to the contrary in the Court’s opinion last term in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, express great certainty that the Supreme Court will never allow our bill to take effect.

Well, in its decision yesterday morning in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, the Court again dumped cold water on that certainty. The court held that the coordinated party spending limits now in the law—the so-called "44(a) limits"—are constitutional. It ruled that the coordinated spending limits are justified as a way to prevent circumvention of the $1,000 per election limits on contributions to candidates that the Court upheld in the landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976. In my view, the
The Court upheld Congress's right to limit the coordinated spending of the parties. But even more than that, I am pleased at the way that the Court looked at the constitutional issues in the case and the arguments of the parties. The Court's analysis demonstrates an understanding of the real world of money and politics that gives me great confidence that the soft money ban in the McCain-Feingold bill against an inevitable constitutional challenge.

As my partner and colleague, Senator McCain, pointed out to me prior to my taking the floor, of course this decision was about hard money; but if you really read it, it isn't so much about hard money or soft money, it is just about money and the corrupting influence it has on our political process.

For example, the Court noted that "the money the parties spend comes from contributors with their own interests. And the Court recognized that those contributions are not to parties in an attempt to influence the actions of candidates. The Court said:

Parties are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party's message to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one, narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors.

This is precisely the point that we who have fought so hard to ban soft money have been making for years. These contributions are designed to influence federal officeholders who raise them for the parties, and ultimately, to influence legislation or executive policy. The Court shows that it understands this use of contributions to political parties when it states:

Parties thus position themselves as more complex than simply electing candidates; whether they like it or not, they act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.

The Court also recognized that the party fundraising, even of limited hard money, provides opportunities for large donors to get special access to lawmakers. The Court states:

Even under present law substantial donations turn the parties into matchmakers whose special meetings and receptions give the donors the chance to get their points across to the candidates.

In a footnote, the Court notes evidence in the record of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee establishing exclusive clubs for the most generous donors. These special clubs and receptions are even more prevalent in the world of soft money fundraising. Both parties sell access to their elected officials for high dollar soft money contributions. This week a Republican fundraiser featuring the President and the Vice President is expected to raise over $20 million.

The corrupting influence of soft money, or at least the appearance of corruption created by the extraordinary sums raised by party leaders and federal officeholders and candidates, is an argument for the constitutionality of a ban on soft money that those who support the McCain-Feingold bill would have made even if the Colorado II case had come out the other way. But the Court's decision itself is solid support for another independent reason that the soft money ban is constitutional.

Corporations and unions are prohibited from contributing money in connection with federal elections. And individuals are subject to strict limits on their contributions to candidates and parties. The soft money loophole allows those limits to be evaded. This is not just a theoretical possibility, as in the Colorado case. There is a massive amount of money being raised by candidates for the parties, and it is being spent in a whole variety of ways to influence federal elections. In recent years, the parties have used soft money to run ads that are virtually indistinguishable from campaign ads run by the candidates. That is what is going on in the real world.

A soft money ban would end the circumvention of these crucial limits in the law, limits that date back to 1907 in the case of corporations, 1947 in the case of unions, and 1974 in the case of individuals. The Supreme Court's decision yesterday tells us that Congress can constitutionally act to end that evasion.

The remaining question, of course, is whether we will do it. Our vote in this body on April 2 was the first step. When the House returns from the July 4th recess it will vote on an omnibus campaign finance reform, and I am hopeful that it will act decisively to pass a bill that is largely similar to the McCain-Feingold bill. Then it will be up to the Senate to act quickly and send the bill to President Bush for his signature. We are getting close, Mr. President, to finally cleaning up the corrupt soft money decision. The Supreme Court's decision yesterday, unexpected as it was to many in the Senate and in the legal community, is a major boost for our efforts. The Court has spoken. Now Congress must act.

I yield the remainder of the time under my control to the Senator from New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

Mrs. CLINTON. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I add my thanks and gratitude to my good friend from Wisconsin. He has been a leader on this issue of campaign finance reform for so many years. He started as a young boy, and it has taken most of his life. I think progress is being made from a most unlikely source. I applaud