

and upon the incentives other countries may have to acquire their own nuclear capabilities?

One final point on this issue: It disturbs me that Russian tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed in this treaty, yet the United States conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt global strike capabilities by counting conventional ICBMs under the limits for delivery systems.

It is striking, moreover, that the preamble would be "mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability," yet be silent on the impact of tactical nuclear weapons on this very same strategic stability. What is more destabilizing: conventionally armed ICBMs or thousands of tactical nuclear weapons?

Despite being told consistently from the very beginning of negotiations that missile defense will be addressed only in the preamble of the treaty, we now discover that article V contains a direct restriction on U.S. missile defense activities (i.e., cannot convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense interceptors). Will this establish a dangerous precedent with respect to including missile defense limitations in future offensive arms control agreements? Why did the U.S. side feel it necessary to concede this point?

What raises concern, with respect to article V, are other efforts by the Russians to create a linkage between U.S. missile defense activities and Russian adherence to the new START treaty. When viewed together, the treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials provide the potential for Russia to threaten or blackmail the United States against increasing its missile defense capabilities by threatening to withdraw from the treaty:

When the preamble states that "current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties," does this not suggest that moving beyond "current" systems could provide grounds for withdrawal?

When the Russian's note in their unilateral statement that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively, and then links American missile defense capabilities to the treaty's withdrawal clause, should we not read this as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses?

Finally, what are we to make of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's warning on March 28 that "the treaty and all the obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of

strategic defensive systems"? Does this mean the Russians will pull out of START if we deploy additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska or if we deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile in Europe?

Despite the administration's assurances that none of this is legally binding, and that the U.S. unilateral statement counters this by expressing our intent to continue to deploy missile defenses, I can not help but worry that these provisions will have a negative impact on U.S. decisionmaking with respect to missile defense. After all, the administration did abandon plans to deploy ground-based interceptors in Europe—an action most believe was an irritant in United States-Russian relations.

There is something fundamentally disturbing about entering into a treaty with the Russians when we have such a divergence in view over a substantial issue like missile defense. To be sure, the Russian side has already expressed displeasure with U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe and to enhance the capability of the SM-3 missile to intercept long-range missiles launched from the Middle East.

Adding to my apprehension is recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee by a senior Department of Defense official, who stated that the United States has not yet even approached the Russians to determine whether the SM-3 IIB is, will cause them to withdraw from the treaty. They can withdraw for any reason.

This likely sets the stage for misunderstanding and confrontation as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe.

Clarifying this ambiguity, coupled with affirmation by the administration that it intends to improve the defense of our homeland and go forward with all phases of its planned missile defense deployments in Europe, is a prerequisite for ratification of the new START treaty.

Our ability to verify Russian compliance with the new agreement is also important. One could even argue that as we go to lower levels of nuclear weapons, verification becomes more important, as the consequences of cheating become more profound. But the standard should not be whether we can verify Russian compliance with the terms of the treaty per se—though this is important—but whether we maintain sufficient confidence in our national ability to monitor developments in Russian strategic forces that, if gone undetected, could alter the strategic balance.

So when the administration argues that "verification procedures in this Treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty," I am inclined to ask why verification procedures have become less stringent and whether such procedures

make it harder for the United States to fully account for Russian strategic forces. Specifically:

Will we be able to determine whether the Russians are developing new, more powerful missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads?

Are the Russians capable of secretly producing and storing missiles and warheads that could afford them a military advantage?

While we may have confidence in the number of missiles deployed by Russia today, can we maintain this confidence over the life of the treaty?

Ultimately, it falls upon our intelligence community to monitor Russian strategic force developments. Thus it is important for the Senate, as part of its advice and consent responsibilities, to review carefully the National Intelligence Estimate on our ability to effectively verify the treaty that normally accompanies arms control agreements. I don't believe we have seen that document yet.

I have identified just a few important issues the Senate will consider as we move forward, and it is likely there will be others as we continue to examine the treaty text, protocol, and annexes. Particularly troubling at this time is the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons which are not addressed in this treaty, and the constraints on missile defense and conventional prompt global strike in a treaty intended only to limit offensive nuclear weapons. At the very least this is a bad precedent, and I have no doubt Russia is attempting to revive the ABM Treaty regime and forestall U.S. prompt global strike capabilities.

This was a treaty that Russia needed more than the United States. Not only were Russian strategic nuclear forces headed to lower numbers for economic reasons, Russia wants an arms control agreement with the United States. Such a binational agreement validates its superpower status. The United States therefore had an opportunity to leverage Russian desire for an agreement to obtain Russian cooperation on a host of issues, starting with Iran. But the administration missed this opportunity because it was so anxious to advance its vision of a world without nuclear weapons that it failed to see how START could help address the more immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

TRIBUTE TO GENERAL VICTOR EUGENE RENUART, JR.

• Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. President, today I pay tribute to a great American who I have had the great pleasure of knowing and working with for a number of years. General Victor

Eugene Renuart, Jr., is preparing to retire from the U.S. Air Force after nearly 39 years of distinguished military service, and it is fitting that we should honor his achievements.

Through peacetime and multiple armed conflicts and operations, General Renuart has embodied the core values of the Air Force: integrity, service, and excellence. He courageously demonstrated his dedication to our Nation and served us honorably as a leader, warrior, and teacher. I want to also express our deepest thanks to his wife Jill, and their sons Ryan and Andrew, for serving as the epitome of a dedicated military family. As you know, military families like the Renuarts are America's unsung heroes, and we owe them a tremendous debt.

Gene Renuart enlisted in the Air Force while our Nation was still engaged in the Vietnam war and received his commission from the Officer Training School in 1972. In the four decades since that day, he has amassed nearly 4,000 flying hours in seven aircraft types and piloted 69 combat missions in major operations. The call to service has led Gene and his family all over the world, and he has commanded units at every level through conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The long list of awards and decorations that General Renuart has earned during his career are a testament to his years of exemplary leadership and unrelenting focus on mission accomplishment.

As a lieutenant colonel during Operation DESERT STORM, General Renuart commanded the 76th Fighter Squadron "Vanguards," who were trusted with a mission critical to the safety of the entire region. They hunted the Iraqi landscape in search of SCUD missile sites and protected Coalition troops from attack. General Renuart's squadron flew hundreds of combat missions and fought at the famed "Highway of Death," leading to the liberation of Kuwait and defeat of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

It was clear to everyone who knew him that Gene Renuart was a leader of the highest caliber, and he quickly rose through the ranks. On September 11, 2001, then-Major General Renuart was serving as the Director of Operations for United States Central Command, and his leadership and experience were instrumental as our nation rapidly transitioned from peace to war. General Renuart was soon providing operational orchestration for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as our armed forces quickly eliminated those repressive regimes.

In March 2007, General Renuart was promoted to the rank of four-star general and appointed Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command. The general and his command were given the no-fail responsibility of protecting the United States and Can-

ada against all threats in the air and on the seas, while leading the Department of Defense's support of civil authorities to save lives during both natural and manmade disasters.

With General Renuart's leadership, NORAD and USNORTHCOM widened its focus to anticipate threats to the United States and respond where necessary. The significant improvements of the unified national response to Hurricane Ike were born from the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and were a direct result of General Renuart's emphasis on anticipating our Nation's needs in times of disaster.

For this effort and many others, General Renuart and his team collaborated with over 120 mission partners representing Federal, State, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private industry to quickly and responsibly execute key Department of Defense responsibilities in the National Response Framework.

He fostered synergy with the inter-agency community and collaborated with the militaries of Mexico and Canada to ensure North America's security. Whether expediting the transfer of helicopters and equipment to the Mexican military for counternarcotic operations or partnering with our northern neighbors under the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan to support the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver, General Renuart set and achieved tremendous goals for theater security cooperation.

Working together to defend the homeland, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have delivered unparalleled security for our Nation. Not only did NORAD achieve a huge milestone—surpassing 55,000 accident-free sorties flown defending our homeland under Operation NOBLE EAGLE—but more importantly, there has not been a single successful foreign terrorist attack on American soil. That success has been the result of the extraordinary diligence, cooperation, and dedication that have exemplified General Renuart's leadership.

On behalf of Congress and the United States of America, I thank General Renuart, Jill, Ryan, and Andrew for their commitment, sacrifice, and contributions to this great Nation. I am also especially pleased to say that General Renuart and Jill will be calling Colorado Springs home for many years to come. We Coloradans are honored to have them as neighbors and friends. I congratulate him on a truly remarkable career and wish him nothing but the best as he transitions from decades of service into his truly well-earned retirement. ●

REPORT ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY THAT WAS ORIGINALLY DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 13047 OF MAY 20, 1997, WITH RESPECT TO BURMA—PM 56

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. I have sent the enclosed notice to the *Federal Register* for publication, stating that the Burma emergency is to continue in effect beyond May 20, 2010.

The crisis between the United States and Burma arising from the actions and policies of the Government of Burma, including its engaging in large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, that led to the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13310 of July 28, 2003, Executive Order 13448 of October 18, 2007, and Executive Order 13464 of April 30, 2008, has not been resolved. These actions and policies are hostile to U.S. interests and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency with respect to Burma and maintain in force the sanctions against Burma to respond to this threat.

BARACK OBAMA.
THE WHITE HOUSE, May 13, 2010.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

At 11:41 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Novotny, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bills:

S. 1067. An act to support stabilization and lasting peace in northern Uganda and areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army through development of a regional strategy to support multilateral efforts to successfully protect civilians and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and to authorize funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice, and for other purposes.

S. 3333. An act to extend the statutory license for secondary transmissions under