

As it stands now, American consumers already depend on foreign and often hostile nations for more than half of our oil supply. In 20 years, that percentage will increase to 64 percent. Doesn't it make more sense to invest in domestic production so that we are not held hostage to the whims of OPEC and the need to militarily defend our interests in the major oil-producing regions?

In conclusion, I commend President Bush and Vice President CHENEY for producing serious and honest proposals to enact a long-term energy strategy on behalf of American consumers. A worsening energy crisis requires all of us to act swiftly on these proposals before the situation becomes more widespread.

I urge our new Democratic leaders to take this proposal seriously and find a way to bring solutions to the floor of the Senate. As these leaders know from their days in the minority, it is much easier to find a way to accommodate the minority's requests than fight them. I hope the new leadership will act in a truly bipartisan way and consider the administration's ideas. We're all in this energy shortage together. Democrats should work with Republicans for the good of all Americans.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. KYL. Madam President, I would like to change gears a little bit and talk about another subject that is very distressing. Throughout this break I would turn the television on to the evening news, and invariably there would be a story about yet more violence in the Middle East. It really got me thinking about the fundamental issue that I think a lot of Americans have ignored.

We wring our hands. We wish that the parties could get together, that there could be peace in the Middle East, and that they could put their problems behind them and live in harmony.

So we ask—and I see newspeople basically asking different versions of this question—why can't they just go back to the peace process? Of course, Secretary Powell urged both parties to agree to a cease-fire, which temporarily they did, yet every single day there has been a bombing or other terrorist attack or attempt in the State of Israel.

The Israeli people have said: Peace is a two-way street. If Yasser Arafat and the PLO are not willing to enforce the multiple cease-fire agreements and the peace process that we thought we had agreed to before, then we will have to enforce the law, and that includes going after those terrorists who threaten our people. No nation can do otherwise.

I rise to comment briefly on this notion of "returning to the peace proc-

ess." The problem is that the 1993 Oslo accords, which were the genesis of this thing we call "the peace process," we now learn were fundamentally flawed. That is now apparent to the Israeli people, despite significant differences. Talk about a robust democracy. It exists in Israel. You have very strongly held views by different citizens in Israel, and they fight it out. During their election process, they had a very robust election contest. Then they come together with a leader, and they hope to be unified as a people.

They had desperately wanted, to borrow someone else's famous phrase, to give peace a chance. As a result, they tried to make the Oslo accords of 1993 work. What they found after Camp David, just about a year ago this month, was that the PLO was unwilling at the end of the day to make the kinds of commitments that would be necessary for a lasting peace in the region. The reason for that is a fundamental difference of approach.

For the Israelis, it has been a question of buying peace with concessions, primarily of land, of territory. But the PLO and other Arab or Muslim groups in the Middle East apparently never had any intention of providing the quid pro quo of peace. Instead, too much of their effort has been focused on the illegitimacy, in their view, of the Israeli State, of the fundamental disagreement with the action that the United Nations took after World War II to literally create a homeland for the Jewish people. Because that homeland was taken from territory which the Palestinians saw as their lands, they have never been willing to concede the legitimacy of the Israeli State.

At Camp David, after historic concessions were made by Prime Minister Barak, concessions which had to do with the most basic rights of the Israeli citizens—to name their own capital and to have that capital an undivided city, Jerusalem; concessions with respect to over 90 percent of the West Bank land returned to the Palestinians; concessions made in removing its troops from Lebanon and a whole variety of other things—after all of those concessions had been made and there was an opportunity to seize the moment, Yasser Arafat, on behalf of the PLO, said no, he wanted one more thing. He wanted the right of return of all of the Palestinians, maybe 2 to 4 million people, maybe more, who he claims were dispossessed in order to create the Jewish state. All of those people had to have the right to go back to their homes.

That, of course, was the ultimate deal breaker. No Israeli leader could ever agree to that concession. That would literally have meant the end of the Jewish state as it is. As a result, those accords of a year ago, that discussion at Camp David of a year ago, concluded with no agreement. It ex-

posed the fundamental fallacy of the Oslo accords in the first instance.

Very briefly, there were three essential premises of the Oslo accords. The first was that if the PLO was given this 30,000-manned armed force, that could be used to suppress violence rather than to promote more agitation in the Middle East. The idea was that whereas a democratic society such as Israel had a hard time dealing with these terrorists, a firm dictatorial Yasser Arafat, with an armed 30,000-manned force, could put down these terrorists and bring peace to the area. Of course, the force expanded significantly beyond that which had been agreed to and eventually it was used to promote violence, not to suppress it.

The second premise was that Israel could withdraw from the territory before a final peace accord was reached without losing its bargaining power or military deterrent. It had worked the other way around with regard to Egypt. Egypt, in good faith with President Sadat, dealt with the Israeli leaders up front. Israel ceded the land after the peace agreement was obtained. But peace was restored between Israel and Egypt as a result. That withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian land prior to the peace ensuing was a true trade of land for peace. But under the Oslo accords, the situation was reversed. Israel was required to withdraw first and then negotiate. The result, of course, has been no credible peace.

The third premise is that peace could be made with the PLO. In Israel there had been a consensus all along among all of the parties, including Labor and Likud, that it was not possible to deal with the PLO because, A, the Palestinian organization was philosophically committed to Israel's destruction. It is hard to deal with people in a peace process who are absolutely committed to your destruction.

Secondly, the PLO's previous negotiations had been based on terrorism as the means of achieving their objectives. No Israeli government had been willing to negotiate with an entity committed to its destruction through violence.

This peace process changed that. The Israeli leaders, in a leap of faith, said: All right, we will deal with the PLO, despite this historic background.

The process itself became the basis for this understanding. A new assumption was basically created. If you are in the process of negotiating, then the quality of the people on the other side really didn't matter. That is why the Israelis were willing to make this leap of faith. It almost became a secular religion. In this country people talked about the peace process almost as the end in itself rather than the means to an end.

It turns out that the nature of the leadership of the negotiating parties does matter. So do the actions on the

ground. The quality of the other people is fundamental to the success of the negotiations. The parties were never close, as some thought. Rather, the question really is whether peace was ever achievable given the Palestinian objectives.

That is why I say the fundamental assumptions of the peace process, of the Oslo accords, were flawed. In the end, none of the three premises turned out to be correct. They all turned out to be false. The Israeli people now understand that.

The question now is how to repair the damage that resulted from an adherence to this peace process where Israel gave up more and more and more and, in the end, got no peace. Ever since the Secretary of State and other officials before him went to the Middle East, there has been a bombing or an attempt every single day, an attempt of terrorism. There is no peace.

Hopefully, this helps to explain in brief form why it is not possible to simply return to the peace process as if there were some magic in that Oslo process. The Oslo process is dead. The reason it is dead is because it was premised on fundamental fallacies. That is why the Israeli people cannot go back to that flawed process.

We in the United States should not be critical of that decision on the part of the Israeli people. The Israeli people are not to blame for dealing now with a situation of violence and lawlessness and terror in as firm a way as they possibly can to protect their own citizens. No country could do otherwise. And for Americans to be so presumptuous as to lecture the Israelis about overreacting and urging them to return to a peace process which they now recognize was fundamentally flawed is the height of arrogance. We in the U.S. have to be much more understanding about the difficulties of achieving peace.

Fundamentally, Madam President, I think what we have to recognize is that as long as the leadership of the other side in this controversy—primarily the PLO—is not democratically based but is totalitarian, as long as there is not an involvement of all of the Palestinian people in the decisions on the other side, there will continue to be conflict.

The nature of the leadership on the other side matters, and it matters greatly. Until there is a democratically elected Palestinian Government, until the leaders are accountable to the people, whom I suspect want peace as much as anybody else in the region or in the world, then we are not likely to get the kind of peaceful resolution for which we all hope.

So what I hope right now is that the American people will be understanding of the position of the Israeli Government; that they will be supportive of this long-time ally, the nation of Israel; that they will recognize that

there is no moral equivalence between acts of terror on the one hand and attempting to enforce the law on the other hand; that they will be supportive both in terms of military and economic support but also psychologically and not buy into this notion that there is repression on the part of the Israeli Government against the Palestinians which is the cause of the problem.

This whole idea of moral equivalence is wrong. If we go back to the founding of the Jewish state by the United Nations and recognize what was attempted there and the moral legitimacy of the Israeli State, then I think Americans will more carefully calibrate their criticism of the Israeli Government and understand that it is going to take a long time; that hearts have to change before there can be peace; and probably the best opportunity is for democracy to take hold in the Arab States so that the leaders are accountable to the people because in the long run, most people really want peace. They want to live together; they want to engage in commerce together; and they do not want to continue to send their sons and daughters to die for causes that are whipped up by their leadership—to die unnecessarily.

That is why I urge my colleagues in the Senate today, the administration in Washington, and the American people generally, to learn to listen carefully and to recognize that the peace process was based upon flawed assumptions, and not to urge the Israelis to act in ways that would be inimical both to their own immediate self-interests in terms of safety and the long-term interests of peace. It is a difficult subject, one that we have to confront; and we have to stand by an ally and also recognize the legitimacy of other Arab aspirations and Muslim aspirations in the Middle East, in which we have a great stake as well. As long as we fail to recognize the complexity of this situation and understand the process that was urged for so long cannot be the basis for future peace negotiations, we are not going to be able to proceed in a constructive way.

I hope the American people, as a result of these comments and others, will support the administration in its very delicate and difficult negotiations in that region and will be supportive of the Members of this body who seek to promote the kind of peace that will be not just temporary but lasting.

Mr. President, yet again Israel's restraint and unilateral acceptance of a "cease fire" has been met with terrorist acts perpetrated against an innocent civilian population. The recent tragic deaths of 20 Israeli teenagers and serious wounding of another 48 by a Palestinian suicide bomber were stark and deeply sad reminders that the key to peace in the Middle East does not depend on the State of Israel.

I am extremely concerned that the doctrine of moral equivalence has taken root among many in the United States and around the world with respect to perceptions of Arab-Israeli violence. While over the years Israel may have taken steps with which we do not always agree, the notion that it operates on the same moral plane as its adversaries is patently false. The suicide bombing, deliberately targeted against Israeli youth, was not the result of individuals driven to extremes by perceived Israeli intransigence in peace talks. It was, in fact, the action of organized groups committed to Israel's total destruction.

At the urging of Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Israeli Government has entered into cease fires. The attacks continue. When the Israelis identify and eliminate the specific perpetrators of these mass terrorist killings, they are called murderers. Meanwhile, the world wrings its hands and asks why the parties can't just return to the "peace process." This is a good time to answer that question, beginning with an assessment of what went wrong with the Oslo peace process.

The effect of the violence in Israel today cannot be overstated. After the failure of the Camp David summit just a year ago, and the subsequent reignition of violence, Israel has suffered from an unrelenting assault on its people. The result has been a total reassessment in Israel of the premises of the Oslo peace process—premises which have turned out to be invalid.

Let's go back to 1993. The first of three basic premises of Oslo was that, if the PLO were given a 30,000-man armed force, it would be used to suppress, not to perpetuate, armed violence. Yitzhak Rabin was Defense Minister back in 1987 when the intifada started. The failure to stop it was a turning point for Rabin; it caused him to decide then to begin a peace process. He thought that if Israel couldn't handle the intifada, maybe Arafat could. But soon the 30,000-man force became a 40,000-man force, and anti-tank weapons, shoulder-fired weapons and other prohibited arms found their way into the Palestinian force's arsenal—weapons that are now pointed and fired at Israeli communities. All of this has occurred in violation of the Oslo Accords.

So the first premise—that the PLO would actually control the intifada with a 30,000-man force—turned out to be false.

The second premise was that Israel could withdraw from territory before a final peace accord was reached without losing its bargaining power or sacrificing physical security. In the case of its dealings with Egypt, Israel had ceded land after the peace agreement was obtained. That withdrawal had worked as a true trade of land for peace. But, under the Oslo Accords,

Israel was required to withdraw first and then negotiate. The result has been no credible peace.

This premise of Oslo had been based on the assumption that Israel was finally strong enough to be able to relinquish land while preserving its ability to deter violence. So Israel withdrew from the West Bank, except for a few military posts authorized in the Oslo agreement, and in May of 2000 also withdrew from southern Lebanon. Both actions appeared to the Arab terrorist organizations and the Palestinian Authority as a retreat from a successful campaign of violence. After the intifada, Israel withdrew from the West Bank. After the terrorism of Hezbollah, Israel withdrew from Lebanon. The PA understandably saw violence as a way to achieve its goals.

So the second premise of Oslo—that Israel could withdraw first and achieve its peace objectives later—has also proven false. Arafat and the PA interpreted the withdrawals simply as a sign of weakness thus emboldening them to incite the violence that has continued unabated since Rosh Hashana.

The third, and central, premise of Oslo was that peace could be made with the PLO. In Israel, there was a consensus until 1993 among all parties, including Labor and Likud, that it was not possible to deal with the PLO. There were two reasons for this view: first, the PLO was philosophically committed to Israel's destruction; and, second, the PLO's negotiations had been historically based on terrorism. No previous Israeli government had been willing to negotiate with an entity committed to its destruction through violence.

But in 1993, Oslo created a new assumption: If you had a process—a process of negotiating—then the quality of people on the other side did not really matter. The process became almost like a secular religion. The process was the important thing, and so actions on the ground didn't matter. This notion had roots in Western dealings with leaders in countries like North Korea, Iraq, and the Soviet Union.

It turns out, though, that the nature of leadership does matter, and so do actions on the ground. The quality of people on the other side is fundamental to the success of negotiations. It is the people, not the process, that matters.

The fact is, the parties were never as close as many believed. The issue was never the desirability of peace, or what either the United States or Israel could do to bring it about. Rather, the question was whether peace was ever achievable given Palestinian objectives. Yet when Barak and Arafat were near the end of negotiations, Arafat raised one more demand: that Israel must agree to the right of return, and admit more than a million Palestinians into Israel.

This notion is anathema to all Israelis. Even those on the left oppose the right of return because of its consequences; literally, the end of Israel as a Jewish state. Israel could not survive the return of over a million Palestinians and continue to exist as a Jewish state. Barak made unprecedented concessions at Camp David. Even Leah Rabin complained that Barak's concessions would cause her late husband to turn over in his grave. This move by Arafat was so shocking that virtually all Israelis lost confidence in the process. Barak lost all support. And a radical reassessment of realities set in.

Despite the disappointment at the failure of negotiations, the awakening of the Israeli people to the faulty premises and the reality of the failure of the Oslo Accords is a healthy development. The Bush Administration seems to have assimilated much of the Israeli attitude, and has been careful to avoid involving itself in the effort to restart the "peace process" at this time. For the future, it is helpful to acknowledge the falseness of the three key Oslo premises. The Oslo process had ended up doing severe damage to Israel's deterrent—its ability to match concessions with tangible peace.

The principal goal now should be to repair that damage. Amid all the Israeli concessions and gestures, it was assumed that there would be reciprocity on the part of the Palestinians. But the Arabs believed showing reciprocity would be a sign of weakness on their part. The evidence abounds. More Israelis were killed by terrorist acts after Oslo than in the decade before. The PLO did not fulfill the promises it made; for example, disarming the terrorists—in fact, releasing from prison some of the most dangerous Hamas terrorists—limiting its arms, and guaranteeing peace.

Moreover, and perhaps even more disturbing for the long run, the Palestinian authority created schools with a curriculum of brainwashing their children in hatred and violence. A shocked New York Times reporter last summer wrote of the creation of summer camps that even taught assassination. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paints the picture of posters throughout Palestinian communities showing a menacing Israeli soldier, armed to the teeth, towering over a pitiful looking Arab youngster who holds only one thing. Do you know what it is? A key. And every Arab child knows what it is. The Key to an Arab home in Jaffa, or Haifa, or any other Arab community of pre-1967 Palestine. So much for the view that the parties were "just this close." All of this has caused a reassessment of the realities, and, as I said, that is a healthy development at this point.

One must view the situation today clear eyed and in strategic terms. It is a situation of more than just military

or economic power. For Israel it is quite simply a question of morale. Israel's problem right now is not that it lacks either economic or military power, but rather that its people have been following a conceptual and intellectual approach to achieving peace which has turned out to be false. The result has been confusion, frustration, and a problem of morale that can only be dealt with by reevaluation of the conceptual and intellectual approach to achieving peace. The people were sold on a "process," and now find that the presumptions underlying that process were illusions. Their disillusionment has set them adrift because they see they have lost territory and credibility that would never have been lost by military force.

The Camp David concessions are especially galling now that there is a recognition that they were based upon false premises, a quid pro quo that was never to be reciprocated by the Palestinians. It makes the last several years seem very lost indeed. So the Israelis are revising their thinking.

Those of us who have cared about the security of Israel and have watched the process over the years, viewed it with great anxiety because we worried it might have resulted in irreversible losses. And yet, with the last election, we see the Israeli people rethinking the premises of Oslo and charting a course to recover the initiative. The fact that Ariel Sharon, with all his political baggage, won so overwhelmingly suggests that the Israeli people are prepared to do what it takes to defend their state and to survive. Like England fighting back from its unpreparedness in the 30's and the United States after its military decline of the 1970's, Israel seems to have said, "This far and no more," and begun to rethink its approach to achieving peace and security. Countries seem to have a way of being better than their failed leaders, and we can hope that the Israelis are on their way back with a more realistic and sober view of what will be required for their long-term security—what kind of approach will provide real, lasting peace.

It is recognized that peace is not available now, but that it can become available in the future. The key to peace is a more democratic and much less corrupt leadership. There are moderate Palestinians, but they are not politically relevant right now. The Palestinians have been cursed with leaders who have always seemed to be wrong for the times. In World War I, Palestinian leaders sided with the Turks against the British; in World War II, with the Nazis against the allies; in the Cold War, with the Soviets against the West; and in the Persian Gulf War, with Saddam against the coalition of allies.

Given his long record as an ideologue, a terrorist, a breaker of promises and fount of untruth, it should not

really surprise anyone that Arafat remains what he has always been. As Charles Krauthammer recently noted in the *Weekly Standard*, “[Arafat] proved, even to much of the Israeli left, that the entire theory of preemptive concessions, magnanimous gestures, rolling appeasement was an exercise in futility.”

The key to peace is a Palestinian leadership that would appeal to the better nature of the Palestinian people, one that would reflect their aspirations for a prosperous and peaceful future—not one that exploits their misery through a policy of physically and vitriolically attacking Israel. In short, a democratic government. As my friend Douglas Feith expressed the point in an article in *Commentary*: “A stable peace [is] possible . . . only if the Palestinians first evolved responsible administrative institutions and leadership that enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of its own people, refrained from murdering its political opponents, operated within and not above the law, and practiced moderation and compromise at home and abroad.” This would, of course, be a boon not only for the Israelis, but for the Palestinians—indeed especially for the Palestinians.

For over fifty years, the United States and Israel have been bound together in a relationship that has weathered many efforts to drive a wedge between us. With the coincident election of a new leader in each country, our two great nations have an opportunity to reassess the lessons recent history has to teach us. For my part, I am optimistic that the new American administration will place a great value on our relationship with the Israeli people; and I am optimistic that the Israelis will maintain the strength and morale that they will need to await a change in Palestinian leadership. At that point there will be much more the Israelis can do to secure their future.

The United States should not push Israel into a process or into an agreement with which the government and people of Israel are not completely comfortable, with their security ensured. It is their existence that is at stake, and we must take no actions that jeopardize their security.

My colleague from Wyoming would like to use the remainder of our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.

ENERGY

Mr. THOMAS. Madam President, I appreciate the time. I thank my friend from Arizona for his comments on energy. Certainly, I can't think of an issue that affects more people and is more likely to become a crisis again than energy. We had some touch of it and backed off of it a little. California is doing a little better than it was. Gas prices are tending to stabilize or even come down.

The real cause of the problem is still there. I am surprised, frankly, that the Senate leadership hasn't been willing to go forward and at least give us a date as to the time in which we can undertake this question of energy and energy supply. We have gone now 8, 10 years without a policy regarding energy, not having any real direction with regard to what we are going to do. We have become 60-percent dependent on OPEC and overseas oil. We haven't developed refineries, new transmission lines, or pipelines in order to move energy from where it is to where it is needed, and still our leadership here refuses to move forward.

I think we will again be facing the same kind of situation we just had if we don't move to find a long-term resolution, and we can.

We now have a policy from the administration, one that deals with domestic production. There is access to public lands, much of it standing in Alaska or in many places that could indeed have production without damage to the environment. We can do that.

We can talk about conservation. We can talk about renewables. We have to have a policy to cause us to do some of these things.

The transportation is vitally important. In Wyoming, we have great supplies of coal, for example. In order to mine and move that energy to where the market is, you have to have some transmission. There are a number of ways to do that, and we can if we decide to and commit ourselves to do it.

Research, clean coal: Our coal in Wyoming is clean, and it can be cleaner if we have research to do that.

Diversity: We can't expect to have only one source of supply for all the energy we use. We are heavy energy users, and most of us are not willing to make many changes to that.

I am grateful for the comments of my friend, and I hope we can get the leadership here to set the agenda to move toward doing something there.

USING SNOW MACHINES IN YELLOWSTONE PARK

Mr. THOMAS. Madam President, I know it is now summer, but I will now talk about using snow machines in the Yellowstone Park in the wintertime. It is a question that has become quite political, as a matter of fact. There have been letters sent to the Department of the Interior from the Senate on both sides.

For a number of years, in Grand Teton, in Yellowstone Park, and many of the other parks, the principal access people have had in the wintertime to enjoy their park was with snow machines. It has been done for a long time, really. Frankly, there hasn't been much management of that technique, unfortunately. The park officials have not had much to do with it.

They have not sought to organize how and where it is done, separate the snow machines from the cross-country skiers, which can be done so each can have their own opportunity. It has to manage numbers sometimes, for instance, if they become too large around Christmas vacation.

They can make changes, but they have not done that. They have an opportunity, and we have an opportunity to have much cleaner machines, which are less noisy and which are less polluting. The manufacturers have indicated they can and will do this. Of course, they need some assurance from EPA that having done it, they will be able to use these machines. But none of these things have happened. Instead, because of the difficulties that are, in fact, there and without management, an EIS study went on for several years.

Unfortunately, toward the end, instead of going on through with the regular system of input, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior went out and said this is what the answer is going to be. The answer was to do away with individual snow machines in the parks over a period of a couple of years. That isn't what is designed to happen when you have EIS studies and when you involve local communities and local people and then have somebody from Washington come and make the decision. But that is what did happen.

Furthermore, the regulation that was agreed to in the study was put before the public the last day of the last administration when there was no opportunity to do anything about it. So what has happened is that there has been a lawsuit filed. I have introduced a bill that would allow not to continue snow machines the way they have been but, rather, to do the management technique, manage the numbers and the sites, and also set specifications so that manufacturers can meet them and you can go forward.

What is the purpose of the park? It is to preserve the resources and to allow the owners to enjoy them. This is the way that you have access in the wintertime.

So this has become somewhat of a discussion, somewhat of a controversy. I am hopeful that they can come to an agreement—and this administration is working toward coming to an agreement—in which these changes could be made. Nobody is suggesting to continue to do it the way it has been done in the past. But there can be changes made that will indeed allow access and protect the environment and the animals and the rural environment at the same time. We can do those things.

One other word on national parks. The Grand Teton National Park was expanded in 1950. When that was done, there were a number of lands that were brought into the park, and among them were several school sections that belonged to the State of Wyoming.