[House Report 107-454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                 Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-454
_______________________________________________________________________


 
     JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE

                               __________

                             SECOND REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             Volume 1 of 3

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Chapter 1--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International Fugitives 
                       Marc Rich and Pincus Green
   Chapter 2--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Grants of 
                           Executive Clemency

                                     


                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

  May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-264                     WASHINGTON : 2002


                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California             PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia                    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida                  ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California                 DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida                 JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia                      ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Tennessee            BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
------ ------                            (Independent)


                      Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                 Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                     James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                     Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                 Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

                  David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel
                     M. Scott Billingsley, Counsel
                       Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel
                        Jason A. Foster, Counsel
                        Hilary J. Funk, Counsel
                        Matthew J. Rupp, Counsel

                  Phil Barnett, Minority Chief Counsel
             Michael Yeager, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
                     Michael Yang, Minority Counsel
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                      Washington, DC, May 14, 2001.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's second 
report to the 107th Congress. The committee's report is based 
on a study conducted by the full committee.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.


                                     


                               DEDICATION

                              ----------                              

    This report is dedicated to the memory of M. Scott 
Billingsley, counsel for the House Committee on Government 
Reform from 1999-2001. Scott died unexpectedly on March 25, 
2002, at the age of 31.
    During his time on the Committee staff, Scott was centrally 
involved in a number of important investigations. Scott made 
immeasurable contributions to the Committee's work, not only 
through his critical thinking and excellent writing, but also 
through his professionalism and cheerful spirit, which made him 
a pleasure to work with.
    Scott devoted two years of his short life to the Committee 
on Government Reform because he wanted to root out waste, 
fraud, and abuse, and promote integrity in the federal 
government. Scott's final, and most important work for the 
Committee was on the investigation of President Clinton's 
eleventh-hour clemency grants. Scott played a key role 
investigating the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green and 
drafted much of the first chapter of this report. Scott's work 
on the Rich and Green pardons was typical of all of his work 
for the Committee: excellent, accurate, and thorough.
    Scott Billingsley certainly has a legacy that goes far 
beyond his work on this Committee. He has left behind many 
individuals who will miss him dearly. His memory will be 
cherished by his parents, sister, fiance, family, and countless 
others whose lives he touched. However, this report should 
serve as a small, but lasting, reminder of Scott Billingsley's 
work and his devotion to the pursuit of truth.


                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                                Volume 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................     1
INTRODUCTION.....................................................    25

    Chapter One--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International 
                  Fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................    99
INTRODUCTION.....................................................   105
 I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN........................107
    A. Rich and Green's Business Activities......................   107
        1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy.....................   107
        2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business 
            Dealings.............................................   108
            a. Iran..............................................   110
            b. South Africa......................................   110
            c. The Soviet Union/Russia...........................   111
            d. Cuba..............................................   113
            e. Libya.............................................   113
            f. Iraq..............................................   113
            g. Angola............................................   114
            h. Romania...........................................   114
            i. Serbia............................................   115
    B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green...   115
        1. The Investigation of Rich and Green...................   115
        2. The Indictment........................................   120
        3. Rich and Green Flee the Country.......................   121
        4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas............................   122
    C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice...............   123
        1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green..................   123
        2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce 
            Their Citizenship....................................   123
        3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green.............   125
        4. 1992 Congressional Hearings...........................   127
        5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business 
            Interests............................................   128
            a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation...................   128
            b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings...............   129
            c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture............................   130
II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE..........131
    A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s...........................   131
    B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s   133
    C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn.....................................   135
    D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements..................................   137
        1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the 
            Pardon?..............................................   137
        2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the 
            Pardon Was Granted?..................................   141
    E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case.......................   145
III.THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION..................149

    A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000..................   149
    B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition....................   154
    C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition............   156
        1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed.................   156
            a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were Fair....   156
            b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out...............   157
            c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy...........   159
            d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes............   160
        2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous''..............   162
            a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and Green....   162
            b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with Media 
                Attention........................................   164
            c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought..................   165
    D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition................   167
        1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His 
            Support..............................................   167
        2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose..   170
        3. Many of the Letters Were Misrepresented to the 
            President............................................   171
IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON...............................173
    A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team...............................   173
        1. Denise Rich...........................................   173
            a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich.........   173
            b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President Clinton.   175
            c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon Effort.   176
            d. Denise Rich's Motives.............................   180
        2. Beth Dozoretz.........................................   182
            a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill Clinton....   182
            b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich 
                Pardon Campaign..................................   184
            c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information About 
                Dozoretz from the Committee......................   187
        3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli 
            Leaders..............................................   188
        4. Elie Wiesel...........................................   192
        5. King Juan Carlos......................................   195
        6. Avner Azulay..........................................   196
        7. Michael Steinhardt....................................   196
        8. Gershon Kekst.........................................   197
        9. Robert Fink...........................................   206
        10. Kathleen Behan.......................................   206
        11. Peter Kadzik.........................................   206
    B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team...............   207
    C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out 
        of the Process...........................................   208
    D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition.........................   214
        1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak...............   215
        2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the 
            White House..........................................   216
    E. The Lobbying Effort.......................................   218
        1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast........   219
        2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta....   220
        3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House 
            Staff................................................   223
        4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and 
            Justice Department...................................   225
        5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and 
            Ehud Barak...........................................   226
        6. ``The HRC Option''....................................   227
    F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort...........   230
        1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta..   230
        2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding 
            Rich.................................................   231
        3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January 
            10 Letter............................................   233
        4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001   233
            a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the 
                President........................................   235
            b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC Chairman Arthur 
                Levitt...........................................   236
    G. January 19-20, 2001.......................................   238
        1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President 
            Clinton..............................................   238
        2. Eric Holder Weighs In.................................   240
        3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and 
            President Clinton....................................   245
        4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn....................   247
        5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the 
            Decision.............................................   250
    H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons...................   254
        1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks..................   254
        2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press.........   255
        3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times......   258
 V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS 
    GREEN INVESTIGATION.............................................262
    A. Marc Rich.................................................   262
    B. Pincus Green..............................................   263
    C. Jack Quinn................................................   263
    D. Denise Rich...............................................   264
    E. Beth Dozoretz.............................................   264
    F. Avner Azulay..............................................   265
    G. Peter Kadzik..............................................   265
    H. Terry McAuliffe...........................................   266

  Chapter Two--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying For Executive 
                                Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................   709
INTRODUCTION.....................................................   715
 I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME........717
    A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other 
        Questionable Sources of Income...........................   719
    B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel 
        Restrictions.............................................   723
    C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis...........................   725
II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS...........................731
    A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime........   731
    B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's 
        Case.....................................................   735
    C. Roger Clinton's Involvement with the Gambino Family.......   739
        1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission.........   743
            a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole 
                Commission.......................................   743
            b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission Staff...   747
                i. December 1997 Meeting.........................   747
                ii. Spring 1998 Contacts.........................   751
                iii. July 1998 Meeting...........................   753
        2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the 
            Parole Commission....................................   753
            a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact the 
                Commission.......................................   755
            b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose Undercover   758
            c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations 
                with Thomas Kowalski.............................   760
        3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White 
            House in the Parole Decision.........................   764
    D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos..   765
    E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton......................   766
        1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's 
            Knowledge............................................   767
        2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the 
            Gambinos.............................................   768
        3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch..   771
    F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario 
        Gambino..................................................   773
III.THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER.......................................777

    A. Garland Lincecum's Account................................   778
        1. The Initial $35,000 Payment...........................   778
        2. The First Dallas Meeting..............................   779
        3. Lincecum's Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money......   782
        4. Lincecum's Payment of $200,000........................   785
        5. The Division of Lincecum's Money Among Clinton, Locke, 
            and Morton...........................................   786
        6. Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon.............   787
    B. Roger Clinton's Reaction to the Allegations...............   790
    C. Dickey Morton's and George Locke's Reactions to the 
        Allegations..............................................   792
    D. Analysis..................................................   795
IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES.........................................799
    A. Dan Lasater and George Locke..............................   799
    B. J.T. Lundy................................................   802
    C. Blume Loe.................................................   807
    D. Rita Lavelle..............................................   809
    E. John Ballis...............................................   811
    F. Stephen Griggs............................................   815
    G. Phillip Young.............................................   819
    H. Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan...................................   822
    I. Mitchell Wood.............................................   823
    J. Mark St. Pe...............................................   825
    K. William D. McCord.........................................   826
 V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON 
    INVESTIGATION...................................................827
    A. Roger Clinton.............................................   827
    B. Tommaso Gambino...........................................   828
    C. Lisa Gambino..............................................   828
    D. Victor Crawford and Kathy Vieth...........................   828
    E. George Locke..............................................   829
    F. Dickey Morton.............................................   829
    G. Richard Cayce.............................................   829
    H. J.T. Lundy................................................   829
    I. Robert Lundy..............................................   829
    J. Chief Carl Griggs.........................................   830
    K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen..............................   830
    L. Bruce Lindsey.............................................   830
    M. Meridith Cabe.............................................   830
    N. Department of Justice.....................................   831
    O. The White House...........................................   831

                                Volume 2
 Chapter Three--Hugh Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive 
                                Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................  1261
INTRODUCTION.....................................................  1267
 I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION.................................1267
    A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali...........................  1267
    B. Vignali's Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency............  1276
        1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali's Sentence..........  1276
            a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota............  1276
            b. Vignali's Appeal..................................  1277
            c. Letters to the White House and Justice Department.  1277
        2. Vignali's Clemency Petition...........................  1280
        3. Supporters of Vignali's Clemency Petition.............  1283
            a. Letters of Support from Prominent California 
                Politicians......................................  1284
                i. Congressman Xavier Becerra....................  1284
                ii. Congressman Esteban Torres...................  1286
                iii. State Senator Richard Polanco...............  1286
                iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina..  1287
                v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez.  1288
                vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony........................  1289
            b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca..  1290
                i. Sheriff Baca's Relationship with the Vignalis.  1290
                ii. Sheriff Baca's Involvement in the Vignali 
                    Clemency Effort..............................  1292
                iii. Conclusion..................................  1293
            c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas.....  1295
                i. Mayorkas' Initial Exposure to the Vignali 
                    Matter.......................................  1296
                ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House...............  1297
                iii. Conclusion..................................  1299
        4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials 
            Supported Vignali's Clemency Petition Despite Serious 
            Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali.......  1301
            a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug 
                Trafficking Against Both Horacio and Carlos 
                Vignali..........................................  1301
            b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio and 
                Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by Sheriff 
                Baca, U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, or the Clinton 
                White House......................................  1304
    C. The White House's Review of the Vignali Clemency Request..  1307
        1. Hugh Rodham's Hiring..................................  1307
        2. Hugh Rodham's Initial Approach to the White House.....  1309
        3. The Justice Department's Input on the Vignali Case....  1311
        4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation.........  1314
            a. Contacts Between the White House and Interested 
                Parties..........................................  1314
            b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh Rodham..  1317
            c. Hugh Rodham's Invocation of First Lady Hillary 
                Clinton..........................................  1318
            d. The President's Decision to Grant the Commutation.  1319
        5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali 
            Commutation..........................................  1320
    D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation..................  1324
        1. The Response of Hugh Rodham...........................  1324
        2. The Florida Bar's ``Investigation'' of Hugh Rodham....  1325
        3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation...........  1327
II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL................................1328
    A. Braswell's History of Misconduct..........................  1329
    B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White 
        House....................................................  1332
III.HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS..........1336

    A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum...........................  1336
    B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the 
        Possibility of a Pardon for the Lums.....................  1337
IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH RODHAM 
    INVESTIGATION..................................................1339
    A. Hugh Rodham...............................................  1339
    B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali................................  1340
    C. James Casso...............................................  1340
    D. Glenn Braswell............................................  1341
    E. Kendall Coffey............................................  1341
    F. Gene and Nora Lum.........................................  1341
    G. Nicole Lum................................................  1341

 Chapter Four--Tony Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive 
                                Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................  1589
INTRODUCTION.....................................................  1590
 I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY.....................................1591
    A. Background................................................  1591
    B. Tony Rodham's Relationship with the Gregorys..............  1592
    C. Tony Rodham's Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons.  1595
    D. Deliberations by the Administration.......................  1598
    E. Conclusion................................................  1600
II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA..........................................1602
    A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba.......................  1602
    B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes' Clemency 
        Petition.................................................  1604
    C. Tony Rodham's Attempt to Become Involved in the Fuentes' 
        Clemency Effort..........................................  1605
    D. Tony Rodham's Representations to Mannerud Were Fraudulent.  1608

  Chapter Five--The Grant of Clemency to Drug Money Launderer Harvey 
                                 Weinig

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................  1709
 I. BACKGROUND.....................................................1712
    A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators............................  1712
    B. The Money Laundering Operation............................  1713
    C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian 
        Cocaine Cartel...........................................  1714
    D. Weinig's Prosecution and Sentencing.......................  1718
II. WEINIG'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY..................1722
    A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency........  1722
    B. Weinig's Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition.....  1725
    C. Weinig's Wife Obtains Support from Individuals with Ties 
        to the Administration....................................  1726
III.THE WHITE HOUSE'S REVIEW OF WEINIG'S COMMUTATION REQUEST.......1729

    A. The Justice Department's Input in the Weinig Clemency 
        Matter...................................................  1729
        1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting 
            Weinig's Sentence....................................  1729
        2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting Weinig's 
            Sentence.............................................  1730
    B. The White House's Deliberations...........................  1732
    C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig 
        Commutation..............................................  1733
    D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation.......................  1736

                                Volume 3
                               Appendices

Appendix I.--Committee correspondence............................  2079
Appendix II.--Committee subpoenas................................  2577
Appendix III.--Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon petition........  2967

                                 Views

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, 
  Hon. Patsy T. Mink, Hon. Bernard Sanders, Hon. Eleanor Holmes 
  Norton, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. 
  Danny K. Davis, Hon. Thomas H. Allen, Hon. Janice D. 
  Schakowsky, and Hon. Diane E. Watson...........................  3292
Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton..............................  3389

                                                 Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-454

======================================================================


     JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE

                                _______
                                

  May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                             SECOND REPORT

    On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled ``Justice Undone: 
Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House.'' The chairman 
was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PARDONS OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN

Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and 
corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of 
the United States.

 Rich and Green have had extensive trade with 
terrorist states and other enemies of the United States. 
Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green 
have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and 
other rogue states which have sponsored terrorist acts. By 
engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well-
being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these 
states.

 The Central Intelligence Agency provided the 
following declassified information about Marc Rich to the 
Committee:

        If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would 
        have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of 
        inquiries by various foreign government liaison 
        services and domestic government agencies regarding 
        their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

        In addition, President Clinton would have received 
        information worthy of his consideration in making his 
        decision on the pardon. This information cannot be 
        declassified.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and 
showed contempt for the American justice system.

 Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the 
criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable, 
including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the 
country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting 
contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these 
tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts 
of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was 
overwhelming.

 Because of the strength of the case against them, 
Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face 
trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, 
Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you 
get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, 
Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international 
fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that 
Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution, 
Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her 
that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I 
think that we are going to have to leave.''

 In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by 
United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While 
this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated 
that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States and 
viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at 
will.

Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen 
years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to 
apprehending them and closing down their business activities.

 Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that 
on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United 
States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various 
foreign countries. A number of countries from the United 
Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in 
these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a 
message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list 
to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the 
proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to 
apprehend fugitives abroad.

 Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that 
in 1991, the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic 
leadership, held a number of hearings, and issued two reports 
about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At 
that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush 
Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in 
hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business 
interests in the U.S.

 While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, 
the American government took a number of actions against their 
interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's 
assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the 
government.

The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea 
agreement with Rich and Green.

 For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the 
country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea 
bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of 
concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were 
rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal 
that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack 
Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice 
Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore, 
that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were 
misleading the White House when they made these claims.

Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and 
attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his 
work for Marc Rich.

 Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation 
from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his 
case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. 
Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on 
the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to 
settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder 
recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the 
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then 
explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder 
did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests 
that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be 
very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how 
baseless they were.

 Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work 
on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack 
Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work 
on the pardon and that he expected no future payment for his 
work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered 
evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had 
discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work 
on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld 
from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced 
only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand 
jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. 
These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his 
``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per 
month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn 
about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee 
staff.

 Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money 
from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the 
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I 
will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further 
compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge 
surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying 
Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the 
Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to 
negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged 
that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 
5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states, ``If you are 
agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next 
few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the 
possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments 
from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the 
Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about 
this matter, but he refused.

 Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent 
violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was 
enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the 
most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited 
former executive branch employees from lobbying their former 
executive branch agencies within five years of their departure. 
Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within 
an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . . 
criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or 
proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to 
apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White 
House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was 
intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former 
White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to 
take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely 
based on the President's personal trust for that former 
staffer.

 The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the 
other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the 
arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green 
pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have 
been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought 
out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.

 The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition 
were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the 
Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for 
Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and 
Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian 
activities justified their pardons. However, many of these 
letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of 
the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a 
Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who 
wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of 
money from them.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different 
individuals with close personal relationships with President 
Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.

 The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key 
role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a 
close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in 
part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic 
causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive 
personal contacts with President Clinton. The $450,000 given by 
Denise Rich to the Clinton Library was an early and large 
contribution. Denise Rich used her relationship with President 
Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich pardon on a number of 
occasions. She has refused to cooperate with the Committee, 
invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer 
questions about her role in the pardon.

 The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another 
close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in 
obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had 
a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties 
and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed 
millions of dollars for the Democratic party and has pledged to 
raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library. 
Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and 
Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President 
Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has 
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, 
the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz 
made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the 
Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon.

 The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times 
about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich 
pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations 
with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he 
granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts 
of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly 
impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the 
President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's 
interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations 
for granting the Rich pardon.

 Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton 
that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just 
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' 
Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or 
Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of 
future financial return.

Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice 
Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision 
to support the pardon had a critical impact.

 Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, 
especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New 
York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the 
Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the 
Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich 
pardon petition with the White House, and leave the Justice 
Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the 
Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to 
wh'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also 
indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under 
him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the 
fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two 
months before it was granted.

 Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a 
critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder 
informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards 
favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich 
was a fugitive from justice and that Justice Department 
prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no 
longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any 
credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon, 
leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other 
motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with 
the Committee.

 Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be 
appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore 
Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in 
the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out 
Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al 
Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore 
confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's 
initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had 
some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General 
when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice 
Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to 
be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his 
actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more 
believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date.

President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing 
about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions, 
and reaching false conclusions.

 The White House never consulted with the prosecutors 
in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. 
As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the 
false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon 
petition.

 Every White House staff member who was working on 
the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do 
the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were 
unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.

 President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their 
negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of 
January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a 
telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this 
conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments 
about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients 
subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of 
this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations 
and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result 
of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as 
a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if 
President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal 
research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, 
meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that 
Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that 
fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and 
Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, 
since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third, 
Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle 
their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had 
no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the 
proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale.

 When the White House did finally provide the names 
of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department 
background check in the middle of the night on January 19, 
2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was 
disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House 
requested the Justice Department to perform a computer 
background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the 
pardons, the check came back with information that they were 
wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all 
of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among 
them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the 
only step the White House took to check on this allegation was 
to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients 
were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting 
information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed 
his staff to ``take Jack's word'' and issue the pardons.

President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his 
decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.

 President Clinton has failed to answer any questions 
about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he 
has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more 
questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to 
explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious 
unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives.

ROGER CLINTON'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his 
brother's name during the Clinton Administration.

 President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to 
capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his 
second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use 
his connections to the Administration to gain financial 
advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State 
Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had 
instructed him that since this was his last term in office, 
Roger should find a way to make a living and use his 
relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By 
suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton 
encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton 
apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from 
whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only 
four years to get things done'' and that they did not care 
``about ethics or what appearances were.''

 Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money 
from foreign governments solely because he was the President's 
brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted 
that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had 
received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. 
Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these 
invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries] 
strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of 
the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in 
addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
musical performances from foreign governments, he also received 
money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger 
Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by 
the President or White House staff that the President was not 
permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.

 Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in 
unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased 
overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered 
at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger 
Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks 
originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed 
by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank. 
This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger 
Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds 
originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes 
requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. 
Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any 
explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious 
transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by 
law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his 
admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign 
governments.

 Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing 
to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One 
company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton 
and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. 
Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in 
the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with 
covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not 
register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying 
contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore, 
needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the 
Department of Justice.

 Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a 
$35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet 
secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated 
Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer 
Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an 
Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to 
obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's 
promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney 
Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis' 
organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to 
pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the 
invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were 
to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at 
a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.''

Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario 
Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure.

 Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario 
Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of 
heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in 
federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of 
organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His 
associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian 
Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, 
murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking 
in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between 
Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.''

 Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the 
Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded 
in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy'' 
Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton 
to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy 
Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward 
if he was successful. Even though he never was successful, 
Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex 
watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.''

 Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to 
the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United 
States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the 
Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying 
Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that 
President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario 
Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact 
the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission 
staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, 
Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the 
President to influence the Commission improperly and win 
Gambino's release.

 The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered 
the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating 
Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However, 
it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of 
the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in 
meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to 
the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to 
have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole 
Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from 
recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole 
Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI 
from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's 
involvement in the Gambino case.

 Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his 
contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with 
the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger 
Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the 
Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts 
with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-
serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written 
memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid 
and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton 
also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the 
Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview. 
While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or 
after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino 
had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house. 
He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the 
money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both 
Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found 
no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or 
that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to 
the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his 
interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and 
contradictory stories in response to questions about his 
receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally 
producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it 
in Tijuana, Mexico.

 Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to 
grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the 
Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win 
parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex 
watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House 
received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. 
Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for 
clemency matters requested a criminal background check on 
Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration 
is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical 
inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that 
level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was 
pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have 
refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown 
whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he 
did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of 
the White House some other way. Although the President did not 
ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances 
surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless 
suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and 
confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is 
disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even 
more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to 
purchase access to the parole and clemency processes with cash 
payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of 
the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of 
the matter, the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling 
or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities.

Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that 
was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with 
the promise of a pardon that never came.

 The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon 
for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted 
felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential 
pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas 
businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close 
relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. 
Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and 
claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton 
and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family 
constituted their life savings and means of support in 
retirement.

 Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds 
from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey 
Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among 
themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in 
checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a 
company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton, 
Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from 
the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself. 
Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM 
while offering no explanation of why he received this 
substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings 
through CLM.

 Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to 
defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a 
pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George 
Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the 
Justice Department or White House for consideration for a 
pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the 
victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps 
Roger Clinton as well.

Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as 
13 other pardons and commutations.

 Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six 
clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. 
Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for 
approximately six close friends and that he did so because of 
concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example, 
Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan 
Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of 
drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. 
However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton 
to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people 
who were not his personal friends and some involve 
solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business 
opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency 
petition in front of the President.

 Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for 
horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing 
profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton 
a share of a the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in 
exchange for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him. 
Lundy suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could 
be concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan 
Lasater's name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the 
venture, discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with 
Roger Clinton.

 Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of 
former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. 
According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked 
her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the 
President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay 
any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition 
anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger 
Clinton asked Lavelle, ``do you have $100,000 to get this 
through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the 
question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive 
a pardon.

 Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for 
Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition 
was seriously considered at the White House. After being 
convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan 
Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's 
connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first 
lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes 
during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster 
Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him 
obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a 
presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and 
restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of 
clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White 
House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before 
inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of 
clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.

 Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency 
to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized 
American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like 
Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's 
but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also 
did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that 
Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President 
even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being 
sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received 
an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had 
fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger 
Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the 
tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to 
become recognized by the federal government.

 According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant 
operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a 
pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to 
Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with 
such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former 
attorney's version of events.

Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the 
Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly 
refusing to produce key documents.

 For months, the Bush White House prevented the 
National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, 
clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The 
Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been 
considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario 
Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently'' 
produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to 
withhold. The accidental production also included documents 
relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had 
sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration 
did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino 
documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing 
to produce the records even though they were not subject to any 
executive privilege claim.

 The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain 
Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. 
After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole 
Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an 
FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased 
producing additional documents, claiming they were related to 
an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-
Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000.

HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION

Vignali's clemency petition was false and misleading.

 Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First, 
he continued to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming 
evidence of his involvement in selling a substantial amount of 
cocaine across state lines and a specific finding by the 
sentencing judge that he lied at trial about his involvement in 
a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that 
he was a first-time offender, despite the fact that he had a 
prior criminal record. By not accepting responsibility for his 
crime and lying about his background, he should not have been 
eligible for executive clemency.

Vignali's supporters provided letters of support which were 
false and misleading.

 A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and 
his father Horacio Vignali, was a series of letters on Carlos' 
behalf from prominent Los Angeles politicians. A number of 
these letters contained misleading statements calculated to 
create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The 
officials who submitted letters included Representative Xavier 
Becerra, Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker 
Robert Hertzberg, State Assembly member Antonio Villaraigosa, 
State Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor 
Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, 
and Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support 
for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his 
position.

 Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio 
Vignali which was based on Vignali's political and financial 
support for Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since 
1991, and Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca, 
giving him at least $11,000 in contributions and raising 
between $60,000-$70,000 more.

 Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support 
of the Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a 
telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that 
he would get a call from the White House about Horacio Vignali. 
Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White House staff 
and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on Baca's 
statements in this telephone call, White House staff clearly 
and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation 
of Carlos Vignali's sentence.

 Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis, 
that he did not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than 
express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff 
Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did 
nothing that could have been interpreted as support for the 
commutation. However, Sheriff Baca's supposed opposition to the 
Vignali commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he 
drafted a letter which he believed Horacio Vignali would use in 
the clemency effort; and (2) when he was asked squarely by the 
White House if the President should commute Vignali's prison 
sentence, he stated that it was ``the President's decision to 
make,'' rather than express his opposition. These facts, and 
others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca 
wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of 
creating a paper record which would clearly indicate his 
support.

 Sheriff Baca's efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are 
even more inappropriate given that there were extensive 
allegations that Horacio Vignali, Carlos' father, was also 
involved in illegal drug trafficking. It is inappropriate 
enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to 
support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale 
drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However, when coupled with 
credible allegations indicating that Horacio Vignali was a drug 
dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine supply for his 
son, Baca's support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali is even more 
inappropriate.

U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support for 
the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his 
position.

 U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White 
House in support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top 
federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali 
to call the White House in support of his son's clemency 
petition. Mayorkas then called the White House about the 
Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details 
of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed 
support for the Vignali commutation.

 Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite 
his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that 
the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed 
clemency. Before he called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken 
twice with Todd Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the 
Vignali case. Jones told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ``major 
player'' in drug trafficking, that he was ``bad news'' and that 
Mayorkas should not ``go there'' when it came to Vignali. 
Despite these warnings from a prosecutor who was intimately 
familiar with the Vignali case, Mayorkas still called the White 
House in support of the Vignali commutation.

 Mayorkas' support for the Vignali commutation was 
inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case. 
What he did know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an 
unrepentant large-scale criminal. These facts alone make his 
support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor, 
totally inappropriate.

There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and Carlos 
Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.

 There are allegations that, in addition to his son, 
Horacio Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking and 
that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond 
the conduct which led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA 
reports documenting these allegations include the following 
statements:

        ``[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell 
        a machine gun and stated to them that he had also 
        smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing 
        automobiles.''

        ``[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos 
        Vignali Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali's father 
        Carlos Vignali aka ``pops'' owns a body shop, at 1260 
        Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son.''

        ``Carlos Horatio Vignali's role in [George Torres' drug 
        dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this 
        time. It is believed that Vignali functions as a 
        financial partner in the organization.''

 These DEA reports are corroborated by law 
enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received 
information indicating that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali 
were involved in large-scale drug trafficking. These charges 
have never been formally made in court, or substantiated by 
physical evidence. However, the mere existence of such 
allegations should have precluded senior law enforcement and 
political officials from supporting a commutation for Carlos 
Vignali on the strength of his father's reputation. However, it 
appears that no one checked with the DEA prior to granting the 
commutation.

Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to the 
White House in support of the Vignali commutation.

 Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the 
Vignali commutation. It appears that in return for this money, 
he worked part-time for two months gathering materials in 
support of Vignali's case and making telephone calls to White 
House staff. It appears that Rodham's payment in the Vignali 
matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the 
$200,000 payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton 
granted clemency to Vignali.

 Rodham repeatedly provided false information during 
his communications with the White House. First, and most 
importantly, Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney 
who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was 
completely false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was 
a first-time offender, when in fact, he had two prior 
convictions and two other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey 
that Vignali ``did not play a major role in the offense,'' when 
in fact, Vignali was a major source of cocaine for the 
Minnesota drug-dealing ring at issue in his case.

Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that the Vignali 
commutation was ``very important'' to her.

 Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali 
commutation was ``very important to him and the First Lady as 
well as others.'' This statement is confirmed by the 
independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke 
to Rodham as well as the note which she took contemporaneously. 
Rodham's statement raises two possibilities: first, that the 
First Lady was aware of, and approved of, Hugh Rodham's 
lobbying efforts; or second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to 
White House staff regarding the First Lady's knowledge of his 
efforts.

The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles 
political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors 
or judge who understood the Vignali case.

 White House staff engaged in telephone conversations 
with a number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali 
case--Hugh Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of 
whom knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key 
White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by 
Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little about 
the case and had mixed motives.

 White House staff failed to reach out to the 
prosecutors who had convicted Vignali, or the judge who 
sentenced him. White House staff justified their failure to 
take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the 
prosecutors and judge would object, so there was no need to 
speak to them. However, if the White House had spoken to Todd 
Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne, or Judge David Doty, they 
would have learned that Carlos Vignali: (1) was not a small-
time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal 
activity; and (3) never cooperated with law enforcement by 
telling them who supplied him cocaine.

The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the Vignali 
commutation which were lodged by the Pardon Attorney.

 The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a 
report that contained his recommendation against granting the 
Vignali commutation. This report contained a number of powerful 
arguments against the commutation, which were apparently 
ignored by the White House. The existence of the Pardon 
Attorney's report means that the White House cannot claim that 
it was totally unaware that Vignali's arguments were completely 
false. The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition 
had no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway. 
President Clinton's decision raises questions about why the 
Vignali commutation was granted.

Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning to the 
Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the clemency 
and ignored former President and Senator Clinton's request that 
he do so.

 On February 21, 2001, at the request of former 
President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham 
promised to return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he 
received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of 
June 2001, Rodham had apparently returned only about $50,000 of 
the money that Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham's attorney has 
confirmed to Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any 
additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining 
$154,000.

HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL PARDON

Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal 
agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon 
was granted.

 Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a 
dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead 
consumers. After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax 
evasion in 1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers 
about the benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to 
facing numerous lawsuits, Braswell's companies have been 
investigated by the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade 
Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Better Business 
Bureau.

 Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal 
investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion 
and money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell's 
petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice 
Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had 
conducted a background investigation instead of the White 
House, Braswell's petition would have been rejected quickly.

Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining 
the pardon.

 Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition 
for $230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a 
letter of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel's 
Office, and he made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham, 
these two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell 
pardon. Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing 
widespread criticism from the media and members of both 
political parties.
HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS

Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors and 
fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit 
contributions and tax offenses.

 In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 
in illegal conduit contributions to the DNC. They were 
sentenced to home detention, confinement in a halfway house and 
a $30,000 fine. In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax 
fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in 
false deductions and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through Hugh 
Rodham.

 Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the 
Lums' efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In 
December 2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband's criminal 
attorneys and asked him to send various documents to Hugh 
Rodham at the White House. He did so. In early January 2001, 
Rodham called Gene Lum's attorney again and asked him to resend 
those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an 
associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters. 
Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits 
of the Lums' pardon request. Cabe then told White House Counsel 
Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about 
her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that the Lums were 
not going to receive clemency.

The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate with the 
Committee's investigation.

 Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the 
Committee's investigation. The Lums' daughter, Nicole (with 
whom Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business 
relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the 
Committee. Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the 
Committee's request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee 
is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums' efforts 
to obtain executive clemency and Rodham's role in those 
efforts.

TONY RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory

 Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant 
pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving 
substantial sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received 
$244,769 in salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years 
and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys. 
The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of 
money for various consulting services that Rodham provided to 
the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any 
documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham.

 Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any 
documentary evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed 
for them by Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what 
Rodham actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The 
most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to 
obtain presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial 
question as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts 
to obtain presidential pardons for them.

 If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons 
for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of 
impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would 
taint Rodham's actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if 
President Clinton knew about Rodham's financial arrangement, it 
would taint his actions in granting the pardons.

 Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the 
Gregory case is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the 
Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case, 
and also the Gregorys' sentencing judge. Apparently, the only 
people in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys 
deserved pardons were President Clinton and Deputy White House 
Counsel Bruce Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham's 
involvement in the matter.

Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba

 Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a 
pardon for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for 
$50,000. When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was 
seeking a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud 
and told her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid 
him a $50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had 
successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the 
Gregorys' pardon petition to support his claim.

 Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by 
making a number of false representations to her. Rodham told 
Mannerud that he was close personal friends with the Pardon 
Attorney, Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would 
use the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case and that 
Roger Adams' wife worked at the law firm, which would help her 
case be treated favorably. All of these representations were 
completely false and were apparently made to mislead Mannerud 
as to the purpose of the payment to Rodham.

 Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer. Mannerud was 
concerned that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain 
a pardon in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned 
about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected 
Rodham's offer.

 After Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer, an associate 
of Rodham came back to Mannerud with another offer. According 
to Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham's proposal, 
Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham's and Mannerud's who 
attended the initial meeting between them, came back to 
Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000 to 
help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still 
concerned about the nature of Rodham's proposal and rejected 
it.

 The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been 
illegal. Rodham, and maybe Parker as well, engaged in an effort 
to defraud Mannerud. While the effort was unsuccessful, it may 
have constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends 
that the Justice Department investigate these allegations.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG MONEY LAUNDERER 
HARVEY WEINIG

Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder 
millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering 
an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme.

 Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to 
launder about $19 million in drug proceeds through a Swiss bank 
for the Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering 
organization, of which Weinig was a part, boasted that they 
successfully laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In 
addition to conducting banking transactions for the 
organization, Weinig consulted with co-conspirators in 
furtherance of the organization's activities and stored the 
drug proceeds in his New York City apartment.

 Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm 
stole from the Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were 
supposed to have laundered. This theft exposed Weinig's family 
to a risk of being harmed by those drug dealers. In the course 
of investigating the organization's money laundering 
activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the 
drug dealers sent a hit man to kill one of Weinig's co-
conspirators.

 Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators 
kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money 
from the victim's family. Rather than report the kidnapping, 
Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the 
ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the 
firm to execute transfer agreements.

Weinig's lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with close 
connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the White 
House in support of Weinig's clemency petition.

 Weinig's wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid 
Weingarten, who was close to the Clinton White House, to lobby 
for the commutation. In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency 
petition on Weinig's behalf with the Justice Department and the 
White House. Knowing that the Justice Department would advise 
the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition, 
Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White 
House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce 
Lindsey and Chief of Staff John Podesta.

 Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the 
facts of Weinig's underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was 
unable to convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate factual 
basis of the merits of Weinig's petition.

Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer and 
Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig's behalf.

 Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin, 
former White House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer. 
Dreyer repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John 
Podesta. Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President 
grant the Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth 
Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee's 
investigation.

 Morey also obtained support for Weinig's commutation 
from former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children 
attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the 
Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the 
commutation of Weinig's sentence.

The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended 
against the commutation of Weinig's sentence.

 On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, 
whose office convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of 
Weinig's sentence. Ultimately, in a report to President 
Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric 
Holder voiced their strong opposition to a commutation of 
Weinig's sentence.

 Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to 
the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams 
pointed out that Weinig ``was a well-respected lawyer who used 
his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of 
dollars that he knew constituted the proceeds of a huge 
narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this 
activity for an extended period of time, and he admits that he 
engaged in it purely out of greed.'' Adams also informed the 
President that Weinig ``aided and abetted the extortion of 
money from an individual he knew had been kidnapped at the 
direction of a co-defendant in order to coerce the production 
of a ransom.''

After an apparently cursory review, the White House set aside 
the Justice Department's negative recommendation and granted 
Weinig clemency.

 Support for Weinig's petition from John Podesta and 
Beth Nolan appears to have been critical. The Associate White 
House counsels responsible for clemency matters did not support 
the petition. However, setting aside the negative 
recommendations of not only the Justice Department but also 
staff at the White House Counsel's Office, Nolan and Lindsey, 
who were lobbied by Weingarten, recommended Weinig's clemency 
to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by 
Weingarten and Dreyer, also recommended to the President that 
Weinig's sentence be commuted.

The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig's sentence.

 None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to 
executive clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main 
reasons why his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his 
sentence was disproportionate and excessive; (2) his 
contributions to society justified his early release from 
prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional 
difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to 
return home. The first reason is simply not true. Weinig's 
sentence was comparable to those received by other co-
conspirators who were directly responsible for laundering large 
amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with 
authorities. Weinig's sentence was also comparable to those 
received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by-
kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The 
other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the vast 
number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly 
sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their 
imprisonment.

President Clinton's commutation of Weinig's sentence has sent 
out the wrong message about the United States' commitment to 
fighting drug trafficking.

 President Clinton's decision conveyed an appearance 
of granting special consideration to wealthy, politically well-
connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger 
Adams foresaw the message sent by the Weinig commutation, 
warning President Clinton that ``[t]o commute [Weinig's] prison 
term to the five years he proposes would denigrate the 
seriousness of his criminal misconduct, undermine the 
government's legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty 
pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and 
could give the appearance of granting special consideration to 
economically advantaged, white-collar offenders.''

 The Weinig commutation undermines the nation's 
efforts to fight the illegal drug trade. Complaints are 
frequently made that U.S. drug laws punish low-level drug 
criminals too severely, yet do not punish high-level drug 
distributors enough. When a large-scale drug money launderer 
like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving 
five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message 
that the U.S. is not serious about prosecuting the high-level 
criminals who make the drug trade possible.

 The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States' 
moral authority to press other countries to fight the drug 
trade within their own borders. The Weinig commutation could 
harm the efforts of the U.S. government to extradite drug 
traffickers and money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers 
in Latin American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy 
in the Weinig case. For example, in Colombia's leading daily, 
former Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op-
ed entitled ``The Morality of the Strongest,'' labeled 
President Clinton's clemency decision ``monstrous.''

                              INTRODUCTION

A. Why the Committee Investigated These Matters
    Unlike most other powers granted to the President by the 
Constitution, the power to grant executive clemency is 
virtually unchecked. Some have argued that because the power to 
grant clemency is unlimited, Congress has no oversight role 
over grants of executive clemency. The opposite is true. 
Because the President can grant clemency to whomever he wants 
for whatever reasons, it is critically important that certain 
grants of clemency be subject to Congressional and public 
scrutiny. If this scrutiny were not applied to grants of 
clemency, the power could easily be abused. As James Madison 
observed:

        A popular Government, without popular information, or 
        the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce 
        or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
        govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
        Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
        knowledge gives.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ James Madison, The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 9th ed. 1910).

While the grants of clemency issued by President Clinton will 
not, and cannot, be overturned by the Committee's 
investigation, this report can serve a valuable purpose to 
inform the public about President Clinton's abuse of power in 
issuing grants of clemency to so many undeserving individuals. 
The report can also serve as a reminder to future Presidents 
not to exercise their pardon power in such a reckless and 
corrupting fashion.
    Before President Clinton, when a President made 
controversial grants of clemency, he often provided a full 
accounting of his reasons for the decision. For example, when 
President Ford pardoned former President Nixon in 1974, 
President Ford made an unprecedented appearance before the 
House Judiciary Committee to explain his decision.\2\ When 
President George H.W. Bush pardoned Caspar Weinberger for his 
involvement in the Iran-Contra matter, he provided a full 
accounting of his decision in a public statement and released a 
number of documents dispelling any concerns that President 
Bush's pardon was meant to cover up his own involvement in the 
Iran-Contra matter.\3\ President Bush even consulted with 
prominent Democratic Members of Congress before issuing the 
Weinberger pardon to see if they would object.\4\ However, 
President Clinton issued a number of controversial pardons and 
commutations and failed to ever provide a satisfactory 
accounting for his decisions. Not only did he avoid 
consultation with Members of Congress, but President Clinton 
also avoided consultation with his own Justice Department and 
other knowledgeable agencies. Moreover, President Clinton has 
declined to answer any questions about his decisions, choosing 
instead to make occasional self-serving statements to friendly 
reporters.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters,'' Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (Oct. 17, 1974).
    \3\ 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).
    \4\ According to news reports, House Speaker Tom Foley, Chairman 
Les Aspin, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan told President Bush that 
they would not object to the Weinberger pardon. Senator Moynihan even 
urged President Bush to grant a pardon to Iran-Contra figure Elliot 
Abrams, a former Moynihan aide. See Marjorie Williams, Burden of Proof, 
Wash. Post Mag., Apr. 11, 1993, at 6; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 
Bush Faces Fallout on Iran-Contra Pardons, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 30, 
1992, at 25.
    \5\ See, e.g., Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Clinton's abuse of the clemency power began with 
the August 11, 1999, grants of clemency to 16 terrorists who 
were part of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist network. When 
the Committee and the public understandably raised questions 
regarding these grants of clemency, President Clinton did 
nothing to answer those questions. Rather, he invoked executive 
privilege over 2,800 pages of documents which would have showed 
why he made his decision.\6\ When President Clinton did attempt 
to offer an explanation for the FALN clemency, it was factually 
inaccurate. Indeed, some documents indicated that the President 
made his decision for political benefit.\7\ For example, one 
document said that the release of the 16 terrorists would 
``have a positive impact among strategic Puerto Rican 
communities in the U.S. (read, voters).'' Another document 
stated: ``[t]he Vice President's Puerto Rican position would be 
helped.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Log of Documents Subject to Executive Privilege, noted in ``The 
FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless 
Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, 106th Cong. 325-68 (Dec. 10, 1999).
    \7\ See generally ``The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading 
Explanations, A Reckless Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. (Dec. 10, 1999).
    \8\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the final hours of his term, President Clinton issued 
141 pardons and 36 commutations.\9\ While other Presidents had 
issued controversial pardons and commutations, never before had 
a President made so many grants of clemency with so little 
justification. To understand the wholesale nature of the 
President's questionable clemency grants, it is useful to 
recall that he granted clemency to 13 individuals convicted in 
connection with independent counsel investigations of the 
Clinton Administration.\10\ Strong arguments could be made 
against all of these grants of clemency. The individuals who 
received these grants of clemency were convicted of serious 
crimes, and many of them played significant roles in major 
political scandals. For example, Susan McDougal was convicted 
of mail fraud, misapplication of funds, and false statements, 
and then was jailed on contempt of court charges for refusing 
to tell a grand jury whether President Clinton had testified 
truthfully at her trial. If Susan McDougal were not a close 
friend of the President, her pardon would be troubling enough. 
She was a convicted felon who defrauded a bank and defied the 
right of a grand jury to receive honest testimony. Considering 
that McDougal was a close friend of the President, who was 
jailed for contempt rather than testify against him, there is 
the indelible appearance that the pardon was a reward for 
McDougal's silence. Yet the Committee did not investigate the 
McDougal pardon or any of the other 12 pardons and commutations 
relating to independent counsel investigations. Neither did the 
Committee investigate the pardons and commutations granted to 
former Congressman Mel Reynolds,\11\ William Borders,\12\ or 
CIA Director John Deutch,\13\ all of which were subject to 
widespread criticism. Rather, the Committee limited its 
investigation to pardons and commutations where there was no 
credible explanation for the grant of clemency, and where there 
was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate 
access or corruption. The fact that the Committee did not 
investigate pardons like Susan McDougal's speaks volumes about 
both the Committee's exercise of restraint and the severity of 
the abuses in those cases the Committee did investigate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Department of Justice Document Production DJ/PAO-MR-00009-23 
(List of Pardon and Commutation Grants, Jan. 20, 2001) (Exhibit 1).
    \10\ Individuals convicted in the Whitewater investigation and 
receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Susan H. McDougal; Robert 
W. Palmer; Stephen A. Smith; and Christopher V. Wade. Individuals 
convicted in the investigation of former Agriculture Secretary Mike 
Espy and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Richard Douglas; 
Alvarez Ferrouillet; John Hemmingson; James H. Lake; Brook K. Mitchell, 
Sr.; and Jack L. Williams. Receiving a commutation for a conviction in 
the Espy case was Ronald Blackley. Individuals convicted in the 
Cisneros investigation and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: 
Henry Cisneros and Linda Jones. In addition, Archibald Schaffer, a key 
defendant in the Espy investigation, received a pardon shortly before 
the end of the Clinton Administration, on December 22, 2000.
    \11\ Reynolds received a commutation for his federal convictions 
for bank fraud, wire fraud, false statements, and conspiracy to 
defraud. He also served time in prison for state convictions for sexual 
misconduct, obstruction of justice, and solicitation of child 
pornography. He is currently a registered sex offender in the state of 
Illinois. See Illinois Sex Offender Information (visited Mar. 4, 2002) 
 (listing Reynolds' registration as a 
sex offender).
    \12\ Borders was convicted for participating in a conspiracy to 
bribe federal judge Alcee Hastings. Borders refused to testify at 
Hastings' criminal trial or his impeachment hearings, which resulted in 
Borders' imprisonment for both contempt of court and contempt of 
Congress. By granting clemency to Borders, President Clinton violated 
his own standards as drafted by then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn. 
Quinn wrote that ``offenses involving central involvement in political 
corruption'' were among those President Clinton would not consider 
``under almost any circumstances.'' Arnold & Porter Document Production 
A0556-57 (Executive Clemency Policy, Jan. 26, 1996) (Exhibit 2).
    \13\ Deutch was accused of mishandling hundreds of highly 
classified documents, including information relating to covert actions, 
storing many on a home computer used to surf ``high risk'' sites on the 
internet, making the documents easily accessible to a hacker. Jerry 
Seper, Deutch Planned Guilty Plea Before Clinton Pardoned Him, Wash. 
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A3. Less than a day before receiving the 
pardon, Deutch had signed a plea agreement wherein he admitted a 
misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $5,000 fine. Vernon Loeb, Senate 
Committee Questions Clinton's Pardon of Deutch, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 
2001, at A2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee investigated two types of clemency grants. 
First was the case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green, which raised 
substantial questions of direct corruption, primarily whether 
pardons were issued in exchange for political and other 
financial contributions. The second group of cases involved 
indirect corruption, where close relatives of the President--
namely Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham--apparently 
traded on their relationships with the President to lobby for 
pardons and commutations. These cases raised serious concerns 
that Roger Clinton and the Rodhams used their access to the 
White House to lobby for pardons, in some cases successfully, 
and received large payments for their lobbying efforts.
    The Committee had three main purposes in its clemency 
investigation. First, as discussed above, the Committee sought 
to let the public know whether President Clinton had abused the 
clemency power. By subjecting the President's exercise of 
clemency to public scrutiny, the Committee hopes to make it 
clear to future Presidents that history will hold them 
accountable for clemency grants that are abusive. Second, the 
Committee sought to determine whether there are adequate 
safeguards in place to prevent individuals with close 
relationships with the President from trading on their access 
to win pardons. A number of the most troubling pardons granted 
by President Clinton were the result of lobbying from former 
White House staff like Jack Quinn or close relatives like Hugh 
Rodham. Third, the Committee examined whether there are 
adequate procedures in the pardon process to protect against 
abuse by the President. While the Justice Department has 
regulations governing its handling of applications for 
clemency, the President is free to ignore those regulations, 
and President Clinton did ignore them in the last month he was 
in office. The key lesson to be learned from the facts detailed 
in this report is that more disclosure is likely to remedy the 
problems in each of these three areas of concern. Public 
scrutiny after-the-fact may provide some deterrence, but a more 
open process before a grant of clemency is likely to be more 
effective. That is why the Committee moved legislation to 
require public disclosure of contributions to entities like the 
Clinton Library, given the potential effect of such 
contributions on policymaking decisions.\14\ Another example of 
potential legislation would be a clarification of the 
definition of ``lobbying'' under the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act.\15\ It could be amended to explicitly cover those who are 
paid to contact executive branch officials on behalf of 
clemency seekers.\16\ If Jack Quinn and Hugh Rodham had been 
required to disclose their status publicly as paid lobbyists 
seeking clemency for their clients, then Marc Rich and Carlos 
Vignali may not have been pardoned. The public outcry could 
have occurred beforehand and possibly prevented the damage done 
by these grants of clemency to public confidence in the 
integrity of government. Even if such a measure would not have 
prevented these particular grants of clemency, knowing who is 
paid to lobby for clemency would certainly assist future 
presidents in making appropriate decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ As a result of the Committee's investigation into the Marc 
Rich and Pincus Green pardons, the Committee voted out H.R. 577, the 
Presidential Library Disclosure Act, a bill which ensures that 
contributions to presidential libraries are publicly disclosed. This 
bill was approved by the House of Representatives in a 392 to 3 vote on 
February 5, 2002, and is awaiting action in the Senate.
    \15\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a) currently defines a ``lobbying 
contact'' as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        G. . any oral or written communication . . . to a covered 
      executve branch official . . . that is made on behalf of a 
      client with regard to--
          G(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of 
      Federal legislation (including legislative proposals);
          G(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a 
      Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other 
      program, policy, or position of the United States 
      Government;
          G(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal 
      program or policy (including the negotiation, award, or 
      administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, 
      or license);
          Gor (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for 
      a position subject to confirmation by the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(b)(xii) currently contains an exception 
for ``a communication that is . . . made to an official in an agency 
with regard to . . . a judicial proceeding or a criminal or civil law 
enforcement inquiry, investigation, or proceeding.'' This exception 
could arguably exclude lobbying for clemency from the statute's 
disclosure requirements. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. 
Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 9, 2001) (holding that ``the pardon process 
was not adversarial'' in the Marc Rich case, that his lawyers were 
``acting principally as lobbyists,'' and that they were, therefore, not 
entitled to withhold certain documents under the attorney-client 
privilege).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. President Clinton Deviated From All Applicable Standards
    In his rush to grant pardons and commutations in the waning 
hours of his presidency, Bill Clinton ignored almost every 
applicable standard governing the exercise of the clemency 
power. There were three obvious sources of guidance regarding 
the exercise of the power. First, the Justice Department had 
published guidelines regarding its handling of clemency 
petitions. While these guidelines were not binding upon the 
President, they should have provided guidance to the Justice 
Department and the President. At a minimum, they provide a 
mechanism to provide the President with relevant information. 
The Justice Department guidelines state first that pardon 
petitions should not be filed until five years after the 
petitioner is released from prison, or, if no prison time is 
served, five years after the date of conviction.\17\ The 
guidelines also state that commutation petitions should not be 
filed while there are other forms of judicial or administrative 
relief, like appeals, still available.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 (2002).
    \18\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.3 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Attorney's Manual also contains detailed standards 
applied to clemency petitions by the Pardon Attorney's Office. 
The Manual lists five standards applicable to the review of 
pardon petitions:

        1. Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation.

        An individual's demonstrated ability to lead a 
        responsible and productive life for a significant 
        period after conviction or release from confinement is 
        strong evidence of rehabilitation and worthiness for 
        pardon.

                                *  *  *

        2. Seriousness and relative recentness of the offense.

        When an offense is very serious (e.g., a violent crime, 
        major drug trafficking, breach of public trust, or 
        white collar crime involving substantial sums of 
        money), a suitable length of time should have elapsed 
        in order to avoid denigrating the seriousness of the 
        offense or undermining the deterrent effect of the 
        conviction. In the case of a prominent individual or 
        notorious crime, the likely effect of a pardon on law 
        enforcement interests or upon the general public should 
        be taken into account.

                                *  *  *

        3. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and 
        atonement.

        The extent to which a petitioner has accepted 
        responsibility for his or her criminal conduct and made 
        restitution to its victims are important 
        considerations. A petitioner should be genuinely 
        desirous of forgiveness rather than vindication. While 
        the absence of expressions of remorse should not 
        preclude favorable consideration, a petitioner's 
        attempts to minimize or rationalize culpability does 
        not advance the case for pardon.

                                *  *  *

        4. The need for relief.

        The purpose for which a pardon is sought may influence 
        disposition of the petition. A felony conviction may 
        result in a wide variety of legal disabilities under 
        state or federal law, some of which can provide 
        persuasive grounds for recommending a pardon.

                                *  *  *

        5. Official recommendations and reports.

        The comments and recommendations of concerned and 
        knowledgeable officials, particularly the United States 
        Attorney whose office prosecuted the case and the 
        sentencing judge, are carefully considered. The likely 
        impact of favorable action in the district or 
        nationally, particularly on current law enforcement 
        priorities, will always be relevant to the President's 
        decision.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.112.

The U.S. Attorney's manual also contains standards for the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
consideration of commutation petitions:

        Generally, commutation of sentence is an extraordinary 
        remedy that is rarely granted. Appropriate grounds for 
        considering commutation have traditionally included 
        disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical 
        illness or old age, and meritorious service rendered to 
        the government by the petitioner, e.g., cooperation 
        with investigative or prosecutive efforts that has not 
        been adequately rewarded by other official action.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.113.

    A second source of guidance comes from a 1996 memorandum 
from then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn to Deputy Attorney 
General Jamie Gorelick and Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate 
Love. In this memorandum, Quinn issued a number of directives 
from President Clinton regarding the exercise of his clemency 
authority. Quinn first stated that the ``President intends to 
continue to rely greatly on your joint recommendations 
regarding clemency applications.'' Quinn also stated that 
President Clinton had identified a number of factors in 
addition to those listed in the U.S. Attorney's Manual, which 
he wanted considered as part of the review of clemency 
petitions:
    The following circumstances would weigh in favor of 
granting clemency:

        1. Indications that the crime for which clemency is 
        sought was truly abberational, i.e., a lone instance of 
        criminal behavior in an otherwise exemplary life.

        2. Cases committed long ago when the individual was 
        very young and which do not involve major crimes.

        3. Cases not involving major crimes in which the 
        individual has clearly turned his or her life around by 
        making sustained and significant contributions to the 
        community since being released from prison.

        By contrast, in certain cases, even extraordinarily 
        exemplary actions post-conviction may not merit the 
        remedy of executive clemency. These cases might 
        include:

        1. The commission of major crimes: There are categories 
        of crimes which are so serious that the President will 
        not consider granting a pardon for them under almost 
        any circumstances. Such crimes would include large-
        scale drug trafficking, sex offenses involving minors, 
        offenses involving central involvement in political 
        corruption, or violent crimes such as murder or rape.

        2. An extensive criminal history: Three or more 
        separate convictions should raise a substantial 
        presumption against granting a pardon with respect to 
        any one of them. This presumption would only be 
        overcome by a truly exceptional rehabilitative history 
        involving exemplary service to the individual's 
        community or country.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556-57 (Memorandum from 
Jack Quinn to Jamie Gorelick (Jan. 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 2).

    The final source of guidance regarding the exercise of the 
President's clemency power is, of course, the President's own 
personal views. In 1996, President Clinton was asked if he was 
considering a pardon for Susan McDougal and other Whitewater 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
defendants. He responded:

        [M]y position would be that their cases should be 
        handled like others . . . there's a regular process for 
        that, and I have regular meetings on that. And I review 
        those cases as they come up and after there's an 
        evaluation done by the Justice Department, and that's 
        how I think it should be handled.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 
23, 1996).

    Therefore, the President suggested that the McDougal case, 
and all others, would be handled according to the ``regular 
process,'' including screening by the Justice Department.
    As to the President's claim that he would follow the 
``regular process,'' he granted clemency to 30 individuals who 
had not even filed clemency petitions with the Justice 
Department,\23\ and some who had not filed any petition at all, 
not even with the White House.\24\ The President also granted 
clemency to 14 individuals who had their petitions previously 
denied and thus were not pending with the Justice 
Department.\25\ Even more important, in a number of cases, 
President Clinton dramatically deviated from the ``regular 
process'' of seeking the Justice Department's input.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, 
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3).
    \24\ The Committee has not attempted to discover every single case 
where clemency was granted without a clemency petition being filed. 
However, it has been reported that a number of individuals who were 
convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations, for 
example, Richard Douglas, Alvarez Ferrouillet, John Hemmingson, James 
H. Lake, Brook K. Mitchell, Sr., Jack L. Williams, Ronald Blackley, 
Henry Cisneros, and Linda Jones all received grants of clemency without 
having filed a petition with either the White House or the Justice 
Department. See Weston Kosova, Running on Fumes: Pulling All-Nighters, 
Bill Clinton Spent His Last Days Obsessing Over Details and Pardons, 
Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30.
    \25\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, 
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many of the President's last-minute grants of clemency 
violated all of these standards. Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
for example, fail all five Justice Department criteria for 
pardons. They did not demonstrate responsible behavior after 
their indictment. Rather, by all accounts, they have remained 
fugitives from justice and continued to engage in business 
relations with the enemies of the United States. Their offenses 
were serious and notorious crimes for which, according to the 
Justice Department, a suitable length of time should pass 
between conviction and pardon. Yet Rich and Green never even 
stood trial. Rich and Green did not demonstrate any 
responsibility, remorse, or atonement for their crimes. Rather, 
they maintained that they were ``singled out'' and unfairly 
prosecuted. Rich and Green had no real need for relief. They 
lived in luxury and apparently sought the pardons only so that 
they could travel freely around the world, without the fear of 
being apprehended by the U.S. Marshals Service in countries 
that were cooperating with U.S. efforts to apprehend them. 
Finally, there were no official recommendations or reports 
regarding the Rich and Green pardons, since the White House 
circumvented the normal pardon review process. If there had 
been such reports, however, it is safe to assume that the U.S. 
Attorney's office would have strongly objected to the Rich and 
Green pardons.
    The other grants of clemency reviewed in this report also 
fail to meet the applicable standards. Carlos Vignali satisfies 
none of the appropriate grounds for commutation identified in 
Justice Department regulations, as his sentence was not 
disparate or unfair, and he did not cooperate with law 
enforcement. As a large-scale drug dealer, Vignali also was not 
eligible for clemency under the President's own guidelines of 
1996. Harvey Weinig similarly failed all relevant standards, 
having been sentenced fairly and having never cooperated with 
law enforcement. Weinig, as a large-scale money launderer for 
the Cali Cartel, also was ineligible for clemency under the 
President's guidelines. Glenn Braswell clearly failed to meet 
the standards for a pardon, as he was under active 
investigation for new criminal acts at the time he received a 
pardon. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory similarly fell short of the 
applicable standard, having committed one of the largest bank 
frauds in Alabama history. Moreover, prosecutors objected to 
the Gregory pardons.
C. Individuals Close to President Clinton Used Their Influence to Lobby 
        for Undeserved Grants of Clemency
    One of the most disturbing aspects of the closing month of 
President Clinton's term in office is that a number of people 
close to the President used their relationship with him to 
lobby for clemency grants which ordinarily would not have been 
considered. While there are certainly individuals who would 
seek to abuse their access in any administration, never have 
they been so successful as in the Clinton Administration. Jack 
Quinn abused his relationship with the President to lobby for 
the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. There can be little 
doubt that these pardons would not have been issued if Jack 
Quinn had not exploited his position as former White House 
Counsel. Hugh Rodham successfully lobbied the President for 
grants of clemency to Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell. Tony 
Rodham successfully lobbied the President to grant pardons to 
Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory. David Dreyer, a former White House 
staffer, lobbied the President to grant a commutation to his 
cousin, Cali cartel money launderer Harvey Weinig.
    It is clear that none of these grants of clemency would 
have been issued on the merits. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were 
fugitives from justice, indicted for the largest tax evasion 
scheme in U.S. history and for selling oil to Iran while 
Americans were being held hostage. Carlos Vignali was the 
source of cocaine for a major drug dealing ring. Glenn Braswell 
was an extremely successful con artist who was actually under 
criminal investigation at the time he received his pardon from 
President Clinton. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory had been 
convicted for the largest bank fraud in Alabama history. Harvey 
Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali cartel and 
participated in a kidnapping, and was only caught when he began 
to steal money from the Cali cartel. Only by capitalizing on 
relationships between President Clinton and individuals close 
to him were these petitioners able to obtain grants of 
clemency.
D. A Number of Potential Violations of Law Have Been Discovered by the 
        Committee
    In the course of its investigation, the Committee has 
learned of a number of potential violations of law by Roger 
Clinton and Tony Rodham. The Committee recommends that the 
Department of Justice review these matters in conjunction with 
the ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
    The Committee has uncovered a number of potential criminal 
acts by Roger Clinton. First, Roger Clinton may have imported 
more than $10,000 in monetary instruments into the United 
States without properly disclosing it to the Customs Service. 
Clinton received substantial sums of money originating from 
overseas between 1998 and 2000. If Clinton imported this money 
into the United States, then he was required to report it to 
proper authorities and apparently did not do so. Second, Roger 
Clinton appears to have violated the Lobbying Disclosure Act. 
There is evidence that Roger Clinton lobbied the President 
regarding travel restrictions to Cuba. Clinton did not register 
as a lobbyist, despite the fact that he was likely required to 
do so. Third, Clinton lied to FBI agents who interviewed him 
regarding his lobbying for Rosario Gambino in 1999. When they 
interviewed Roger Clinton, he claimed that ``he did not 
represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother 
was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family.'' \26\ 
However, when Clinton lobbied the U.S. Parole Commission, he 
had explicitly stated that his brother was ``completely aware'' 
of his involvement.\27\ Roger Clinton also lied to the FBI 
about a $50,000 payment from the Gambino family.\28\ Although 
he deposited the payment the same day as the FBI interview, he 
did not disclose it to the agents explicitly or truthfully. 
Rather he claimed that Rosario Gambino's son had offered to 
loan him money for a down payment on a house.\29\ Despite this 
claim to the FBI, which Clinton repeated to the media in the 
summer of 2001, bank records indicate that Clinton neither used 
the $50,000 for a down payment nor did he ever repay any of the 
money. During the interview, Clinton also told three separate 
and contradictory stories when questioned about a Rolex watch 
he received from the Gambinos.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00003 
(Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4).
    \27\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, U.S. Parole Commission, to File (Jan. 31, 
1996)) (Exhibit--5); Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case 
Operations Manager, U.S. Parole Commission (July 27, 2001). Roger 
Clinton made it clear to Parole Commission staff on multiple occasions 
that President Clinton had specific knowledge that he was contacting 
the Parole Commission regarding Rosario Gambino. See generally, Chapter 
Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, 
Section II.E.1., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding his Brother's 
Knowledge.''
    \28\ See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in 
Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.2., ``Roger Clinton's 
Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos.''
    \29\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00005-06 
(Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4).
    \30\ The interviewing FBI agents apparently were not satisfied with 
Roger Clinton's candor during the interview, as they took the unusual 
step of explaining to Clinton the penalties for making false statements 
during the course of the interview. Id. at FBI-RC-00006. See generally, 
Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive 
Clemency, Section II.E.3., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the 
Rolex Watch.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee has also learned about Tony Rodham's 
participation in a scheme to defraud Vivian Mannerud in 
connection with Mannerud's effort to obtain a commutation for 
her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba. Tony Rodham was introduced 
to Mannerud by his business partner, Marilyn J. Parker. 
Together, Rodham and Parker attempted to convince Mannerud to 
hire Rodham to help her obtain a commutation for her father. In 
making his pitch to Mannerud, Rodham made a number of false 
statements to Mannerud, including the assertion that he was 
friendly with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, and that he would 
hire a law firm at which Adams' wife was a partner. Rodham then 
asked Mannerud to pay him $50,000 to help with the Fernando 
Fuentes Coba commutation effort. After Mannerud refused, 
Marilyn Parker called Mannerud to tell her that Rodham now only 
wanted $30,000 to help with the Fuentes commutation. Mannerud 
declined both offers for fear of being involved in some 
improper activity. The activity by Rodham and Parker may amount 
to a criminal conspiracy to defraud Vivian Mannerud. Whether or 
not the conduct by Rodham and Parker amounts to criminal 
activity depends greatly upon the specific evidence that can be 
gathered by the Justice Department. However, it is clear that 
this matter deserves thorough investigation by the Department 
of Justice.
E. The Message Sent by President Clinton's Grants of Clemency
    The way in which a President exercises the clemency power 
speaks volumes about that President's priorities. The clemency 
grants reviewed in this report send a clear message, one that 
does not speak well of President Clinton. While the clemency 
power is vitally important and should be used by the President, 
it should not be debased, particularly where large sums of 
money are flowing to relatives of the President or to 
foundations in which he has a significant interest.
    First, President Clinton granted pardons and commutations 
to individuals who never would have received clemency but for 
the fact that they hired individuals close to the President to 
represent them. Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Carlos Vignali, Glenn 
Braswell, Edgar Gregory, and Vonna Jo Gregory were all 
extremely wealthy and were able to hire Jack Quinn, Tony 
Rodham, and Hugh Rodham to lobby the White House and short-
circuit the normal clemency review procedures. The average low-
income criminal defendant does not have the money necessary to 
hire a White House insider to lobby for his pardon. At best, he 
can fill out his clemency application and watch it proceed 
through the normal Justice Department review process. By 
listening to the advice of highly-paid White House insiders 
like Jack Quinn, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham, and by granting 
clemency to their clients, President Clinton has sent the 
message that he had two standards of justice--one for the rich, 
and one for the poor. Representative Elijah Cummings described 
some of his concerns about this issue at the Committee's 
February 8, 2001, hearing:

        One of the things that concerns me about [the Rich] 
        pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in this 
        audience or anybody who is watching this at home, you 
        know, when the little guy, when the Department of 
        Justice comes after the little guy, the guys that I 
        used to represent, they tear their lives apart, I mean 
        rip them apart. They can't afford the Mr. diGenovas, 
        the great lawyers, as he is and others. They do the 
        best they can. They spend all of their money. Their 
        reputations are tarnished. Even if they're found not 
        guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their 
        homes, subpoenas are issued.

        And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who 
        apparently goes off to another country, they've got the 
        money to do so, and it appears as if they're evading 
        the process. The little guys that I represent and the 
        women, you know, they really have a problem with that, 
        because they sit here and they say, wait a minute, you 
        know, I'm sitting in jail for 20 years. And it does not 
        even compare. I mean, I may have done one-millionth of 
        what was allegedly done here, but I'm sitting in jail. 
        And I didn't have the money to go off somewhere else. I 
        didn't have the money to do that. I didn't have the 
        money to hire the big-time lawyers. So it does concern 
        me.

                                *  *  *

        And it's one thing to go to trial. It's one thing to 
        stay here and face the music. It's one thing to be 
        found not guilty. It's a whole other thing, in my 
        opinion, when somebody, because they have the money, 
        can go outside the country and evade the system. I tell 
        you it really concerns me because my constituents have 
        a major problem with that, and I do, too.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 164-65 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Elijah Cummings).

These concerns are shared by many on the Committee.
    President Clinton's pardons did not just send the message 
that he believes in two standards of justice. By pardoning 
fugitives from justice, President Clinton undermined the 
efforts of law enforcement officers everywhere. Since 1983, 
Assistant United States Attorneys and agents of the United 
States Marshals Service have been trying to apprehend Marc Rich 
and Pincus Green. They listed Rich as one of the most wanted 
fugitives in the world. They set up sting operations to arrest 
Rich overseas. They have submitted arrest requests and 
extradition requests to a number of foreign countries. 
President Clinton's pardon of wanted fugitives is a direct slap 
in the face to the U.S. law enforcement officers who spent 
almost two decades trying to apprehend Rich. The pardons also 
could serve to undermine U.S. efforts to extradite fugitives in 
the future.
    By commuting the sentences of Carlos Vignali and Harvey 
Weinig, President Clinton undermined U.S. efforts to fight the 
flow of illegal drugs into the country. Neither was a minor 
participant in drug trafficking. Vignali supplied cocaine to 
the largest drug-dealing ring in Minnesota history. Moreover, 
he never cooperated with law enforcement and failed to reveal 
where he obtained his cocaine. Harvey Weinig laundered millions 
of dollars for the Cali cartel. Without individuals like Harvey 
Weinig, drug traffickers would not be able to enjoy the 
proceeds from their drug sales. Despite the seriousness of 
their crimes, President Clinton commuted the sentences of both 
Vignali and Weinig.
    The message of these commutations was loud and clear. Tony 
Adams, a narcotics detective in Minnesota, spoke eloquently to 
the meaning of the Vignali commutation. Adams stated that he 
was stunned to learn of the commutation: ``It's like, 
basically, you've just been told that this kid, he's 
untouchable.'' \32\ Adams observed that the Vignali case ``more 
or less tells us that America's system has been bought if you 
have money.'' \33\ He also observed that ``politicians always 
get in front of this camera and say ``We're trying to take dope 
off the streets. We're trying to put dope dealers in jail.'' 
Well, you just let one out, a big one.'' \34\ Finally, Adams 
suggested that ``the politicians in L.A. or Washington, D.C., 
should finish the nine years that [Vignali] has left on his 
time, and I'm standing right by that.'' \35\ Adams is certainly 
not alone in his criticism of the Vignali commutation, but his 
comments are particularly noteworthy, coming from a detective 
who investigated the case, and who routinely places his life on 
the line to protect the public from drug traffickers.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American 
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at 10.
    \33\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television 
broadcast, Feb. 27, 2001).
    \34\ Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001).
    \35\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television 
broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001).
    \36\ While conducting plainclothes surveillance in April 2001, 
Adams was shot at by a suspect and escaped uninjured. David Chanen, Man 
Fires at Officer, But Nobody is Hurt, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN), 
Apr. 20, 2001, at 9B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Weinig case has sent no less a destructive message to 
U.S. law enforcement. In fact, the Weinig commutation has 
created a great deal of consternation in Latin American nations 
from which the U.S. is attempting to extradite drug kingpins. 
Many individuals in these nations have argued that they should 
not extradite their citizens to the U.S. for narcotics offenses 
because the U.S. clearly is not serious about enforcing its 
narcotics laws, pointing specifically to the Weinig 
commutation.\37\ By pardoning a major money launderer for the 
Cali cartel, President Clinton has made it harder for the U.S. 
to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. and harder to fight 
the war on drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ See Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, Wash. Times, 
Mar. 6, 2001, at A13; Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on 
Drugs, Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 
2001, at A15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Obstacles Faced by the Committee
    The Committee conducted a thorough investigation, 
interviewing dozens of witnesses. The majority of parties 
contacted by the Committee cooperated with the investigation. 
However, a number of key individuals refused to cooperate, 
which in turn seriously hampered the Committee's investigation.
            1. Witnesses Who Have Not Cooperated with the Investigation
    The Committee has faced a number of obstacles that have 
prevented it from discovering the full truth regarding the 
pardon and commutations which it investigated. The greatest 
problem faced by the Committee was that a number of key 
witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise 
refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. A 
total of 26 witnesses either invoked their Fifth Amendment 
rights or refused to be interviewed in the course of the 
Committee's investigation. Some of these witnesses, like Marc 
Rich, Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, and Roger Clinton, were 
critically important. The impact of the refusal of key 
witnesses to cooperate is discussed below in the relevant 
chapters regarding each part of the investigation.
    Another significant problem the Committee has faced is the 
refusal of a number of parties to produce records subpoenaed or 
requested by the Committee. A number of document requests 
issued by the Committee have not been complied with by their 
recipients, either because of an invocation of Fifth Amendment 
rights or an invocation of attorney-client privilege. In some 
cases, the invocation of privilege has been spurious. For 
example, Hugh Rodham refused to produce any records regarding 
the Vignali matter because of the attorney-client privilege. 
Obviously, Rodham possesses records which are not privileged, 
which he could provide to the Committee, however, he simply 
declined to do so.\38\ This refusal adversely impacted the 
ability of the Committee to develop a full understanding of 
Rodham's work on the Vignali matter. The specific problems 
faced by the Committee in each aspect of the pardon 
investigation are discussed below in the relevant chapters 
regarding each pardon and commutation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Such records would include records provided to Rodham by third 
parties and documents which Rodham provided to third parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The White House
    It is a matter of some concern that the Bush White House 
and Justice Department failed to cooperate fully with the 
Committee's investigation. Early in its investigation of the 
Marc Rich pardon, the Chairman requested that former President 
Clinton waive any claim of executive privilege he might have 
over testimony and documents relating to the pardons and 
commutations he granted.\39\ On February 27, 2001, former 
President Clinton's attorney, David Kendall, sent the Chairman 
a letter in which he informed the Committee that ``he will 
interpose no Executive Privilege objections to the testimony of 
his former staff concerning these pardons, or to other pardons 
and commutations he granted.'' \40\ Despite former President 
Clinton's decision to waive executive privilege, the Committee 
faced a number of problems receiving records relating to the 
pardons and commutations, both from the White House and the 
Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to former President William J. Clinton (Feb. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 
6).
    \40\ Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for President Clinton, 
Williams & Connolly, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 7). In addition to waiving any 
claim of privilege with respect to the testimony of his former staff, 
President Clinton has not raised executive privilege with respect to 
any of the records the Committee has requested from the National 
Archives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beginning on January 25, 2001, the Committee issued a 
series of document requests to the National Archives and 
Records Administration (``NARA''), seeking records relating to 
pardons and commutations issued or considered by former 
President Clinton. Under the Presidential Records Act, once the 
responsive records were located by NARA staff, they were 
provided to staff for former President Clinton to be reviewed 
for executive privilege concerns.\41\ After President Clinton's 
staff had reviewed them, the records were reviewed by staff for 
President Bush, who independently has the right to assert 
executive privilege over the records. The Committee's first 
requests to NARA for records relating to Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green were satisfied. However, shortly thereafter, the 
Committee began to have significant problems receiving the 
records it had requested from NARA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2204 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 8, 2001, the Committee issued a request to NARA 
for records relating to the pardons and commutations of a 
number of individuals--including Glenn Braswell, Carlos 
Vignali, Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, and Eugene and Nora Lum--
as well as records relating to Roger Clinton's involvement in 
lobbying for pardons. The Committee's request called for the 
records to be provided to the Committee by March 22, 2001. At 
some point in April 2001, NARA had gathered all of the 
responsive documents, and they had been reviewed and cleared by 
the office of former President Clinton. However, they had not 
been provided to the Committee because of objections from the 
Bush White House Counsel's Office.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Notes of Telephone Conversation with Amy Krupsky, Associate 
General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration (May 1, 
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff spent the next month engaged in fruitless 
negotiations with the Bush White House regarding the production 
of the requested records. Staff from the Bush White House 
explained that they had concerns about producing the requested 
records, because the records went to the heart of the clemency 
review process, which was part of a core Presidential power. 
During these negotiations, Committee staff pointed out that the 
White House had been delaying the production of a wide variety 
of records from NARA, including documents sent into the White 
House from individuals seeking pardons, and that these records 
could not possibly raise any privilege concerns. The White 
House agreed to provide these types of non-deliberative records 
to the Committee.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ The White House did not agree to provide records provided to 
the White House from third parties until June 6, 2001. It is unclear 
why these types of records, which were clearly not privileged, were 
withheld from the Committee for so long. The delay in the production of 
these records--which did not occur until three months after they were 
requested--imposed a substantial delay on the Committee's 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the White House was not nearly so accommodating 
with respect to deliberative documents about the clemency 
process that were generated inside of the Clinton 
Administration. White House staff informed the Committee staff 
that the White House did not plan to assert executive privilege 
over these records but would simply decline to produce them and 
hope that the Committee understood the reasons why. Committee 
staff attempted to explain that a number of these records were 
critically important to the Committee's investigation. For 
example, the report prepared by Pardon Attorney Roger Adams 
regarding the Vignali commutation was central to the 
Committee's understanding of the Vignali matter. Committee 
staff also offered to reach a number of compromise 
accommodations, which would satisfy the Committee's needs to 
review the Adams memo, while still protecting the White House's 
interests. All of these offers were rejected. The White House's 
refusal to reach any accommodation meant that the Committee was 
unable to obtain a number of key documents regarding pardons 
and commutations issued by President Clinton.
    On June 7, 2001, shortly after the Committee's offers to 
the White House were rejected, the Committee received a 
production of records from NARA. This production apparently 
included both deliberative and non-deliberative records 
responsive to the Committee's March 8, 2001, request. 
Approximately two weeks later, Committee staff informed the 
White House that NARA had provided the Committee with a number 
of records that the White House may have intended to withhold 
from the Committee. Shortly thereafter, the Committee received 
a telephone call and then a letter from the NARA General 
Counsel, Gary Stern, requesting the return of the documents. In 
his letter, Stern stated that ``some of the records that were 
provided to the Committee were inadvertently produced. 
Accordingly, we now request the return of these records, and 
any copies made thereof.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Letter from Gary Stern, General Counsel, NARA, to Jim Wilson, 
General Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 21, 2001) (Exhibit 8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, for several reasons, the Committee decided not to 
return the records in response to Stern's request. First, the 
records were responsive to the Committee's request and, 
therefore, should have been produced in any event. Second, 
neither President Bush nor President Clinton asserted any 
privilege over the documents. In the absence of a valid claim 
of privilege, the Committee has a right to receive documents 
responsive to its request. Third, even if President Bush or 
President Clinton had asserted executive privilege, the 
Committee might have determined to keep certain essential 
records produced by NARA on June 7, 2001. A number of these 
records were critical to the Committee's investigation and did 
not raise legitimate executive privilege concerns. However, 
since neither the current nor the former President raised any 
such privilege, the Committee used these documents in its 
investigation and in this report.
    The documents that were ``inadvertently'' produced to the 
Committee were of central importance to the Committee's 
investigation. The following is a brief description of some of 
the records included in that production:

 All White House records regarding the Vignali 
commutation: These records included the report by Pardon 
Attorney Roger Adams objecting to the Vignali commutation.\45\ 
This report was of critical importance to the Committee, as it 
showed the extent to which the Clinton White House was aware of 
Carlos Vignali's criminal activities. These records also 
included one White House document indicating that Hugh Rodham 
had informed the White House staff that the Vignali commutation 
was ``very important'' to First Lady Hillary Clinton.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on 
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr., 
Jan. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 9).
    \46\ See NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woolen, 
Administrative Assistant, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Staff, the 
White House) (Exhibit 10).

 Documents that led the Committee to uncover Roger 
Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for organized crime 
figure Rosario Gambino: Before receiving these records from 
NARA, the Committee was aware only of a payment of $50,000 from 
Anna Gambino to Roger Clinton. Only after receiving these 
documents did the Committee have reason to believe this payment 
might be related to an effort to free Rosario Gambino from 
prison.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Committee staff had been unable to reach Mrs. Gambino or 
determine the purpose of her payment. The key document in the NARA 
production was a note apparently drafted by White House staffer 
Meredith Cabe which referenced the fact that she was requesting an NCIC 
check on Rosario Gambino. Given the fact that Rosario Gambino was a 
well-known organized crime figure who was an exceedingly unlikely 
candidate for a legitimate grant of clemency, the Committee 
investigated this matter and determined that Anna Gambino was Rosario 
Gambino's daughter, and that the payment of $50,000 from Anna Gambino 
to Roger Clinton was part of the Gambinos' efforts to obtain a 
commutation for Rosario Gambino.

 Documents showing three additional pardons that 
Roger Clinton attempted to obtain: These documents indicated 
that representatives of Mark St. Pe and Steven Griggs sent 
materials requesting pardons to Roger Clinton at the White 
House, and that these materials were forwarded to the White 
House Counsel's office. Another document indicating that 
William McCord had sent a petition was produced in the midst of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
other Roger Clinton-related material.

 Pardon Attorney Roger Adams' report on the 
commutation of drug money launderer Harvey Weinig: This report 
demonstrated that the White House was fully aware of the extent 
of Weinig's criminal activities, including his role in a 
kidnapping.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on 
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) (Exhibit 11).

    Given the importance of these records to the Committee's 
investigation, and the absence of any claim of privilege over 
the documents, the Committee decided to use the records in its 
investigation and in this report. Given the apparent 
sensitivity of the records to the White House, the Committee is 
using only those records which are directly relevant to 
necessary subject matter covered in this report.
    The Committee must emphasize that it is disappointed with 
the way the Administration handled its requests for documents 
relating to the pardon matter. It is clear that if a large 
number of documents relating to the pardon had not been 
``inadvertently'' produced by NARA personnel on June 7, the 
Committee would never have received those records. 
Consequently, Members of Congress, historians, and the public 
might never have known about many of the significant abuses of 
public trust detailed in this report. Developments since June 
2001 have made it clear that the Administration is engaged in a 
wide-ranging effort to expand executive privilege beyond its 
traditional boundaries and reduce Congressional oversight of 
the White House and Justice Department. It is disappointing 
that the Bush Administration would attempt to withhold key 
documents from the Committee in an investigation like this, 
where the Committee is looking into allegations of malfeasance 
at the highest levels of government. That the Bush 
Administration attempted to withhold these records even though 
former President Clinton approved their release is especially 
discouraging.
            3. The Justice Department
    The recalcitrance of the Bush Administration in refusing to 
turn over records in the pardon investigation also extended to 
the Justice Department. The Justice Department refused to 
provide a number of records requested by the Committee in the 
course of its investigation. Most of these documents related to 
the Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton, specifically 
relating to Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for 
Rosario Gambino. The Committee requested from the Justice 
Department all records relating to any consideration of a grant 
of clemency for Rosario Gambino, as well as all records 
relating to the Justice Department's investigation of Roger 
Clinton's efforts to obtain a grant of clemency for Gambino. 
The Justice Department refused to comply fully with either 
request.
    With respect to the Committee's request for records 
relating to the Justice Department's work on the Gambino 
commutation request, the Department refused to turn over any 
records or even specify which records it was withholding. 
Apparently, the Justice Department based its refusal on 
privilege concerns, presumably executive privilege, although 
Justice Department staff did not identify any specific 
privileges in explaining their decision.
    With respect to the Committee's request for records 
relating to the investigation of Roger Clinton's involvement in 
the Gambino matter, the Justice Department initially provided 
records but then abruptly stopped doing so. The Justice 
Department claimed that it was entitled to withhold records 
because of its ongoing investigation of Roger Clinton. However, 
the records that the Committee sought related to the Justice 
Department's investigation of Roger Clinton, which was 
conducted in 1998 and 1999, and then closed, not its ongoing 
investigation from the Southern District of New York. The 
Justice Department's decision to withhold these records 
significantly hindered the Committee's investigation of the 
Gambino matter. The withheld documents likely contain the 
Justice Department's rationale for failing to pursue criminal 
charges against Roger Clinton, as well as the answers to key 
factual questions such as whether the FBI was even aware of the 
$50,000 payment from the Gambinos before the Committee 
uncovered it in the summer of 2001. Without a complete 
understanding of facts and reasoning underlying the Justice 
Department's decision to close the Clinton-Gambino 
investigation, the Committee is unable to determine whether 
that decision was made in good faith or may have been tainted 
by political considerations.
    [Exhibits referred to follow:]
    
    
                              CHAPTER ONE

``TAKE JACK'S WORD'': THE PARDONS OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES MARC RICH 
                            AND PINCUS GREEN

                       FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and 
corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of 
the United States.

 Rich and Green have had extensive trade with 
terrorist states and other enemies of the United States. 
Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green 
have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and 
other rogue states that have sponsored terrorist acts. By 
engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well-
being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these 
states.

 The Central Intelligence Agency provided the 
following declassified information about Marc Rich to the 
Committee:

        If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would 
        have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of 
        inquiries by various foreign government liaison 
        services and domestic government agencies regarding 
        their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

        In addition, President Clinton would have received 
        information worthy of his consideration in making his 
        decision on the pardon. This information cannot be 
        declassified.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and 
showed contempt for the American justice system.

 Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the 
criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable, 
including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the 
country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting 
contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these 
tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts 
of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was 
overwhelming.

 Because of the strength of the case against them, 
Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face 
trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, 
Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you 
get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, 
Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international 
fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that 
Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution, 
Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her 
that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I 
think that we are going to have to leave.''

 In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by 
United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While 
this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated 
that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States, and 
viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at 
will.

Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen 
years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to 
apprehending them and closing down their business activities.

 Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that 
on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United 
States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various 
foreign countries. A number of countries from the United 
Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in 
these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a 
message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list 
to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the 
proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to 
apprehend fugitives abroad.

 Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that 
in 1991 the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic 
leadership, held a number of hearings and issued two reports 
about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At 
that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush 
Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in 
hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business 
interests in the U.S.

 While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, 
the American government took a number of actions against their 
interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's 
assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the 
government.

The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea 
agreement with Rich and Green.

 For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the 
country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea 
bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of 
concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were 
rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal 
that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack 
Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice 
Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore, 
that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were 
misleading the White House when they made these claims.

Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and 
attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his 
work for Marc Rich.

 Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation 
from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his 
case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. 
Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on 
the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to 
settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder 
recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the 
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then 
explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder 
did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests 
that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be 
very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how 
baseless they were.

 Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work 
on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack 
Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work 
on the pardon, and that he expected no future payment for his 
work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered 
evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had 
discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work 
on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld 
from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced 
only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand 
jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. 
These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his 
``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per 
month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn 
about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee 
staff.

 Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money 
from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the 
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I 
will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further 
compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge 
surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying 
Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the 
Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to 
negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged 
that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 
5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states ``If you are 
agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next 
few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the 
possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments 
from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the 
Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about 
this matter, but he refused.

 Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent 
violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was 
enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the 
most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited 
former executive branch employees from lobbying their former 
executive branch agencies within five years of their departure. 
Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within 
an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . . 
criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or 
proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to 
apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White 
House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was 
intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former 
White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to 
take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely 
based on the President's personal trust for that former 
staffer.

 The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the 
other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the 
arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green 
pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have 
been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought 
out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.

 The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition 
were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the 
Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for 
Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and 
Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian 
activities justified their pardons. However, many of these 
letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of 
the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a 
Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who 
wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of 
money from them.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different 
individuals with close personal relationships with President 
Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.

 The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key 
role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a 
close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in 
part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic 
causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive 
personal contacts with President Clinton. Denise Rich used this 
relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich 
pardon on a number of occasions. Denise Rich has refused to 
cooperate with the Committee, invoking her Fifth Amendment 
rights rather than answer questions about her role in the 
pardon.

 The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another 
close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in 
obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had 
a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties 
and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed 
millions of dollars for the Democratic party, and has pledged 
to raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library. 
Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and 
Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President 
Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has 
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, 
the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz 
made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the 
Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon.

 The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times 
about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich 
pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations 
with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he 
granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts 
of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly 
impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the 
President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's 
interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations 
for granting the Rich pardon.

 Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton 
that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just 
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' 
Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or 
Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of 
future financial return.

Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice 
Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision 
to support the pardon had a critical impact.

 Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, 
especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New 
York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the 
Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the 
Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich 
pardon petition with the White House and leave the Justice 
Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the 
Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to 
wh,'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also 
indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under 
him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the 
fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two 
months before it was granted.

 Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a 
critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder 
informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards 
favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich 
was a fugitive from justice, and that Justice Department 
prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no 
longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any 
credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon, 
leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other 
motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with 
the Committee.

 Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be 
appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore 
Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in 
the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out 
Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al 
Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore 
confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's 
initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had 
some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General 
when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice 
Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to 
be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his 
actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more 
believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date.

President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing 
about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions 
and reaching false conclusions.

 The White House never consulted with the prosecutors 
in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. 
As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the 
false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon 
petition.

 Every White House staff member who was working on 
the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do 
the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were 
unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.

 President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their 
negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of 
January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a 
telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this 
conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments 
about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients 
subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of 
this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations 
and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result 
of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as 
a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if 
President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal 
research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, 
meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that 
Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that 
fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and 
Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, 
since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third, 
Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle 
their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had 
no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the 
proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale.

 When the White House did finally provide the names 
of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department 
background check in the middle of the night on January 19, 
2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was 
disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House 
requested the Justice Department to perform a computer 
background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the 
pardons, the check came back with information that they were 
wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all 
of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among 
them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the 
only step the White House took to check on this allegation was 
to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients 
were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting 
information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed 
his staff to ``take Jack's word,'' and issue the pardons.

President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his 
decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.

 President Clinton has failed to answer any questions 
about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he 
has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more 
questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to 
explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious 
unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives.

INTRODUCTION

    The pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green were the most 
controversial and most outrageous pardons issued by President 
Clinton, and likely, by any President. Rich and Green were 
fugitives from justice, and were two of the largest tax cheats 
in U.S. history. In addition, they had a long and disgraceful 
record of trading with America's enemies, helping prop up the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and the 
Russian mafia, among others. This track record has led even 
Marc Rich's lawyers to call him a ``traitor'' and observe that 
he has ``spit on the American flag.''
    It is beyond any dispute that Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
did not deserve pardons. Therefore, the inevitable question is 
why the President granted them. Some believe that the Rich and 
Green pardons were the product of a pardon process that 
completely broke down at the end of the Clinton Administration. 
These individuals would argue that in his rush to create a 
legacy at the end of his term, President Clinton short-
circuited the normal clemency review process, and granted 
pardons without conducting the due diligence that was required. 
While this is hardly a charitable view of President Clinton, it 
is the most innocuous explanation that can be presented for the 
Rich and Green pardons.
    There are a number of reasons to believe that the pardons 
were not just the product of a sloppy process. After all, even 
though they did not fully understand the scope of Rich and 
Green's crimes, the President and White House staff grasped the 
essentials of the Rich case: Rich and Green were massive tax 
cheats, fugitives from justice, and had traded with the enemy. 
Yet, they received the pardons despite these damning facts. 
Therefore, the Committee has looked at the motives of the key 
players in the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon effort.
    The evidence raises many questions regarding the motives of 
the key players.

 Jack Quinn, for example, used his influence as a 
former White House Counsel to lobby the President on Rich's 
behalf. Quinn repeatedly provided misinformation to the White 
House. At the height of the public's outcry about the Rich 
case, Quinn claimed that he was representing Rich on a pro bono 
basis. However, the evidence obtained by the Committee shows 
that Quinn was attempting to secure a lucrative payment from 
Rich, and may still be trying to obtain payment from Rich.

 Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder provided 
critical support for the Rich pardon. While Holder should have 
ensured that the Justice Department's views were represented in 
the pardon process, Holder instead advised Jack Quinn on how to 
cut the Justice Department out of the process. While all of the 
White House staff was opposing the Rich and Green pardons, Eric 
Holder provided critical support for it at the eleventh hour. 
Holder may claim that his actions were the result of 
misjudgment, but Holder himself admitted that he was seeking 
Quinn's support to be nominated as Attorney General if Al Gore 
was elected President. This created a conflict of interest for 
Holder.

 Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz were both close 
friends of President Clinton and major contributors to the 
Democratic Party. In addition, Denise Rich contributed $450,000 
to the Clinton Library, and Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 
million for the Clinton Library. Both lobbied the President on 
the Rich pardon. Both have also invoked their Fifth Amendment 
rights rather than testify about their discussions with the 
President.

 President Clinton is ultimately responsible for the 
pardons, and must ultimately provide an explanation of why he 
granted them. He has, however, failed to provide any 
satisfactory rationale for his actions. He has failed to answer 
any serious questions, and instead, has offered only one self-
serving, factually inaccurate newspaper column to justify the 
pardons. President Clinton's attempted explanations have raised 
more questions than answers about his motivations for granting 
two of the most unjustified pardons in U.S. history.

    Regardless of the motivations for the Rich and Green 
pardons, the nation must live with the consequences of them. 
The pardons have sent two equally destructive messages. First, 
by granting the pardons, President Clinton undermined the 
efforts of U.S. law enforcement to apprehend fugitives abroad. 
By pardoning a man who evaded capture by the U.S. Marshals 
Service for almost two decades, President Clinton sent the 
message that indeed, crime can pay, and that it may be 
worthwhile to remain a fugitive rather than face charges. The 
pardon also could undermine U.S. efforts to obtain extradition 
of fugitives from foreign countries. When a man like Rich can 
go from the Justice Department's most wanted to a free man with 
a stroke of the pen, it is difficult for the U.S. to credibly 
demand the extradition of wanted fugitives. Finally, the 
pardons send the message that President Clinton did believe 
that different rules applied to wealthy criminals. If he did 
not have the money to hire Jack Quinn and his White House 
access, Marc Rich never would have obtained a pardon. The 
President abused one of his most important powers, meant to 
free the unjustly convicted or provide forgiveness to those who 
have served their time and changed their lives. Instead, he 
offered it up to wealthy fugitives whose money had already 
enabled them to permanently escape American justice. Few other 
abuses could so thoroughly undermine public trust in 
government.

I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN

A. Rich and Green's Business Activities
            1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy
    Marc Rich is one of the wealthiest people in the world. His 
network of business enterprises is estimated to generate 
upwards of $30 billion annually.\1\ Rich's personal net worth 
is estimated at between $1.5 and $8 billion.\2\ Along with his 
business partner Pincus ``Pinky'' Green, Rich has made this 
fortune principally through the commodities trading business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Josh Getlin, Clinton Pardons a Billionaire Fugitive, and 
Questions Abound, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1.
    \2\ A. Craig Copetas, Court TV Chat Transcript (visited Mar. 10, 
2002) http://www.courttv.com/talk/chat--transcripts/2001/0220rich-
copetas.html. It should be noted that estimates of Rich's personal 
fortune are probably lower than the actual amount because of Rich's 
history of questionable accounting and tax evasion, including that for 
which he was indicted in 1983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rich began his career as a commodities trader in 1954 with 
the New York office of the trading firm Philipp Brothers.\3\ 
Rich traded in a wide variety of commodities, including 
precious metals. Throughout his early career he was highly 
successful, amassing huge profits for the firm. Over time, Rich 
also developed a niche within the firm as a crude oil trader. 
He and Green revolutionized international oil trading by 
creating the ``spot market,'' which is the practice of 
purchasing oil from producers and immediately selling it to 
refineries for a large profit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 65 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After more than twenty years of trading for Philipp 
Brothers, Rich decided that he could make more money on his 
own. In 1975, while managing Philipp Brothers' Madrid office, 
Rich called a meeting of the firm's European managers in Zug, 
Switzerland, during which he demanded an impossibly high 
bonus.\4\ When, as expected, Rich's boss refused, Rich 
announced that he was leaving the firm to start his own 
company. He left with Pincus Green, taking six other top 
traders from the firm, as well as files of information on 
Philipp Brothers' clients.\5\ Rich's new firm was a success, 
and Rich was well on his way to becoming a billionaire. By 
1982, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. had become the second largest 
commodities firm in the world.\6\ However, as Rich's biographer 
explained, the initial financing for Rich's new company was 
based largely on ``a promise from Iranian Senator Ali Rezai to 
help set up a series of no-holds-barred oil deals that would, 
in part, lead to making Marc Rich the most wanted white-collar 
fugitive in American history.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Id. at 96.
    \5\ Id. at 99.
    \6\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 98 (Feb. 
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and 
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., 
Department of Justice).
    \7\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 99 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business 
                    Dealings
    Even before he had departed Philipp Brothers, Marc Rich 
developed a reputation as a shrewd and unethical manipulator. 
As fellow Phillip Brothers' trader Bill Spier explained, ``What 
separated our friendship was his belief that you could only 
make it bigger and better than the next guy by buying people 
off. Marc was suave and sophisticated and obsessed with power. 
He was always looking to see who he could buy off.'' \8\ While 
at Philipp Brothers, Rich also learned to deal with rogue 
political regimes in order to make a profit. For example, in 
1958, Rich was sent to Cuba, and continued to work there after 
the fall of the Batista regime. As one former associate 
explained, ``Marc cut his teeth in Havana, and the experience 
shaped his character because it taught him that being illegal 
was okay under certain conditions[.]'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Id. at 66.
    \9\ Id. at 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once he set up his own business enterprise, Rich's 
questionable practices appear to have expanded. His trading 
empire was based largely on systematic bribes and kickbacks to 
corrupt local officials. For example, in 1977, one of Rich's 
traders claimed to have deposited $125,000 into the Swiss bank 
account of Reza Fallah, then-head of the Iranian National Oil 
Company, in exchange for ``services rendered'' in securing a 
shipment of Iranian oil to Spain.\10\ In 1978, Rich and Green 
were caught diverting Nigerian oil shipments to South Africa. 
When the Nigerians threatened to cut off relations with Rich, 
he paid a $1 million bribe to the Nigerian transport minister 
to get the contract back.\11\ Rich also reportedly paid former 
Jamaican President Edward Seaga $45,000 to send the Jamaican 
track and field team to the 1984 Olympics. In return, Rich 
signed a ten-year agreement to purchase most of the output of 
the Jamaican Alcoa plant, which annually produced a significant 
portion of the world's aluminum.\12\ One former Rich trader 
explained the standard practices of Rich's companies as 
follows: ``[t]o go into places like Iran and do honest business 
is naive. I'd figure 15 percent of your net in payoffs for 
every deal made.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Id. at 115.
    \11\ Id. at 119.
    \12\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug. 
1, 1988, at 74.
    \13\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 115 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As is explained in more detail below in the section 
discussing Rich's legal troubles in the United States, Rich 
also laundered funds and hid his profits to protect them from 
the taxing authorities of various countries. For example, Rich 
routinely used Panamanian shell companies (Sociedades Anonimas) 
to launder money and to conceal profits from taxing 
authorities.\14\ As explained by author Craig Copetas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Id. at 125.

        Panamanian corporate law is particularly helpful to a 
        trader whose operations extend outside the Central 
        American nation and into several different countries. A 
        Sociedad Anonima is never required to file financial 
        reports or tax returns and may maintain its books in 
        any manner it desires in any part of the world. This 
        permits a procedure generally known as laundering, and 
        for Marc Rich--an expert at sidestepping the politics 
        of nations by acting as a maverick middleman between 
        producers and consumers--it was quite the bargain at 
        $1,650 plus a $50 annual franchise tax.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Id.

Rescor Incorporated, (a company that Rich used in his illegal 
oil scam that led to his legal troubles in the United States) 
was one such shell company. At one point, according to a former 
Rich shareholder, Rich had $800 million in cash concealed in 
his Panamanian shell companies.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Working with corrupt governments was not Marc Rich's only 
trademark. Much of Rich's fortune was made dealing with 
countries that no one else would deal with. Rich shrewdly used 
his multinational status, and his familiarity with unscrupulous 
business practices, to profit from embargoes and wars by 
trading with pariah nations. Rich's pattern of dealing with 
America's enemies, especially Iran, led even one of Rich's own 
lawyers to admit that Rich could be considered a traitor to his 
country:

        Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with the statement that these 
        gentlemen [Rich and Green] were two traitors to their 
        country?

        Mr. Libby. I can understand someone using those terms.

        Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with them?

        Mr. Libby. Their companies engaged in trades with 
        Iran--

        Mr. Waxman. Traitors not traders.

        Mr. Libby. No, sir, I was trying to finish--during a 
        period when trades [sic] were held, and that was an act 
        you could consider an act of a traitor.

        Mr. Waxman. That someone could consider, but you do not 
        consider it?

        Mr. Libby. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I 
        didn't advise it. I do not admire it.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 486 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of I. Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby).

    The following section describes specific business 
relationships that Rich maintained with regimes or countries 
with interests adverse to the United States. U.S. intelligence 
agencies have considerable information about Marc Rich, none of 
which was reviewed by the White House prior to the pardons. 
Unfortunately, most of the information remains classified. The 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIA, however, did declassify the following statement:

        If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would 
        have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of 
        inquiries by various foreign government liaison 
        services and domestic government agencies regarding 
        their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

        In addition, President Clinton would have received 
        information worthy of his consideration in making his 
        decision on the pardon. This information cannot be 
        declassified.

As described below, though, the public record alone should have 
been enough to eliminate any possibility of pardons for Marc 
Rich and Pincus Green.
                a. Iran
    Marc Rich got his start in the oil trade through business 
dealings with the Shah of Iran. After the Shah fell from power, 
many were concerned by Ayatollah Khomeini's violent rise to 
power. However, Rich saw a new opportunity, and began trading 
with the Khomeini regime. In the early days of the Iranian 
revolution, after the new Iranian government seized 51 American 
hostages, the United States imposed a strict trade embargo on 
Iran. Nevertheless, Rich directed his staff to meet the new 
directors of the Iranian state-owned oil company.\18\ Shortly 
thereafter, Marc Rich and Pincus Green reached a deal to 
purchase Iranian oil through his Swiss company, Marc Rich + Co. 
A.G. Reportedly, Rich paid for much of this purchase in small 
arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets.\19\ One of 
Rich's colleagues stated that because of this deal ``Rich got 
more excited than I had ever seen him.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 131 (1985).
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id. at 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. South Africa
    Rich's companies also dealt extensively with the South 
African government throughout the apartheid regime. 
Notwithstanding the United Nations' ban on oil sales to South 
Africa, throughout the 1980s Rich's company was one of the 
three main traders of oil between the Middle East and South 
Africa.\21\ Where other companies saw legal peril, Marc Rich 
saw profit, with South African companies willing to pay a 
premium of $8 per barrel of oil. According to the Dutch-based 
Shipping Research Bureau, Rich supplied about 6 percent of all 
oil imports to South Africa between 1979 and 1986, earning 
upwards of $1 billion from the transactions.\22\ And according 
to a former Rich shareholder, at the time of their indictment 
in the United States, Rich and Green were trading Soviet and 
Iranian oil to the apartheid government in South Africa in 
exchange for Namibian uranium, which Rich and Green in turn 
sold back to the Soviet Union.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Andrew Lycett, Spectrum: Plain Sailing Through the Sanctions 
Net, Times (London), Sept. 12, 1986.
    \22\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug. 
1, 1988, at 74.
    \23\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 198 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At times, Rich's deals with South Africa were so risky and 
profitable that Rich would scuttle the oil tanker at the 
conclusion of the deal and fly the crew home. In one deal, a 
tanker was loaded with oil from the Soviet Union, was diverted 
from its intended itinerary, covered its name with tarpaulins, 
communicated only in code, and then delivered its oil in secret 
to South Africa.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 
1994, at 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. The Soviet Union/Russia
    The South African uranium transactions were not the only 
dealing Rich had with the Soviet Union. In fact, Rich and his 
companies dealt extensively with the Soviet Union and other 
Communist countries. His oil trading with the Soviet Union 
provided Moscow with the hard currency needed to purchase grain 
during the United States' grain embargo.\25\ Rich's dealings 
with the Soviet Union were so extensive and helpful to the 
Soviet Union that when he was indicted in the United States in 
1983, one Moscow newspaper printed a front page, above-the-fold 
story defending Marc Rich and attacking the United States.\26\ 
In fact, the Russian newspaper Izvestia wrote the following in 
defense of Rich:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 196-197 (1985).

        The United States thinks that all countries, big and 
        small, must subvert their national interests to 
        American measures. . . . Under the pretext of 
        nonpayment of taxes by the Swiss branch of the Marc 
        Rich firm, American authorities have given an 
        ultimatum: either Switzerland changes its internal 
        legislation or its companies will be deprived of 
        admission to American markets. This action by the 
        Reagan Administration is an open threat, an attempt to 
        interfere into the internal affairs of Western European 
        countries through the threat of economic sanctions. The 
        Americans are living under the illusion of a Pax 
        Americana.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Id. at 197.

The fact that one of the leading propaganda organs of the 
Soviet state would dedicate itself to the defense of a 
capitalist commodities trader like Marc Rich shows the 
importance Rich and his company had in providing hard currency 
to the Soviet regime.
    Marc Rich's influence has only grown in post-Communist 
Russia. Rich took advantage of widespread privatization in 
Russia to acquire large supplies of industrial materials at 
bargain prices. As explained in The Washington Post, ``[a]fter 
the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, these relationships helped 
Rich become for a time the single most important Western trader 
in Russia.'' \28\ There is also evidence that Rich has 
developed deep ties with Russian organized crime, a powerful 
force in post-Communist Russia.\29\ According to press 
accounts, law enforcement agencies including the FBI and the 
CIA had information indicating that Rich had financial ties to 
the Russian mafia.\30\ According to one U.S. intelligence 
source who spoke to the press, ``Clinton would have found out 
about the relationships if he had asked either the FBI or CIA, 
[but] [h]e clearly never bothered to ask.'' \31\ Another source 
told the press that ``[t]he FBI has tons of material on the 
Russian mafia and in particular the Rich-mafia connection.'' 
\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
    \29\ Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob has 
Invaded America 51 (2000) (indicating that Rich had a relationship with 
Russian gangster Marat Balagula, now serving time in prison for 
gasoline price fixing). Rich is also suspected to have been involved in 
metals trading going in and out of the Estonian port of Tallinn, where 
Russian copper, nickel and cobalt are often exported. Tallinn is 
notorious for being controlled by the Russian mafia. Rich's company has 
denied using the port of Tallinn. See Tony Glover, The EU's Baltic 
Extension, EuroBusiness, May 1, 1994.
    \30\ Matthew McAllester, Rich's Suspect Ties/Sources: Clinton Could 
Have Learned Russian Mob Links, Newsday, Mar. 1, 2001, at A5.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reportedly, Rich has been linked specifically by U.S. law 
enforcement to Mikhail Chernoy, a former agent for Trans-World 
Metals. Chernoy is a defendant in a civil case in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. He is 
named as a controller of two Russian aluminum companies by 
European companies who claim that the defendants used bribery, 
money-laundering and extortion in order to illegally seize a 
large aluminum plant in Russia.\33\ Moreover, according to an 
investigative report commissioned by the World Bank in 1998, 
Chernoy was arrested by the Swiss police in 1996 during an 
investigation of Russian gangs.\34\ As the report states, 
Mikhail's brother Lev ``is believed to be a major Russian mafia 
figure by most international police and intelligence 
organizations.'' \35\ The report further states that Marc Rich 
provided the seed money necessary to start up Trans-World 
metals.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Id.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Id. David Reuben, the Chairman of Trans-World has denied this 
account. See Letters, Newsday, Mar. 7, 2001, at A39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rich has also been linked to Grigori Loutchansky, a 
Georgian-born Israeli citizen who is considered to be a 
significant player in Russian mob activities. According to 
press accounts, Loutchansky worked with Rich in the early 1990s 
selling Russian oil and aluminum from formerly state-run 
enterprises.\37\ Loutchansky, who was ``accused of drug 
trafficking and smuggling nuclear weapons,'' \38\ is ``listed 
in a 1995 State Department `watch list' as a `suspected 
criminal,' '' \39\ and was involved in the 1996 campaign 
fundraising scandal. Time magazine has said that Loutchansky is 
``considered by many to be the most pernicious unindicted 
criminal in the world,'' \40\ yet he dined with Clinton at a 
White House dinner in 1993 and subsequently channeled money 
into Clinton's campaign.\41\ He was also invited to a 
fundraising dinner in July 1995 but was unable to attend when 
his visa was denied and invitation withdrawn.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ The U.S. Connection in Caucasus, Intelligence Newsletter, No. 
401, Mar. 8, 2001.
    \38\ Judi Hasson, Panel Offers Evidence of China Link Beijing Bank 
Wired Funds to L.A. Man Prior to Donation, USA Today, July 11, 1997, at 
6A.
    \39\ Jerry Seper, Ukrainian Gained U.S. Entry Because of Spelling 
Mismatch, Wash. Times, Dec. 13, 1997, at A4.
    \40\ Statement by Former CIA Director on Clinton Ties to 
Loutchansky, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1996.
    \41\ Jerry Seper, Soloman Asks Again for Data on Meetings with 
Russian, Wash. Times, Feb. 11, 1997, at A4.
    \42\ Lee Davidson, Bennett Zeros in on Demo Donations, Deseret News 
(Salt Lake City, UT), July 11, 1997, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                d. Cuba
    In this hemisphere, Rich continued to conduct business with 
Communist Cuba, notwithstanding the U.S. embargo. Rich's early 
dealings with Fidel Castro as a trader for Philipp Brothers 
apparently paid off decades later when he started his own 
companies. Marc Rich reportedly assisted Cuban efforts to 
escalate its nuclear power program in 1991.\43\ Rich negotiated 
with Castro's son to develop a uranium deposit in Western 
Cuba.\44\ The highly enriched uranium could be used to fuel 
Cuba's twin 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors. In addition, 
U.S. officials were concerned about the weapons potential of 
the enriched uranium used in the reactor.\45\ Also in 1991, 
Marc Rich & Co., Ltd. arranged a $3.9 million deal for sugar 
and oil that were transferred through Cuba.\46\ Ultimately, 
these transactions violated the Cuban Assets Control 
regulations, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the 
U.S. Department of Treasury blocked nearly $3 million of funds 
from Rich's Cuba transactions.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ John J. Fialka and Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Speeds Nuclear 
Project; Marc Rich Is Said to Assist, Wall St. J. europe, June 4, 1991, 
at 2.
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ See id.
    \46\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note to 
file C-17306 from the Compliance Programs Division) (Exhibit 1).
    \47\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum 
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under 
Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) 
(Exhibit 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                e. Libya
    Marc Rich also apparently traded with Libya under Muammar 
Qaddafi.\48\ Rich's companies purchased oil from Libya 
beginning in the 1970s.\49\ Yet even after the United States 
bombed Libya in April of 1986 in response to the terrorist 
attacks originating in that country, Rich reportedly continued 
to purchase crude oil from Qaddafi's regime.\50\ Rich continued 
to do business with Libya even after U.S. oil companies 
completely withdrew from the country.\51\ Unlike the other 
American oil companies, Rich ignored the oil embargoes and 
executive orders of the Reagan Administration designed to 
punish the terrorist-sponsoring state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 118 (1985).
    \49\ Id.
    \50\ Strong Tanker Fixtures Seen as Indication of Undiminished 
Interest in Libyan Oil, Platt's Oilgram News, July 16, 1986, at 1.
    \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                f. Iraq
    It has also been reported that Marc Rich attempted to 
violate the UN embargo against Iraq during the Persian Gulf 
War.\52\ Other reports indicate that U.S. officials have been 
investigating charges that Rich lent money to Saddam Hussein's 
government in exchange for future deliveries of cheap oil.\53\ 
In a statement to The Financial Times of London, Marc Rich 
acknowledged that he had communications with Iraq in September 
of 1991, but denied that it involved oil trading.\54\ The fact 
that Rich would admit to having discussions with Saddam 
Hussein's government just months after the end of the Gulf War 
is remarkable. Based on his pattern of shrewd, unethical, and 
illegal business dealings with other rogue regimes, Rich's 
claim to be interested only in humanitarian aid for Iraq 
completely lacks credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ See John Hooper, Oil Traders Get Rich in Global Game of Chess, 
The Guardian (London), Aug. 7, 1990. See also Jim Hougan, King of the 
World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104.
    \53\ Paul Klebnikov, How Rich Got Rich, Forbes, June 22, 1992, at 
41.
    \54\ Ian Rodger, Marc Rich Hopes for Resolution of Tax Case, 
Financial Times, (London), Mar. 12, 1993, at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                g. Angola
    In Angola, as in many other countries, Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green became close to the dictators ruling the country. These 
relationships gave them exclusive rights to the country's oil. 
When other Western oil companies wanted Angolan oil, they had 
to turn to Marc Rich and Pincus Green. This point was made with 
somewhat comedic effect when, in the late 1970s, a number of 
western oil executives were called to a meeting with Angola's 
oil agents. Expecting a group of communist officials, the 
executives ``were visibly stunned when the communist 
representative who walked into the conference room turned out 
to be Pinky Green, greeting Exxon executives with a hearty `How 
ya doin'?' '' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-
Dollar Scam 115 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                h. Romania
    Marc Rich is reported to have traded several commodities, 
including oil, with the Romanian regime of Nicolae 
Ceausescu.\56\ At the time, Rich reportedly had his own 
refineries based in Romania.\57\ Trade unionists in Romania 
have accused Rich of cashing in on the fortunes that Ceausescu 
stole from the Romanian people.\58\ It also appears that, based 
on documents received by the Committee from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Marc Rich was trading grain with the Ceausescu 
regime in the late 1980s.\59\ As is discussed in detail below, 
these sales (in addition to sales to countries like China, the 
Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia) resulted in Rich's companies 
receiving $95 million from the Department of Agriculture 
through a program that provided surplus grain to companies 
selling subsidized grain abroad.\60\ This led to an 
investigation by then-Congressman, and later Secretary of 
Agriculture, Dan Glickman. Glickman's investigation would 
eventually lead the first Bush Administration to direct the 
Department of Agriculture to bar Rich's companies from 
receiving any new contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Romania: Life After Debt, International Trade Finance, May 18, 
1989.
    \57\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 
1994, at 104.
    \58\ Id.
    \59\ See Department of Agriculture Document Production (Minutes of 
Richo Grain Board Meeting, Jan. 6, 1987); Department of Agriculture 
Document Production (Listing of E.E.P. Awards Made to Richco Grain, 
Sept. 27, 1989) (Exhibit 3).
    \60\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Export Subsidies for Firm 
Linked to Fugitive Marc Rich, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 
19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                i. Serbia
    One document from the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
produced to the Committee by the U.S. Department of Treasury 
indicates that Rich was also dealing with Serbia in violation 
of U.S. and international sanctions.\61\ Press accounts 
indicate that Rich violated the U.N. trade embargo by dealing 
with Belgrade in a variety of commodities, including copper and 
oil.\62\ According to an article in The Oil Daily, at the time 
of the U.N. embargo, Serbia reportedly had a deal in place with 
Marc Rich to process crude oil in Romania.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum 
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under 
Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) 
(Exhibit 2).
    \62\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
    \63\ Roger Benedict, U.N. Oil Cutoff of Serbia Hinges on Russia, 
China (Security Council Vote), Oil Daily, June 1, 1992, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When asked at a Committee hearing about allegations 
relating to Marc Rich's transactions with rogue states, Rich's 
lawyer Jack Quinn responded ``I don't know the answer to 
that.'' \64\ When asked about the White House's knowledge and 
research of these activities, White House Counsel Beth Nolan 
told the Committee that she never received an intelligence 
briefing and never explained Rich's shady dealings to the 
President.\65\ While it may be understandable that Jack Quinn 
would not know--or at least not want to know--about Rich's 
dealings with so many dictatorships and rogue regimes, it is 
inexcusable that the White House failed to take the time to 
learn about these disturbing details.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 111 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \65\ Id. at 374.
    \66\ The Committee, however, does not take the position that it was 
``understandable'' for Quinn not to have known about Rich's dealings 
with rogue states. While Quinn's actions may be legally permissible, 
one must think long and hard about the morality of Quinn's actions. 
Given Rich's status as a fugitive, common sense and due diligence 
should have led Quinn to inquire further into Rich's past dealings. 
However, the power of money is often enough to promote willful 
ignorance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is clear that Rich built his fortune doing business 
without legal, ethical, or even moral restraints. He regularly 
dealt with corrupt officials, dictators and rogue regimes. U.S. 
and international embargoes and sanctions were not barriers to 
Rich, merely hurdles to be climbed over, under, or around. As 
is discussed in more detail below, it is shameful and an 
embarrassment to the United States that the Clinton 
Administration did not take adequate steps to determine the 
extent of Marc Rich's illegal and unethical business activities 
before the President granted his pardon. This failure by the 
Clinton Administration is especially troubling in light of the 
fact that Marc Rich built his fortune by trading with so many 
enemies of the United States.
B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green
            1. The Investigation of Rich and Green
    Marc Rich's illegal business practices in the United States 
came under the scrutiny of the United States government in the 
early 1980s. In the fall of 1981, staff from the Fraud Section 
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice called 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr. of the 
Southern District of New York (``SDNY'').\67\ They told 
Weinberg of a lead they had received concerning a crude oil 
reseller named Marc Rich whose company had an office in New 
York City.\68\ As Weinberg and his fellow former prosecutor 
Martin Auerbach explained to the Committee during the first 
hearing on the Rich pardon, this initial lead on Marc Rich was 
developed through oil reseller prosecutions in Abilene, 
Texas.\69\ John Troland and David Ratliff of West Texas 
Marketing--who had been prosecuted for illegal oil reselling--
provided information about the offshore laundering of funds by 
Rich.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 97 (Feb. 
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and 
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., 
Department of Justice).
    \68\ Id.
    \69\ Id. at 97-98.
    \70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December of 1981, when Weinberg flew to Texas to 
investigate, he obtained a furlough for the principals of West 
Texas Marketing (``WTM''), who took him to their office.\71\ 
Upon reviewing their records of WTM's dealings with Marc Rich, 
Weinberg confirmed that Rich earned $70 million in illegal oil 
resale profits in 1980 and 1981 and had funneled the money to 
his Swiss company in order to evade federal income tax and 
federal energy oil control regulations.\72\ As Weinberg 
testified to the Committee, it was then apparent to him that he 
and his office had uncovered ``the biggest tax fraud in 
history.'' \73\ As he further testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Id. at 98.
    \72\ Id.
    \73\ Id. The eventual indictment accused Marc Rich's companies of 
evading taxes on over $100 million in unreported income.

        The case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very 
        strong. . . . Like any fraud case, the evidence was 
        rife with false documents, inflated invoices, sham 
        transactions and off the books deals. The conspirators 
        kept track of the illegal profits in hand written 
        journals in what was described as the ``pot.'' . . . 
        [T]he evidence included meetings between co-
        conspirators and Marc Rich regarding the pots and the 
        scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of the country 
        to off-shore accounts.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Id. at 104.

    The illegal scheme that Weinberg uncovered stemmed from 
Marc Rich's evasion of specific Department of Energy (``DOE'') 
regulations. In September of 1980, pursuant to the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,\75\ the DOE promulgated 
regulations establishing the permissible average markup for oil 
reselling.\76\ The permissible price was different for 
different regulatory categories of crude oil. The categories 
contemplated by the regulations included: ``old'' or ``lower 
tier;'' ``new'' or ``upper tier;'' and ``stripper.'' \77\ Under 
the regulations, every seller or reseller of domestic crude oil 
was required to certify to the purchaser the respective amounts 
and prices of old oil, new oil, and stripper oil contained in 
the crude oil that was being sold.\78\ The regulations 
prohibited markups of more than 20 cents per barrel of oil for 
a reseller such as Marc Rich's company, Marc Rich + Co. 
International, Ltd. (``International'').\79\ International was 
also required to submit ERA-69 forms to the DOE on a monthly 
basis that set forth the dollar amount of any permissible 
average markup overcharges so that they could be immediately 
refunded to customers.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 751, et seq.
    \76\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 8-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
    \77\ Id. at 6. As the indictment states, ``Crude oil coming from a 
well at or below a designated 1972 level of production was labelled 
`old'; `new' oil referred to crude oil discovered since 1973 or oil 
obtained from existing wells in excess of the 1972 level of production; 
`stripper' oil referred to crude oil produced from a well whose average 
daily production was less then [sic] ten barrels.''
    \78\ Id. at 7.
    \79\ Id. at 8-9.
    \80\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beginning in September of 1980, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
agreed with the principals of West Texas Marketing that when 
International was limited to the 20 cents per barrel markup, 
the huge profits from their crude oil transactions would be 
retained by WTM rather than being reflected on the books of 
International.\81\ These profits were referred to as the 
``pot.'' \82\ As the indictment against them would allege, to 
further conceal the scheme, Rich, Green and the principals at 
WTM conspired to have WTM prepare and mail invoices to 
International, which falsely indicated that WTM had sold oil 
barrels to International ``at the high world market price, when 
in truth and in fact . . . International was paying a far lower 
price upon WTM's agreement secretly to kickback to [Rich and 
Green] the huge profits held by WTM for . . . International in 
the `pot.' '' \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Id. at 10-11.
    \82\ Id. at 11.
    \83\ Id. The manipulation of the oil categories by oil resellers 
such as Marc Rich and his companies was referred to as ``daisy 
chaining.'' As is explained in the indictment:

        GDuring the period of price controls, in order to evade 
      the regulations and produce huge profits, controlled oil 
      was on occasion sold through a series of oil resellers 
      known in the crude oil industry as a ``daisy chain.'' The 
      defendant INTERNATIONAL frequently participated as the 
      original reseller of controlled oil into a ``daisy chain.'' 
      The ``daisy chain'' was utilized by the original reseller 
      to make it extremely difficult to trace the movement of 
      controlled barrels and to facilitate alteration of the 
      certifications on controlled barrels into stripper barrels 
      (uncontrolled) which could then be sold at the much higher 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      world market price.

Id. at 7-8.
    The profits in these ``pots'' were moved out of the U.S. to 
foreign bank accounts at the direction of Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green.\84\ This would occur through sham foreign loss 
transactions involving Marc Rich + Co., A.G., (``A.G.'').\85\ 
From October 1980 through May 1981, Rich, Green, and their 
companies moved more than $23 million in income to offshore 
accounts from WTM ``pots.'' \86\ These fraudulent transactions 
were transmitted through telefaxes and wire transfers.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Id. at 11.
    \85\ Id. at 11-12.
    \86\ Id. at 12.
    \87\ Id. at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This scheme by Rich and Green was essentially repeated with 
another company, Listo Petroleum, for a total of $47 
million.\88\ Rich and Green also entered into false deduction 
transactions with Charter Crude Oil Company, as well as 
ARCO.\89\ In the case of Charter, at the direction of Marc 
Rich, International prepared fraudulent invoices purporting 
that International had purchased foreign crude oil from A.G. at 
its fair market value and subsequently sold it to a Charter 
subsidiary at a substantial discount.\90\ As a result, 
International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income 
by more than $31 million dollars.\91\ In the ARCO case, in the 
fall of 1980, Rich and Green's company Rescor invoiced their 
other company, International, for nearly $3 million. The 
invoice concerned a non-existent contract for the sale of 
foreign crude oil to Rescor by International. The fraudulent 
invoice made it appear that International had failed to provide 
oil to Rescor which subsequently had to purchase a similar 
quantity of oil from Arco at five dollars per barrel above the 
original contract price.\92\ As a result, International 
fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income for 1980 by 
nearly $3 million.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Id. at 13, 15.
    \89\ Id. at 15-18.
    \90\ Id. at 16.
    \91\ Id.
    \92\ Id. at 17-18.
    \93\ Id. at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Weinberg uncovered evidence of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green trading with Iran during the American hostage 
crisis. In 1979 and 1980, President Carter issued several 
executive orders and the Department of Treasury subsequently 
promulgated regulations that prohibited any American from 
trading with Iran without a special license from the Department 
of Treasury.\94\ The regulations further required all 
individuals engaging in trade with Iran to keep records to be 
available for examination by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.\95\ Nevertheless, on April 30, 1980, Marc Rich + Co., 
A.G. entered into a contract with the National Iranian Oil 
Company (``NIOC'') for the purchase of crude and fuel oil from 
May 1, 1980 through September 30, 1980.\96\ As the indictment 
indicates, from their offices in New York City, Rich and Green 
in turn sold 6,250,000 barrels of the Iranian oil to an oil 
company in Bermuda for a total of more than $200 million. In 
order to conceal this scheme, Rich and Green did not disclose 
to their banks in the United States that the ultimate 
beneficiary of the U.S. dollars was the NIOC.\97\ Rich and 
Green further devised a secret code for their interoffice cable 
communications to disguise the participation of the Iranian oil 
company.\98\ The scheme was completed through several wire 
transactions and transmissions, and ultimately caused United 
States dollars to be illegally transferred to Iran at the same 
time that Iran was holding American hostages.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Id. at 44-45. The executive orders issued pursuant to the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 included Executive 
Orders No. 12,170, 12,205, and 12,211.
    \95\ Id. at 45.
    \96\ Id.
    \97\ Id. at 46.
    \98\ Id. at 47.
    \99\ Id. at 47, 49. These charges were brought under 31 CFR 
Sec. Sec. 535.206(a)(4), 535.208, 535.701, and 50 USC Sec. 1705, and 18 
USC Sec. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In early 1982, the Southern District of New York began 
subpoenaing millions of documents from oil companies and crude 
oil resellers in the United States that had done business with 
Marc Rich.\100\ Prosecutors also served subpoenas on Marc 
Rich's companies in New York.\101\ The Southern District 
decided to subpoena Marc Rich + Co. A.G.--even though it was a 
Swiss company--because there were sufficient contacts through 
its American subsidiary to give them jurisdiction for enforcing 
document subpoenas.\102\ Rich, who had retained high-powered 
attorneys such as Edward Bennett Williams, Peter Fleming, and 
former federal judge Marvin Frankel, sought to quash the grand 
jury subpoenas.\103\ However, United States District Judge 
Leonard Sand denied the Rich team's motion to quash and ordered 
A.G. to produce the documents from Switzerland.\104\ The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Sand's decision in May 
of 1983.\105\ When Marc Rich + Co. A.G. refused to produce the 
documents, Judge Sand held the company in contempt and ordered 
a $50,000 per day fine in order to compel production of the 
documents.\106\ Nevertheless, Rich and his company refused to 
produce the documents or pay the fine.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 99 (Feb. 
8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and 
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., 
Department of Justice).
    \101\ Id.
    \102\ Id.
    \103\ Id.
    \104\ Id.
    \105\ Id.
    \106\ Id. at 100.
    \107\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rich's behavior during the litigation soon became even more 
confrontational and deceptive. As the Southern District of New 
York was to learn, on June 29, 1983, Rich quietly sold off his 
company's only American asset.\108\ Judge Sand called the sale 
a ``ploy to frustrate the implementation of the court's 
order,'' and thereby ordered a freeze of A.G.''s assets in the 
United States.\109\ The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also 
concluded that the sale was a fraud.\110\ As a result of these 
rulings by the courts, Rich and his lawyers agreed to negotiate 
a resolution of the contempt issue. A.G. agreed to pay the more 
than $1 million in contempt fines that had accumulated and to 
continue paying the contempt fines until all of the documents 
had been produced from Switzerland.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ Id.
    \109\ Id.
    \110\ Id.
    \111\ Id. at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At first, Rich's company appeared to be complying with the 
agreement by producing hundreds of thousands of documents from 
Switzerland. However, on August 9, 1983, four days after the 
agreement, the Southern District received an anonymous tip that 
subpoenaed documents were being secreted out of the U.S. by a 
paralegal of the law firm Milgrim Thomajan & Lee.\112\ In 
responding to the tip, the Southern District seized two steamer 
trunks full of subpoenaed documents from a Swiss Air 
flight.\113\ As a result of this incident, Judge Sand ordered 
the production of every document of the Marc Rich companies in 
the world that had been subpoenaed.\114\ Rich and his legal 
team argued that the Swiss government had already seized all of 
the remaining documents, thereby rendering compliance with the 
agreement they had reached impossible.\115\ Judge Sand 
nevertheless ruled that the contempt fines should 
continue.\116\ In total, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. paid over $21 
million in contempt fines over the course of the 
litigation.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\ Id. When asked about this episode at the Committee's hearing, 
Jack Quinn testified ``what I have been told is that those documents 
were going to Switzerland for the purpose of being reviewed for 
privilege by the lawyers.'' Id. at 113 (testimony of Jack Quinn). In 
response to this claim, Martin Auerbach testified: ``With respect to 
the documents that were being slipped out of the country, the 
suggestion was never that those were being reviewed for attorney-client 
privilege. It was simply that it would be more convenient for counsel 
to review them in Switzerland then [sic] to review them in New York. 
Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered to us. These two 
steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn't get a call from them 
saying, you know, we've got some people over in Zug with nothing better 
to do than to look at documents; would you mind if we took them over 
there outside of the jurisdiction at the time when we're in contempt 
for refusing to produce documents from Switzerland?'' Id. (testimony of 
Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., 
Department of Justice).
    \113\ Id. at 101 (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, 
Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the 
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
    \114\ Id.
    \115\ Id. at 101-02. The Committee does not know Rich's precise 
role in orchestrating this action by the Swiss government. Rich's power 
in that country makes it reasonable to assume that he might have played 
a part in creating the condition that made his representations in the 
United States possible. The Committee is not aware of the Swiss 
government penalizing Rich or taking any other action against him.
    \116\ Id. at 102.
    \117\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rich's attorneys made a number of attempts to settle the 
case before an indictment was issued. When Rich hired Edward 
Bennett Williams to represent him, Williams assured him that he 
could settle the case if Rich paid a large fine, telling Rich 
``I can get rid of it for $30 million.'' \118\ Williams then 
went to Sandy Weinberg and asked how much the government wanted 
to settle the case. When Weinberg told Williams he was not 
interested, Williams asked Weinberg what he had in mind.\119\ 
Weinberg responded ``J-A-I-L.'' \120\ Later, Williams would 
offer as much as $100 million to settle the Rich case.\121\ All 
of these offers were rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 415 
(1991).
    \119\ Id. at 416.
    \120\ Id.
    \121\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., 
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the 
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The Indictment
    In September of 1983, a federal grand jury in New York 
returned a 51-count indictment against Marc Rich, Pincus Green, 
and their companies.\122\ The original indictment was 
restructured into a 65-count indictment in March of 1984.\123\ 
All of the first 42 counts were charged against Marc Rich, 
Pincus Green, Clyde Meltzer, A.G., and Marc Rich + Co, 
International Ltd. The superseding indictment was arranged to 
include in counts 1 through 23 the scheme to defraud the 
IRS.\124\ These charges were brought pursuant to 18 USC 
Sec. 1343, the federal statute prohibiting wire fraud.\125\ 
These charges related to the fraudulent transactions among WTM, 
and Marc Rich's companies discussed above. Counts 24 through 38 
included the scheme to defraud the Department of Energy, and 
were brought pursuant to 18 USC Sec. 1341, prohibiting mail 
fraud.\126\ Count 39 and 40 were racketeering charges brought 
under the RICO statute, 18 USC Sec. 1962(c).\127\ Counts 41 and 
42 included two tax evasion counts for Marc Rich + Co. 
International's 1980 and 1981 tax returns, covering an amount 
totaling over $100 million in unreported income which was 
concealed by the efforts of Rich, Green, Meltzer, and Rich's 
two companies.\128\ As stated in the indictment, International 
was able to evade more than $49 million in taxes.\129\ These 
counts were also brought against Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
personally. The tax and racketeering counts were approved and 
authorized by the Department of Justice.\130\ Counts 43 through 
57 alleged that Rich defrauded the Department of Treasury for 
his transactions with the Iranians during the oil embargo and 
the American hostage crisis. Finally, counts 57 through 65 
charged Rich with ``trading with the enemy'' for Rich's secret 
deals with the Iranians.\131\ In the superseding indictment, 
these charges were not leveled against the companies. As a 
letter accompanying the indictment states, ``[t]he primary 
focus of those counts has always been the activities of the 
American individuals, Marc Rich and Pincus Green.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Id.
    \123\ See Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
    \124\ Id. at 19-22.
    \125\ Id. at 22.
    \126\ Id. at 22-25.
    \127\ Id. at 33-34.
    \128\ Id. at 40-42.
    \129\ Id.
    \130\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 102-03 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., 
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the 
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
    \131\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 
1984) (S 83 Cr. 579). See also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1705.
    \132\ Cover letter to superseding indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, 
Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            3. Rich and Green Flee the Country
    Even though their companies eventually pled guilty and paid 
heavy fines, Rich and Green personally refused to face the U.S. 
justice system. Rich and Green were out of the country when 
their indictments were handed down. They refused to return to 
the United States, even after warrants were issued for their 
arrest. As Weinberg and Auerbach explained to the Committee, 
``[b]y the time of the indictment, Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
had made it clear that they would not return to the United 
States to face the charges. Apparently, they had quietly left 
the United States in June 1983 at a time when their lawyers 
were attempting to negotiate a resolution of the case.'' \133\ 
Even Rich's own lead attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, was 
shocked by Rich's conduct:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., 
and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the 
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). It should be noted that by this 
point, Rich and Green had already renounced their U.S. citizenship and 
become citizens of Spain and perhaps Bolivia.

        Rich responded to the warrant for his arrest by 
        refusing to return from Switzerland. Williams was 
        standing in the office of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles 
        when he heard the news that his client was on the lam. 
        According to Davis, Williams shouted in the phone, 
        ``You know something, Marc? You spit on the American 
        flag. You spit on the jury system. Whatever you get, 
        you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum. Now 
        you're going to sink.'' \134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 417 
(1991). Rich denied Davis' account of this conversation, saying, 
``There is not a shred of truth in it.''

Despite the outrage of their own lawyers, as well as the 
prosecutors, Rich and Green never returned to the country to 
face the charges. They remained fugitives in Switzerland for 
more than seventeen years until they received their pardons 
from President Clinton.
            4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas
    Notwithstanding the fact that Rich and Green would not 
return to face the charges against them, their companies 
entered plea negotiations with the government. A year after the 
indictment was handed down, Marc Rich's companies pled guilty 
to evading $50 million in taxes. In the allocution on October 
11, 1984, Peter Fleming, counsel for Marc Rich + Co. 
International, Ltd. stated to the court:

        Beginning in September 1980 International generated 
        millions of dollars of income from crude oil 
        transactions which International should have disclosed 
        but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal 
        Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.

                                *  *  *


        In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of 
        agencies of the United States, specifically the 
        Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, 
        International and A.G. knowingly and willfully made 
        those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the 
        Department of Energy which were false in that they 
        failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual 
        income from those crude oil transactions, in violation 
        of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, which is 
        the charging statute of counts 1 through 38.

                                *  *  *


        In addition, by knowingly and willfully failing to 
        report at least $50 million of taxable income generated 
        from these transactions for the years 1980 and 1981, 
        International committed income tax evasion for these 
        years in violation of Title 26, United States Code, 
        Section 7201.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et 
al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).

Counsel for Marc Rich + Co. A.G. then stated to the court, 
``[a]s you know, A.G. is charged only in counts 1 through 38 of 
this information, and A.G. adopts Mr. Fleming's statements in 
connection with those counts.'' \136\ As part of their guilty 
plea, A.G. and International (which by then had been renamed 
``Clarendon, Ltd.''), also agreed to pay the United States $150 
million,\137\ and agreed to waive any right to recover the $21 
million in fines they had already paid the government.\138\ The 
total amount that the companies paid to the government for 
their crimes was $200 million.\139\ As then-United States 
Attorney Rudolph Giuliani explained in court, this represented 
the largest amount of money ever recovered by the United States 
in a criminal tax evasion case.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ Id. at 20.
    \137\ Id. at 3.
    \138\ Id. at 4.
    \139\ Id.
    \140\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The guilty pleas and fines paid by the companies controlled 
by Marc Rich and Pincus Green clearly demonstrate the guilt of 
the two principals. Based on the overwhelming evidence against 
them, it is no wonder Rich and Green fled the country rather 
than face trial. The evidence, including the admissions by Marc 
Rich's companies, also explains why Martin Auerbach of the 
Southern District of New York could confidently respond to Jack 
Quinn's criticism at the Committee's hearing, stating, ``Mr. 
Quinn has suggested to the Committee and to the Nation that we 
had a legal house of cards. Well, if we did, it was all aces.'' 
\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \141\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice

            1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green
    After Rich and Green fled the country in anticipation of 
their indictment, the Southern District of New York made many 
attempts to have foreign governments extradite the two 
fugitives in order to bring them back to the country to stand 
trial on the numerous charges against them. On July 20, 1984, 
the United States requested extradition of Rich and Green from 
Switzerland. That request was rejected by the Swiss government 
in September of 1984 on the basis that the offenses charged 
against Rich and Green were ``fiscal violations'' and 
violations of ``provisions concerning currency, trade policy 
and economic policy'' \142\ and that the government of 
Switzerland did not recognize the charges against Rich and 
Green as extraditable crimes. In June of 1994, the Justice 
Department attempted to extradite Rich and Green from Israel, 
but the Israeli government also turned down the request. 
Israel's Attorney General, Michael Ben-Ya'ir, told the U.S. 
Government that the extradition treaty between the two 
governments did not include fiscal offenses.\143\ And even 
though Rich had become a citizen of Spain, prosecutors could 
not extradite him from that country because, like Switzerland 
and Israel, Spain does not extradite its citizens for tax 
evasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \142\ Unofficial translation of a note delivered on September 25, 
1984, by the Office for Police Matters to the Embassy of the United 
States. See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d 
Cong. 3 (May 27, 1992).
    \143\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce Their 
                    Citizenship
    After fleeing the United States, Rich and Green attempted 
to renounce their U.S. citizenship for the specific purpose of 
avoiding extradition on the charges against them. According to 
a U.S. government memorandum from the Embassy in Madrid, Rich 
expatriated himself on September 3, 1982, prior to his 
indictment, and became a naturalized Spaniard on February 11, 
1983.\144\ As Rich explained in a letter to the U.S. Consul 
General in Zurich, ``I was naturalized under the laws of Spain, 
swore an oath of allegiance to the King of Spain, and formally 
stated that I thereby renounced U.S. nationality.'' \145\ On 
May 27, 1983, Green, and perhaps Rich, were naturalized as 
Bolivian citizens according to U.S. State Department 
cables.\146\ In the case of Green, a letter from the Ministry 
of the Interior in Bolivia states that ``the privilege of 
Bolivian nationality has been given to Pincus Green Bergstein, 
who previously renounced his nationality of origin and complied 
with the required procedures determined by current legal 
regulations.'' \147\ According to a letter from the Department 
of Justice to Congressman Robert Wise in November of 1991, Rich 
and Green also became citizens of Israel in 1983.\148\ The 
pardon application submitted to the White House by Jack Quinn 
also lists Green as a citizen of Switzerland, although it does 
not list Rich as a Swiss citizen, and it appears that Rich is, 
in fact, not a Swiss citizen.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ Department of State Document Production (Government 
Memorandum from U.S. Embassy in Madrid to U.S. Department of State, 
Aug. 25, 1983) (Exhibit 7).
    \145\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Marc 
Rich to Ruth H. Van Heuven, U.S. Consul General, Switzerland (Oct. 27, 
1992)) (Exhibit 8). In this and other letters, Rich claims that he 
became a citizen of Spain in July of 1982, earlier than the date 
indicated by the U.S. government. Spanish government documents appear 
to confirm this. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed a 
district court ruling that Rich's attempt to renounce his citizenship 
in Madrid had failed. The Second Circuit held:

        GThe evidence strongly supports the district court's 
      finding that Rich had no intention whatsoever to relinquish 
      his American citizenship prior to commencement of this 
      action. Despite mouthing words of renunciation before a 
      Spanish official, he refused to acknowledge such 
      renunciation before the United States Consul in Madrid 
      before this action commenced. Instead, he brought a Swiss 
      action as an American national, traveled on his American 
      passport, and publicized himself in a commercial register 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      as a United States citizen.

Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \146\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from the 
American Consul to Pincus Green (Dec. 19, 1983)) (Exhibit 9). The State 
Department apparently believed that Rich and Green entered Bolivia 
illegally because of the restrictions on their passports, which would 
have jeopardized their claim of Bolivian citizenship. See U.S. Marshals 
Service Document Production (Department of State Cable, Oct. 11, 1983) 
(Exhibit 10).
    \147\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Dr. 
Emilio Perez Barrios, Sub-Secretary of Immigration, Bolivian Ministry 
of Interior, to the American Consul (Sept. 9, 1983)) (Exhibit 11).
    \148\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00008-
09 (Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert E. 
Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and 
Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (Nov. 21, 1991)) (Exhibit 12).
    \149\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 1, 3 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1983, the State Department informed the Southern 
District of New York that Rich was seeking to renounce his U.S. 
citizenship. The American embassy attempted to contact Rich to 
have him fill out a questionnaire to determine his citizenship, 
but he never responded.\150\ Rich and Green also never 
responded to letters from the American Consul in Bern, 
Switzerland, attempting to determine their citizenship. On 
September 29, 1993, the U.S. State Department revoked Rich's 
American passports because of the ``outstanding federal felony 
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.'' \151\ The next day, the State 
Department also revoked Pincus Green's passport.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Julian 
L. Bartley, Consul, Embassy of the United States of America in Madrid, 
to Marc Rich (Mar. 25, 1983)) (Exhibit 13).
    \151\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department 
Cable, Sept. 29, 1983) (Exhibit 14).
    \152\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department 
Cable, Sept. 30, 1983) (Exhibit 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The confusion over Marc Rich's citizenship status also 
became an issue of concern to the U.S. Treasury Department in 
November of 1991. A letter written by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control prompted the State Department to make a 
determination of Rich's citizenship. In its response of April 
14, 1992, the State Department made a final determination that 
Marc Rich had failed to renounce his citizenship, and was still 
a U.S. citizen.\153\ The conclusion was based on the fact that 
the Department never approved Rich's Certificate of Loss of 
Nationality.\154\ It was also based on the fact that Rich did 
not demonstrate the requisite intent to lose his U.S. 
Citizenship--in part because he used his U.S. passport to 
travel to the United States after he became a Spanish 
citizen.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000660-61 (Letter 
from Carmen A. DiPlacido, Director of the Office of Citizens Consular 
Services, Department of State, to Richard Newcomb, Director of the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (Apr. 14, 
1992)) (Exhibit 16).
    \154\ Id.
    \155\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the U.S. Government's official finding that Rich is 
still a U.S. citizen, Rich and his lawyers claim that he is not 
a U.S. citizen. When he appeared on television after the Rich 
pardon, Jack Quinn stated ``he is a U.S. citizen.'' \156\ 
However, when he appeared before the Committee, Quinn stated 
that he ``misspoke'' when he was on Meet the Press, and took 
the position that Rich had indeed renounced his citizenship. 
Sandy Weinberg, testifying with Quinn, observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001).

        I suppose when he [Marc Rich] heard on television from 
        Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I'm sure it did 
        concern him whether or not he had a problem over the 
        last 20 years. I suspect that . . . Mr. Quinn got a 
        call the next day saying ``no, I'm not a citizen'' 
        because I believe that there are some very significant 
        tax implications if he's been a citizen all these 
        years.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 167 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green
    Between 1984 and 1992, the Department of Justice submitted 
five provisional arrest requests to various countries in an 
attempt to apprehend Rich and Green.\158\ None of these 
attempts were successful. As early as October 9, 1985, Rich and 
Green were listed as wanted international criminals by the U.S. 
National Central Bureau of Interpol.\159\ In 1987, Interpol 
issued an international ``red notice'' (warrant) that requested 
the provisional arrest of Rich and Green with the eventual goal 
of extradition.\160\ On several occasions, the FBI and the U.S. 
Marshals Service appeared ready to apprehend the two fugitives. 
One operation set up by the Marshals Service to snare Rich, 
referred to as ``the Otford Project,'' was nearly 
successful.\161\ In the fall of 1987, a U.S. Marshal assigned 
to the project barely missed apprehending Rich in France after 
he canceled a meeting with an African oil minister.\162\ A few 
months later, in November of 1987, the U.S. Marshals Service 
again came close to capturing Rich. They were tipped off by a 
businessman close to Rich that Rich would be taking a private 
plane to England for a weekend party. The Marshals set the trap 
for Rich at the Biggen Hill Airport in Kent. However, thick fog 
settled in over England, and Rich's plane turned back to 
Switzerland.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green,'' Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 10 (May 27, 1992) 
(quoting Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert 
E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and 
Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (received Oct. 11, 1991)).
    \159\ Interpol Document Production (Wanted International Criminal 
Request, Oct. 9, 1985) (Exhibit 17). The document itself lists Rich and 
Green as wanted for the indictments in the Southern District of New 
York for wire fraud, mail fraud, income tax evasion, racketeering, 
racketeering conspiracy, and trading with the enemy.
    \160\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol International Red 
Notice, June 4, 1992) (Exhibit 18).
    \161\ Craig Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich, 
Regardie's, Feb. 1, 1990, at 46.
    \162\ Id.
    \163\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1986, prior to the international arrest warrant being 
issued, Rich had another brush with the law. Rich had been 
asked by his wife Denise to visit her in London. After the 
visit, Rich was at Heathrow airport to catch the return 
Swissair flight to Zurich. As he approached the gate, Rich 
apparently noticed that the security staff was conducting a 
complete search of luggage and identification.\164\ Rather than 
submit to the search, Rich apparently went to a public 
telephone and left three checks payable to him for 
1.6 million stuck between the pages of a telephone 
book.\165\ Free of the checks that Rich thought would identify 
him to the British authorities, Rich then boarded the flight 
for Zurich.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\ Id.
    \165\ Id.
    \166\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September of 1991, the FBI and Interpol attempted to 
arrest Rich in Finland.\167\ According to a Finnish businessman 
who helped the FBI with the matter, Rich was tipped off that he 
would be arrested at the Helsinki airport, and he therefore 
turned his plane around before landing.\168\ Other failed 
attempts to arrest Rich are indicated by several documents 
produced to the Committee. As an Interpol cable indicates, Rich 
was expected to be in Moscow both in May and September of 1992. 
Attempts were made at the Justice Department in September of 
that year to ``insure a provisional arrest warrant is in place 
should [Rich] appear in Moscow.'' \169\ In March of 1992, the 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as well as 
the Office of International Affairs at the Justice Department, 
made a request for Interpol to assist in apprehending Rich in 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, based on information that he would be 
meeting with the new republic's prime minister.\170\ In fact, 
Interpol sent a senior officer directly to Dushanbe carrying 
the United States' provisional arrest request.\171\ A request 
for the arrest of Rich was also made in anticipation of his 
arrival in Czechoslovakia in February of 1992, when Rich was 
negotiating the purchase of the Slovak Aluminum Company.\172\ 
Yet another document indicates that provisional arrest warrants 
were also issued for Marc Rich in France, Portugal, and 
Norway.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Interpol Document Production (Letter from Darrell W. Mills, 
Chief, Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19).
    \168\ Telephone Interview with Pertti Ruoho, Finnish Oil Trader 
(Feb. 22, 2001). See also Letter from Darrell W. Mills, Chief, 
Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19).
    \169\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, 
Sept. 1, 1992) (Exhibit 20).
    \170\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, 
1992) (Exhibit 21).
    \171\ Id.
    \172\ Interpol Document Production (Fax from Donald S. Donovan, 
Assistant Chief, Interpol-USNCB, to Don Ward, Deputy Chief, U.S. 
Marshals Service (Feb. 21, 1992)) (Exhibit 22).
    \173\ Interpol Document Production 000317 (Identifiers on Marc 
Rich, Nov. 19, 1991) (Exhibit 23).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is difficult to believe that Marc Rich went from being 
an international fugitive, sought by teams of Marshals across 
the world, to a free man with the simple stroke of a pen. The 
effort to apprehend Marc Rich was the subject of intense law 
enforcement, diplomatic, and Congressional interest. Beyond the 
obvious negative effects of the Rich pardon, it also had a 
demoralizing effect on the individuals who tried for so long to 
track down Rich. In addition, it undermines U.S. authority to 
apprehend criminal fugitives. When the United States government 
attempts to apprehend someone by utilizing Interpol and working 
with law enforcement in foreign countries, it is reasonable to 
assume that those persons being sought should have to face 
trial in the United States. By granting pardons to Rich and 
Green, international law enforcement efforts on behalf of the 
United States were seriously undermined.
            4. 1992 Congressional Hearings
    The Marc Rich matter and the failure of the government to 
apprehend him was an issue of great interest to this Committee 
when it was under a Democratic chairmanship in the early 1990s. 
In particular, Congressman Robert Wise held three days of 
hearings on the matter when he served as chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and 
Agriculture of the Committee on Government Operations.\174\ The 
hearings, entitled ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting 
with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' also resulted in 
two Committee reports. One of those reports, entitled ``They 
Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green,'' focused on the efforts of the United States to 
apprehend the two fugitives.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \174\ The Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture 
Subcommittee held three separate Marc Rich hearings on December 4, 
1991, February 18, 1992, and March 5, 1992, entitled ``The Strange Case 
of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the 
Alps.''
    \175\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d 
Cong. (May 27, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressman Wise and his Subcommittee criticized the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations for failing to take adequate steps to 
apprehend Marc Rich. At a hearing on December 4, 1991, 
Congressman Mike Synar was particularly critical of the 
Department of Justice for failing to apprehend the fugitives:

        It is unacceptable that the Justice Department has 
        failed to show up today. It is unacceptable that they 
        have failed to enforce the law in this very important 
        matter, and as the chairman pointed out, in the case of 
        the No. 1 tax abuser in our history. Can there be 
        little wonder, can there be little wonder why Americans 
        have lost confidence with respect to this government's 
        ability to enforce the laws? And can there be little 
        wonder why most Americans believe there are two sets of 
        laws in this country, one for the rich, no pun 
        intended, and one for the rest of us? \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \176\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax 
Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt. 
Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on 
Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 7 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of the 
Honorable Mike Synar).

    The Committee reached similar conclusions in its 1992 
reports on the Rich matter, stating, for instance, that the 
U.S. government ``lacked the political will to effect the 
return of these fugitives[.]'' \177\ The Subcommittee urged 
``that the Department of Justice rejuvenate its efforts to 
apprehend the fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green and that it 
become a high profile matter for the U.S. Government.'' The 
report continued to admonish, stating, ``[t]he continuing 
failure to return these fugitives to the United States to stand 
trial before their fellow citizens only furthers the idea `that 
there are . . . two standards of justice in the United States . 
. . one for accused criminals without money and there's one for 
accused criminals with money.' '' \178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d 
Cong. 37 (May 27, 1992).
    \178\ Id. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second report by the Subcommittee, ``Coin, Contracting, 
and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to 
Coordinate,'' focused on the failure of the U.S. government to 
keep Rich from receiving government contracts after he fled the 
U.S.\179\ The Subcommittee concluded that Rich's Clarendon firm 
continued to provide the U.S. Mint with metals despite being 
debarred from government contracting.\180\ The Subcommittee 
also criticized the Justice and Treasury Departments for 
failing to take any action against Clarendon for over three 
years because of a series of missteps and 
miscommunications.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \179\ ``Coins, Contracting, and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice 
Departments Fail to Coordinate,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. 
Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992).
    \180\ Id. at 18.
    \181\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business 
                    Interests
    After they fled the country, several federal agencies took 
actions against Rich and Green's businesses. Notwithstanding 
their indictment and fugitive status, Rich and Green continued 
to contract with several agencies within the U.S. government. 
Companies controlled by Rich and Green held contracts with the 
U.S. Mint as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These 
contracts continued for several years until they were 
eventually reviewed by Congress and relevant agencies. The 
Department of the Treasury also was forced to block money 
destined for Rich and Green because of their companies' 
dealings with Cuba.
                a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation
    In the wake of Rich's indictment, in 1985, one of his 
companies, Clarendon, Ltd., was debarred from contracting with 
the federal government by the Defense Logistics Agency. 
However, the debarment lasted only three years. Soon after that 
period, in July of 1988, Clarendon, Ltd. began contracting with 
the U.S. Mint to supply raw metal for producing coins. From 
1989 through 1992, Clarendon won numerous contracts to supply 
the mint with copper, nickel, and zinc.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \182\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax 
Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt. 
Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on 
Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 58 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of Kenneth 
Gubin, Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Clarendon was able to secure the metal contracts because, 
from mid-1988 on, the company was not listed on the GSA's 
``Parties Excluded from Procurement Programs'' list. This was 
possible in part because Marc Rich set up the management of the 
company so that he was not the majority stockholder. By 
controlling 49 percent of Clarendon's stock, Rich could claim 
that he did not have control over the company's business 
decisions. This move, however, was part of a scheme by Marc 
Rich in which he purchased back the remaining 51 percent of 
Clarendon through a wholly owned subsidiary of Marc Rich + Co., 
A.G.\183\ By the time Clarendon was reaping the benefits of the 
new contract with the Mint, Marc Rich was in full control of 
the company. The contracts were reported to be worth up to 
$45.5 million to Marc Rich's company.\184\ As discussed above, 
this prompted congressional hearings and a subsequent report. 
Congressman Robert Wise of West Virginia, who chaired the 
hearings, stated to the press, ``[e]very time I reach into my 
pocket for some change, I have to wonder if there's a little 
bit of Marc Rich in there.'' \185\ This attention by Congress 
eventually played a part in ending Rich's contracts with the 
U.S. Mint. In a letter on February 27, 1992, Rich's lawyers 
announced that, ``Clarendon does not intend to participate in 
bid or contract opportunities with the Mint in the foreseeable 
future.'' \186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ This scheme also led to a civil action against the company. 
See U.S. v. Clarendon, Ltd. (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995) (CA 1:95CV00700). 
The charges were authorized under the signature of Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder.
    \184\ Rick Wartzman, Bid to End Pact to Clarendon Comes Amid 
Disputes Over Marc Rich's Stake, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1992, at B2a.
    \185\ Id.
    \186\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from 
David P. Langlois, Partner, Milgrim Thomajan & Lee, to Kenneth Gubin, 
Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint (Feb. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit 24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings
    Between July of 1986 and September of 1989, one of Marc 
Rich's companies, Richco Grain Ltd., participated in the 
Commodity Credit Corporation's Export Enhancement Program. The 
Department of Agriculture used the program to sell American 
grain to overseas customers at prices below U.S. market levels. 
The companies who won the contracts received subsidies from the 
department in the form of surplus grains. A tally by the 
Department showed that Richco received $95 million worth of 
such U.S. grain through the program.\187\ Rich made money 
through his sales of grain to China, the Soviet Union, Romania, 
and Saudi Arabia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Subsidies for Exporter, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After prompting from Congressman Dan Glickman and an 
investigation by the Inspector General, the Department of 
Agriculture suspended Richco Grain Ltd. from participating in 
the program. A letter written on September 29, 1989, by the 
Vice-President of the Commodity Credit Corporation listed Rich 
and Green's fugitivity and indictment as reasons for the 
suspension.\188\ Notwithstanding the suspension, Congressman 
Glickman continued to press the Bush Administration on the 
matter. On March 4, 1992, Congressman Glickman wrote to 
President Bush to ask that the Department of Agriculture 
permanently exclude Rich and Green from participating in the 
program by debarring them.\189\ The Bush Administration 
responded by referring Glickman's letter to the Department of 
Agriculture, requesting that the department ``take action, if 
warranted, to see that no new contracts are awarded to Richco 
Grain.'' \190\ It appears that no new contracts were awarded to 
Marc Rich's company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from 
R.E. Anderson, Jr., Vice President of the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
Department of Agriculture, to Robert Thomajan, Partner, Milgrim 
Thomajan & Lee (Sept. 29, 1989)) (Exhibit 25).
    \189\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from 
Dan Glickman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed 
Grains, Committee on Agriculture, to President George H.W. Bush (Mar. 
4, 1992)) (Exhibit 26).
    \190\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from 
Allan V. Burman, Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy, the White House, to Charles R. Hilty, Assistant Secretary for 
Administration, Department of Agriculture (Apr. 20, 1992)) (Exhibit 
27).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is troubling that a member of President Clinton's own 
cabinet, who, as a Member of Congress was justifiably concerned 
over Marc Rich's dealings with the Agriculture Department, was 
apparently not consulted when the White House was considering 
the pardons. As Secretary of Agriculture, Glickman could have 
provided insight into the ways in which the fugitive from 
American justice continued to profit from the very government 
that had indicted him.
                c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture
    Marc Rich has also had Department of Treasury actions taken 
against his companies because of his disregard for U.S. 
regulations related to the embargo against Cuba. In late 1991, 
the Compliance Programs Division of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control blocked more than $2.5 million relating to a 
$3.9 million deal for Cuban sugar brokered by Marc Rich + Co., 
Ltd. in the United Kingdom.\191\ This transaction had run afoul 
of the Cuban Assets Control regulations.\192\ As R. Richard 
Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
explained to Rich attorney Robert Fink in a December 27, 1995, 
letter, these regulations prohibit transactions by persons 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction involving any property of Cuba or 
Cuban nationals.\193\ According to Newcomb, Rich's Cuban sugar 
deal was clearly contemplated by the regulations and was 
therefore illegal.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000022 (Memorandum 
from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Department of Treasury, to Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary 
of Enforcement of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of 
Treasury) (Exhibit 28).
    \192\ Id. See 31 C.F.R. part 515.
    \193\ Department of Treasury Document Production (Letter from R. 
Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
Department of Treasury, to Robert F. Fink, Partner, Piper and Marbury 
(Dec. 27, 1995)) (Exhibit 29).
    \194\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September of 1994, Marc Rich + Co., A.G. in Switzerland 
provoked a similar blocking of nearly $1 million in proceeds 
from an oil deal with Venezuela going through Cuba. Internal 
notes of the Compliance Programs Division indicate deep concern 
with attempts by the Venezuelan state-run oil company to have 
the funds released. As the Compliance Division wrote in its 
internal notes, the Venezuelan oil company ``also stated that 
it `believes' that Marc Rich intended to resell the oil to 
Cuba, but that this particular transfer did not relate to the 
sale of the oil to Cuba. If it did not relate to Cuba, why did 
it reference Cuba?'' \195\ Ultimately, in February of 1995, the 
Department of Treasury unblocked the funds because, as it 
stated in one document, ``Cuba does not have a direct interest 
in the blocked transaction, which involves a Venezuelan and a 
Swiss company[.]'' \196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note from 
Compliance Programs Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control) 
(Exhibit 1).
    \196\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000636 (License 
Request by J. Kerrigan, Compliance Programs Division of the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury (Jan. 1, 1995)) (Exhibit 
30).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It does not appear that the Clinton Administration took 
into consideration the fact that Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
profited from the United States while flouting its embargoes. 
Indeed, a review of Rich and Green's business relationships 
shows a complete disregard for the welfare of the United States 
and its citizens. Furthermore, Rich's clever and illegal 
business schemes meant that U.S. taxpayers' money came out of 
agencies such as the U.S. Mint and the Department of 
Agriculture and wound up in the pockets of Rich and Green while 
they evaded the U.S. legal system, and U.S. income taxation. 
This is one of the many reasons that Republicans and Democrats 
alike have been so critical of President Clinton's decision to 
grant these men a pardon.

II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE

A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s

    While living as fugitives in Switzerland, Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green attempted to negotiate a settlement with the 
Southern District of New York. In addition to prominent lawyers 
such as Edward Bennett Williams, Rich and Green hired other 
well-known and politically connected lawyers.\197\ In the 
Spring of 1985, they hired President Richard Nixon's attorney 
Leonard Garment.\198\ Around this same time, Garment hired 
Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby to join his firm.\199\ Garment assigned 
Libby the task of assessing whether or not there were legal 
defenses to the charges to which Rich and Green's companies had 
already pled guilty.\200\ As Libby testified at the Committee's 
March 1, 2001, hearing, he worked with Robert Fink and other 
attorneys in an attempt to demonstrate that Marc Rich's 
companies ``had properly reported their tax obligations and 
energy transactions and that these criminal charges should be 
reexamined.'' \201\ Libby and the Rich legal team used their 
analysis in an effort to negotiate a settlement with the 
Southern District on the outstanding indictment.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ Marc Rich's practice of hiring attorneys who are close to the 
parties investigating him has continued to this day. In response to 
this Committee's investigation, Rich and his attorneys have hired an 
array of prominent Republicans, including the former personal attorneys 
to Chairman Burton and the Committee's former Chief Investigator.
    \198\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 438 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Lewis Libby, former counsel for Marc Rich, 
Dechert Price & Rhoads).
    \199\ Id. Libby is currently Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick 
Cheney.
    \200\ Id.
    \201\ Id.
    \202\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It should be noted that Lewis Libby's involvement in the 
Rich matter--like that of Garment and former Reagan Justice 
Department official William Bradford Reynolds--was limited to 
settlement negotiations and never included work on the pardon 
matter. Libby, and to a lesser extent, Garment and Reynolds, 
have been mentioned by President Clinton and others as 
prominent Republicans who supported the Rich pardon. This 
representation is inaccurate, as Libby, Reynolds and Garment 
worked only on settlement negotiations, and did not work on the 
pardon. Libby's efforts included an attempt to negotiate a 
settlement with the Southern District of New York in the late 
1980s until he left to work at the Pentagon in the first Bush 
Administration in 1989.\203\ When he returned to private 
practice in 1993, Libby again attempted to achieve a settlement 
for Rich and Green.\204\ This attempt again failed by 
1995.\205\ Libby's final involvement in the Rich case was in 
1999 and early 2000, when he briefed the newly-hired Jack Quinn 
on the legal team's previous efforts to reach a settlement with 
the Southern District and helped prepare yet another request to 
the Southern District.\206\ Libby was instructed to cease all 
work on behalf of Rich and Green in the spring of 2000.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \203\ Id.
    \204\ Id. On this occasion he also worked with Laurence Urgenson of 
Kirkland & Ellis.
    \205\ Id.
    \206\ Id. at 438-39.
    \207\ Id. at 439. It appears that Rich's lawyers considered 
approaching Libby to help with the pardon effort, but were concerned 
that he would refuse them. On December 26, 2000, Robert Fink sent the 
following e-mail to Jack Quinn and Michael Green:

        GMarc thought it made sense to call Scooter to see if he 
      could be helpful, knowing he might not be able to be 
      helpful but that he would never do anything that hurt Marc. 
      I agreed and raised it with Mike Green. Mike is concerned 
      that Scooter would want to help but would feel he had to 
      raise the matter with the ethics committee on the 
      transition and it would get caught up there, and we would 
      effectively be bringing it to the attention of a number of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      people who might not be helpful.

Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00398 (E-mail 
from Robert Fink, Partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, to Jack Quinn 
and Michael Green, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Dec. 
26, 2000)) (Exhibit 31).
    Despite the fact that Rich and Green fled the country as a 
result of their pending indictment, the Southern District of 
New York continued to negotiate with lawyers like Fink, Libby 
and Garment to try to achieve the return of Rich and Green to 
the United States. In their appeals to President Clinton for a 
pardon, Rich's lawyers often claimed that the SDNY refused to 
negotiate with Rich. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Despite the fact that Rich and Green had fled the country, SDNY 
prosecutors continued to negotiate with Rich, even offering to 
reduce the charges against Rich and Green in return for their 
surrender. For example, in the early 1990s, Otto Obermaier, 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, traveled 
to Switzerland to meet with Rich and Green. This was a highly 
unusual step for a United States Attorney to make. In fact, 
Eric Holder testified at a Committee hearing that he could 
think of no other instance in which a U.S. Attorney had 
traveled to a foreign country to negotiate with an indicted 
fugitive.\208\ Despite this accommodation, Rich and Green 
failed to reach an agreement with the Southern District to 
return to the United States to stand trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268-69 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The SDNY also offered a number of other accommodations if 
Rich would return to the U.S. to face the charges. For example, 
prosecutors offered to agree in advance on bail, so that Rich 
would not have to be incarcerated pending trial.\209\ They also 
offered to have a full meeting with Rich's attorneys, and 
conduct a complete review of the charges against Rich.\210\ 
Most importantly, they offered to drop the RICO charges against 
Rich and Green.\211\ Marc Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink, 
confirmed that prosecutors offered to drop the RICO charge as a 
result of negotiations.\212\ Fink wrote about these 
negotiations in an e-mail he sent to Avner Azulay on February 
10, 2000, stating ``I was told at one point that they would 
drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came in.'' \213\ Fink 
confirmed the substance of this e-mail at the Committee's 
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation 
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ Id.
    \212\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
    \213\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation 
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).

        Mr. LaTourette. Looking at [the February 10, 2000, e-
        mail], or your recollection from the representation of 
        Marc Rich, is it accurate that at one point you were 
        told that the prosecuting authorities would drop the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        RICO charge if Marc Rich returned to this country?

        Mr. Fink. That was something that was discussed with me 
        in at least one meeting I had with the 
        prosecutors.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \214\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).

Given the fact that the SDNY had offered to drop the RICO 
charges if Rich and Green returned to the U.S., it is 
interesting that Quinn continued to cite the RICO charges as 
one reason the pardon was necessary. Throughout the pardon 
petition, his contacts with White House officials, and even his 
attempts to justify the pardon after the fact, Quinn cited the 
RICO charges as a reason Rich and Green fled the country rather 
than face trial. However, the SDNY's offer makes it clear that 
Quinn's RICO argument, like most of his other arguments, was 
false and misleading.
    Finally, in addition to the offer to drop the RICO charges, 
prosecutors also offered another accommodation to Rich and 
Green. The SDNY indicated it would agree to bail so that Rich 
and Green would not have to be incarcerated while they stood 
trial. The only condition of this offer was that they give up 
their passports.\215\ Even after the offers to drop RICO and 
allow bail was presented to them, the two men still chose to 
remain fugitives and refused to face the American judicial 
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \215\ Id. at 470.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s

    After he fled the United States, Marc Rich began to 
contribute large sums of money to various humanitarian 
activities, mainly in Israel and to Jewish communities in 
Europe and the United States. Marc Rich's contributions, beyond 
achieving their humanitarian purposes, also served a useful 
purpose of making Rich a well-known and respected figure in 
Israeli and Jewish political circles. These contacts would 
prove useful both in Rich's unsuccessful attempt to settle his 
indictment and in his successful campaign to win a pardon.
    Rich also used his wealth to cultivate political contacts. 
In 1985, after an Egyptian policeman shot and killed a number 
of Israeli tourists at Ras Burka, Rich contributed $400,000 to 
a compensation fund which was established for the victims.\216\ 
More recently, in 1995, Rich began to make offers of providing 
substantial sums of money to help the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process.\217\ According to internal Marc Rich legal documents, 
Rich offered to help fund the economic development of 
Palestinian territories as part of the peace process.\218\ As 
part of his offer, Rich apparently told Israeli officials that 
his ability to help was limited by his outstanding U.S. 
indictment. Receptive Israeli officials then went to U.S. 
officials to see what could be done to settle Rich's case. 
According to an account of the negotiations prepared by Rich's 
lawyers, the Israeli government approached the Justice 
Department to discuss the Rich case.\219\ Mark Richard, a 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, 
informed the Israelis that while the Justice Department could 
not act directly on the Israeli request, the Justice Department 
would ``give serious consideration to a statement by the State 
Department or the White House that the United States had an 
interest in allowing Israel to obtain the active participation 
of Rich in a Middle East Initiative.'' \220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 8 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III); Leonard Garment, Crazy Rhythm 375 (1997).
    \217\ Id. at 9; Jack Quinn Document Production (Background 
Memorandum to the Marc Rich Case, Dec. 1997) at 5 (Exhibit 33).
    \218\ Id.
    \219\ Id.
    \220\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following Mark Richard's suggestion, the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry took the Rich case to the State Department. In July 
1995, Uri Savir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, 
presented Ambassador Dennis Ross with a briefing paper on the 
Rich case.\221\ Several months later, Ross informed Savir that 
the Rich case was a ``hot potato'' and should not be 
pursued.\222\ Despite Ross' rebuff, then-Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres instructed the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., 
Itamar Rabinovich, to press the Rich matter with the State 
Department.\223\ Peres himself also raised the Rich case with 
Ross and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk.\224\ 
While Ross did not respond to Peres, Indyk suggested that the 
Rich case could be discussed at greater length by Israeli 
officials and the State Department.\225\ Ambassador Rabinovich 
and his staff met with a State Department official in October 
1995 and discussed the Rich case.\226\ In follow-up meetings 
with the State Department, Israeli officials learned that they 
were not likely to win support from the State Department for 
settling the Rich case.\227\ According to the Israeli 
officials, State Department officials were concerned about 
allegations that the Administration was interfering with law 
enforcement for political purposes, and the potential 
embarrassment that would follow if the public learned of a deal 
with Marc Rich.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ Id. at 5-6.
    \222\ Id. at 6.
    \223\ Id. Itamar Rabinovich, now President of Tel Aviv University, 
wrote a letter of support for the Rich pardon to President Clinton.
    \224\ Id.
    \225\ Id.
    \226\ Id.
    \227\ Id.
    \228\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the internal account prepared by the Marc Rich 
lawyers, Shimon Peres continued his efforts on behalf of Marc 
Rich even after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and Peres became 
Prime Minister.\229\ However, by 1996, as Israeli elections 
approached, Peres' priorities shifted, and Israeli contacts 
with the U.S. government on the Rich matter subsided until the 
pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \229\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other than the initial response from Mark Richard, it 
appears that Justice Department and State Department officials 
were unified in their resistance to Israeli efforts to have the 
Rich case settled. The resistance of these government officials 
should be contrasted with the receptivity displayed by 
President Clinton and Deputy Attorney General Holder for the 
much more drastic step of pardoning Rich. Also noteworthy is 
the fact that this brief effort in 1995 appears to be the only 
time that Marc Rich's name came up in the context of the Middle 
East peace talks. To the extent that Rich's name came up, it 
appears to have been a minor matter that never had any impact 
on the Middle East peace talks. Dennis Ross, the Clinton 
Administration's Middle East envoy, has stated that Marc Rich 
``was not a factor in the Middle East talks.'' \230\ The fact 
that Marc Rich was never a factor in the peace talks, either in 
1995 or in 2000, suggests that President Clinton's key 
justification for the pardon--that it was important to Israel--
is an after-the-fact excuse that the President has put forward 
to cover up other motivations for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \230\ James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned 
Aside Israeli Push on Rich's Behalf, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn

    After several years of failed negotiations with the 
Southern District of New York, Marc Rich and his team tried 
another approach to resolve his case. Instead of dealing only 
with the federal prosecutors from New York, Rich began a 
process of going directly to the Justice Department in 
Washington. Beginning sometime in 1997, Michael Steinhardt, a 
prominent hedge-fund investor and friend of Rich, recommended 
that Rich hire public relations consultant Gershon Kekst to 
help with his case.\231\ Although Kekst was at first reluctant 
to get involved, he eventually began working with Rich to help 
resolve his legal troubles in the United States.\232\ It was 
through Kekst's efforts that Jack Quinn was hired to work on 
the Marc Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \231\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
    \232\ As discussed in Section IV(A)(9) of the report, Kekst tried 
to disavow his role in helping Marc Rich with negotiations and the 
pardon effort. It appears, however, that Kekst was deeply involved in 
the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kekst explained that in late 1998, he attended a dinner 
celebrating the merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler.\233\ At 
the dinner, he was seated next to an individual he did not 
know, who explained that he worked at ``Main Justice.'' \234\ 
It turned out that this individual was Deputy Attorney General 
Eric Holder.\235\ Kekst asked this stranger to whom U.S. 
Attorneys are accountable.\236\ Holder explained that they 
answer to Main Justice.\237\ Kekst had Marc Rich in mind, but 
did not mention Rich's name at the time.\238\ Kekst then asked 
Holder what someone should do if ``they were improperly 
indicted by an overzealous prosecutor.'' \239\ Holder told 
Kekst that a person in that situation should try to work it out 
and resolve it.\240\ Holder further stated that, ``lawyers know 
there is a path back to DOJ, to me.'' \241\ Holder told Kekst 
that such a person should ``hire a lawyer who knows the 
process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' \242\ Kekst 
asked who such a lawyer would be, and Holder pointed to an 
individual sitting at a nearby table and said, ``there's Jack 
Quinn. He's a perfect example.'' \243\ According to Kekst, 
Quinn was in attendance, but he did not discuss Marc Rich or 
Eric Holder with Quinn at that dinner.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001). To the best of Kekst's recollection, the Daimler Chrysler 
dinner took place in November of 1998.
    \234\ Id.
    \235\ Id.
    \236\ Id.
    \237\ Id.
    \238\ Id.
    \239\ Id.
    \240\ Id.
    \241\ Id.
    \242\ Id.
    \243\ Id.
    \244\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Shortly after the Daimler Chrysler dinner, Kekst began to 
explore this new strategy. First, he worked to gather names of 
lawyers in addition to Jack Quinn who might be able to help 
Marc Rich.\245\ By the time he met with Michael Steinhardt and 
Robert Fink to discuss the Rich case several weeks later, Kekst 
recommended that Rich hire a senior Washington lawyer who could 
intercede with the Justice Department in Washington.\246\ Kekst 
then provided the names of three such lawyers who might be able 
to help: Warren Christopher, Judah Best, and Jack Quinn.\247\ 
Kekst called each of the three to introduce them to Fink.\248\ 
According to Kekst, Warren Christopher said that taking the job 
would be inappropriate since he had just come out of 
government.\249\ Fink interviewed Best but did not like him 
enough to hire him for the job. Rich, Fink, and Kekst 
eventually settled on Jack Quinn. As Quinn explained to The New 
York Times, he traveled to Switzerland, studied the issues, and 
met with Marc Rich ``not for hours, but for days.'' \250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \245\ Id.
    \246\ Id.
    \247\ Id.
    \248\ Id. At the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink testified 
that he asked Kekst to ``recommend someone who [he] called the white-
haired man.'' Fink testified that this expression referred to ``someone 
who understood the entire political process.'' ``The Controversial 
Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. 
on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 471 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert 
Fink).
    \249\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \250\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His 
Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jack Quinn began working for Marc Rich in the spring of 
1999.\251\ According to Quinn, he was hired at first, ``not to 
go to the White House, but to work with Main Justice and the 
Southern District of New York.'' \252\ It is noteworthy that 
Eric Holder's recommendation to Gershon Kekst was the impetus 
for Marc Rich's hiring of Jack Quinn. Quinn had a warm 
relationship with Holder--Holder even solicited Quinn for 
support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General. This warm 
relationship appears to have had a significant role in Holder's 
support for the Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \251\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 216 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \252\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements

    Jack Quinn was a partner with the law firm of Arnold & 
Porter when he began working for Marc Rich. Quinn also worked 
on the Rich matter with Kathleen Behan, another Arnold & Porter 
partner. As Behan explained to Committee staff, although they 
were not officially retained by Marc Rich until July of 1999, 
from February until July, Quinn and Behan were ``engaged in a 
series of familiarization and preparatory efforts'' to learn 
about the case ``in preparation for possible retention on the 
matter.'' \253\ Quinn and Behan were officially retained after 
they met with Marc Rich in Zug, Switzerland, in May of 1999 to 
discuss the representation.\254\ As the engagement letter 
explains, Quinn and Behan were hired for a minimum rate of 
$55,000 per month for six months, totaling $330,000, with an 
option to reconsider if their billable hours were to 
``substantially exceed'' $55,000 per month.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \253\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 
27, 2001).
    \254\ Id.
    \255\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from 
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the Pardon?
    In November 1999, just several months after he was hired by 
Rich, Quinn left Arnold & Porter to form the lobbying firm of 
Quinn and Gillespie.\256\ While Quinn brought Rich as a client 
to the new firm, he did not sign a new retainer with Rich. 
Quinn continued to work for Rich at Quinn and Gillespie, both 
on negotiations with the Justice Department, and on lobbying 
for the pardon. However, Quinn has taken the incredible 
position that he did not expect to be paid for any of his work 
on the Rich case after he left Arnold & Porter. In the first 
days of the uproar regarding the pardon, Quinn told The New 
York Times, ``I have no understanding with Marc Rich about 
future payments. If Marc Rich sent me a box of Godiva 
chocolates tomorrow, it would be more than he is obligated to 
do.'' \257\ He expanded on this position at a Committee 
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \256\ According to one magazine article about his departure from 
Arnold & Porter, Quinn brought $4.5 million in business to Arnold & 
Porter. The article continued:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GBut that's small potatoes to what he can make on his 
      own, because now Quinn is not constrained by the hourly 
      rate structure and will take equity stakes in start-up 
      companies in exchange for his services. That will give him 
      the possibility of making millions on one client when it 
      goes public. Arnold & Porter, like almost all corporate 
      firms, does not allow equity participation with clients.
Kim Eisler, Old Political Opponents Join Forces for Lucrative Lobbying, 
Washingtonian, Feb. 2000, at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \257\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice 
Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14.

        Mr. Burton. You left [Arnold & Porter], and I guess the 
        contract stayed with them; is that right? What 
        happened? They went on just to a fee-for-service with 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        that law firm?

        Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.

        Mr. Burton. And you have said that you didn't receive 
        any fees from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box 
        of chocolates. It was all going to be voluntary if you 
        got that. That just seems very unusual to me. Don't 
        most attorneys have some kind of a contractual 
        agreement when they leave a law firm with a new client?

        Mr. Quinn. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The 
        fees you just reported were received by Arnold and 
        Porter. And, of course, as a partner, and because I had 
        a contractual relationship with a firm, I benefited to 
        some extent from those fees. To another extent, the 
        fees went to other partners of the firm.

        After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and 
        discuss with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new 
        arrangement. I came to the conclusion that, 
        particularly because of the fact that we were 
        unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the 
        Southern District, and because I didn't think, frankly, 
        there would be that much more additional time in it, 
        and because I believed that the earlier payments had 
        been fair and reasonable, that I would see this through 
        to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had been 
        paid earlier.

        Mr. Burton. So you received nothing further from Mr. 
        Rich?

        Mr. Quinn. I have not received any further fees from 
        him on this pardon matter.

        Mr. Burton. Have you received any fees from him for 
        anything?

        Mr. Quinn. No, sir.

        Mr. Burton. You've received no fees from Marc Rich or 
        his--how about any of his companies or friends or 
        associates?

        Mr. Quinn. No, sir.

        Mr. Burton. All that was received was from the--to the 
        law firm that you previously worked with?

        Mr. Quinn. Right.

                                *  *  *


        Mr. Burton. Do you have any kind of understanding where 
        he is going to give you a lump sum of money or funds 
        down the road for the services you've rendered?

        Mr. Quinn. No sir[.] \258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 242 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

    It is impossible to believe that Jack Quinn did his work on 
the Rich pardon out of the goodness of his heart, on a pro bono 
basis. Quinn apparently spent hundreds of hours \259\ on the 
Rich matter, calling and e-mailing his colleagues on the Rich 
legal team in the middle of the night, on vacation, on 
Christmas Day, and New Year's Eve.\260\ While Quinn's 
dedication to his client was admirable, it suggests that Quinn 
anticipated some satisfaction beyond seeing Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green pardoned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\ In media accounts Quinn claimed that he spent 60-100 hours on 
the Rich pardon. These claims simply are not credible. Kitty Behan, who 
was considerably less involved in the Rich pardon than Quinn spent 126 
hours on the Rich pardon. Arnold & Porter Document Production A0513-15, 
A1128 (Arnold & Porter billing records for Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001 and 
Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 35). It is likely that Quinn was 
underestimating his hours to the media to try to support his claims 
that he was not expecting to be paid.
    \260\ See Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from 
Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 
2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0850 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 27, 
2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0861 (E-mail from Robert 
Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)); 
Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail 
from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Marc 
Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document 
Production PMR&W 00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 
31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the common sense rejection of Quinn 
proceeding on a pro bono basis, e-mails between Jack Quinn, 
Robert Fink, and Marc Rich indicate that Rich was specifically 
contemplating entering into a large-dollar retainer agreement 
with Quinn after Quinn left Arnold & Porter. These documents 
were withheld from the Committee for over a year on the basis 
of a claim of attorney-client privilege which was rejected by 
federal Judge Denny Chin. Once provided to the Committee, the 
documents seriously undermined Quinn's claims that he never 
expected any payment from Rich. On February 3, 2000, the day 
after the Southern District of New York rejected Quinn's 
request for a meeting to discuss the Rich case, Quinn asked 
Fink about his status with Marc Rich, asking ``not that I'm 
concerned, but did marc decide to renew the retainer? I've not 
heard anything.'' \261\ Two weeks later, Fink addressed Quinn's 
status in an e-mail to Marc Rich, suggesting that Quinn could 
still be useful, despite his failure to date:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02847 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Robert Fink (Feb. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 37).

        Separately, I have been thinking about your reaction to 
        Jack. When we meet [sic], he felt (and made it clear 
        that he believed this, but was not sure) that he could 
        convince Eric that it made sense to listen to the 
        professors and that he could convince Eric to encourage 
        Mary Jo to do the same. In this he was correct. 
        Moreover, in the preparation process, it became clear 
        that Jack was not just a pretty face but had thoughtful 
        ideas and questions and was not simply relying on his 
        past contacts to make this happen. So, I would not give 
        up on him, at least not yet, as he is still a 
        knowledgeable guy who has a clear understanding of 
        relationships and what may be doable. While we may get 
        more than that, we should not have enlarged 
        expectations.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \262\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00720-21 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2000)) 
(Exhibit 38).

On February 29, 2000, Fink sent another message to Rich 
suggesting that he enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn 
while their negotiations with the Justice Department were still 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pending:

        All in all, while he has been very busy and sometime 
        hard to get to, he has not separated himself from the 
        matter and has fully participated. He has not pushed me 
        for the retainer, though, and realizes that he does not 
        have an agreement with you. I think it makes sense to 
        compensate him for what he has done and may continue to 
        do. Just give it some more thought and we can come back 
        to it soon. We can wait, if you want, to see what Eric 
        says, although it may pay to respond now, before Eric 
        response [sic] to the last message from Jack, so it 
        does not look like you were only willing to pay because 
        of a positive response, as that was not the agreement. 
        Even if we stop everything we are doing, and decide not 
        to investigate the pardon, etc., at this time, we 
        should fold this down in a friendly way.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \263\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).

    After the effort to settle the criminal case with the 
Justice Department failed, Fink continued to recommend that 
Rich enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn, who was 
continuing to raise the issue. On June 6, 2000, Fink sent the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
following e-mail to Rich:

        Jack raised the question of his status. I told him that 
        I felt that you would feel that he had been compensated 
        for the past, even though the retainer had run out 
        before he stopped work, but that you would not want or 
        expect him to work without compensation going forward--
        indeed, you appreciated that it was important to 
        compensate people who asked you to perform for you; 
        although I thought you would not want to get involved 
        in another one of those six month retainers.

        Jack said he did not want to make a proposal that you 
        might find objectionable, but felt some clear 
        arrangement for the future was appropriate. I told him 
        I hoped to see you soon, and that I would raise it with 
        you when I see you and come back with a suggestion. He 
        was happy with that and we agreed to catch up with each 
        other on this issue in the beginning of July.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \264\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40).

At the beginning of July 2000, Fink e-mailed the figures for a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
proposed retainer agreement to Marc Rich:

        Here is my proposal on Jack Quinn, consistent with your 
        advice to me.

        Jack originally proposed a $50,000 per month retainer 
        and additional hourly charges for Kitty Behan. We 
        settled at $55,000 per month, including Kitty, which 
        was a better deal because at her hourly rate her 
        billings would have averaged over $10,000 per month. 
        Moreover, we continued to consult with Jack (and Kitty) 
        after the retainer period had ended so that the average 
        blended rate for Jack was well below $45,000. (OK, 
        enough with making you feel better.)

        At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is 
        how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is 
        available for questions that might arise and, more 
        importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to 
        be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know 
        whether you want him to gear up again within four 
        months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per 
        month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain 
        open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with 
        the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed 
        that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to 
        reflect the changed circumstances.

        This arrangement could start mid-July or August 1st. He 
        has not pushed me for this and, indeed, we are the ones 
        who raised the idea of keeping him on a retainer. 
        Still, if we do go back to Jack and offer a package, we 
        should not schedule it to begin weeks after the 
        proposal. So, if I were to call him next week, I would 
        want to suggest a July 15th start date.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \265\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41).

Despite the clear and detailed indications that Rich and Quinn 
were negotiating a lucrative retainer agreement, Quinn 
testified that he never received any money from Marc Rich 
between the time that he left Arnold & Porter and the time that 
the pardon was granted. The Committee requested interviews with 
Jack Quinn and Robert Fink so that they could provide further 
explanation regarding these e-mails. Both refused to 
participate in an interview.
            2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the 
                    Pardon Was Granted?
    Because he spent so much time and effort on the Marc Rich 
pardon effort, and was successful, many believe that Quinn may 
have expected some large payment from Rich after the pardon was 
granted. Quinn has always denied these allegations. However, 
among the documents withheld by Quinn, and which were forced 
out by the decision of Judge Denny Chin in December 2001, were 
documents which undermined Quinn's denials. Shortly after the 
pardon was granted, Quinn was asked by a reporter if he 
received a fee for his work on the Rich matter. Rather than 
just saying ``no,'' it appears that Quinn did not know what to 
say. On January 23, Quinn told Gershon Kekst that ``Debra [sic] 
Orin wants to know if I received a fee. My instinct is to 
either not respond or say that I have never, in 25 yrs, thought 
it propoer [sic] to discuss a client fee arrangement or even if 
there was one. What say you?'' \266\ Kekst suggested a response 
that ``[t]he privacy of my personal and professional 
relationships is inviolate and so I would not, as a lifelong 
practice, discuss such a question. Suffice to say that in this 
case my motivation was quite simple: an injustice needed to be 
corrected and I determined to do what I could to help 
accomplish that.'' \267\ Quinn then fueled further speculation 
about his fee arrangement when he told the press that he was 
handling the Rich pardon as a ``personal matter,'' indicating 
he would not share the profits with his partners at Quinn & 
Gillespie.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \266\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02973 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Jan. 23, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 42).
    \267\ Id.
    \268\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His 
Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    E-mails between Marc Rich and Jack Quinn after January 20, 
2001, suggest that Rich was seeking some way to show his thanks 
to Quinn, perhaps alluding to a payment to Quinn. On January 
23, 2001, Rich told Quinn that ``As time goes by it's sinking 
in more and more and I once again want to thank you for all 
you've done. I still want to thank you personally and properly 
on a separate occasion when we meet.'' \269\ After Quinn's 
appearance before the Committee, and on a number of television 
programs, Rich e-mailed Quinn to congratulate him.\270\ Quinn 
responded with his own thanks, and an assurance that he would 
continue to fight to point out the flaws in Rich's 
indictment.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \269\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02924 (E-mail from Marc 
Rich to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43).
    \270\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Marc 
Rich to Jack Quinn (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 44).
    \271\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02930 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Marc Rich (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 45).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most conclusive piece of evidence that Quinn fully 
intended to be paid by Marc Rich for his work on the pardon 
came from Rich lawyer Robert Fink at the Committee's March 1 
hearing. Fink confirmed that Rich fully intended to pay Quinn 
for his work. Fink's testimony also strongly suggests that 
Quinn was lying when he stated that he had no expectation of 
being paid for his work on the pardon:

        Counsel. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon, the 
        prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating 
        him for that work?

        Mr. Fink. I anticipated that he would be compensated 
        for that work by Mr. Rich.

        Counsel. And if you could, tell us what you were 
        thinking.

        Mr. Fink. Actually, I--I don't know that I was thinking 
        anything other than he was entitled to some fair fee, 
        the exact parameters of which I did not have in mind. I 
        believe I told Mr. Quinn when we started to discuss the 
        pardon that we would find a fair fee arrangement for 
        him consistent with whatever his fee arrangements were. 
        I did not know how he was handling his fee 
        arrangements.

        Counsel. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr. 
        Quinn?

        Mr. Fink. Could you excuse me just one moment?

        Counsel. Certainly.

        [Mr. Fink confers with counsel.]

        Mr. Fink. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated 
        thoughts I had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not 
        disagree.

        Counsel. And what did you communicate to him?

        Mr. Fink. I actually communicated to him what I told to 
        Mr. Quinn.

        Counsel. And what was that?

        Mr. Fink. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement 
        that was consistent with his normal fee arrangements.

        Counsel. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that you 
        would come to an arrangement with him to compensate 
        him?

        Mr. Fink. Yes.

        Counsel. And when was that?

        Mr. Fink. The precise date I do not know, but it was 
        most likely early November 2000.

        Counsel. And when did you stop thinking that was going 
        to be the case?

        Mr. Fink. I stopped thinking that was going to be the 
        case during the first hearings of this committee.

        Counsel. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his 
        compensation?

        Mr. Fink. I believe you were the questioner.

        Counsel. I'm not quite sure where to go after that. But 
        you had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during 
        which you had discussed the prospect of him not being 
        compensated up until at least the time of our last 
        hearing; is that correct?

        Mr. Fink. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not 
        that I reflected on this frequently, but if you had 
        stopped me at any point in time and said would you 
        expect that Mr. Quinn would be compensated for this 
        work, I would have thought that he would be.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \272\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 505-06 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).

Fink's testimony, in addition to the circumstantial evidence, 
establishes that Quinn expected to receive payment for his work 
on the Rich pardon. It is likely that Quinn attempted to 
mislead the public and the Committee on this point to try to 
improve the public perception of his actions in this case. That 
is, if Quinn could say he did all of his work on the Rich 
pardon out of his belief in the merits, rather than his belief 
in a large payday, it would show the strength of the Rich case.
    Knowing now that Quinn did do his work on the Rich pardon 
with an expectation of payment, the question is--how large of a 
payment would Quinn receive? Fink loosely characterized it as 
``consistent with his normal fee arrangements.'' However, given 
the enormous sums at Rich's disposal, and the vast amounts Rich 
had spent, unsuccessfully, to resolve his case, it is not 
unreasonable that Rich would pay Quinn a large sum of money. 
However, at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn 
pledged not to accept any future payment on the Rich case:

        Counsel. Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions 
        about compensation. Apart from your attorney's fees, 
        will you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future?

        Mr. Quinn. Well, look, I don't think it would be fair 
        to ask me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As 
        I've said to you, if I do work that justifies my 
        billing him for it, I will do so. I expect to be 
        reimbursed for the expenses I'm put to in connection 
        with this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate 
        receiving from him.

        Counsel. But as far as your work done in pursuit of 
        obtaining a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him--
        you're not going to ask him to pay you any money?

        Mr. Quinn. That's correct.

        Counsel. You're not going to accept any money if he did 
        offer it to you; is that correct?

        Mr. Quinn. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys 
        in connection with work I may do.

        Counsel. My question was, will you accept any money if 
        he offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining 
        the pardon?

        Mr. Quinn. I have no idea what he might offer. It's a 
        hypothetical question. I don't think I should be 
        required to say--

        Counsel. It's not a hypothetical question. It's a very 
        clear question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in 
        the future for work you did in pursuit of obtaining his 
        pardon, will you accept it or will you not accept it?

        Mr. Quinn. I will not bill him, and I will not accept 
        any further compensation for work done on the 
        pardon.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \273\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

    However, in February 2002, as a result of Judge Chin's 
decision in the Southern District of New York, the Committee 
received a number of documents which had been earlier withheld 
from the Committee on the basis of attorney-client privilege. 
One of the e-mails provided to the Committee indicated that on 
March 5, 2001, after the Committee's second and final hearing 
on the Marc Rich pardon, Quinn asked Rich to enter into a new 
retainer agreement to pay Quinn. Quinn's e-mail reads as 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
follows:

        Greetings. Quite a month we have had! If you are 
        agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in 
        the next few days a new retainer agreement. I cannot, 
        under the D.C. Bar rules continue to work without a 
        written agreement, and I have been crafting one which I 
        will forward shortly. I hope that, in recent days, the 
        public has begun to see your pardon in a different 
        light. I particularly thought that our hearing last 
        Thursday brought to the fore aspects not previously 
        appreciated. About all this I hope we shall speak soon. 
        Best to you.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \274\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Marc Rich (Mar. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 44).

    Rich responded to Quinn by telling him: ``[w]ith reference 
to your email of March 5, please go ahead and send me the new 
retainer agreement.'' \275\ Neither Quinn nor Robert Fink 
provided the Committee with a copy of any retainer agreement, 
or any further e-mails regarding payments from Rich to Quinn 
after March 5, 2001. However, the March 5 e-mail raises the 
possibility that Quinn is receiving payment from Rich, despite 
his express promise to the contrary at the Committee's February 
8 hearing. The Committee requested an interview with both Quinn 
and Fink to provide further explanation for these e-mail 
messages, but both declined to participate. While Quinn has 
refused to provide an explanation to the Committee, his 
spokesman has told the press that Quinn has signed a new 
retainer with Rich to ``cover new legal matters.'' \276\ The 
Committee will continue to investigate this matter to determine 
the nature of Quinn's work for Rich and the amounts that Quinn 
is being paid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \275\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02974 (E-mail from Marc 
Rich to Jack Quinn (Mar. 6, 2001)) (Exhibit 46).
    \276\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek, Mar. 10, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case

    In October 1999, Quinn followed the advice offered by Eric 
Holder to Gershon Kekst and approached Main Justice in an 
effort to settle the Rich case. He started by drafting a 
presentation for the Justice Department. Quinn also hired Neal 
Katyal, a lawyer who interned for Quinn when he was Counsel to 
Vice President Gore.\277\ Katyal had also worked as National 
Security Advisor to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. 
According to Katyal, he was hired more as a consultant than as 
a lawyer.\278\ Katyal characterized the presentation he helped 
prepare as more marketing than legal.\279\ Katyal helped draft 
documents that were presented to Eric Holder. He denied 
contacting Holder directly, or using his access to Holder to 
benefit the Rich lawyers. However, he did acknowledge that on 
several occasions Jack Quinn told him, ``you know, I want to 
talk to Eric about this.'' \280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\ Telephone Interview with Neal Katyal, Associate Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 26, 2001).
    \278\ Id.
    \279\ Id.
    \280\ Id. Katyal further explained that Quinn already had an 
independent relationship with Holder and would not have needed Katyal's 
assistance in setting up any meetings between them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quinn had a number of contacts with Holder about settling 
the Rich case. It appears that Quinn's main request to Holder 
was that he intercede with the Southern District of New York 
and have the Southern District's prosecutors meet with the 
members of the Marc Rich legal team. On October 22, 1999, Quinn 
met with Holder for the first time regarding the Rich case. 
Quinn reviewed a number of points about the Rich case with 
Holder, and asked that Holder intervene with the Southern 
District of New York, to encourage the Southern District to 
meet with Marc Rich's lawyers and reach a settlement of the 
criminal case.\281\ On November 8, 1999, Holder called Quinn 
and told him that he and other senior staff at the Justice 
Department believed that the refusal of the Southern District 
to meet with Rich's lawyers was ``ridiculous.'' \282\ Holder 
recommended that Quinn send a letter requesting a meeting to 
U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, with copies to Holder and 
Assistant Attorneys General James Robinson and Loretta Collins 
Argrett.\283\ Holder told Quinn that once he got the letter, he 
would call White and suggest that she should meet with 
Quinn.\284\ Holder also told Quinn that he was assigning one of 
his top deputies, David Margolis, to look at the Rich 
matter.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \281\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 
47).
    \282\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn (Nov. 8, 
1999)) (Exhibit 48).
    \283\ Id.
    \284\ Id.
    \285\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Holder spoke with Mary Jo White about a meeting with 
Quinn and members of the Rich legal team, Quinn made a direct 
appeal to Mary Jo White, writing her on December 1, 1999:

        We would like to begin by asking that you or your 
        representative, along with representatives of the Tax 
        and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice, 
        meet with Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg, and members 
        of our legal team, to personally evaluate their 
        conclusions. We urge this approach because the tax 
        allegations underlie so much of the indictment, and 
        because the merits of our tax position can be quickly 
        evaluated. We believe that such a meeting will advance 
        a resolution of this matter. We further believe that we 
        can persuade you that neither the law nor the policies 
        of the Department of Justice support the RICO charges 
        and that, in this regard, too, the indictment as 
        currently drafted should not stand.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn and 
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Mary Jo White, U.S. 
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 1, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 49).

    On January 18, 2000, Quinn spoke to Holder to see how Mary 
Jo White had received his letter. Holder told Quinn that he had 
spoken to White, and that she was reviewing the matter 
personally. Holder told Quinn that he would ``do what he can,'' 
\287\ and also provided encouragement to Quinn, telling him 
that White ``didn't sound like her guard was up.'' \288\ On 
February 2, 2000, the Southern District responded to Quinn and 
Behan's letter by turning down their request to meet in order 
to modify the indictment.\289\ As Mary Jo White further 
explained in her letter to Quinn, ``I have communicated with 
representatives of the Deputy Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, and with the Acting 
Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division. They all concur 
that this is a matter within the discretion of the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.'' \290\ 
White's letter was a complete rejection of the overtures made 
by Quinn and Holder, and was a significant setback for the Marc 
Rich legal team. Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Avner Azulay 
explaining that ``[w]e received a negative response to our 
overture from [Deputy U.S. Attorney] Shira[h Neiman]. She said 
her office will not negotiate while Marc is away, and that the 
DoJ agrees. JQ was surprised and disappointed that the DoJ had 
agreed even though he had not heard from Eric.'' \291\ Azulay 
responded that ``I am not exactly surprised. I foresaw this 
answer from the moment I read JQ's ltr. I hate to say that `I 
told you so.' I was surprised by JQ's optimistic report.'' 
\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 
50).
    \288\ Id.
    \289\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, 
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, 
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51).
    \290\ Id.
    \291\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation 
(Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 32).
    \292\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After this rejection, Quinn turned his efforts to Eric 
Holder, asking him to review the Rich case, despite White's 
refusal to do so. Robert Fink laid out Quinn's proposed plan of 
action in a February 17, 2000, e-mail to Marc Rich:

        [Jack] agrees (subject to further discussion) with 
        trying to have Eric help us meet with the tax lawyers 
        in Main Justice (and maybe the head of the criminal 
        division) to see if the professors can convince the 
        chief government tax lawyers that this was a bad tax 
        case. He also agrees that such a conclusion would be 
        useful for many purposes including going back to the 
        SDNY. Similarly, he agrees we should make something of 
        the fact that the office was dealing with fugitives 
        (who surrendered this week) in connection with the 
        Russian money laundering case, while insisting that 
        they can't deal with fugitives. Still, he wants to give 
        Eric a short list of what is wrong with the indictment 
        as he agreed to do that. He feels we can do both.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \293\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 52).

    On February 28, 2000, Quinn sent Holder a short memorandum 
entitled ``Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment.'' 
\294\ In this memorandum, Quinn stated that ``[t]he refusal of 
the SDNY to participate in a discussion of the Marc Rich case 
is sorely disappointing. That office (and DOJ) should not sit 
on a defective indictment.'' \295\ Quinn then explained why he 
believed that the RICO, mail fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion, 
and energy charges against Rich were faulty.\296\ Quinn also 
claimed that the SDNY had recently negotiated with fugitive 
Russian money launderers, despite their policy against 
negotiating with fugitives. Quinn also stated that ``[t]he DOJ 
website lists Marc Rich on its International Fugitive page. 
This involves USG resources and is a potential embarrassment 
for DOJ.'' \297\ Quinn did not provide any explanation, though, 
of why listing Rich as a fugitive would be an embarrassment for 
DOJ, given the fact that the Justice Department had been trying 
to extradite or apprehend him for almost 20 years. Holder 
apparently reviewed Quinn's arguments, but failed to help 
Quinn. Quinn spoke to Holder on March 14, 2000, and reported 
back to Fink, Behan, and Kekst:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ 
Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment'' (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 53).
    \295\ Id.
    \296\ Id.
    \297\ Id.

        [W]e spoke briefly today. it started out badly--``we've 
        gone as far as we can go, can't figure out a way around 
        Shira[h Neiman], etc.''--but I pushed back hard on the 
        russian money laundering culprits and the uneven 
        treatment of marc. he wants to talk further about that 
        with his people, said he'd call me back tomorrow. it's 
        time to move on the GOI [Government of Israel] 
        front.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to 
Robert Fink (Mar. 14, 2000)) (Exhibit 54). Quinn's suggestion to ``move 
on the GOI front'' was rebuffed by Avner Azulay, who stated that 
``there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is going to 
initiate a call to EH--a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who 
has proved to be a weak link.'' Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document 
Production PMR&W 00728 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich 
Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 55).

Holder did speak to Quinn almost a month later, on March 25, 
2000, and told him that ``we're all sympathetic'' and that the 
``equities [are] on your side.'' \299\ However, Holder 
apparently informed Quinn that he could not force a meeting on 
the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \299\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 
56). In this conversation, Holder also answered Quinn's arguments 
regarding the SDNY's negotiations with the fugitive Russian money 
launderers, pointing out that they, unlike Rich, agreed to cooperate 
with the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Jack Quinn 
confirmed that Holder was sympathetic to his cause:

        I certainly formed the impression that there was, as 
        one of my notes reflect, a view among some senior 
        people in Main Justice that the equities were on our 
        side in some senses.

        Again, I'm not trying to overstate this. I'm not trying 
        to say that I believed that senior people at Main 
        Justice thought the indictment was meritless, but I did 
        absolutely believe that Main Justice thought that the 
        Southern District was being unreasonable in being 
        unwilling to talk to us. I thought that there was a 
        more sympathetic audience at Main Justice.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

However, Eric Holder attempted to qualify his support of Jack 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quinn's arguments:

        With regard to question of equities and whether or not 
        we thought the Southern District was being 
        unreasonable, I think Mr. Quinn was just a little 
        confused. What we were talking about there was them 
        being unreasonable and not having the meeting. The 
        equities were on their side, as Mr. Quinn's side, with 
        regard to the meeting. No one at Main Justice thought 
        that, with regard to the substance, the equities were 
        on Mr. Quinn's side.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \301\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 231 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

Even assuming, though, that Holder's support was limited to his 
request for a meeting with Mary Jo White, it is still unclear 
why he thought the ``equities were on Quinn's side,'' even with 
respect to a meeting. The SDNY had a number of meetings and 
negotiations with Rich's attorneys, both before and after 
Rich's flight from the U.S. The SDNY had made a number of 
reasonable offers to settle the case, and U.S. Attorney Otto 
Obermaier and one of his senior aides even met with Rich in 
Switzerland. Rich's lawyers, however, took an inflexible 
position that they would not agree to any plea that required 
jail time. Given this position, the SDNY decided further 
negotiations would not be productive. For Holder to 
characterize the SDNY's position as ``ridiculous,'' suggests 
that Eric Holder supported Quinn's efforts to settle the Rich 
case from the beginning.

III. THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION

A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000

    Jack Quinn and others on the Marc Rich legal team have 
maintained that they did not decide to seek pardons for Rich 
and Green until October 2000.\302\ However, there is extensive 
evidence that Marc Rich and his lawyers were contemplating a 
pardon as early as February 2000, while they were still 
attempting to settle Rich's criminal case with the Southern 
District of New York. It appears that Rich and his legal team 
viewed the Presidential pardon effort as a fall-back in case 
they were unable to settle the criminal case. Moreover, it 
appears that although they were considering petitioning for a 
pardon as early as February 2000, Rich and his legal team 
waited until November 2000 to submit their petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \302\ See, e.g., ``The Controversial Pardon of International 
Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th 
Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed previously, on February 2, 2000, Mary Jo 
White, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
rejected Jack Quinn's offer to meet regarding the Marc Rich 
case. After White's rejection, Jack Quinn turned again to 
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, and asked him to intervene 
and force a reconsideration of the Marc Rich indictment. By 
late March 2000, it became clear to Quinn that Holder was 
sympathetic to Quinn's requests, but would not force the 
Southern District to meet with Quinn. However, during the time 
that Quinn was discussing his request for a meeting with Eric 
Holder, the Marc Rich legal team was already considering a 
Presidential pardon.
    A privilege log submitted to the Committee by Arnold & 
Porter suggests that attorneys working for Marc Rich had been 
researching Presidential pardons as early as March 1999.\303\ 
It appears, though that serious consideration of a pardon began 
in February 2000, while Quinn was still attempting to settle 
the criminal case through Eric Holder. February 9, 2000, Robert 
Fink sent an e-mail to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, which 
referred to the pardon effort cryptically as the ``second 
option:''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \303\ Arnold & Porter Document Production (Privilege Log, Mar. 27, 
2001) (Exhibit 57). The privilege log notes that a memorandum regarding 
the pardon power was prepared on March 12, 1999, and withheld from the 
Committee on the basis of the attorney work product privilege.

        I briefed Marc and he is awaiting word on your call. (I 
        have also sent Avner a briefed [sic] email letting him 
        know of the current status.) I also told Marc that I 
        would discuss with you and Kitty your views on the 
        second option (whether there is any reason to consider 
        it, or whether what happened here made it so unlikely 
        that you did not think it worthwhile, as I told him 
        that you would not work on it unless you thought there 
        was some possibility of success). He was curious as to 
        your thinking. I told him I would also check on your 
        thinking on what Avner was doing. but let's see what 
        Eric says.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \304\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00695 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, 
Arnold & Porter (Feb. 9, 2000)) (Exhibit 58).

On February 14, 2000, Fink had a telephone discussion with 
Quinn regarding the efforts to settle Rich's criminal case in 
New York. Quinn apparently mentioned the possibility of seeking 
a Presidential pardon, as Fink's notes of the call state in 
part, ``Pardon--mid to late Nov.'' \305\ Two weeks later, 
Robert Fink sent another e-mail to Marc Rich explaining Quinn's 
role in the negotiations with the Justice Department, and his 
potential role in seeking a Presidential pardon. Fink concluded 
his e-mail to Rich by suggesting that Rich enter into a 
retainer agreement with Quinn before they heard back from Eric 
Holder:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
01202-03 (Notes of Robert Fink, Feb. 14, 2000) (Exhibit 59).

        I think it makes sense to compensate him for what he 
        has done and may continue to do. Just give it some more 
        thought and we can come back to it soon. We can wait, 
        if you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay 
        to respond now, before Eric response [sic] to the last 
        message from Jack, so it does not look like you were 
        only willing to pay because of a positive response, as 
        that was not the agreement. Even if we stop everything 
        we are doing, and decide not to investigate the pardon, 
        etc., at this time, we should fold this down in a 
        friendly way.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \306\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).

    On March 18, 2000, Avner Azulay sent Fink an e-mail which 
again alluded to the possibility of seeking a pardon in 
November 2000. More importantly, this e-mail also raised the 
possibility of capitalizing on Denise Rich's relationship with 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Clinton:

        I had a long talk with JQ and Michael. I explained why 
        there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] 
        is going to initiate a call to E[ric] H[older]--a 
        minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has 
        proved to be a weak link. We are reverting to the idea 
        discussed with Abe--which is to send D[enise] R[ich] on 
        a ``personal'' mission to N01. with a well prepared 
        script. IF it works we didin't [sic] lose the present 
        opportunity--until nov--which shall not repat [sic] 
        itself. If it doesn't--then probably Gershon's course 
        of acion [sic] shall be the one left option [sic] to 
        start all over again.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \307\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink 
(Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60).

At the March 1, 2001, hearing on the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn 
and Robert Fink were asked to explain their understanding of 
this communication. Fink stated that he understood ``N01'' to 
mean President Clinton.\308\ However, neither of the two 
attorneys could provide a definitive answer as to whether 
Denise Rich actually undertook the `` `personal' mission'' to 
the President contemplated in the e-mail. For example, Quinn 
provided the following response:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \308\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 515 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).

        Now, I'm telling you, I did not speak to the President 
        in the year 2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not 
        a recipient of this [e-mail]. I have no reason to 
        believe that anyone asked Denise Rich to speak to him 
        about this matter, and I have no reason to believe that 
        she did so. But my firsthand knowledge of this is 
        limited to the facts I'm able to testify to.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \309\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn).

When asked what Denise Rich's involvement was around this time, 
Robert Fink provided an even more lawyerly response: ``I have 
an imperfect memory, so I'll be careful. I believe as I sit 
here that there was no involvement by Denise Rich in Mr. Rich's 
problems during that period of time. I have absolutely no 
recollection that she became involved in any way.'' \310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \310\ Id. at 515 (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, neither attorney could give a definitive 
answer as to whether this ``well prepared script'' for Denise 
Rich related to the pardon, or to negotiations with the 
Department of Justice. During questioning about the March 18, 
2000, e-mail, Quinn testified that it was possible that ``every 
one of us involved in this thought out loud with each other, is 
there any way to persuade the President to tell Justice, to 
tell the southern district to do something.'' \311\ Quinn 
continued, however, stating, ``It's also entirely possible that 
Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a 
conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to 
pardon one of these days.'' \312\ Robert Fink's testimony, 
while also not definitive, suggests that the script related to 
negotiations with the Department of Justice. When asked about 
the last sentence of Azulay's e-mail that discusses reverting 
to ``Gershon's course of action'' if Denise Rich's script were 
to fail, Fink stated, ``I suspect that he's talking about an 
application for a pardon here.'' \313\ Assuming Fink's 
supposition is correct, then the script for Denise would have 
related to Department of Justice negotiations.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \312\ Id.
    \313\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink).
    \314\ This also tends to suggest that while the attorneys were not 
working on a pardon effort in March of 2000, the idea had already been 
discussed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 2000, Robert Fink had further communications with 
Marc Rich indicating that they were intentionally waiting until 
after the November 2000 election to petition for a Presidential 
pardon:

        Jack Quinn and I traded calls until today. He is well 
        and doing well. He has not forgotten you or what we set 
        out to do, but has pretty much concluded that there is 
        nothing to do until we get closer to (or even passed) 
        [sic] the election, or as he put it, the closing days 
        of the current administration.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \315\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40).

In July 2000, Fink again e-mailed Rich suggesting that Rich 
sign a retainer agreement with Quinn so that he would be 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
available to work in the Fall of 2000:

        At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is 
        how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is 
        available for questions that might arise and, more 
        importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to 
        be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know 
        whether you want him to gear up again within four 
        months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per 
        month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain 
        open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with 
        the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed 
        that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to 
        reflect the changed circumstances.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \316\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41).

    This documentary evidence is supported by the information 
provided by two witnesses who indicate that they were aware of 
pardon discussions well before the Fall of 2000. Abraham 
Foxman, the National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, 
informed the Committee that he recommended that Rich seek a 
Presidential pardon as early as February 2000. Foxman first met 
Marc Rich fifteen years ago through mutual friend Max Maxin who 
was President of B'nai B'rith.\317\ According to Foxman, Maxin 
asked Foxman to meet with Rich ``because Rich felt that there 
may have been anti-Semitism involved in his prosecution.'' 
\318\ According to Foxman, he met Rich in Europe sometime in 
late 1998 or early 1999.\319\ Foxman told Rich at that meeting 
that he did not see any evidence to support a charge of anti-
Semitism.\320\ Later, in February of 2000, Foxman was contacted 
by Zvi Rafiah, who was then congressional liaison for the 
Israeli Embassy in Washington.\321\ Rafiah suggested that 
Foxman go to Paris to meet with Avner Azulay, the former Mossad 
agent who managed Marc Rich's philanthropic organizations.\322\ 
At that meeting in Paris, Foxman allegedly told Azulay that if 
the attorneys for Rich continued to be unsuccessful in their 
negotiations with the prosecutors in New York, a pardon might 
be a ``long-shot'' possibility to consider.\323\ Foxman told 
Azulay that, to the best of his knowledge, Denise Rich ``hated 
Marc Rich's guts,'' but that if someone could convince her to 
speak to the President, ``then you have the beginning of a 
pardon situation.'' \324\ Foxman later learned that, ``as it 
turns out, that is what happened.'' \325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \317\ Interview with Abraham Foxman, National Director, Anti-
Defamation League (Mar. 19, 2001).
    \318\ Id. Marc Rich has charged on a number of occasions that he 
was singled out for prosecution because he was Jewish. There is no 
support for Mr. Rich's assertion. Mr. Rich's decision to play the race 
card emphasizes the extent to which he has failed to accept 
responsibility for his crimes. Rather than recognizing the extent of 
his criminal acts, of which violation of Department of Energy 
regulations and the Tax Code were among the least, Rich has made 
baseless accusations against federal prosecutors.
    \319\ Id.
    \320\ Id.
    \321\ Id. According to Foxman, Rafiah is now a lobbyist for 
``commercial interests.'' Id. Lobbying registration materials from the 
FEC indicate that Rafiah's main client is Elisra Electronic Systems 
Ltd., a company that develops and manufactures electronic warfare 
systems. Lobbying Registration of Zvi Rafiah (visited Feb. 16, 2001) 
 (Exhibit 61).
    \322\ Id.
    \323\ Id.
    \324\ Id.
    \325\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Publicist Gershon Kekst claims that he mentioned the 
possibility of a Presidential pardon to Rich's lawyers as early 
as 1999. Kekst had been hired by Rich to assist with strategy 
and public relations relating to his criminal case.\326\ In 
1999, the same time period in which Kekst was looking for a 
Washington lawyer to represent Rich, Kekst was giving general 
thought to the Rich case, including his basic conclusion that a 
public relations campaign could not help Rich. Seeking to 
conduct a ``sanity check'' on his conclusion, Kekst turned to 
former Attorney General William P. Barr, the Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel for Verizon Communications. Kekst 
met Barr through public relations work he did for Verizon 
Communications.\327\ Kekst claimed that he was unaware at that 
time that Barr had been U.S. Attorney General.\328\ However, 
Kekst was impressed with Barr's legal acumen, and thought that 
he could offer some insight into the Rich case. Kekst called 
Barr, and asked him whether he thought that a public relations 
campaign would be useful in trying to resolve the Rich 
case.\329\ Kekst claims that Barr told him that a public 
relations campaign was the worst thing he could do. According 
to Kekst, Barr told Kekst that, assuming the Rich case was a 
bad case, the most that Rich could do was wait until the end of 
the Administration and seek a pardon from President 
Clinton.\330\ Kekst stated that before Barr's suggestion, he 
had never heard any discussion of Rich seeking a Presidential 
pardon. Kekst also believes that Barr told him that even if the 
case against Rich was not justified, as long as Mary Jo White 
was U.S. Attorney and Rudolph Giuliani was Mayor, there was 
nothing to be done.\331\ The latter point appears to have been 
the main thing taken away from the conversation by Kekst and 
those on the Rich team who he informed about the conversation 
with Barr. In December 2000, Robert Fink e-mailed Jack Quinn 
and reminded him that Kekst had spoken to Barr in 1999, and 
that Barr believed ``it paid to wait for the new administration 
and the retiring of several of the then-current players.'' 
\332\ Fink then suggested that they ask Barr to assist with the 
pardon effort, but apparently, Quinn and Fink decided not to 
include a prominent Republican in their efforts.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \326\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \327\ Id.
    \328\ Id.
    \329\ Id.
    \330\ Id.
    \331\ Id.
    \332\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00073 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 62).
    \333\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For his part, Barr recalls that he told Kekst that 
political pressure would be a ``waste of time.'' \334\ Barr 
explained to Kekst that the Justice Department supported the 
Southern District of New York prosecutors because it was a 
matter of significant principle for the Department.\335\ He 
also told Kekst that it was inconceivable that any relief was 
possible as long as Rich remained a fugitive.\336\ In short, 
Barr believed that the White House would never do anything for 
Rich unless Rich were willing to surrender himself and accept 
responsibility for what he had done.\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \334\ Telephone interview with William P. Barr (Mar. 10, 2002).
    \335\ Id.
    \336\ Id.
    \337\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the days immediately following the Rich pardon, Jack 
Quinn and the other lawyers for Marc Rich emphasized that they 
did not decide to seek a pardon for Rich until October 2000. 
What they did not make clear, however, was that they were 
actively considering a pardon much earlier. They decided to 
wait until the closing days of the Clinton Administration to 
apply for the pardon. While the reasons for the delay are not 
clear, there are two likely reasons: first, by waiting until 
December to apply, opponents of the pardon would have a limited 
amount of time to learn of and resist the pardon effort; 
second, the Clinton White House would have limited time to 
conduct a detailed review of the petition and learn of its 
numerous flaws.

B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition

    The centerpiece of Marc Rich's effort to obtain a 
Presidential pardon was the pardon petition, which was put 
together by the Marc Rich legal team in October and November 
2000. The main attorneys involved in preparing the pardon 
petition were Jack Quinn; Kathleen Behan; Robert Fink; 
Christopher Man, an associate at Arnold & Porter; Michael 
Hepworth, Of Counsel at Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe; and G. 
Michael Green of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky. These 
lawyers spent dozens, if not hundreds, of hours compiling the 
petition.
    The resulting document, which had a number of 
misrepresentations and factual inaccuracies, was a surprisingly 
poor effort, considering the amount of time and money that went 
into it. The argument section of the petition, the only portion 
that was actually drafted anew in October and November 2000, 
totaled 31 double-spaced pages. The first 20 of those pages 
were dedicated to biographical sketches of Rich and Green. 
These pages attempted to cast Rich and Green in a favorable, 
even likable light. These statements seem almost laughable 
given what the world knows now about Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green:

        Mr. Rich and Mr. Green have lived exemplary, indeed, 
        remarkable lives. Although they have suffered terrible 
        hardships as the result of their exile from the United 
        States, they have continued to work productively and 
        contribute to society.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \338\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 4 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).

Although it is true that the work of Rich and Green assisted 
the governments of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya, it is 
difficult to argue that they contributed to the United States 
once they fled their country and attempted to renounce their 
citizenship.
    Included in the attempt to make Marc Rich seem like the 
victim was a reference to the tragic death of his daughter 
Gabrielle while Marc Rich was a fugitive from justice: 
``Because Gabrielle lived and died in the United States, Mr. 
Rich felt the extra weight of being unable to personally visit 
with her during her final months.'' \339\ This claim, which was 
repeated by Denise Rich in her appeals to the President, made 
it sound as if the prosecutors in the Southern District of New 
York denied Rich the opportunity to visit with his dying 
daughter. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rich knew 
that if he returned he would receive bail, and that he would 
not be incarcerated unless convicted of the crimes he had been 
accused of committing. He was prevented from returning to visit 
his dying daughter only if he refused to face the U.S. justice 
system. Rich's desire to both have his cake and eat it too, 
makes it difficult to generate any sympathy for him in this 
matter. In fact, the only possible conclusion is that Marc Rich 
placed his own needs over those of his daughter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ Id. at 7 n.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The petition also made it sound as if Rich was providing 
the world with an economic benefit through his dealings:

        In building this business, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green made 
        substantial contributions to the world economy by 
        increasing competition--and even breaking cartels--in 
        the physical commodities industries.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \340\ Id. at 6.

Of course, the petition did not mention that Marc Rich's 
business was built by supporting corrupt and dictatorial 
regimes across the world, ranging from Communist Cuba to 
apartheid South Africa. Nor did the petition mention that 
Rich's deals with third world countries meant that Rich himself 
gained monopolies over commodities that often paid developing 
nations less than fair-market prices for their commodities. Nor 
did the petition point out that Rich provided opportunities to 
those regimes the United States was actively attempting to 
penalize, including Iran during the period when 54 Americans 
were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.
    The petition also made the claim that Rich and Green's 
lives were exemplary, setting aside the 65-count indictment:

        Other than the allegations for which clemency is 
        sought, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green never have been charged 
        with a crime. Indeed, Mr. Rich's and Mr. Green's lives 
        both before and after the accusations have been ones of 
        hard-working, resourceful businessmen who have become 
        remarkably successful and have devoted much time and 
        money to philanthropy and statesmanship.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\ Id. at 20.

Again, the pardon petition made no mention of other less-than-
savory aspects of Marc Rich's business dealings, for which he 
was never prosecuted, but which remain of questionable legality 
and morality, including supporting the Khomeini regime while it 
held U.S. hostages, selling weapons and missile parts to 
Khomeini, and trying to do business with Saddam Hussein during 
the Gulf War.
    The petition then takes six pages to argue that the 
indictment of Rich and Green was flawed and unfair, and the 
appropriate subject of a Presidential pardon. As described 
below, these arguments were largely a rehash of the same 
arguments that Rich and his lawyers had been making since the 
indictment was handed down. The final four pages of the 
petition were used to explain that it was permissible for the 
President to issue a pardon before a conviction. Also attached 
to the petition were the ``letters of support,'' as well as 
other attachments, including the tax analysis by Professors 
Ginsburg and Wolfman, as well as other varied materials related 
to negotiations with the Southern District of New York and the 
President's pardon power in general.

C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition

    The pardon petition crafted by Jack Quinn and the other 
attorneys on the Rich legal team is filled with numerous 
misleading and disingenuous legal arguments. Many commentators 
have stated that Quinn was merely being a good lawyer providing 
zealous representation to Marc Rich. However, many of the 
points made by Quinn and others go beyond zealous 
representation to the point of deception. Quinn had a 
responsibility to be honest in the pardon petition, and he 
failed. Normally, such dishonesty would not have a tremendous 
effect, but when it was combined with the total failure of the 
Clinton White House to examine the Rich case, the result was 
disastrous.
            1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed
    The first charge leveled by Quinn and the Rich legal team 
is that Rich and Green and their companies, Marc Rich + Co. 
A.G. (``A.G.'') and Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. 
(``International''), were subjected to an ``unprecedented 
criminal investigation'' and ``a unique indictment based on 
now-discarded and rejected theories.'' \342\ Notwithstanding 
the fact that this is an argument made by almost all 
individuals and companies accused of white collar crime, this 
claim is especially specious here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \342\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were
                    Fair
    In his pardon petition, Rich claimed to have been the 
victim of overly complex and unfair Department of Energy 
regulations. One element of this line of defense is that the 
regulations governing the conduct for which Rich and Green were 
indicted were too confusing. According to the pardon petition, 
the Department of Energy regulations limiting prices in oil 
reselling were ``extremely complicated,'' and were therefore 
rescinded in January 1981 because they were ``unworkable.'' 
\343\ Such an argument is completely disingenuous. Rich and 
Green were able to understand the regulations well enough to 
exploit them for millions of dollars in profit. Regardless of 
whether they outlived their usefulness, they were deemed 
appropriate at the time when the United States was seriously 
concerned about fuel shortages. More important, they were the 
law at that time, and Rich and Green therefore had a duty to 
play by the rules or face the consequences. Indeed, other 
companies were able to obey the law and were not subject to 
prosecution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \343\ Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quinn also argued that the Department of Energy indicated 
that Rich and his company ``properly . . . accounted for the 
transactions.'' \344\ This argument is irrelevant because 
Rich's accounting was not the central issue. Rather, Rich's 
companies falsified reports in order to hide profits over the 
legal limits in violation of law. Marc Rich's own companies 
admitted as much when they pled guilty and paid $200 million in 
taxes, penalties, and interest. As the lawyers for Rich's 
companies stated in federal court:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \344\ Id. at 27.

        Beginning in September 1980 International generated 
        millions of dollars of income from crude oil 
        transactions which International should have disclosed 
        but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.

                                *  *  *


        In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of 
        agencies of the United States, specifically the 
        Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, 
        International and A.G. knowingly and wilfully made 
        those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the 
        Department of Energy which were false in that they 
        failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual 
        income from those crude oil transactions[.] \345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \345\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et 
al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).

This language from the allocution clearly demonstrates not only 
that the Department of Energy in no way exonerated Rich and 
Green's activities, but also that Rich and Green and their 
companies clearly understood the nature of the supposedly 
complicated regulations well enough to violate them ``knowingly 
and wilfully.'' Their arrangement with West Texas Marketing was 
clearly intended to contravene the regulations and perpetrate 
tax fraud against the United States.
                b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out
    Another element of Quinn's attack on the indictment is that 
Rich and Green were unfairly singled out because ``others 
engaging in similar activity'' were pursued only in civil 
regulatory actions.\346\ This argument is simply false, and a 
minimally competent lawyer would have known that it was false. 
Even Rich's own lawyers had earlier determined this in their 
research, which was also in Jack Quinn's possession. According 
to a 1988 memo drafted by Rich's lawyers, there were 48 
criminal cases nationwide brought against crude oil 
resellers.\347\ In 14 cases, the defendants spent some time in 
prison.\348\ Texas resellers John Troland and David Ratliff of 
West Texas Marketing were prosecuted for ``daisy chain'' oil 
transactions and for falsely classifying different types of 
crude oil to skirt DOE regulations. It was while serving 10 
months in prison that they first alerted prosecutors to the 
activities of Rich and Green.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \347\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers 
to Scooter Libby 1 n.1 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63).
    \348\ Id. at 1-2 n.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rich's lawyers have also argued that, unlike Rich and 
Green, the few violators who were pursued criminally were 
involved in ``daisy chaining'' or miscertification (falsely 
labeling controlled oil as uncontrolled oil).\349\ However, 
Rich and Green were not alone in facing criminal penalties even 
though they were not accused of miscertification. Oscar Wyatt, 
David Chalmers, and Sam Wilson, Jr. pled guilty to a willful 
violation of the price control enforcement provision that 
involved no accusation of miscertification.\350\ These cases 
are consistent with the relevant statute, which distinguishes 
between civil and criminal violations on the basis of whether 
the conduct was willful--not whether it involved 
miscertification.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \349\ Quinn made this argument before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. See ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing 
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 78 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \350\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers 
to Scooter Libby 2-3 n.4 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63).
    \351\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 754 (1982 ed.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More important, Rich and Green were also involved in 
illegal conduct that was unique in the context of the commodity 
they were trading. In September 1980, DOE clarified its oil 
reseller regulations to make it plain that resellers were not 
permitted to profit more than $0.20 per barrel.\352\ Rich and 
Green made profits far in excess of that limitation but created 
fraudulent invoices and filed false reports to hide about $100 
million in illegal profits from both the DOE and the IRS. In 
other words, Rich and Green were engaged in classic criminal 
financial fraud. The grand jury in New York had ample evidence 
from documents and witnesses that Rich and Green were willfully 
violating the price controls and, as discussed above, their 
companies later pled guilty to doing so.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \352\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 
1984)(S 83 Cr. 579).
    \353\ Telephone Interview with Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., 
former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice 
(Feb. 7, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quinn further tried to advance the argument that Rich and 
Green's entire case was sui generis by stating in the petition 
that similarly situated individuals and corporations such as 
ARCO were never criminally charged.\354\ However, ARCO was not 
a similarly situated corporation because it was never involved 
in attempting to hide illegal profits as was Rich's company. In 
fact, in looking at the more analogous case of the corporations 
(West Texas Marketing and Listo Petroleum) that helped Rich 
hide illegal profits, the executives of those companies were 
prosecuted. Two executives from West Texas Marketing served 10 
months in prison and one from Listo pled guilty to felony 
charges of making false statements and was sentenced to five 
years probation and fined $5,000.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \354\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \355\ See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Grand Jury Probing Shift of Oil 
Profits, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1982, at A1. See also Rich Associate Gets 
Probation, Associated Press, Dec. 17, 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beyond being completely false, the argument that Marc Rich 
was ``singled out'' for prosecution also draws upon the 
preposterous claims, made by Marc Rich himself, that the 
prosecution was the result of anti-Semitism.\356\ In an 
interview with the Israeli Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Rich 
stated, ``I'm convinced that the fact that I was a foreigner 
and a relative newcomer on the oil-trading market and Jewish 
influenced the manner in which my case was handled.'' \357\ 
Rich has never provided any support for this outlandish claim. 
Rich's clumsy attempt to play the race card was rejected even 
by associates like Abraham Foxman, who found no evidence to 
support it. Rich's attorneys did not make any overt reference 
to anti-Semitism in the pardon petition, but did repeatedly 
claim that Marc Rich had been ``singled out'' by prosecutors, 
never explaining why they believed that to be the case. 
Furthermore, Quinn's own notes make it appear possible that he 
raised the specter of anti-Semitism in his last-minute appeal 
to the President on January 19, 2001.\358\ It is unfortunate 
that the President found Rich's arguments believable--when in 
fact, they were completely inaccurate--a fact the President 
could have discovered with minimal due diligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \356\ While these arguments were not made explicitly in the pardon 
petition, Rich made them in the media, and Jack Quinn may have made 
them to President Clinton. See Section IV(G)(4).
    \357\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
    \358\ For a detailed discussion, see Section IV(G)(4) below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy
    The pardon petition claims that ``the Iranian [trading with 
the enemy] counts were added to the indictment to incite public 
opinion against the defendants.'' \359\ The petition further 
claims that ``[t]he prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian 
claims against the companies, but never dealt with the claims 
against the individuals.'' \360\ By making this claim, Rich 
suggested that the charges had no merit. In fact, the charges 
appear to have been accurate, and were only dropped from the 
indictment for technical reasons. The trading with the enemy 
charges against the Marc Rich companies were dropped because 
Clyde Meltzer--the Listo petroleum executive who, unlike Rich 
and Green, did not flee the United States--was not involved in 
trading with Iran. Since Rich and Green fled and were 
unavailable for trial, the only charges of conspiracy against 
the remaining defendants were unrelated to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \360\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The charges against Rich and Green personally for trading 
with Iran during the hostage crisis were never dropped or 
dismissed. They remained in effect at the time of the 
pardon.\361\ Indeed, there is voluminous evidence that Rich and 
Green traded with Iran, in addition to a number of other 
prominent enemies of the United States. While a foreign company 
may have been allowed to trade with Iran, Rich and Green were 
American citizens and it was illegal for them to engage in 
trade with Iran regardless of whether they did so on foreign 
soil or through the use of a foreign corporation. In fact, the 
evidence showed that Rich and Green negotiated the deals from 
the Manhattan offices of Marc Rich International, an American 
firm.\362\ It was the height of irresponsibility for Marc Rich 
and his lawyers to suggest that prosecutors charged Rich with 
trading with the enemy only to ``incite public opinion'' 
against Rich when Rich was, in fact, trading with Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \361\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 110 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
    \362\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jack Quinn, who signed the pardon petition, admitted in the 
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that Rich had indeed 
traded with Iran:

        Mr. Shays. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S. 
        hostages were being held captive?

        Mr. Quinn. I do not know the precise answer to that 
        question. It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I 
        can't tell you right now when that occurred.

        Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if it 
        did?

        Mr. Quinn. Again, I approached this as a lawyer 
        concerned with the indictment that was before me and 
        whether or not it should stand. I was not here to be a 
        character witness. I was here to take on four points--

        Mr. Shays. It didn't make any difference to you. Should 
        it have made a difference to the President of the 
        United States?

        Mr. Quinn. It is something he well may have taken into 
        consideration, certainly.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \363\ Id. at 111.

While Quinn admitted that he knew that Rich did indeed trade 
with Iran, he failed to address how he could state in the 
pardon petition that ``the prosecutors quietly dropped the 
Iranian charges against the companies, but never dealt with the 
claims against the individuals.'' Quinn likely failed to 
address this statement because he knew the implication that the 
charges were ``quietly'' dropped for lack of evidence is 
misleading.
                d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes
    Quinn and the Rich legal team also attacked the core tax 
evasion counts in the indictment against Rich and Green. As 
they argued in the petition, ``The tax treatment of the 
transactions in the indictment, however, is governed by a U.S.-
Swiss tax treaty, which was ignored by the prosecution. . . . 
The transactions in issue were consistently reported in 
accordance with the tax treaty.'' \364\ In making these 
arguments, Rich's lawyers relied on what they called the 
``independent'' analyses of law professors Bernard Wolfman and 
Martin Ginsburg.\365\ However, the language from the pardon 
application is misleading in its use of the word 
``independent.'' First of all, the professors were paid 
handsomely by Marc Rich for their work on his behalf. Professor 
Ginsburg, husband of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
was paid $66,199 for his work on the Rich case.\366\ Professor 
Wolfman was paid $30,754 for his analysis.\367\ Wolfman was 
hired as a consultant by one of Rich's firms, and was paid 
between $250 and $300 per hour.\368\ Hence, the analysis was 
not ``independent'' of Marc Rich. Second, the professors did 
not come to the same conclusion ``independently'' of each 
other, but rather worked jointly. Third, they emphasized that 
their analysis made ``no independent verification of the 
facts,'' and that they were merely ``accepting the statements 
thereof made to us by'' Marc Rich's attorneys.\369\ As Rich 
prosecutor Martin Auerbach stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \365\ Id.
    \366\ Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64). Ginsburg 
is also of Counsel at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Of the 
$66,199 received by his firm on the Rich matter, $43,980 reflected work 
by Ginsburg personally. The remainder reflects work by other attorneys 
assisting Ginsburg. Ginsburg billed his time at rates of $300 to $400 
per hour. Id.
    \367\ Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, 
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 
2001) (Exhibit 65).
    \368\ Id.
    \369\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, 
Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division 
Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department 
of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66).

        The transmittal letter that came with that analysis 
        says it all and betrays the problem, the fundamental 
        flaw in the pardon application as it was applied to Mr. 
        Rich and Mr. Green, and that is a complete absence of a 
        knowledge of the facts, the true facts of this case, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the facts that led the companies to plead guilty.

        When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the 
        professors who wrote it said, . . . quote, making no 
        independent verification of the facts but accepting the 
        statements thereof made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr. 
        Green's lawyers.

        And that is the problem. The President relied on the 
        facts as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's 
        lawyers, making no independent investigation.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \370\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

In the end the analysis by the two professors cannot, and does 
not, attempt to explain the necessity for double accounting, 
phony invoices, and false reports to the Department of Energy. 
Nor do the professors discuss the double accounting, phony 
invoices, and false reports employed by Rich and Green to hide 
their illegal profits. The only rational explanation for the 
artifices employed by Rich is that he was fraudulently 
attempting to hide profits from the DOE and the IRS. In the 
final analysis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman sold their names to the highest 
bidder, thereby turning their backs on the accounting and legal 
considerations that were necessary for a meaningful 
professional opinion.
    Quinn further attempted to justify the granting of a pardon 
by explaining that Rich's companies reached a settlement with 
the government and ``paid a total of approximately 200 million 
dollars in back taxes, interest, fines and foregone tax 
deductions, an amount far in excess of any taxes, penalties or 
interest which might have been assessed in a civil tax 
proceeding.'' \371\ Far from being a reason to grant a pardon, 
this fact only proves the point that Rich and Green fled from 
justice because they were caught red-handed and most likely 
would have gone to prison if they stood trial in the United 
States. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. and Marc Rich + Co. 
International, Ltd. each pled guilty to making false statements 
and evading about $48 million in taxes because the strength of 
the case against them was overwhelming.\372\ Rich's companies 
pled guilty to a criminal scheme to conceal ``in excess of $100 
million in taxable income . . . most of which income was 
illegally generated through the defendants' violations of 
federal energy laws and regulations.'' \373\ Rich's companies 
further admitted that they had engaged in this criminal scheme 
``together with Marc Rich, Pincus Green . . . and others . . . 
unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly[.]'' \374\ That Rich's 
companies paid these moneys and made these admissions of guilt 
squarely contradicts Quinn's claim that the indictment was 
without merit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \371\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 24-25 
(Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \372\ The case against Rich and Green individually was just as 
strong as the case against the companies. As noted above, Edward 
Bennett Williams offered to have Rich pay $100 million to settle the 
charges against him individually. Prosecutor Sandy Weinberg told 
Williams that the government would not reach any settlement that did 
not result in jail time for Rich. See ``The Controversial Pardon of 
International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris 
``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the 
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). See also Evan Thomas, The Man to See: 
Edward Bennett Williams 415-16 (1991).
    \373\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3-4 
(Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of 
Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al. 
at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
    \374\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3 (Mar. 
6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S. 
v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al. at 11 (Oct. 11, 
1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous''
    A second theme in the pardon application is that the 
investigation and indictment of Rich and Green was flawed 
because the prosecutors were overzealous and overly ambitious. 
Quinn attacked not only Weinberg and Auerbach on this basis, 
but also Rudolph Giuliani who was at the time the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As with the 
claims of the flawed indictment, however, these claims were 
also misleading.
                a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and
                    Green
    The pardon petition claims that the federal prosecutors 
refused to negotiate with Rich and Green. Quinn repeated this 
claim before the Committee, as well as in the press. However, 
as is discussed in detail above, Rich and Green were fugitives. 
The Southern District of New York had (and continues to have) a 
longstanding policy of not negotiating with fugitives from 
justice. As was explained by the SDNY in its February 2, 2000, 
letter to Quinn, negotiating with fugitives ``would give 
defendants an incentive to flee,'' providing them ``the 
inappropriate leverage and luxury of remaining absent unless 
and until the Government agrees to their terms.'' \375\ The 
particular history of the office's dealings with Rich counseled 
against negotiations. As is discussed in detail above, Rich had 
a history of acting in bad faith during the grand jury 
investigation. From refusal to obey grand jury subpoenas to 
attempting to fly two steamer trunks full of subpoenaed 
documents to Switzerland, Rich showed that he was not the type 
of defendant with whom to negotiate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \375\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, 
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn 
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet even with such outrageous conduct, the Southern 
District of New York made many good faith efforts to reach an 
accommodation with Rich. During the investigation of Rich and 
his companies, prosecutors undertook numerous negotiations with 
Rich's lawyers, which resulted in the guilty pleas by Rich's 
companies. Even after Rich fled the country, prosecutors 
attempted to negotiate terms for Rich's return. In the early 
1990s, U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier and a top prosecutor in his 
office took the extraordinary step of flying to Switzerland and 
meeting with Marc Rich in an attempt to negotiate a resolution 
to the case. Moreover, the Southern District made numerous 
accommodations for Rich, including offering to drop the RICO 
charges as well as allowing him and Green to stand trial 
without spending any time in jail prior to trial. Despite these 
efforts, Rich and Green refused to return to the United States 
to stand trial. Rather, they would only return as part of a 
settlement that guaranteed they would not serve jail time 
unless convicted. It is therefore misleading for Quinn to 
simply state that the Southern District of New York ``takes the 
position that it will not even discuss the matter while Mr. 
Rich and Mr. Green continue to live outside of the United 
States.'' \376\ By itself, this statement fails to account for 
the numerous good faith efforts of the prosecutors in spite of 
their well-founded reluctance to negotiate with fugitives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \376\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 25 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quinn also argued in the petition that the Southern 
District had ``negotiated with numerous other absent defendants 
over the years, and the Department of Justice has no such 
policy against such negotiations.'' \377\ However, as the 
Southern District noted in its February 2, 2000, letter to 
Quinn, Department of Justice policy places the decision to 
negotiate with a fugitive within the discretion of the office 
responsible for the prosecution.\378\ The Southern District of 
New York was well within the reasonable exercise of its 
discretion to require Rich to return to the United States 
before engaging in further negotiation, especially given Marc 
Rich's history of bad faith behavior and brazen legal tactics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \377\ Id.
    \378\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, 
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn 
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Quinn argued that the Southern District refused to 
negotiate with his legal team by failing to agree to a meeting 
between Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg and tax experts in the 
Department of Justice.\379\ This, too, is misleading. As the 
Southern District explained in the February 2, 2000, letter to 
Quinn, ``in 1987, an Assistant in this Office met with Mr. 
Rich's counsel and listened to the same presentation by 
Professor Martin D. Ginsburg referenced in your letter 
regarding the merits of the tax charges.'' \380\ Prosecutors 
had rejected the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis because it was based 
on an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the facts of 
this case. Its legal conclusions were, therefore, irrelevant. 
For the Southern District to meet with the professors again 
would have been redundant and fruitless.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \379\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \380\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, 
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn 
and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 
51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with
                    Media Attention
    Quinn and the Rich legal team further tried to discredit 
the prosecution by claiming that United States Attorney Rudolph 
Giuliani was unfairly bringing the glare of the media to the 
case. According to the pardon petition, Giuliani 
``aggressively'' pursued Rich and Green in court as well as in 
the press: ``Not only did Mr. Giuliani and other prosecutors 
from his office speak frequently to the media in off and on 
record conversations, the office held formal press conferences 
where purported `evidence' against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was 
showcased to the press.'' \381\ Responding to this charge, 
Mayor Giuliani said on Meet the Press,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \381\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).

        First of all, the indictment was actually just about 
        put together before I even became United States 
        Attorney. It's been pursued by at least three 
        Democratic appointees, who were United States attorney 
        and the Justice Department, that had him number six on 
        the fugitive list, was President Clinton's Democratic 
        Justice Department. And the United States attorney of 
        the Southern District in New York, an appointee of 
        President Clinton, is as outraged as I am by the pardon 
        that was given here. . . . You've been covering me a 
        long time, right, running for office? Did you ever hear 
        me mention Marc Rich? So this was hardly used by me in 
        any way in any of my political campaigns. . . . And the 
        fact that he was a fugitive--it was not something 
        [about which I would] say, ``Gee, look what a good job 
        I did as United States attorney.'' So that's kind of a 
        silly thing to [s]ay.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001).

    Rudolph Giuliani was one of dozens of prosecutors, 
Republican and Democrat, who worked on the Rich case. Robert 
Litt and Gerald Lynch were prominent Democrats who were also 
involved in the case. It would be strange for Quinn also to 
accuse them of overcharging. Litt was one of Attorney General 
Janet Reno's closest advisors, and Lynch, currently a professor 
at Columbia University Law School, was appointed to the federal 
bench by President Clinton. The two main prosecutors who 
brought the Rich case, Morris Weinberg and Martin Auerbach, 
were Democrats as well. The attempt to cast the Rich indictment 
as the result of partisan prosecutorial overreaching by Rudolph 
Giuliani is simply one more fabrication by Marc Rich's legal 
team. This argument had no basis in reality, and likely was 
invented to appeal to President Clinton's partisan instincts, 
as well as his dislike for aggressive prosecutors. As many have 
observed, by the end of his term, President Clinton was very 
sensitive to issues of prosecutorial overreaching, as a result 
of his perceptions of the Independent Counsel 
investigations.\383\ Quinn exploited these sentiments 
masterfully by fabricating claims regarding prosecutorial 
conduct in the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought
    The pardon application also accuses the federal prosecutors 
of unfairly bringing a racketeering charge against Rich and 
Green. According to Quinn, RICO was misused because the 
underlying allegation involved tax fraud.\384\ The petition 
points to a Department of Justice policy that was adopted in 
1989, stating that, ``[f]ollowing the indictment, the United 
States government recognized the misuse of RICO in tax fraud 
cases and issued guidance in the United States Attorney's 
Manual explicitly stating that tax offenses are not predicates 
for RICO offenses.'' \385\ Jack Quinn suggested at the 
Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that the decision to 
bring RICO charges against Marc Rich and Pincus Green was the 
key factor that led to their flight from the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \384\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \385\ Id.

        It's the position of my client that he remained outside 
        the United States because what Mr. Weinberg earlier 
        described to you as, in essence, a simple tax evasion 
        case was also made into a RICO case. And he may choose 
        to say it was only one count in the indictment, but it 
        was the sledgehammer that brought about the current 
        impasse.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \386\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 161 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

    Quinn's argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, 
at the time of the indictment, there was no policy against 
bringing RICO charges predicated on tax offenses. To the 
contrary, the RICO charges were brought consistent with Justice 
Department policy and the RICO charges were reviewed and 
approved by the RICO section of the Department of Justice--as 
were the tax charges by the tax section.\387\ As prosecutor 
Sandy Weinberg observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 187 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

        If you're away for 20 years and you're fortunate enough 
        to be able to persuade two foreign States not to 
        extradite you, the gloss of time is always going to 
        change the interpretation of the law. You can look at 
        indictments that were brought in 1980, and if you 
        examine them in 2000, the gloss of time is--you're 
        going to find that the courts interpret the laws 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        different in 2000 than they did in 1980.

        But you've got to look at the guts of what the case was 
        about and these people. And when you look at the guts 
        of what the case was about and the people, it doesn't 
        make any difference whether or not we would bring a 
        RICO charge today. It is whether or not we would bring 
        a criminal charge today and whether or not it is 
        acceptable to be pardoning folks who have done things 
        like renouncing their citizenship, becoming fugitives, 
        not coming back and making these arguments that they 
        say are so clear. I mean it--was it justified? And you 
        can't come in and say, well, 20 years have passed and, 
        you know, the courts now interpret or the Justice 
        Department interprets the RICO statute 
        differently.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\ Id. at 156.

Along similar lines, even former Clinton White House Counsel 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abner Mikva has stated:

        Clearly, a defendant would rather negotiate the 
        unfairness of RICO charges from a comfortable abode in 
        Switzerland than from a hardback chair in the U.S. 
        attorney's office in Manhattan. This is especially true 
        when defendants have been trying, unsuccessfully, to 
        make the same ``unfair'' point about RICO for the last 
        30 years.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \389\ Coming in from the Cold, The Recorder, Mar. 28, 2001, at 5.

    Second, Quinn's argument also fails to address the non-tax 
RICO predicates in the case or the fact that there are money 
laundering statutes available today that were not available in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980. As prosecutor Martin Auerbach observed:

        I'm afraid that the argument with respect to the change 
        in RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the 
        argument with respect to fugitivity. While it is true 
        that the Justice Department changed its view with 
        respect to tax counts as a predicate for RICO, it has 
        not changed its view with respect to mail and wire 
        fraud as a predicate to RICO. And as Mr. Quinn knows, 
        as the indictment reflects, there are both mail and 
        wire fraud counts which are predicates for RICO.

        So I believe that the Justice Department might well 
        approve this indictment today. And I, in fact, believe 
        that, were they to review this indictment today, and of 
        course they did review it before it was brought, there 
        would be money laundering charges in this case.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \390\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 156 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

Therefore, it is likely that if he was charged today, Rich 
would be facing stiffer, not lighter penalties.
    Third, and most importantly, Quinn conveniently ignored the 
fact that the prosecutors tried to reach an accommodation with 
the two fugitives by offering to drop the RICO charges. As 
Robert Fink himself testified to the Committee, he was in 
discussions with prosecutors during which they offered to drop 
the RICO charges if Rich and Green would simply stand trial in 
the United States.\391\ These discussions are reflected in a 
February 10, 2000, e-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay: 
``[a]t those times the office [Southern District of New York] 
offered to do a variety of things, none of which are 
necessarily still on the table. First, I was told at one point 
that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came 
in.'' \392\ Given the willingness of the SDNY to drop the RICO 
charges, Quinn's claim that the RICO charge was ``the 
sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse,'' is 
completely inaccurate and misleading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \391\ Id. at 469 (testimony of Robert Fink).
    \392\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation 
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It appears that even Jack Quinn realized that the arguments 
in the petition were deeply flawed. On December 29, 2000, he 
sent the following e-mail to Kathleen Behan:

        What do you think our chances really are for Marc? the 
        hardest question, i think, is ``if you're right about 
        the weakness of the govts case, why not go to ct and 
        win?'' the answr, i guess is that we couldn't have 
        gotten a fair trial, but that was 18 years ago. 
        couldn't he get one now? isn't that the way this shd 
        go? these are tough questions, but I guess we have 
        decent answers.\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \393\ Arnold & Porter Document Production KB00037 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Dec. 29, 2000)) 
(Exhibit 67).

It is unclear what ``decent answers'' Quinn had to that 
argument or to any of the multiple arguments against the Rich 
pardon.

D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition

    The legal arguments contained in the petition are not the 
only problematic section of the Rich and Green pardon petition. 
The ``letters of support'' in the petition also raise several 
troubling issues. Most of the letters were collected by Avner 
Azulay.\394\ Those letters were a crucial part of the pardon 
petition, as they helped create the impression that Marc Rich 
was a humanitarian who had made a minor mistake but who had a 
positive impact on countless lives. The significance and import 
of the letters presented to President Clinton was compromised 
by several factors, including: (1) many of those who wrote the 
letters in support of the pardon were either themselves, or 
their organizations, given money by Rich; (2) many who wrote 
the letters were misled about the purpose of the letter; and 
(3) their letters were misrepresented to the President. Given 
these facts, the letters of support in the Rich pardon petition 
represent just one more dishonest ploy in Marc Rich's overall 
scheme to obtain a pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \394\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 
27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His 
                    Support
    The letter written by Abraham Foxman is one of the most 
prominently displayed letters in the petition. As National 
Director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), his support of 
clemency for Marc Rich was of obvious importance to the 
application. However, the ADL received $100,000 from Marc Rich 
shortly after Foxman became involved in the pardon effort.\395\ 
In fact, this money was received a few weeks after Foxman flew 
to Paris to meet with Rich aide Avner Azulay.\396\ Moreover, 
Rich has given the ADL a total of $250,000 since he fled the 
country in 1983.\397\ Foxman has publicly denied that Rich's 
contributions to the ADL had anything to do with his help in 
the pardon effort. He stated to a group of reporters, ``I 
really find offensive the idea that Abe Foxman was bought for a 
check for $100,000. If he gave me nothing--or he gave me $10 
million--I would have made the same decision, for which I now 
say I made a mistake.'' \398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \395\ Michael Isikoff, ``I Made a Mistake''; The ADL's Abe Foxman 
Admits the Jewish Organization Received a $100,000 Grant from Marc Rich 
but Maintains He Wasn't ``Bought,'' Newsweek, Mar. 23, 2001, at 2001 WL 
24138340.
    \396\ Id.
    \397\ Id.
    \398\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notwithstanding Foxman's denial of a quid pro quo, the 
payment to the ADL raises the general question of Marc Rich's 
tactics in drumming up support for his pardon application. The 
ADL was not the only organization to which Marc Rich paid money 
or attempted to pay money. In another instance, Marc Rich 
attempted to secure the assistance of the American Jewish 
Congress (AJC) with the promise of a large contribution. A week 
after Foxman's admission, Phil Baum, executive director of the 
AJC revealed that his organization had been approached by a 
representative of Marc Rich who told them, ``that if we were to 
speak favorably of Mr. Rich, we would be the beneficiary of a 
gift.'' \399\ Baum denied that there was any direct quid pro 
quo.\400\ However, Baum went on to state that, ``there was an 
understanding communicated to us[.]'' Baum further stated, ``It 
was not a contract. But these things are communicated in more 
subtle ways. We had reason to hope or expect that if we did 
this thing, we could probably be the recipient of Mr. Rich's 
generous recognition of our importance.'' \401\ The AJC 
ultimately turned down Rich's request.\402\ Committee staff 
attempted to contact Baum to corroborate this account and learn 
other details of the offer from the Rich team. Unfortunately, 
Baum failed to cooperate with the Committee's investigation, 
refusing on three separate occasions to return phone calls from 
Committee staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \399\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon 
Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001. 
See also Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post, 
Mar. 29, 2001, at 14.
    \400\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon 
Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001.
    \401\ Id.
    \402\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another example of Rich's efforts includes Birthright 
Israel, an organization that pays for young American Jews to 
travel to Israel. Marc Rich has pledged $5 million to 
Birthright Israel.\403\ The organization was founded by Michael 
Steinhardt, a longtime friend of Rich's who was heavily 
involved in the pardon effort. Steinhardt wrote a letter that 
was included in the petition. In addition, Birthright Israel's 
current North American Chairperson, Marlene Post, also wrote a 
letter supporting Rich's request for clemency.\404\ This letter 
was prominently displayed in the petition. As with the public 
statements of the ADL and the AJC, a spokesman for Birthright 
Israel denied any quid pro quo relating to the $5 million 
pledge to the organization and the organization's support for 
the Rich pardon.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \403\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jews Divided Over Rich Pardon, Associated 
Press, Mar. 29, 2001, at 2001 WL 17989287.
    \404\ Letter from Marlene E. Post, North American Chairperson, 
Birthright Israel, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) 
(Exhibit 68). The original letter was part of Rich and Green's pardon 
petition.
    \405\ Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post, 
Mar. 29, 2001, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet another person with a connection to Birthright Israel 
also wrote a letter on behalf of Marc Rich. Rabbi Irving 
Greenberg, Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum 
Council, wrote a letter on Holocaust Museum Council letterhead 
in favor of clemency for Rich. Rabbi Greenberg is also 
President of the Jewish Life Network, an organization that is a 
partner with Birthright Israel.\406\ However, when Committee 
staff asked Greenberg's lawyer about press accounts of Rich's 
contributions, he stated that Rich had never given any 
contributions to any organization or entity controlled or 
operated by Greenberg.\407\ Greenberg's letter and Rich's 
contributions to Birthright Israel caused seventeen former and 
current members of the Holocaust Museum Council to send a 
letter demanding Greenberg's resignation.\408\ Rabbi Greenberg 
apologized for his letter on behalf of Rich, and ultimately, 
the Council voted to keep him as Chairman.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \406\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9.
    \407\ Telephone Interview with Andrew Levander, Partner, Swidler 
Berlin Shereff Friedman (representing Rabbi Greenberg) (May 2, 2001).
    \408\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9. Kitty Dukakis also signed the letter.
    \409\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are other cases of Rich contributing or attempting to 
contribute to individuals (and their organizations) who wrote 
letters on his behalf. One prominent example is Jerusalem Mayor 
Ehud Olmert, who wrote a letter to President Clinton on 
November 27, 2000, that was included in the petition. According 
to The New York Times, Rich contributed $25,000 to Olmert's 
first mayoral campaign in 1993.\410\ The Committee has not been 
able to determine whether Rich made financial contributions to 
other foreign political officials who supported his pardon. 
However, the Marc Rich team was clearly concerned about 
inquiries along these lines. Shortly after the pardon was 
granted, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to others on the Rich team 
stating that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \410\ William A. Orme, Jr., Marc Rich Aided Israeli Official, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A21.

        Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have 
        enough names on the list other than his. Important to 
        keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share 
        with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is 
        election time here and has a potential of blowup. A 
        newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were 
        any political contributions.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).

    Some of the other letter writers have also mentioned Rich's 
generosity and philanthropy as the reason for agreeing to write 
their letters. For example, several of the letter writers in 
Switzerland have ties to the Doron Foundation, an organization 
of Rich's that gives awards of $63,000 to Swiss groups and 
individuals.\412\ Zurich Mayor Josef Estermann was among that 
group.\413\ Estermann did not return calls from Committee 
staff. He has, however, spoken on the matter in his home 
country, saying, ``I think every person has a right to a 
pardon.'' \414\ To this, one Swiss paper responded, ``Yes, but 
does this right have to be one you can buy?'' \415\ Others with 
connections to the Doron Foundation who wrote letters on Rich's 
behalf include: Pierre de Weck, of UBS Bank; Michael de 
Picciotto, a director of Union Bancaire Privee in Geneva; Kurt 
R. Bollinger, of the Swiss Air Rescue Foundation; and Professor 
Verena Meyer of Zurich University. Michael de Picciotto spoke 
with Committee staff over the phone. When asked if Marc Rich or 
any of his associates had ever given anything of value to him 
or his company in exchange for his letter, de Picciotto 
responded, ``an important man like Mr. Rich does not need to do 
anything like this.'' \416\ The others with connections to the 
Doron Foundation failed to return Committee calls. Kurt 
Bollinger, whose rescue service received an award from Rich's 
foundation in 1992 failed to return the Committee's calls.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \412\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm 
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. The Doron Foundation 
has now been folded into the Marc Rich Foundation.
    \413\ Id.
    \414\ Id.
    \415\ Id.
    \416\ Telephone Interview with Michael D. de Picciotto, Managing 
Director, Union Bancaire Privee, Geneva, Switzerland (Apr. 26, 2001).
    \417\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm 
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff contacted or attempted to contact almost 
all of those whose letters were included in the section of the 
pardon petition entitled, ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable 
President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon 
of Mr. Marc Rich.'' While the Committee does not have 
sufficient evidence to conclude that all of the letters were 
written on a quid pro quo basis, it cannot completely rule out 
the possibility. This is largely because a number of the letter 
writers and intended letter writers failed to cooperate with 
the Committee by not returning phone calls. Nevertheless, there 
does appear to be a pattern of receiving contributions or 
pledges from Marc Rich among many of those who wrote letters. 
The fact that a number of the most prominent letters of support 
for the Rich pardon were tainted with allegations of linkage to 
large financial contributions diminishes Rich's claims to have 
been a great humanitarian. Rather, it appears that many of 
Rich's humanitarian activities were just one part of a lengthy 
strategy to escape criminal prosecution in the U.S.
            2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose
    The significance and import of several of the letters is 
further weakened by the lack of candor of the Rich team in 
soliciting them. Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink, admitted that 
during the solicitation of the letters, ``[n]ot everyone was 
necessarily told it was going to be for a pardon.'' \418\ 
Professor Verena Meyer, who serves on the board of the Doron 
Foundation, stated that she did not know that her letter would 
be included in a pardon petition.\419\ She thought the letters 
were ``routine'' and ``assume[d] other members of the 
foundation also wrote letters.'' \420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \418\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware 
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15.
    \419\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm 
in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11.
    \420\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several others who wrote letters on behalf of Rich felt 
even more deceived. Professor Jonathan Halevy, CEO of the 
Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem, wrote a letter on 
November 30, 2000, acknowledging contributions from Marc Rich's 
Doron Foundation. Halevy was contacted by Avner Azulay and 
asked to write a letter acknowledging the contribution.\421\ 
According to Halevy, Azulay told him that the letter would be 
used in a ``book in honor of Mr. Rich and the foundation.'' 
\422\ When interviewed about his letter being used in Rich's 
pardon application, Halevy stated, ``I'm obliged, if I got a 
donation from someone, to confirm that I got it in writing. But 
I think it would be very fair to tell me this was the 
purpose.'' \423\ Anthony J. Cernera, President of Sacred Heart 
University, in Fairfield, Connecticut, was similarly misled 
about his letter. Cernera wrote Rich to ``express my deepest 
appreciation for your on-going support for our program of 
Christian-Jewish understanding.'' \424\ When the director of 
public relations for the University discovered that Cernera's 
letter was included in the pardon petition, he was astonished, 
responding, ``Wow. So these letters were used as part of the 
petition for his pardon?'' \425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \421\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware 
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15.
    \422\ Id.
    \423\ Id.
    \424\ Letter from Anthony J. Cernera, President, Sacred Heart 
University, to Marc Rich (Nov. 27, 2000) (Exhibit 70).
    \425\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware 
of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. In fact, when reached by 
The New York Times, only one of six letter writers were aware that 
their letters would be used as part of a pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fact that Avner Azulay and others on the Marc Rich team 
misled individuals to obtain letters of support from them 
suggests a level of dishonesty that calls into question all 
representations made by the Rich pardon team. It also suggests 
that a number of people affiliated with Marc Rich, many of whom 
received his money, would not have written in his support if 
they had known that their letter was being used to get a 
pardon.
            3. Many of the Letters were Misrepresented to the President
    Finally, the letters included in the pardon petition are 
further compromised by the way in which they were presented to 
President Clinton. The second section of the petition 
containing these letters was divided into two parts, one 
entitled ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable President William 
J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc 
Rich,'' and another entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for 
the Pardon of Marc Rich.'' Both of these titles are misleading.
    All of the twenty-one letters in the first part of this 
section were addressed to President Clinton. However, several 
of these letters made no mention of Marc Rich's request for a 
pardon or executive clemency. Among the letters that included 
no reference to the pardon issue were those written by Nobel 
Laureate Camilio Jose Cela, Chief Rabbi of France; Rene-Samuel 
Sirat, President of the Jewish Community of Madrid; Issac 
Querub Caro; and President of the Association of Spanish 
Business Enterprises Fernando Fernandez Tapias. These letters 
all refer to Rich's philanthropic contributions over the years. 
But none of them makes any reference to the pardon. It is 
therefore misleading for such letters to be included under the 
cover page indicating that all of the writers are expressing 
their support for a pardon.
    The cover page for the second part of this section of the 
petition is even more problematic. There are fifty-two letters 
included under the title ``Letters Expressing Support for the 
Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich.'' Not one of these letters makes any 
mention of the pardon effort. Almost all of these letters were 
addressed to Marc Rich or Avner Azulay, thanking them for the 
generosity of Marc Rich and his foundations. Furthermore, based 
on the fact that most of these letters were written in late 
November and early December of 2000, it is clear that they were 
solicited by the Rich team for use in the pardon. However, as 
discussed above, their use in the pardon application came as a 
surprise to many of the letter writers. It stands to reason, 
therefore, that most of the writers were not informed of the 
purpose of the letters, let alone that they would be sent to 
President Clinton in such a misleading format.
    There is also disturbing evidence that a more accurate 
title for these letters was considered, but not used, in the 
application. Among the materials produced for the Committee was 
an earlier draft of the same document, containing the same list 
of names, but with a different header reading ``List of Letters 
of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation.'' \426\ The existence 
of this more accurate title makes it much less likely that the 
use of the inaccurate and misleading title was a mere oversight 
by the Rich team. Lawyers billing many hundreds of dollars an 
hour certainly should not make such errors, and circumstantial 
evidence makes it appear that they were simply trying to 
mislead. Given the rejection of an accurate title, and the fact 
that it was replaced with an inaccurate title, there can be no 
other reasonable conclusion. Moreover, when the Committee 
confronted Jack Quinn about the misleading cover page that was 
included in the pardon petition, he stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ Compare Jack Quinn Document Production (Document entitled 
``List of Letters of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation'') (Exhibit 
71), with Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Document 
entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich'' 
(Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 72).

        I don't know who made that change. And I accept 
        responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will 
        tell you that, for the most part, I was not involved in 
        the effort to gather these letters. I became aware 
        after the petition had been filed that some of these 
        letters were simply sought as testimonials to his 
        charitable activities and that some of the people from 
        whom they were sought were not told in advance that 
        these letters were going to be used from a pardon 
        application. I very much regret that. And to the extent 
        that, as a result, any of that was misunderstood or was 
        misleading, I certainly apologize for it.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \427\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 172 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

    The deceptive tactics used by the Rich team in securing and 
presenting so many of the letters sent to President Clinton in 
the pardon application are disturbing. The Committee is also 
troubled by the fact that the Clinton Administration failed to 
take the time to review these letters and the misleading way in 
which they were presented. However, in the context of the rush 
to grant last-minute pardons, and all of the unfortunate 
decisions made during the pardon process, the dishonest use of 
these letters is not surprising. The misleading presentation of 
the letters is consistent with the misleading legal arguments 
that form the basis of the Rich and Green pardon petition.

IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON

A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team

    Marc Rich employed much more than Jack Quinn and a 
deceptive petition to obtain his Presidential pardon. Just as 
important to the pardon effort was a carefully orchestrated 
lobbying campaign that used a number of individuals with unique 
access to the Clinton White House. Rich employed private 
attorneys with personal relationships with White House staff, 
personal friends of the President, and foreign leaders to press 
his case with the White House. The key players in the lobbying 
effort included Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak, as well as other Israeli leaders, King 
Juan Carlos of Spain, Michael Steinhardt, Peter Kadzik, and a 
number of other individuals, all working for the same goal, the 
pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.
            1. Denise Rich
    Denise Rich was in many ways the key figure in the effort 
to obtain a pardon for Marc Rich. She enjoyed a close 
relationship with President Clinton, which gave the Rich team 
the access they needed to make their case directly to the 
President. She used this access as much as she could, sending 
two letters to the President, and making her case to him 
personally on at least three occasions. Denise Rich's 
involvement in the pardon effort has raised three serious 
questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to help Marc Rich; (2) 
what were the nature of her communications with President 
Clinton; and (3) did she in any way connect the pardon of Marc 
Rich to contributions she had made or would make to the DNC or 
Clinton Library? The Committee has not been able to find 
definitive answers to these critical questions, largely because 
Denise Rich has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination rather than cooperate with the Committee. To 
attempt to understand Denise Rich's role in helping to obtain 
Marc Rich's pardon, the Committee has considered documents 
about the pardon effort, testimony provided by other 
individuals, and even Denise Rich's self-serving media 
appearances.
                a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich
    Denise Rich was wealthy before she married Marc Rich. She 
was the daughter of Emil Eisenberg, who founded Desco 
Incorporated, one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the 
United States. In 1966, at the age of 22, Denise married Marc 
Rich, whom she had met six months earlier. Denise Rich was 
married to Marc Rich for the next 25 years, having three 
children. In 1983, when Marc Rich was indicted and fled the 
country, Denise and her children left the United States with 
Marc Rich. Despite the fact that she accompanied her husband 
into exile, and remained with him there for the next eight 
years, Denise Rich claims to have been ignorant of the reasons 
for Rich's indictment and flight:

        Question. In 1980, were you aware that your husband was 
        reportedly trading with Iran after we had an embargo 
        because of the hostages?

        Denise Rich. I really didn't know much about that at 
        all because I was so involved in my life. It's not like 
        he would come home and he would say, ``Hey, I'm trading 
        with the enemy.'' We didn't talk about it.

                                *  *  *


        Question. How did you find out [about the indictment] 
        and what was your reaction?

        Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me 
        and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the 
        government. And--and I think that we are going to have 
        to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These 
        are my children. I'm not going to split up the 
        family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would 
        do. I left the country.

        Question. Did you understand that by fleeing to 
        Switzerland and refusing to return to this country, 
        that your husband was considered one of the 10 most 
        wanted fugitives in America?

        Denise Rich. That had nothing to do with me because I 
        was . . .

        Question. Yes. It's your husband, Denise. It's the 
        father of your children.

        Denise Rich. Yes, he's the father of my children . . .

        Question. He's a fugitive.

        Denise Rich. . . . and he was my husband, but as far as 
        I knew, it was a tax situation. So I really never 
        understood anything else. And I really didn't--that's 
        all that I knew.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \428\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).

    While living in exile, Denise began her musical career, 
becoming a successful songwriter. In approximately 1990, Denise 
discovered that Marc Rich had taken up with a younger woman, 
model Gisela Rossi. In 1991, Denise divorced Marc Rich. In the 
ensuing legal battle, she received a substantial sum of money, 
which has never been disclosed by Marc Rich, Denise Rich, or 
their representatives, but is believed to be in the vicinity of 
$500 million.\429\ As a result of the divorce, Denise and Marc 
Rich were reportedly on very poor terms, rarely speaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \429\ Some estimates list the amount as high as $900 million. See 
Debunking the Buzz Over Denise, N.Y. Post, Feb. 1, 2001, at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1996, however, the Richs' daughter Gabrielle died of AML 
leukemia. Denise Rich has often pointed to Gabrielle's death as 
an important factor in her change of heart regarding her ex-
husband. First, she has claimed that Marc Rich was ``cruelly 
denied the opportunity'' \430\ to return to the U.S. to visit 
her. She has also claimed that the death of Gabrielle caused 
her to forgive her ex-husband for his transgressions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \430\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to 
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73).

        Question. Here is what a lot of people don't 
        understand. How do you go from almost hating your 
        husband at the time of the divorce to writing a letter 
        pleading for his clemency and his pardon? What changed 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        in your mind?

        Denise Rich. My daughter died. And when you've lost a 
        child, there's nothing more you can say. There are no 
        more questions. When you've lost a child, everything 
        changes, and I felt--I felt in my heart 
        forgiveness.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \431\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).

This explanation, however, fails to address one fundamental 
issue: should Marc Rich have decided to spend time with his 
daughter, he could easily have done so. Rather, he placed his 
legal jeopardy ahead of his concerns for his family and elected 
to refrain from visiting her. Years later, it appears that he 
and his ex-wife would cynically use the death of his daughter 
to gain sympathy for his earlier transgressions.
                b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President
                    Clinton
    After her divorce from Marc Rich, Denise Rich returned to 
New York, where she purchased what is reportedly the largest 
penthouse on Fifth Avenue, a 28-room triplex filled with works 
of art by Picasso, Miro, Dali, Calder, Warhol, and Chagall, as 
well as a staff of 20 to serve her needs, including two cooks, 
a stylist, and a ``personal healer.'' \432\ Shortly after 
arriving in New York, Denise Rich sought to establish herself 
as a leading figure in New York social circles. Geraldo Rivera, 
a close friend of Denise Rich, observed that ``[t]he people who 
think she wants to be a kind of Pamela Harriman person are not 
off the mark. . . . She wanted a salon, she wanted a Gertrude 
Stein, Paris kind of scene, she wanted to watch the parade of 
contemporary popular cultural life march through her living 
room.'' \433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \432\ Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2001, 
at C3.
    \433\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; 
Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An important part of becoming a ``kind of Pamela Harriman'' 
was to get involved in political fundraising. Denise Rich began 
making large political contributions and holding lavish 
fundraisers shortly after her return to the United States. 
Denise Rich and her daughters gave over $1.1 million to federal 
political causes between 1993 and 2000, all but $5,000 of that 
to Democrats. Denise Rich's political contributions increased 
as the end of the Clinton Administration neared, with over 
$625,000 of her contributions coming between 1998 and 2000.
    While she was giving and raising vast amounts of money for 
the Democratic Party, Denise Rich developed a close 
relationship with President Clinton:

        When I met him there was so much charisma, and I saw a 
        lot of idealism, and eventually I had a very special 
        relationship with the former President and the former 
        First Lady because they were so compassionate to me 
        when I lost my daughter. And it--and it was as if he 
        understood and . . . could put himself in my 
        shoes.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \434\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).

This special personal relationship was also manifested in 
Denise Rich's political fundraising, where she became one of 
the Democratic Party's largest and most reliable fundraisers. 
In fact, Denise Rich held the fundraiser that was President 
Clinton's first public appearance after the publication of the 
Independent Counsel's referral in 1998. It raised nearly $3 
million.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \435\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; 
Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Denise Rich's special relationship with President Clinton 
was also manifested in her large contributions to the William 
J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, the charitable foundation 
responsible for building the Clinton Library. Between 1998 and 
2000, Denise Rich gave $450,000 to the Clinton Library.\436\ 
Among these contributions was a $250,000 gift in July 1998, 
which was one of the earliest large contributions to the 
Library, made during one of the darkest times in the Clinton 
presidency.\437\ Because she and her friend Beth Dozoretz have 
used the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering the Committee's 
questions, little is known about Denise Rich's motivations for 
contributing to the Clinton Library. However, one document 
suggests that Denise Rich was seeking ``help'' from Dozoretz. 
On a note accompanying her $100,000 library contribution, 
Denise Rich wrote, ``Dear Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of 
love, Denise.'' \438\ However, since both Rich and Dozoretz 
have refused to testify on grounds that their testimony would 
incriminate them, the Committee has not been able to develop an 
understanding of this note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\ See William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library 
for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)); William J. Clinton Presidential 
Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0008 (Check from Denise Rich to 
the Clinton Library for $100,000 (Aug. 7, 1999)); William J. Clinton 
Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0031 (Check from 
Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $100,000 (May 11, 2000)) 
(Exhibit 74).
    \437\ Id.
    \438\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former 
finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Denise Rich helped President Clinton with his charity, 
he helped Denise Rich with hers. In 1998 and 2000, President 
Clinton attended fundraising galas for the G&P Charitable 
Foundation, which Denise Rich established to raise funds for 
cancer research.
                c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon
                    Effort
    Little is known about when Denise Rich decided to assist 
the Marc Rich pardon effort, or who asked her to help.\439\ 
Avner Azulay has stated that he personally convinced her to 
write in support of the pardon, telling her that ``everyone in 
the world is supporting this and you can't just stand aside, 
it's embarrassing.'' \440\ The first documentary evidence of 
her support for the effort to resolve Marc Rich's criminal case 
appears in the March 2000 e-mail discussing sending her on a 
``personal mission'' to President Clinton.\441\ The first 
specific references to her role in the late 2000 pardon effort 
come in November 2000, in a meeting agenda prepared by attorney 
Robert Fink. The agenda for that meeting, which included Jack 
Quinn, includes an item ``Maximizing use of D.R. and her 
friends.'' \442\ It appears that the first conversation between 
Denise Rich and the pardon team took place on December 4, 2000, 
when she spoke to Robert Fink.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \439\ There are reports that Denise Rich may have also assisted the 
effort to obtain a pardon for ex-boyfriend Niels Lauersen, a prominent 
New York gynecologist who was convicted of fraudulent billing 
practices. According to one account, though, Rich was approached to 
help with Lauersen's pardon effort, and was willing to help, until she 
was ``reminded that she might be spreading herself thin.'' See James 
Barron with Alison Cowan and Shaila Dewan, A Second Pardon Front, N.Y. 
Times, May 15, 2001, at B2.
    \440\ Rich's Israeli Aide: The Pardon Surprised Us. So Did the 
Furor, Forward, (Feb. 23, 2001), at 1.
    \441\ There is some circumstantial evidence of reconciliation 
between Denise Rich and Marc Rich somewhat earlier, at least in 
November 1999, when Denise Rich and her daughter Danielle traveled to 
Israel to attend the dedication of the Gabrielle Rich wing of the Tel 
Aviv Museum of Art, which was funded by Marc Rich. A photograph of that 
event shows Denise and Danielle Rich posing with one of Marc Rich's 
closest aides, Avner Azulay.
    \442\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-69 (Agenda of Nov. 
21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76).
    \443\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00021 
(Billing Records for Marc Rich, Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit 77).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Rich legal team did maximize use of Denise Rich. They 
started with a December 6, 2000, letter from Denise Rich to the 
President. This letter was in many ways, the centerpiece of the 
pardon petition. While it appears to have been a heartfelt 
plea, in reality, it was drafted by Marc Rich's lawyers. The 
letter combines inaccurate charges about the indictment with 
emotional pleas about Rich's ``exile:''

        I support his application with all my heart. The pain 
        and suffering caused by that unjust indictment battered 
        more than my husband--it struck his daughters and me. 
        We have lived with it for so many years. We live with 
        it now. There is no reason why it should have gone on 
        so long. Exile for seventeen years is enough. So much 
        of what has been said about Marc as a result of the 
        indictment and exile is just plain wrong, yet it has 
        continued to damage Marc and his family.

                                *  *  *


        My husband and I could not return to the United Sates 
        [sic] because, while the charges were untrue, no one 
        would listen--all the prosecutors appeared to think 
        about was the prospect of imprisoning Marc for the rest 
        of his life. With a life sentence at stake, and press 
        and media fueled by the U.S. Attorney, we felt he had 
        no choice but to remain out of the country.

        Let no one think exile for life is a light burden. The 
        world we cared about was cut off from us. When our 
        daughter was dying from leukemia, Marc was cruelly 
        denied the opportunity to see her by the prosecutors.

        What was this exile for? The charges all relate to old 
        energy regulations, where all of the other people and 
        companies involved in the same kinds of transactions 
        were never charged with a crime. Only my husband was 
        treated differently.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \444\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to 
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73).

This letter was placed prominently at the front of the stack of 
testimonials in the Marc Rich pardon petition, and it was 
quoted extensively in the petition itself. Of course, the 
arguments in the letter were completely inaccurate.
    After including the letter in the pardon petition, Denise 
Rich took a number of other actions to lobby for the pardon. 
Another letter from her to President Clinton was prepared by 
Marc Rich's lawyers on December 20, 2000. This letter was 
discussed among the Marc Rich legal team, with Robert Fink 
suggesting the following text: ``Because I could not bear it 
were I to learn that you did not see my letter and at least 
understand my special person[al] reasons for being a supporter 
of a pardon, I am sending you an additional copy, and an 
additional request that you wisely use your power to pardon 
Marc.'' \445\ Jack Quinn thought that this language was 
``perfect,'' \446\ and suggested that Denise Rich should ``hand 
it to him [the President] in [a] sealed envelope and mention 
that she is aware I intend to discuss the matter with him 
personally. She shd simply ask him to read it later and let him 
know how strongly we feel that we have the merits on our 
side.'' \447\ After Marc Rich's lawyers had finalized the text 
of the letter, it was presented to Denise Rich for her 
signature. Denise Rich did see the President on December 20, 
2000, at a White House Christmas party. According to one 
witness at the party, Rich wrested the President away from 
Barbra Streisand to press her case about the pardon.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \445\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00068 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et 
al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 78).
    \446\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00069 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 
79).
    \447\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00397 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 
80).
    \448\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Documents Show a Complex Campaign to Win 
a Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2001, at A11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Little is known about how many other contacts Denise Rich 
might have had with President Clinton during the final month of 
the Clinton Administration. There is evidence that she had at 
least one, and maybe more, telephone calls with the President 
about the pardon. E-mails between Jack Quinn and Robert Fink on 
January 16, 2001, indicate that they wanted Denise Rich to make 
``another call,'' indicating there had been other calls before 
this one. First, Quinn wrote that:

        I am advised that it would be useful if she [Denise] 
        made another call to P. I am in a fannie mae bd mtg, 
        but would like to set this in motion asap. Message shd 
        be simple: ``I'm not calling to argue the merits. Jack 
        has done that, and we believe a pardon is defensible 
        and justified. I'm calling to impress upon you that MR 
        and our whole family has paid a dear price over 18 yrs 
        for a prosecution that shd never have been brought and 
        that singled out MR while letting the oil companies he 
        dealt with go scot free. Please know how important this 
        is to me personally.'' can you or avner call her this 
        morning? \449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \449\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00167 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit 
81).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fink responded:

        I called at 10:30 AM and she is still asleep (she was 
        at her Dad's yesterday and it was a very full day) but 
        I left a message that I had to talk to her before a 
        noon meeting. I expect I will hear from her and I will 
        give her the message.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \450\ Id.

    In the absence of cooperation from Denise Rich, however, it 
is impossible to know exactly how many contacts Rich had with 
President Clinton, and what those contacts were about. An e-
mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink's assistant shortly after 
the pardon raises interesting questions. This document was 
withheld from the Committee for over a year, and was produced 
only after a decision from a federal district court judge 
requiring it to be turned over to a grand jury. Quinn wrote the 
following in response to an e-mail titled ``One of the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporters' Requests:''

        Shd def confirm it didn't. Is this the moment to say 
        that he asked DR for pol support? Or might DR have said 
        something stupid like that when they spoke. God knows, 
        I hope not.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \451\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02958 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Rosemary Micciulli, Quinn Gillespie & Associates (Jan. 24, 
2001)) (Exhibit 82).

The Committee requested an interview with Jack Quinn after it 
received this e-mail, but he refused. Without further 
illumination from Quinn, this e-mail's meaning is not clear. 
One interpretation suggests that a reporter may have called 
asking whether the President asked Denise Rich for ``political 
support,'' perhaps in the context of their discussions about 
the Rich pardon. It also suggests that Quinn was fearful that 
Denise Rich might have said something like this to the press. 
Quinn's question ``is this the moment to say that he asked DR 
for pol support,'' raises a real question as to whether 
President Clinton asked Denise Rich for ``political support'' 
in the midst of their discussions about the Rich pardon. While 
Quinn has refused to answer questions from the Committee about 
this e-mail, his spokesman has informed the press that the 
``he'' in the e-mail refers to former New York Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani, not President Clinton.\452\ While Quinn's explanation 
is possible, it is troubling that Quinn has refused to provide 
this explanation to the Committee himself. Absent further 
information from Quinn, Denise Rich, or President Clinton, the 
Committee can only speculate as to the meaning of this e-mail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \452\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek (Mar. 10, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is clear that Denise Rich had frequent opportunities to 
press the pardon case with President Clinton. Rich was 
scheduled to visit the White House 19 times during the Clinton 
presidency, with six of those visits scheduled between May 2000 
and January 2001.\453\ In addition, Rich also called the White 
House on several occasions near the end of the Clinton 
Administration.\454\ However, without cooperation from Denise 
Rich or President Clinton, the Committee is unable to know what 
was discussed during those telephone calls or how many of those 
scheduled White House visits actually occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \453\ National Archives and Records Administration Document 
Production (WAVES records (1994-2000)).
    \454\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from 
Denise Rich to the White House (Dec. 9, 1999)); Qwest Document 
Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House (Feb. 
16, 2000)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                d. Denise Rich's Motives
    Denise Rich's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort 
raises a number of serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich 
agree to help Marc Rich; (2) did Denise Rich's extremely large 
political contributions play any role in the President's 
decision to grant the pardon of Marc Rich; (3) were additional 
large contributions envisioned or hoped for; (4) what did the 
President and Denise Rich discuss; and (5) was Denise Rich 
making her political contributions with her own money? Due to 
Denise Rich's decision to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights 
against self-incrimination, the Committee is not able to answer 
any of these questions definitively. However, there are a 
number of factors suggesting that Denise Rich's involvement in 
the Marc Rich pardon case is far more complicated than she has 
suggested.
    First, Denise Rich's explanation for why she helped Marc 
Rich obtain the pardon does not withstand full scrutiny. Denise 
Rich has stated that she helped him because, after her daughter 
died, she forgave Marc Rich for his transgressions. She also 
claimed that she helped get the pardon so that her daughters 
could be with their father again. However, the Committee is 
unaware of Rich returning to the United States since he has 
obtained the pardon. Moreover, during Marc Rich's self-imposed 
``exile,'' his daughters were free to visit him in Europe and 
Israel, as they often did. Since Denise Rich's explanations do 
not fully explain her involvement, it is fair to consider other 
possible motivations. One comes from the fact that Rich 
promised to give $1 million a year to the G&P Charitable 
Foundation, at the precise time that he was trying to get 
Denise Rich to help with the pardon effort.\455\ This sum would 
have represented a major influx of cash for the G&P Foundation, 
which raised $2.4 million in 1998 and only $978,000 in 
1999.\456\ Second, the Committee has attempted to examine 
whether Denise Rich and her daughters continue to receive 
financial support from Marc Rich, or would receive enhanced 
financial support in the future, other factors which could have 
influenced their decision to support his pardon. While Denise 
Rich's bank records do not indicate any influx of money from 
Marc Rich, at least one document received by the Committee 
suggests that Rich might have established a Swiss bank account 
for his daughter Ilona. In a December 4, 2000, letter from 
Robert Fink to Ilona Rich, Fink wrote ``here are some banking 
papers to set up the account with UBS for you that need your 
signature. Please execute where indicated and also return these 
to me so I can send them back to Switzerland.'' \457\ While 
this reference is certainly capable of multiple 
interpretations, it at least raises the possibility that Marc 
Rich was providing untraceable funds to his family through 
Swiss bank accounts. This could provide another explanation for 
their support for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \455\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Pardon Reportedly Followed Pledge to 
Charity of Former Wife, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2001, at A1. $500,000 of 
this sum would have been given by Marc Rich and the other $500,000 
would have been given by Pincus Green.
    \456\ See Department of the Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable 
Foundation, 1998; Department of Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable 
Foundation, 1999 (Exhibit 83). A copy of G&P's tax return for the year 
2000 was unavailable because the Foundation may have received a filing 
deadline extension.
    \457\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00259 
(Letter from Robert Fink to Ilona Rich (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 84).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, the Committee is unable to reach any firm 
conclusions regarding the nature of Denise Rich's 
communications with the President, and specifically whether 
Denise Rich's political contributions and contributions to the 
Clinton Library played any role in the pardon. Absent true 
cooperation from Denise Rich or President Clinton, there is no 
way of knowing what they discussed, or what they were thinking 
about the Marc Rich pardon. However, there are a number of 
pieces of circumstantial evidence that raise the indelible 
appearance of impropriety in this case, which Denise Rich and 
President Clinton have done nothing to refute. First, Denise 
Rich made $1.1 million in political contributions to Democrats, 
including the Clintons, and the contributions increased 
dramatically toward the end of the Clinton Administration. 
Denise Rich also made $450,000 in contributions to the Clinton 
Library, including one of the earliest large contributions to 
the Library. Although this sum has been downplayed, it was in 
fact an appreciable percentage of cash actually advanced to the 
Library. Given the difficulties generally experienced raising 
money after a President leaves office, the individuals who are 
prepared to give large sums--particularly after there are no 
more elections to finance--assume a particular importance. 
Second, Denise Rich used the relationship she had with the 
President, which was built in large part of political 
contributions, to lobby the President to grant the pardon. 
Third, Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz, the two people who were 
privy to the reasons for Denise Rich's political contributions 
and her discussions with the President regarding the pardon, 
were so concerned about their potential criminal exposure that 
they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Were there a benign 
explanation to the events prior to the pardon, there is little 
conceivable reason to have invoked the Fifth Amendment. Fourth, 
the President, Denise Rich, and Beth Dozoretz have offered the 
weakest of justifications for their actions in the Marc Rich 
pardon matter. Given these facts, there is an unmistakable 
appearance of impropriety.
    The Committee had the opportunity to grant Denise Rich 
immunity against prosecution so that it could receive compelled 
testimony from her, but decided not to proceed with a grant of 
immunity for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that 
Denise Rich intended to cooperate with the Committee. After the 
Committee received notice that the Justice Department had no 
objection to a grant of immunity, Committee staff contacted 
counsel for Mrs. Rich, to determine whether they would offer 
the Committee a proffer before the immunity vote. By receiving 
a proffer, the Committee hoped to receive an understanding of 
what Mrs. Rich would testify to if she received immunity. 
Counsel for Mrs. Rich were unwilling to provide a proffer. By 
refusing to provide a proffer, counsel for Mrs. Rich made it 
clear that they had no intent of cooperating with the 
Committee's investigation, and would make obtaining information 
from Denise Rich as difficult as possible.
    Another factor that played a role in the Committee's 
decision not to grant immunity to Denise Rich were Mrs. Rich's 
own public statements about her role in the investigation. When 
Mrs. Rich appeared on the television program 20/20, to the 
extent she made any statements addressing her role in the 
pardon, her statements were difficult to believe. This 
appearance raised real questions as to whether Denise Rich 
intended to provide honest and complete testimony to the 
Committee, even if she were immunized.
            2. Beth Dozoretz
    Together with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn, Beth Dozoretz 
served a key role in lobbying for the pardon of Marc Rich. Like 
Denise Rich, Dozoretz enjoyed a close personal relationship 
with President Clinton that was a mixture of friendship and 
extremely significant political fundraising. Like Denise Rich, 
Dozoretz took advantage of this close relationship to press 
President Clinton about the Rich pardon. Also, much like her 
friend Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth 
Amendment rights rather than testify before the Committee.
                a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill
                    Clinton
    In 1992, Beth Dozoretz attended the Democratic Convention 
in New York City at the urging of her husband, Ron Dozoretz. 
Until that point, Dozoretz had never been significantly 
involved in political events of any type. But at the Democratic 
convention, Dozoretz had an epiphany of sorts, as Hillary 
Clinton passed by:

        On her way to the podium she had to walk by where I was 
        sitting. . . . She was looking around, smiling, and I 
        flattered myself to think that our eyes met. And I 
        blurted something out like, ``I just think you're 
        fabulous!'' And I felt like she looked at me and said, 
        ``Thank you!'' with her big, beautiful smile.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \458\ Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth 
and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 
1999, at C1.

Beginning with the 1992 convention, Beth Dozoretz began to be 
deeply involved in Democratic politics. She and her husband 
moved to Washington from Norfolk, Virginia, in 1993. First at 
an apartment in Georgetown and then at an estate in Northwest 
Washington, the Dozoretzes began to host high-profile 
fundraising events. Through these events, the Dozoretzes had 
frequent contact with the Clintons, and struck up a warm 
relationship with both the President and First Lady. During the 
course of the Clinton presidency, the Dozoretzes were close to 
the Clintons, vacationing with them, and playing golf with 
them.\459\ Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz remained close to 
the President throughout the Monica Lewinsky scandal. In 
November 1998, the Dozoretzes asked the President to serve as 
godfather to their infant daughter.\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \459\ Id. The Dozoretzes had their critics, some of whom suggested 
that their friendship with the Clintons was the result of a deliberate 
plan:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GStarting from the very beginning, they were having 
      dinners and soirees at their apartment in Washington 
      Harbour. . . . The whole program was geared to rising to 
      the top. She had a staff from the very first day. I mean, 
      how many housewives have staffs? She played golf with the 
      president, and she took golf lessons so she could play with 
      him. Her husband obviously is very, very wealthy, and this 
      is something they set out to accomplish. And obviously they 
      have.
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \460\ Id. President Clinton agreed, and he and Hillary Clinton 
attended a high-profile christening at the Dozoretz estate. The star-
studded attendance list for the event also included Jack Quinn. Annie 
Groer and Ann Gerhart, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1998, 
at C3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the close personal relationship she 
maintained with President Clinton, Beth Dozoretz also developed 
a fundraising relationship with the President. In 1994, 
Dozoretz served as co-Chairman of the DNC's large contributor 
program. By 1999, Dozoretz had raised $5 million for various 
Democratic causes.\461\ As a result, in early 1999 Dozoretz was 
appointed, with the President's personal blessing, as Finance 
Chairman of the DNC, the chief fundraiser for the Democratic 
Party. Dozoretz resigned her post in September 1999, to allow 
new DNC Chairman Ed Rendell to appoint his own Finance 
Chairman. However, even after she left her position as Finance 
Chairman, Dozoretz continued to raise funds for the Democratic 
Party, and maintain a warm relationship with President Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \461\ It was through her fundraising work for the DNC that Beth 
Dozoretz became enmeshed in her first White House scandal. In September 
1997, Dozoretz testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs regarding a controversial White House fundraising coffee 
attended by John Huang and Pauline Kanchanalak. Two witnesses at the 
coffee testified that Huang made an illegal appeal for political 
contributions at the White House coffee. Dozoretz, who was also 
attending the coffee with a prospective donor, denied that Huang made 
the remarks. See ``Investigation into Fundraising Activities During the 
1996 Elections,'' Hearings Before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Special Investigations Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept. 16, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to raising funds for the DNC, Beth Dozoretz 
raised money for President Clinton's personal causes. For 
example, she raised money for the President's legal defense 
fund. She also raised money for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz 
solicited Denise Rich for her first contribution to the Clinton 
Library, a $250,000 contribution made in July 1998.\462\ 
Apparently, Rich gave the check to Dozoretz, who sent it on to 
the lawyers for the Library.\463\ In connection with this, or 
one of Denise Rich's other contributions to the Clinton 
Library, Rich drafted a note to Dozoretz reading ``Dear Beth, 
Thanks for your help, Lots of love, Denise.'' \464\ Apparently, 
Denise Rich was a person specifically targeted by Dozoretz to 
solicit for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz gave Peter O'Keefe, 
the chief fundraiser for the Clinton Library, a list of 
individuals Dozoretz intended to solicit, and Denise Rich was 
listed on this document.\465\ In addition to the substantial 
sums she raised from Denise Rich, on May 23, 2000, Beth 
Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton 
Library.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the William J. Clinton 
Presidential Foundation Library for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)) (Exhibit 
74).
    \463\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0004 (Letter from Janine Werkman, Chief of Staff for 
Beth Dozoretz, to Nicole Seligman (July 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 85).
    \464\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former 
finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75).
    \465\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document 
Production WJCPF 0048 (List of Potential Contributors to William J. 
Clinton Presidential Foundation) (Exhibit 86); Interview with Peter 
O'Keefe, Fundraiser, William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation (Apr. 
12, 2001).
    \466\ This information was provided to the Committee in a briefing 
by David Kendall and Nicole Seligman, counsel for the Clinton 
Foundation. See also William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation 
Document Production WJCPF 0024 (Letter from Skip Rutherford, President, 
William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, to Beth Dozoretz, former 
finance chair, Democratic National Committee (Jan. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 
87).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich
                    Pardon Campaign
    Around Thanksgiving of 2000, Jack Quinn informed Beth 
Dozoretz that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf of 
Marc Rich. Quinn was close friends with Dozoretz, and also knew 
that she was close to Denise Rich. Quinn testified that he 
``encouraged her to help me be sure that the President himself 
was aware of the fact that the application had been filed with 
the White House Counsel's office.'' \467\ According to Quinn, 
Dozoretz did talk to the President, who told her that Quinn 
should make his case to Bruce Lindsey and the other staff in 
the White House Counsel's office.\468\ Quinn described his 
motivation for involving Dozoretz at the Committee's March 1 
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \467\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 69 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony 
of Jack Quinn).
    \468\ Id.

        I did so because she was a friend of mine, because she 
        had a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much 
        more frequent communication with the President than I 
        was. I was motivated by two things principally; one, I 
        was hopeful that she could let the President know that 
        I had or was going to file this so that he would be 
        aware it was there; and two, she was another person who 
        I hoped might be in a position to give me the kind of 
        information that I have, as a lawyer, thought would be 
        useful to me to pursue their efforts on behalf of my 
        client vigorously. Now, I want to also tell you have 
        [sic] that in that conversation I had with her again 
        around Thanksgiving time, I cautioned her that it would 
        be very important to make sure that no such 
        conversation was ever connected in any way with any 
        kind of fundraising activity. She reacted to that by 
        kind of looking at me like how could I even suggest 
        that. She said to me, of course I would never do that 
        to him.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \469\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 410-11 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

It is apparent that Quinn turned to Dozoretz because of her 
access to and influence with the President. Precisely how 
Dozoretz used these skills is a mystery, because of Dozoretz's 
invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\ Irving Sandorf, a former colleague of Dozoretz's from the 
clothing industry, noted that ``She has a way of getting into you a 
little bit. She knows how to manipulate people. I don't know if you'd 
call them `people skills.' It's more like `I'll use you, you use me' 
skills.'' See Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How 
Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 
1, 1999, at C1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over the course of the next two months, Beth Dozoretz and 
Jack Quinn were in frequent contact about the Marc Rich pardon 
effort.\471\ Jack Quinn estimated that they spoke between five 
and ten times about the Marc Rich pardon effort. The real 
question is, of course, how many times Beth Dozoretz spoke to 
the President about the Marc Rich pardon, and what they spoke 
about. Because of the Fifth Amendment claims of Dozoretz and 
Denise Rich, the Committee knows little about these 
communications. However, the e-mail discussions of the Marc 
Rich legal team offer some insight into the matter. On January 
10, 2001, Avner Azulay e-mailed Jack Quinn with the following 
message:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \471\ Beth Dozoretz left telephone messages for Jack Quinn on: 
December 8, 2000; January 2, 2001, with the question, ``[A]ny news on 
the matter?''; January 8, 2001; an undated message between January 8 
and January 18, 2001; January 18, 2001; and January 19, 2001, leaving 
her contact information for the rest of that day. Jack Quinn Document 
Production (Telephone Messages from Beth Dozoretz, former finance 
chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 88).

        2. D[enise] R[ich] called from aspen. Her friend B--who 
        is with her--got a call today from potus--who said he 
        was impressed by J[ack] Q[uinn]'s last letter and that 
        he wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn 
        around the WH counsels. D[enise] R[ich] thinks he 
        sounded very positive but ``that we have to keep 
        praying.'' There shall be no decision this wknd and the 
        other candidate Milik [sic] is not getting it.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \472\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).

When questioned about this e-mail, Quinn confirmed that the 
``B'' referred to by Azulay was indeed Beth Dozoretz.\473\ 
However, Quinn could do little to explain the message, 
including why the President would by trying to convince the 
staff of the need for the pardon, rather than vice-versa. 
Robert Fink responded to this message with an e-mail stating, 
``I said it before, and I say it again, `nice letter.' Keep on 
praying, and, oh, a few phone calls won't hurt.'' \474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \473\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 246-48 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \474\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dozoretz remained deeply involved in the Marc Rich pardon 
effort through the granting of the pardon. Three e-mail 
messages to Jack Quinn make it appear that Dozoretz was 
urgently trying to reach Quinn on January 17, 2001. At 12:13 
p.m., Quinn's assistant informed him that ``Beth Dozoretz wants 
you to call her on her cell if you get a chance.'' \475\ At 
1:38 p.m., Quinn's assistant told him that ``Beth is very eager 
to talk to you. She called again and knows that you are at the 
WH.'' \476\ A mere 24 minutes later, Quinn's assistant sent 
Quinn an e-mail regarding ``BETH'' stating ``[v]ery sorry to 
bother you with this but she is insistent. Please call her--she 
says that it is URGENT.'' \477\ On January 19, 2001, Dozoretz 
traveled to Beverly Hills, California, with her husband.\478\ 
That day, she called Jack Quinn to let him know her contact 
information, both in her private jet, and at the Peninsula 
Hotel, where she would be staying.\479\ At 10:48 p.m., Quinn 
called Dozoretz at the Peninsula Hotel.\480\ Presumably, Quinn 
informed Dozoretz that he believed Marc Rich was going to 
receive a pardon. Shortly after that call, Dozoretz called the 
White House and spoke to President Clinton.\481\ According to 
one press report, Dozoretz thanked President Clinton, but he 
was so busy that he did not initially understand why Dozoretz 
was thanking him.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \475\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03027 (E-mail from April 
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 90).
    \476\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03028 (E-mail from April 
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 91).
    \477\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03029 (E-mail from April 
Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 92).
    \478\ WAVES records from the White House indicate that both 
Dozoretz and Denise Rich visited the White House on January 19, 2001. 
However, it appears that these records are spurious. White House WAVES 
records usually show a scheduled time of entry for any scheduled visit 
to the White House. However, only if a visitor actually shows up at the 
White House is an actual time of entry entered into the WAVES system. 
In this case, the WAVES records show actual times of entry for Rich and 
Dozoretz. The United States Secret Service, has explained, however, 
that a large group of individuals were scheduled to visit the White 
House at one time for a party. Rather than hold up the group of 
individuals who were actually there, the Secret Service waved through 
the entire group. Therefore, the WAVES system shows erroneously that 
everyone who was scheduled for that event actually showed up. Hotel 
records as well as several eyewitnesses confirm the fact that Dozoretz 
was in transit and in California on January 19. The fact that the 
United States Secret Service had no idea of who was actually admitted 
to the White House is obviously troubling.
    \479\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth 
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 88).
    \480\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Quinn Gillespie telephone 
bill, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 93).
    \481\ Peninsula Hotel Document Production (Dozoretz Invoice from 
Peninsula Hotel, Jan. 21, 2001) (Exhibit 94).
    \482\ Corky Siemaszko, Dem Aide Had Early Word of Pardons, N.Y. 
Daily News, Feb. 26, 2001, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the pardon was granted, Dozoretz continued her 
contacts with Jack Quinn. Between January 23, 2001, and 
February 5, 2001, Dozoretz called Quinn at least nine times, 
leaving messages of support such as (1) ``NY Times was great 
today!'' \483\ (2) ``You are getting a reputation as the 
smartest lawyer in America;'' \484\ (3) ``Hearing lots of good 
things about you especially hearing that you are brilliant;'' 
\485\ and (4) ``Just had important conversation she would like 
to share with you.'' \486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \483\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth 
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 95).
    \484\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth 
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 29, 2001)) (Exhibit 96).
    \485\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth 
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack 
Quinn (Jan. 31, 2001)) (Exhibit 97).
    \486\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth 
Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack 
Quinn (Feb. 1, 2001)) (Exhibit 98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beth Dozoretz's efforts to help get Marc Rich's pardon cast 
yet additional doubt on the motives of President Clinton. Like 
Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz was a close personal friend of 
President Clinton. Also like Denise Rich, and a number of the 
President's other close friends, her friendship was closely 
intertwined with her fundraising relationship for the President 
and Democratic Party.
    Dozoretz's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort has 
the indelible appearance of impropriety. Whether or not 
criminal acts were involved is unknown, and can only be 
discovered with facts not available to the Committee--namely 
the truthful testimony of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz. 
However, the appearance of impropriety is substantial:

 Beth Dozoretz was herself a major fundraiser for the 
DNC as well as President Clinton's personal causes, including 
his legal defense fund and library. In addition, she was the 
primary solicitor for Denise Rich's contributions to the 
Clinton Library. Therefore, at a minimum, Beth Dozoretz's 
endorsement of a pardon carried particular weight with the 
President.

 The one communication between Dozoretz and President 
Clinton of which the Committee is aware raises serious 
questions. According to the e-mail describing the call, 
President Clinton told Dozoretz that he was ``doing all 
possible to turn around the WH counsels.'' This upside-down 
construction suggests that the President had made up his mind 
to grant the pardon, but was hoping to convince the staff so as 
to improve appearances.

 No acceptable explanation has been made to the 
Committee of why Beth Dozoretz agreed to become involved in the 
pardon effort. Obviously, Dozoretz is friendly with both Denise 
Rich and Jack Quinn. It is possible that she agreed to help 
Rich and Quinn as part of this friendship.\487\ However, given 
the substantial effort that Dozoretz made, and the excitement 
that she showed at the President's decision to grant the 
pardon, the possibility that Dozoretz had some other motivation 
should be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \487\ Of course, there are questions regarding why Denise Rich and 
Jack Quinn were making such great efforts to obtain the pardon. As 
described above, Rich has never adequately explained her motivations, 
leading to speculation that her motivation may have been financial, not 
personal. Jack Quinn's explanations have been even more suspect, as he 
has maintained that he was not expecting any payment for his work on 
the Marc Rich pardon effort. As described above, this suggestion is 
contradicted by common sense, as well as by Marc Rich's primary U.S. 
lawyer, Robert Fink. Fink confirms that Quinn's motivation was likely 
financial, as he was going to receive handsome financial compensation 
for his efforts. Because Quinn and Rich have offered weak reasons for 
their involvement in the Rich pardon effort, the motivations of 
individuals with even less at stake, like Beth Dozoretz, must be 
subjected to even greater scrutiny.

 Rather than cooperate with the Committee's 
investigators, Dozoretz invoked her Fifth Amendment right 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
against self-incrimination.

    However, absent cooperation from Ms. Dozoretz, the 
Committee is unable to answer these questions.
                c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information
                    About Dozoretz from the Committee
    It should be noted that Jack Quinn apparently tried to keep 
the Committee from learning the true nature of Beth Dozoretz's 
role in the pardon effort. When Quinn was asked about the 
January 10, 2001, e-mail at the Committee's February 8, 2001, 
hearing, the Committee did not have any information regarding 
the role of Dozoretz in the pardon effort. When he was asked 
about the e-mail, Quinn did acknowledge that it referred to 
Beth Dozoretz, but he was then quite reticent about explaining 
Dozoretz's role:

        Mr. Barr. Why would the President be sharing this 
        information with the finance chair of the DNC? What do 
        they have to do with it?

        Mr. Quinn. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail, 
        and I don't know the answer to that. I was aware of 
        this e-mail.

        Mr. Barr. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why 
        would the DNC finance chair be involved here?

        Mr. Quinn. Well, I believe--my impression was that 
        Denise and Beth were--have been friends, and that, in 
        fact, they grew--

        Mr. Barr. I suspect so.

        Mr. Quinn. That they grew up in the same town in 
        Massachusetts up north.

                                *  *  *


        Mr. Quinn. But let me be clear, I don't know that he 
        [the President] called her about this.

                                *  *  *


        Mr. Barr. Clearly it was about this.

        Mr. Quinn. I believe that--my impression was that in 
        the course of the conversation they were having she 
        asked him what is happening with these two pardon 
        applications, and apparently was with Denise Rich at 
        the time, which may have motivated her to ask the 
        President in the course of the conversation, but I was 
        not of the impression, I want to be careful to say this 
        accurately, that the call was placed for the purpose of 
        discussing the pardons.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \488\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 248 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and testimony of 
Jack Quinn).

    Quinn's initial testimony on this point was misleading. 
When Representative Barr asked why the President would be 
calling Beth Dozoretz about the Rich pardon, Quinn answered ``I 
don't know the answer to that.'' When Representative Barr asked 
Quinn to speculate about why Dozoretz was involved in this 
matter, the best Quinn could offer was that Denise Rich and 
Beth Dozoretz were friends, and had grown up in the same town 
in Massachusetts. Quinn neglected to mention the more salient 
point that he had personally asked Dozoretz to become involved 
in the pardon effort. Therefore, he knew specifically why she 
was discussing the Rich pardon with the President. However, at 
no time during the Committee's February 8 hearing did Quinn 
disclose the fact that he had specifically asked Dozoretz to 
become involved in the pardon effort, because of her close 
relationship with President Clinton. If the House Government 
Reform Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee had not held 
follow-up hearings on this matter, it is likely that Quinn 
never would have told the truth about Dozoretz's involvement. 
The fact that Quinn tried to conceal this information only adds 
to the appearance that Dozoretz's role in the pardon was 
improper.
            3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli 
                    Leaders
    Key players in the lineup of individuals assisting the Marc 
Rich pardon effort were Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and a 
number of other current and former Israeli officials who 
weighed in with the Clinton Administration. President Clinton 
has made much of the influence of Prime Minister Barak's appeal 
in his decision making. This claim can be debated. However, it 
cannot be debated that the Marc Rich team made a substantial 
effort to get these Israeli officials involved. However, much 
like some of the key American players, it is difficult to gauge 
whether these officials were involved because they believed in 
the Rich pardon, or because they received financial support 
from Marc Rich.
    After he fled the United States in 1983, Marc Rich began to 
make large financial contributions to various charities in 
Israel, as well as Jewish charities in Europe and the United 
States. Marc Rich also made political contributions to Israeli 
political candidates. However, since Israeli law does not 
require the public disclosure of these contributions, the 
Committee is not able to determine to whom Rich has 
contributed. Communications among the Marc Rich legal team make 
it clear that they were able to call upon a number of prominent 
Israelis to weigh in on Rich's behalf with President Clinton.
    Marc Rich's pardon petition included a number of letters of 
support from prominent Israelis, including: Shlomo Ben-Ami, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Security; 
Itamar Rabinovich, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United 
States; Yaakov Neeman, the former Minister of Finance and 
former Minister of Justice; Ehud Olmert, the Mayor of 
Jerusalem; Isaac Herzog, the Israeli Government Secretary; and 
Shabtai Shavit, the former Director of the Mossad.\489\ A 
number of these officials received some sort of financial 
contributions from Marc Rich. Olmert received a $25,000 
political contribution from Rich in 1993.\490\ A community 
development organization called Yedid, which was linked to 
Shlomo Ben-Ami, received $100,000 from Rich.\491\ Herzog's wife 
worked for the Rich Foundation.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \489\ See Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green (Dec. 
11, 2000) (Appendix III).
    \490\ Michael Dobbs, Pardon Smoothed Ties to Israel; Barak, Others 
Aided Rich's Campaign, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2001, at A1.
    \491\ Id.
    \492\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More important than the letters of support, though, were 
telephone calls to President Clinton from some of these Israeli 
leaders. Most importantly, Marc Rich's supporters were able to 
have Prime Minister Ehud Barak raise the Marc Rich pardon with 
President Clinton. Prime Minister Barak described the approach 
to him by Avner Azulay as follows:

        Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman 
        of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr. 
        Azoulay is a man I know [sic] for many years, who had 
        contributed a lot to the security of the State of 
        Israel. The Rich Foundation is well known and highly 
        appreciated in Israel for its philanthropic activities 
        in the fields of healthcare, education and culture.

        Mr. Azoulay asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with 
        President Clinton. I raised the subject with President 
        Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of 
        routine telephone conversations during the last two or 
        three months of his presidency and made a personal 
        recommendation to him to consider the case.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \493\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the 
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) 
(Exhibit 99).

    Avner Azulay's efforts to enlist Israeli officials in the 
pardon effort were helped dramatically when, in early January 
2001, Marc Rich himself flew to Israel to attend a convention 
for Birthright Israel, a recipient of Rich's largesse. While 
Rich was in Israel, he took the opportunity to meet senior 
Israeli political officials as well as Jewish-American leaders. 
During this trip to Israel, Rich met personally with Prime 
Minister Barak, and shortly after that meeting, Barak raised 
the Rich pardon with President Clinton a second time. Azulay 
referred to Rich's scheduled meetings in a January 4, 2001, e-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mail to the Rich legal team:

        As I have already mentioned--during this wknd [sic] 
        M[arc] R[ich] is scheduled to meet the P[rime] 
        M[inister], F[oreign] M[inister] & SH[imon] P[eres]--as 
        well as a main vector to E[lie] W[iesel].

        If possible it would be very useful to ask the W[hite] 
        H[ouse] to hold the final decision (unless it is 
        positive!)--until the above have the opportunity to 
        make/repeat their personal appeals.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \494\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 100).

    It also appears that the Rich team attempted to have other 
Israeli officials call the President or his staff. Former 
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called President Clinton 
about the Marc Rich matter on December 11, 2000,\495\ the day 
that the Rich petition was filed, and the same day that Prime 
Minister Barak spoke to the President. On December 19, 2000, 
Avner Azulay suggested that he ask Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg 
to call the President on Marc Rich's behalf.\496\ It is unclear 
whether Burg actually spoke with President Clinton. Burg 
apparently did write a letter to President Clinton on January 
9, 2001, advocating Rich's pardon.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \495\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0842 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 
2000)) (Exhibit 101).
    \496\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00071 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen 
Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 102).
    \497\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00163-64 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack 
Quinn et al. (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103). While Burg's letter did 
expressly advocate Rich's pardon, it was criticized by Gershon Kekst 
and Bob Fink. Kekst asked Quinn and Fink ``is this a helpful letter?'' 
Id. Fink responded, ``I think Potus will realize that it is intended to 
be helpful. Frankly, I am a little surprised Avner let it go in this 
form, as we pulled one like it from the original petition. Maybe he did 
not see it until after it had gone. I see no reason to rain on anyone's 
parade.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Azulay also asked Israel Singer, Secretary General of the 
World Jewish Congress, and Edgar Bronfman, President of the 
World Jewish Congress, to raise the Marc Rich matter with the 
President:

        Israel Singer & Edgar Bronfman (CEO & President of the 
        World Jewish Congress) are scheduled to meet potus on 
        Sunday evening in NY (the Israel Policy Forum--not 
        adequate for a private talk) and on Wednesday for a 
        private seance at the WH. In anticipation of Abraham 
        Burg's meeting, I contacted Singer through Rabbi 
        Rizkin. Burg will give his support only if he knows 
        that Singer and Bronfman will . . [sic] I don't know 
        but suspect that this has to do with JPoll.

        Now Singer wants to be sure that the MRPG petition is 
        on the agenda of potus. I suggest you contact Israel 
        Singer the soonest possible--either to brief him and 
        answer his questions or arrange for a mtg with him 
        before he meets potus.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \498\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0866 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 5, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 104).

    In his desperation to find prominent Israeli supporters for 
the Marc Rich petition, Jack Quinn even suggested that the 
deceased widow of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin, Leah, call President Clinton. Robert Fink made this 
request to Avner Azulay in an e-mail: ``Oh one more thing. Jack 
asks if you could get Leah Rabin to call the President; Jack 
said he was a real big supporter of her husband.'' \499\ Azulay 
responded the following day: ``Bob, having Leah Rabin call is 
not a bad idea. The problem is how do we contact her? She died 
last November--on the 5th anniversary of her husband's 
murder.'' \500\ In the end, the Rich team settled for the 
Rabins' daughter, who met with Avner Azulay on January 10, 
2001, and informed him that she would call President Clinton on 
Rich's behalf.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \499\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation 
(Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 36).
    \500\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00094 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink 
(Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 105).
    \501\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the tactics used by Azulay to enlist Israeli leaders 
was to link the Rich pardon to the Jonathan Pollard matter. The 
Pollard pardon had long been a priority for a number of Israeli 
officials, and Azulay attempted to use the Pollard matter to 
Rich's advantage:

        I can also cfm [sic] the info on J[onathan] P[ollard]. 
        It seems that the topic was discussed in telecons with 
        potus--within the framework of the peace agreement. 
        JP's freedom is considered as a public-political 
        ``sweet pill'' which shall help swallow (or divert 
        public attention from) the more sour pills in the 
        agreement with arafat [sic]. I am sure potus is aware 
        that JP is going to be big trouble with the entire 
        intelligence community and MR could go along with it 
        ``less unnoticed''. On the other hand if he says no to 
        JP--one more reason to say yes to MR.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \502\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 100).

Jack Quinn made the same linkage between Rich and Pollard in 
his appeals to the White House: ``Lastly, I told her [Beth 
Nolan] that, if they pardon JP, then pardoning MR is easy, but 
that, if they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In 
the last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from 
people in or connected to the GOI [Government of Israel].'' 
\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \503\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00111 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et 
al. (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 106).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is difficult to gauge whether the efforts of the Marc 
Rich team to link their fate to that of Jonathan Pollard helped 
their cause. Jonathan Pollard certainly feels that the Rich 
pardon was granted at his expense. Pollard made the following 
statement after the Rich pardon:

        I've become disillusioned. This is the hardest thing 
        for me. . . . But what has shaken me to my very bones 
        is to finally realize, after 16 years, that I made a 
        mistake. For 16 years I have been desperately waving 
        the Israeli flag, crying out for help to the Israeli 
        political establishment. But since the Marc Rich 
        campaign, I realize that I made a mistake. All those 
        years I should have waved something else to get their 
        attention. I should have waved a dollar bill in front 
        of them and convinced them that I had a lot of money. 
        That is the depths to which we have sunk as a nation, 
        that an agent has to bribe his own government to rescue 
        him. That is how low we have sunk.

        Esther and I are pinching pennies in order to stay 
        alive. Israel has never assisted us. But this Marc Rich 
        fellow, with all of his millions, he's the one that 
        everyone in Israel is breaking their backs for.

                                *  *  *


        Barak, the politicians, and all those who were 
        involved, were corrupted and debased by Marc Rich's 
        money. Every one of them was corrupted at some level or 
        another. The corruption and the repulsiveness that 
        characterized the Rich pardon campaign is 
        appalling.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \504\ Eran Tiffenbraun and Mody Kreitman, Expose: Using Pollard to 
Get Rich, Yediot Achronot, Feb. 25, 2001 (Exhibit 107).

While Pollard clearly did not deserve a pardon of his own, his 
comments about the Rich pardon may be accurate.
            4. Elie Wiesel
    The Rich team also attempted to recruit prominent Holocaust 
survivor and author Elie Wiesel to their cause. As a prominent 
spokesman for Jewish causes and a close friend to President 
Clinton, Wiesel was a logical candidate for the Rich team to 
turn to. It appears that Gershon Kekst initially identified 
Wiesel as a potential supporter of the Rich pardon. After a 
meeting with Kekst, Avner Azulay informed Behan, Fink, and Marc 
Rich that Kekst ``proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral 
authority'' to present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to 
reach him--and that I shall do in the next few days.'' \505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \505\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0542 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & 
Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 108). When asked about this 
document, Kekst said, ``I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a 
moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' Interview with Gershon 
Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). Kekst said that he was 
asked, but refused, to request Wiesel's help. As discussed below, Kekst 
has repeatedly denied that he made suggestions and recommendations even 
when they are corroborated by contemporaneous e-mails. Kekst's denials 
are not credible, and appear to be part of an effort to understate his 
role in the Marc Rich pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It appears that Azulay followed Kekst's recommendation, and 
attempted to enlist Wiesel. In an e-mail of November 29, 2000, 
Azulay suggested that the Rich team might be obtaining a letter 
of support from Wiesel: ``We shall have a few days to get 
additional letters in New York (Elie Wiesel, Abe Foxman and 
others). I assume by now you are getting letters from 
Switzerland and Spain.'' \506\ When he was interviewed over the 
telephone by Committee staff, Wiesel confirmed that he was 
asked by Avner Azulay to write a letter on behalf of Rich. At a 
November or December 2000 meeting at Wiesel's home in New York 
City, Azulay showed Wiesel other letters written on behalf of 
Marc Rich.\507\ According to Wiesel, although he told Azulay 
that he was impressed by the list of names, he said he could 
not write such a letter for someone he did not know.\508\ 
Wiesel told Committee staff that he also told Azulay that he 
did not believe Rich could legally receive a pardon without 
standing trial.\509\ According to Wiesel, even though Azulay 
assured him that Rich could receive a pardon, Wiesel told 
Azulay that he could not write the letter because he had 
already written a letter requesting a commutation of Jonathan 
Pollard's sentence. Wiesel felt that he could not make another 
request.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \506\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00066 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink 
and Marc Rich (Nov. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 109).
    \507\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). Yossi 
Ciecanover, a banker and former high official in Israel, and Danny 
Karavan, who lived in both Paris and Israel, arranged this meeting. 
Wiesel indicated that he was under the impression that Gershon Kekst 
asked Yossi Ciecanover to contact Wiesel on behalf of Azulay.
    \508\ Id.
    \509\ Id.
    \510\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Wiesel, Avner Azulay called him several days 
later to see if he had changed his mind.\511\ Wiesel told him 
that he had not.\512\ While this seemingly would have been the 
end of Wiesel's involvement in the Rich pardon campaign, there 
is evidence that it was not. Several e-mails indicate that 
Wiesel may have lobbied the White House. On December 21, 2000, 
Jack Quinn wrote to Robert Fink and Azulay, responding to 
Azulay's question about ``having another VIP place an 
additional call'' to President Clinton.\513\ As Quinn wrote, 
``I think another call is fine, but it needs to come from 
someone who can get POTUS personally on the line. Did Elie 
Wiesel call?'' \514\ Azulay responded to Quinn's inquiry by e-
mailing, ``I don't know positively if he talked directly to 
potus and if he did what was his reaction. All he told me was 
that `he was at the WH the day potus traveled but he couldn't 
give me any reaction.' '' \515\ Azulay then spoke with Wiesel 
again, and on December 25, 2000, Azulay responded to Quinn in 
an e-mail with the subject line ``elie wiesel,'' stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ Id.
    \512\ Id.
    \513\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0831 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 110).
    \514\ Id.
    \515\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0836 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 22, 
2000)) (Exhibit 111).

        I talked to him today. He says that he brought up the 
        topic at the WH on Monday Dec 12th, he refused to 
        disclose who he met. He was told of the difficulties 
        lying ahead in dealing with it (he would explain it 
        only in a face to face meeting) and hopes that they can 
        be surmounted[.] \516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \516\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0845 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 
2000)) (Exhibit 112).

    On December 27, 2000, Azulay told Quinn, Kekst, Behan, 
Fink, and Marc Rich that he was looking for some way to have 
Wiesel express his opinion on the Rich pardon in a clear way to 
the President: ``Elie Wiesel--I am still checking if there is a 
way to get from him a straight forward support statement--
direct call to potus.'' \517\ Azulay followed up with another 
e-mail on December 31, 2000, stating that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \517\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0851 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27, 
2000)) (Exhibit 113).

        I was informed today that EW visited the WH last Dec 
        12th. He didn't meet or speak directly with potus. EW 
        had a scheduled mtg [sic] with the ``person responsible 
        for the pardons.'' His original goal was to discuss 
        Pollard--and at the same time raised a question about 
        the MRPG case. He was told that the MRPG case can't be 
        defined as humanitarian because there was no trial, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        conviction or punishment to deal with[.]

        I understand--although he didn't disclose it that he 
        talked with a lawyer, the WH counsel. Perhaps BL.

        This is not new to you. What the lawyers think or 
        thought at the time. However, I think it worthwhile 
        mentioning that EW's mtg [sic] was held in the morniing 
        [sic] hours of Monday, Dec 12th--before xx [sic] before 
        the formal petition was delivered in the afternoon 
        hours. I hope that the lawyers have a different view of 
        the case by now?

        It is clear that EW is reluctant to make a direct 
        appeal to potus--with the uncertainty that he is doing 
        something that doesn't stand a chance. Therefore, it 
        seems plausible that if someone he respects will 
        convince him that he is doing the right thing it might 
        still be possible.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0854 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 31, 
2000)) (Exhibit 114).

Despite the assurances that Wiesel had raised the Rich pardon 
with White House staff, Azulay apparently continued his efforts 
to have Wiesel raise it directly with the President. On January 
2, 2001, he e-mailed Fink, Quinn, and Behan to tell them that 
Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg was going to try to recruit Wiesel 
to help with the Rich case.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \519\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00104 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink et 
al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other than the information that Azulay was able to get from 
Wiesel, Gershon Kekst also told the rest of the Rich team that 
Wiesel had weighed in with the White House on the Rich pardon. 
In a January 9, 2001, e-mail, Kekst wrote that ``[b]y the way, 
please tell marc [sic] that I am `assured' the call has been 
made by elie [sic].'' \520\ Robert Fink responded that he would 
``tell Marc about Elie.'' \521\ When he was interviewed by 
Committee staff, Kekst explained that he discussed Wiesel's 
involvement in the Rich pardon effort with Yossi Ciecanover, a 
former senior Israeli government official.\522\ Ciecanover told 
Kekst that he had been asked by Azulay to ask Wiesel to express 
support for the Rich pardon.\523\ Ciecanover said that Wiesel 
either ``would call'' or ``did call'' the President.\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \520\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).
    \521\ Id.
    \522\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \523\ Id.
    \524\ Id. Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel also suggested 
that he heard that Wiesel raised the Rich matter with President 
Clinton. However, after making this initial assertion, Angel 
backtracked, and said that he was not certain if he recalled hearing 
this before the pardons were granted, or from media accounts after the 
fact. Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Elie Wiesel has denied any involvement in the Marc Rich 
pardon effort, calling such allegations ``pure fantasy.'' \525\ 
Wiesel acknowledged that he did visit the White House in 
December 2000 and January 2001.\526\ However, Wiesel denied 
that he raised any Marc Rich pardon issues with anyone at the 
White House on either of those visits.\527\ He also denied that 
he ever raised any pardon issues with anyone at the White House 
in any other form, other than writing a letter on Jonathan 
Pollard's behalf to the President.\528\ Given the lack of any 
first-hand evidence that Wiesel did actually lobby the 
President on behalf of Marc Rich, the e-mails of Kekst and 
Azulay most likely overstated involvement of Wiesel in the Rich 
pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \525\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001).
    \526\ Id.
    \527\ Id.
    \528\ Id. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            5. King Juan Carlos
    King Juan Carlos apparently made two contacts with the 
White House over the Rich pardon. The first contact was a 
direct one, when the King called President Clinton personally 
regarding the Rich pardon. On January 13, 2001, Avner Azulay 
sent an e-mail to the Rich legal team indicating that ``we have 
a CFM [confirmation] that the king of spain [sic] talked to 
potus. He reports a positive conversation. No concrete sayings 
[sic].'' \529\ It is unclear why the King took this action on 
Rich's behalf. It is possible that the King was motivated by 
Rich's support of Madrid's Jewish community, but he has not 
offered any explanation for his actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0881 (E-mail from Avner 
Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 13, 
2001)) (Exhibit 117).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Also in this same time frame, John Podesta heard of King 
Juan Carlos' interest in the Rich pardon. Podesta received a 
telephone call from former Congressman John Brademas, President 
Emeritus of New York University, who is a friend of King Juan 
Carlos.\530\ The King had informed Brademas that he had 
recently met with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, 
who had raised the Marc Rich pardon with the King. The King in 
turn called Brademas to see if Brademas could make the King's 
interest in the pardon known to the White House. Podesta told 
Brademas that ``while it was the President's decision, the 
White House Counsel's Office and I were firmly opposed and I 
did not believe that the pardon would be granted.'' \531\ While 
Podesta apparently braced the King for the worst, the King's 
interest in the Rich matter was made known to the President, as 
well as Marc Rich's supporters, who have often mentioned his 
support for the pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \530\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 320 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
    \531\ Id. at 317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            6. Avner Azulay
    Avner Azulay is a former high-ranking Mossad agent. He 
founded his own security consulting company after leaving the 
Mossad in the early 1990s.\532\ Marc Rich retained his services 
and placed him as the head of the Marc Rich Foundation and the 
Doron Foundation, based in Jerusalem.\533\ These Foundations 
handle all of Rich's philanthropic interests (they were 
recently merged and are now referred to only as the Marc Rich 
Foundation). These foundations also paid significant amounts of 
money to many organizations and persons who wrote letters on 
behalf of Marc Rich that were included in the pardon petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \532\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 
1, 1999 (Exhibit 6).
    \533\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Azulay was a central figure in the pardon effort. His name 
appears on a large number of the e-mails produced to the 
Committee that were sent among the Rich pardon team. Azulay 
played a key role in securing many of the letters included in 
the petition. He traveled throughout Israel, Europe, and the 
United States soliciting the letters for the pardon. Azulay 
also solicited many Jewish leaders for their support of Rich. 
In this effort, Azulay contacted Abraham Foxman, Elie Wiesel, 
and Rabbi Irving Greenberg, among others. As would be revealed 
after the pardon was granted, however, not everyone who was 
approached by Azulay was told that their letter would be used 
in the pardon effort.
    The Committee first sought Avner Azulay's cooperation in 
its investigation in a March 8, 2001, letter asking him to 
participate in an interview with Committee staff.\534\ Azulay 
refused to meet with staff, citing health reasons.\535\ 
Committee staff followed up with a number of telephone calls to 
Azulay's counsel to try to secure an interview, but he made it 
clear that Azulay would not participate in an interview, due to 
health concerns and concerns regarding the ongoing criminal 
investigation by the Southern District of New York. As a close 
advisor to Marc Rich and a key participant in the pardon 
effort, Azulay has a great deal of valuable information that he 
has decided to withhold from the Committee. His lack of 
cooperation appears to be part of a concerted effort by Marc 
Rich and his closest advisers to keep critical information 
about the pardon effort from the American people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \534\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) 
(Exhibit 118).
    \535\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the 
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) 
(Exhibit 119).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            7. Michael Steinhardt
    Michael Steinhardt is a prominent hedge fund investor who 
has also been involved in Democratic politics, having served as 
the Chair of the Democratic Leadership Council and the 
Progressive Policy Institute. He first met President Clinton 
while serving in the former position. Steinhardt mentioned this 
fact in his December 7, 2000, letter to President Clinton that 
was included in the pardon application.\536\ Steinhardt also 
wrote a follow-up letter to President Clinton on Marc Rich's 
behalf on January 16, 2001.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \536\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J, 
Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit 120). As Steinhardt mentioned in the 
letter to President Clinton, ``I think you may remember me as one of 
your earliest national supporters.'' Steinhardt went on in the letter 
to explain his decision to step away from the DLC in 1995 ``when ideas 
and human judgments seemingly led in different directions[.]''
    \537\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J. 
Clinton (Jan. 16, 2001) (Exhibit 121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Steinhardt has been an acquaintance of Marc Rich since the 
1970s, and a close friend since 1996. Both Marc Rich and Denise 
Rich's father, Emil Eisenberg, had invested in Steinhardt's 
fund.\538\ In 1997, Steinhardt made his first recommendation to 
Rich, which was to hire public relations specialist Gershon 
Kekst to help him with his case.\539\ Over the course of the 
last few years, Steinhardt had numerous meetings and 
discussions with Rich, Azulay, Kekst, Jack Quinn, and Robert 
Fink concerning the legal negotiations and the pardon effort. 
Throughout that time, Steinhardt advised Rich on his efforts to 
settle his criminal case. In the fall of 2000, when the efforts 
to settle the case reached a dead-end, Steinhardt claims that 
he conceived of the pardon option and recommended that Rich 
seek a presidential pardon.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \538\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
    \539\ Id.
    \540\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Steinhardt was also involved in the effort to solicit Edgar 
Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, to assist in 
the Rich lobbying effort. Around the same time that he faxed 
his follow-up letter to President Clinton, Steinhardt attempted 
to contact Bronfman in Washington, D.C. In a January 16, 2001, 
e-mail to Jack Quinn and copied to Robert Fink and Marc Rich, 
Avner Azulay wrote, ``Michael faxed the letter to potus as 
requested. Edgar B. is in DC. Michael is trying to contact him 
to enlist his support.'' \541\ When asked about this e-mail by 
Committee staff, Steinhardt confirmed that he had tried to 
contact Bronfman to enlist his support in the pardon 
effort.\542\ However, Steinhardt explained that he did not 
contact Bronfman in time for him to help.\543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \541\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00171 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 122).
    \542\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
    \543\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            8. Gershon Kekst
    Gershon Kekst is a prominent public relations specialist 
who heads his own firm, Kekst and Company, which focuses on 
corporate communications. Kekst was hired by Marc Rich to 
assist with strategy and public relations relating to his 
criminal case.\544\ Michael Steinhardt told Committee staff 
that he first recommended Kekst to Marc Rich sometime in 
1997.\545\ Kekst recalled this meeting, explaining to Committee 
staff that he met Steinhardt and two of Marc Rich's lawyers, 
including Robert Fink, at Steinhardt's office.\546\ According 
to Kekst, he told the lawyers that he would probably not get 
involved because he did not believe a public relations campaign 
would be helpful for Rich.\547\ Rich's lawyers implored Kekst 
to study the Rich case and to meet personally with Rich to 
discuss working for him.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \544\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \545\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001).
    \546\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \547\ Id.
    \548\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A few months later, Kekst met with Marc Rich in 
Switzerland.\549\ According to Kekst, Rich told him that unless 
Kekst could guarantee that getting publicity would help resolve 
Rich's problems, Rich did not want to go through with it.\550\ 
Kekst said he left the meeting with the understanding that he 
would do no work on the Rich case.\551\ When back in the United 
States, he again met with Fink and Steinhardt.\552\ According 
to Kekst, he told them that they should either let Marc Rich 
live in peace or get a lawyer in Washington who worked with DOJ 
to work on the case.\553\ As is discussed in a previous 
section, it was Kekst who recommended Jack Quinn to the Rich 
team in late 1998.\554\ Nevertheless, Kekst claims that he 
never worked on the Rich case and ``turned down'' work on the 
case.\555\ In 1997 and 1998, Rich paid Kekst $75,000 for the 
time he spent reviewing the case and traveling to Switzerland. 
However, Kekst did not receive any payments from Rich after 
1998 despite the fact that he devoted considerable time to the 
Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\ Id.
    \550\ Id.
    \551\ Id.
    \552\ Id.
    \553\ Id.
    \554\ Id.
    \555\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite his claim that he repeatedly rebuffed the Rich 
team's attempts to recruit him throughout the late 1990s, there 
is evidence that Kekst was working with the team at least as 
early as 1999. In responding to an October 13, 1999, e-mail 
from Robert Fink concerning press articles written about Rich, 
Kekst wrote, ``I did not like it because we had agreed that no 
publcity [sic] best serves us for the time being. If someone 
wanted to change that position, I would have liked to have 
known so I could argue a bit.'' \556\ It is telling that at 
this point in 1999, Kekst was referring to ``us'' when 
responding to Marc Rich's lawyer. It is also telling that in a 
fax sent the previous day from Azulay to Fink, Azulay suggests 
conferring with Kekst to get his opinion on the articles.\557\ 
This evidence strongly indicates that Kekst was already part of 
the Rich team in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \556\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00642-43 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst & Co., to Robert 
Fink (Oct. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 123).
    \557\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00839 
(Fax from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Oct. 
12, 1999)) (Exhibit 124).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to several e-mails produced to the Committee, 
Kekst continued to be included in the strategy and planning of 
the Rich team in 2000. In late January of 2000, Fink e-mailed 
Marc Rich to inform him that Fink and Quinn would be meeting 
with Kekst to discuss their negotiations with the Southern 
District of New York.\558\ Furthermore, in a February 10, 2000, 
e-mail, Avner Azulay described Kekst's active role in strategy 
sessions involving the Southern District. Discussing the 
rejection letter sent by Mary Jo White's deputy Shirah Neiman, 
Azulay wrote, ``I note that Shirah's ltr is dated feb [sic] 2. 
This means that she had already issued the ltr when you JQ GK 
[sic] were discussing what to do and how to approach her.'' 
\559\ After the rejection letter from the SDNY, Kekst continued 
to consult on the next steps the Rich team should take. As 
Robert Fink explained to Marc Rich on February 17, 2000, ``I 
have only recently spoken to Jack, Gershon and Kitty on this 
issue and all agree that we should try to approach the DoJ tax 
lawyers even without the SDNY if necessary.'' \560\ On February 
29, 2000, Fink sent Marc Rich an e-mail noting that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \558\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A1011-12 (E-mail from 
Robert Fink to Marc Rich et. al. (Jan. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 125).
    \559\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00698 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink 
(Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 126).
    \560\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich 
Foundation (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 52).

        Gershon has not billed for months. He has spoken to me 
        many time[s] and Avner at least one and meet [sic] with 
        me and Jack at least three times (Jack speaks to him 
        more) in the last two months and I know he speaks to 
        Michael from time to time. He even did a draft outline 
        of what he thought our response should be to the 
        Southern District, which he, frankly, thought required 
        a response. No doubt he has some billable work for 
        which we have not been billed. He knows that you do not 
        want him to work for free, but has not billed or has 
        just delayed it.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \561\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39).

As these e-mails demonstrate, Kekst was obviously much more 
involved in the pre-pardon efforts than he was willing to 
reveal to the Committee.
    Kekst's claim not to be involved in the Rich pardon 
campaign is also strongly contradicted by the documentary 
evidence received by the Committee. As early as March of 2000, 
Kekst was mentioned by the Rich team in their strategic 
planning. A March 18, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Robert 
Fink discussing Denise Rich's ``personal mission'' states, ``IF 
it works we didin't [sic] lose the present opportunity--until 
nov--which shall not repat [sic] itself. If it doesn't--then 
probably Gershon's course of acion [sic] shall be the one left 
option to start all over again.'' \562\ When asked about this 
e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he has no understanding 
of what this e-mail means.\563\ He said his entire awareness of 
Denise Rich comes from watching C-SPAN.\564\ Kekst further 
stated that he did not think he knew Denise Rich was 
involved.\565\ He said he has never met Denise Rich and does 
not recall speaking to Azulay around March 2000, the time of 
this e-mail.\566\ Kekst's lack of memory on this message is 
brought into question by the testimony of Jack Quinn and Robert 
Fink. When asked about the March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn 
testified, ``It's also entirely possible that Mr. Azulay, 
others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where 
someone said you know we are going to try to pardon one of 
these days.'' \567\ Perhaps most significantly, when Fink was 
asked about this e-mail, he testified that he believed that 
``Gershon's course of action'' referred to the idea of a pardon 
application.\568\ This raises the distinct possibility that not 
only was Kekst heavily involved in the pardon effort, but more 
importantly that the idea to seek a pardon was his own. This 
may explain why Kekst was not forthcoming when he was 
interviewed by Committee staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \562\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink 
(Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60).
    \563\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \564\ Id.
    \565\ Id.
    \566\ Id.
    \567\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 396 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \568\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kekst again became heavily involved with the Rich team when 
the pardon effort began in earnest. In November of 2000, Robert 
Fink asked Kekst to meet with Avner Azulay.\569\ This meeting 
took place on November 15, 2000.\570\ According to Kekst, he 
told Fink that he had no interest in mounting a public 
relations campaign and that it would only hurt Rich.\571\ 
Nevertheless, Kekst met with Azulay. Azulay told Kekst about 
the plans for a pardon petition and the need to get letters of 
support.\572\ Azulay asked for Kekst's help but, according to 
Kekst, he told Azulay ``no.'' \573\ Kekst told Committee staff 
that he knew before his conversation with Azulay that Rich was 
seeking a pardon.\574\ From time to time Kekst received e-mail 
asking if he had changed his mind. According to Kekst, he 
either clicked the delete button or would send a short negative 
answer.\575\ Kekst asked the Rich team to let him know if Jack 
Quinn changed his mind about a public relations campaign.\576\ 
Kekst thought that if Quinn thought a public relations campaign 
was warranted, then he would reconsider.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \570\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0541 (E-mail from Robert 
Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, and Avner Azulay, 
Director, Rich Foundation (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 127).
    \571\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \572\ Id.
    \573\ Id.
    \574\ Id.
    \575\ Id.
    \576\ Id.
    \577\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Kekst's claim that he refused to help Azulay is undermined 
by a November 15, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Kathleen 
Behan, Robert Fink, and Marc Rich, the subject line of which 
reads, ``meeting with gershon kekst[.]'' The e-mail begins with 
the statement ``GK supports the idea of presenting the request 
for a P[ardon].'' The e-mail also goes on to state the 
following:

        Although chances are not high, no damage could result 
        thereof if plea is rejected. It could also generate a 
        positive effect on the DOJ even if case is not 
        resolved.

        -Media & public criticism can be countered by the fact 
        that for years DOJ and SD stonewalled and were never 
        open to find a solution that the interested parties 
        offered. The most recent rejection of JQ's proposal for 
        a review can be used as an example.

        -GK proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral authority'' to 
        present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to reach 
        him--and that I shall do in the next few days.

        -I gave GK a copy of my updated long list of potential 
        supporters (Bob--pse [sic] fax a copy to KittY [sic]), 
        and reported on my contacts with DR's friend. I expect 
        to recieve [sic] a priority list from these to work on.

        -GK pointed out that Prof. Itamar Rabiinovitch [sic] is 
        an important supporter because he is highly respected 
        in the US and could help with additional names in the 
        US--which are lacking in my list.

        -The time-table [sic] for implementing this project 
        with a dead line should be decided upon with JQ.

        -I also raised the idea that ``a task force'' under his 
        guidance and strategy should be established to make 
        sure we make good use of the time and means available. 
        I understood from GK that he shall undertake this 
        project.

        -GK is meeting Bob on Thursday, shall contact JQ and 
        decide on how to proceed.\578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \578\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0552-53 (E-mail from 
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, 
Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 128).

This e-mail was followed up by Azulay in an e-mail which reads, 
``-GK thinks it is better to present the plea in 2 consecutive 
steps (MR first and PG later). It might be easier to obtain 
positive results, if any, for one single. If it succeeds then 
the second shall be easier to obtain.'' \579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \579\ Id. at A0552.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These e-mails indicate that Kekst was heavily involved in 
the pardon process. From holding meetings with the Rich team, 
to going over lists of potential supporters, to recommending 
Elie Wiesel to lobby the President, Kekst had a hand in many 
aspects of the campaign. When asked about this first e-mail, 
however, Kekst told Committee staff that the e-mail does not 
accurately reflect what he said at the meeting.\580\ Kekst 
stated that he does not believe he advocated seeking a pardon 
or taking any particular option.\581\ He said he did not know 
how criticism could be countered, and that is why he did not 
agree to assist in the first place.\582\ He also stated, ``To 
think you could counter the record, which was pretty awful, is 
outrageous to me. I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a 
moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' \583\ However, e-
mails sent by Robert Fink strongly contradict Kekst's claim 
concerning Wiesel. On November 17, 2000, Fink wrote to Azulay 
and Behan that ``Gershon made it clear that he thinks his 
proposed moral authority, EW, is the most important person by 
far.'' \584\ On January 5, 2001, Fink sent Quinn an e-mail 
stating that ``Gershon continues to believe, indeed, he is very 
consistent, that Elie Weisel [sic] is the key. I will email 
Avner and ask where he is on that.'' \585\ The Committee is 
troubled by Kekst's apparent dishonesty regarding his suggested 
use of Elie Wiesel in the pardon process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \580\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \581\ Id.
    \582\ Id.
    \583\ Id.
    \584\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0564 (E-mail from Robert 
Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Kathleen Behan, 
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Nov. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 129).
    \585\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00403 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 130).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff also asked Kekst about numerous other e-
mails also detailing his involvement in the Rich case. In one 
of the e-mails, Kekst personally responds to the Rich team 
about a meeting agenda from November 21, 2000, concerning the 
pardon petition and lobbying campaign. One of the bullets from 
the meeting agenda mentions ``Maximizing use of Gershon.'' 
\586\ In response to the meeting agenda, Kekst wrote the 
following, in all capital letters, to Robert Fink:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \586\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-0569 (Agenda of 
Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76).

        ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT THE CASE MUST BE MADE (FOLLOWING 
        THE GUIDELINES MEMO) IN THE CORE DOCUMENT. AS THERE IS 
        NO MARGIN FOR ERROR OR OMISSION, I MUST LEAVE THE 
        DRAFTING TO THE EXPERTS (YOU, KITTY AND JACK). I WOULD 
        WANT A SHOT AT IT, THOUGH, BECAUSE ONCE THAT DOCUMENT 
        HAS PASSED THAT TEST, IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT FROM A 
        PUBLIC AND PERSUASION TEST, AS WELL. SECOND, THE 
        SUPPORT-SPONSORSHIP OF AN ELIE WIESEL IS CRUCIAL: AVNER 
        SAID HE WOULD WORK ON THAT. A [sic] AND THE LIST OF 
        SUPPORTERS MUST NOT BE ALL RECIPIENTS OF PHILANTHROPY, 
        JEWS AND ISRAELIS: IT MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL AND 
        BUSINESS LEADERS FROM AROUND THE WORKLD [sic], 
        INCLUDING THE U.S.A. I BELIEVE AVNER SAID HE WOULD 
        START ON THAT. (AS TO HOW TO USE GERSHON BEST . . . . . 
        GEE, LET ME KNOIW [sic] WHEN YOU DECIDE !) BY THE WAY, 
        I WILL ONLY HAVE ABOUT AN HOUR (PERHAPS A FEW MINUTES 
        LESS) BECAUSE I AM TO CATCH A PLANE THAT 
        AFTERNOON.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \587\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0570 (E-mail from 
Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn 
(Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 131).

When asked about the meeting and this e-mail, Kekst told 
Committee staff that he was unaware of any meeting being 
planned.\588\ Committee staff then asked him about the 
specifics of his response. Kekst stated that he wrote this e-
mail as an ``angry e-mail,'' suggesting that he did not want to 
be involved.\589\ Asked why he said he wanted ``a shot at [the 
pardon petition] though because once the document has passed 
that test, it should be looked at from a public and persuasion 
test as well,'' Kekst said ``I don't know.'' \590\ Later, Kekst 
claimed that he was concerned because Azulay went so far in 
enlisting Jewish organizations that it would have a negative 
``boomerang'' effect on the Jewish people.\591\ So, Kekst said 
he may have offered to review the petition as ``one last shot 
to keep them from doing that.'' \592\ Kekst stated that his 
offer to review the pardon petition was limited solely to this 
aspect.\593\ Kekst claimed that when he stated, ``it should be 
looked at from a public and persuasion test as well,'' he was 
referring to trying to limit any anti-Semitic backlash.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \589\ Id.
    \590\ Id.
    \591\ Id.
    \592\ Id.
    \593\ Id.
    \594\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The explanation by Kekst that he was only reluctantly 
involved, and only offered advice because of fear of an anti-
Semitic backlash is belied by the fact that the Rich team 
included him in numerous conference calls, and continued to 
include him in their e-mail loop. Moreover, Kekst continued to 
respond to some of the messages. For example, before the pardon 
application was submitted, Robert Fink forwarded Kekst a copy 
of Avner Azulay's work on the letters concerning Rich's 
philanthropic activity that would be included in the 
application.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \595\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0001 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and 
Co. (Nov. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 132).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 26, 2000, Kekst responded to a Robert Fink e-
mail, which discussed contacting Hillary Rodham Clinton for her 
support and having Denise Rich call the White House, by 
registering his agreement with Fink's recommendation.\596\ The 
following day, Kekst responded to an e-mail from Robert Fink, 
reminding him of his position on submitting two separate pardon 
applications for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Kekst responded, 
``As you will recall, I always thought it best to de-link the 
two. But . . . .'' \597\ Finally, on December 27, 2000, Kekst 
responded to an e-mail from Fink concerning Senator Charles 
Schumer, stating, ``Can quinn tell us who is close enough to 
lean on schumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, but have 
no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly who the 
top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard Schwartz??'' 
\598\ As this series of e-mails makes clear, Kekst was far from 
a passive bystander who was simply worried about anti-Semitism. 
He was actively making suggestions about tactics--including the 
use of prominent political contributors to enlist the help of 
elected officials in the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \596\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00076 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
(Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 133).
    \597\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00081 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 134).
    \598\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the last few weeks of the Clinton Presidency, Kekst 
continued to advise the Rich team. When asked on January 9, 
2001, by Robert Fink about a potential press story on Rudy 
Giuliani's treatment of Marc Rich, Kekst responded:

        Unless jack quinn changes his views about the risk-
        reward ratio for publicity, I vote against it. The 
        herald tribune, in any event, is not the place for us 
        to be. The publicity I was referring to relates to the 
        repair of marc's name assuming we fail, not to help 
        make it happen (unless jack says it would). By the way, 
        please tell marc that I am ``assured'' the call has 
        been made by elie.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \599\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).

Two days later, Fink wrote to Marc Rich, stating, ``Meanwhile I 
spoke to Gershon yesterday, and he said he would call first 
thing this morning to specifically ask that EW call Potus and 
no one else.'' \600\ That same day, January 11, 2001, Kekst 
received a copy of a letter from the Speaker of the Israeli 
Knesset concerning Marc Rich. Kekst questioned its 
effectiveness in asking Quinn and Fink, ``[I]s this a helpful 
letter?'' \601\ On January 16, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Marc 
Rich about Kekst's views on the pardon effort:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \600\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00165 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich 
Foundation (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 136).
    \601\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00163-64 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to 
Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103).

        Gershon just called and said he is convinced this is 
        still possible and that this is a critical week, and 
        suggests you call Jack directly and encourage him to 
        keep plugging away, and thanking him for what he has 
        done. Gershon is also convinced that the no publicity 
        route was correct.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \602\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMRW 00168 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 137).

    Even after the pardon was granted, Kekst continued to 
receive and respond to e-mails from the Rich team. In a January 
23, 2001, e-mail that Kekst sent to Quinn and Fink, he stated 
``I spoke with marc. He asked the question and I told him that 
he should not speak with any reporters anywhere, , , , , , , 
[sic] if after his first trip to America and that `trauma' 
passes, he may be able to make `courtesy calls' in Europe.'' 
\603\ By dealing directly with Marc Rich concerning press 
inquiries, Kekst was clearly actively involved in the pardon 
process until the end. When asked about this e-mail, Kekst said 
that he spoke with Marc Rich twice after the pardon.\604\ The 
first, he claimed, was to say congratulations.\605\ The second 
was to say that he should do nothing at all about the public 
relations strategy.\606\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \603\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, 
President, Kekst and Co., to Jack Quinn and Robert Fink (Jan. 23, 
2001)) (Exhibit 138).
    \604\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \605\ Id.
    \606\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A series of e-mails from January 22 and January 24, 2001, 
suggests, however, that Kekst was actively consulting with the 
Rich team on post-pardon public relations strategy. On January 
22, Kekst made suggestions for a post-pardon letter from Marc 
Rich to President Clinton. He wrote, ``I think he needs to make 
reference to the fact that the president's opinion and action 
were based on his having been willing to take the time and give 
consideration to the best professional analysius [sic] of the 
matter which made clear the need to `do justice' at this 
point.'' \607\ That same day, Avner Azulay wrote to Quinn, 
Fink, Behan, Green, Kekst, and Rich, stating, ``I thought we 
agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be channeled to 
gershon. Why is BF giving interviews? He shouldn't be dealing 
with this aspect.'' \608\ Furthermore, in a discussion about an 
op-ed piece being solicited by the Rich team, a statement to 
Robert Fink reads, ``It is Gershon's view that the New York 
Times is the first choice for placement. He suggests that Jack 
resubmit this version for the Time's consideration.'' \609\ In 
another e-mail of January 24, 2001, Fink asked a question about 
a New York Times reporter. In response, Kekst wrote, ``I 
believe the paper is being dealt with . . . . and has been[.]'' 
\610\ Asked about this e-mail by Committee staff, Kekst said he 
was ignoring Azulay and did not want to talk to him.\611\ Kekst 
said he believed Azulay had the ``insane idea'' that the Times 
reporter could help turn the public relations campaign 
around.\612\ Nevertheless, Kekst continued to advise the Rich 
team and deal with members of the press. On January 25, 2001, 
when it was clear that the press was turning negative on the 
Rich pardon, Kekst issued a warning to Azulay, Fink and Quinn. 
He stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \607\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, 
President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 22, 
2001)) (Exhibit 139).
    \608\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).
    \609\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Roanne Kulakoff 
to Robert Fink (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 140).
    \610\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, 
President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et 
al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 141).
    \611\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \612\ Id.

        The reporter at the ny times is Allison cowan working 
        with Johnny apple. A senior, well-experienced team. 
        They have met with jack and I believe you should run 
        this past him. Unless there is strong evidence, they 
        are not likely to fabricate a story. Is there any trace 
        of evidence?? lenzner told me that forbes believes 
        milkin [sic] should have been pardoned and he wanted to 
        do a piece contrasting the two and showing that if mike 
        did'nt [sic] deserve one certainly m.,r. [sic] didn't 
        either. Talk with fink about him. PLEASE be careful 
        about letting so many people talk with reporters. . . . 
        . .all that is being accomplished is that, however 
        ``well-intentioned'' they stir the story and keep it 
        cooking!! We are a stage [sic] now at which the story 
        is being kept alive be [sic] wannabe heroes.\613\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \613\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, 
President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et 
al. (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 142).

    Kekst's claim not to be actively involved in the pardon 
effort is simply not believable. It is troubling that, despite 
all of the evidence to the contrary, Kekst told the Committee 
that he ``did not work on the Marc Rich case.'' \614\ It would 
make no sense for Azulay or others on the Rich team to waste 
time e-mailing each other about suggestions that were not made 
or offers to help that were fabricated. If Kekst were not 
involved, the Rich team would have been engaged in a fruitless 
effort to include him in their deliberations. Kekst made far 
too many suggestions to the Rich team throughout the pardon 
campaign for him to credibly assert that he was not involved. 
Kekst even admitted to Committee staff that he billed Marc Rich 
between $80,000 and $90,000--a large fee for someone who was 
not involved in the process.\615\ It stands to reason that a 
person such as Kekst who needs to preserve his public image for 
his own livelihood as a public relations consultant would try 
to distance himself from the Marc Rich affair. Unfortunately, 
Kekst did so at the expense of providing the Committee with 
candid information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \614\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 
15, 2001).
    \615\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            9. Robert Fink
    Robert Fink has worked as an attorney for Marc Rich for two 
decades, beginning in 1980.\616\ At that time, Fink was with 
the law firm of Milgrim Thomajan and Lee. Fink's former law 
firm was responsible for what the Southern District of New York 
referred to as the ``steamer trunk affair,'' in which 
subpoenaed documents from Marc Rich's company were taken out of 
the country on a plane to Switzerland.\617\ Fink continued to 
represent Rich when he moved to his new law firm, Piper Marbury 
Rudnick & Wolfe. Fink was involved throughout the 1980s and 
1990s with the failed efforts to reach an acceptable 
arrangement with the SDNY. It was Fink to whom the SDNY 
communicated the offer to drop the RICO charge in the 
indictment if Rich and Green would return to the United States 
to face trial.\618\ Fink continued to work on the matter when 
Jack Quinn and Kitty Behan were retained by Rich. He was one of 
the most active and important members of the Rich pardon 
effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \616\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 467 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
    \617\ See Section I(B)(1) above.
    \618\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00697 (E-
mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 
10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            10. Kathleen Behan
    Kathleen Behan is a partner at the law firm Arnold & 
Porter. Jack Quinn recruited her to the Marc Rich case when he 
was also at the firm. Behan was one of the three most active 
lawyers in the pardon process, along with Quinn and Fink. Behan 
met Marc Rich in 1999 when she and Quinn flew to Switzerland to 
discuss their representation of Rich. Like Quinn, Behan was 
retained in July of 1999 to work for Marc Rich for a fee of at 
least $330,000 that included $55,000 per month for the first 
six months.\619\ Behan was interviewed by Committee staff on 
February 27, 2001. Behan asserted attorney-client privilege or 
work product privilege in response to the majority of questions 
relating to her work on the pardon.\620\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \619\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from 
Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 34).
    \620\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            11. Peter Kadzik
    Peter Kadzik is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro Morin & 
Oshinsky LLP. According to Jack Quinn, Kadzik was hired at the 
suggestion of Michael Green, a fellow partner of Kadzik's, 
because he was ``trusted by [White House Chief of Staff John] 
Podesta,'' and was considered to be a ``useful person to convey 
[Marc Rich's] arguments to Mr. Podesta.'' \621\ Kadzik's effort 
on behalf of the Rich team included seven contacts with the 
White House Chief of Staff or his assistants between December 
12, 2000, and the end of the Clinton Administration.\622\ He 
also called the White House four out of the final five days of 
the Administration to see what progress had been made on the 
Rich pardon.\623\ Based on the testimony of Podesta before the 
Committee, it does not appear that Kadzik's efforts were 
successful, as Podesta remained opposed to the Marc Rich pardon 
until the end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \621\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \622\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0064-65 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to 
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
    \623\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team

    During the lobbying campaign for the pardon, the Rich team 
was keenly aware that public knowledge of their efforts would 
hamper their ability to secure a pardon. The most logical 
reason for their concern was knowledge that sunshine regarding 
the Rich pardon application would severely curtail their 
ability to misrepresent facts about the history of Rich's legal 
troubles. Perhaps more importantly, public attention probably 
would have resulted in the Administration consulting with the 
Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency. 
Such consultation would certainly have had a negative impact on 
the Rich pardon petition.
    Rich's legal team was determined to keep their efforts 
secret from the outset. An agenda for one of the first meetings 
regarding the Rich pardon effort lists as a discussion item ``A 
need for secrecy and possibility/likelihood of potential leaks. 
(Kitty says people are watching this closely.)'' \624\ Robert 
Fink defended this approach, testifying that ``Marc Rich has 
been victimized by the press and publicity and that if the 
press learned about this that victimization would continue.'' 
\625\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \624\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0569 (E-mail from Robert 
Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 76). Fink sent the 
agenda for the November 21, 2000, meeting as an e-mail attachment.
    \625\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 476 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 9, 2001, Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Gershon 
Kekst and Jack Quinn in which he discussed a negative story 
that was being written about New York Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani.\626\ Fink mentioned that the story ``led to a 
discussion [with Marc Rich] on whether we seek any publicity 
about the pardon application[.]'' \627\ As Fink continued, ``I 
explained that we did not want publicity now. He [Marc Rich] 
understands that is our view. I look forward to hearing from 
you.'' \628\ Jack Quinn responded to Fink's e-mail the same day 
stating, ``[I] think we've benefitted from being under the 
press radar. [P]odesta said as much.'' \629\ Gershon Kekst also 
responded to Fink's message, stating, ``Unless jack quinn [sic] 
changes his views about the risk-reward ratio for publicity, I 
vote against it.'' \630\ To this, Fink responded, ``I agree 
with your views on publicity[.]'' \631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \626\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00158 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., 
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 144).
    \627\ Id.
    \628\ Id.
    \629\ Id.
    \630\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).
    \631\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fears over the disclosure of the pardon effort 
concerned the Rich team up until the very end of the Clinton 
Administration. On January 19, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner 
Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty Behan, and informed them that the 
head of the SEC knew about the pardon efforts.\632\ As Fink 
stated in the message, ``[w]e agree that is not good and that 
maybe the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it.'' 
\633\ In other words, the Rich team recognized that knowledge 
of their efforts could produce an outcry, especially if 
government officials who knew the details of the criminal case 
became aware of the possibility of a pardon for Rich and Green. 
Jack Quinn acknowledged as much at the Committee's February 8, 
2001, hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \632\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00180 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et 
al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145).
    \633\ Id.

        Mr. LaTourette. [I]s there any plain reading of that e-
        mail on January 19, 2001, other than you all were 
        afraid if the Southern District of New York caught wind 
        of what you were up to, the egg was going to hit the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        fan?

        Mr. Quinn. My preference was that the White House 
        counsel contact Main Justice and that, based on the 
        course of dealings we had earlier, that they would make 
        a recommendation that would be helpful to us. I 
        certainly knew that if Main Justice deferred to the 
        prosecutors in New York, they were likely to have a 
        negative recommendation. But I thought that, based on 
        our earlier dealings, they had enough information.\634\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \634\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230-31 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Steven LaTourette and 
testimony of Jack Quinn).

    Not only did Quinn and the Rich team recognize the public 
relations problem posed by the Rich pardon campaign, but, 
according to one e-mail, the White House Chief of Staff 
recognized this potential problem as well.\635\ As it turned 
out, the eventual pardon of Marc Rich by President Clinton 
produced exactly the public outrage that the Rich team sought 
to avoid by keeping their lobbying campaign secret. However, by 
the time this wide-ranging public outrage was realized, Marc 
Rich already had his presidential pardon secured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \635\ For his part, Podesta stated that he did not recall telling 
Kadzik that Rich had benefited from being ``under the press radar.'' 
See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' 
Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1, 
2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out of the 
        Process

    By late November 2000, the Marc Rich pardon petition had 
been prepared and was ready to be filed with the White House. 
Rather than go immediately to the White House, Jack Quinn first 
turned to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Holder had 
worked with Quinn during the previous year to try to force the 
Southern District of New York to sit down and meet with Quinn 
about settling the charges against Rich. During that process, 
Holder became more familiar with the Marc Rich case, to the 
extent he was aware of the charges against Rich, and the fact 
that Rich was a fugitive from justice. Despite these facts, 
Holder had a basically sympathetic view of the Rich case. 
Holder believed that the prosecutors in New York should meet 
with Quinn, despite the fact that Rich was a fugitive and that 
prosecutors from the SDNY had already had a number of 
unproductive negotiations with Rich's lawyers. In fact, Holder 
told Quinn the refusal of the prosecutors to meet was 
``ridiculous,'' \636\ that ``we're all sympathetic,'' and the 
``equities [are] on your side.'' \637\ By taking this position 
with Quinn, Holder had already sent the message to Quinn that 
he had a favorable view of the Marc Rich case, despite the 
firmly entrenched position that his own agency had taken for 
the preceding seventeen years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \636\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn, Nov. 
8, 1999) (Exhibit 48). See also ``The Controversial Pardon of 
International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \637\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) 
(Exhibit 56).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Marc Rich's lawyers prepared to file the pardon 
petition, Eric Holder provided pivotal assistance to their 
effort. Holder encouraged Jack Quinn to seek the pardon and 
helped Quinn cut the Justice Department out of the process of 
reviewing Rich's pardon petition. Ordinarily, the Justice 
Department has a key role in reviewing pardon petitions and 
providing a recommendation to the President as to whether each 
petition should be granted. However, Eric Holder abdicated his 
responsibilities as the Deputy Attorney General and took 
actions that ensured the Justice Department would have no 
meaningful input on the Rich and Green pardons. This was the 
first of two actions taken by Holder at the Justice 
Department's expense. After first succeeding in keeping the 
career prosecutors at the Justice Department from having any 
input in the Rich pardon, Holder informed the White House on 
the last day of the Clinton Administration that he was 
``neutral, leaning towards favorable'' on the Rich and Green 
pardons.\638\ Together, these actions had a dramatic impact on 
ensuring that the pardons were ultimately granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \638\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 198 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Knowing that Holder was favorably disposed to the Marc Rich 
case, Quinn approached Holder and confided in him that he was 
going to file the pardon petition with the White House. On 
November 21, 2000, Holder, Quinn, and representatives from the 
U.S. Marshals Service met regarding a matter for another client 
of Quinn's. After this meeting was over, Quinn took Holder 
aside and informed him that he would be filing a pardon 
petition on behalf of Marc Rich directly with the White House. 
Quinn then stated that ``I hoped I could encourage the White 
House to seek his views and he said I should do so.'' \639\ 
Quinn then asked Holder if Quinn should send a letter to the 
White House encouraging the White House Counsel to seek 
Holder's views. Holder told Quinn ``no, just have him [sic] 
call me.'' \640\ It is also likely that at the November 21, 
2000, meeting, Quinn and Holder discussed whether Holder wanted 
to receive a copy of the pardon petition. When a senior Justice 
Department official informed The Washington Post that Holder 
left the November 21 meeting expecting to receive a copy of the 
pardon petition from Quinn, Quinn told the newspaper that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \639\ Id. at 44 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \640\ Id. at 158.

        I am astounded that he now takes that position. . . . I 
        am astounded because I specifically had a conversation 
        [in November] with him [Holder] about the fact that I 
        was going to submit it to the White House and I asked 
        him if he needed it in writing and he said he did 
        not.\641\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \641\ James V. Grimaldi and Robert O'Harrow Jr., Recollections at 
Odds on Pardon, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2001, at E1.

While Quinn did not repeat this charge at the Committee's 
hearings, his statement to the newspaper makes it fairly clear 
that he offered to provide Holder with a copy of the pardon 
petition, and that Holder decided he did not want one. This 
appears to be in keeping with Holder's apparent disinterest in 
learning about the details of Marc Rich's legal troubles. In 
the normal course of events, one would expect Holder to have 
welcomed input from professional staff with experience in the 
pardon process. For some unknown reason, however, he eschewed 
such expertise.
    For his part, Holder has testified that he does not recall 
any discussion of Marc Rich with Jack Quinn on November 21, 
2000:

        Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told 
        me he was going to file a pardon request on behalf of 
        Mr. Rich at the White House. I have no memory of that 
        conversation but do not question Mr. Quinn's assertion. 
        His comment would have been a fairly unremarkable one, 
        given my belief that any pardon petition filed with the 
        White House ultimately would be sent to the Justice 
        Department for review and consideration.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \642\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                *  *  *


        What I assumed was going to happen in late November of 
        2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that 
        the White House would be reaching out to the Justice 
        Department, and that we would have an opportunity at 
        that point to share with them as we do in pardon--that 
        we generally do in pardon requests, after all of the 
        vetting had been done, the opinion of the Justice 
        Department.\643\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \643\ Id. at 212.

Holder's defense is difficult to believe. First, his 
characterization of Quinn's comments as ``unremarkable'' is 
inconsistent with everything about the Rich case. Marc Rich was 
one of the most wanted fugitives in the United States, and the 
largest tax cheat in the country's history at the time of his 
indictment. Holder knew that his fugitive status meant that 
federal prosecutors wouldn't even meet with Rich's lawyers. 
Yet, when Jack Quinn informed him that he was seeking a 
presidential pardon, outside of the normal pardon process, 
Holder claims that he did not take note of it and could not 
even remember it two months later. Equally as unbelievable is 
Holder's claim that he did not want a copy of the pardon 
petition because he was confident that the White House would 
send the Justice Department a copy of the petition and seek out 
the Department's opinion. The fact that Quinn was going 
directly to the White House indicated that Quinn was trying to 
avoid the normal Justice Department procedure by which pardon 
petitions were reviewed. It also indicated that no serious 
vetting would be done on the Rich petition.
    For his part, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not trying to 
keep any information from the Justice Department, but rather 
was filing his petition with the White House merely to expedite 
consideration of the pardon. Quinn claimed that he believed 
that the White House would provide the Justice Department with 
a copy of the pardon petition, and therefore, that he had no 
malign intent in failing to provide Holder with a copy of the 
petition in November, or at any point during the application 
process:

        Counsel. Why did you not send Mr. Holder the pardon 
        application?

        Mr. Quinn. I believed that a good deal of the material 
        included in the pardon application consisted, at least 
        in their central parts, of the materials that I had 
        provided to him in October 1999 when he asked Mr. 
        Margolis to take a look at this matter. But you're 
        correct. I did not at that time send him a copy of the 
        full pardon petition.

        Counsel. The question was, why did you not do that? Is 
        it because you thought he had all of the material from 
        over a year previous?

        Mr. Quinn. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar 
        with the underlying case that, when he was asked, he 
        would be in a position to advise the White House.

                                *  *  *


        Counsel. But you had not provided the extent of your 
        ultimate argument to the President, so you didn't feel 
        that he needed to see that?

        Mr. Quinn. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have 
        to say, if you look at the material I provided to him 
        earlier about the flaws in the indictment, you will see 
        that it was the same argument made in the pardon 
        petition.

        Counsel. Because you're proud of your work, and you 
        believe in your work, you want to provide it to people. 
        It's not a matter of how much it costs, because that's 
        not the issue. You would like to provide it to people 
        so they can see the extent of what you are representing 
        in whatever material you're pursuing. And, generally, 
        it seems when you don't provide material to people it's 
        because you don't want them to review it or you don't 
        want them to poke holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I 
        mean, the courts require briefs. You have to provide 
        them so they can see your legal reasoning. In this 
        case, were you concerned that if you provided Mr. 
        Holder your application that Mr. Holder might send it 
        on to somebody who might actually read it and look at 
        it?

        Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these 
        arguments to him at an earlier point.

        Counsel. You haven't provided all of the arguments, all 
        the letters and all the other things in the tabs. You 
        couldn't have provided them previously.

        Mr. Quinn. Fair enough. The other point I was going to 
        make is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White 
        House Counsel's Office to reach out to him, and there's 
        no reason in the world why they couldn't have shared a 
        copy of the pardon petition when they did so.

        Counsel. I understand, but I've not yet heard of a 
        lawyer who has decided to take a weak argument and 
        leave it on the table when he's strengthened his 
        argument. . . . . [I]t's hard for us to understand, 
        even if it was the 11th hour, why you simply wouldn't 
        put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let Mr. 
        Holder take a look at it, take it home, spend a couple 
        of hours. He could think to himself, maybe we want to 
        talk to security people; maybe we want to send it over 
        to the FBI. It's just--we still don't understand. I 
        guess what you said is you provided material the 
        previous year, and that was enough for Mr. Holder.

        Mr. Quinn. Well, look, you can disagree with me on 
        this. I was not--I didn't make that decision in an 
        effort to hide the pardon petition from anybody. I 
        encouraged the White House to reach out to the Justice 
        Department and seek their views. That's my 
        testimony.\644\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \644\ Id. at 267-68 (testimony of Jack Quinn).

Quinn's testimony is not convincing. As the questioning at the 
hearing demonstrated, Quinn simply did not have any reasonable 
justification for failing to send Holder a copy of the pardon 
petition. Perhaps most important, Quinn knew that if the 
petition were provided to Holder, Holder would likely forward 
it to the staff of the Pardon Attorney. Even more likely, the 
correspondence would be copied to the Pardon Attorney as a 
matter of routine. These lawyers would review the case, which 
would have likely involved contacts with the attorneys at the 
Southern District of New York, FBI, CIA, and NSA. If that had 
happened, Quinn's arguments would have been revealed as 
fraudulent, and this might have proven fatal to the pardon 
effort.
    Quinn's claim that he had provided Holder with everything 
he needed to know in 1999 simply is not true. In early 2000, 
Quinn provided Holder with a two-page set of talking points 
that addressed solely why the Justice Department should review 
the Rich indictment.\645\ It did not even begin to address the 
issues raised in the 31-page pardon petition. Quinn could have 
no reason for wanting to keep the pardon petition from Holder 
other than his desire to keep Rich's quest for a pardon as 
confidential as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \645\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ 
Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment,'' Feb. 28, 2000) (Exhibit 53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The key point that must be taken away from November 21, 
2000, discussion between Holder and Quinn is that it took both 
of them to keep the Rich pardon petition from the Justice 
Department. It cannot be disputed that Holder should have 
recognized the significance of the fact that Quinn was applying 
for a pardon for Rich, and should have asked for a copy of the 
pardon petition to be forwarded to the Justice Department. 
Holder has not provided any coherent explanation of why he 
failed to do so. Similarly, Quinn should have provided a copy 
of the pardon petition to Holder. Quinn has claimed that he had 
nothing to hide, and frequently asked the White House to 
include the Justice Department in the pardon process. Quinn's 
claims are misleading. Quinn clearly tried to keep his pardon 
petition from the Justice Department, apparently out of the 
fear that it could fall into the wrong hands, namely the 
prosecutors in New York, or anyone else who had knowledge of 
Rich's illegal activities or his subsequent actions in support 
of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
    The final question then is whether Holder's failure to 
obtain the Rich petition and involve the Justice Department in 
the pardon process was the result of incompetence or a 
deliberate decision to assist Jack Quinn. At the Committee's 
hearing, Holder suggested that it was the result of poor 
judgment, initially not recognizing the seriousness of the Rich 
case, and then, by the time that he recognized that the pardon 
was being considered, being distracted by other matters.\646\ 
However, it is difficult to believe that Holder's judgment 
would be so monumentally poor that he could not understand how 
he was being manipulated by Jack Quinn. Rather, the 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Eric Holder was 
deliberately assisting Quinn with the Rich petition, and 
deliberately cut the rest of the Justice Department out of the 
process to help Quinn obtain the pardon for Marc Rich. This 
conclusion is supported by the following e-mail, which was sent 
by Quinn to Kitty Behan, Gershon Kekst, and Robert Fink on 
November 18, 2000, three days before Quinn's meeting with 
Holder on November 21:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \646\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193-95 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Subject: eric

        spoke to him last evening. he says go straight to wh. 
        also says timing is good. we shd get in soon. will elab 
        when we speak.\647\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \647\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0565 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 18, 
2000)) (Exhibit 146).

Assuming the ``eric'' referenced is Eric Holder, this e-mail 
contradicts the heart of Holder's defense. Holder claims that 
he was not focused on the Rich pardon until late in the 
process, at first on January 6, when he spoke to Beth Nolan, 
and then, not really until January 19, when he announced his 
position of ``neutral, leaning towards favorable.'' He claims 
that he does not even recall the November 21, 2000, meeting, 
because it was an unremarkable request. And he claims that he 
did not ask for a copy of the petition because he thought he 
would get everything in due course from the White House. 
However, this e-mail indicates that Holder suggested that Quinn 
file the petition directly with the White House and circumvent 
the Justice Department. It also suggests that Holder had reason 
to know that the request was remarkable, as he suggested to 
Quinn that he circumvent the Justice Department. Finally, it 
indicates that Holder was a willing participant in the plan to 
keep the Justice Department from knowing about and opposing the 
Marc Rich pardon.
    The final question is why Eric Holder would do such a 
thing. As discussed below, Holder had been asking Quinn for his 
help in being appointed Attorney General in a Gore 
Administration. At the time when Holder made the decision to 
assist Quinn, there was still a realistic possibility of Vice 
President Gore winning the election. As an influential friend 
of Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn would be in a key position 
to assist Holder's chances of becoming Attorney General. While 
this may not have been Holder's sole motivation in aiding 
Quinn, it was likely a powerful motivation for Holder.\648\ 
Regardless of Holder's motivations, his actions were 
unconscionable. One of Holder's primary duties in the pardon 
process was to make sure that the views of the Justice 
Department were adequately represented in the pardon process. 
In addition, as a Justice Department employee, he was bound by 
federal regulations that required the Justice Department to 
review pardon petitions before they were presented to the White 
House. Finally, as a simple matter of prudence, Holder should 
have ensured that he knew something about the pardon before he 
took action that substantially assisted the chances that the 
pardon would be issued. By helping Quinn circumvent the Justice 
Department, Holder ensured that his own prosecutors would not 
be able to express their opinion about the Rich case. In so 
doing, Holder disserved his own Department, as well as the 
statutes he was sworn to uphold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \648\ In evaluating Holder's motivations, one should keep in mind 
that the only reason Jack Quinn was hired by Marc Rich was because of 
Eric Holder's initial recommendation to Gershon Kekst. Holder's 
suggestion to Kekst that he hire a lawyer like Quinn, who could come to 
him and solve the problem, was a self-fulfilling prophecy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition

    On December 11, 2001, Jack Quinn called White House Counsel 
Beth Nolan to inform her that he would be submitting a pardon 
application to the White House that day.\649\ Quinn personally 
delivered the application to the White House later that 
day.\650\ Accompanying the application was a letter from Quinn 
to President Clinton, briefly explaining Rich's arguments.\651\ 
In that letter, Quinn provided a brief summary of his 
arguments, claiming that a ``grave injustice'' had been done, 
that Rich and Green's attempts at settlement had been rebuffed, 
and that the charges against Rich and Green were unjustified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \649\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 431 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House). By contrast, Kathleen Behan, who was 
present when Quinn called Nolan, told Committee Staff that she did not 
recall Quinn saying he was sending over a pardon application. Behan 
stated, ``It sounded like he didn't need to explain to her what it was. 
It was very cordial conversation.'' Interview with Kathleen Behan, 
Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001).
    \650\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
President William J. Clinton (Dec. 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 147).
    \651\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The filing of the pardon petition triggered a small wave of 
phone calls and other attempts to lobby the President and top 
White House officials on the Rich pardon. These contacts ranged 
from calls from Prime Minister Ehud Barak to personal 
communications between Jack Quinn and his former White House 
colleagues.
            1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak
    On December 11, 2000, the same day that the pardon 
application was delivered to the White House, the Rich pardon 
became a topic of discussion between President Clinton and 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. One can only speculate as to 
whether this was orchestrated or an extraordinary coincidence. 
Barak's involvement in the lobbying campaign was secured by 
Avner Azulay of the Rich Foundation. On May 13, 2001, Barak 
responded to a March 8, 2001, inquiry by the Committee 
concerning his involvement in the Rich pardon. As he stated in 
his letter:

        Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman 
        of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr. 
        Azoulay [sic] is a man I know [sic] for many years, who 
        had contributed a lot to the security of the State of 
        Israel for its philanthropic activities in the fields 
        of healthcare, education and culture.

        Mr. Azoulay [sic] asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with 
        President Clinton. I raised the subject with President 
        Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of 
        routine telephone conversations during the last two or 
        three months of his presidency and made a personal 
        recommendation to him to consider the case.\652\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \652\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the 
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) 
(Exhibit 99).

    The first of these three telephone conversations between 
Barak and Clinton concerning clemency for Marc Rich took place 
on December 11, 2000. The notes of the conversation taken by 
National Security Council staff indicate Prime Minister Barak 
raised the matter towards the end of the nineteen-minute 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conversation:

        Barak. Okay, thank you. One last remark. There is an 
        American Jewish businessman living in Switzerland and 
        making a lot of philanthropic contributions to Israeli 
        institutions and activities like education, and he is a 
        man called Mark [sic] Rich. He violated certain rules 
        of the game in the United States and is living abroad. 
        I just wanted to let you know that here he is highly 
        appreciated for his support of so many philanthropic 
        institutions and funds, and that if I can, I would like 
        to make my recommendation to consider his case.

        Clinton. I am going to take all of them up at the same 
        time. I know about that case because I know his ex-
        wife. She wants to help him, too. If your ex-wife wants 
        to help you, that's good.

        Barak. Oh. I know his new wife only, an Italian woman, 
        very young. Okay. So, Mr. President, thank you very 
        much. We will be in touch.\653\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \653\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation 
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, 
Israel (Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 148).

    As this exchange indicates, President Clinton may have 
already heard of the Marc Rich matter because of some contact 
with Denise Rich. It is unclear, however, when this contact 
occurred or in what context it occurred. It is also possible 
that President Clinton discussed with Denise Rich her ex-
husband's pardon over the phone. Phone records reflect a number 
of telephone calls between Rich and the White House.\654\ It 
may also be that the President discussed the Marc Rich matter 
with Beth Dozoretz, who visited the White House on numerous 
occasions and placed numerous phone calls prior to Barak's 
first phone call. In any event, it is clear from the transcript 
of this conversation that President Clinton was already aware 
of the Marc Rich pardon effort when he first spoke with Prime 
Minister Barak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \654\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from 
Denise Rich to the White House, Dec. 9, 1999); Qwest Document 
Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House, Feb. 
16, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There were additional lobbying contacts made with the White 
House on the Marc Rich matter on December 11. That same day, 
former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres contacted President 
Clinton about the Marc Rich case. Presumably, this call, like 
the call from Prime Minister Barak, was initiated by Avner 
Azulay. Also on December 11, 2000, President Clinton attempted 
to call Beth Dozoretz. \655\ It is unclear, from available 
documentary evidence, whether Dozoretz successfully spoke with 
the President, or what they spoke about. However, it is clear 
that Dozoretz and President Clinton discussed Marc Rich at some 
point in the days around when the petition was filed. In this 
conversation, President Clinton told Dozoretz that Quinn should 
make his case to the White House Counsel's Office. Finally, as 
discussed above, on December 12, 2000, Elie Wiesel visited the 
White House and may have raised the Rich pardon with a member 
of the White House staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \655\ NARA Document Production (White House record of attempted 
call between Dozoretz and President Clinton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the 
                    White House
    When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich pardon petition with 
the White House and contacted White House staff regarding the 
pardon, he violated Executive Order 12834. On January 20, 1993, 
the first day of the new administration, President Clinton 
signed into law Executive Order 12834.\656\ The order 
prohibited persons who had worked for the administration from 
lobbying the administration for a five-year period.\657\ In 
fact, Jack Quinn had a hand in writing this regulation. Quinn 
had left the White House in February of 1997, and was therefore 
under the prohibition when he submitted the pardon petition. 
Beth Nolan testified that when Quinn brought the pardon 
application to the White House, she raised the issue of his 
eligibility to represent someone before the White House.\658\ 
According to Nolan, Quinn responded to her concerns by telling 
her that he ``had obtained a legal opinion that it was 
permissible for him to represent someone in a pardon 
application.'' \659\ Kathleen Behan also told Committee staff 
that Quinn told Nolan he could act ``pursuant to the exception 
for representations like this.'' \660\ In fact, Quinn does not 
appear to have obtained a ``legal opinion.'' Rather, it appears 
that he exchanged brief e-mails with Kathleen Behan. Behan's 
entire ``legal opinion'' appears to be a two-sentence e-mail 
titled ``Re: exec order 12834.'' Behan stated, ``Certainly the 
plain language you have cited would not preclude your 
participation. I'd be happy to look at the whole order.'' \661\ 
Nolan also testified that she ``asked one of [her] associate 
counsels to look at the question independently and got the 
answer back that Quinn's work did meet the exception.'' \662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \656\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 
149).
    \657\ Id.
    \658\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).
    \659\ Id.
    \660\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 
27, 2001).
    \661\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Kathleen Behan, 
Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Jack Quinn (Dec. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 150).
    \662\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Executive Order 12834 prohibits lobbying of the executive 
branch agency for which the person was employed for a five-year 
period. The exception to this rule referred to by Quinn reads 
as follows:

        [T]he term ``lobby'' does not include: . . . (2) 
        communicating or appearing with regard to a Judicial 
        proceeding, or a criminal or civil law enforcement 
        inquiry, investigation or proceeding (but not with 
        regard to an administrative proceeding) or with regard 
        to an administrative proceeding to the extent that such 
        communications or appearances are made after the 
        commencement of and in connection with the conduct or 
        disposition of a Judicial proceeding[.] \663\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \663\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 
149).

Quinn testified to the Committee that he believed he was within 
this exception when he lobbied the White House on behalf of 
Marc Rich. In response to a question from Congressman 
LaTourette, Quinn stated, ``there was, as you've heard, an 
indictment pending in the Southern District of New York, so 
there was a judicial proceeding that had been commenced.'' 
\664\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \664\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 153 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contradiction of Quinn, ethics expert Stephen Gillers of 
New York University law school says that Quinn has twisted this 
exception beyond its original intent. Gillers explains that the 
provision, known as the ``judicial exception,'' is boilerplate 
for government ethics regulations and laws. It is meant for 
former government employees who are advocates in court, acting 
as attorneys in the traditional sense. According to Gillers:

        The problem with Quinn's efforts to use that loophole 
        is that the president, in exercising his pardon power, 
        is not performing in a judicial capacity . . . . He is 
        performing in an executive capacity. And the pardon 
        function does not enjoy any of the safeguards that led 
        to the creation of the judicial exception. There is no 
        judge, there is no adversary process necessary and 
        there is no sunshine. . . . I don't think any 
        reasonable interpretation of the language, in light of 
        the history of this exception, can support his claim[.] 
        \665\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \665\ James V. Grimaldi, In Rich Pardon Case, Did Quinn Violate the 
Ethics Rule He Wrote?, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2001, at E4.

    Quinn's claim that he was appearing with regard to a 
``judicial proceeding'' is not credible. Quinn was appearing to 
obtain a pardon, which is not a judicial power, but rather, is 
an executive power. If Quinn had been lobbying the President to 
intervene and force the Justice Department to drop criminal 
charges against Rich, his argument might be more sound. Quinn's 
claim was also severely undercut by a ruling in Federal Court 
that he and his colleagues were acting principally as lobbyists 
in the Rich case, rather than as attorneys.\666\ As Judge Chin 
held in that decision:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \666\ In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. M11-189 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

        Although Quinn may be an excellent attorney, he was 
        preceded by series of excellent attorneys; clearly, he 
        was not hired for his ability to formulate better legal 
        arguments or write better briefs. To the extent it 
        contained legal arguments at all, the [pardon] Petition 
        made the same arguments that Rich and his prior 
        attorneys had been presenting, unsuccessfully, to the 
        Southern District for almost 17 years. Rather, Quinn 
        was hired because he was ``Washington wise'' and 
        understood ``the entire political process.'' He was 
        hired because he could telephone the White House and 
        engage in a 20-minute conversation with the President. 
        He was hired because he could write the President a 
        ``personal note'' that said ``I believe in this cause 
        with all my heart,'' and he would know that the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        President would read the note and give it weight.

                                *  *  *


        The public relations consultants and media experts here 
        were not helping the lawyers prepare for litigation. It 
        was the other way around, as the lawyers were being 
        used principally to put legal trappings on what was 
        essentially a lobbying and political effort.\667\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \667\ Id. at 41-42.

    It should also be noted that Quinn's position is 
diametrically opposed to Hugh Rodham's view of his work 
lobbying for pardons. Rodham received two large contingency 
fees for his work in lobbying for a pardon for Glenn Braswell 
and a commutation for Carlos Vignali. Florida bar rules 
prohibit lawyers from receiving contingency fees in criminal 
matters. When questioned about this matter, Rodham took the 
position that his contingency fees were permissible, because 
his appearance before the White House was a lobbying matter, 
not a criminal matter.

E. The Lobbying Effort

    After the initial filing of the pardon petition, the Marc 
Rich legal team began a coordinated campaign to lobby the White 
House on the Rich and Green pardons. These contacts ranged from 
telephone calls from Jack Quinn to Beth Nolan, to personal 
appeals made by Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz to the President, 
to calls from other lawyers to staff they knew at the White 
House. The apparent goal of this campaign was to raise the Rich 
pardon as frequently as possible and keep it as prominent as 
possible in the White House, without letting anyone outside of 
the White House know of the effort.
            1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast
    Immediately after submitting the pardon application, Jack 
Quinn began to personally lobby the White House on behalf of 
Marc Rich. On December 13, 2000, Jack Quinn traveled to 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, with President Clinton's delegation 
for the peace talks. During this trip, Quinn took the 
opportunity to raise the Marc Rich pardon with Bruce Lindsey, 
who was also on the trip. But the first reaction by the Deputy 
White House Counsel was not positive: ``Mr. Quinn asked me if I 
had gotten his packet of material on Mr. Rich and Mr. Green. I 
told him I had. He asked me what I thought. I told him I 
thought they were fugitives.'' \668\ Apparently, Quinn disputed 
Lindsey's assertion, but it is not clear what else they 
discussed about the Rich matter during the Belfast trip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \668\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 323 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to 
the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Quinn returned to the United States, he sent a brief 
letter to Lindsey to try to address Lindsey's concerns. In his 
letter, Quinn summarized some of the same arguments made in the 
pardon petition:

        You expressed a concern that they [Rich and Green] are 
        fugitives; and I told you they are not. Here is why: 
        Rich and Green were in fact residing in Switzerland 
        when they were indicted in September 1983. They 
        (understandably in my mind) chose not to return to the 
        US for a trial in light of all that had happened to 
        them; particularly the enormous and overwhelmingly 
        adverse and prejudicial publicity generated, I am sure, 
        by then U.S. Attorney Giuliani. Their failure to return 
        to New York was not a crime and no one has ever accused 
        them of a crime for failing to come to the US for a 
        trial. . . . Our review of the law in the area (18 USC 
        1073) similarly confirms to us that their conduct is 
        not proscribed by federal law.\669\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \669\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House 
(Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 151).

    Quinn's claims were absurd, and it appears that the White 
House staff recognized that they were absurd. As described 
further below, Rich and Green were fugitives, both in the 
practical and the legal sense. Practically, they fled the 
country when they believed that their indictment was imminent, 
and never returned, because they knew they would be arrested. 
The federal government considered them fugitives, listing Rich 
as one of its ten most wanted international fugitives, 
attempting to extradite Rich and Green, and mounting 
complicated operations to apprehend them abroad. In the legal 
sense, Rich and Green clearly violated the federal statute 
outlawing fugitivity, which prohibits ``travel[ing] in . . . 
foreign commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution.'' 
\670\ The fact that Rich and Green were never charged with 
violating this statute has more to do with the fact that they 
were already facing dozens of felony counts, rather than any 
lack of evidence. It appears that Quinn's facile arguments had 
little impact on Lindsey as he, and every other lawyer at the 
White House who considered the Marc Rich matter, continued to 
believe that Rich was a fugitive.\671\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \670\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073 (2000). This section states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GWhoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign 
      commerce with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or 
      custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of 
      the place from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt 
      to commit a crime, punishable by death or which is a felony 
      under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees, 
      or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal 
      proceedings in such place in which the commission of an 
      offense punishable by death or which is a felony under the 
      laws of such place, is charged, or (3) to avoid service of, 
      or contempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of, lawful 
      process requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or 
      the production of documentary evidence before an agency of 
      a State empowered by the law of such State to conduct 
      investigations of alleged criminal activities, shall be 
      fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
      years, or both. For the purposes of clause (3) of this 
      paragraph, the term ``State'' includes a State of the 
      United States, the District of Columbia, and any 
      commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
      States. Violations of this section may be prosecuted only 
      in the Federal judicial district in which the original 
      crime was alleged to have been committed, or in which the 
      person was held in custody or confinement, or in which an 
      avoidance of service of process or a contempt referred to 
      in clause (3) of the first paragraph of this section is 
      alleged to have been committed, and only upon formal 
      approval in writing by the Attorney General, the Deputy 
      Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or an 
      Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which 
      function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated. 
      (Emphases added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \671\ Moreover, it appears that Quinn's own associates believed 
that Rich was a fugitive. Shortly after the pardon was granted, Jeff 
Connaughton, one of Quinn's partners, sent him an e-mail explaining 
that Quinn had to make the case that ``President Clinton was right to 
pardon Rich despite the fact that he's a fugitive.'' Jack Quinn 
Document Production JQ 03088 (E-mail from Jeff Connaughton, Quinn 
Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 27, 2001)) (Exhibit 152).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More important, should there have been any doubt about the 
matter, Quinn had Denise Rich to tell him what really happened. 
As she succinctly explained to the American people on April 27, 
2001:

        Question. How did you find out [about the indictment] 
        and what was your reaction?

        Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me 
        and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the 
        government. And--and I think that we are going to have 
        to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These 
        are my children. I'm not going to split up the 
        family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would 
        do. I left the country.\672\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \672\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).

There can be no clearer ``cause and effect'' explanation of 
what happened than this, and it is hard to argue that Denise 
Rich failed to understand, at the time, why she and her 
children fled from the United States. In short, Quinn's after-
the-fact rationalization is nothing more than pure dishonesty.
            2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta
    Peter Kadzik is a partner at the law firm Dickstein Shapiro 
Morin & Oshinsky LLP, the same firm as long-time Rich lawyers 
Michael Green and I. Lewis Libby. Kadzik was recruited into 
Marc Rich's lobbying campaign because he was a long-time friend 
of White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, dating back to law 
school. Kadzik had also represented Podesta in connection with 
Congressional and independent counsel investigations.\673\ Over 
the course of his lobbying efforts for Marc Rich, Peter Kadzik 
had seven contacts with either Podesta or administrative staff 
at the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \673\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 445-46 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro 
Morin & Oshinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 12, 2000, Peter Kadzik had his first telephone 
conversation with John Podesta relating to the Marc Rich pardon 
application.\674\ In his opening testimony before the 
Committee, Podesta explained his initial contact with Kadzik:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \674\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky 
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).

        My first recollection of this matter is that some time 
        in mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter 
        Kadzik who has been a friend of mine since we attended 
        law school together in the mid-1970's. I remember that 
        Mr. Kadzik told me that his firm represented Mr. Rich 
        and Mr. Green in connection with a criminal case and 
        that Jack Quinn was seeking a Presidential pardon from 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        them.

        At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green 
        case. Mr. Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon 
        matters at the White House. I recalled that I told him 
        that the White House Counsel's office was reviewing 
        pardon applications.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \675\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).

    A few days after this initial contact, on December 15, 
2000, Kadzik sent Podesta a copy of Jack Quinn's cover letter 
to the pardon application, which provided a summary of Marc 
Rich's case.\676\ Podesta testified that he forwarded this on 
to the White House Counsel's Office.\677\ Kadzik next contacted 
Podesta on January 2, 2001.\678\ According to Podesta, Kadzik 
``asked, in light of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued 
around Christmas, whether any more pardons were likely to be 
considered.'' \679\ Podesta told Kadzik that President Clinton 
``was considering additional pardons and commutations, but it 
was unlikely that one would be granted under the circumstances 
he had briefly described unless the counsel's office, having 
reviewed the case on the merits, believed that some real 
injustice had been done.'' \680\ Apparently, Kadzik also 
informed his partner Michael Green that the Rich case was 
pending, and would be considered within the next week, but that 
they needed a supporter in the Counsel's Office. As Fink 
explained to Jack Quinn:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \676\ Id. See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document 
Production DSM0005 (Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein 
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House (Dec. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 153).
    \677\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
    \678\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky 
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
    \679\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
    \680\ Id.

        Mike spoke with his partner [Kadzik] today who spoke to 
        Podesta who said, in effect, that we are still in the 
        running but we are fourth and long. It seems that there 
        are many requests and only the ones being pushed by 
        Beth or Bruce are being followed, so we have to get one 
        of them strongly behind this. They have to become 
        advocates.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \681\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0370 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Michael Green, 
Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 
154).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fink sent a similar message to Avner Azulay:

        I learned from Mike Green today that our case is still 
        pending and is part of a large group that may be 
        considered at the end of the week. But his friend 
        [Kadzik] told him that we need a rabbi among the people 
        in the counsel's office (it seems that Mike's friend 
        [Kadzik] believes we do not have one yet), so I have 
        written Jack to ask him to follow up with the two 
        people there (Beth and Bruce), both of whom received 
        our papers, both of whom he knows well and both of whom 
        he has already discussed this matter [sic].\682\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \682\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from 
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 155). Fink's use of the term ``rabbi'' caused some confusion 
for Azulay, who responded ``I don't understand the comment about the 
rabbi. Our book is full of rabbis. Could you get more specific?'' Id. 
Fink then responded, ``Yes, by rabbi I meant someone inside who is in 
favor of the pardon and working for it to be granted. Sorry about the 
lack of clarity, it is just common usage here.'' Id.

    On January 6, 2001, Kadzik met with Podesta in the White 
House.\683\ At this meeting, Podesta conveyed the collective 
view of the White House Counsel's Office on the potential 
pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \683\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House). See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & 
Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records of Dickstein 
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 
2001)) (Exhibit 143).

        I told him that I, along with the entire White House 
        staff counsel, opposed it and that I did not think it 
        would be granted. At that point, I believed that the 
        pardons would not be granted in light of the uniform 
        staff recommendation to the contrary and that little 
        more needed to be done on the matter.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \684\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).

Notwithstanding Podesta's negative views, and the discouraging 
news on the White House's consideration of the Rich pardon, 
Kadzik placed one more call to Podesta on January 16, 
2001.\685\ According to Podesta, Kadzik told him that ``he had 
been informed that the President had reviewed the submissions 
Mr. Quinn had sent in and was impressed with them and was once 
again considering the pardon.'' \686\ Podesta told Kadzik that 
he still opposed the pardon and did not believe it would be 
granted.\687\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \685\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky 
to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
    \686\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
    \687\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Taking John Podesta's testimony at face value, it does not 
appear that the Rich team's Kadzik approach was successful. 
Podesta, like Bruce Lindsey and the other key staff, appears to 
have been steadfastly against the pardon. However, as is 
discussed in more detail below, notwithstanding their strong 
opposition, White House staff did not give their best efforts 
to dissuade President Clinton from granting the Rich and Green 
pardons.
            3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House 
                    Staff
    After Peter Kadzik spoke to John Podesta, and learned that 
Rich needed a ``rabbi'' among the White House staff to press 
the case for a pardon, Robert Fink decided that they needed to 
press their case as strongly as possible at both the staff 
level and with the President.\688\ Fink then apparently asked 
Jack Quinn to make another call to the White House.\689\ Quinn 
agreed to make the call,\690\ and spoke to Beth Nolan on 
January 3, 2001.\691\ He reported back to Fink, Marc Rich, 
Avner Azulay, and Behan later on January 3:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \688\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00106-07 (E-mail from 
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 156).
    \689\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from 
Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 155).
    \690\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from 
Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157).
    \691\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0864 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 158).

        I just got off the phone with Beth Nolan, the White 
        House Counsel. She told me that her office will do the 
        next ``reassessment'' of our and other applications on 
        Friday [January 5]. I impressed upon her that our case 
        is ``sui generis'' only in that M[arc] R[ich] was 
        indicted but did not stand trial and then elaborated at 
        some length on the circumstances of MR's decision not 
        to return--the facts that Rudy was new, was trying to 
        make a reputation, overcharged in the most gross way 
        (and in ways that would not stand today--RICO, mail/
        wire fraud, etc.) and that MR, seeing the mountain of 
        adverse publicity generated by the US Atty's ofc and 
        the disproportionate charges, made the choice anyone 
        would make, i.e., not to return. She responded that 
        this is still a tough case--that the perception will 
        nevertheless be that MR is in some ``sense'' a 
        fugitive. I explained why he is not. I told her that I 
        want an opportunity to know, before a final decision, 
        if there are things we have not said or done that 
        should be said or done. She promised me that 
        opportunity. I asked if she would see us to review the 
        matter in person and she said she would if there was 
        reason to think, after her reassessment, that that 
        would be fruitful. I told her, finallt [sic], that I 
        intend to have one more conversation with POTUS before 
        this is finalized in order to make the case to him, 
        focusing in particular on his appreciation of what an 
        overly-zealous prosecutor can do to make a fair trial, 
        in court or in the court of public opinion, impossible. 
        Lastly, I told her that, if they pardon J[onathan] 
        P[ollard], then pardoning MR is easy, but that, if they 
        do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the 
        last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from 
        people in or connected to the G[overnment] O[f] 
        I[srael].\692\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \692\ Id.

    After this call, Jack Quinn also tried to bring another 
former White House staffer into the Marc Rich pardon effort. 
Cheryl Mills was the former Deputy Counsel to the President, 
and was now an executive at Oxygen Media in New York. However, 
Mills was still influential in the Clinton White House, and 
Quinn brought his arguments to her. At some point before 
January 5, 2001, Quinn apparently called Mills and discussed 
the Rich pardon with her. Then, on January 5, 2001, Mills was 
in the White House for a party for former White House 
Counsels.\693\ On January 5, Quinn sent a new letter to the 
President outlining his key arguments on the Rich pardon.\694\ 
He sent copies of this letter to Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and 
Mills.\695\ Quinn explained that he sent the material to Mills 
because she was:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \693\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
    \694\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 159).
    \695\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00153 (E-mail from 
April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to 
Robert Fink and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Jan. 5, 
2001)) (Exhibit 160).

        A person who, after some 7 years at the White House, 
        was enormously well regarded and trusted, well might at 
        some point be consulted on this. I had raised with her 
        the fact that I was pursuing the pardon as I did with 
        others from time to time to just bounce ideas off. But 
        also I was hopeful, knowing of her relationship with 
        Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey and the President, that as 
        any good lawyer would, that as this thing progressed, 
        if it were progressing, that I would get some sense of 
        how people were reacting to different arguments in 
        order that I might be in a position to know better what 
        concerns the folks advising the President might have so 
        that I might address those concerns.\696\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \696\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 331 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

Then, at the party for former White House Counsels later that 
day, where the former counsels, including Abner Mikva, Lloyd 
Cutler, and Bernard Nussbaum were filming a video for President 
Clinton, Quinn raised the Rich pardon with Nolan again. At that 
time, Mills told Quinn to ``stop pestering'' Nolan about the 
Rich pardon.\697\ While Mills had received information about 
the pardon from Quinn, she was not familiar enough with the 
issue to discuss the merits with Quinn.\698\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \697\ Id. at 333.
    \698\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While Quinn apparently did not make much progress with 
Mills at the January 5 party, he did lay important groundwork 
for the last day of the Clinton Administration, when Cheryl 
Mills would be the most supportive voice for the Rich pardon 
among White House staff.
            4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and Justice 
                    Department
    When he met with Eric Holder on November 21, 2000, Jack 
Quinn had told Holder that he was going to urge the White House 
to contact him about the Rich pardon. At the time, Holder had 
indicated that he looked forward to contact from the White 
House. True to his word, Quinn did suggest that the White House 
contact Holder. Quinn recognized that what Holder said to the 
White House would be crucial to whether or not Rich received a 
pardon. In an e-mail on Christmas 2000, Quinn told his 
colleagues that ``[t]he greatest danger lies with the lawyers. 
I have worked them hard and I am hopeful that E. Holder will be 
helpful to us. But we can expect some outreach to NY.'' \699\ 
Apparently, Quinn underestimated just how helpful Holder would 
be, keeping the Rich pardon completely to himself, and keeping 
his prosecutors in New York from even knowing about the effort 
to pardon Rich, much less asking for their opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \699\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack 
Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 
2000)) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the first week of January, Beth Nolan met with 
Holder, and asked for his opinion regarding a number of 
clemency matters. During this conversation, Nolan brought up 
Marc Rich's name. Holder told Nolan that he was neutral.\700\ 
Later, at the Committee's February 8 hearing, Holder explained 
that when he used the term ``neutral,'' he was trying to convey 
that he ``didn't have the basis to form an opinion.'' \701\ 
However, it is unclear why, if he was trying to tell Nolan that 
he did not know enough about the Rich case to have an opinion, 
Holder simply did not say that. In addition, it is strange that 
Holder would start out with a position of ``neutral'' on the 
Rich case, knowing what he did, namely, that Rich was a 
fugitive from justice, that his had been one of the largest tax 
cases in history, and that the prosecutors in New York would 
not even meet with his lawyers. However, late on January 19, 
2001, Holder would revise his opinion of the Rich pardon from 
``neutral'' to ``neutral, leaning towards favorable,'' on the 
basis of a third-hand account of Prime Minister Barak's call to 
President Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \700\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 205 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice). See also id. at 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) 
(testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White 
House).
    \701\ Id. at 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former 
Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Holder's default position of neutrality on the Marc Rich 
case is especially peculiar in light of express Justice 
Department policy regarding grants of clemency to fugitives. In 
the case of Fernando Fuentes Coba, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams 
rejected Fuentes' petition for clemency because Fuentes was a 
fugitive from the United States. Adams stated that:

        Mr. [Fuentes] Coba is ineligible to apply for a 
        presidential pardon. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 . . 
        . ``[n]o petition for pardon should be filed until the 
        expiration of a waiting period of at least five years 
        after the date of the release of the petitioner from 
        confinement . . . .'' Because Mr. Coba has served none 
        of his prison sentence, he fails to meet this most 
        basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration. 
        Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently 
        declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals, 
        such as Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon 
        process assumes the Government's ability to implement 
        either of the President's possible decisions regarding 
        a petition--that is, a denial of clemency as well as a 
        grant of clemency. Put another way, it is not 
        reasonable to allow a person to ask that the President 
        grant him a pardon which, if granted, would have the 
        effect of eliminating the term of imprisonment to which 
        he has been sentenced, while at the same time 
        insulating himself from having to serve the sentence if 
        the pardon is denied.\702\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \702\ Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams, 
Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera, 
Counsel to Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt & Rasenberger (Nov. 7, 
2000)) (Exhibit 161).

The same principles should have applied to the Marc Rich 
pardon. The fact that Eric Holder disregarded this policy, as 
well as every other warning sign about the Rich case, raises 
further questions about his motivations in the Rich case.
            5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and Ehud 
                    Barak
    The second week in January started with another call from 
Prime Minister Barak on the Rich pardon. Towards the end of the 
eighteen-minute call on January 8, 2001, Barak mentioned the 
Marc Rich pardon for a second time. It appears that this second 
conversation was prompted by a meeting between Marc Rich and 
Prime Minister Barak. A January 12, 2001, e-mail from Avner 
Azulay to Jack Quinn, Marc Rich, Robert Fink, and Kathleen 
Behan included the subject line ``telecons to potus.'' \703\ As 
Azulay wrote, ``Following mr's mtg with the pm--the latter 
called potus this week. Potus said he is very much aware of the 
case, ``that he is looking into it and that he saw 2 fat books 
which were prepared by these people.'' Potus sounded positive 
but maede [sic] no concrete promise.'' \704\ Azulay's summary 
closely tracks the discussion between the President and the 
Prime Minister as recorded by the National Security Council 
staff:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \703\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00166 (E-mail from 
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 12, 
2001)) (Exhibit 162).
    \704\ Id.

        Prime Minister Barak. Let me tell you last but not 
        least two names I want to mention. [Redacted] The 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        second is Mark [sic], the Jewish American.

        President Clinton. I know quite a few things about 
        that. I just got a long memo and am working on it. It's 
        best that we not say much about that.

        Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I understand. I'm not 
        mentioning it in any place.

        President Clinton. I understand.

        Prime Minister Barak. I believe it could be important 
        [gap] not just financially, but he helped Mossad on 
        more than one case.

        President Clinton. It is a bizarre case, and I am 
        working on it.

        Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I really appreciate 
        it.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \705\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation 
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, 
Israel (Jan. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 148).

    Two facts about this telephone conversation stand out. 
First, it appears that President Clinton told Prime Minister 
Barak to ``not say much'' about the Rich matter. It is 
difficult to know exactly what the President meant by this 
comment, but one interpretation is that President Clinton did 
not want to discuss the Rich matter with Barak when there were 
a number of staff on the line taking notes about the 
conversation. Perhaps most important, if he was leaning towards 
pardoning Rich, he probably understood that if this became 
known, the public outcry would have made the pardon politically 
untenable. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other reason 
why President Clinton would tell Prime Minister Barak to ``not 
say much'' about Rich.
    Another critical element of the telephone call is Barak's 
statement that ``I believe it could be important [gap] not just 
financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' Read 
literally, Barak's statement suggests that the Rich pardon had 
future financial implications for Barak, and perhaps President 
Clinton as well. It is also possible, though, that Prime 
Minister Barak was referring to Rich's past financial 
assistance to Israel. While the Committee does not have enough 
information to confirm that Barak or Clinton took action on 
behalf of Rich in exchange for future payment, Barak's comments 
raise this possibility.
            6. ``The HRC Option''
    The Marc Rich legal team used a number of approaches to 
influence President Clinton and his staff. One approach that 
was considered was for then-First Lady Hillary Clinton to 
become involved. There is now, however, a uniform denial that 
she ever participated in the Marc Rich pardon process.
    Beginning in late December, the lawyers representing Rich 
had a number of discussions in which they debated the merit of 
asking Hillary Clinton for help with the Rich pardon. 
Apparently the first discussions regarding Mrs. Clinton started 
around December 26, 2000, when Robert Fink sent the following 
e-mail to Quinn, with copies to Marc Rich, Kitty Behan, and 
Avner Azulay: ``Kitty and I think the best person to call 
Hilary [sic] (if it makes sense to call her at all) may well be 
Denise. She is in Aspen; let me know if you need the number.'' 
\706\ Later that day, Fink e-mailed the same group again:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \706\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00072 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 
163).

        Of all the options we discussed, the only one that 
        seems to have real potential for making a difference is 
        the HRC option and even that has peril if not handled 
        correctly. I assume, and am emphasizing that this is an 
        assumption, that we want Avner to speak to Abe [Foxman] 
        about the support this will get in NY to see if Abe 
        could make the necessary representation to HRC.\707\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \707\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00075 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 
164).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following day, December 27, 2000, Avner Azulay weighed in:

        I have been advised that HRC shall feel more at ease if 
        she is joined by her elder senator of NY who also 
        represents the jewish [sic] population. The private 
        request from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems that 
        this shall be a prerequisite from her formal position 
        [sic].\708\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \708\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00080 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 165).

Robert Fink passed this recommendation on to Gershon Kekst, who 
had been advising the Rich team with media relations. Kekst 
seemed to be taken with the idea, and recommended asking 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Schumer's campaign contributors to ``lean'' on him:

        Good point. Can [Q]uinn tell us who is close enough to 
        lean on [S]chumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, 
        but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us 
        quickly who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe 
        Bernard Schwartz?? \709\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \709\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 
(E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink 
(Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135).

    Jack Quinn apparently signed onto the concept of involving 
the First Lady in the Rich pardon effort. On December 28, 2000, 
Robert Fink apparently contacted Quinn about the proposal, and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sent the following confirming e-mail to Quinn:

        I understand I am to call DR and ask her to call HRC, 
        but I wanted to talk to you first to make sure that 
        makes sense and to determine what you thought DR should 
        be saying, not just what she should be asking.\710\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \710\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00401 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 166).

It appears that Robert Fink discussed the ``HRC option'' with 
Denise Rich, and that Denise Rich did not react well to the 
idea. He sent the following e-mail to Azulay and Marc Rich on 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 28, describing his conversation with Denise Rich:

        I spoke to DR who was adamantly against the proposal. 
        She is convinced it would be viewed badly by the 
        recipient. Nothing good will come of the overture even 
        with a good word from anyone in NY. She said she is 
        convinced of this and so is her friend who has advised 
        DR not to discuss it in front of HRC. I spoke to MR 
        both before the call and in the middle of this email 
        and he now agrees we should do nothing on this 
        topic.\711\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \711\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00087 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, 
and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 167).

    From this e-mail, it appears that the proposal to lobby 
Hillary Clinton was presented to Denise Rich, who in turn 
discussed it with Beth Dozoretz. Dozoretz advised Rich not to 
lobby Hillary Clinton on the pardon, and Denise Rich rejected 
the plan. In turn, Marc Rich decided not to press the matter 
any further. However, Jack Quinn and Robert Fink still saw 
merit in the ``HRC option,'' and continued to pursue it. Quinn 
told Fink that he thought ``the friend [Dozoretz] is naive to 
think this will not be discussed in front of her [Hillary 
Clinton].'' \712\ Fink replied that ``I cannot help but think 
they are right. She has something to lose and little to gain 
and may not want anything which will affect her new position.'' 
\713\ Quinn also stated, ``I continue to think it most likely 
HRC would be at least informed before anything positive 
happens, given the possibility of a Giuliani/NY press 
reaction.'' \714\ Fink then replied to Quinn's suggestion: ``I 
will call Avner to see what he thinks. . . . DR was very sure 
speaking to HRC was a mistake and told me that Beth worned 
[sic] her not to raise the issue while HRC was in ear shot. 
Still want to contact HRC?'' \715\ Quinn replied:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \712\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 28, 2000)) 
(Exhibit 36).
    \713\ Id.
    \714\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00089 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 168).
    \715\ Id.

        [I]t's a tough call, no doubt. [I] just think HE will 
        know the calculation you mention and therefore she will 
        become aware it is pending. If this is right, do we 
        want her to hear about it first in that way or from 
        someone (assuming we have someone) who can put it to 
        her in the context we need? \716\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \716\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 
00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) 
(Exhibit 36).

    By January 2, 2001, Fink was apparently convinced, and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
suggested to Quinn that he call Hillary Clinton:

        Frankly, I think you are the best person at this point. 
        You signed the petition and the letter and know the 
        case better than anyone else who could call. DR is out 
        and probably could only make a personal appeal. You 
        know of Abe Foxman and of the Israeli connection and of 
        all the giving and the Brooklyn connection (Pinky). So 
        my vote is that you call her.\717\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \717\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00102 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 
169).

But, it appears that by later on January 2 and on January 3, 
Marc Rich and Avner Azulay had decided against an approach to 
Hillary Clinton. First, around January 2, Marc Rich apparently 
spoke to Denise Rich. Azulay reported that ``her impression--
from Beth is that HRC shall try to be protective of her husband 
and stay out of potential trouble.'' The following day, January 
3, Azulay e-mailed Quinn, Fink, Behan and Rich, and stated 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that:

        Looking from the sideline and hearing all this--I would 
        like to forward the idea that perhaps we should just 
        leave HRC alone. By initiating a call to her we are 
        ``saying in a way that there is a problem here . . .'', 
        and in the process we might create a problem out of 
        speculations on her reaction. I don't think we have any 
        positive knowledge that she is for or against, only 
        assumptions. Potus should deal with this himself--and 
        if it does then intervene with all the arguments 
        etc.\718\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \718\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00109 
(E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et 
al. (Jan 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157).

    Apparently, Azulay's suggestion settled the matter, as 
there was no more discussion of the ``HRC option.'' At the 
Committee's February 8 hearing, Jack Quinn testified that ``I'm 
confident that I never communicated with the First Lady about 
this, and I don't believe that anyone else did.'' \719\ In 
addition, the Committee has received no documents suggesting 
that the First Lady was actually contacted by anyone connected 
to Marc Rich or that the First Lady offered any opinion on the 
Marc Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \719\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 257 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort

            1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta
    As the end of the Clinton presidency approached, the Marc 
Rich legal team increased the intensity of its lobbying 
efforts. Peter Kadzik called the White House four out of the 
final five days of the Administration to see what progress had 
been made on the Rich pardon. On January 16, 2001, he spoke to 
his friend and sometime client, White House Chief of Staff John 
Podesta. Kadzik asked Podesta what the status of the Rich 
pardon was, and what recommendation the White House staff would 
make. After a conversation with Podesta, Kadzik relayed the 
results of that conversation to his partner at Dickstein 
Shapiro, Michael Green. The two calls took Kadzik a total of 
thirty minutes.\720\ According to an e-mail sent by Robert Fink 
to the rest of the Rich legal team:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \720\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0064 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to 
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).

        [Kadzik partner] Mike Green called after speaking with 
        Peter [Kadzik] who spoke with Podesta: it seems that 
        while the staff are not supportive they are not in a 
        veto mode, and that your efforts with POTUS are being 
        felt. It sounds like you are making headway and should 
        keep at it as long as you can. We are definitely still 
        in the game.\721\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \721\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00169 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 
170).

The e-mail message indicates that Podesta informed Kadzik that 
he and the other key White House staff did not support the Rich 
pardon, but at the same time, appeared to give Kadzik some 
encouragement, indicating that the President still might decide 
to grant the Rich pardon. However, when questioned about these 
discussions at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, both 
Podesta and Kadzik disowned the contents of the e-mail message. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Podesta described the conversation with Kadzik as follows:

        He told me he had been informed that the President had 
        reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in and was 
        impressed with them and was once again considering the 
        pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to the 
        pardons and that I did not believe they would be 
        granted.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \722\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).

Kadzik likewise indicated that the e-mail describing his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conversation with Podesta was inaccurate:

        Mr. LaTourette. [T]his e-mail in particular states that 
        Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I assume is you, who 
        spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told Peter that 
        while the staff are not supportive they are not in the 
        veto mode.

        First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you 
        on January 16th?

        Mr. Kadzik. No. . . . Again, he told me he was opposed 
        to it, that the staff was opposed to it, but no final 
        decision had been made and again the decision was the 
        President's.\723\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \723\ Id. at 464-66 (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein 
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky).

    It is difficult to square the recollections of John Podesta 
and Peter Kadzik with the contents of the Robert Fink e-mail 
message. The e-mail message is consistent with the portrait of 
the White House painted by a number of other contemporaneous e-
mail messages--namely that the White House staff opposed the 
Rich pardon, but was not fully engaged on the issue, and that 
the President was open to it. This is the message that the Marc 
Rich legal team was getting from its contacts with the White 
House, despite the after-the-fact characterizations from 
Podesta and Kadzik.
            2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich
    White House staff had a number of contacts with Jack Quinn 
and other lawyers representing Marc Rich regarding the Rich 
pardon in December 2000 and January 2001. Similarly, the 
President had contacts with individuals advocating on Rich's 
behalf during those two months. However, the first time that 
the President sat down with his staff to discuss the Rich 
pardon was January 16, 2001, just four days before the end of 
his Administration. The purpose of the January 16 meeting was 
for the President to discuss other clemency matters with White 
House staff. According to John Podesta, who was present at the 
meeting, President Clinton then initiated discussion of Marc 
Rich:

        [T]he President brought up the Rich case and told us 
        that he thought Mr. Quinn had made some meritorious 
        points in his submission. He clearly had digested the 
        legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he made a 
        point of noting the Justice Department had abandoned 
        the legal theory underlying the RICO count and 
        mentioned the Ginsburg/Wolfman tax analyses. The staff 
        informed the President that it was our view that the 
        pardon should not be granted.\724\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \724\ Id. at 317 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff 
to the President, the White House).

Podesta interpreted the President's reaction to the views of 
the White House staff as meaning that ``he accepted our 
judgment and I didn't think this was a particularly active 
matter.'' \725\ Beth Nolan, who also attended the January 16 
meeting, also remembered a fairly brief discussion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \725\ Id. at 325.

        I don't recall that it was an extensive discussion. 
        However, we were going through a number of pardon 
        applications, and my memory is that it was a fairly 
        brief discussion in which he heard from all of us our 
        opposition. I didn't think it was going anywhere. . . . 
        I did not believe that the pardon was going anywhere. 
        He was familiar with it. He was sympathetic with it. 
        And he was familiar with the issues, but I did not have 
        the sense . . . at that meeting or until the 19th that 
        he really was inclined to grant the pardon.\726\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \726\ Id. at 324-25 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).

While Beth Nolan interpreted the President's comments as 
meaning that the Rich pardon was not ``going anywhere,'' Bruce 
Lindsey did not reach the same conclusion, informing the 
Committee, ``I clearly left the meeting understanding that no 
decision had been made. I don't know if I knew what was in his 
mind.'' \727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \727\ Id. at 325 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel 
to the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The account of the January 16, 2001, meeting appears to be 
an attempt by senior White House staff to explain why they were 
caught so unprepared when the President decided to grant the 
Marc Rich pardon three days later. As became clear on that day, 
White House staff knew little about the Rich case, and had not 
made any attempt to gather the necessary information. The 
ignorance of the senior White House staff meant that they were 
unable to provide any clear refutation of the arguments made by 
the Rich legal team. As explained by Beth Nolan, John Podesta, 
and to a lesser extent, Bruce Lindsey, they were caught 
unprepared because they simply did not believe that the 
President was going forward with the Rich pardon, based on the 
opposition that they expressed at the January 16 meeting. This 
argument explains why White House staff, while claiming to be 
opposed to the Rich pardon, did so little to actually keep it 
from being granted.
    However, the defense of the White House staff does not seem 
to comport fully with reality. While the President listened to 
the White House staff as they objected to the Rich pardon, he 
apparently did not say anything to indicate that he actually 
agreed with White House staff. Rather, he clearly expressed 
that he was sympathetic to the Rich pardon. If the White House 
staff were serious about opposing the Rich pardon, they would 
have done more than simply express their opposition to the 
pardon. They would have taken the time period between January 
16 and January 20 to gather information about the Rich case, 
and present it to the President as reasons why he should not 
grant the pardon. Unfortunately, White House staff never took 
any such steps.
            3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January 10 
                    Letter
    On January 17, 2001, the letter that Jack Quinn sent to 
Eric Holder on January 10, 2001, finally arrived at the Justice 
Department. Quinn had intended to have the letter delivered to 
Holder by messenger, but due to a secretarial error, the letter 
was sent to 901 E Street, in Washington, rather than the main 
Justice Department headquarters building, where Holder 
maintained his office.\728\ The January 10 letter from Quinn to 
Holder represented the only documentary information the Justice 
Department ever received regarding the Rich pardon. The cover 
letter from Quinn to Holder stated ``I hope you can say you 
agree with this letter. Your saying positive things, I'm told, 
would make this happen.'' Attached to the letter was a copy of 
Quinn's January 5 letter to President Clinton, which summarized 
the arguments made by Quinn in the Rich pardon petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \728\ The Justice Department's Civil Division maintained offices at 
901 E Street. While it is not clear why Quinn sent the letter to 901 E 
Street, the most obvious explanation is that Quinn's secretary had sent 
materials to the Justice Department Civil Division offices at 901 E 
Street in the past, and mistakenly assumed that Deputy Attorney General 
Holder had an office at 901 E Street as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between January 10 and January 17, this letter made its way 
from the Justice Department offices at 901 E Street to the 
Justice Department Executive Secretariat, which is in charge of 
managing the paper flow at Justice Department headquarters. 
Despite the fact that the letter was addressed to the Deputy 
Attorney General, because it obviously related to pardon 
matters, the letter was directed to Roger Adams, the Pardon 
Attorney. The Office of Pardon Attorney received the letter 
during the afternoon of January 18, and Adams saw it in his 
inbox on the morning of Friday, January 19.\729\ Adams drafted 
a short response to the Quinn letter, stating that neither Marc 
Rich nor Pincus Green had filed a pardon petition with the 
Justice Department, and advising Quinn that petition forms were 
available upon request from his office. Adams decided not to 
send the letter out, and instead hold it until the following 
Monday. Adams explained that he did not send the letter out 
because he recognized Jack Quinn's name, and knew that Quinn 
had substantial influence as a former White House Counsel, and 
acknowledged that he could not be certain of what was going on 
at the White House. Rather than send out what amounted to a 
rejection letter for a person who might yet receive a pardon 
later that day, Adams decided to hold the letter until after 
President Clinton left office, when he could be certain that 
Rich was not going to receive a pardon. As it turned out, 
Adams' fears were realized, and he never did mail the rejection 
letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \729\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001
    As the Clinton Administration entered its final days, the 
Rich team increased its efforts. It was well known that the 
President was considering granting a large batch of pardons as 
one of his final acts as President. In fact, during his final 
visit to Arkansas as President on January 17, 2001, the 
President acknowledged this, asking reporters, ``You got 
anybody you want to pardon? Everybody in America either wants 
somebody pardoned or a national monument.'' \730\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \730\ Andrew Goldstein, Countdown to a Pardon, Time, Feb. 26, 2001, 
at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Rich team increased the intensity of its lobbying 
campaign in the final days. First, Jack Quinn faxed a memo to 
Beth Nolan that purported to provide additional evidence that 
Rich had been singled out for prosecution. In a note at the top 
of the memo, Quinn wrote: ``This is FYI further to the point 
that no one else was prosecuted.'' \731\ In fact, the memo 
stands for the opposite point. The memo, which was drafted by a 
lawyer on the Rich legal team in 1988, provided a review of 
enforcement actions against individuals who had violated energy 
regulations. The memo concluded that ``[w]e have uncovered no 
case in which a jail sentence has been imposed for a willful 
violation of the PAM regulations, the conduct for which M[arc] 
R[ich] and P[incus] G[reen] have been indicted.'' \732\ 
Ironically, this memo, which was intended to provide support 
for the Rich case, actually weakens it. A close reading of the 
memo indicates that the Rich lawyers located 48 criminal cases 
brought for violations of the energy regulations, 14 of which 
resulted in jail time.\733\ The Rich legal team distinguished 
those cases on the thinnest of technical grounds, since those 
convictions were for ``miscertification'' of oil, not a 
violation of the permissible markup regulations. However, it is 
most likely that the memo had no impact on the White House's 
consideration of the Rich pardon, either pro or con, since the 
White House staff took little time to read the Rich pardon 
petition, much less extraneous information pertaining to the 
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \731\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers 
to Scooter Libby (June 10, 1988) (Exhibit 63).
    \732\ Id.
    \733\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Attorney Peter Kadzik called the White House on each of the 
last three days of the Clinton Administration, seeking 
information about the status of the Rich pardon. On January 18, 
January 19, and January 20, Kadzik called staff in John 
Podesta's office to see if the President had made any decisions 
on pardons. After the calls on the 19th and 20th, he relayed 
what he had learned to his partner Michael Green, who was also 
working on the Rich pardon.\734\ Kadzik characterized these 
calls as ministerial in nature--simply trying to determine 
whether any pardons had been granted, and if so, whether a list 
of pardons was available--as opposed to his earlier direct 
contacts with his client John Podesta.\735\ Nevertheless, 
Kadzik billed Marc Rich an hour for his work on January 18, 
half an hour for his work on January 19, and half an hour for 
his work on January 20.\736\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \734\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to 
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143).
    \735\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 466 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro 
Morin & Oshinsky).
    \736\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production 
DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to 
Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). The 
billing entry on January 18 consists of two items, the call to the 
White House and a redacted entry. The entries on January 19 and January 
20 each consist of two items, calls to the White House and Michael 
Green. Based on his descriptions of the calls to the White House, those 
calls should not have taken more then 6 minutes each, the minimum 
amount of time that could be billed at Dickstein Shapiro. While it is 
possible that Kadzik spent 54 minutes on other Marc Rich business on 
January 18, and 24 minutes speaking to Michael Green on January 19 and 
20, the length of the periods of time billed during these days casts 
doubt either on Kadzik's description of the calls to the White House or 
the accuracy of his billing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the
                    President
    Also on January 18, 2001, Jack Quinn submitted a letter to 
the President ``to clarify several points with regard to the 
petition'' and to ``propose a solution to any concerns . . . 
regarding the setting of an unwise precedent involving 
individuals living outside the jurisdiction of our American 
country.'' \737\ In this letter, Quinn again attempted to 
refute the argument that Rich was a fugitive. To support his 
position, Quinn made three arguments, all of them spurious. 
First, Quinn claimed that ``much of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's 
professional lives have been spent abroad. . . . Thus, while 
they did not return to the United States following the issuance 
of the indictment, there is no question that this did not 
constitute a significant change in their international living 
circumstances.'' \738\ Second, Quinn claimed that Rich and 
Green ``violated no laws in not returning to the United States, 
and no violation of law with regard to their purported 
``fugitivity'' ever has been alleged.'' \739\ Third, Quinn 
pointed out that Rich and Green ``have lived not as fugitives, 
but their residences and places of business always have been 
available to and known to the United States.'' \740\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \737\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171).
    \738\ Id.
    \739\ Id.
    \740\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quinn's first point, that Rich and Green spent a great deal 
of time outside of the country prior to their indictment, was 
completely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Rich and Green 
refused to return after their indictment. Legally and 
practically, the fact that Rich and Green had houses in 
Switzerland prior to that indictment was meaningless. They fled 
to those homes in anticipation of the indictment and to avoid 
its consequences. That they managed to escape before rather 
than after the indictment is irrelevant.\741\ Quinn's second 
assertion, that Rich and Green had not violated the law by 
remaining outside of the United States, was completely wrong. 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073, which outlaws fugitivity, states that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \741\ U.S. v. Lupino, 171 F. Supp 648 (D.C. Minn. 1958).

        Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign 
        commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution . . . 
        under the laws of the place from which he flees, for a 
        crime, or an attempt to commit a crime . . . which is a 
        felony under the laws of the place from which the 
        fugitive flees . . . shall be fined under this title or 
        imprisoned not more than five years, or both.\742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \742\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073.

This statute clearly proscribes the behavior of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green, namely, traveling in foreign commerce to avoid 
prosecution for a felony. The fact that Rich and Green were 
never charged with violation of this statute has more to do 
with the fact that they were already facing numerous felony 
charges than any innocence on their part.\743\ Quinn's final 
point, rather than dispelling the argument that Rich and Green 
were fugitives, only shows the contempt with which they treated 
American laws. The fact that Rich and Green both lived in 
palatial estates in Switzerland, at addresses known to American 
authorities, did not mean that they were not fugitives. Swiss 
authorities refused to extradite Rich and Green, and they were 
therefore able to live their lives in comfort, rather than in 
hiding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \743\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 123 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former 
assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the facile and irrelevant arguments 
regarding his clients' status as fugitives, Quinn also made an 
offer to President Clinton in the January 18 letter. Quinn 
stated that ``[m]y clients have authorized me to make it clear 
that they have always sought to negotiate a civil resolution 
with the government, and would willingly accept a disposition 
that would subject them to civil proceedings with the 
Department of Energy (or other appropriate agencies).'' \744\ 
While this offer might have appeared dramatic to President 
Clinton, someone with any understanding of the Rich case would 
have recognized that Rich and Green were not offering anything 
that they had not offered on any number of previous occasions. 
Throughout the Rich investigation, Rich's lawyers had offered 
to pay many millions of dollars to settle the case, as long as 
Rich was not required to serve jail time. This offer was 
repeatedly rejected by prosecutors, who recognized that Rich's 
crimes were of such a scale that jail time was amply justified. 
In addition, someone with knowledge of the Rich case would have 
recognized another serious flaw with Quinn's January 18 offer. 
All civil liability for Rich and Green was extinguished with 
the guilty pleas of the Rich companies, and that the only 
penalties available against Rich in 2001 were criminal.\745\ 
Thus, Rich's offer--to be subject to civil penalties that could 
not be applied against him--was an empty offer. However, this 
letter, and the empty offer in it, had an impact at the White 
House, as would be demonstrated the following day. It does not 
appear that Quinn had any misgivings about what was really at 
issue--Rich wanted to buy his way out of his legal predicament, 
and if this was not an option, he would not only eschew the 
United States, but also work against vital U.S. interests. It 
is an interesting commentary on Quinn that he appears to agree 
with the thesis that rich people should be able to pay money to 
avoid prison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \744\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171).
    \745\ At the Committee's hearing, Mr. Auerbach stated, ``The civil 
liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich 
and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150 
million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate 
civil liabilities.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of International 
Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th 
Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC
                    Chairman Arthur Levitt
    In this same time period, Clinton aide Bruce Lindsey made 
an apparent effort to gather information to use in opposition 
to the Rich pardon. On the morning of January 17 or 18, Lindsey 
called Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC.\746\ Lindsey asked 
Levitt what he knew about Pinky Green.\747\ Levitt told Lindsey 
that he had never heard the name.\748\ Lindsey then told Levitt 
that Green was Marc Rich's business partner.\749\ Levitt told 
Lindsey that he would find out what he could about the matter. 
Levitt consulted with his staff, who informed him that the SEC 
had no information about Rich and Green, because theirs had 
been an IRS and Commodities and Futures Trading Commission 
matter, not an SEC matter.\750\ Levitt then left a message for 
Lindsey indicating that he was getting back to him about the 
Marc Rich matter. Lindsey called back that afternoon, and 
Levitt told Lindsey that the Rich matter was not in the SEC's 
jurisdiction. However, Levitt then added that he believed that 
pardons of Rich and Green would be a ``real bad idea.'' \751\ 
Lindsey agreed that Rich and Green were ``fugitives'' who had 
``never set foot in the country'' and that this ``is not what 
pardons are intended for.'' \752\ Based on his contacts with 
Lindsey, Levitt assumed that Lindsey was personally opposed to 
the pardons of Rich and Green, and that he was looking for 
further justification or reinforcement for his position.\753\ 
Levitt also assumed that the pardons would not be granted, 
given Lindsey's great influence in the White House.\754\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \746\ Telephone Interview with Arthur Levitt (Feb. 20, 2001).
    \747\ Id.
    \748\ Id.
    \749\ Id.
    \750\ Id.
    \751\ Id.
    \752\ Id.
    \753\ Id.
    \754\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Shortly after the call between Lindsey and Levitt, the Marc 
Rich team found out about the call. In the afternoon of January 
19, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty 
Behan, and informed them that:

        I just spoke to Jack [Quinn]. He has not heard from the 
        President, but agreed to call him as soon as he gets to 
        a hard line phone (he was in the car). He said that the 
        SEC knows of the request and for some reason opposed 
        it. But not like they opposed Milken. He does not know 
        how they learned of it. (He found out when the head of 
        the SEC gave one of his partners a hard time about Marc 
        yesterday.). We agree that is not good and that maybe 
        the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it. 
        No other pardons have been announced yet, as far as we 
        know. Bob \755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \755\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00180 (E-
mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. 
(Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145).

The Fink e-mail again confirms that the Rich team was counting 
on secrecy to achieve its objective. Fink's message shows the 
concern with which the Rich team reacted any time that any 
government agency outside of the White House received word of 
the effort to obtain the pardon. When questioned about this 
matter at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink stated 
that he was concerned not that certain government agencies 
would learn of the pardon effort, but that he was concerned 
that the press would learn of it, and that the press' reaction 
``would not be helpful for a thoughtful review of the pardon 
application.'' \756\ However, Fink's assertion is not 
plausible. Fink's contemporaneous e-mail specifically 
identifies the prosecutors in the Southern District of New 
York, not the public or the press, as a subject of concern. 
Fink's e-mail, along with other evidence, shows that Rich's 
lawyers were trying to keep the pardon effort from the 
prosecutors in New York, the people who knew the most about the 
Rich case and could do the most to thwart the pardon effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \756\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 509 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lindsey's interaction with Arthur Levitt on the Rich and 
Green pardons represents the only time that White House staff 
reached out to anyone other than Rich's lawyers and Eric Holder 
to gather information about the Rich case. It was a half-
hearted effort, as the SEC was not involved in the Rich case, 
and had no information to offer. Lindsey's effort at outreach 
therefore demonstrated two important facts. First, it shows 
that Lindsey had little understanding of the Rich case, as he 
did not even know where to turn to get information about Rich. 
If Lindsey had turned to the Southern District of New York, 
rather than the SEC, he would have obtained voluminous 
information that refuted Quinn's arguments. Second, the Lindsey 
effort shows that there was a genuine rift between President 
Clinton and his closest advisor on this issue--to the extent 
that Lindsey even felt the need to gather outside information 
to bolster his case.

G. January 19-20, 2001

    The final full day of the Clinton Presidency was obviously 
a busy one. Early in the day, President Clinton reached an 
agreement with the Office of Independent Counsel whereby the 
President admitted that ``I acknowledge having knowingly 
violated Judge Wright's discovery orders in my deposition in 
[the Jones] case. I tried to walk a line between acting 
lawfully and testifying falsely but I now recognize that I did 
not fully accomplish this goal and that certain of my responses 
to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false.'' \757\ After 
making these admissions, which the President reportedly 
considered difficult to make, the President began final 
consideration of a number of grants of clemency.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \757\ Neil A. Lewis, Transition in Washington: The President; 
Exiting Job, Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2001, 
at A1.
    \758\ Many, including Representative Waxman, have speculated that 
President Clinton was especially sensitive to ``overzealous 
prosecutors'' after making these admissions regarding his testimony in 
the Jones case. ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive 
Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman). It is very 
possible that the President was motivated to issue a number of 
controversial grants of clemency in Independent Counsel cases as a 
result of his feelings about the Whitewater-Lewinsky investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President 
                    Clinton
    Also on the final day of his presidency, President Clinton 
made a number of farewell telephone calls to world leaders. 
Among these was a call to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. 
Between 2:47 and 3:09 p.m., Clinton and Barak spoke.\759\ 
During that conversation, it appears that President Clinton 
brought up that Marc Rich matter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \759\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation 
between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, 
Israel (Jan. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 148).

        President Clinton. [Redacted] I'm trying to do 
        something on clemency for Rich, but it is very 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        difficult.

        Prime Minister Barak. Might it move forward?

        President Clinton. I'm working on that but I'm not 
        sure. I'm glad you asked me about that. When I finish 
        these calls, I will go back into the meeting on that 
        but I'm glad you raised it. Here's the only problem 
        with Rich; there's almost no precedent in American 
        history. There's nothing illegal about it but there's 
        no precedent. He was overseas when he was indicted and 
        never came home. The question is not whether he should 
        get it or not but whether he should get it without 
        coming back here. That's the dilemma I'm working 
        through. I'm working on it.

        Prime Minister Barak. Okay.\760\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \760\ Id.

    There are two important aspects of this call. First, the 
transcript does not make it appear that Prime Minister Barak 
was tenaciously lobbying for the Rich pardon. The only comments 
he made at this critical juncture were ``Might it move 
forward?'' and ``Okay.'' Neither can be seen as a forceful 
request. In fact, the transcript raises the possibility that 
Prime Minister Barak, not President Clinton, brought up the 
Marc Rich pardon during the telephone call. Second, not in this 
call, or in any other call, did Prime Minister Barak claim that 
the Rich pardon would have any foreign policy benefits.
    These facts undermine the suggestions made by the President 
and his supporters which place great importance on the January 
19 call by Prime Minister Barak. For example, in the 
Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, John Podesta stated that 
``[w]hile the bulk of that [January 19] call concerned the 
situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister Barak raised the 
Rich matter at the end and asked the President once again to 
consider the Rich pardon.'' \761\ Bruce Lindsey testified that 
``[i]n our meeting when he [the President] said Barak had 
raised it in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I 
think, the third time it had been raised by Mr. Barak.'' \762\ 
If the notes of the call prepared by the White House are 
correct, it appears that the President, not Prime Minister 
Barak, raised the question of the Marc Rich pardon during the 
January 19 telephone call. James Carville, a longtime defender 
of President Clinton, appeared on Meet the Press and stated 
that ``Prime Minister Barak made enormous concessions to try to 
get a peace agreement. It was very important to him. And on the 
last day, he called and said `look, I really would like for you 
to do this,' and the President did it.'' Again, Carville's 
description of the January 19 call was completely inaccurate 
and was either purposefully misleading or the result of false 
information provided to him by President Clinton or the 
President's staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \761\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
    \762\ Id. at 431 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel 
to the President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most importantly, both on January 19, and during the 
controversy about the Rich pardon that followed, President 
Clinton repeatedly suggested that the calls from Prime Minister 
Barak ``profoundly'' influenced his decision making.\763\ This 
claim was echoed by John Podesta at the Committee's March 1 
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \763\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001).

        I do know that Mr. Barak--as Mr. Lindsey said and 
        raised a couple of times--that was, as you properly 
        point out, was an emotional time. The peace process 
        obviously wasn't coming to fruition. He had enormous 
        respect for Mr. Barak. I think Mr. Barak had asked him 
        for several things, if you will, that were intended to 
        show support for the State of Israel, not so much for 
        Mr. Barak but for the State of Israel, including, for 
        example, the pardon of Jonathan Pollard.\764\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \764\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 376 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).

There is nothing in any of the discussions between Clinton and 
Barak, especially the January 19 discussion, that supports 
President Clinton's conclusion that the Rich pardon was 
especially important to Prime Minister Barak so that Barak's 
calls should have had a ``profound'' influence on the 
President. The actual transcripts of the calls suggest that, at 
least on January 19, the Rich pardon seemed to have a more 
prominent place in President Clinton's mind than in Prime 
Minister Barak's mind.
            2. Eric Holder Weighs In
    At about 6:30 in the evening on January 19, 2001, Jack 
Quinn called the office of Eric Holder. Quinn said that the 
Rich pardon was receiving serious consideration at the White 
House and that the White House would be calling Holder for his 
opinion before any decision was made.\765\ Holder told Quinn 
that while he ``had no strong opposition based on [Quinn's] 
recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York would 
strongly oppose it.'' \766\ Quinn's notes of the conversation 
with Holder indicate that Holder told Quinn that he had ``no 
personal prob[lem]'' with the Rich pardon, and that his 
personal feeling was that he was ``not strongly against'' it, 
but that the prosecutors in the Southern District would 
``howl.'' \767\ It also appears that Quinn informed Holder that 
Prime Minister Barak had expressed support for the Rich 
pardon.\768\ Holder was told that Barak ``had weighed in 
strongly on behalf of the pardon request,'' and this assertion 
``really struck'' Holder.\769\ It appears that Quinn learned of 
Barak's call to President Clinton from sources in Israel, 
likely Avner Azulay, rather than the White House.\770\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \765\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 
8, 2001) (statement of Jack Quinn).
    \766\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
    \767\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 
172).
    \768\ In his hearing testimony, Holder stated that he did not 
recall whether he learned of Barak's support through Quinn or Nolan. 
However, Beth Nolan made it clear that Holder stated that he had heard 
that Barak was interested in the pardon, and explained that this new 
information moved his position from ``neutral'' to ``neutral leaning 
toward or neutral leaning favorable.'' See ``The Controversial Pardon 
of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, 
former Counsel to the President, the White House). Given Nolan's 
seemingly clear recollection that Holder already knew about Barak's 
support when she spoke to him on January 19, it is fair to conclude 
that it was Quinn, rather than Nolan, who told Holder about the Barak 
call.
    \769\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
    \770\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 348 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Earlier that afternoon, Cheryl Mills arrived in Washington 
from New York to visit the Clinton White House one last time. 
Mills spent some of the afternoon in the West Wing office of 
White House Counsel Beth Nolan. While Mills was in Nolan's 
office, Jack Quinn called for Nolan. Nolan told Mills that she 
was busy and couldn't take the call, and asked Mills to take it 
instead. Mills picked up the line, and spoke with Quinn. Quinn 
told Mills that he had recently spoken with Eric Holder, and 
that Holder informed him that his position on the Rich pardon 
was ``neutral, leaning favorable.'' Mills passed this 
information on to Nolan. Nolan understood Mills to say that 
Quinn had told her that Holder ``favored the pardon.'' \771\ 
Mills was surprised that Holder had taken such a positive 
position on the Rich pardon, as she believed him generally to 
be ``conservative'' with respect to pardons, and believed that 
under Holder the Justice Department ``had not fulfilled its 
pardon function.'' \772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \771\ Id. at 354 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).
    \772\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate White House 
Counsel, in New York, NY (Mar. 19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Mills told Nolan that Quinn said that Holder 
``favored the pardon,'' Nolan decided to call Holder herself to 
see if this was true. She called Holder at about 6:40 
p.m.,\773\ and described her conversation with Holder as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \773\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/ODAG-MR-00040 
(Telephone log of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jan. 22, 2001) 
(Exhibit 173).

        I had talked with him the first week in January about 
        it, and I did not have the impression that he was in 
        favor of it, so that's what I said. I said, I'm hearing 
        you're in favor of it. I didn't think you were in favor 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        of it.

        He said that he was neutral, which I think is the 
        language he had used earlier in January about it. He--
        and I said, well, I'm a little confused because I'm 
        hearing that you're not just neutral. And he said that 
        he, if--he had heard that Mr. Barak was interested, 
        that if that were the case, while he couldn't judge the 
        foreign policy arguments, he would find that very 
        persuasive and that--and I finally said, well, are you? 
        I still don't understand what neutral means here. And 
        he described it as neutral leaning toward or neutral 
        leaning favorable.\774\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \774\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).

    The position that Holder took in support of the Rich pardon 
took many by surprise. Obviously, Beth Nolan was surprised at 
Holder's position, especially when he had been neutral with 
respect to the pardon just two weeks earlier. Cheryl Mills was 
surprised, given what she considered Holder's ``conservative'' 
perspective on pardons. Other White House staff were surprised 
as well. After her call with Holder, Beth Nolan informed 
Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel that Holder was in 
favor of the Rich pardon. Angel, like the rest of the staff, 
opposed the pardon and exclaimed, ``Why the f**k would he say 
that?'' \775\ Nolan responded by shrugging her shoulders.\776\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \775\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
    \776\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Eric Holder's support for the Rich pardon would have a 
significant impact in the President's deliberations later that 
evening. Coming from the nation's second-ranking law 
enforcement official, Holder's support could easily 
counterbalance the objections to the Rich pardon made by White 
House staff. Holder's support also had the illusory effect of 
giving the Justice Department's blessing to the Rich pardon, 
when in reality, not a single individual at the Justice 
Department other than Eric Holder knew that the Rich pardon was 
even being considered. No information about the Rich pardon had 
been shared with the Justice Department through official 
channels. Indeed, Holder had a central responsibility for 
ensuring that no one else at the Justice Department knew that 
the pardon was even under consideration. Moreover, despite the 
fact that he had been on notice that Rich was seeking a pardon 
since November 2000, and that the White House was actively 
considering it in early January 2001, Holder made no attempt to 
contact prosecutors in the Southern District of New York to get 
their opinion regarding the case.
    One of the most serious questions before the Committee is 
why Holder decided to support the Rich pardon, given the 
paucity of information that Holder had about the matter. Holder 
had never seen any documents regarding the Rich pardon, and his 
sum total of knowledge about the Rich case came from a page of 
talking points provided to him by Jack Quinn in 2000, before 
the pardon effort had even begun. Holder offered a number of 
excuses for his decisionmaking, many of them conflicting, none 
of them convincing. First, Holder claimed that he was really 
neutral, not in favor of, the Rich pardon:

        Neutral meaning I don't have a basis to form an opinion 
        consistent with what I told him before. . . . I was 
        neutral because I didn't have a basis to make a 
        determination. I have not seen anything on the pardon.

        I'm now saying that I'm neutral consistent with what I 
        said before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign 
        policy benefit. I could not make the determination if 
        there were foreign policy benefit[s].\777\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \777\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 201 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

    Holder's claims of ``neutrality'' are completely 
implausible. First, everyone who had contact with Holder on 
this matter took Holder's words as being in support of the Rich 
pardon. Second, Holder had to have known that when he was asked 
for his opinion regarding a prosecution which had been brought 
by his agency, if he said that he was ``neutral, leaning 
towards favorable,'' it was tantamount to supporting the 
pardon. Representative Barr pointed this fact out to Holder in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Committee's February 8 hearing:

        Mr. Barr. [I]n one conversation, you were swayed from 
        let's give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn't 
        know anything about the case and it was unremarkable to 
        you, to understanding that it was important enough for 
        a foreign leader to become personally involved in, and 
        just based on that information alone . . . not having 
        heard anything back from your prosecutors who 
        identified this case as one of the most significant in 
        white collar crime history, you all of a sudden become 
        leaning toward favorably simply because some foreign 
        leader, for whatever reason, [says] that he wants us to 
        act favorably on this pardon?

        Mr. Holder. What I said was that I was neutral leaning 
        toward. Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said 
        before, which was I don't have a basis to one way or 
        the other--

        Mr. Barr. Is that your presumption as the second top 
        official at Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks 
        you about a pardon that you don't know anything about, 
        that your position is immediately neutral and therefore 
        their job is to move you toward favorable? I mean, 
        wouldn't your position as a prosecutor be you stand by 
        your prosecutors and your initial position when you 
        don't know about a case is to oppose it?

        Mr. Holder. No. Without a basis to know whether--how 
        the decision should go, I think it would be incumbent 
        upon--

        Mr. Barr. Don't you presume that your prosecutors have 
        prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate 
        from the presumption as their superior at the 
        Department of Justice that you were going to stand by 
        them and not take a neutral position? \778\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \778\ Id. at 209-10 (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and 
testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of 
Justice).

What Holder could not see, or would not admit to, even after it 
was made clear by Representative Barr, was that when he refused 
to support the work of the prosecutors in his own office, it 
amounted to one of the largest expressions of support for the 
Rich pardon that any independent party could muster.
    Holder also attempted to argue that he was presumptively 
neutral on the Rich case because Rich was a fugitive, and 
Holder had supported a pardon for another fugitive several 
years earlier.

        I did not reflexively oppose it [the Rich pardon] 
        because I had previously supported a successful pardon 
        request for a fugitive, Preston King, who, in the 
        context of a selective service case, had been 
        discriminated against in the 1950's because of the 
        color of his skin.\779\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \779\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

Holder's argument amounts to a claim that since he once 
supported a pardon for a fugitive, he had to support all future 
pardon requests by fugitives. Holder's bizarre argument 
actually treats fugitivity as a bonus in the consideration of a 
pardon, rather than a criminal act.
    Mere incompetence cannot account for Eric Holder's 
decisionmaking in the Marc Rich case. Holder knew about Jack 
Quinn's efforts to obtain a pardon for Rich as early as 
November 2000, yet he never mentioned the effort to prosecutors 
in New York or the Pardon Attorney. Holder kept this 
information from them, even though he knew that they would 
vehemently oppose any effort to pardon Rich. Perhaps more 
important, he never made an effort to educate himself about the 
facts of the case. These efforts to keep prosecutors from 
finding out what was happening, in conjunction with Holder's 
complete inability to explain or defend his decisionmaking, 
make the concerns regarding Eric Holder's motivations even more 
serious.
    During the Committee's February 8 hearing, at least one 
potential motivation for Holder was revealed. Holder asked Jack 
Quinn for his support to have Holder nominated as Attorney 
General in a future Gore Administration.\780\ Quinn recalled 
such a discussion, but claimed that it was in the fall, prior 
to the election, and prior to the filing of the Rich pardon 
petition.\781\ However, Holder allowed that there might have 
been more than one discussion with Quinn regarding his 
appointment as Attorney General.\782\ When asked about this 
matter, Holder angrily denied that his efforts to be appointed 
as Attorney General, and his solicitation of Quinn's support, 
had any effect on his decisionmaking:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \780\ Id. at 202.
    \781\ Id. (testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \782\ Id. (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).

        My actions in this matter were in no way affected by my 
        desire to become Attorney General of the United States, 
        any desires I had to influence or seek to curry favor 
        with anybody. I did what I did in this case based only 
        on the facts that were before me, the law as I 
        understood it and consistent with my duties as Deputy 
        Attorney General, nothing more than that.\783\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \783\ Id. at 203.

Holder's impassioned defense would be more believable if 
Holder's decisionmaking could be justified based on the facts 
that were in front of him. However, given his complete 
inability to justify his decision to keep the Rich matter from 
the rest of the Justice Department and his position in favor of 
the Rich pardon when he knew next to nothing about the case, 
the Committee must question Holder's motivations.
            3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and 
                    President Clinton
    After hearing from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Beth 
Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, John Podesta, Meredith Cabe, Eric Angel, 
and Cheryl Mills all went to an Oval Office meeting with 
President Clinton to discuss the President's last grants of 
clemency.\784\ This meeting took place at approximately 7:00 
p.m. The presence of Cheryl Mills, who at this time was not a 
government employee, and had not been for over a year, has 
raised two serious concerns. First, Mills might have been 
exposed to information, that as a private citizen, she was not 
legally entitled to review. Certainly, if minimal due diligence 
regarding the Rich pardon had been performed, Mills would have 
been exposed to a considerable amount of highly classified 
information. Furthermore, even NCIC information on Rich and 
Green would have been inappropriate to disseminate to a private 
citizen like Mills. Second, at the time, Mills was a trustee of 
the Clinton Library. As a trustee, Mills was responsible for 
supervising the effort to construct the Library. However, Mills 
claimed that she was unaware both of general fundraising 
efforts, and of Denise Rich's large contributions to the 
Library. The White House staff present at the meeting explained 
that Mills was invited to the meeting because of her 
substantial knowledge regarding the various independent counsel 
investigations of the Clinton Administration.\785\ The bulk of 
this meeting concerned pardons relating to various 
investigations by independent counsels, and Mills was asked for 
her opinion on whether various individuals involved in these 
investigations should receive pardons.\786\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \784\ Id. at 428 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former 
Counsel to the President, the White House); Interview with Meredith 
Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 
16, 2001).
    \785\ During her tenure as Associate White House Counsel and then 
Deputy White House Counsel, Mills was one of the primary lawyers 
handling scandal-related matters at the Clinton White House.
    \786\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); See also ``The 
Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings 
Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 328 (Mar. 1, 2001) 
(testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the 
White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After a lengthy discussion regarding the Independent 
Counsel-related pardons, the President raised the issue of Marc 
Rich. President Clinton said that he had received a message 
from Jack Quinn,\787\ and that he had also received a call from 
Prime Minister Barak. Bruce Lindsey clearly recalled that the 
President stated that ``Prime Minister Barak had spoken to him 
that afternoon and had asked him again--I don't believe it was 
the first time that the Prime Minister had raised the Marc Rich 
pardon--had asked him again to consider it.'' \788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \787\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). Quinn's phone records 
indicate that he called the President at 12:29 p.m. on January 19 for a 
duration of two minutes. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone bill 
of Jack Quinn, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 174). It appears that Quinn did 
not actually speak to the President, but rather left a message, which 
was returned in the evening.
    \788\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 347 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to 
the President, the White House). See also id. at 328.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Before the President raised the Marc Rich matter, everyone 
on the White House staff thought it was a dead letter, and had 
not prepared for the issue to be brought up at the January 19 
meeting.\789\ Nevertheless, once the President raised the 
matter, Nolan, Lindsey, Cabe, and Angel all expressed their 
opposition to the Rich pardon.\790\ Those present recall 
Lindsey giving a strong statement of opposition, focusing on 
the fact that Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives from justice 
who had never faced the charges against them.\791\ The basic 
thrust of all of the arguments offered by the staff focused on 
the fact that Rich and Green were fugitives. When asked about 
the strength of the arguments made by Rich and Green, Meredith 
Cabe stated that if their arguments were strong, Rich and Green 
could obviously finance an excellent defense, and they should 
make those arguments in court.\792\ During this discussion, 
Beth Nolan also expressed her opposition to the pardon. 
However, she also informed the President that Eric Holder was 
``leaning toward'' the granting of the pardon. A number of 
individuals involved in the decisionmaking process have 
identified Holder's position as being a significant factor in 
the President's decisionmaking.\793\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \789\ Id. at 344-45 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of 
Staff to the President, the White House).
    \790\ Id. at 110. See also Interview with Eric Angel, former 
Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). 
John Podesta was present for the portion of the meeting where the 
independent counsel pardons were discussed, but left the meeting prior 
to the discussion of Marc Rich to tape a television appearance.
    \791\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
    \792\ Id.
    \793\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 367 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the 
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the White House staff argued against the Rich pardon, 
Cheryl Mills questioned their knowledge of the case. Mills 
pointed out that the White House Counsel's Office staff was not 
responding to the substantive issues raised in the Marc Rich 
petition. Mills specifically pointed out that Bruce Lindsey was 
not the best person to give an opinion on the Rich case since 
he had not even read the petition.\794\ It appears that no one 
among the six individuals discussing the Rich pardon had even 
read through the 31-page petition. At this point, Mills 
outlined what she did know about the case, based on her review 
of materials provided to her by Jack Quinn. The President then 
asked her what she thought about the arguments made by Quinn 
about Rich's fugitive status in his January 18 letter. Mills 
stated that she did not find Quinn's arguments persuasive.\795\ 
She did say that the President should look at the selective 
prosecution argument which had been raised by Rich. According 
to Beth Nolan, Mills said that the White House should be 
looking at the selective prosecution argument ``seriously.'' 
\796\ But then Mills told them ``you know me, I don't care 
about rich white guys,'' and then argued that American blacks 
were selectively prosecuted every day.\797\ Of the individuals 
present at the meeting, only Mills made any statements that can 
be construed as anything other than negative about the Rich 
petition. The President indicated he was interested in the 
matter, but did not make any clear statements that he was going 
to issue the Rich pardon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \794\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001).
    \795\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
    \796\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 346 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).
    \797\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After this discussion, the President indicated that he had 
to return Quinn's call. He did not indicate whether he had made 
up his mind on the Rich pardon. It was clear, though, that the 
President still had a strong interest in the matter.
            4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn
    The President then tracked down Jack Quinn, who was having 
dinner at the home of a friend. Clinton spoke to Quinn about 
the Rich case. According to Quinn, this conversation lasted 
approximately twenty minutes. Before the call, Robert Fink e-
mailed Quinn the following suggestion: ``I would say, Do it for 
me. I know it is deserved.'' \798\ Also providing a suggestion 
as to the topics discussed between Quinn and President Clinton 
is a list of bullet points apparently prepared by Quinn for the 
call:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \798\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00406 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 175).

         unusual
         but not unworthy
         never was a case
         tax RICO fraud
         stayed away--publicity
         CTS/RUDY SAY OVERREACHED
         will submit to some civil processes in ARCO
         others similarly sit.
         controversial/defensible
         humanitarian record since that time
         Ken Starr
         Ira[n]-Contra
         inequity
         bias--rich Jew
         Israel \799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \799\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 
176).

As has been discussed throughout this report, most of Quinn's 
apparent arguments were completely false, ranging from the 
assertion that there ``never was a case,'' to the claim that 
other similarly situated defendants were subject to civil 
penalties, to the preposterous claim that Rich was targeted 
because he was Jewish.
    According to Quinn, ``President Clinton had obviously read 
and studied the pardon petition. He grasped the essence of my 
argument about this case being one that should have been 
handled civilly, not criminally, and he discussed with me 
whether the passage of time would permit statute of limitations 
defenses in such a civil proceeding.'' \800\ After President 
Clinton expressed this opinion, Quinn told the President that 
he ``would happily give him a letter waiving those defenses, 
and he insisted that I provided one to him within an hour.'' 
\801\ Quinn has testified that his discussion with the 
President was limited to the law and the facts of the Rich 
case, and at no time touched upon the financial contributions 
of Denise Rich. After getting off the phone with the President, 
Quinn drafted a short letter making the necessary waiver. The 
letter reads as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \800\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 70 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Jack Quinn).
    \801\ Id.

        I am writing to confirm that my clients, Marc Rich and 
        Pincus Green, waive any and all defenses which could be 
        raised to the lawful imposition of civil fines or 
        penalties in connection with the actions and 
        transactions alleged in the indictment against them 
        pending in the Southern District of New York. 
        Specifically they will not raise the statute of 
        limitations or any other defenses which arose as a 
        result of their absense [sic].\802\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \802\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to 
President William J. Clinton (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 177).

This letter was then faxed to the White House, where it was 
apparently provided to the President and the relevant White 
House staff.
    It was after the telephone call with Jack Quinn that 
President Clinton apparently decided to grant the pardons to 
Marc Rich and Pincus Green. The President himself has pointed 
to this agreement as a significant concession that he was able 
to obtain from Jack Quinn and Marc Rich.\803\ That the 
assurances given by Jack Quinn had any impact on President 
Clinton's decisionmaking is deeply troubling. The promise made 
by Quinn was an empty promise for at least three reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \803\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2001 (Exhibit 178).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, Quinn agreed to waive a defense that Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green could not use in any event. Due to their absence 
from the United States, Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not have 
a statute of limitations defense to waive. The statute of 
limitations provision of the Petroleum Overcharge Distribution 
and Restitution Act of 1986 \804\ would apply to any civil 
enforcement action imposing civil penalties on Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green for violations of the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act of 1973 \805\ and the Economic Stabilization Act 
of 1970.\806\ The limitations provision provides that a civil 
enforcement action cannot be commenced after the later of 
September 30, 1988, or six years after the date of the 
violation.\807\ It appears that this provision would provide a 
defense for Marc Rich and Pincus Green; however, immediately 
following the limitations provision are exceptions tolling the 
limitations period. The first exception provides:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \804\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 4501-4507 (2001).
    \805\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 751-760(h) (2001), omitted pursuant to 
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 760(g).
    \806\ 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1904 (1976) omitted, pursuant to Pub.L. 91-
151, Title II, Sec. 211.
    \807\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(a)(1).

        (1) In computing the periods established in 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        section, there shall be excluded any period--

        (A) during which any person who is or may become the 
        subject of a civil enforcement action is outside the 
        United States, has absconded or concealed himself, or 
        is not subject to legal process.\808\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \808\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(b)(1)(A).

Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the statute, the 
time Marc Rich and Pincus Green were outside the United States 
tolled the statute of limitations. Furthermore, a look at the 
legislative history of this provision shows that Congress 
intended this result. Congress enacted the limitations 
provision with the intent that all alleged violations of the 
law would be pursued expeditiously but it did not intend for 
those who violated the laws to escape prosecution.\809\ It is 
evident from the plain meaning of the statute, as well as the 
legislative history, that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not 
have a statute of limitations defense to raise, but that, in 
fact, their absence tolled the limitations period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \809\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1012, at 234 (1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, it appears almost certain that Rich does not have 
any civil liability relating to the charges against him in 
1983. Martin Auerbach, one of the main prosecutors responsible 
for investigating Rich, opined that ``[t]he civil liabilities 
in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and 
Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150 
million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were 
corporate civil liabilities.'' \810\ When asked about Rich's 
promise to pay civil liabilities, Sandy Weinberg stated, ``What 
civil penalties? The civil penalties already have been 
extracted, $200 million worth. They were corporate liabilities 
and were already handled through plea agreements. This is about 
as big an empty promise as can be made.'' \811\ Rich's own 
lawyers agree with the assessment of the prosecutors. Michael 
Green, one of the main lawyers representing Rich, stated that 
``[w]e think he [Marc Rich] owes no civil liabilities.'' \812\ 
Perhaps the most telling sign is that over a year after the 
Rich pardon, the Department of Energy has taken no action to 
collect civil penalties from Rich.\813\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \810\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Martin Auerbach, former assistant U.S. 
attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).
    \811\ Jerry Seper, Pardoned Financier Gives ``Empty Promise,'' Ex-
Prosecutor Says, Wash. Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1.
    \812\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice 
Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14.
    \813\ Department of Energy staff have informed the Committee that 
they are still reviewing the Rich case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, to the extent that civil penalties were available, 
Marc Rich had been willing to pay as much as $100 million to 
settle the case against him, going back to the early 1980s. 
What Rich had feared though, and was not willing to accept, was 
any time in jail. Rather than representing a concession, the 
agreement between the President and Quinn represented exactly 
what Rich had been demanding all along.
    It cannot be disputed that the deal the President reached 
with Jack Quinn on January 19, 2001, was a hollow, meaningless 
deal. The only remaining question is whether the President's 
mistake was the result of ignorance, part of his complete 
failure to conduct any research about the Marc Rich case, or 
whether the President knew it was an empty agreement and made 
it solely to provide window dressing for his decision. Since 
this question goes to the heart of whether or not President 
Clinton's decision was corrupt, it is difficult for the 
Committee to reach a conclusion on this question, absent 
additional information from individuals who have refused to 
cooperate with the Committee's investigation. However, it is 
difficult to understand why President Clinton would enter into 
these kinds of negotiations with Jack Quinn, reach this kind of 
agreement, and then use the agreement as a justification for 
granting the pardon without even checking with someone who 
understood the case to see if the agreement had substance. 
President Clinton knew that his staff had not even read Quinn's 
submissions to the White House, much less spoken to parties 
outside the White House about the Rich matter. Therefore, 
President Clinton, if he was attempting to reach a reasonable 
decision in the Rich matter, should have understood the need to 
turn to someone who understood the case to assist him in the 
matter. That he did not seek such advice raises further 
questions about his decisionmaking, and about his motive for 
issuing the Rich and Green pardons.
            5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the 
                    Decision
    President Clinton apparently made the decision to pardon 
Rich and Green in the evening of January 19, 2001. After the 
President made the decision, Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan were 
informed of the decision. Nolan then asked Associate White 
House Counsel Meredith Cabe to inform the Justice Department, 
and have the Justice Department perform a National Crime 
Information Center (``NCIC'') check on Rich and Green. It was 
standard procedure for the Justice Department to perform this 
kind of check on an individual before they received a pardon, 
even under the dramatically truncated background checks 
employed by the Clinton Administration in January 2001. The 
purpose of the NCIC check was to ensure that the individual 
receiving the pardon did not have any outstanding warrants or 
criminal charges.
    Shortly after midnight on January 20, 2001, less than 
twelve hours before the end of the Clinton Administration, Cabe 
telephoned Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, and informed him 
that she would be faxing over a list of additional individuals 
to whom President Clinton was considering granting 
pardons.\814\ When the list arrived, Adams saw the names of 
Marc Rich and Pincus Green on the list. This was the first time 
that Adams had heard of Rich or Green being considered for 
pardons. Adams saw that the faxed list did not contain any 
identifying information for Rich or Green, so he called Cabe to 
ask for additional information.\815\ Cabe provided Adams with 
dates of birth and social security numbers for Rich and Green. 
Cabe then informed Adams that she expected that there would be 
little information on them, because they had been ``living 
abroad'' for several years.\816\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \814\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22-23 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
    \815\ Id. at 23.
    \816\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department 
of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the FBI conducted the NCIC check on Rich and Green, 
the White House Counsel's Office faxed further information on 
Rich, consisting of several pages from Quinn's pardon petition, 
to the Pardon Attorney's Office.\817\ Based on his review of 
these pages, Roger Adams understood the full magnitude of the 
Rich and Green case for the first time. He saw that they had 
been indicted 17 years earlier in New York, and had remained 
fugitives since then. A member of Adams' staff then began to 
conduct internet research on Rich and Green.\818\ While Adams's 
staff was attempting to gather information about Rich and 
Green, the FBI faxed the results of the NCIC check to Adams. 
The NCIC check revealed that Rich and Green were fugitives 
wanted for mail and wire fraud, arms trading, and tax 
evasion.\819\ Adams drafted a summary of the charges against 
Rich and Green, and faxed the summary to the White House 
shortly before 1:00 a.m. on January 20.\820\ At this point, 
Adams was obviously concerned about the effort to pardon Rich 
and Green, and called his superior at the Justice Department, 
Deputy Attorney General Holder, at home.\821\ Adams informed 
Holder that President Clinton was considering granting pardons 
to Rich and Green. Holder then informed Adams that he was aware 
of the pending clemency requests from Rich and Green.\822\ 
According to Holder, when he received this call from Roger 
Adams, it was the first time that he actually thought that the 
Rich pardon was likely to be granted.\823\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \817\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
    \818\ Id.
    \819\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department 
of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
    \820\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
    \821\ Id.
    \822\ Id.
    \823\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After his brief conversation with Holder, Adams received 
another call from the White House Counsel's office, which by 
this time had received Adams' summary of the charges against 
Rich and Green. During this conversation, Adams told Meredith 
Cabe that in addition to the charges against Rich, there was a 
customs alert posted for Rich and Green and that he believed 
this was significant. Apparently not trusting Adams' summary, 
Cabe asked Adams to fax over the original printout from the 
NCIC check that was performed by the FBI. Adams faxed the 
printout over, as well as the articles that his staff had been 
able to locate through their Internet searches.\824\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \824\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23-24 (Feb. 14, 2001) 
(testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What had caused such concern at the White House was the 
reference in the NCIC check to ``arms trading.'' No one at the 
White House had ever heard that Rich or Green had been involved 
in arms trading. Cabe and Eric Angel took the information about 
arms trading to Beth Nolan. Nolan and Cheryl Mills were in 
Nolan's office. Bruce Lindsey had apparently left the White 
House for the evening. Cabe gave Nolan and Mills the 
information, which had been provided to her by the Pardon 
Attorney's office. Nolan compared the information in the NCIC 
printout to the Rich and Green indictment, attempting to 
discern whether they had been charged with arms trading in 
1983, or whether this was new information. Cabe, Angel, Mills, 
and Nolan were unable to come to any definitive answer as to 
whether the information about arms trading was already known, 
or whether this was new information which would complicate the 
effort to issue a pardon. At the time, they speculated that 
either this was a new charge for which Rich and Green were 
wanted, unrelated to their 1983 indictment, or this was the way 
that the NCIC database referred to the Trading with the Enemy 
count which was part of their indictment.\825\ In short, 
however, they did not have an understanding of what the ``arms 
trading'' reference meant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \825\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 374-75 
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the 
President, the White House).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The meaning of the ``arms trading'' reference in the NCIC 
is not entirely clear, since none of the charges in Rich and 
Green's 1983 indictment related to arms trading. The NCIC 
printout itself, however, does not support the speculation by 
the White House staff that the ``arms trading'' reference was 
just another term for trading with the enemy. The printouts for 
Marc Rich from the NCIC database show separate entries for 
``trading with the enemy'' and ``arms trading,'' suggesting 
that they are separate offenses.\826\ Given the fact that on 
its face the NCIC printout raises serious questions about Rich 
being wanted for arms trading, President Clinton clearly should 
have made a serious inquiry to determine what the arms trading 
entry meant before granting the Marc Rich pardon.\827\ Instead, 
he did not make a single inquiry of law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \826\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00021-
23 (NCIC Printouts for Pincus Green and Marc Rich (Mar. 3, 1992, and 
Mar. 18, 1994)) (Exhibit 179).
    \827\ The Committee is not aware of any criminal charges that have 
been lodged against Rich or Green for illegal arms trading. There are 
numerous reports, however, that Marc Rich is involved in trafficking 
weapons, included sophisticated missile guidance systems. This arms 
dealing activity may or may not be legal. See, e.g., A. Craig Copetas, 
Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-Dollar Scam 131 (1985) 
(indicating that Rich paid for Iranian oil with small arms, automatic 
rifles, and hand-held rockets); Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc 
Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104 (indicating that Rich bought gas-
fired gyroscopes from North Korea and sold them to Iran).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To try to figure out a response to this new piece of 
information, Nolan, Mills, Cabe, and Angel called Bruce 
Lindsey. Lindsey did not have any insight regarding the arms 
trading information, but reiterated his opposition to the Rich 
pardon, and stated that the arms trading information was yet 
another reason not to issue the pardon.\828\ Nolan then called 
Jack Quinn. Quinn expressed irritation to be receiving a call 
at 2:00 a.m.\829\ Quinn also was not immediately responsive to 
the concerns Nolan was raising.\830\ Quinn told Nolan that he 
``would have known if [Rich] had been charged with that.'' 
Apparently Nolan, and Cheryl Mills as well, did not consider 
that a satisfactory answer, and pressed Quinn for more 
information. Mills told Quinn that ``you've got to work with us 
here.'' \831\ At that point, Quinn told Nolan and the others 
that he would check back on this issue and call them back.\832\ 
Shortly thereafter, Quinn called back and forcefully told Nolan 
and the others that he had no knowledge about any arms trading 
charges against Rich.\833\ He told them to look at the 
indictment against Rich, and that the indictment ``was the only 
thing out there.'' \834\ Quinn's answer was obviously non-
responsive but no one appears to have taken any steps to obtain 
a responsive answer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \828\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
    \829\ Id.
    \830\ Id.
    \831\ Id.
    \832\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel, 
former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 
2001).
    \833\ Id.
    \834\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the 
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the Committee's March 1 hearing, Nolan was asked why she 
did not take any further steps to determine exactly what 
charges were outstanding against Marc Rich. Nolan's answer was 
less than satisfactory:

        Mr. Burton. An intelligence agency tells you that there 
        was arms trading, a violation of law, and all these 
        other things had taken place which had not just been 
        revealed or checked; and you take the man's word or the 
        President takes his word on the pardon of one of the 
        most wanted fugitives in the world who renounced his 
        citizenship and all the other things we talked about. 
        You took his word when Mr. Quinn was representing him. 
        And Mr. Quinn said in previous testimony the last time 
        he was here, my job wasn't to tell all the facts that 
        were against the pardon. My job was to point out all 
        the reasons why there should be a pardon.

        You know as an attorney that's what you do. You try to 
        make the best case for your client.

        Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there 
        was a question of illegal activity and say, hey, what 
        about this? You know darn well he's going to say, oh, 
        that's nothing. That was just a minor thing. That was 
        probably not arms trading. It was oil trading or 
        something else. Why would you take his word for it and 
        why would the President take his word for it and then 
        go ahead and grant the pardon? I just don't understand 
        it. It eludes me. Would you explain that to me?

                                *  *  *


        Ms. Nolan. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially 
        stuck together by then. I had my contact lenses in 
        since 7 or 6 the morning before. I had been going on a 
        couple hours of sleep most nights that week, as had the 
        President; and I think frankly, as Mr. Podesta said, 
        because this came up so late we did not do the kind of 
        checks that we would have if we would have had the 
        time. . . . As Mr. Lindsey indicated, he had indeed 
        indicated that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your 
        advisor, he is an advocate. But I do think that the 
        President viewed Mr. Quinn as somebody who he truly did 
        trust to give him correct information; and as far as we 
        know that information was correct, not incorrect.

                                *  *  *


        Mr. Burton. I'm running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn 
        at the White House?

        Ms. Nolan. No.

        Mr. Burton. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck 
        together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn't try 
        to contact the Justice Department to ask them about it 
        because it was 2:30 a.m.? And you can get a hold of the 
        man who is an advocate for pardoning one of the most 
        wanted fugitives in the world, but you don't call the 
        Justice Department or the intelligence agency at 2:30 
        a.m.? I don't understand that.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \835\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 379 
(Mar. 1, 2001).

    After the final conversation with Quinn, at 2:30 a.m., 
Nolan called President Clinton. Nolan told the President that 
they had performed an NCIC check, which showed that Rich was a 
wanted fugitive, and also revealed new information suggesting 
that Rich was wanted for arms trading. Nolan then told the 
President that the White House did not have any information 
showing that the NCIC information was inaccurate, other than 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what Quinn had told them:

        I said all we have is Jack Quinn's word that the arms 
        trading is not, in fact, an issue for Mr. Rich.

                                *  *  *


        [T]hat's when I said, you know, what we have is Jack 
        Quinn's word; that's all we have at this hour. And he 
        said, take Mr. Quinn's word, or take Jack's word.\836\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \836\ Id. at 378, 429 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to 
the President, the White House).

With that sentence--``take Jack's word''--President Clinton 
decided to grant the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. 
Nolan informed Cheryl Mills and Meredith Cabe, both of whom 
were in her office, of the decision, and then went home for the 
evening. The actual master warrant granting pardons to Marc 
Rich, Pincus Green, and 139 others was prepared at the Justice 
Department, and then delivered to the White House on the 
morning of January 20. The warrants were then signed by 
President Clinton.

H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons

            1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks
    The first reaction of the Marc Rich legal team to the 
pardons was one of happiness and self-congratulation. By 
Monday, January 22, they had turned to more practical concerns, 
like having the travel restrictions and arrest warrants for 
Rich and Green lifted. Jack Quinn spoke with Eric Holder, who 
was now Acting Attorney General. Quinn asked Holder what steps 
needed to be taken to ensure that Rich and Green were not 
arrested when they traveled. Holder told Quinn he needed to 
have detainers removed from computers, as well as inform 
Interpol of the pardon.\837\ Apparently, Holder thought that 
the Southern District of New York might resist the pardon, and 
refuse to dismiss the indictment. In that case, Holder 
counseled Quinn, Rich and Green to move to dismiss the 
indictment in court.\838\ According to Jack Quinn, who took 
notes of the conversation, Holder said that Quinn ``did a very 
good job.'' \839\ Holder also gave Quinn advice on how to 
handle the burgeoning media requests regarding the pardon 
effort, telling Quinn that he should ``make public [their] 
commitment to waive defenses to civil penalties at [DOE] and 
tthe [sic] support of [B]arak.'' \840\ Also in this same 
conversation, Holder asked Quinn to consider hiring two of his 
former aides at the Justice Department.\841\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \841\ Id. Holder sent the resumes of the two aides, former 
Associate Deputy Attorney General Bernard J. Delia and former Associate 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas M. Gess, later that day. Jack Quinn 
Document Production (Fax from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, 
Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (dated Dec. 1, 2000, date stamped 
by fax machine Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 182). In addition, at least one 
of these aides, Nick Gess, called Quinn as early as January 2, 2001, 
presumably seeking a job. The telephone message reads, ``Calling at 
Holder's suggestion.'' See Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone 
Message from Nick Gess, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department 
of Justice, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 183).
    \837\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
    \838\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to 
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180); Jack Quinn Document 
Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 181).
    \839\ Id.
    \840\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to 
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Holder has offered evolving accounts of his congratulatory 
remarks to Jack Quinn. At first, Holder's supporters informed 
the press that his comments to Quinn were ``sarcastic, not 
congratulatory.'' \842\ Then, when questioned about this matter 
at the Committee's hearing, Holder denied making the comments 
at all.\843\ Given the fact that Quinn took notes and sent an 
e-mail contemporaneously with the conversation with Holder, and 
that Holder has offered conflicting accounts of the 
conversation, it appears that Holder has not offered an honest 
explanation, and that he did indeed make the congratulatory 
comments to Quinn. Such comments support the Committee's 
conclusion that Eric Holder was sympathetic to the Marc Rich 
pardon or was willing, through his own inaction, to see the 
pardon granted so as not to interfere with his other interests. 
It is also worth noting that Holder, who had himself sought 
Quinn's support for his appointment as Attorney General if Vice 
President Gore won the presidency, continued to seek Quinn's 
support for finding employment for his underlings, even after 
the Rich pardon had been granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \842\ Lucy Howard, Susannah Meadows, Bret Begun and Katherine 
Stroup, Periscope, Newsweek, Feb. 12, 2001, at 6.
    \843\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 215 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press
    After Holder's congratulations, things began to go downhill 
for the Marc Rich team. By the end of the day on Monday, 
January 22, it became clear that the pardons of Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green were going to be a major news story. E-mails 
between Rich's representatives showed that they were having 
some difficulty dealing with this unforeseen consequence of the 
pardons. Rich lawyer Robert Fink began by asking how he should 
deal with press calls:

        I have been asked who lobbied the President in behalf 
        of Marc (and Pinky) and said it may be private and 
        therefore did not immediately respond. May I? Who 
        should I say? I have told everyone that Denise was in 
        favor of the resolution of this case and was in favor 
        of the pardon.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \844\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 
(E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et 
al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).

Rich's representative in Israel, Avner Azulay, was concerned 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about the publicity:

        Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have 
        enough names on the list other than his. Important to 
        keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share 
        with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is 
        election time here and has a potential of blowup. A 
        newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were 
        any political contributions. Other than that I thought 
        we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be 
        channeled to [G]ershon. Why is B[ob] F[ink] giving 
        interviews? He shouldn't be dealing with this 
        aspect.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \845\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Quinn also made a case for further disclosure:

        I have this very great concern: we are withholding our 
        very good and compelling petition from the press only 
        to protect the tax professors who don't want to be too 
        far out front. The tail is wagging the dog. I think it 
        is critical that one of us sit down with some 
        journalist and share the petition. I hope I'm not over-
        reacting, but thins [sic] is my best judgment. I'd do 
        it with the NY Times. In the next hour or so. Is that 
        possible? \846\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \846\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00195 
(E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 
184).

Avner Azulay agreed with the need to make the tax professors' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
opinion public:

        You are right. Why do we have to worry so much about 
        the professors. They did a job and there is nothing 
        wrong in giving expert onions [sic]. A lot know about 
        it, including the doj and sdny. It is part of the 
        petition. Why hide it? \847\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \847\ Id.

    The e-mails indicate that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman 
expressed some hesitancy to have their work for Marc Rich 
publicly disclosed. When asked if Professor Ginsburg was 
hesitant to be linked to the Rich case because it might harm 
the reputation of his wife, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Quinn said Professor Ginsburg's, and Professor 
Wolfman's concerns were limited to a fear of being ``besieged 
with media requests.'' \848\ It appears that the professors' 
concerns were more serious than fear of dealing with a barrage 
of press calls, and it stands to reason that they were 
concerned about having their reputations tarnished by having 
the public know of their lucrative work for Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \848\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 180 
(Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While they were deciding how to deal with the public, the 
Marc Rich team was also receiving communications from former 
President Clinton. On January 23, Anne McGuire, an associate at 
Quinn Gillespie, e-mailed Jack Quinn to let him know that she 
had heard from Clinton Library fundraiser Peter O'Keefe:

        Just got a weird call from Peter O'Keefe--was up in 
        Chappaqua for the last few days--he asked me to check 
        with you on whether or not you were going to go out and 
        start defending vigorously--said ``we wanted to find 
        out.'' I am assuming he meant Terry [McAuliffe]--but I 
        did not go into it on the cell phone.\849\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \849\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, 
Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 185). Shortly after her conversation with O'Keefe, McGuire 
spoke to Terry McAuliffe and asked Quinn to ``[c]all me as soon as you 
can.'' Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, 
Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 186). The timing of McAuliffe's call suggests that it was 
related to Quinn's response to the Rich matter. However, since 
McAuliffee has refused to participate in an interview with Committee 
staff, the Committee cannot know definitively what McAuliffe's call was 
about.

It appears that Quinn spoke to former President Clinton on 
January 23 and 24, about how to handle the Rich issue in the 
press. On January 23, Quinn e-mailed Avner Azulay and pointed 
out that Clinton ``himself is saying in his frustration about 
the press coverage that good people like the PM [Barak] 
supported this.'' \850\ The following day, Quinn e-mailed the 
Marc Rich team and said that he ``spoke to BC. [He] thinks we 
shd offer op-ed to daily news. [C]an anyone help?'' \851\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \850\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to 
Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) 
(Exhibit 187).
    \851\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to 
Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 188).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 26, 2001, Quinn did write an op-ed piece, which 
was published by The Washington Post. The article was little 
more than a rehash of the same inaccurate arguments that Quinn 
made to the White House when he was seeking the pardon. Quinn's 
main claims were that: (1) companies which committed acts 
similar to those of Rich and Green were not prosecuted for 
their actions; (2) the prosecutors in the Southern District of 
New York refused to negotiate with Rich and Green; and (3) 
Quinn did not violate the Executive Order banning lobbying by 
officials who had left the White House in the previous five 
years. As explained earlier in this report, all of these 
arguments were misleading.
    Internal e-mails among the team defending Jack Quinn 
indicate that they were particularly concerned about Quinn's 
exposure for his possible role in ``coordinating'' political 
activities and the effort to obtain the Rich pardon. These e-
mails also indicate that Quinn was eager to place the blame for 
the Rich pardon onto others. The day after the Committee's 
February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn associate Peter Mirijanian 
sent the following e-mail to Quinn and a number of his 
associates:

        Where Jack remains exposed is in defending the optics 
        of the emails, contributions and the DNC piece (Beth 
        Dzoretz [sic]). We need to anticipate the worst in this 
        regard--i.e. Fink refuses to testify, Denise is granted 
        immunity and Beth is brought before the committee. 
        Since Jack has been out front and center on this the 
        impression will stick that, yes, he knew of these 
        activities and gave them his tacit approval.

        Just like with Holder, if these other parties don't 
        come forward and instead duck their responsibility on 
        these matters, we'll have to do it for them. (Does that 
        sound too ``Sopranos-like''?) \852\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \852\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02943 (E-mail from Peter 
Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Scott Hynes, Quinn 
Gillespie & Associates et al. (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 189).

    On February 10, 2001, Mirijanian advised Quinn against 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
appearing on Meet the Press because of similar concerns:

        My concern jack is that russert is going to get into a 
        series of questions involving denise's political 
        activities and you will be the de facto defender of 
        what she did. That will only result in more press 
        inquiries about your ``coordinating'' role--something 
        we want to avoid.\853\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \853\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02946 (E-mail from Peter 
Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 10, 
2001)) (Exhibit 190).

These e-mails suggest that Quinn and his defenders felt that 
they were vulnerable to questions about Quinn's coordination of 
the political activities of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz and 
the effort to obtain Marc Rich's pardon. The e-mails raise the 
possibility that Denise Rich and Dozoretz might have had 
valuable information regarding these activities which they did 
not share with the Committee, due to the invocation of their 
Fifth Amendment rights.
            3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times
    For the first month of public outcry about the Marc Rich 
pardon, President Clinton was largely silent. He made a few 
scattered comments about the matter, most notably a telephone 
call to Geraldo Rivera. Through the call to Rivera, the public 
learned that the President felt ``blindsided by this. I have no 
infrastructure to deal with this, no press person. I just 
wanted to go out there and do what past presidents have done, 
but the Republicans had other ideas for me.'' \854\ President 
Clinton also suggested that the outcry over Marc Rich was 
hypocritical, because Republicans had worked on the Rich case: 
``It's terrible! I mean, he had three big-time Republican 
lawyers, including Dick Cheney's chief of staff. Marc Rich 
himself is a Republican.'' \855\ President Clinton also told 
Rivera about the influence that Israeli support for Rich had 
played: ``Now, I'll tell you what did influence me. Israel did 
influence me profoundly.'' \856\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \854\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001).
    \855\ Id.
    \856\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On Sunday, February 18, former President Clinton attempted 
a fuller defense by publishing a column in The New York Times. 
Unfortunately for the President, his attempt at defense only 
made matters worse. The column largely parroted the arguments 
made by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers. Therefore, 
it was rife with false and misleading statements. The following 
is a summary of the arguments made by the President, and the 
problems with each argument:

         ``I understood that the other oil companies 
        that had structured transactions like those on which 
        Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were indicted were instead sued 
        civilly by the government.'' \857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \857\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).

           LAs explained earlier in this report, there were 48 
        criminal prosecutions for violations of oil price 
        control regulations by crude oil resellers, and 14 of 
        those individuals served time in prison. In fact, John 
        Troland and David Ratliff, resellers of oil who played 
        a small part in Marc Rich's plan to avoid U.S. oil 
        regulations and tax laws, served 10 months in prison, 
        and provided vital evidence against Marc Rich and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pincus Green.

         ``I was informed that, in 1985, in a related 
        case against a trading partner of Mr. Rich and Mr. 
        Green, the Energy Department, which was responsible for 
        enforcing the governing law, found that the manner in 
        which the Rich/Green companies had accounted for these 
        transactions was proper.'' \858\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \858\ Id.

           LThe so-called DOE finding was completely irrelevant 
        to the criminal charges against Rich and Green. Despite 
        the finding about accounting methods in a related case, 
        the Department of Energy never disputed that Rich's 
        companies falsified reports to hide illegal profits and 
        then failed to pay taxes on those illegal profits. 
        Furthermore, the former President neglected to mention 
        that he made no effort, and he was aware that his staff 
        made no effort, to check with Justice Department or 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Energy Department experts regarding this matter.

         ``[T]wo highly regarded tax experts, Bernard 
        Wolfman . . . and Martin Ginsburg . . . reviewed the 
        transactions in question and concluded that the 
        companies `were correct in their U.S. income tax 
        treatment of all the items in question[.]' '' \859\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \859\ Id.

           LThe tax analysis that was performed by Ginsburg and 
        Wolfman was performed only with facts provided to the 
        professors by the Marc Rich legal team.\860\ The 
        professors did not gather facts independently, and 
        therefore based their analysis on an incorrect set of 
        assumptions. In addition, the President failed to 
        disclose in his column that Marc Rich paid Professors 
        Ginsburg and Wolfman over $96,000 for their work on the 
        Rich case.\861\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \860\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, 
Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division 
Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department 
of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66).
    \861\ See Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64); Letter 
from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable 
Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 
65).

         ``[I]n order to settle the government's case 
        against them, the two men's companies had paid 
        approximately $200 million in fines, penalties and 
        taxes, most of which might not even have been warranted 
        under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis that the companies 
        had followed the law and correctly reported their 
        income.'' \862\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \862\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).

           LRather than being an argument in support of the 
        pardon, the fact of the corporate guilty plea and the 
        massive fines shows that the case against Rich and 
        Green was overwhelming. As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg 
        observed, ``if the case is so weak, I mean what in the 
        world were those lawyers [for Rich's companies] 
        thinking at that time . . . . They would have never 
        pled guilty, they would have never paid those fines. 
        Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr. Chairman, and 
        members of the committee, whatever the reason, surely 
        the reason was not the merits of the case.'' \863\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \863\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc 
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 91 (Feb. 
8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former assistant 
U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

         ``[T]he Justice Department in 1989 rejected 
        the use of racketeering statutes in tax cases like this 
        one[.]'' \864\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \864\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).

           LThe fact that the Justice Department stopped using 
        the tax charges as predicate offenses for bringing RICO 
        charges is irrelevant to the Rich pardon. While the 
        Justice Department did stop using tax charges in this 
        way, it continues to allow mail and wire fraud as 
        predicate offenses, and therefore, RICO charges could 
        still be brought against Rich and Green under current 
        legal theories. In addition, money laundering statutes 
        were not in place in 1983, and Rich could have been 
        charged under these statutes if he were charged today. 
        Finally, to look at the evolution of the law over the 
        seventeen years that Marc Rich was a fugitive from 
        justice, and argue that those changes merit a pardon 
        for Rich is to reward Rich for his flight from the 
        country. Indeed, sophisticated practitioners of money 
        laundering--which is one of the things that Rich and 
        Green were doing--would be in a far worse position if 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        indicted today.

         ``It was my understanding that Deputy 
        Attorney General Eric Holder's position on the pardon 
        application was `neutral, leaning for.' '' \865\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \865\ Id.

           LAs explained throughout this report, Holder's 
        position on the pardon is more of an indictment of 
        Holder's judgment and reasoning than it is a 
        justification for the pardon. Holder served the Justice 
        Department and President poorly by failing to gather 
        any facts about the Rich case before reaching his 
        decision about the pardon. He also created the 
        indelible impression that he did not have a pure motive 
        in supporting Rich's request while he was soliciting 
        Jack Quinn's support for appointment as Attorney 
        General. This point is also an indictment of Jack 
        Quinn, who worked very hard to keep the Rich pardon 
        matter away from anyone who would be able to refute his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        spurious arguments.

         ``[T]he case for the pardons was reviewed 
        and advocated not only by my former White House counsel 
        Jack Quinn but also by three distinguished Republican 
        attorneys: Leonard Garment, a former Nixon White House 
        official; William Bradford Reynolds, a former high-
        ranking official in the Reagan Justice Department; and 
        Lewis Libby, now Vice President Cheney's chief of 
        staff.'' \866\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \866\ Id.

           LThis was President Clinton's most misleading 
        assertion. When President Clinton initially drafted 
        this statement, it said that ``the applications were 
        viewed and advocated'' not only by my former White 
        House counsel Jack Quinn but also by three 
        distinguished Republicans[.]'' \867\ After some initial 
        copies of the newspaper were printed, the former 
        President's spokesmen called The New York Times and 
        asked that the word ``applications'' be replaced with 
        ``the case for the pardons.'' \868\ The pardon 
        applications were never reviewed by Garment, Reynolds, 
        or Libby, so the initial form of the statement was 
        blatantly untrue.\869\ However, even the improved 
        statement was misleading. Garment, Reynolds and Libby 
        had worked with Rich in the 1980s and early 1990s to 
        try to reach a resolution of the charges against Rich 
        in New York. The arguments made by Garment, Reynolds 
        and Libby focused on the claim that the SDNY was 
        criminalizing what should have been a civil tax case. 
        They did not make, compile, or in any other way lay the 
        groundwork for, or make a case for a Presidential 
        pardon. When former President Clinton stated that they 
        ``reviewed and advocated'' ``the case for the 
        pardons,'' he suggested that they were somehow involved 
        in arguing that Rich and Green should receive pardons. 
        This was completely untrue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \867\ Editors' Note, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15.
    \868\ Id.
    \869\ Id.

         ``[F]inally, and importantly, many present 
        and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major 
        political parties and leaders of Jewish communities in 
        America and Europe urged the pardon of Mr. Rich because 
        of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable 
        causes, to the Mossad's efforts to rescue and evacuate 
        Jews from hostile countries, and to the peace process 
        through sponsorship of education and health programs in 
        Gaza and the West Bank.'' \870\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \870\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).

           LThis argument would have been more sound if 
        President Clinton had been President of Israel, rather 
        than President of the United States. Indeed, President 
        Clinton received more pressure from the Israeli 
        government, Israelis, and Israeli sympathizers for a 
        pardon for Jonathan Pollard than for Marc Rich and 
        Pincus Green. Presumably, President Clinton was 
        representing U.S. interests when he declined to pardon 
        Pollard. While it would certainly not have been 
        inappropriate to take many concerns into consideration, 
        one would have expected President Clinton to continue 
        to put U.S. interests above all others when considering 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the Rich and Green pardons.

           LThere were a number of other problems with 
        President Clinton's reliance on statements of support 
        from Israeli and Jewish officials. First, as discussed 
        throughout this report, it appears that Marc Rich 
        carefully cultivated support by making large financial 
        contributions to political candidates and charitable 
        groups, in some cases making his financial support 
        contingent on their support for his pardon. In other 
        cases, individuals voicing support for Rich were 
        misled, and had no idea that their support would be 
        used to obtain a pardon. Finally, as explained 
        previously, it appears that the President has grossly 
        exaggerated the extent to which Prime Minister Barak 
        pressed him to issue the Rich pardon. President Clinton 
        even misinformed his staff on January 19 that Prime 
        Minister Barak had raised the Marc Rich issue, when in 
        reality, it was President Clinton who raised the Rich 
        pardon with Barak.

    Given the fact that every reason that the President offered 
for the Rich pardon was either misleading or inaccurate, the 
President's column added to the public furor over the pardons. 
Given the President's inability to provide any factually 
accurate or convincing justification for the Rich pardon, the 
public, and the Committee, are left wondering what the 
President's true motivations were.\871\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \871\ In a televised interview, Roger Clinton made the following 
statement about the Marc Rich pardon:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GWell, it was surprising, I can't--but I'm not saying it 
      was wrong. I have talked to my brother about it, not in 
      detail, but he has explained to me the reasons, the 
      nonpersonal reasons--because I don't need to know the 
      personal ones--but he has explained to me how he was right 
      in doing it, and he thought that he was right, specially 
      based on all the people that had written him about it.
Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001). Roger 
Clinton's reference to the ``personal reasons'' for President Clinton's 
action is noteworthy. While Roger Clinton has limited credibility, as 
the President's brother, he would have reason to know whether President 
Clinton had hidden motives for issuing the Marc Rich and Pincus Green 
pardons. However, it is unclear, what, if any, ``personal reasons'' the 
President had for issuing the pardons.

V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS 
        GREEN INVESTIGATION

    The Committee's investigation of the pardons of Marc Rich 
and Pincus Green was hampered by a number of Fifth Amendment 
claims and other refusals to cooperate with the Committee.

A. Marc Rich

    On February 15, 2001, Chairman Burton directed a letter to 
Marc Rich, asking him to testify before the Committee and waive 
attorney-client privilege with respect to documents relating to 
his efforts to obtain a pardon. On February 27, 2001, Laurence 
Urgenson, counsel for Mr. Rich, informed the Committee that 
because of the various criminal investigations into Mr. Rich's 
activities, Rich would not waive his attorney-client privilege, 
or appear before the Committee.\872\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \872\ Letter from Laurence A. Urgenson, Counsel for Marc Rich, 
Kirkland & Ellis, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Pincus Green

    On August 27, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Pincus 
Green, requesting that he participate in an interview with 
Committee staff.\873\ Green never responded to this request. 
Given that Green apparently still lives outside of the United 
States, the Committee has not been able to serve him with a 
subpoena requiring the production of documents or testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \873\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Pincus Green (Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Jack Quinn

    Jack Quinn cooperated with the initial phase of the 
Committee's investigation, testifying at both the February 8, 
2001, and March 1, 2001, hearings. Quinn also produced a number 
of documents to the Committee regarding his work for Marc Rich 
and Pincus Green. However, Quinn also withheld hundreds of 
pages from the Committee, claiming that they were covered by 
the attorney-client privilege. Quinn and three other law firms 
which had represented Marc Rich also made similar arguments to 
try to withhold the documents from the grand jury investigating 
the Rich and Green pardons. In December 2001, Federal District 
Court Judge Denny Chin overruled the claims of privilege by 
Quinn and the other lawyers, and directed them to produce the 
subpoenaed records to the grand jury. On December 17, 2001, 
Chairman Burton requested that Quinn and three other law firms 
representing Rich to produce to the Committee any documents 
they produced to the grand jury in response to Judge Chin's 
ruling.
    On February 7, 2002, Quinn produced hundreds of pages of 
documents to the Committee which he had withheld for over a 
year. The documents were highly significant, and raised serious 
questions about Quinn's work on the Rich case, including 
whether Quinn was going to receive money from Rich, contrary to 
assurances given by Quinn at the Committee's February 8, 2001, 
hearing. On February 19, 2002, Chairman Burton asked Quinn to 
participate in a voluntary interview with Committee staff 
regarding the documents he had turned over. On March 5, 2002, 
Quinn's counsel Victoria Toensing informed Committee staff that 
Quinn would not participate in an interview with Committee 
staff. It is disturbing that Quinn withheld documents from the 
Committee for over a year, and then refused to answer questions 
about those documents when they were finally turned over to the 
Committee. Quinn's refusal to answer questions about these 
documents creates an impression that Quinn is still attempting 
to conceal relevant information from the Committee about his 
work on the Marc Rich case. In an attempt to obtain further 
information from Quinn, the Committee issued a document 
subpoena to him on March 6, 2002.

D. Denise Rich

    On February 5, 2001, Chairman Burton submitted a list of 
written questions to Denise Rich regarding her efforts to win a 
pardon for her ex-husband.\874\ Chairman Burton sent this 
letter in an attempt to obtain information from Mrs. Rich 
without calling her to testify at a public hearing. On February 
7, 2001, Committee staff met with Carol Elder Bruce, counsel 
for Denise Rich. Bruce informed Committee staff that Rich would 
be invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer the 
questions posed to her by the Chairman. Bruce also informed the 
Committee staff that Rich was ``privy to a number of private 
conversations that might be of interest'' to the 
Committee.\875\ She further informed the Committee that Rich 
had given a large amount of money with respect to the Clintons, 
including an ``enormous sum'' of money to the Clinton 
Library.\876\ However, Bruce denied that Rich had any intent to 
bribe President Clinton. Later that day, Bruce sent a letter to 
Chairman Burton in which she confirmed that ``Ms. Rich is 
asserting her privilege under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution not to be a witness against herself and, 
accordingly, will not be answering any questions of the 
Chairman or the Committee.'' \877\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \875\ Notes of meeting with Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise 
Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 7, 2001).
    \874\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe 
Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 5, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \876\ Id.
    \877\ Letter from Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe 
Patton Armstrong & Teasdale, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, 
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 7, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Beth Dozoretz

    After the Committee learned of Beth Dozoretz's involvement 
in the Rich pardon matter at its February 8, 2001, hearing, 
Committee staff attempted to interview Dozoretz. She refused to 
answer calls from Committee staff, and accordingly, on February 
16, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Dozoretz requesting 
her to participate in an interview.\878\ On February 20, 2001, 
Tom Green, counsel for Dozoretz, called Committee staff and 
stated that Dozoretz declined to be interviewed. Accordingly, 
on February 23, 2001, Chairman Burton issued a subpoena to 
Dozoretz requiring her to testify before a hearing of the 
Committee on March 1, 2001. On February 26, 2001, Mr. Green 
wrote to the Chairman to inform him that Dozoretz ``has elected 
to invoke her constitutional privilege not to testify.'' \879\ 
When Chairman Burton informed Green that he intended to call 
Dozoretz to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights publicly,\880\ 
Green sent a letter requesting that Dozoretz be excused from 
her appearance.\881\ However, the Chairman required Dozoretz to 
testify for two main reasons: first, a letter from counsel 
stating that a client will invoke the Fifth Amendment if called 
is not a satisfactory invocation of the Fifth Amendment; and 
second, the Committee could not be certain that Dozoretz would 
actually take the Fifth if called to testify, and accordingly 
had a responsibility to call her to determine whether or not 
she would actually invoke her Fifth Amendment rights. On March 
1, 2001, Dozoretz appeared before the Committee and invoked her 
Fifth Amendment rights rather than testify about her role in 
the Rich and Green pardons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \878\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Beth Dozoretz, former Finance Chair, Democratic 
National Committee (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \879\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, 
Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \880\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & 
Austin (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \881\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, 
Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Avner Azulay

    Avner Azulay was a key participant in the effort of Marc 
Rich and Pincus Green to obtain a pardon. Since Azulay resides 
outside of the United States, the Committee was not able to 
compel Azulay's testimony. However, on March 8, 2001, Chairman 
Burton sent a letter to Azulay requesting that he participate 
in an interview with Committee staff.\882\ On March 15, 2001, 
Azulay responded by referring the Committee to his lawyer in 
New York, Robert Morvillo.\883\ Committee staff then had a 
number of communications with Morvillo attempting to arrange an 
interview of Azulay. The Committee was initially informed that 
Azulay was undergoing medical treatment, and was unable to 
participate in an interview. However, over the course of the 
negotiations with Morvillo, it became clear that Azulay had no 
intention of cooperating with the committee. In a final 
discussion on February 28, 2002, Morvillo confirmed that Azulay 
would not participate in an interview with Committee staff. 
Given his key role in enlisting support for the Rich and Green 
pardons among Israeli leaders, Azulay's refusal to cooperate 
with the Committee's investigation has had a significant 
negative impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \882\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) 
(Exhibit 118).
    \883\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the 
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) 
(Exhibit 119).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Peter Kadzik

    The Committee only learned of Peter Kadzik's role in 
lobbying for the Rich and Green pardons after receiving records 
from his law firm, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, which 
reflected Kadzik's work on the matter. On Friday, February 23, 
2001, Committee staff left a message with Kadzik's attorney 
informing him that Kadzik would be called to testify at the 
Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. On Monday, February 26, 
Chairman Burton sent a letter to Kadzik formally notifying him 
that he would be called to testify.\884\ At 7:40 p.m. on 
February 27, 2001, only 36 hours before the March 1 hearing, 
and without so much as a telephone call from Kadzik or his 
attorneys to Committee staff, Kadzik sent a response to the 
Chairman, declining to testify because he was to be in 
California for a meeting.\885\ Upon receiving this information, 
Chairman Burton issued a subpoena for Kadzik's attendance at 
the hearing.\886\ Despite the fact that Committee staff 
informed Kadzik's attorneys that the Chairman would subpoena 
Kadzik to attend the hearing, Kadzik boarded a plane for 
California on the morning of February 28, 2001. Accordingly, 
the Committee provided the subpoena to the U.S. Marshals 
Service for service upon Kadzik. When Kadzik exited his plane 
in San Francisco, he was served by a U.S. Marshal. He then 
boarded the next plane for Washington, and arrived in time to 
testify at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. While the 
Committee was able to serve Kadzik and receive testimony from 
him, his attempts to avoid compulsory process were unseemly. 
Kadzik declined to testify voluntarily. Then, when he was 
informed that the Committee would issue a subpoena to compel 
his attendance at the hearing, he left Washington, mistakenly 
assuming that the Committee would not be able to serve him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \884\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & 
Oshinsky (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \885\ Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & 
Oshinsky, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform 
(Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \886\ Subpoena from House Comm. on Govt. Reform to Peter Kadzik, 
Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 27, 2001) (within 
Appendix II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Terry McAuliffe

    In a letter dated February 16, 2001, Chairman Burton 
requested Terry McAuliffe to participate in an interview with 
Committee staff regarding the Rich and Green pardons, 
specifically regarding Denise Rich's contributions to the 
Clinton Library.\887\ Shortly thereafter, Richard Ben-Veniste, 
McAuliffe's attorney, contacted Committee staff to state that 
he wanted to wait until the Committee reached an accommodation 
with the Clinton Library regarding access to the Library's 
information, before he decided whether to make McAuliffe 
available. On March 22, 2001, Chairman Burton informed Ben-
Veniste that after obtaining information from the Clinton 
Library, he still wanted McAuliffe to participate in an 
interview with Committee staff.\888\ On March 23, 2001, Ben-
Veniste responded to state that he wanted more information 
regarding what the Committee sought from McAuliffe.\889\ The 
Committee's Chief Counsel provided this information in a letter 
dated March 30, 2001.\890\ Nevertheless, on April 11, 2001, 
Ben-Veniste sent a reply stating that ``it does not appear that 
a personal interview with the staff is warranted at this time. 
Mr. McAuliffe wishes you to know that his obligations as 
Chairman of the Democratic National Committee to help elect a 
Democratic majority to the House and Senate are fully occupying 
his time at the present.'' \891\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \887\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil 
Gotshal & Manges (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \888\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil 
Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 22, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \889\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, 
Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform (Mar. 23, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \890\ Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil 
Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 30, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \891\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, 
Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform (Apr. 11, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    [Exhibits referred to follow:]
    
    
                              CHAPTER TWO

     ROGER CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT IN LOBBYING FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

                       FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his 
brother's name during the Clinton Administration.

 President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to 
capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his 
second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use 
his connections to the Administration to gain financial 
advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State 
Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had 
instructed him that since this was his last term in office, 
Roger should find a way to make a living and use his 
relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By 
suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton 
encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton 
apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from 
whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only 
four years to get things done'' and that they did not care 
``about ethics or what appearances were.''

 Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money 
from foreign governments solely because he was the President's 
brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted 
that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had 
received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. 
Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these 
invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries] 
strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of 
the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in 
addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
musical performances from foreign governments, he also received 
money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger 
Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by 
the President or White House staff that the President was not 
permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.

 Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in 
unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased 
overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered 
at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger 
Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks 
originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed 
by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank. 
This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger 
Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds 
originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes 
requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. 
Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any 
explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious 
transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by 
law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his 
admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign 
governments.

 Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing 
to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One 
company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton 
and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. 
Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in 
the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with 
covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not 
register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying 
contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore, 
needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the 
Department of Justice.

 Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a 
$35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet 
secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated 
Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer 
Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an 
Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to 
obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's 
promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney 
Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis' 
organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to 
pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the 
invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were 
to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at 
a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.''

Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario 
Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure.

 Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario 
Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of 
heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in 
federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of 
organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His 
associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian 
Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, 
murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking 
in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between 
Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.''

 Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the 
Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded 
in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy'' 
Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton 
to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy 
Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward 
if he was successful. Even though he never was successful, 
Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex 
watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.''

 Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to 
the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United 
States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the 
Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying 
Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that 
President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario 
Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact 
the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission 
staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, 
Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the 
President to influence the Commission improperly and win 
Gambino's release.

 The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered 
the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating 
Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However, 
it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of 
the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in 
meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to 
the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to 
have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole 
Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from 
recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole 
Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI 
from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's 
involvement in the Gambino case.

 Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his 
contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with 
the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger 
Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the 
Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts 
with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-
serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written 
memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid 
and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton 
also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the 
Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview. 
While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or 
after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino 
had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house. 
He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the 
money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both 
Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found 
no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or 
that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to 
the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his 
interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and 
contradictory stories in response to questions about his 
receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally 
producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it 
in Tijuana, Mexico.

 Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to 
grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the 
Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win 
parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex 
watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House 
received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. 
Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for 
clemency matters requested a criminal background check on 
Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration 
is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical 
inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that 
level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was 
pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have 
refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown 
whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he 
did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of 
the White House some other way. Although the President did not 
ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances 
surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless 
suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and 
confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is 
disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even 
more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to 
purchase access to the both the parole and clemency processes 
with cash payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the 
President of the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI 
investigation of the matter, the Justice Department has, to 
date, been unwilling or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of 
his activities.

Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that 
was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with 
the promise of pardon that never came.

 The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon 
for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted 
felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential 
pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas 
businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close 
relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. 
Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and 
claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton 
and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family 
constituted their life savings and means of support in 
retirement.

 Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds 
from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey 
Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among 
themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in 
checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a 
company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton, 
Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from 
the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself. 
Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM 
while offering no explanation of why he received this 
substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings 
through CLM.

 Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to 
defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a 
pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George 
Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the 
Justice Department or White House for consideration for a 
pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the 
victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps 
Roger Clinton as well.

Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as 
13 other pardons and commutations.

 Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six 
clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. 
Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for 
approximately six close friends and that he did so because of 
concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example, 
Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan 
Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of 
drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. 
However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton 
to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people 
who were not his personal friends and some involve 
solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business 
opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency 
petition in front of the President.

 Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for 
horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing 
profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton 
a share of the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange 
for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy 
suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could be 
concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan Lasater's 
name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the venture, 
discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with Roger 
Clinton.

 Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of 
former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. 
According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked 
her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the 
President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay 
any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition 
anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger 
Clinton asked Lavelle ``do you have $100,000 to get this 
through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the 
question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive 
a pardon.

 Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for 
Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition 
was seriously considered at the White House. After being 
convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan 
Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's 
connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first 
lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes 
during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster 
Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him 
obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a 
presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and 
restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of 
clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White 
House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before 
inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of 
clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.

 Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency 
to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized 
American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like 
Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's 
but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also 
did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that 
Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President 
even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being 
sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received 
an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had 
fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger 
Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the 
tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to 
become recognized by the federal government.

 According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant 
operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a 
pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to 
Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with 
such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former 
attorney's version of events.

Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the 
Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly 
refusing to produce key documents.

 For months, the Bush White House prevented the 
National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, 
clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The 
Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been 
considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario 
Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently'' 
produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to 
withhold. The accidental production also included documents 
relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had 
sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration 
did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino 
documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing 
to produce the records even though they were not subject to any 
executive privilege claim.

 The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain 
Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. 
After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole 
Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an 
FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased 
producing additional documents, claiming they were related to 
an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-
Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000.

INTRODUCTION
    Unlike other presidential relatives discussed in this 
report, Roger Clinton was fairly unsuccessful in actually 
obtaining clemency for anyone but himself. Nevertheless, the 
Committee investigated his activities because the substantial 
number of credible allegations of influence peddling demanded 
further scrutiny. Even though Roger Clinton was unable to 
deliver actual grants of clemency, he was able to deliver the 
time and attention of the President and his senior staff. Roger 
Clinton's ability to circumvent the normal process was worth a 
great deal of money to those hoping for clemency, and he 
exploited it for his personal gain. The damage done by this 
exploitation is even worse in light of evidence suggesting that 
President Clinton was aware of and even encouraged it. While 
investigating these matters, the Committee also discovered 
several potential violations of law and suspicious 
transactions, some of which are not directly related to 
clemency requests. However, these non-clemency matters are 
detailed briefly in this chapter because they provide evidence 
of a pattern of behavior by Roger Clinton that is instructive 
when considering the evidence in the clemency-related matters.
    For a variety of reasons, including his 1985 conviction for 
cocaine distribution, Roger Clinton was generally mocked and 
regarded with derision during President Clinton's two terms in 
office. When Roger Clinton's involvement in lobbying for 
presidential pardons came to light, it was often treated with 
humor in the press and was fodder for late-night talk show 
monologues. However, as the Committee investigated these 
allegations, it became clear that Clinton was involved in 
serious and reckless misconduct constituting a systematic 
effort to cash in on his fame as the President's brother. Roger 
Clinton's efforts to use his status as the President's brother 
to try to win clemency for an organized crime figure represents 
one of the darkest examples of influence peddling ever reviewed 
by the Committee. His other seamy business dealings, along with 
his frequent acceptance of large cash payments from foreign 
governments, only compounds the disturbing appearance that 
access to the President was up for sale. That the President 
could have been completely unaware of these sordid dealings is 
implausible at best. Yet, too often, public disclosure of this 
type of behavior has prompted laughter rather than stern 
rebukes. To dismiss Roger Clinton's activities as merely the 
comical bumbling of Bill Clinton's less-gifted half-brother, 
however, runs the risk of seriously undermining public 
confidence in the integrity of government.
    At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Clinton 
attempted to obtain grants of clemency for a number of 
individuals, many of whom he barely knew. While he appears to 
have been motivated by friendship in some instances, many of 
the others appear to be motivated by the promise of financial 
reward. The Committee has collected evidence indicating that 
Roger Clinton was connected to pardon or commutation requests 
for at least 15 different individuals, excluding himself: John 
Ballis, Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita 
Lavelle, Garland Lincecum, George Locke, Blume Loe, J.T. Lundy, 
Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan, Jim McClain, William McCord, Mark St. 
Pe, Mitchell Wood, and Phillip Young. For his part, Roger 
Clinton has admitted only to leaving a list of six pardon 
requests at the White House for his brother's consideration.\1\ 
The Committee has been unable to obtain a copy of the list \2\ 
or confirm which names were on the list.\3\ Whether Roger 
Clinton provided President Clinton with a list of six names is 
largely irrelevant, however, as the Committee has compiled 
evidence clearly demonstrating that of the 15 cases with some 
connection to Roger Clinton, he actually pressed for grants of 
clemency for at least eight individuals.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Roger Clinton Says He 
Promised Pardons, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 2001, at A1.
    \2\ In attempting to obtain a copy of the list from the files of 
the former Administration, the Committee requested from the National 
Archives, ``All records relating to any requests for clemency made by 
Hugh Rodham or Roger Clinton on behalf of any individual.'' Letter from 
the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John W. 
Carlin, Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records 
Administration (Mar. 8, 2001) (within Appendix I). On March 14, 2001, 
the Committee also issued a subpoena to Roger Clinton seeking, inter 
alia, ``all records relating to any efforts made by you, or on your 
behalf, to assist in the obtaining of any grant of executive clemency'' 
(within Appendix II).
    \3\ The Committee sent Roger Clinton a letter requesting answers to 
a number of questions, including, ``Please list all individuals on 
whose behalf you ever requested executive clemency.'' Letter from the 
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C. 
Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I). The reply from his lawyer 
refused to answer any of the questions, stating, ``Like anyone who 
values his own privacy and who respects the privacy of those close to 
him, Mr. Clinton will not submit willingly to a general warrant.'' 
Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable 
Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within 
Appendix I).
    \4\ The eight individuals are Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan 
Lasater, Rita Lavelle, George Locke, Joseph McKernan, William McCord, 
and Mark St. Pe. Their cases are discussed in more detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Roger Clinton failed to obtain the grants of 
clemency for which lobbied, he did receive clemency for his own 
cocaine conviction. While the Committee did not investigate it 
directly, President Clinton's grant of clemency to his brother 
now appears to be one of his most egregious last-minute 
pardons. Roger Clinton was involved in potentially illegal 
conduct and was under active investigation by the FBI at the 
time that he received his pardon. The fact that he was involved 
in the type of conduct described in this report should have 
disqualified him from receiving clemency. Moreover, the media 
widely reported in August 2001 that Roger Clinton had entered 
rehabilitation for chronic cocaine abuse.\5\ Obviously, if 
Roger Clinton was engaged in illegal cocaine use in January 
2001, it would indicate that he was neither rehabilitated nor 
remorseful for his cocaine distribution crimes, making him an 
unsuitable candidate for a presidential pardon under President 
Clinton's own guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See, e.g., Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source: First Paula 
Poundstone, then Ben Affleck, now Roger Clinton, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 
2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The focus of this chapter, though, is Roger Clinton's 
involvement in lobbying for others in their attempts to obtain 
executive clemency. The sheer number of people who attempted to 
purchase or were solicited to purchase a pardon through Roger 
Clinton gives credence to allegations that he was engaged in a 
systematic effort to capitalize on his relationship to the 
President of the United States. Moreover, the Committee's 
investigation has revealed that his attempts to sell his access 
to the President were not confined to clemency-related matters. 
Indeed, Roger Clinton repeatedly treated his relationship to 
President Clinton as a commodity to be sold to the highest 
bidder. This disturbing pattern of behavior began shortly after 
Bill Clinton became President and apparently continued until 
Bill Clinton's last day in office. Roger Clinton's behavior was 
unseemly at best, but it is even more troubling is that the 
President himself appears to have instigated and encouraged 
this behavior.
I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME
    When the FBI interviewed Roger Clinton in conjunction with 
its investigation of his relationship with the Gambino family, 
Clinton made a number of startling admissions. He admitted that 
since early in President Clinton's term, foreign governments 
had paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Clinton claimed 
that these payments were for musical performances but 
acknowledged that he knew he was receiving the money only 
because he was the President's brother. Roger Clinton also 
admitted that foreign governments had given him gifts for 
President Clinton and that he had kept some of those gifts for 
his own use. He informed the FBI that early in President 
Clinton's term, he received cash payments from foreign 
governments, which he was to give to the President. White House 
staff had to instruct him that the President could not accept 
cash payments from foreign countries. Some of Clinton's conduct 
is explained in his interview with FBI investigators:

        [Roger Clinton] has made a number of business trips to 
        foreign countries over the last few years. Clinton 
        stated that he is a musician and plays with a six piece 
        band. He has received invitations from Presidents and 
        other foreign government leaders from between 10-12 
        different countries. Clinton advised he knows he 
        receives these invitations strictly because he is the 
        First Brother of the President of the United States. 
        Clinton advised that the President is aware of the 
        invitations, in general, but may not know each time he 
        takes a trip. Clinton stated that when he received an 
        invitation to visit a country he is offered money by 
        the country to make the trip. He stated that he would 
        not accept the invitation unless he could earn the 
        money. He insists on performing with his band while 
        visiting the country. He is a musician and wants to be 
        recognized for his music. Clinton stated he receives a 
        minimum of $25,000 per performance when he travels. He 
        may play a few nights during a given trip. He likes to 
        perform for children during these trips and attempts to 
        make those arrangements.

        Clinton stated he has traveled to South Korea 
        approximately six times. He has gone as the personal 
        guest of President Kim Dae Jong (phonetic). He has been 
        paid as much as $200,000 for performing on a trip. He 
        has also traveled to Japan, Argentina, and 8 to 10 
        other countries. Clinton stated that the country 
        extending the invitation usually pays for him and his 
        six piece band to fly to the country and perform. The 
        host country usually pays all their expenses and 
        provides a Presidential security detail while they are 
        there.

        Clinton stated he has received payment for these 
        performances in a number of ways. He has received 
        payment by check in United States dollars, cash in 
        United States dollars and also in the currency of the 
        host country. Clinton stated in some instances the 
        foreign government even provides extra funds to cover 
        the costs of taxes that would be assessed against the 
        money. Clinton advised he did not want to provide 
        specific details on what exactly he is paid for his 
        performances because that is ``personal.''

        Clinton stated that when he receives an invitation to a 
        country he always calls the National Security Council 
        to get the clearance to make the trip. He stated that 
        they usually say no at the very beginning, then he 
        talks them into agreeing to let him make the trip. 
        Clinton stated that he always provides the Security 
        Council with an itinerary whenever he makes one of 
        these trips.

                                 * * *

        Clinton advised that while he visits foreign countries 
        as their guest he is often presented with all kinds of 
        gifts. Examples he gave were vases, sheep skin rugs and 
        many more he could not remember. He also received gifts 
        for the President which he has sometimes kept. Clinton 
        advised that in his earliest trips, at the beginning of 
        the Presidents [sic] term, he would be offered money 
        for the President from some of the foreign government 
        officials he was visiting. He stated years ago he did 
        not know he could not accept money for the President. 
        Clinton stated he was told by either the President or 
        his staff that he could not bring money back from a 
        foreign country for the President. He advised he was 
        told on a couple of occasions to send the money back 
        because the President was not allowed to accept money 
        from a foreign country.

        Clinton was asked if he reported the money he earned on 
        his foreign country visits as income on his United 
        States tax returns. He stated that yes he reported the 
        income. He was asked if he claimed the expenses on his 
        tax returns as well. Clinton stated that he only 
        claimed the expenses that he actually paid for on his 
        tax returns. Clinton further advised that years ago he 
        had some tax problems. At one point he owed between 
        $40,000 to $60,000 dollars [sic] in taxes. He made 
        arrangements with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to 
        pay of [sic] the tax debt, and does not want to have 
        any more problems.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000007-8 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

    Roger Clinton's statements to the FBI make it clear that 
from the earliest days of his brother's presidency, he used his 
fame and proximity to power to make as much money as possible. 
Over the next eight years, Roger Clinton accepted hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from foreign governments in exchange for 
``musical performances.'' Clearly, the payments made to Clinton 
far exceeded the actual value of his performances. Presumably, 
the foreign governments paying Roger Clinton were attempting to 
curry favor with the Clinton Administration by paying large 
sums of money to the President's brother. Whether these 
governments found increased favor or access with the Clinton 
Administration is unknown. However, this pattern of conduct 
clearly establishes that Roger Clinton was attempting to use 
his position and access to cash in, without regard to whether 
his actions were legally or ethically questionable.
    Although Roger Clinton used his name to make money early in 
the Clinton Administration, he apparently believed the 
potential to exploit his relationship to the President was 
greater than he had previously realized. Roger Clinton's 
longtime friend and fellow convicted cocaine felon George Locke 
told the Committee through his lawyer about a conversation in 
which Roger Clinton described his determination to profit more 
effectively from his status as brother of the President:

        On the night of the reelection of Bill Clinton as 
        president, a special party was held at the Excelsior 
        Hotel for VIP guests. Roger Clinton invited George 
        Locke to the party. During the course of the evening, 
        Roger had a conversation with George Locke. Roger 
        Clinton advised that during his brother's first term in 
        office, (although he had been invited to numerous 
        social gatherings as a result of being the president's 
        brother) Roger Clinton had never ``capitalized'' on his 
        relationship to the president. Further, Roger related 
        that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this 
        was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to 
        make a living and use his relationship with the 
        President to his advantage. Bill Clinton had stressed 
        to Roger that whatever business endeavors Roger was 
        involved in, they must be legitimate concerns and not 
        to find himself involved in any illegal activity.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and 
George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief 
Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).

It appears that Roger Clinton took at least part of Bill 
Clinton's advice to heart. During the last term of the Clinton 
presidency, Roger Clinton was involved in a number of efforts 
to use his brother's name to make large amounts of money. 
However, despite his brother's advice to engage only in 
legitimate and legal business, Roger Clinton's activities may 
have violated the law and clearly raise substantial ethical 
questions.
A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other Questionable 
        Sources of Income
    A review of Roger Clinton's bank records shows that he 
received money from a wide variety of sources, ranging from 
small amounts for television and film appearances to large 
amounts for lobbying his brother. However, one of the greatest 
influxes of money to Roger Clinton during the Clinton 
Administration came in the form of at least $335,000 in 
overseas travelers checks. These transactions present a number 
of troubling issues. Nevertheless, Roger Clinton has provided 
no explanation of why he received these travelers checks.

         First, almost all of these travelers checks 
        were purchased by third parties overseas, largely in 
        Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. Why Roger Clinton 
        received these substantial sums of money from overseas 
        is unknown.

         Second, the travelers checks were provided 
        to Roger Clinton blank. Clinton signed and 
        countersigned all of the checks, despite the fact that 
        he did not purchase the checks. Usually, the individual 
        who purchases travelers checks signs them when they are 
        purchased, so that they cannot be stolen or used by an 
        unauthorized individual. The fact that the buyer did 
        not sign them and gave them to Clinton blank suggests 
        that the funds were intentionally provided to Clinton 
        in a manner calculated to conceal their origin.

         Third, the travelers checks were purchased 
        overseas and then imported into the United States. If a 
        total of $10,000 or more was imported at any one time, 
        then the importation should have been declared on 
        customs forms. However, Roger Clinton did not file any 
        such forms with the Customs Service.\8\ If Roger 
        Clinton imported these travelers checks into the United 
        States from overseas without filing the required forms 
        with the Customs Service, then he committed a serious 
        crime.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Committee sought any records indicating, inter alia, that 
Roger Clinton filed forms declaring the importation of more than 
$10,000 into the United States. Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to James F. Sloan, Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network Director, Department of Treasury (June 1, 2001) 
(within Appendix I). The one document produced in response to this 
request appears to be unrelated to the travelers checks deposited into 
Roger Clinton's bank account. Letter from Albert R. Zarate, Senior 
Counsel, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, to David A. Kass, Deputy 
Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 8, 2001) (within Appendix 
I).
    \9\ 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5316 imposes an obligation on anyone who 
``transports . . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000'' into the 
United States or who ``receives monetary instruments of more than 
$10,000 at one time transported into the United States'' to file a 
report of the importation. Failure to file such a report can result in 
both civil penalties under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5321 and criminal penalties 
under Sec. 5322. Monetary instruments subject to the reporting 
requirement include travelers checks in any form, whether restrictively 
endorsed or not. U.S. v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1997).

    The following is an accounting of the travelers checks 
received by Roger Clinton, indicating the country of origin of 
the checks and the name of the purchaser. Although the 
Committee has been able to obtain the name of the individual 
purchasing the travelers checks, it has been unable to obtain 
further information regarding the purpose of the checks.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Date Deposited               Type of Check            Origin            Purchaser Name        Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 30, 1998                  American Express      Unknown               Chen Jianxing              $1,000
December 1, 1998                   American Express      Taiwan                Huang Xian Wen            $15,000
December 8, 1998                   American Express      Taiwan                Huang Xian Wen            $23,000
December 15, 1998                  Citicorp              Taiwan                Unknown                   $90,000
December 15, 1998                  Unknown               Unknown               Unknown                   $29,000
December 15, 1998                  Visa-Sumitomo         Taiwan                Lin Mei Guang              $4,000
December 15, 1998                  American Express      Taiwan                Huang Xian Wen             $2,000
July 12, 1999                      American Express      Unknown               Unknown                   $20,000
July 12, 1999                      Citicorp              South Korea           Sook-Eun Jang \10\         $5,000
November 30, 1999                  Citicorp              Taiwan                Unknown                    $3,000
November 30, 1999                  Citicorp              Taiwan                Unknown                   $10,000
November 30, 1999                  Citicorp              Taiwan                Unknown                    $5,000
November 30, 1999                  Visa                  Taiwan                Unknown                    $1,000
November 30, 1999                  Visa                  Taiwan                Xu Jingsheng               $3,000
November 30, 1999                  Citicorp              Venezuela             Pedro Jose Garboza        $38,000
                                                                                Matos
November 30, 1999                  Unknown               Unknown               Unknown                   $40,000
February 22, 2000                  American Express      Taiwan                Qu Guang Yin               $7,000
March 24, 2000                     Citicorp              Venezuela             Pedro Jose Garboza         $3,000
                                                                                Matos
April 5, 2000                      American Express      Taiwan                Mou Chuanxue               $4,000
April 17,2000                      American Express      Taiwan                Qu Guang Yin              $13,000
April 17, 2000                     American Express      Unknown               Suk Eun Chang              $5,000
May 15, 2000                       American Express      Unknown               Unknown                    $5,000
July 13, 2000                      Citicorp              South Korea           Seung-Chul Ham             $1,000
July 27, 2000                      Citicorp              South Korea           Seung-Chul Ham             $2,000
July 31, 2000                      Citicorp              South Korea           Seung-Chul Ham             $4,000
August 2, 2000                     American Express      Unknown               Unknown                    $1,000
August 11, 2000                    American Express      Unknown               Unknown                    $1,000
                                                                                                    ------------
                                                                                           Total:       $335,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Roger Clinton therefore deposited in his bank accounts at 
least $335,000 in travelers checks, most or all of which 
originated overseas. It is possible that Clinton was provided 
with even more funds in travelers checks, which were not 
deposited in his bank accounts but were spent instead. Roger 
Clinton has refused to answer any questions about the travelers 
checks, including why they were paid to him, who paid them to 
him, or whether he paid appropriate taxes on them.\11\ Given 
the large amount of money involved and the attempt to conceal 
its source, these circumstances give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that multiple laws may have been violated, including 
those relating to declaring monetary instruments imported into 
the United States and reporting the income for tax purposes. 
Accordingly, the Committee believes this matter should be 
investigated further by the Department of Justice, which would 
have the ability to review Roger Clinton's tax records and 
could potentially obtain sworn testimony from him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ This individual is likely the same person identified as ``Suk 
Eun Chang'' who purchased $5,000 in travelers checks deposited by Roger 
Clinton on April 17, 2000. See also n.19 and accompanying text.
    \11\ See Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, 
to Roger Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from Bart 
H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the $335,000 in travelers checks, Roger 
Clinton has also received funds from a number of other 
suspicious sources, raising questions about the legality of his 
activities:

 Cash: Roger Clinton deposited into his bank accounts 
$85,000 in cash between February 1998 and February 2001. 
Clinton claimed to the FBI that he received this cash while 
traveling to foreign countries ostensibly for the purpose of 
performing with his six-piece band. Like the transactions 
involving blank travelers checks, these large cash transactions 
give rise to reasonable suspicions that the purpose of the 
payments was not legitimate. In addition, the $85,000 figure 
represents only the money that Clinton deposited into his 
account. It seems likely that Clinton received more money and 
spent it, rather than depositing it. However, as Clinton has 
refused to answer any questions from the Committee, it is 
impossible to know exactly how much cash he received, from 
whom, and for what purpose.

 Seaway II Florida and Tony Rodham: Seaway II Florida 
is a company controlled by Florida businessman Gene 
Prescott.\12\ Prescott owns the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, 
Florida, as well as a number of other properties. Prescott also 
has a close relationship with Hillary Clinton's brother Tony 
Rodham and has an interest in Rodham's consulting business, 
Tony Rodham and Associates. Between January and November 1998, 
Seaway II Florida issued three checks to Roger Clinton totaling 
$20,000. According to the lawyer for Seaway II Florida, Roger 
Clinton was paid this money for referring business to Tony 
Rodham, although neither the attorney nor Prescott could recall 
the specific referral.\13\ In addition, it appears that Tony 
Rodham attempted to pay Roger Clinton $25,000 personally, in 
April 1998, but that the check was returned for insufficient 
funds.\14\ Due to the refusal of Rodham and Clinton to 
cooperate with the Committee, the purpose of the attempted 
$25,000 payment is not clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See Telephone Interview with Gene Prescott, Owner, Biltmore 
Hotel (June 5, 2001).
    \13\ Telephone Interview with Daniel Ponce, Counsel for Gene 
Prescott (June 29, 2001).
    \14\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 2).

 Edvard Akopyan: Edvard Akopyan is a Glendale, 
California, resident who paid $61,100 to Roger Clinton between 
August and December 1999. Akopyan claims that he paid the money 
to Clinton because he was acting as a middleman in scheduling 
Clinton's appearance at a musical concert in Kazakhstan.\15\ 
Akopyan stated that Clinton made one appearance in Kazakhstan 
in the summer of 1999 and a second in January 2000.\16\ Akopyan 
stated that the individual in Kazakhstan who provided the funds 
to him for Clinton's payment was named Darkhan Berdaleav.\17\ 
Akopyan also stated that Roger Clinton informed him that he 
checked with the State Department before he traveled to 
Kazakhstan to perform.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Telephone Interview with Edvard Akopyan (June 5, 2001).
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.

 Suk Eun Chang: In December 1999, Suk Eun Chang 
provided Roger Clinton with a cashier's check for $70,000.\19\ 
The source of the cashier's check was apparently $193,000 
deposited by Chang into a bank in Los Angeles.\20\ Chang also 
provided $10,000 in travelers checks to Clinton. However, the 
Committee has been unable to locate Chang to ask him about the 
source of this cash or the purpose of the payment to Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 3).
    \20\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 4).

    These questionable sources of income, together with the 
travelers checks received by Roger Clinton, should be the 
subject of further investigation by the Department of Justice. 
At a minimum, the government should satisfy itself that the 
requisite taxes have been paid.
B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions
    In the course of reviewing Roger Clinton's bank records, 
the Committee learned that during 2000, Roger Clinton was paid 
to lobby President Clinton regarding the restrictions on travel 
to Cuba. Roger Clinton's receipt of substantial sums of money 
to lobby his brother raises serious ethical and legal questions 
given Clinton's failure to register as a lobbyist as required 
by federal law. This arrangement also served as a precedent for 
Roger Clinton's acceptance of money to lobby his brother for 
grants of clemency at the end of President Clinton's term.
    In June 2000, a Los Angeles-based company called Cuba 
Travel Services (``CTS'') hired Roger Clinton. Michael Zuccato, 
President of CTS, is a personal friend of Roger Clinton's.\21\ 
According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was hired to help CTS lift 
restrictions on travel to Cuba.\22\ CTS specialized in 
arranging charter flights from Los Angeles to Cuba and would 
substantially benefit from a loosening of legal restrictions on 
such travel. A CTS affiliate, J. Perez Associates, and Roger 
Clinton's company, Odgie Music, signed a consulting agreement 
in which CTS retained Roger Clinton to ``provide counsel, 
advice and to promote [CTS] to entities necessary to conduct 
its import and export business.'' \23\ CTS agreed to pay 
Clinton $5,000 per month for these services.\24\ Over the next 
four months, CTS and J. Perez Associates paid Roger Clinton a 
total of $30,000.\25\ According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was 
paid during this period to present information to ``his brother 
and other people.'' \26\ Indeed, one invoice from Odgie Music 
to J. Perez and Associates charges $5,000 for a trip made by 
Roger Clinton to Washington, D.C.\27\ Although Zuccato denied 
that Roger Clinton's contacts with ``his brother and other 
people'' constituted ``lobbying,'' \28\ there is no other 
accurate description for what Roger Clinton did. The Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 (``the Act'') defines the term 
``lobbying contact'' as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba 
Travel Services (June 5, 2001).
    \22\ Id.
    \23\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Consulting 
Agreement) (Exhibit 5).
    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Bank of America Document Production (Checks from CTS and J. 
Perez Associates) (Exhibit 6).
    \26\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato (June 5, 2001).
    \27\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Invoice from Odgie 
Music) (Exhibit 7).
    \28\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba 
Travel Services (June 5, 2001).

        [A]ny oral or written communication . . . to a covered 
        executive branch official . . . that is made on behalf 
        of a client with regard to--(i) the formulation, 
        modification, or adoption of Federal legislation 
        (including legislative proposals) [or] (ii) the 
        formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal 
        rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other 
        program, policy, or position of the United States 
        Government[.] \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a). A ``covered executive branch 
official'' includes the President. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(3)(a).

Any contact Roger Clinton had with the President about easing 
restrictions on travel to Cuba would certainly constitute a 
communication with regard to a modification of a policy or 
position of the United States. If Roger Clinton's lobbying 
activities \30\ for Cuba Travel Services constituted more than 
20 percent of the total work he did for the company, then he 
would be ``a lobbyist'' under the provisions of the Act.\31\ As 
a lobbyist who earned more than $5,500 in a six-month period 
from a single client, Roger Clinton would have an obligation to 
register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives.\32\ A search of those filings 
indicates that he did not do so.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ The term ``lobbying activity'' is broadly defined as 
``lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including 
preparation and planning activities, research and other background work 
that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and 
coordination with the lobbying activities of others.'' 2 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1602(7).
    \31\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(10).
    \32\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(a)(3)(A)(1); 2 
U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(3)(b).
    \33\ See Office of Public Records, United States Senate, ``Lobby 
Filing Disclosure Program,''  (U.S. Lobby 
Report Images for 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because Roger Clinton declined to be interviewed by the 
Committee, the precise content of his discussions with 
President Clinton is unknown.\34\ However, it is clear that he 
was paid $30,000 to lobby the President to loosen travel 
restrictions to Cuba and that he told his clients that he had, 
in fact, contacted his brother on their behalf. These 
circumstances warrant further investigation by law enforcement 
authorities to determine whether Roger Clinton violated federal 
law by failing to register as a lobbyist.\35\ Apart from his 
failure to register, Roger Clinton's activity in this case was 
likely legal. However, whether such activities should be legal 
is another question. Even when properly disclosed, which these 
contacts were not, paid lobbying of the President by close 
relatives is likely to decrease public confidence in the 
integrity of government. As a matter of prudence, the President 
should not have agreed to be lobbied by family members who 
received payment. President Clinton implicitly admitted this 
principle when he asked his brother-in-law Hugh Rodham to 
return money paid to lobby for the pardons of Carlos Vignali 
and Glenn Braswell. The day after learning of the payments, 
President Clinton issued a statement: ``Neither Hillary nor I 
had any knowledge of such payments. We are deeply disturbed by 
these reports and have insisted that Hugh return any moneys 
received.'' \36\ The payments to Roger Clinton to lobby his 
brother on travel restrictions to Cuba should be equally 
disturbing for exactly the same reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ A statement in the summary of the FBI's interview with Roger 
Clinton suggests that at some point, Roger discussed the Cuban trade 
embargo with President Clinton:

        G[Roger] Clinton recalled a conversation, the date or 
      approximate time of which he could not recall, he had with 
      his brother, Bill Clinton, who told him the [Cuban] cigar 
      embargo would not be lifted while he was still President. 
      President Clinton allegedly said ``The embargo will be 
      eased for food and medicine because that is the direction 
      the world is going, but not for cigars, not during your 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      life time [sic].''

DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000004 (Summary of Interview with Roger 
Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ The penalty for such a violation is a fine of up to $50,000. 2 
U.S.C. Sec. 1606.
    \36\ John Solomon, Clinton Kin Returns Pardon Fee, Associated 
Press, Feb. 21, 2001. See generally Chapter Three, ``Hugh Rodham's Role 
in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency,'' Section I.D.1., ``The 
Response from Hugh Rodham.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis

    The Committee investigated another episode in which Roger 
Clinton tried to exploit his Administration contacts to enrich 
himself. Roger Clinton and a business associate, Larry Wallace, 
pressured the president of an association of local governments 
in Alabama, John Katopodis, to hire Clinton for his ability to 
contact Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater and others in 
the Clinton Administration. As described below, Wallace and 
Clinton apparently engaged in strong-arm tactics to try to 
force Clinton's hiring.
    In early 1996, John Katopodis, a Harvard-educated Fulbright 
Scholar,\37\ was advocating the construction of a new 
international airport for Alabama.\38\ Katopodis served as 
Executive Director of the Council of Cooperating Governments, 
an association of city and county governments dedicated to 
improving transportation in the Southeast.\39\ As part of its 
efforts to publicize the airport project, the Council was 
seeking a prominent guest speaker for its 1996 symposium.\40\ 
Local and state political figures, as well as federal agency 
representatives, were planning to attend the symposium,\41\ and 
Katopodis sought the Secretary of Transportation as the ideal 
guest speaker.\42\ Yet, attracting the Secretary of 
Transportation proved to be no easy task. While discussing the 
airport project with his colleague Dr. Frank Stuart, Katopodis 
was advised that Arkansas attorney Larry Wallace could be 
instrumental in arranging for the Secretary's visit.\43\ 
Katopodis eventually received an unsolicited telephone call 
from Wallace.\44\ Mr. Wallace, a self-proclaimed power broker 
from Little Rock, Arkansas, was well connected to the Clinton 
Administration.\45\ One of these connections included the White 
House Chief of Staff at the time, Mack McLarty, Wallace's 
former law partner.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis, Executive Director, 
Council of Cooperating Governments (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \38\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \39\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000166 (Council of Cooperating 
Governments Brochure) (Exhibit 9)
    \40\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \41\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000091 (Symposium Schedule, 
June 27, 1997) (Exhibit 11).
    \42\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \43\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \46\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000024 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Katopodis explained that he wanted Secretary of 
Transportation Federico Pena to speak at a symposium on 
Alabama's aviation future.\47\ Wallace agreed to use his 
influence to help Katopodis draw the Secretary to the 
conference.\48\ Wallace informed Katopodis that Rodney Slater 
would replace Pena once President Clinton was reelected.\49\ 
Wallace contacted Katopodis at least eight times in late 
September and early October of 1996.\50\ He advised Katopodis 
to talk to Wallace's ``friend at the White House,'' \51\ Bob 
Nash, the Director of Presidential Personnel.\52\ All White 
House liaisons reported directly to Nash, and Wallace promised 
that the transportation liaison would have an answer for 
Katopodis soon.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \48\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12).
    \49\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \50\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12); DOJ Document 
Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis 
(Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000191 
(Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 2, 1996)) (Exhibit 
14); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to 
John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15); DOJ Document Production 
FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 
1996)) (Exhibit 16); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000169 (Fax from 
Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 12, 1996)) (Exhibit 17); DOJ 
Document Production FBI-RC-0000159 (Telephone message from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 14, 1996)) (Exhibit 18); DOJ Document 
Production FBI-RC-0000168 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis 
(Oct. 15, 1996)) (Exhibit 19).
    \51\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16).
    \52\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13).
    \53\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry 
Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 5, 1996, Katopodis attended an election night 
party hosted by Wallace in Little Rock. At the election night 
party--the same party where Roger Clinton informed George Locke 
that President Clinton had advised him to make the most of his 
last four years in office \54\--Wallace introduced Katopodis to 
individuals Wallace described as ``financial heavy hitters'' 
and ``friends of Bill.'' \55\ Among these individuals was a 
former state senator whom Wallace introduced as ``Roger 
Clinton's mentor and closest associate,'' \56\ likely George 
Locke.\57\ Roger Clinton had apparently enlisted Locke's 
assistance because Locke lobbied for Roger's employment during 
the election night party.\58\ Locke was not the only one trying 
to find Roger Clinton gainful employment. After the party, 
Wallace and Katopodis continued to discuss the airport 
issue.\59\ During one of these conversations, Wallace told 
Katopodis that his close personal friend, President Clinton, 
was concerned about his ``baby brother's'' lack of employment 
and income.\60\ According to Wallace, the President tasked him 
with finding some type of job for Roger.\61\ Wallace wanted to 
follow the President's directive and asked Katopodis if they 
could meet in Washington to discuss a possible contract for 
Roger.\62\ To lure him to the nation's capital, Wallace even 
offered Katopodis the opportunity to spend a night in the 
Lincoln Bedroom of the White House.\63\ Katopodis declined the 
invitation.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ See n.7 and accompanying text.
    \55\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \56\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \57\ See Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Partner, Hampton and 
Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 
(May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).
    \58\ See Telephone Interview with Larry Wallace (Aug. 27, 2001).
    \59\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \60\ See id.; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \61\ Id.
    \62\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \63\ See id. Wallace extended this invitation before the Lincoln 
Bedroom scandal became public.
    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Katopodis wanted to define and formalize Clinton's 
responsibilities before signing a contract for his 
services.\65\ Katopodis also wanted to ensure that Clinton's 
responsibilities passed ethical and legal standards of conduct 
and could not be construed as influence peddling.\66\ In fact, 
Katopodis offered to hire Wallace, instead of Clinton, to avoid 
these concerns.\67\ Wallace stated that he could not guarantee 
the Secretary's appearance and would not be acting as an 
attorney, but he did offer Clinton's access ``thrown in as a 
bonus.'' \68\ Katopodis rejected this proposal because he 
wanted to hire Wallace only in his capacity as an attorney.\69\ 
In future conversations, Wallace returned the focus of contract 
discussions to finding Roger employment as the President 
directed.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000022.
    \66\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \67\ See id.
    \68\ Id.
    \69\ Id.
    \70\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Katopodis asked Wallace to place a figure on Roger 
Clinton's services, Wallace suggested that $30,000-$35,000 per 
month would be sufficient.\71\ Katopodis asserted that the 
Council of Cooperating Governments could not possibly afford to 
pay Clinton such an inordinate amount.\72\ Moreover, Katopodis 
was understandably suspicious of this proposal because he had 
never spoken with Roger Clinton \73\ and was beginning to doubt 
whether Wallace was actually as ``connected'' to the Clinton 
Administration as he claimed.\74\ These doubts were dispelled, 
however, when Roger Clinton personally telephoned 
Katopodis.\75\ During the call, Clinton and Katopodis discussed 
the $35,000 per month contract.\76\ In return for such a large 
fee, Clinton offered to ``open a lot of doors'' for the 
Council.\77\ The President's brother gave Katopodis his pager 
number and his telephone and fax numbers in Farmer's Branch, 
Texas.\78\ Clinton was aware of contract details that Wallace 
and Katopodis had discussed, which convinced Katopodis of 
Wallace's close relationship with Clinton.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 
2001). In this interview, Katopodis stated that Wallace proposed a 
contract for Roger at $30,000 per month. See id. When the FBI 
interviewed Katopodis in May 1997, soon after these events occurred, he 
stated that Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $35,000 per month. 
See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with 
John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \72\ See id.
    \73\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).
    \74\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \75\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 
2001).
    \76\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \77\ See Bob Johnson, Former Birmingham Official Says FBI Probed 
Clinton's Half-Brother Over Job Query, Associated Press, Feb. 22, 2001.
    \78\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000035 (Roger Clinton 
Contact Information) (Exhibit 20). Roger Clinton was likely visiting 
his wife's family who live in Farmer's Branch, Texas.
    \79\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following their introductory conversation, Katopodis and 
Clinton discussed a possible business relationship on several 
occasions.\80\ Katopodis maintained that having the Secretary 
of Transportation as a guest speaker was not worth hiring 
Clinton for $35,000 per month.\81\ As Katopodis later told 
Newsweek, the $35,000-per-month contract was ``a pretty big 
consulting fee for someone who plays in a rock band.'' \82\ 
Katopodis asked Clinton to create a list of tasks with a 
reasonable amount of money assigned to each task before the 
Council could make a financial commitment.\83\ The potential 
conflict of interest between having the President's brother 
lobby the Secretary of Transportation for the Council concerned 
Katopodis.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000023.
    \81\ See id.
    \82\ Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's Keeper, 
Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33.
    \83\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \84\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another concern disturbing Katopodis was the relationship 
between Wallace and Clinton.\85\ Clinton clarified Wallace's 
role by declaring that Wallace had no influence that did not 
``drive directly through me.'' \86\ Clinton continued that he 
was tired of doing favors without being recognized or 
compensated.\87\ Clinton then asked Katopodis to meet him in 
Redondo Beach, California, because Clinton wanted to avoid 
further discussions over the telephone.\88\ The conversation 
concluded with Clinton saying that he and his brother had 
``only four years to get things done'' and did not care about 
``ethics or what appearances were.'' \89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \86\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \87\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \88\ See id.
    \89\ Id. Katopodis recorded some of his telephone conversations 
with Roger Clinton once the situation became ``stickier.'' Telephone 
Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). Due to the passage of 
several years, Katopodis cannot locate these tapes and believes that 
they may have been turned over to the FBI. If the FBI has possession of 
these tapes, they should have been provided to the Committee based on 
the Committee's request to the FBI for ``[a]ll records relating to any 
criminal investigation relating to the relationship between Roger 
Clinton, Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace, and Birmingham, Alabama, 
businessman John Katopodis.'' Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to the Honorable John Ashcroft, 
Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2001) (within 
Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A few minutes after this telephone call, Wallace contacted 
Katopodis and expressed frustration over the difficulty in 
formalizing a contract between Clinton and the Council.\90\ 
Wallace reiterated his demand for a one-month's payment to 
Clinton and informed Katopodis that the airport project would 
remain at a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the 
money.'' \91\ After Wallace's not-so-veiled threat to block 
Katopodis' efforts with Secretary of Transportation Rodney 
Slater, Katopodis made no progress on attracting the Secretary 
to the aviation seminar as Wallace promised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \91\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While negotiating with Wallace and Clinton, Katopodis 
concurrently continued his individual efforts to have Secretary 
Slater speak at the seminar.\92\ In a December 19, 1996, 
letter, Katopodis congratulated Slater on his selection as 
Secretary, explained the purpose of the symposium, and invited 
him to give the keynote address.\93\ The Secretary responded 
one month later to Katopodis' congratulatory wishes without 
mentioning the conference.\94\ On February 24, 1997, Katopodis 
sent a fax to the Secretary's office reminding them of the 
invitation and requesting an answer.\95\ Katopodis then called 
the Secretary's office several times to determine whether an 
answer was forthcoming.\96\ The Secretary refused to give 
Katopodis an answer--not even a ``no''--for nearly four 
months,\97\ so he tried a different strategy by establishing a 
deadline for the Secretary's response in a letter dated April 
11, 1997.\98\ The deadline passed without a word from the 
Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000013.
    \93\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000076 (Letter from John 
Katopodis, to Rodney Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department 
of Transportation (Dec. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit 21).
    \94\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000041 (Letter from Rodney 
Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation, to 
John Katopodis (Jan. 22, 1997)) (Exhibit 22).
    \95\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000104 (Fax from John 
Katopodis, to Peg Weathers, Deputy Scheduler for Rodney Slater, 
Department of Transportation (Feb. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 23).
    \96\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John 
Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, 
Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24).
    \97\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \98\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John 
Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, 
Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Upon hearing that the Secretary was considering a separate 
speaking engagement in Birmingham, Katopodis faxed another 
letter on April 28, 1997, requesting to be included on the 
Secretary's schedule.\99\ The Council again received no 
response. On May 7, 1997, Katopodis called Slater's scheduler, 
Vonnie Robinson, and expressed his suspicion that Clinton and 
Wallace had urged the Secretary's office not to respond while 
contract discussions were ongoing.\100\ Robinson told Katopodis 
that this was not the case but did acknowledge knowing who 
Roger Clinton and Wallace were.\101\ After speaking with 
Robinson, Katopodis received a brusque telephone call later 
that day from Catherine Grunden, Secretary Slater's Director of 
Scheduling and Advance.\102\ Grunden immediately launched into 
a monologue stating that the Secretary's office disclaimed any 
connection with Roger Clinton or Larry Wallace.\103\ If 
Katopodis still was not satisfied, Grunden advised him to turn 
over any allegations of wrongdoing to the proper 
authorities.\104\ Katopodis indicated his understanding and 
hung up.\105\ Following this unsolicited telephone call, 
Katopodis faxed Robinson a letter on May 8, 1997, in which he 
wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000090 (Letter from John 
Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department 
of Transportation (Apr. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 25).
    \100\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \101\ Id.
    \102\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \103\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \104\ Id. at FBI-RC-0000024.
    \105\ Id.

        I can't begin to tell you how disgusted I am with this 
        whole matter. If it is the normal policy of your office 
        to not respond to written requests from established 
        organizations, then perhaps I am wrong in my 
        assumptions about the lack of response being tied to an 
        attempt at extortion.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000088 (Letter from John 
Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Secretary Rodney Slater, 
Department of Transportation (May 8, 1997)) (Exhibit 26).

    Grunden's was not the only odd telephone call Katopodis 
received while trying to schedule Secretary Slater's 
appearance. On April 16, 1997, Katopodis reached out to his 
local Congressman, Representative Earl Hilliard, to ask for his 
advice and assistance in solving this problem.\107\ On May 14, 
1997, less than one week after Katopodis' letter to Robinson, 
Congressman Hilliard's staff member cryptically told Katopodis 
that the Congressman had received a call ``from the highest 
level'' concerning this matter.\108\ The staff member told 
Katopodis that he had ``been bad again'' and that he should 
stop incriminating Roger Clinton and Larry Wallace.\109\ This 
conversation, in addition to Grunden's telephone call and the 
Secretary's absolute lack of response, reinforced Katopodis' 
conclusion that Clinton and Wallace were obstructing any 
progress on the airport project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8); DOJ Document 
Production FBI-RC-0000101 (Fax from John Katopodis, to Ken Mullinax, 
Staff Assistant, Office of the Honorable Earl Hilliard (Apr. 16, 1997)) 
(Exhibit 27).
    \108\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of 
Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \109\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 16, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
contacted Katopodis regarding this matter.\110\ Agents from the 
FBI asked Katopodis to wear a wire in a meeting with Wallace or 
Clinton.\111\ Katopodis declined to wear a wire because he had 
friends in both political parties and feared a political 
backlash if he fully pursued an investigation.\112\ 
Nevertheless, Katopodis participated in one face-to-face 
meeting and two full telephone interviews with the FBI,\113\ 
and provided FBI agents with all of his documents regarding 
Wallace and Clinton.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).
    \111\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
    \112\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview 
with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8).
    \113\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000011-13; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-
0000020-24 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) 
(Exhibit 10).
    \114\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Referring to the FBI's handling of this information as an 
``investigation'' may be a misnomer. Notwithstanding the facts 
that Katopodis submitted to multiple interviews, possessed 
incriminating recordings of conversations with Roger Clinton, 
and provided hundreds of pages of documentation supporting his 
allegations, the Committee has been unable to obtain any 
evidence that the FBI ever interviewed Larry Wallace or Roger 
Clinton regarding this incident. Katopodis described the FBI as 
not ``follow[ing] up with any sort of intensity.'' \115\ 
Without aggressive pursuit by the FBI, the investigation 
effectively died.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Id.
    \116\ See Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's 
Keeper, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The airport project met a similar fate. Katopodis severed 
his ties with Clinton and Wallace in Spring 1997,\117\ but he 
continued as director for the Council of Cooperating 
Governments. Support for the airport and its promotional 
symposium lost all momentum because of the delay in receiving a 
response from the Secretary. In fact, the Secretary never 
responded to Katopodis' series of invitations or pleas for an 
answer. Larry Wallace and Roger Clinton apparently ensured that 
no answer would be forthcoming as long as Katopodis was 
unwilling to pay their price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Roger Clinton's dealings with John Katopodis served as a 
harbinger of things to come in 1998-2001. Clinton would use his 
status as the President's brother to obtain even larger 
payments, lobbying for parole and pardons of convicted 
criminals, including a member of the Gambino crime family. 
Moreover, Roger Clinton's lobbying efforts in these other areas 
would show no more subtlety than did his crude dealings with 
Katopodis.

II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS

    While Roger Clinton lobbied for executive clemency for a 
number of unsavory and undeserving individuals, none was as 
unsavory as Rosario Gambino. Gambino was a major organized 
crime figure serving a 45-year prison sentence for heroin 
trafficking. It is difficult to believe that anyone, much less 
the brother of the President, would lobby for parole or 
clemency for an individual like Gambino. Indeed, Roger 
Clinton's involvement in this matter can be explained only by 
the fact that he received $50,000 from the Gambinos and was 
promised even more money.

A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime

    At 20 years of age in 1962, Rosario ``Sal'' Gambino was 
arrested on immigration charges and deported to Italy.\118\ At 
some point, however, this son of a Sicilian butcher \119\ 
returned to the United States and, between the ages of 27 and 
38, was arrested three times on charges ranging from possession 
of a dangerous weapon to assault and extortion.\120\ Then in 
1980, he was arrested for conspiracy to import heroin after 
police in Milan, Italy, confiscated 91 pounds of heroin valued 
at $60 million destined for the United States.\121\ Although 
acquitted in the United States, Gambino was tried in absentia 
(with representation by counsel) in Italy, convicted, and 
sentenced to 20 years in prison.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. 
Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28).
    \119\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0096 (Hearing 
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29).
    \120\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. 
Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28).
    \121\ Id.
    \122\ Id. at 00068.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without being extradited to serve any time in Italy, 
Gambino was arrested yet again in the United States in March 
1984 and was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, use 
of a communication facility to distribute heroin, and 
possession with intent to distribute heroin.\123\ Following his 
conviction in October 1984, Gambino was sentenced to 45 years 
in prison, which he has been serving since December 6, 
1984.\124\ Throughout his incarceration, Gambino has failed to 
take responsibility for his crimes, has maintained his 
innocence, and has vigorously pursued every possible avenue of 
appeal including arguments that he was entrapped, that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel, and that he was the victim of racial discrimination. 
Yet, his conviction, sentence, and denials of parole have 
withstood every legal challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ Id. at 00038.
    \124\ USPC Document Production 00075 (Progress Report, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, Jan. 4, 2001) (Exhibit 30).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 1984, two of Gambino's relatives and co-
conspirators, Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino, were seeking 
to sell heroin. Unknown to them, the prospective buyer was an 
undercover FBI agent. In intercepted phone conversations, 
Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino discussed Rosario Gambino 
and the heroin deal in code.\125\ They referred to the heroin 
as a ``car'' and to Rosario as the ``short guy.'' \126\ The 
intercepts made it plain that Rosario Gambino was in a 
leadership role in the conspiracy. The first transaction was 
completed in a room at Caesar's Boardwalk Regency Hotel in 
Atlantic City.\127\ A call was placed from the room to Rosario 
Gambino's residence and immediately after leaving the hotel, 
the co-conspirators drove to his residence to pay him his 
proceeds from the deal.\128\ The undercover agent continued to 
communicate with Antonio Gambino in an attempt to negotiate a 
second transaction.\129\ The FBI intercepted several additional 
phone calls related to a second sale of heroin to the 
undercover agent and involving Rosario Gambino or referring to 
him in code, such as ``Saruzzo'' and ``the short one.'' \130\ 
The undercover agent eventually completed a second purchase of 
a half-kilogram of heroin for $120,000.\131\ When Rosario 
Gambino was arrested in March 1984, a search of his master 
bedroom uncovered two of the $100 bills the agent had used to 
purchase the heroin.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ U.S. v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 942 (1986).
    \126\ Id.
    \127\ Id.
    \128\ Id.
    \129\ Id.
    \130\ Id.
    \131\ Id.
    \132\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout his attempts to obtain parole, Rosario Gambino 
has claimed that authorities treated him unfairly merely 
because of his infamous name. In his initial parole hearing, 
Gambino denied his guilt and implied that he was a victim of 
either mistaken identity or prejudice:

        Hearing Officer. Now, what the government writes is 
        that you were involved in a large-scale heroin 
        distribution ring. You've told me that you didn't have 
        anything to do with this whatsoever. What do you think 
        caused the jury to believe that you were involved with 
        the other guys. What do you think would cause the jury 
        to convict you?

        Gambino. Because number one is my name. Because see, 
        they [built] this name like [a] big building[.] I'm 
        not, I'm not the name they're looking for.

        Hearing Officer. Who they [sic] looking for?

        Gambino. I don't know. They looking [sic] for some big 
        name.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing 
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31).

Prosecutors have maintained that Rosario Gambino is a relative 
of the 1950s-era ``boss of bosses,'' Carlo Gambino, the man for 
whom the Gambino crime family is named. Reports by special 
organized crime task forces in two states, Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, linked Rosario Gambino to the Gambino crime 
family,\134\ and regulators banned him from Atlantic City 
casinos.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Pennsylvania Crime Commission, A Decade of Organized Crime 
70-72 (1980), New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Twelfth 
Annual Report 15 (1980).
    \135\ Division of Gaming Enforcement, New Jersey Department of Law 
and Public Safety, ``Exclusion List,''  (exclusion ordered Oct. 30, 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rosario Gambino's representatives, however, have argued 
that he is not related to members of the Gambino crime family 
and that claims to the contrary were unsubstantiated. However, 
the transcript of one of Rosario Gambino's parole hearings 
seems to indicate that Rosario Gambino himself believes his 
grandfather may have been related to the 1950s mob boss:

        Hearing Officer. Is there any family connection between 
        those people--between he and Carlo Gambino?

        Lawyer. There is none.

        Hearing Officer. I just want it for the record.

        Lawyer. The report tries to make an unsubstantiated 
        allegation of some tie on Mr. Gambino's part to--

        Gambino. Excuse me, there was a my grandfather, 
        grandfather relative--I don't know. Maybe, I don't 
        know.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0092 (Hearing 
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). At another hearing, Gambino made 
separate statement, which could be construed as a denial of a 
relationship to Carlo Gambino:

        GHearing Officer. Let's put the cards on the table.
        GGambino. Go ahead.
        GHearing Officer. Carlo Gambino. What relationship are 
      you to Carlo Gambino?
        GGambino. No relationship. No because I refuse him to be 
      my cousin or something like that.

Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) 
(Exhibit 31).

Regardless of whether or how closely Gambino is related to the 
notorious family whose name he shares, members of his immediate 
family have admitted to being involved in organized criminal 
activity. Rosario's brothers, Giovanni ``John'' Gambino and 
Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino pled guilty in January 1994 to charges 
of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and 
heroin trafficking.\137\ Witnesses had testified in court that 
John and Joe Gambino were the ``main link between Mafia heroin 
traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.'' \138\ The media 
also described John Gambino as a ``capo'' in John Gotti's 
organization, the Gambino crime family.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime 
Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994.
    \138\ Id.
    \139\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only were Rosario Gambino's brothers known associates 
of Gambino crime family members, but Rosario himself was as 
well. He was a close friend with Philadelphia mob boss Angelo 
Bruno, and police surveillance revealed that Bruno often met 
New York underboss Paul Castellano at the Valentino's supper 
club,\140\ which was owned by Rosario Gambino.\141\ Castellano 
later became boss of the Gambino crime family, until John Gotti 
had him assassinated and became boss in December 1985.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
    \141\ USPC Document Production 00499 (Pre-hearing Assessment, Feb. 
3, 1994) (Exhibit 32).
    \142\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to his ties to the U.S. Mafia, Rosario Gambino 
is also alleged to be an associate of well-known members of the 
Sicilian Mafia:

        When Tommaso Buscetta, a Sicilian Mafia boss from 
        Palermo, needed to hide his ex-wife and daughter in 
        America, Rosario Gambino took the women in. A few years 
        later, Buscetta fled a violent mob war in Sicily and 
        settled in Brooklyn, where he often hung out with the 
        Gambino brothers as well as Carlo Gambino.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ Id.

A letter to the Parole Commission advocating Gambino's release 
also confirms Rosario Gambino's association with Buscetta. The 
letter refers to statements by Buscetta that he knew Gambino 
and his brothers but claimed that they were not a part of 
organized crime.\144\ Parole Commission documents and news 
reports also refer to Rosario Gambino's role in the phony 
kidnapping of Michele Sindona, an international banker and 
money launderer for the Sicilian Mafia.\145\ After being 
indicted in both the U.S. and Italy in 1979 for bank fraud 
involving more than $400 million,\146\ Sindona disappeared and 
friends claimed he had been kidnapped.\147\ During the sham 
kidnapping, Sindona flew to Sicily accompanied by Rosario 
Gambino's brother, Giovanni, and when he returned to the U.S., 
Rosario Gambino met him at JFK airport.\148\ Giovanni Gambino 
and Michele Sindona were arrested in Italy for aggravated 
extortion in connection with this incident.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ USPC Document Production 00758 (Letter from Edward S. Panzer, 
to Hearing Examiner (Sept. 25, 1995)) (Exhibit 33).
    \145\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
    \146\ USPC Document Production 00925 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff 
(Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34).
    \147\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
    \148\ Id.
    \149\ Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 
1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, a 1995 report issued by the New Jersey State 
Commission of Investigation refers to evidence that Rosario 
Gambino was not merely a relative and associate of members of 
the Mafia. The report details the testimony of Philip Leonetti, 
whom it describes as ``a former, high-ranking La Cosa Nostra 
member'' and the ``underboss and confidant to his uncle 
Nicodemo Scarfo, the boss of the Southeastern Pennsylvania-
South Jersey Family of La Cosa Nostra, commonly referred to as 
the Scarfo Family.'' \150\ The report also makes a distinction 
between being a member of La Cosa Nostra (the American Mafia) 
and being a member of the Sicilian Mafia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\ New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Organized Crime 
in Bars, Part II 1 (1995).

        Leonetti learned from Scarfo that John Gambino was a La 
        Cosa Nostra member in the Gambino Family. Gambino and 
        Leonetti were later introduced to each other as ``amico 
        nostra'' by Nicholas ``Nick'' Russo at a sit-down at an 
        Atlantic City restaurant in approximately 1983. Russo 
        was a member of the Gambino Family who lived in the 
        Trenton, N.J., area. The words ``amico nostra'' mean 
        ``friend of ours.'' If a La Cosa Nostra member 
        introduces two people as ``amico nostra,'' it lets each 
        know that the other is a La Cosa Nostra member. The 
        words are only used when introducing La Cosa Nostra 
        members to each other. [Rosario ``Sal''] Gambino 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        [however,] was a member of the Sicilian Mafia.

        Scarfo told Leonetti that sometime in the 1970s, he was 
        introduced to Sal Gambino as ``amico nostra'' by 
        [Philadelphia crime boss] Angelo Bruno. Because of the 
        way that Bruno introduced Sal Gambino to Scarfo, Scarfo 
        and Leonetti always thought that he was a member of La 
        Cosa Nostra. It wasn't until January or February of 
        1986, when Scarfo and Leonetti first met John Gotti 
        after he became the boss of the Gambino Family, that 
        they found out that Sal Gambino wasn't a member of La 
        Cosa Nostra. Gotti informed Scarfo and Leonetti that 
        Gambino was a member of the Sicilian Mafia, not La Cosa 
        Nostra.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \151\ Id.

Italian authorities also allege that Rosario Gambino and his 
brothers were members of the Sicilian Mafia, so-called ``men of 
honor,'' at the time he entered the United States.\152\ Given 
all these circumstances, prosecutors' allegations against 
Gambino seem well founded. Rosario Gambino appears to be more 
than merely associated with mobsters; the evidence suggests 
that he is himself a ``made man.'' As one New Jersey 
investigator put it, ``[t]o call Rosario Gambino a mob 
associate is like saying John Gotti was just a street corner 
thug. Rosario and his brothers were some of the most important 
Sicilian Mafiosi to ever operate in this country.'' \153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. Moreover, the body of an execution-style 
murder victim was found in the trunk of a car belonging to Erasmo 
Gambino, a cousin, co-conspirator, and fellow leader with Rosario 
Gambino in the heroin distribution ring that led to his incarceration. 
The body was that of Pietro Inzerillo, Gambino's cousin and partner in 
his pizzeria business. While Erasmo Gambino was never implicated in the 
murder and a court found that it could not be considered as a factor in 
denying Erasmo's parole request, it is nevertheless worth noting as an 
example of the kind of activity surrounding Rosario Gambino and his 
associates. See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (1998).
    \153\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of 
Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City 
Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's Case
    At Rosario Gambino's initial parole hearing in February 
1995, the hearing officer recommended a release date of July 
15, 1996.\154\ As Hearing Examiner Harry Dwyer explained at the 
time, however, this was merely a recommendation subject to 
review by the U.S. Parole Commission:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 
16, 1995) (Exhibit 35).

        I'm going to take it to 148 months, recommend that you 
        get a date of July 15[.] You've been in custody since 
        March 16 of '84. Twelve years and four months, 148 
        months, that would be--July 15. I'm going to tell you, 
        I do not believe it's going to come back any less than 
        that. It could come back more. They could disagree with 
        me and push you way down the road. So don't pack your 
        bags.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0068 (Hearing 
Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31).

Although Dwyer set a presumptive parole date, he noted that 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gambino had not taken full responsibility for his crimes:

        After careful consideration of subject's statements and 
        information contained in the pre-sentence report this 
        examiner believes that there is more credible evidence 
        that subject did in fact engage in the activities as 
        described in the pre-sentence report and that subject's 
        statements [of denial] are self-serving. Thus, this 
        examiner has concluded by the preponderance of evidence 
        that subject did in fact engage in a Category eight 
        offense behavior regarding the extremely large scale 
        heroin distribution.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 
16, 1995) (Exhibit 35).

No other examiner or commissioner ever concurred with Dwyer's 
initial recommendation of a July 1996 release date, and even 
Dwyer himself later repudiated it.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ USPC Document Production 00551 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal 
Summary) (Exhibit 36).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Acting Regional Commissioner Jasper Clay reviewed the 
decision in March 1995, he referred it to the National 
Commissioners for original jurisdiction consideration and voted 
to require that Gambino serve out his entire sentence. Clay's 
decision memorandum cited as factors in his decision both 
Gambino's connections to organized crime and the leadership 
role he played in the heroin conspiracy that landed him in 
jail:

        Although he was not convicted of racketeering or 
        continuing criminal enterprise, the New Jersey and 
        Pennsylvania crime commission reports indicate that Mr. 
        Gambino is a soldier and descendant in the Organized 
        Crime Family of the late mob boss, Carlo Gambino. The 
        PSI further indicates that he, along with his brother, 
        Giuseppe, owned and operated pizza parlors in New York, 
        Pennsylvania and Southern New Jersey to facilitate a 
        continuing criminal enterprise[.]

        The current conviction surrounds Mr. Gambino's heroin 
        distribution activities between October 1983 and March 
        1984. The PSI indicates that our subject was the most 
        culpable, holding a high managerial role in this scheme 
        which centered around six individuals, all of whom were 
        related. Mr. Gambino had the authority to determine who 
        would be actively involved in the heroin negotiations 
        and transactions and how the profits would be divided 
        among the participants.

        Specifically, he was involved in the arrangements to 
        deliver \1/2\ kilogram of heroin to undercover agents 
        on two occasions. Also, 3 kilograms and later 2 
        kilograms of heroin were made available during 
        negotiations and subject and his co-conspirators 
        offered guarantees to supply 10 kilograms of heroin per 
        month to the agents.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ USPC Document Production 00490 (Memorandum from Jasper R. 
Clay, Acting Regional Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Mar. 13, 
1995)) (Exhibit 37).

In April 1995, the full Commission agreed with Clay and 
rejected Dwyer's initial recommendation, voting to continue 
Gambino's case until a 15-year reconsideration hearing in March 
2010.\159\ Gambino appealed the decision, arguing the 
Commission did not have enough evidence of his reputed 
membership in organized crime to legitimately consider it as a 
factor in denying his parole. Ultimately, the Commission based 
its final decision on Gambino's actual conduct rather than on 
his associations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\ USPC Document Production 00480 (Continuation Order) (Exhibit 
38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is not necessary for one to be a member of the specific 
group known as La Cosa Nostra or the Sicilian Mafia to be an 
organized crime figure of the type for whom early release would 
be inappropriate. Rather, it is enough that one demonstrate 
certain characteristics of a lifetime, career criminal who has 
the inclination and capacity to run a large-scale criminal 
enterprise upon release. Apart from his relatives, 
associations, and Sicilian Mafia membership, Rosario Gambino 
has himself engaged in behavior that invites scrutiny from 
those charged with combating organized crime--behavior that led 
to his conviction and incarceration. In denying his parole, 
officials at the U.S. Parole Commission relied on Gambino's own 
activities and leadership in the heroin trafficking scheme for 
which he was convicted, noting that he exhibited the 
characteristics of an organized crime boss:

        It would appear that Rosario Gambino certainly has more 
        extensive ties to organized criminals than his own 
        circle of codefendants, but his status as a member of 
        ``organized crime'' is not sufficiently clear to 
        support a finding by the Parole Commission. . . . 
        [However,] the Commission was persuaded that Rosario 
        Gambino was, within his own circle, a traditional 
        organized crime boss who operated through a reputation 
        for violence, through evident corruption of local 
        police, and through subordinates with close family ties 
        of loyalty. . . . Gambino certainly has the background 
        and behavioral characteristics of the career organized 
        criminal, and it is reasonable to suppose that he knows 
        no other way to succeed in life than through his 
        ``family business.'' His connections within the world 
        of organized crime would probably still be extensive 
        upon release, and Gambino shows nothing in his makeup 
        that would distinguish him from the familiar type of 
        Mafioso who is not deterred even by long imprisonment 
        from continuing the only career he knows. In 
        particular, as long as Gambino continues to file 
        appeals in which he denies his leadership role, and 
        portrays himself as a simple first offender, it will be 
        difficult for the Commission to find any basis for 
        deciding that Gambino has the capacity to shake off his 
        past, and discover a law-abiding way to make 
        living.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ USPC Document Production 00702-03 (Original Jurisdiction 
Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 39).

    There is no shortage of evidence to support the assertion 
that Gambino exhibited the characteristics of an organized 
crime boss by operating through a reputation for violence and 
corruption of local police. When he was arrested, Gambino was 
in possession of police surveillance documents relating to his 
own case, which the Commission considered to be significant 
circumstantial evidence that Gambino had a ``a sophisticated 
ability to penetrate police operations.'' \161\ Furthermore, an 
investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms in 
1980 produced evidence implicating Rosario Gambino in two 
arsons:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\ Id. at 00701-02.

        [The arsons] appear related to efforts by Rosario and 
        his brother, Guiseppe Gambino, to take over a pizza 
        franchise in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Rosario and his 
        brother were observed at the scene of a pizza 
        restaurant following the arson and shortly thereafter, 
        the manager received a call and [was] told to close the 
        store and return to New York. Two days later, the 
        manager's automobile was destroyed by a firebomb. Two 
        days later, the manager received a telephone call and 
        [was] threatened with death.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ USPC Document Production 00887 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff 
(Dec. 30, 1997)) (Exhibit 40).

The Commission also relied on evidence that his subordinate co-
conspirators deliberately promoted Rosario Gambino's reputation 
for violence to undercover police agents during the commission 
of the crimes for which he was convicted.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ USPC Document Production 00702 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal 
Summary) (Exhibit 39)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Rosario Gambino's lawyers argued in court that 
denial of his parole was motivated by prejudice based on his 
national origin, that claim was rejected by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The statement that 
allegedly indicated the bias was, ``Gambino appears to come 
from an immigrant background in which family connections are 
simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the 
law.'' \164\ However, the court ruled that, ``[Gambino's] 
contention is devoid of merit. . . . The reference to Gambino's 
`immigrant background' in a Commission memorandum is 
insufficient to establish a due process violation. In sum, the 
Commission's final decision was not tainted by ethnic bias.'' 
\165\ The court also rejected Gambino's argument that his due 
process rights were violated when his offense severity rating 
was set higher than that of his co-defendants:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\ Id.
    \165\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th 
Cir. 2000).

        Differences between Gambino's offense severity rating 
        and his codefendants' were justifiable in light of 
        their differing roles in the heroin distribution 
        conspiracy. Holding Gambino accountable for an amount 
        of heroin greater than what was actually sold to 
        government agents was supported by evidence 
        establishing his ability and willingness to provide 
        greater amounts.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ Id.

Despite Gambino's claims to be a victim of prejudice because of 
his last name, the evidence is clear that he was indeed 
involved in organized criminal activity, and it is certainly 
reasonable to conclude that he was at least an associate, if 
not an outright member, of the Mafia. All of which made the 
denial of his request for early release the only conscientious, 
responsible course of action the U.S. Parole Commission could 
have taken.
C. Roger Clinton's Involvement in the Gambino Parole Effort
    Tommaso ``Tommy'' Gambino is the 27-year old son of Rosario 
Gambino and a personal friend of Roger Clinton.\167\ That the 
President's brother lobbied for the release of Rosario Gambino 
is troubling enough, but that he came to do so through a 
personal relationship with Tommy Gambino is positively 
alarming. According to Los Angeles law enforcement and press 
accounts, Tommy Gambino is not only the son of a mobster, he is 
a reputed underboss in the Los Angeles Mafia currently under 
investigation for his own criminal activity.\168\ While Tommy 
Gambino purportedly runs a company called Progressive Telecom 
that places pay phones in bars, restaurants, and other 
businesses, his standard of living appears to be well beyond 
his visible means of support.\169\ Like his father, Tommy 
Gambino associates closely with known mobsters; his partner in 
the pay phone business is Dominick ``Donnie Shacks'' 
Montemarano.\170\ Montemarano was convicted in 1987 on 
racketeering, bribery, and extortion charges.\171\ The 
indictment described Montemarano as a captain in ``the Colombo 
organized-crime family of La Cosa Nostra.'' \172\ He served 11 
years of an 18-year sentence for his role in the scheme to 
obtain cash payments from New York City concrete companies in 
exchange for major construction projects.\173\ In addition to 
Tommy Gambino's business partnership with a known mobster, law 
enforcement also suspected that he was involved in the 
distribution of the drug Ecstasy.\174\ In October 2001, the 
investigation of a lab capable of producing up to 1.5 million 
tablets of Ecstasy per month was linked to Tommy Gambino:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Tommy Gambino, a resident of Los Angeles, should not be 
confused with the legendary Carlo Gambino's son, Thomas, a 72 year-old 
resident of New York. Through his lawyer, Michael Rosen, Thomas Gambino 
was quick to make this clear in the days following the public 
revelations of Roger Clinton's efforts on behalf of Tommy and Rosario. 
Rosen said, ``my client had nothing to do with the low-rent, trailer-
park trash politicians who infested our country for the past eight 
years.'' Al Guart, Wiseguy Fires at ``Trashy'' Clintons, N.Y. Post, 
July 1, 2001.
    \168\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los 
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001) (identity withheld due to the 
sensitive nature of the detective's work). Tommy Gambino ``is 
considered by Southern California organized crime investigators to be a 
rising star in the Los Angeles underworld.'' John L. Smith, Las Vegas 
Review Journal, June 29, 2001. ``[T]he police and FBI . . . suspect 
young Gambino is a rising underboss in the Los Angeles La Cosa Nostra 
scene.'' John L. Smith, Pardons Scandal Could Mean Congressional Heat 
for Gambino, Las Vegas Review Journal, July 5, 2001. See also John L. 
Smith, Will the Last Guy Left in L.A. Mob Please Turn Out the Lights? 
Las Vegas Review Journal, Nov. 16, 1997 (indicating that Tommy Gambino 
was ``sent West by father Rosario Gambino'').
    \169\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los 
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001).
    \170\ Id.
    \171\ Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia 
Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987.
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Alan Abrahamson, UCLA is Cleared after FBI Probe, L.A. Times, 
Mar. 12, 1999. Following his release, Montemarano was the subject of an 
FBI investigation of point shaving by UCLA football players. Id.
    \174\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los 
Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001).

        Federal agents raided the lab Oct. 17 in an industrial 
        park. During the yearlong investigation, authorities 
        say they taped phone conversations between Derek 
        Galanis [one of the defendants accused of building the 
        lab] and Tommy Gambino, the son of a convicted drug 
        trafficker. Federal authorities contend his father, 
        Rosario Gambino, is an associate of the New York-based 
        Gambino crime family.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \175\ Marisa Taylor, Feds Link Ecstasy Case, Organized Crime; 
Escondido Wiretapping also Points to Trafficking in Kosovo, San Diego 
Union-Tribune, Oct. 25, 2001.

While Tommy Gambino was not among the 24 defendants charged, 
prosecutors said that ``members of the drug ring were 
attempting to seek financing for the Ecstasy lab from the 
Gambino family.'' \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \176\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All these circumstances make Tommy Gambino's friendship 
with the brother of the President of the United States 
unseemly, to say the least. That friendship began when the 
manager for 70s pop star Gino Vanelli introduced Roger Clinton 
to Tommy Gambino sometime in the mid-1990s at a club in Beverly 
Hills.\177\ The purpose of the introduction was so that Tommy 
could request Roger's help in obtaining his father's release 
from prison.\178\ When FBI agents interviewed him regarding the 
Gambino case, Roger described how he was introduced to the 
matter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
    \178\ Id.

        The two most common questions he gets asked regularly 
        are, ``What is it like to be the President's brother? 
        and Can you help me get someone out of jail?'' Clinton 
        stated after talking to Tommy Gambino he knew the 
        reason for the introduction was to see if he could help 
        Tommy Gambino get his father released from prison.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \179\ Id.

Despite the fact that Clinton was accustomed to requests to 
help get convicts out of prison, he became particularly 
enamored with the Gambino family. Clinton described to the FBI 
why he enthusiastically joined in the effort to secure Rosario 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gambino's release:

        Clinton advised that after he began to spend time with 
        Tommy Gambino, he learned about the family and the 
        efforts that they have made to get Tommy's father, 
        Rosario, released from prison. They have hired very 
        qualified attorneys and been through the appeal 
        process. Clinton stated that he identified with Tommy 
        Gambino on a number of levels and because of this, he 
        became passionate about trying to help him get his 
        father released.

        Clinton stated that since Rosario Gambino has been in 
        prison, Tommy has had to grow up without a father. 
        Clinton advised that he, too, had grown up without a 
        father, and sympathized with that position. Tommy 
        Gambino has a close knit Italian family. Clinton stated 
        that when he grew up in Arkansas he and his brother 
        grew up close to an unnamed tight knit Italian family. 
        He further stated that he has is [sic] own prison 
        experience which has given him an insight to the prison 
        system. Through his experience of being incarcerated, 
        he claimed to have learned that things are not always 
        as they appear or as they are reported.

        Clinton advised that Tommy Gambino provided him with 
        all the case files related to his father's case. He has 
        spent hours reviewing all the files. Clinton stated 
        that after his full review of the case, he does not 
        believe that Rosario Gambino is being treated fairly. 
        Rosario Gambino has served three years longer than the 
        maximum guidelines for his offenses. He has been given 
        release dates on two occasions and they have both been 
        denied. The same person, whose name he declined to 
        provide, has denied the release, and provided different 
        reasons each time. Clinton further advised that he 
        believes Tommy Gambino's father may be treated 
        differently than other people strictly because of this 
        name. Clinton advised that he too has experienced that 
        problem. He stated that the name can be both a positive 
        or negative depending on the circumstances.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ Id. at FBI-RC-00002.

When the Committee subpoenaed Clinton for all of his materials 
relating to Gambino, he provided approximately 130 pages of 
documents, many of which were apparently provided to him by 
Tommy Gambino. Most of these documents were transcripts and 
forms related to Rosario Gambino's parole.
    After he conducted his ``full review'' of the Gambino case 
files, Roger Clinton decided to assist Gambino with his effort 
to obtain parole. Clinton described his decision to help 
Gambino to the FBI when they interviewed him in September 1999:

        He [Clinton] told Tommy Gambino that he would not agree 
        to help the family unless they provided him with all 
        the information related to the case. Clinton told Tommy 
        Gambino that he did not want any information withheld 
        that might effect his decision to help the family. 
        Gambino told Clinton if there is any information 
        withheld from you, it was also being withheld from him 
        (Tommy Gambino). Clinton stated he really felt for the 
        family and grew passionate about trying to help them. 
        He further advised that he told Tommy Gambino that by 
        his providing assistance and making contact with the 
        U.S. Parole Commission to seek assistance with this 
        case, it could actually work against him. Clinton 
        stated his name will not necessarily be an advantage 
        when it comes to fighting this matter. Gambino was 
        willing to take the risk and have Clinton attempt to 
        help.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ Id.

    Given the assurances by Tommy Gambino to Roger Clinton--and 
by Clinton to the FBI--that Clinton had been provided with all 
of the relevant background information about Rosario Gambino, 
it is fair to conclude that Clinton was aware of the extent and 
seriousness of Rosario Gambino's criminal activity and mob 
ties, including: (1) Rosario Gambino's conviction for dealing 
heroin; (2) his Italian conviction for conspiracy to distribute 
$60 million of heroin; (3) his role in extortion and arson in 
southern New Jersey; and (4) his involvement in a phony 
kidnapping to keep a Mafia money launderer from U.S. 
authorities.\182\ Despite his knowledge of some or all of these 
issues, Roger Clinton decided that he should lend his support 
to getting Rosario Gambino out of prison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \182\ See n.145 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By Roger Clinton's own admission, he was frequently asked 
to help get people out of prison. Accordingly, it should be 
asked why he would decide to assist someone who was a member of 
organized crime, whose involvement in large-scale heroin 
dealing was beyond dispute, and who was reputed to be involved 
in a series of serious and violent crimes? If his motives were 
pure, then surely Roger could have chosen a more deserving case 
to champion from among all those who approached him for help. 
Despite Roger Clinton's efforts to convince the FBI that he 
assisted Gambino because he believed in the merits of his 
cause, and because he had known a close-knit Italian family 
growing up in Arkansas, the primary motivation for Roger 
Clinton was clearly money. Clinton confirmed this fact during 
his FBI interview:

        Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of 
        value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he 
        had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton 
        stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could 
        help get his father out of prison, ``we will take care 
        of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what that means. 
        He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand what the big 
        picture is.'' He again stated that no specific 
        compensation was discussed if he were to be successful 
        in obtaining Rosario Gambino's release. Clinton advised 
        it was his understanding if he were successful, he 
        would be financially compensated. Clinton is not sure 
        however, if he will be able to help Tommy Gambino and 
        his family.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

Clinton admitted that the ``big picture'' included the 
expectation that the Gambinos would pay him for his work. What 
he did not admit, however, was that the Gambinos actually did 
pay him significant amounts of money. As discussed below, Tommy 
Gambino paid at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton during the time 
that Clinton was trying to obtain parole or executive clemency 
for Rosario Gambino. Clinton was also provided with an 
unspecified amount of ``expense money,'' as well as a gold 
Rolex, while he was working on the Gambino matter. This 
payment, and the promise of additional payments, likely had a 
great deal to do with Roger Clinton's willingness to disregard 
the clear evidence that Rosario Gambino was a career criminal 
and use his influence with the Clinton Administration to help 
get Gambino out of prison. Once Roger Clinton decided to help 
Gambino, the real question was whether his status as the 
President's brother would help convince the Parole Commission 
to release Gambino or whether the Parole Commission would 
resent Clinton's attempts to lobby them. In fact, some members 
and staff on the Parole Commission attempted to assist Clinton, 
while others resisted his attempts to win the release of a 
major criminal.
            1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission
                a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole
                    Commission
    Roger Clinton's lobbying on behalf of Rosario Gambino began 
in earnest in January 1996. He first contacted the U.S. Parole 
Commission's regional office in Kansas City, which had been the 
source of the recommendation to deny early release.\184\ 
Apparently, Clinton spoke with Parole Commissioner Carol P. 
Getty and voiced his support for the parole of Rosario Gambino. 
Clinton also apparently told Getty that he planned on visiting 
her office in Kansas City on January 17 or 18, 1996, and asked 
if he could meet with her or her staff, and Getty agreed to a 
meeting between Clinton and her staff.\185\ During this 
conversation, Clinton also mentioned that he was aware that the 
Kansas City Regional Office of the Parole Commission, of which 
Getty was the head, was scheduled to be closed.\186\ Getty was 
concerned that Roger Clinton had this information, as it 
apparently made it appear that Roger Clinton was aware of some 
of the inner workings of the Parole Commission.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. 
Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics 
Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41).
    \185\ Id.
    \186\ Id.
    \187\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Clinton had spoken to Getty, on January 16, 1996, 
Getty called Parole Commission headquarters in Maryland and 
spoke to Commissioner Michael J. Gaines regarding the Clinton 
call.\188\ Getty related to Gaines the fact that Clinton had 
called about the Gambino case. Getty told Gaines that she had 
scheduled a meeting between Clinton and her staff to discuss 
the case. Getty also told Gaines that she was concerned that 
Clinton was aware of the planned closure of her regional Kansas 
City Parole Commission office and asked Gaines if he had spoken 
to Clinton about the closure.\189\ Gaines said he had not, to 
his knowledge, ever spoken with Roger Clinton.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ Id.
    \189\ Id.
    \190\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following his conversation with Getty, Gaines notified the 
White House Counsel's Office of Roger Clinton's attempt to 
contact a Commission member about a pending case.\191\ The 
Commission's General Counsel, Michael A. Stover said that he 
had suggested to Gaines that he call the White House to ``warn 
them about Roger Clinton.'' \192\ When interviewed by Committee 
staff, Gaines said his decision to contact the White House was 
``a spur of the moment decision'' because of the appearance of 
impropriety.\193\ He contacted someone in the Counsel's office 
that he had known from Arkansas, Trey Schroeder. Gaines said he 
wanted to ensure that someone at the White House was aware that 
Roger Clinton had contacted the regional office about an 
inmate's case.\194\ Gaines told Schroeder that he did not 
intend to speak to Clinton, and Schroeder replied, ``okay, 
thanks,'' and that was the end of the conversation.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Id.
    \192\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \193\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, 
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \194\ Id.
    \195\ Id. When asked about Gaines' contact with the White House, 
Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti stated that Gaines told her about his 
conversation with someone at the White House. According to Gaines, when 
he told White House staff about Roger Clinton's contacts with the 
Parole Commission, the staffer replied ``for God's sake, you can handle 
that one.'' Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, 
USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 17, 1996, Commissioner Getty again contacted 
Commissioner Gaines to inform him that Roger Clinton had 
contacted Rosario Gambino's hearing examiner, Sam 
Robertson.\196\ Clinton told Robertson he would not come to the 
Kansas City office as he had planned, but instead would contact 
the Parole Commission's main offices in Maryland.\197\ On 
January 30, 1996, he did so, leaving a message with a secretary 
for Commissioner Gaines.\198\ The message slip read, ``Roger 
Clinton, very important . . . ASAP, re: brother recommended 
meeting.'' \199\ Because Commissioner Gaines knew from 
Commissioner Getty that Roger Clinton was planning to contact 
him about the Gambino case and because he knew that any such 
contact would be improper, he consulted the General Counsel 
Michael Stover.\200\ Stover volunteered to contact Roger 
Clinton on behalf of Gaines to shield him from an inappropriate 
contact and to advise Clinton that such a contact would be 
inappropriate.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. 
Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics 
Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41).
    \197\ Id.
    \198\ USPC Document Production 00896 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
    \199\ Id; Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC 
(July 17, 2001) (indicating that the message slip was attached to the 
last page of his January 31, 1996, memo to file at 00896).
    \200\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
    \201\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With the Parole Commission's Deputy Designated Agency 
Ethics Officer (``DAEO'') Sharon Gervasoni present, Stover 
returned Roger Clinton's phone call, describing it in detail in 
a memo dated the following day.\202\ According to Stover's 
memo, Roger Clinton immediately invoked his brother, President 
Clinton, saying not only that the President was aware of what 
Roger was doing but also that he was assisting Roger with 
strategy on the best way to achieve his objectives:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \202\ Id.

        [Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me 
        that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my 
        involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother 
        had recommended to him that he not meet with 
        Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's 
        Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed. 
        Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested 
        that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead. (I knew 
        about the previous contact with Commissioner Getty's 
        office, and that Roger Clinton is apparently a friend 
        of Rosario Gambino's son Thomas, who also lives in 
        California.) \203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \203\ Id.

The parenthetical comment inserted by Stover makes clear that 
he understood the context of the conversation related 
specifically to the case of inmate Rosario Gambino. This is 
important because when he was interviewed by the FBI regarding 
his efforts in the Gambino matter, Roger Clinton told the FBI 
that ``he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission 
that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino 
family or that the President was supporting his effort to 
assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from prison.'' \204\ 
In light of Stover's memo (as well as subsequent contacts with 
Case Operations Manager Tom Kowalski),\205\ Roger Clinton's 
statement to the FBI appears to be false. If Roger Clinton 
believed that his brother's involvement would be illegal or 
improper and might spark another scandal, then he would have 
had a powerful motivation to lie to the FBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
    \205\ Kowalski recalled that on several occasions, Clinton made it 
clear that his brother knew of his involvement in the Gambino matter. 
Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Stover's record of the January 30, 1996, conversation with 
Clinton indicates that Stover clearly explained to Clinton the 
applicable law and proper procedures for lobbying for parole:

        I informed Roger Clinton that . . . the Privacy Act of 
        1974 prohibited Commissioners and staff of the U.S. 
        Parole Commission from discussing any case with a 
        member of the public without a signed waiver from the 
        inmate in question. . . . I further informed Roger 
        Clinton that Commissioner Gaines could not meet with 
        him because, even if Roger Clinton were an authorized 
        representative of the inmate, he would have to appear 
        before the hearing examiners at a regularly-scheduled 
        parole hearing. . . . I explained the Commission's 
        procedures whereby hearing examiners make recommended 
        decisions after hearing presentations on the record, 
        and that Commissioners vote and make their decisions 
        without meeting with prisoners' representatives. I 
        explained that, in this respect, the Commission 
        operates like a court of law.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \206\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).

According to Stover's memo, Roger Clinton reacted to Stover's 
explanation by once again invoking the President's authority in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
suggesting he meet with Commissioner Gaines:

        Roger Clinton evinced his strong disappointment upon 
        learning that he could not meet with Commissioner 
        Gaines about this case. . . . I informed him that such 
        a meeting would not have been appropriate. Roger 
        Clinton then asked me how it could be that the 
        President would be misinformed as to the law, and 
        emphasized that the President had suggested that he 
        should meet with Commissioner Gaines, ``. . . a friend 
        of ours from Arkansas.'' Roger Clinton professed his 
        bewilderment as to how the President would not be 
        knowledgeable as to the law with regard to the 
        propriety of this suggested meeting. He stated that he 
        would have to inform his brother that his brother had 
        been wrong. I replied that it would be an honor for me 
        to be advising the President of the United States, 
        directly or indirectly, as to the law. Roger Clinton 
        again stated that he would have to report this 
        information to his brother, who would be ``glad to 
        know'' what I had said. During this colloquy, however, 
        Roger Clinton's voice rose, and betrayed the fact that 
        he was upset with what I was saying.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ Id. at 00895.

Stover and Gervasoni clearly believed that Clinton's call was 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an attempt to exercise political influence:

        Deputy DAEO and I are disturbed at the tactic employed 
        by Roger Clinton of repeatedly invoking his brother as 
        having allegedly recommended that he meet with 
        Commissioner Gaines[.] The U.S. Parole Commission must 
        not permit itself to be subjected to improper attempts 
        to exercise political influence over its procedures. 
        (Roger Clinton did not address himself to the merits of 
        the case itself.) . . . My preference is for the 
        Commission to vote a decision based only on the facts 
        of the Gambino case, and without reference to this 
        episode.

        Finally, I have discussed the situation with 
        Commissioner Gaines, who agrees that the Commission 
        should be shielded, if at all possible, from the 
        unwelcome intrusion of a man who would appear to have 
        nothing to contribute to the Commission's deliberations 
        in the Gambino case but a crude (and I hope 
        unauthorized) effort to exercise political influence.

When interviewed by Committee staff, Stover reiterated his 
strong disapproval of Roger Clinton's attempts to contact 
Commission members and Commission staff, saying he ``was 
concerned that Roger had no business contacting the 
Commission'' and that his goal in advising Gaines on how to 
proceed was to keep Clinton ``as far away as possible from the 
Commission.'' \208\ Stover emphasized that he took two steps in 
response to Clinton's contact: (1) he suggested that Gaines 
call the White House ``to warn them about Roger Clinton;'' and 
(2) he called the Deputy Attorney General's office and spoke to 
Roger Adams about the matter.\209\ Stover explained that ``an 
alarm bell goes off when the half-brother of the President is 
helping an organized crime figure.'' \210\ He believes that 
Adams discussed the matter with Deputy Attorney General Jamie 
Gorelick.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \209\ At this time, Adams was an Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
and was Stover's primary contact at Main Justice. He later became U.S. 
Pardon Attorney. Id.
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission
                    Staff
    From February 1996 to November 1997, there was a pause in 
Roger Clinton's approaches to the Parole Commission. After 
Roger Clinton had his hostile telephone discussion with Michael 
Stover in January 1996, he did not approach the Parole 
Commission again until December 1997. Due to Roger Clinton's 
refusal to discuss the Gambino matter with Committee staff, 
little is known about the reasons for the nearly two-year 
hiatus.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ In the middle of this lull in activity, Rosario Gambino 
signed a letter apparently intended for President Clinton seeking his 
assistance. A copy of the letter was produced to the Committee by Roger 
Clinton. The salutation of the January 9, 1997, letter is curiously 
blank, but the rest reads in relevant part:

        GI am writing this letter to you as my last hope to get 
      justice. I feel that the system has been turned inside out 
      in my case, and I now seek your help in the hope that you 
      can right the wrong that is being done to me. What I am 
      asking for is that my punishment be based on the crime that 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      I did, and not on my name.

        GThe reason I am asking for your help is because my son 
      knows your brother, and my son has told me that your 
      brother is a good and honorable man; I know such traits run 
      in families, and I have heard that you are also such a man. 
      Because of the trust and respect that my son has for your 
      family, he suggested that I write this letter to you to 
      explain my situation in more detail. So please let me take 
      a few lines to explain my case.

Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0046 (Letter from Rosario Gambino 
(Jan. 9, 1997)) (Exhibit 43). The letter continues to explain the 
detailed procedural history of the case and makes false statements in 
the process. For example, Gambino claimed that after his December 1995 
parole hearing, the examiner ``made a finding that I was not connected 
to `Organized Crime.' '' Id. at RCC0047. In truth, the examiner merely 
found that there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to 
conclude, for the purpose of a parole decision, that Gambino was a 
member of La Cosa Nostra. This finding of insufficient evidence in a 
particular proceeding is far different from the blanket exoneration 
Gambino claimed he received.
                    i. December 1997 Meeting
    In December 1997, Chairman Michael Gaines informed his 
Chief of Staff, Marie Ragghianti, that Roger Clinton had 
contacted him. Ragghianti had come to the Commission as its 
first politically appointed staffer \213\ around August 
1997.\214\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines called her into his 
office and said, ``I have a problem. I hope you can handle it 
for me.'' \215\ He explained to her that Roger Clinton was 
trying to meet with him but that he did not think it would be 
appropriate to do so.\216\ Gaines also informed Ragghianti that 
Clinton had tried to contact him about the same matter almost 
two years earlier, in January 1996. Gaines asked Ragghianti to 
meet with Clinton and treat him the way she would ``anyone 
else.'' \217\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines' instructions to 
her about meeting with Roger Clinton were ``as scrupulous as 
you could want.'' \218\ She said that Gaines told her to be 
courteous because Roger was the President's brother, but to 
tell him that if Gaines spoke to him, Gaines would have to 
recuse himself.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \213\ Before her appointment, only the Commissioners were 
politically appointed. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General 
Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).
    \214\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001). As head of the Tennessee Parole Board in the 1970s, 
Ragghianti had been responsible for initiating a federal investigation 
of Governor Ray Blanton, who was later convicted on other charges, and 
his staff for soliciting money in exchange for clemency. Her story was 
told in a book by Peter Maas and in a motion picture. Id.
    \215\ Id.
    \216\ Id.
    \217\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, 
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \218\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \219\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was Ragghianti's understanding that Gaines believed it 
would be inappropriate for him to meet Clinton and that he 
wanted her to shield him from the inappropriate approach being 
made by Clinton.\220\ When asked by Committee staff why he 
referred the Clinton matter to Ragghianti rather than, as 
before, to General Counsel Stover, Gaines said that in 1996 he 
had not been the Chairman of the Commission and Marie 
Ragghianti did not yet work for the Commission.\221\ In 1997, 
he had become the Chairman, and as such, Chief of Staff Marie 
Ragghianti answered directly to him. Therefore, he subsequently 
asked her to handle such matters.\222\ Gaines was aware that 
the January 1996 telephone conversation between Clinton and 
Stover did take place, as he requested that Stover make the 
contact. However, he claims that he was not aware until well 
after the call of what Clinton and Stover discussed or that the 
call was quite hostile, likely because Stover was attempting to 
shield him from knowledge that could arguably require his 
recusal from the Gambino case.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\ Id.
    \221\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, 
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \222\ Id.
    \223\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After her meeting with Chairman Gaines, Ragghianti called 
Roger Clinton and scheduled a meeting with him for December 23, 
1997.\224\ Before the meeting occurred, General Counsel Michael 
Stover learned that it had been scheduled from Tom Kowalski, 
the Director of Case Operations at the Parole Commission.\225\ 
Ragghianti had asked Kowalski to join her in the meeting with 
Clinton.\226\ Stover said he was not pleased upon learning that 
the meeting was scheduled and that he called Chairman Gaines to 
see if he knew the meeting was going to occur.\227\ Stover 
reiterated his advice to Gaines that ``as a matter of prudence 
that it was not a good idea to meet with a man who had 
previously attempted to use political influence in an improper 
way.'' \228\ According to Stover, Gaines responded ``in a 
peremptory tone that this discussion was over'' and that he 
believed that Roger Clinton deserved to be treated with the 
same courtesy as any other member of the public.\229\ Wanting 
to do everything possible to discourage the meeting without 
being insubordinate, Stover made a copy of his January 1996 
memo that described his conversation with Roger Clinton and 
gave it to Ragghianti.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \224\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \225\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \226\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \227\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \228\ Id.
    \229\ Id. When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines stated that 
he did not recall Stover advising against having the meeting with 
Clinton, or of any effort by Stover to prevent the meeting. Telephone 
Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \230\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001). Ragghianti, however, denies that she received a copy of the 
memo before her meeting and denies having read it until being shown a 
copy by Committee staff during her interview. She said she would have 
remembered the memo because it ``slams the Chairman.'' Ragghianti said 
she could not have forgotten ``this `friend of ours' business'' and 
that the memo was, ``pure Michael [Stover].'' Interview with Marie 
Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While Gaines asked Ragghianti to extend only common 
courtesy to Clinton and treat him like any other member of the 
public, it is clear that from the outset, Ragghianti treated 
Roger Clinton like a celebrity and gave him access that she 
never would have afforded a member of the general public. She 
gave Roger Clinton her home telephone number even before she 
met with him, and he placed at least four calls to that home 
number.\231\ Ragghianti's warm approach to Roger Clinton 
continued at the December 23, 1997, meeting. Clinton, 
Ragghianti, and Kowalski attended the meeting.\232\ Ragghianti 
said the meeting was cordial and that Clinton was personable 
and bright.\233\ Ragghianti said that Roger Clinton was ``not 
the yokel he is painted to be'' and ``was downright engaging.'' 
\234\ After the meeting, Ragghianti marveled at Roger's 
charisma, telling Tom Kowalski, ``this isn't even the 
President. Imagine what the President is like.'' \235\ 
Ragghianti explained that she had ``connected'' with Roger 
Clinton because her mother had died a few years earlier and 
that Roger Clinton's mother had also died recently.\236\ 
Ragghianti took Clinton to Tom Kowalski's office, where Clinton 
began referring to papers regarding specific cases he wanted to 
discuss.\237\ In addition to the Gambino case, Clinton also 
wanted to discuss the cases of two other prisoners. For one, 
John Ballis,\238\ he was seeking to obtain a furlough, and for 
the other, whose name Ragghianti could not recall, he was 
seeking a pardon.\239\ Tom Kowalski explained that for a 
furlough, Roger needed to speak to the warden of the prison in 
which Ballis was incarcerated and for a pardon, he needed to 
contact the Pardon Attorney's office.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \231\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Jan 1, 
1998, at 12-13; Mar. 1, 1998, at 16; Aug. 1, 1998). Ragghianti claims 
that she gave her home telephone number to Clinton because it was 
difficult to get in touch with him, given the time differential between 
the east coast and west coast.
    \232\ USPC Document Production 00889 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).
    \233\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \234\ Id.
    \235\ Id.
    \236\ Id.
    \237\ Id.
    \238\ See generally Section IV.E., ``John Ballis.''
    \239\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \240\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the first two issues, Clinton turned to the Gambino 
matter. In describing the denial of Gambino's parole to 
Committee staff, Ragghianti claimed that the Commission had 
``thrown the book'' at Gambino and that ``intelligent people 
would be able to say that a case could be made for less time.'' 
\241\ She said Clinton delivered a ``heartfelt narrative'' 
about how he had been in prison and knew what it was like.\242\ 
The following day, Kowalski prepared a memo summarizing Roger's 
appeal on behalf of Gambino, whom Kowalski described as a 
``notorious organized crime figure:'' \243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \241\ Id.
    \242\ Id.
    \243\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).

        [Roger Clinton] basically believes that the Commission 
        has been much too harsh in this case and that Rosario 
        Gambino is not an organized crime boss as the 
        Commission has considered him to be. If anything, he 
        believes that he is only on the fringes of organized 
        crime and he is being discriminated against because his 
        name happens to be ``Gambino.'' He used the Original 
        Jurisdiction Appeal Summary by Michael Stover as his 
        primary source of information. He specifically named 
        Michael Stover as being discriminatory in his 
        description of the prisoner and was particularly 
        incensed by the statement in the summary which states, 
        ``Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background 
        in which family connections are simply exploited (as in 
        the current offense) to get around the law.'' In 
        discussing this case, he was actually quite animated 
        and argued rather emotionally about how the Commission 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        is being too harsh with the prisoner.

        Ms. Ragghianti and I merely listened throughout the 
        session since we did not have file [sic] nor did Mr. 
        Clinton have a signed release from the subject. He was 
        advised that the case would be reviewed and no further 
        promises were given.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \244\ Id.

Marie Ragghianti also drafted a memo regarding the same 
meeting, and rather than being critical of Clinton's approach, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ragghianti appeared sympathetic:

        Regarding Rosario Gambino, who apparently has been 
        denied parole by this Commission, Mr. Clinton asked for 
        any possible reconsideration of the matter. He pointed 
        out that Gambino has served nearly 15 years, has at 
        least 2 potential job opportunities, and also the 
        support of a loving son, Tommy (Mr. Clinton's friend), 
        and his wife and other children. We explained to him 
        that the Commission takes a hard line in matters 
        perceived as related to organized crime. Tom did offer 
        to review the history of the case and write a summary 
        (which will be sent to me). At that time, with the 
        approval of the Commission or its legal department, I 
        will notify Mr. Clinton of Tom's summary, as (or if) 
        appropriate.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \245\ A handwritten note at this place on the memo dated September 
17, 1998, nine months after the memo was initially prepared, reads ``I 
never discussed Tom's summary at any time with Mr. Clinton (nor did he 
ask me to).'' USPC Document Production 00891 (Memorandum from Marie 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Dec. 23, 1997)) (Exhibit 45). Even 
if Ragghianti did not share the summary with Clinton, it is troubling 
that she considered doing so, as it would have been a violation of 
Commission rules.

        Mr. Clinton was articulate. His questions and comments 
        were thoughtful and appropriate, which is to say that 
        he in no way came across as wishing to capitalize on 
        his name. Instead, he apologized for taking our time. 
        He appeared to be a genuinely caring person, not only 
        for the 3 individuals he was seeking advice for, but in 
        general.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \246\ Id.

While Ragghianti took the position that Clinton did not appear 
to be capitalizing on his name, Tom Kowalski disagreed, noting 
that Clinton ``mentioned his brother'' at virtually every 
meeting and made it clear that he was operating ``with his 
brother's knowledge.'' \247\ Kowalski said Clinton frequently 
made references to his plans to be in Washington and to stay at 
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, saying, ``he threw it in your face 
that he was staying at the White House.'' \248\ Kowalski said 
that from the first meeting, Clinton made it clear that his 
brother knew of his involvement.\249\ Specifically, Kowalski 
said his impression was the President knew that Roger was 
contacting the Parole Commission about the Gambino case.\250\ 
Kowalski's memory on this point was vivid. He explicitly 
recalled his reaction, ``I thought to myself, `Lord, Lord, Oh 
Lord, why would the President want to get involved in the case 
of this guy?' '' \251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \247\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \248\ Id.
    \249\ Id.
    \250\ Id.
    \251\ Id. Kowalski's recollections raise serious questions about 
Roger Clinton's veracity when he was interviewed by the FBI. See also 
n.205 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ragghianti told Committee staff that she and Kowalski 
instructed Clinton that in the future, ``the best way of doing 
this'' would be to address his concerns to the Commission in 
writing rather than through further meetings, although this 
admonition was not recorded in either of the contemporaneous 
memos.\252\ Ragghianti thought that following her initial 
contact, Clinton would not return seeking further 
meetings.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \252\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \253\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the December 1997 meeting, Ragghianti also asked 
Kowalski to review the Gambino file. In case Ragghianti had any 
doubts about the lack of merit in Clinton's argument, 
Kowalski's December 30, 1997, memo summarizing the Gambino case 
should have dispelled them. Kowalski found, in part, that: (1) 
Gambino participated in a conspiracy which promised the 
delivery of 10 kilograms of heroin per month; (2) ``Rosario 
Gambino's criminal activities also extend to arson and 
extortion;'' (3) Gambino participated in harboring Michele 
Sindona while he was a fugitive; and (4) ``[t]he Sentencing 
Memorandum and documents in the file clearly depict the subject 
as an individual deeply involved in organized criminal 
activity.'' \254\ Given these findings, it is disturbing that 
Ragghianti continued to meet with Clinton and discuss the 
Gambino case with him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \254\ USPC Document Production 00925-26 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff 
(Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    ii. Spring 1998 Contacts
    Roger Clinton continued to remain in contact with 
Ragghianti and Kowalski after the December 1997 meeting, making 
telephone calls to both of them regarding the Gambino case. 
Kowalski recalls that Gambino was scheduled for a parole review 
hearing and that Clinton called because he was concerned that 
Gambino had been moved from a prison in California to one in 
Arizona, which was further from Gambino's family.\255\ Clinton 
asked Kowalski to find out why Gambino was moved.\256\ Kowalski 
looked into the matter and discovered that Gambino was moved 
because he had been ``muscling,'' or intimidating, other 
inmates at the prison.\257\ Kowalski did not pass this 
information on to Clinton, but it did confirm his feelings 
regarding Rosario Gambino.\258\ Clinton apparently prepared 
talking points for himself in anticipation of these telephone 
calls. One set of notes, in Clinton's handwriting, reads as 
follows and provides a further suggestion as to the nature of 
Clinton's calls to Kowalski:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \255\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \256\ Id.
    \257\ Id.
    \258\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Questions for Tom Kowalski:

        1) Possibility of re-transfer back to Terminal Island. 
        Should he before or after parole hearing?

        2) If transfer back to Ca. is accepted, can Sam 
        Robertson still conduct the hearing or is it out of his 
        jurisdiction? (Harry Dwyer?)

        3) What else can I do to serve as a reminder or as 
        further emphasis? (personal letter, etc.)

        4) What is the state of the upcoming hearing at FCI-
        Phoenix? The last one was postponed because the 
        Commission's counsel was reviewing the file. Sam 
        Robertson wasn't at the last hearing that was 
        postponed. Will he, in fact, conduct this hearing? 
        \259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0031 (Handwritten notes) 
(Exhibit 46).

    Clinton also sent two handwritten letters to Kowalski in 
February 1998, in advance of the review hearing. One stated in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
part:

        We need someone to ``step up to the plate'' on this 
        one. I firmly feel that if everything in this case was 
        the same and the prisoner's name was Rosario Stevens 
        (only an example), then Mr. Stevens would have been 
        released in July 1996.

        I understand the scenario of decisions based on name 
        recognition, be it positive or negative. This man 
        deserves to be released to return to his family after 
        14 years. He did the crime and he has done the time. We 
        all deserve a second chance! I am living proof of that. 
        Please help us achieve what is right! \260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \260\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0176 (Letter from Roger 
C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 
13, 1998)) (Exhibit 47).

In the other letter to Kowalski, Clinton made slightly more 
sophisticated arguments, analyzing the applicable sentencing 
provisions, arguing that Gambino was eligible for release.\261\ 
In this letter, Clinton denied that Gambino was a member of La 
Cosa Nostra and claimed that the Gambino name was a common one:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0173 (Letter from Roger 
C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 
13, 1998)) (Exhibit 48).

        As documented by copies of pages from the Sicilian 
        phone book, Gambino is a very popular name. A large 
        majority is unrelated to the Gambino crime family.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \262\ Id. at RCC0175.

Remembering an occasion when Clinton made the same argument to 
Kowalski in person, Kowalski said: ``I was very professional . 
. . I didn't laugh.'' \263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \263\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug 
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the spring of 1998, Clinton scheduled another meeting 
with Ragghianti and Kowalski. Both Ragghianti and Kowalski 
recall that Clinton basically repeated the same arguments that 
he had made in December 1997, claiming that Gambino had been 
treated unfairly by the Parole Commission and should be 
released.\264\ At the end of this meeting, as Clinton, 
Kowalski, and Ragghianti were saying their goodbyes in the 
lobby, Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines walked through 
the lobby.\265\ Clinton apparently recognized Gaines on sight, 
and eagerly introduced himself to him. According to Gaines, 
Roger ``acted like he knew who I was,'' despite the fact that 
he did not know Clinton.\266\ According to all of those 
present, Gaines kept the conversation with Clinton short and 
limited to superficial matters.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \264\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former 
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \265\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, 
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \266\ Id.
    \267\ Id; Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former 
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  iii. July 1998 Meeting
    After the spring 1998 meeting, Clinton continued to make 
telephone calls to Ragghianti and Kowalski to press his case. 
Between May 1998 and July 1998, Clinton called Kowalski and 
Ragghianti at least 11 times.\268\ He even called Ragghianti at 
home on at least one occasion.\269\ In July, Clinton apparently 
asked for and received another meeting with Kowalski and 
Ragghianti. While Clinton was waiting for Kowalski at the 
Parole Commission offices, he had a second fortuitous run-in 
with Chairman Gaines. Again, Gaines attempted to avoid any 
substantive discussion with Clinton and ended the discussion as 
quickly as he could.\270\ The meeting between Clinton, 
Ragghianti, and Kowalski went much like the previous two 
meetings. Roger repeated his arguments that Rosario Gambino had 
been treated unfairly and deserved to be released. Neither 
Kowalski nor Ragghianti provided extensive substantive comments 
about the case but simply tried to listen to Clinton's 
concerns.\271\ At the conclusion of the meeting, Ragghianti and 
Clinton looked over pictures of Clinton's new baby, and then 
Ragghianti saw Clinton to the elevators.\272\ Referring to the 
Gambino case, Ragghianti told Clinton ``the only thing worse 
than no hope is false hope'' and that she ``did not want him to 
have false hope.'' \273\ Then, as Clinton got onto the 
elevator, Ragghianti counseled him to pray about the Gambino 
matter.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \268\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, July 
1, 1998, at 10-11; Aug. 1, 1998, at 14-15); WorldCom Document 
Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, May 23, 1998, at 8-9).
    \269\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Aug. 
1, 1998, at 14).
    \270\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, 
USPC (Aug. 7, 2001).
    \271\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former 
Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \272\ Id.
    \273\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).
    \274\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the 
                    Parole Commission
    In late August 1998, the FBI sought to review Rosario 
Gambino's file at the Parole Commission.\275\ Michael Stover 
said that the FBI's original interest appeared to be in Rosario 
Gambino rather than Roger Clinton.\276\ Stover provided the FBI 
with all of the documents relating to the Gambino case, 
including those relating to Roger Clinton's contacts with the 
Parole Commission.\277\ On September 11, 1998, Stover informed 
Ragghianti that the FBI had visited USPC offices to review the 
Gambino file. In the following days, the agents returned to 
interview Stover, Ragghianti, and Kowalski about their contacts 
with Roger Clinton.\278\ Ragghianti was ``very annoyed'' that 
Stover had not told her earlier about the FBI's interest in the 
Gambino file.\279\ Ragghianti told Committee staff that her 
``private view'' was that Stover had initiated the FBI's 
investigation of Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole 
Commission.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \275\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \276\ Id.
    \277\ Id.
    \278\ USPC Document Production 00922 (Memorandum from Marie F. 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). FBI 
interview summaries relating to Ragghianti, Kowalski, and Stover 
presumably exist, but the Justice Department has refused to produce 
them to the Committee. After producing hundreds of pages regarding the 
Clinton-Gambino matter, the Justice Department stopped producing 
records in August 2001 because of its ``ongoing criminal 
investigation'' into the Clinton-Gambino matter.
    \279\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \280\ Id. There appears to be no support for Ragghianti's view. 
Rather, it appears that Roger Clinton was of investigative interest to 
the FBI well before this point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the FBI began its investigation of Roger Clinton's 
lobbying for Gambino, Michael Stover learned that Marie 
Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski had been maintaining contact with 
Roger Clinton over the preceding eight months. While discussing 
the FBI's interest in the Gambino matter with Stover, Tom 
Kowalski indicated that he and Ragghianti had two additional 
meetings with Clinton, as well as a number of telephone 
conversations after the December 1997 meeting.\281\ Stover knew 
only about the December 1997 meeting and was not happy to learn 
about the additional meetings, especially given the fact that 
he was not consulted about them before they took place. 
Ragghianti defended her decision to keep Stover from knowing 
about the meetings with Clinton on the basis that, as Chief of 
Staff, she did not report to Stover.\282\ While Ragghianti may 
have been above Stover in the hierarchy of the Parole 
Commission, her decision to engage in a series of contacts with 
Roger Clinton without consulting her General Counsel is 
troubling and suggests that she wanted to provide Roger Clinton 
with an extraordinary measure of access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \281\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \282\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the FBI conducted its investigation of Clinton's 
contacts with the Parole Commission, Ragghianti and Stover 
disputed the propriety of the series of contacts between 
Clinton and Commission staff between December 1997 and July 
1998. Ragghianti wrote of the meetings in a memo drafted just 
after she learned the FBI was involved: ``[a]fter his initial 
visit, Mr. Clinton called and came in 2 other times. I did not 
record additional memoranda on either of the subsequent visits, 
because he did not offer additional information, but seemed 
only to want to be heard.'' \283\ Rather than scrupulously 
attempting to avoid any appearance of impropriety and follow 
Stover's advice, Ragghianti continued her contacts with Roger 
Clinton unapologetically and without informing Stover. 
Ragghianti told Committee staff that there was ``no question'' 
in her mind about the propriety of her meetings.\284\ She 
dismissed Stover's concerns, suggesting he was motivated by a 
feeling that ``he had been ignored'' and that ``he didn't like 
Roger Clinton.'' \285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \283\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).
    \284\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \285\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The split between Ragghianti and Stover over the propriety 
of staff contacts with Clinton appears to be part of a broader 
animosity Ragghianti harbored for Stover, but it is unclear 
whether their dispute over the Clinton contacts was a symptom 
of her antagonism or a catalyst for it. During her interview 
with Committee staff, Ragghianti went out of her way to 
criticize Stover, describing him as ``a bull in a china shop'' 
who ``doesn't have a fine touch in extending common courtesy.'' 
\286\ Ragghianti similarly criticized Stover's handling of the 
Roger Clinton matter. She wrote in a September 14, 1998, memo:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\ Id.

        I think the record should show that I felt that Mr. 
        Stover had, in the past, been gratuitously rude to Mr. 
        Clinton. My personal philosophy was that Mr. Clinton 
        deserved to be treated at least courteously by this 
        Commission, which is why I agreed to see him. 
        Nevertheless, it seemed appropriate that I should not 
        visit with him alone, not only because of 
        ``appearances,'' but because I did not really know the 
        intricate details of reading inmate files, nor the 
        precise legal constraints on what information might be 
        appropriately shared with interested parties.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).

When asked what her basis was for writing that Stover had been 
``gratuitously rude'' to Clinton, Ragghianti said she could not 
recall but that it might have come from Chairman Gaines and may 
have been the reason Gaines asked her to handle the second 
Clinton contact rather than Stover, whom he had asked to handle 
the first.\288\ Stover said that Ragghianti had never discussed 
with him his handling of the 1996 Clinton contact.\289\ 
Ragghianti complained that Stover, ``did not give Clinton the 
benefit of any doubt,'' that he viewed Clinton as ``guilty 
until proven innocent,'' and that Stover's memo was ``very 
heavy-handed.'' \290\ For his part, Stover did not engage in 
any attacks on Ragghianti, but he did maintain that it was 
unwise for Ragghianti to engage in a series of contacts with 
Clinton about the Gambino case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \288\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \289\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \290\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact
                    the Commission
    In the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton was apparently unaware 
that the FBI was looking into his contacts with the Parole 
Commission. Following the initial FBI interviews of Parole 
Commission staff in the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton continued 
calling Commission staff. Ragghianti and Kowalski did not 
respond to most of these calls. When they received these calls, 
they reported them to Michael Stover. On the one occasion where 
Clinton did successfully reach Tom Kowalski, Kowalski prepared 
a memo to the file summarizing the conversation.\291\ Clinton 
also called seeking a meeting with Chairman Gaines, despite 
having been informed repeatedly that he could not meet with 
members of the Parole Commission.\292\ Gaines, Ragghianti, and 
Stover then met to discuss how to respond to Clinton's request 
for a meeting with Gaines. They decided to send a letter to 
Clinton informing him that he could not meet with Gaines and 
that he could no longer meet with staff. Stover prepared the 
initial draft of the letter, and then Ragghianti ``toned it 
down.'' \293\ Curiously, the letter was addressed to Roger 
Clinton at 1015 Gayley Avenue in Los Angeles, a commercial 
mailbox used by Tommy and Anna Gambino.\294\ The letter, dated 
October 26, 1998, stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \291\ USPC Document Production 00915 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Oct. 2, 1998)) 
(Exhibit 50).
    \292\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \293\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \294\ U.S. Postal Service Document Production (Application for 
Delivery of Mail Through Agent, June 2, 2001) (Exhibit 52).

        The Chairman has asked me to express his sincere 
        regrets that he cannot accept your kind invitation to 
        meet during your trip to Washington this week. As I 
        have mentioned before, it is agency policy that members 
        of the Commission cannot engage in private meetings of 
        any kind with parties having an interest in parole 
        proceedings. This is true even if the meeting is sought 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        for purely social reasons.

        Similarly, our policy also restricts the ability of 
        Commission staff from engaging in any continued series 
        of calls or discussions on official matters that are 
        not in the context of an agency proceeding. Should you 
        have any further request, I encourage you to write 
        us.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \295\ USPC Document Production 00876 (Letter from Marie F. 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to Roger C. Clinton (Oct. 26, 1998)) 
(Exhibit 53).

The sentence regarding staff contacts appears to be at odds 
with the practice of Ragghianti and Kowalski before the FBI 
began investigating. When asked about whether the policy 
against third party-meetings as stated in the letter was in 
fact the practice of Commission staff beforehand, Stover said, 
``Sometimes you state a policy at the moment of its creation.'' 
\296\ He said he was trying hard to set a useful policy for 
future precedent and that he saw Ragghianti's sending the 
letter with his language about staff contacts included as a 
victory on that issue.\297\ It is curious that before the FBI 
began its investigation of Clinton and Gambino in September 
1998, Ragghianti was strongly in favor of meeting with Clinton, 
and then, once the FBI began its investigation, she suddenly 
agreed with Michael Stover's longstanding advice to stop 
meeting with Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \296\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001).
    \297\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the letter's clear instructions to put future 
requests in writing, Clinton immediately called Ragghianti upon 
receiving the fax.\298\ In a voice mail message left for 
Ragghianti, Clinton said he was embarrassed and hurt that 
anyone at the Commission might have thought he was asking for 
something inappropriate and asked Ragghianti to return his 
call, which she did not.\299\ Ragghianti described the message 
as ``long, wordy, [and] slightly incoherent'' and quoted 
Clinton as saying, ``I guess I went over the line. I didn't 
mean to do anything wrong.'' \300\ Ragghianti said she did not 
acknowledge the call in any way.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \299\ Id.
    \300\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \301\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In November 1998, Hearing Examiner Sam Robertson 
recommended reexamination of the Commission's decision and a 
possible reduction of time to be served. Apparently unaware 
that Robertson's recommendation was only preliminary advice and 
not a final action on the case, Clinton sent ``a lavish letter 
of gratitude'' to the Commission on November 17, 1998.\302\ The 
letter states in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \302\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51); USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. 
Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54).

        There are certain situations in almost everyone's life 
        that require standing up for what is right, regardless 
        of the possible consequences. . . . Over the past few 
        years, and for several reasons, this particular case 
        became very personal with me. I felt it necessary to 
        stand and fight for what I thought was fair. I never 
        asked for, never expected and never received any 
        preferential treatment. You simply treated me with 
        respect by allowing me, through written 
        correspondence,\303\ to express my passionate feelings 
        regarding this case. The entire process was handled in 
        a fair and professional manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \303\ To the extent Clinton's letter suggested that his contacts 
with the Parole Commission were limited to ``written correspondence,'' 
it is, of course, completely untrue.

        At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday, October 
        30th, 1998, a release date was given. It is to be 
        January 15, 1999. I have marked that date on my 
        calendar as a day of celebration. I will celebrate in 
        my own private way, filled with satisfaction and pride. 
        With your decision, I feel that justice has now been 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        served for everyone.

        With the utmost respect, appreciation and gratitude, I 
        want to thank you from the bottom of my heart.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \304\ USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton, 
to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54).

Neither Ragghianti nor Kowalski acknowledged the letter in any 
way.\305\ In January 1999, the Parole Commission overruled 
Robertson's recommendation and set a new parole date of March 
2007.\306\ In April 1999, the full Parole Commission denied 
Gambino's final appeal and left in place a parole date of March 
2007.\307\ Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines recused 
himself from this decision, based on his involvement in the 
myriad meetings and discussions regarding Roger Clinton's 
involvement in the Gambino case and the resulting FBI 
investigation of Clinton's contacts with the Commission.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \306\ USPC Document Production 00665 (Memorandum from John R. 
Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 55).
    \307\ USPC Document Production 00817 (Notice of Action on Appeal, 
Apr. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 56).
    \308\ USPC Document Production 00820 (Memorandum from Michael J. 
Gaines, Chairman, to File (Apr. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 57).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In mid-January 1999, the FBI again contacted the Commission 
requesting access to the Gambino file.\309\ On Friday, January 
22, 1999, FBI Agent Jackie Dalrymple went to the Parole 
Commission Offices to review the file.\310\ While she was 
there, Roger Clinton again attempted to contact Ragghianti and 
Kowalski, leaving messages on their voice mail.\311\ Ragghianti 
and Kowalski notified General Counsel Stover who suggested that 
Agent Dalrymple be notified.\312\ Dalrymple asked to hear the 
two voice mail messages and, upon hearing them, asked 
Ragghianti and Kowalski not to delete them for a few days.\313\ 
On Monday, January 25, 1999, Agent Dalrymple returned and asked 
to tape record the two voice mail messages. Stover advised 
Ragghianti to cooperate, and she did.\314\ When asked about the 
content of the messages, Ragghianti said she could not recall 
precisely what her message said but that she was surprised 
Clinton was calling yet again.\315\ Ragghianti said she ``felt 
kind of bad'' about allowing the FBI to tape the message, 
comparing it to how she felt years ago in Tennessee when 
``friends were in trouble with the law'' because of actions she 
had taken.\316\ Ragghianti recalled that Kowalski's message was 
longer than hers and that Clinton had said something on 
Kowalski's message that ``made it sound like they were in 
cahoots.'' \317\ Ragghianti recalled that she said jokingly to 
Kowalski, ``My God Tom, what do you two have going?'' \318\ She 
believed Kowalski was embarrassed by the message and that is 
why he ultimately cooperated with the FBI.\319\ There is no 
support for Ragghianti's suggestion, but it is telling that 
Ragghianti thought Kowalski would need some sort of secret 
motivation to work with the FBI. Every indication is that 
Kowalski worked with the FBI merely because he believed it is 
important to cooperate with law enforcement when requested to 
do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \309\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \310\ Id.
    \311\ Id.
    \312\ Id. at 00869.
    \313\ Id.
    \314\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \315\ Id.
    \316\ Id. See generally n.214.
    \317\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \318\ Id.
    \319\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose
                    Undercover
    After listening to Roger Clinton's messages to Ragghianti 
and Kowalski, the FBI decided to intensify its investigation of 
Clinton. The FBI came to Ragghianti and suggested a plan 
whereby Kowalski would set up a meeting with Clinton away from 
the Parole Commission headquarters, at a local restaurant.\320\ 
Kowalski would then introduce Clinton to another Parole 
Commission staffer who could help Clinton with the Gambino 
case.\321\ In reality, this Parole Commission staffer would be 
an undercover FBI agent. This agent would then be able to talk 
to Clinton about the Gambino case and determine if Clinton was 
attempting to influence the Commission illegally. General 
Counsel Michael Stover had no objection to the FBI plan.\322\ 
Marie Ragghianti, though, rejected this proposal out of hand 
without consulting with Chairman Gaines or the rest of the 
Parole Commission.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \320\ Id.
    \321\ Id.
    \322\ Id.
    \323\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ragghianti's basis for rejecting the FBI proposal was 
highly suspect. She felt that the Parole Commission ``did not 
conduct its business in restaurants'' and that it would make 
the Parole Commission look bad if someone overheard the 
discussion between Clinton and the undercover FBI agent.\324\ 
She also felt that it was entrapment to allow the FBI to 
operate under Parole Commission auspices in order to obtain 
evidence against Roger Clinton.\325\ Ragghianti also was 
annoyed by Stover's approval of the FBI plan. She felt that he 
had ``crossed over the line and lost legal objectivity'' and 
``had no concern'' for the Commission.\326\ However, Ragghianti 
appears to be the one who ``crossed over the line and lost 
legal objectivity'' in rejecting the FBI's request. Her reason 
for rejecting the request--that it did not reflect the way the 
Commission normally conducts business--misses the point. In 
order to be successful, an FBI operation of this sort requires 
exactly the sort of informal environment to which Ragghianti 
objected. The fact that such a meeting would be less formal and 
less professional than normal Commission business is exactly 
why the FBI wanted to do it. If Clinton were so inclined, a 
relaxed environment would make him feel comfortable enough to 
make candid admissions that might yield evidence of illegality 
in the Gambino case. Ragghianti's reason for opposing the 
request, therefore, was essentially that it was likely to be 
successful. Moreover, her characterization of the FBI proposal 
as ``entrapment'' is without merit and represents a judgment 
that she lacked both the expertise and the responsibility to 
make. The FBI agents and their superiors are accountable for 
entrapment issues in their investigations, not the Parole 
Commission Chief of Staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \324\ Id.
    \325\ Id.
    \326\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The real question is what was Marie Ragghianti's actual 
motive for rejecting the FBI request. Ragghianti had a 
reputation for ethical conduct prior to coming to the 
Commission. That she would make such a decision is, therefore, 
surprising. However, she clearly went out of her way to be 
accommodating to Roger Clinton. Whether Ragghianti was trying 
to curry favor with the Clinton Administration or whether she 
just genuinely liked Roger Clinton is unclear. But, for 
Ragghianti to ignore the advice of the Parole Commission 
General Counsel regarding such a sensitive legal matter 
suggests, at best, that she was not objective in her handling 
of the Clinton-Gambino matter. At worst, Ragghianti may have 
been trying to protect Roger Clinton.
    The effect of Ragghianti's decision certainly was to 
protect Clinton. Her decision to reject the undercover plan may 
have had a crippling effect on the FBI investigation. As 
described below, the FBI would continue with its attempts to 
determine the purpose of Clinton's contacts with the Parole 
Commission. Rather than having an undercover FBI agent directly 
in contact with Clinton, though, the FBI had to work through 
Tom Kowalski, who allowed the FBI to place listening devices in 
his office. However, Kowalski, unlike a trained FBI agent, was 
uncomfortable talking to Clinton while his office was bugged. 
Law enforcement sources who helped investigate the Clinton-
Gambino case have informed the Committee that the undercover 
contacts with Clinton were exactly the thing that the case was 
missing.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \327\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations
                    with Thomas Kowalski
    After Ragghianti rejected the initial FBI proposal, Agent 
Dalrymple proposed another possible approach to Roger Clinton. 
In late January 1999, she suggested that Tom Kowalski page 
Roger Clinton, and then when Clinton called back, the FBI would 
tape their conversation.\328\ The FBI would provide Kowalski 
with suggested questions for Clinton to determine Clinton's 
purpose in contacting the Parole Commission. Even though the 
FBI had significantly reduced the scope of its request, 
Ragghianti still opposed cooperation.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \328\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \329\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite her opposition to the FBI's request, Ragghianti 
took the FBI request to other staff at the Parole Commission. 
According to Ragghianti's contemporaneous notes \330\ of a 
meeting held later that day, her initial reaction upon hearing 
of the request was to question whether any taping at the 
Commission's headquarters in Maryland would be illegal, 
``recalling the Linda Tripp debacle related to a similar tape 
recording.'' \331\ Ragghianti also referred to her experiences 
in Tennessee, explaining that she had not cooperated with an 
FBI request for her to allow them to make recordings of her 
conversations.\332\ Deputy DAEO Sharon Gervasoni advised 
Ragghianti and Kowalski that she would ordinarily urge that 
Clinton's call be answered by another letter requesting that 
Clinton send his inquiries in writing.\333\ Given the FBI's 
request, however, she recommended that General Counsel Stover, 
who was home on sick leave, be contacted for his input about 
how to handle the situation.\334\ Stover told his colleagues 
that a similar situation had arisen before and that the 
Commission employee was advised that the decision of whether to 
record a conversation to assist the FBI was a personal decision 
left to the employee and not one to be dictated by the 
Commission.\335\ Therefore, Stover advised that the Commission 
precedent be followed and that Kowalski should make the 
decision about whether and to what extent he wished to 
cooperate with the FBI.\336\ Ragghianti disagreed, inquiring as 
to ``why any USPC employee might be free to exercise that kind 
of decisionmaking in an issue so important to the functioning 
of the Commission.'' \337\ Because she disagreed with Stover on 
how to handle this issue, Ragghianti took it to the Parole 
Commissioners for their decision.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001); Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, 
USPC (July 17, 2001).
    \331\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \332\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). See n.214.
    \333\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \334\ Id. Stover said he was sick with the flu and a 102-degree 
temperature on this day, so it was difficult for him to remember the 
details. He does recall staff from the Commission called him at home 
and insisted that he ``weigh in'' on the matter. After reviewing 
Ragghianti's meeting notes, Stover said he did not see anything in them 
that was inconsistent with his recollection. Interview with Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).
    \335\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) 
(Exhibit 51).
    \336\ Id.
    \337\ Id.
    \338\ Id. at 00870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At 4:35 p.m. that day, Chairman Gaines convened a meeting 
with Commissioner Reilly, Commissioner Simpson, Chief of Staff 
Ragghianti, and Deputy DAEO Gervasoni to discuss the FBI's 
request.\339\ Two main issues arose during this meeting. First, 
there was discussion about whether Kowalski should be able to 
decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI or whether 
that was a decision for the Parole Commission to make. Second, 
there was extensive discussion about why the FBI was 
investigating Clinton and whether the investigation was part of 
the Office of Independent Counsel investigation of President 
Clinton. The Commissioners ended the meeting by reaching ``the 
general consensus that no one present should tell Mr. Kowalski 
what to do.'' \340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ Id. at 00867.
    \340\ Id. at 00871.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, because of the concerns that the Commissioners and 
Ragghianti had about why the FBI was investigating Roger 
Clinton, Ragghianti followed up to determine the purpose of the 
Clinton investigation. According to Ragghianti, she had fears 
that the FBI's investigation of Roger Clinton was a 
``witchhunt.'' \341\ These fears appear to have been based 
partly on Ragghianti's erroneous belief that the FBI 
investigation was part of the Office of Independent Counsel 
investigation of President Clinton.\342\ Ragghianti first 
called Lynn Battaglia, the U.S. Attorney in Maryland.\343\ 
Agent Dalrymple had told Ragghianti to call Battaglia if she 
had any concerns. Battaglia told Ragghianti that the 
investigation was ``not a wild goose chase,'' that she knew 
Agent Dalrymple was a ``good agent,'' and that this was not ``a 
witch hunt.'' \344\ Some of Ragghianti's fears about the 
investigation were allayed by Battaglia's assurances.\345\ 
Battaglia's familiarity with the case also convinced Ragghianti 
that this investigation was being conducted by the U.S. 
Attorney's Office in Maryland, not Independent Counsel 
Starr.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \342\ During the Parole Commission's debate of this issue, 
Commissioner Simpson also expressed concerns that the Office of 
Independent Counsel was involved: ``Commissioner Simpson again stated 
that someone needs to ask Jackie Dalrymple what they're investigating. 
There was subsequent discussion regarding the fact that it appears at 
this time not to be related to Ken Starr. Commissioner Simpson stated 
that we need to call [Eric] Holder if we believe it's a Starr matter.'' 
USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 
51). However, Deputy DAEO Gervasoni ``expressed doubts'' about whether 
the Commission should contact Holder's office. She said that her 
``impression of Holder is that he's a `stickler,' `by the book' kind of 
person,'' and that the Commission would need a ``good reason to refuse 
cooperation'' with the FBI. Id.
    \343\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \344\ Id.
    \345\ Id.
    \346\ Michael Stover also discovered that the Roger Clinton 
investigation was not being conducted by Independent Counsel Starr. 
According to a memorandum prepared by Ragghianti, ``Mr. Stover advised 
Ms. Ragghianti that he had been advised by Roger Adams [who was 
informed by the FBI when they visited his office] that the 
investigation was Ken Starr's; however, Mr. Stover stated that sometime 
later, he had received a call from an FBI asst. general counsel, who 
said that the investigation had the attention of both the FBI Director 
& Gen'l Counsel.'' USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 
26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). Ragghianti also said that Stover had told her 
on another occasion that he believed the investigation had been 
initiated in a U.S. Attorney's Office in California. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, Ragghianti still was not comfortable with Michael 
Stover's conclusion that whether Tom Kowalski cooperated with 
the FBI was a personal decision, not a Parole Commission 
decision. Therefore, Ragghianti and Stover called the Deputy 
Attorney General's office and discussed the matter with Kevin 
Ohlsen, the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General, and 
David Margolis, an Associate Deputy Attorney General.\347\ They 
called to see if ``any responsible person in Main Justice was 
aware'' of the investigation.\348\ Ohlsen promised to look into 
it and later told Stover that the ``higher-ups knew about it.'' 
\349\ Ragghianti also recalls that Ohlsen and Margolis informed 
them that the FBI's proposed contacts with Roger Clinton were 
not ``entrapment,'' but on the other hand, they stated that the 
Parole Commission did have a say in whether Kowalski should 
cooperate with the FBI.\350\ But, according to Ragghianti, by 
this point, the Commissioners did not want to have any more 
meetings about the Gambino matter because they were concerned 
that they would have to recuse themselves from a decision on 
the Gambino case.\351\ Therefore, they allowed Kowalski to 
decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \347\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 
17, 2001)
    \348\ Id.
    \349\ Id.
    \350\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC 
(July 27, 2001).
    \351\ Id.
    \352\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Marie Ragghianti, the Parole Commission staff 
also debated whether they should inform the White House 
regarding the FBI's investigation. According to Ragghianti, 
they debated this point a ``number of times'' but decided not 
to inform the White House. While it is comforting that Parole 
Commission decided not to inform the White House about the 
investigation, it is slightly troubling that such action was 
even seriously considered. Clearly, the FBI was conducting a 
proper, authorized investigation that targeted the President's 
brother and potentially involved the White House. For the 
Parole Commission to inform the White House of such an 
investigation would likely have hindered the legitimate FBI 
inquiry.
    Kowalski quickly agreed to cooperate with the FBI's 
investigation.\353\ He went to an FBI office where there were 
facilities to record a telephone call and placed one to Roger 
Clinton's cell phone.\354\ Kowalski left a voice mail for 
Clinton, but Clinton did not call back.\355\ Kowalski could not 
recall for certain whether they were ever successful in 
recording a live telephone conversation with Clinton but said 
they may have.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \353\ USPC Document Production 00866 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Jan. 27, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 58).
    \354\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \355\ Id.
    \356\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given their inability to obtain any useful evidence from a 
recorded telephone call, the FBI then arranged to record a 
meeting between Kowalski and Clinton at the Parole Commission 
offices. In Spring 1999, Clinton called Kowalski and told him 
that he was coming into town for the White House Easter Egg 
hunt and arranged to come by the Parole Commission offices and 
meet with Kowalski.\357\ The FBI wired Kowalski's office with a 
microphone under his desk and monitored the conversation from a 
car in front of the building.\358\ Kowalski said the FBI had 
suggested questions to ask Clinton such as, ``Is there anything 
you want me to do,'' and ``Should I do anything further?'' 
\359\ Clinton and Kowalski had the meeting, but Clinton did not 
provide any incriminating responses to Kowalski's 
questions.\360\ Kowalski said that after the meeting, the 
agents came to his office and indicated they would have to 
close the investigation.\361\ That was the last time Kowalski 
recalled having contact with the FBI regarding this 
matter.\362\ Indeed, it appears that the FBI's interest in 
Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission did come to an 
end with the taped meeting between Clinton and Kowalski.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \357\ Id.
    \358\ Id.
    \359\ Id.
    \360\ Id. A transcript exists of this taped conversation between 
Clinton and Kowalski. Despite specific requests from the Committee for 
the transcript, the Justice Department has refused to produce it. 
Despite the fact that they have provided the Committee with hundreds of 
pages regarding Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case, and the 
FBI's investigation of Clinton's role in Gambino case, the Justice 
Department claims that the transcript, and a number of other documents 
cannot be provided to the Committee because of the Department's 
``ongoing criminal investigation.''
    \361\ Id.
    \362\ Id.
    \363\ Other commission staff also had the impression that the FBI 
had ceased its investigation. According to Michael Stover, ``things 
were pretty tense at the Parole Commission about this,'' before he went 
on vacation from late March to early April 1999. However, when he 
returned, the issue appeared to be over because ``the FBI had not heard 
what they wanted to hear Roger say.'' From Stover's perspective, they 
had ``dropped the matter.'' Stover said he was not aware of any other 
incidents in which conversations with Roger Clinton were recorded, and 
he was also unaware of other contacts between Roger Clinton and Parole 
Commission personnel. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General 
Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the fact that the Committee has not been provided 
with the transcript of the taped conversation between Clinton 
and Kowalski, it is difficult to determine all of the reasons 
why the FBI was not able to pursue the investigation of 
Clinton's lobbying of the Parole Commission. However, Kowalski 
made it clear that he was not comfortable participating in the 
taped conversation with Clinton. Kowalski's lack of comfort 
likely had some impact on Roger Clinton, and if Clinton had 
been planning to make any illegal proposals, he was unlikely to 
do so in such a meeting. The failure of the taped conversation 
with Kowalski makes Ragghianti's decision to reject the FBI 
undercover proposal even more significant. If the FBI was able 
to have a trained, professional undercover agent discussing 
Gambino's parole with Clinton, it might have made a significant 
difference in the FBI's case. However, due to Ragghianti's 
refusal to cooperate with the FBI, it is impossible to know 
what would have happened.
            3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White 
                    House in the Parole Decision
    One set of notes produced to the Committee by the National 
Archives indicates that Roger Clinton approached White House 
staff regarding the Gambino case. Notes produced to the 
Committee from the files of White House Deputy Counsel Bruce 
Lindsey indicate that Lindsey and Clinton met on February 19 of 
an unknown year regarding the Gambino matter. While assigning a 
date to the notes without Bruce Lindsey's or Roger Clinton's 
cooperation is somewhat speculative, the facts suggest that the 
meeting most likely occurred in February 1999.\364\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ In February 1998, Clinton was still in the middle of his 
series of meetings with Commission staff, and likely did not yet see 
the need to escalate matters to the White House. By February 2000, the 
Commission had rejected Gambino's bid for parole, but it was likely 
still too early for Clinton to be meeting with Lindsey regarding a 
pardon or commutation for Gambino. Nothing in the notes suggests that 
Clinton was asking for executive clemency; rather, the discussion 
appeared to be limited to parole. In addition, Gambino's commutation 
petition was not filed with the White House until November 2000. NARA 
Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59). 
In February 1999, on the other hand, Clinton was still trying to obtain 
meetings with Parole Commission staff, but their receptiveness had 
dropped off considerably, since, unknown to Clinton, the FBI was 
investigating the matter. In January 1999, the Commission overturned 
the preliminary decision in favor of Gambino, and was moving towards a 
final resolution of Gambino's parole bid in April 1999. A final piece 
of evidence supporting the conclusion that the meeting took place in 
February 1999 is the fact that Bruce Lindsey conducted legal research 
regarding the Gambino case in April 1999. NARA Document Production 
(Summary page from Lexis-Nexis Research, the White House, Apr. 5, 1999) 
(Exhibit 60). This research may have been prompted by Clinton's meeting 
with Lindsey. Accordingly, February 1999 is the likely time when Roger 
Clinton approached Lindsey and asked for his assistance with Gambino's 
parole bid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lindsey's notes reflect that Roger Clinton explained the 
procedural history of Rosario Gambino's criminal case and bid 
for parole. Clinton apparently claimed that: (1) Gambino had 
only dealt one kilogram of heroin; (2) Gambino's codefendants 
were treated more leniently than Gambino; and (3) there was no 
evidence that Gambino was linked to organized crime.\365\ The 
first and third claims are false. The second claim is true but, 
according to a federal appeals court, was justified in light of 
his leadership role in the conspiracy. Clinton apparently made 
special reference to Parole Commission General Counsel Michael 
Stover, who had rejected Clinton's previous entreaties to the 
Commission.\366\ Lindsey's notes state, ``Michael Stover--
counsel to Mike Gaines'' and then have an arrow pointing from 
Stover's name to the word ``improper,'' which is 
underlined.\367\ The notes also indicate that Clinton provided 
Lindsey with a number of documents relating to the Gambino 
parole case.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \365\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Notes) (Exhibit 61).
    \366\ Id.
    \367\ Id.
    \368\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assuming that the meeting took place on February 19, 1999, 
and related to the Gambino parole effort rather than the 
Gambino clemency effort, the question is what, if any, action 
did Lindsey or other White House staff take as a result of the 
meeting with Roger Clinton. Neither Parole Commission nor White 
House records reflect any contacts between the White House 
staff and the Parole Commission regarding the Gambino case, 
other than the one previously described.\369\ However, Roger 
Clinton's attempt to reach out to Bruce Lindsey demonstrates 
that Clinton was intent on using his influence at the White 
House improperly to influence the Parole Commission's handling 
of the Gambino case. While Clinton may not have successfully 
enlisted Bruce Lindsey in his effort, it is disturbing that 
Clinton's overtures received any consideration at the Clinton 
White House at all, much less the lengthy meeting and follow-up 
research indicated by the documents in Lindsey's file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \369\ The contact took place in January 1996 when Commissioner 
Michael Gaines called Trey Schroeder at the White House to let him know 
that Clinton was contacting the Commission about Gambino. See n.195 and 
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite Roger Clinton's efforts, Rosario Gambino's bid to 
obtain parole failed. In April 1999, the Parole Commission 
denied Gambino's final appeal and set a parole date of March 
2007.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \370\ USPC Document Production 00010 (Sentence Monitoring 
Computation Data, Mar. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 62).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos
    Undeterred by his failure to win parole for Rosario 
Gambino, Roger Clinton's contacts with the Gambino family 
continued. Clinton's relationship with Tommy Gambino included a 
March 1999 trip together from Los Angeles to Washington, 
D.C.\371\ It is unknown what Gambino and Clinton did in 
Washington or with whom they met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \371\ American Express Document Production (Exhibit 63).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Clinton's relationship with Gambino also had a significant 
financial dimension. In 1999, Roger Clinton was playing a game 
of pick-up golf with three strangers at a public course in Los 
Angeles.\372\ Somewhere near the tenth hole, Tommy Gambino 
drove up in a golf cart and had a brief conversation with 
Clinton, handed Clinton a box, and left.\373\ Clinton told his 
golfing partners that the person who had been talking to him 
was Tommy Gambino and that he was ``helping'' Tommy Gambino's 
father.\374\ Clinton then opened the box Gambino had given him. 
In the box was a gold Rolex watch.\375\ What Roger Clinton did 
not know was that two members of his foursome were Air Force 
intelligence officers.\376\ They were apparently troubled by 
Clinton's relationship with Gambino and the receipt of the 
Rolex and reported the incident to the FBI, which was 
continuing its investigation.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \372\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug 
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001. The Committee requested records 
relating to this matter, including summaries of FBI interviews with the 
Air Force intelligence officers. The Justice Department declined to 
produce those records to the Committee because of its ongoing criminal 
investigation of Roger Clinton.
    \373\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug 
Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001.
    \374\ Id.
    \375\ Id.
    \376\ Id.
    \377\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Later in 1999, Clinton received a $50,000 payment from the 
Gambinos. On September 27, 1999, Anna Gambino, Tommy Gambino's 
sister, wrote a check to Roger Clinton's company in the amount 
of $50,000 dated September 29, 1999.\378\ The funds used to pay 
Clinton appear to have originated with Lisa Gambino in Staten 
Island, New York. Anna Gambino deposited three cashier's checks 
from Lisa Gambino dated April 30, 1999, totaling $227,889.97 
into the account from which she later paid Roger Clinton's 
company $50,000.\379\ The bank records indicate that without 
this deposit, there would have been insufficient funds to cover 
the check to Clinton.\380\ However, Lisa Gambino has refused to 
answer requests for an interview. Accordingly, the Committee 
has been unable to determine the nature of the relationship 
between Lisa Gambino and Anna Gambino or why Lisa Gambino paid 
Anna Gambino the money.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \378\ The discovery of this check in Roger Clinton's bank records 
is what led the Committee to begin inquiries regarding Rosario Gambino. 
When the Committee received the original check from Tommy Gambino in 
response to a subpoena, it became apparent that the check had been 
filled out by three different individuals using three different pens. 
Anna Gambino apparently signed the check, which was presumably blank; 
Tommy Gambino then apparently filled out the amount of the check, 
$50,000; and then the ``payable to'' line was filled out in Roger 
Clinton's handwriting, payable to Odgie Music. Tommy Gambino Document 
Production (Exhibit 64).
    \379\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 65).
    \380\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 66).
    \381\ The Committee was, however, able to determine the source of 
the funds. The cashier's checks provided to Anna by Lisa Gambino were 
the proceeds of a $499,000 mortgage on her home in Staten Island, New 
York. Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 67). In 
the loan application documents, Lisa Gambino wrote a note in her own 
hand indicating she was seeking the loan ``for an investment.'' Staten 
Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 68). Given the refusal 
of Roger Clinton and Tommy Gambino to cooperate, however, the Committee 
has also been unable to definitively determine the purpose of the 
$50,000 payment to Roger Clinton. However, as discussed below, Clinton 
suggested to the FBI and the media that the money was a loan, which 
appears to be false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other evidence connects Lisa and Anna Gambino to reputed 
organized crime figures. Both the accounts of Anna and Lisa 
Gambino received frequent inflows of funds from Antonio 
Genovese,\382\ a New York businessman who was partners with 
Giovanni Gambino in G&G Concrete Company.\383\ Giovanni 
``John'' Gambino is the brother of Rosario Gambino and was 
convicted of murder and heroin distribution, together with his 
other brother, Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino.\384\ G&G Concrete 
played a central role in a 1995 dispute between another New 
York construction firm, Nasso and Associates, and the city's 
School Construction Authority (``SCA''). The disagreement was 
settled, but according to reports, Nasso had failed to disclose 
that it received financing from G&G Concrete partner Antonio 
Genovese.\385\ Both Genovese and John Gambino had worked for 
Julius Nasso, the grandfather of the principal of Nasso and 
Associates, before forming G&G Concrete.\386\ According to news 
reports:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ See Fidelity Federal Document Production.
    \383\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to 
Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995.
    \384\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime 
Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994.
    \385\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to 
Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995.
    \386\ Id.

        Testimony at the 1987 trial of Genovese mob boss 
        Anthony Salerno's [sic] disclosed that the elder Nasso 
        met with then-Gambino boss Paul Castellano and others 
        in an effort to convince another firm to step aside and 
        let Nasso take the $26 million Javits Convention Center 
        job.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\ Id.

The controversy led to Nasso and Associates being prohibited 
from bidding on New York City school projects.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton
    In the same time that Roger Clinton was receiving $50,000 
and a gold Rolex from the Gambinos, the FBI was continuing its 
investigation of his relationship with Tommy Gambino. The 
report of Clinton's receipt of the Rolex reinvigorated the 
investigation, leading to the interview of Clinton. At some 
point in 1999, the Justice Department also issued a grand jury 
subpoena to Tommy Gambino.\389\ Through his attorney, James 
Henderson,\390\ Gambino informed the Justice Department that he 
planned on invoking his Fifth Amendment rights.\391\ 
Accordingly, the Department did not call Gambino to the grand 
jury.\392\ Instead, Gambino and his attorney participated in an 
interview with the Justice Department.\393\ However, 
reportedly, little resulted from the interview.\394\ Due to the 
Justice Department's decision to withhold documents selectively 
relating to the Clinton-Gambino investigation from the 
Committee, including the Tommy Gambino interview summary, it is 
not clear exactly what Gambino was questioned about, whether he 
was truthful, or whether he was interviewed before or after 
Roger Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \389\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
    \390\ Although Henderson is the former head of the Justice 
Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Los Angeles, he has 
represented individuals alleged to have ties to organized crime, 
including Tommy Gambino, Louis Caruso, a ``reputed soldier in the Los 
Angeles mob family,'' and Ronald ``The Cigar'' Sacco, an alleged $1 
billion per year bookie with reputed ties to organized crime families. 
John L. Smith, Oddsmaker Going Back to Control Board to Clear His Name, 
Las Vegas Review Journal, June 11, 1997; Seth Rosenfeld, Alleged Bookie 
Gets Huge Bail, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 31, 1993.
    \391\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001).
    \392\ Id.
    \393\ Id.
    \394\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 30, 1999, the same day that Roger Clinton 
deposited the $50,000 Gambino check, two FBI agents interviewed 
Clinton at his home in California.\395\ It is not clear what 
prompted the FBI's interview, and specifically, whether they 
were aware of the $50,000 check. The FBI interview summary 
shows that Clinton attempted to mislead the FBI agents on 
several occasions and had to change his story a number of 
times. Even with Clinton's belated efforts to correct his 
falsehoods, in the end he appears to have lied to the FBI 
agents about multiple topics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \395\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's 
                    Knowledge
    Clinton's first falsehood related to whether he discussed 
his efforts on behalf of Gambino with President Clinton:

        Clinton stated he did not discuss his decision to 
        assist the Gambino family in this case with anyone. . . 
        . Clinton stated he did not tell his brother, the 
        President of the United States, specifically what he 
        was working on. He believes, however, that the 
        President knew he had some business with the U.S. 
        Parole Commission, but did not know specifically what 
        he was working on. He did not tell his brother that he 
        was working on the Rosario Gambino case. He did not 
        seek advise [sic] or referrals from the President in 
        his efforts to contact the Parole Commission on behalf 
        of Rosario Gambino.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \396\ Id. at FBI-RC-00003.

As discussed earlier, Clinton told Thomas Kowalski the 
opposite. According to Kowalski, Clinton explicitly told him on 
several occasions that the President knew what Roger was doing 
for Gambino.\397\ Michael Stover's contemporaneous record of 
his conversation with Clinton in January 1996 is also far more 
consistent with Kowalski's recollection than with Clinton's 
claims to the FBI:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \397\ See n.251 and accompanying text.

        [Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me 
        that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my 
        involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother 
        had recommended to him that he not meet with 
        Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's 
        Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed. 
        Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested 
        that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \398\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).

    Clinton told Kowalski that the President knew of his 
efforts on behalf of Gambino; then, he told the FBI that he 
never discussed the matter with his brother. Clinton told 
Stover that the President was actively advising him in his 
efforts to contact the Commission; then, he told the FBI that 
his brother was not involved at all. If he had said nothing 
further on the matter, the worst one could conclude would be 
that either Clinton was lying to Kowalski and Stover or he was 
lying to the FBI. However, Clinton went further by telling the 
FBI ``that he did not represent to anyone on the Parole 
Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist 
the Gambino family or that the President was supporting his 
effort to assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from 
prison.'' \399\ If Kowalski is to be believed, then Clinton's 
statement is false. According to Kowalski, Clinton did 
represent that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist 
Gambino.\400\ Unlike Clinton's statement to the FBI, Kowalski's 
statement is not a self-serving denial standing alone. Rather, 
Kowalski has no discernable motivation to lie, and his 
recollection about Clinton's representation of his brother's 
knowledge is consistent with the contemporaneous, written 
record of a conversation in which Clinton made very similar 
statements to Stover.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \399\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
    \400\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \401\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. 
Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the 
                    Gambinos
    Clinton told the FBI that his efforts on behalf of Rosario 
Gambino were ``above board.'' \402\ He told the agents that 
immediately after learning that Commission personnel were 
unable to discuss particulars of the case with him without 
violating the Privacy Act, he ``processed the proper paperwork 
to register as an official representative of Rosario Gambino.'' 
\403\ The agents then began to ask about compensation for 
Clinton's assistance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \402\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).
    \403\ Id. It appears that this statement was also untrue. The 
Parole Commission did not provide the Committee with any such 
paperwork, and internal Parole Commission documents repeatedly refer to 
the fact that Clinton had not filed the appropriate paperwork under the 
Privacy Act. See, e.g., USPC Document Production 00879 (Memorandum from 
Sharon Gervasoni, DDAEO, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Sept. 23, 
1998)) (Exhibit 69).

        Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of 
        value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he 
        had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton 
        stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could 
        help get his father released from prison, ``we will 
        take care of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what 
        that means. He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand 
        what the big picture is.'' . . . Clinton advised it was 
        his understanding [that] if he were successful, he 
        would be financially compensated. . . . Clinton then 
        stated that he had received two airline tickets to 
        Washington D.C. from Tommy Gambino and expenses for the 
        trips. Tommy Gambino put the airline tickets on his 
        credit card. Clinton also admitted to having received 
        an undisclosed amount of expenses, but did not provide 
        any information as to how the expense money was 
        furnished to him.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \404\ Id. at FBI-RC-00004.

The trip to Washington D.C. mentioned here appears to be a 
different trip than the one mentioned earlier, because the 
earlier trip was paid for on Roger Clinton's company credit 
card, not on Gambino's. Accordingly, Clinton and Gambino may 
have traveled to Washington together on more than one occasion.
    After Clinton initially denied that he had ever received 
anything of value for his assistance to the Gambino family 
(other than the airline tickets and expense money), the agents 
began questioning him about any gifts he may have received from 
the Gambinos. Clinton then partially addressed the $50,000 he 
had either just received or was about to receive from Gambino 
that day: \405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \405\ The Roger Clinton FBI interview summary does not state what 
time of day on September 30 the interview was conducted. Similarly, 
Roger Clinton's bank records do not indicate what time of day Clinton 
deposited the $50,000 check from Gambino. In the absence of more 
documentation, it is difficult to be certain that Clinton had received 
the Gambino check at the time of the FBI interview. However, 
considering the fact that the check was dated September 29, and 
deposited September 30, it is distinctly possible that Clinton received 
the check before September 30. If Clinton had the check in his 
possession at the time of the FBI interview, his statements about 
payment from Gambino would have been explicitly false.

        Clinton advised he is currently trying to buy a house 
        in the Torrance, California area and Tommy Gambino has 
        offered to loan him an undisclosed amount of money for 
        the down payment. This loan is not compensation for his 
        assistance to the Gambino's [sic] in attempting to get 
        Rosario Gambino released from prison. The offer is for 
        a loan which must be repaid. It is not to give Clinton 
        the money. This offer was made regardless of the 
        outcome with Clintons [sic] efforts to obtain Rosario 
        Gambino's release.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \406\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005-06.

Clinton's explanation of the Gambino ``loan offer'' is 
misleading for a number of reasons. First, if Clinton had 
received the $50,000 check from Anna Gambino at the time of the 
interview, his statements would clearly be misleading, as he 
would have received an actual payment, not just an ``offer.'' 
Second, there is no evidence that the payment from Gambino was 
a loan, or was ever intended to be a loan. There is no record 
of repayment of the $50,000 in either Clinton's or Gambino's 
bank records.
    Also undermining Clinton's claims that the money from 
Gambino was a loan are the other large payments Clinton 
received in this same period, which were clearly intended to be 
loans and which Clinton repaid in short order. For example, in 
the same time period, Clinton received and repaid a large loan 
from Gerard Guez, CEO of the Tarrant Apparel Group. According 
to Guez, Clinton said he needed money to buy a house and 
promised to repay Guez from funds he would soon receive as 
payment for a performance in Korea.\407\ On October 25, 1999, 
Guez wired $100,000 to Roger Clinton's business checking 
account.\408\ Less than three months later, Clinton had repaid 
the entire amount (with no interest) through two checks from 
his personal checking account: one on December 17, 1999, for 
$50,000 and another on January 6, 2000, also for $50,000.\409\ 
Clinton did purchase a home for $570,000 on September 27, 1999, 
with a down payment of $114,000.\410\ The deed transfer was 
recorded on October 29, 1999, four days after Guez wired the 
funds and two days after Clinton withdrew $115,703 from his 
account.\411\ The $100,000 from Guez appears to have been the 
primary source of funds for the down payment rather than the 
$50,000 from Gambino. Even if Roger Clinton used some of the 
money from Gambino ($15,703 at most) for the down payment, 
there appears to be no record of his repaying any of it. This 
is in contrast to the $100,000 from Guez, which Roger repaid in 
full within three months. Accordingly, the claim that the 
payment from Gambino was a loan for a down payment on his house 
is clearly false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \407\ Telephone Interview with Gerard Guez, CEO, Tarrant Apparel 
Group (June 11, 2001).
    \408\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 70).
    \409\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 71).
    \410\ Property Transfer Record, Los Angeles County, CA (Doc. #:99-
2032105).
    \411\ Id; Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 72).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is also evidence that Clinton attempted to coach 
Tommy Gambino and influence his potential testimony regarding 
this payment. When it became clear that the Committee was 
investigating the $50,000 payment from Gambino, Roger Clinton 
reportedly called Gambino and attempted to convince him that 
the payment had been a loan. As The New York Times reported:

        According to one person close to the Gambinos, Roger 
        Clinton called Tommy Gambino on Monday [June 25, 2001] 
        because questions were being raised about the 1999 
        payment.

        ``Don't you remember this is money you gave me for my 
        house for a loan?'' this person quoted Roger Clinton as 
        saying to Tommy Gambino.

        Tommy Gambino, this person said, thought it best not to 
        reply on the chance that the phone was tapped.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \412\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Pardon for Felon Considered After Kin 
Paid Roger Clinton, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch
    Roger Clinton also attempted to mislead the interviewing 
FBI agents regarding the gold Rolex that he received from Tommy 
Gambino. Clinton first attempted to tell the agents that he 
never received any gifts from Gambino and then altered his 
story several times:

        Clinton was asked if he had received any gifts from 
        Tommy Gambino while he was assisting the family with 
        the case, and Clinton initially responded ``no.'' After 
        further inquiry, Clinton then advised ``I was shown a 
        Rolex watch once, but it was not given to me.'' Clinton 
        explained that the watch was on the wrist of Tommy 
        Gambino who asked Clinton if he ever had a Rolex.

        Clinton related that he and Tommy Gambino were 
        discussing watches and cigars at a coffee shop in 
        Beverly Hills, the name and location of which Clinton 
        could not remember.

                                 * * *

        Clinton stated that after leaving the coffee shop, 
        Tommy Gambino took him to look at watches at an unnamed 
        ``pawn shop,'' also in Beverly Hills, California where 
        they encountered actor and Hollywood celebrity George 
        Hamilton. Clinton said Hamilton, who is ``a friend of 
        Tommy's,'' sells watches and cigars. Clinton said 
        Hamilton had a briefcase full of watches which he 
        displayed to Clinton and Gambino, but they left without 
        buying a watch.\413\
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    \413\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004-05 (Summary of Interview 
with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

So, Clinton's initial response when asked specifically about 
the watch was to deny that he had ever received one. That 
version of events, however, did not withstand scrutiny for 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
long:

        Clinton subsequently reversed his earlier denials and 
        admitted to having actually received a watch from Tommy 
        Gambino, who told him it was an ``Italian custom'' to 
        give such a gift as a token of appreciation. Clinton 
        could not remember either when he was given the watch, 
        or where he was when he received it. Clinton claimed, 
        however, he did not keep it, but returned it to Gambino 
        after he had ``heard'' the watch is a ``fake.'' Clinton 
        could not remember who told him the watch was an 
        imitation, or when he had learned it was a ``fake.'' 
        \414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \414\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005.

Thus, Clinton's second story was that he did receive a watch 
from Gambino but had returned it. Again, this story did not 
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withstand scrutiny and was withdrawn:

        Clinton again amended his previous statement when 
        pressed for details regarding the watch's return. 
        Clinton stated that even though it was supposed to be 
        ``a fake,'' he did not return the watch because it was 
        a gift of appreciation from the family. Clinton 
        contended that he never wore it because it was ``too 
        gaudy'' with a thick gold band and a blue face. Clinton 
        said he was confused in that he did not know the 
        present location of the watch. Clinton stated ``Tommy 
        could have it,'' or that he may actually still have the 
        watch. He stated ``he really didn't know.'' Clinton 
        advised ``It could be in my flippin trunk for all I 
        know, it could be in my garage, or almost anywhere.'' 
        Clinton offered to locate the watch ``if it is really 
        important, but it's going to take a lot of effort, so 
        don't ask unless you really need it.'' Clinton was 
        asked to look for the watch after the interview and 
        contact the interviewing agents if he located it. 
        Clinton agreed to do so.

        Clinton asked if Tommy Gambino was in trouble and if he 
        was involved in something Clinton should know about. He 
        stated that as far a [sic] he knew, Tommy Gambino is 
        very clean.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \415\ Id.

Hence, Clinton's third version was that he had received the 
watch, did not return it, and was unsure of its location. 
Despite all three earlier claims, Clinton later produced a 
Rolex watch to the agents and offered the following explanation 
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of how he had obtained it:

        Clinton stated that he does now own a silver Rolex 
        watch. He bought it from an unknown street vendor in 
        front of a ``rainbow'' or ``multicolored'' hotel in 
        Tijuana, Mexico. He paid $250 dollars for the watch in 
        cash and has no receipt of the purchase. He could not 
        provide either the name, street address or approximate 
        location of the hotel.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \416\ Id. at FBI-RC-00006.

At this point in the interview, the agents took the unusual 
step of warning Clinton about the potential consequences of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lying to the FBI:

        [T]he interviewing agents advised Clinton of the 
        provisions of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001 and the 
        criminal exposure of making false statements to federal 
        agents. Clinton was informed it was a violation of law 
        to provide false information to federal law enforcement 
        officers and that he could be prosecuted, fined and 
        imprisoned for doing so. Clinton was then asked, after 
        being advised of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001, 
        would he care to change or otherwise amend any of his 
        previous statements, and Clinton replied ``No,'' he was 
        comfortable with what he had said.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \417\ Id.

    Clinton's bumbling efforts to mislead the interviewing FBI 
agents should not distract from the central fact that Roger 
Clinton was attempting to conceal from the FBI the true nature 
of his relationship with Tommy Gambino, reputed underboss of 
the Los Angeles Mafia, and his efforts to win the release of 
Rosario Gambino, a convicted heroin trafficker and organized 
crime figure. Clinton's efforts on behalf of the Gambino family 
were not merely embarrassing. His behavior was unconscionable 
and his attempts to conceal certain key aspects of his 
involvement from the FBI were illegal. Clinton was attempting 
to use his influence to affect the decision of the U.S Parole 
Commission; he was receiving money from the Gambino family; and 
he may have been doing it with the full knowledge of his 
brother, the President. For Roger Clinton to refuse to 
cooperate fully and truthfully with the FBI in an investigation 
of these deeply disturbing issues only strengthens the 
conclusion that Clinton knew his activity was highly unethical 
and quite possibly illegal.
F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario Gambino
    In November 2000, Rosario Gambino requested that President 
Clinton exercise his power of executive clemency and commute 
his prison sentence. Gambino filed with the White House a two-
page commutation petition, as well as a twelve-page brief with 
a number of attachments.\418\ Gambino's brief in support of his 
commutation request made a number of familiar arguments: (1) 
that Gambino was given a higher ``offense severity rating'' 
than his co-conspirators; (2) that Gambino had been subjected 
to prejudice based on national origin; and (3) that Gambino had 
an ``outstanding institutional record'' and strong family 
support, which merited release from prison.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \418\ NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 
2000) (Exhibit 59).
    \419\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The arguments raised by Gambino were seriously flawed. As 
has been noted before, a federal appeals court explicitly 
rejected the first two. The Parole Commission repeatedly and 
properly found that Gambino's offense severity rating was 
correctly set at level eight, the highest available to the 
Commission. This rating was based on the courts' and the 
Commission's judgment that Gambino was at the head of a major 
heroin distribution ring and had been involved in other major 
organized criminal activities. Gambino's argument focused on 
the claim that his co-defendants received a less severe rating 
of level six while being equally involved in the heroin 
distribution ring. This claim does not have great merit. First, 
there was evidence that it was Rosario Gambino, rather than 
Erasmo Gambino or Anthony Spatola, who headed the heroin 
distribution ring. In addition, the Parole Commission also 
determined that Erasmo Gambino may have incorrectly been 
granted a rating of level six, and likely should have received 
a more severe rating. The Commission found that it ``need not 
give the ringleader of a major heroin conspiracy a lower rating 
just because his subordinates have been rated too low.'' \420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \420\ USPC Document Production 00664 (Memorandum from John R. 
Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) 
(Exhibit 55).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also appears that Gambino's arguments of discrimination 
based on national origin were completely spurious. The only 
evidence cited in support of Gambino's claim was a Parole 
Commission memo stating that ``Gambino appears to come from an 
immigrant background in which family connections are simply 
exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.'' 
\421\ This quote simply provides no evidence of prejudice 
against Gambino. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
summarily rejected Gambino's claim of racial prejudice.\422\ 
The Court likely recognized that the Commission memo stated a 
simple fact, namely that Gambino's background indicated that he 
did, in the current offense, employ family loyalty as a tool to 
ensure the success of his criminal enterprise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \421\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. 
Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 
24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).
    \422\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th 
Cir. 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Gambino's claim that he was a model prisoner was incorrect. 
Gambino did have one official infraction in his prison record, 
and the Committee also learned that Gambino was transferred 
from at least one prison because he was ``muscling'' other 
prisoners.\423\ While these offenses may not be as serious as 
other inmates' infractions, they are not the actions of a model 
prisoner. Finally, Gambino argued brazenly that he had ``strong 
family support'' and could be provided a job by his son Tommy 
upon release. Given the allegations suggesting that Tommy 
Gambino is an organized crime figure in his own right and that 
his business partner is convicted mobster Dominick ``Donnie 
Shacks'' Montemarano,\424\ it is hardly an argument for Rosario 
Gambino's release that he would return home and take a job in 
the ``family business.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \423\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations 
Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001).
    \424\ See Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia 
Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987 (describing Montemarano's 
conviction).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is clear that the Gambino commutation petition was filed 
with the White House and rejected at some point in January 
2001. Beyond that, few facts about consideration of his 
petition are known. The inability to discover this information 
is the result of two unfortunate decisions. First, former 
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey and former Associate 
White House Counsel Meredith Cabe refused to be interviewed by 
Committee staff regarding their handling of the Gambino matter. 
Second, the Bush Administration withheld from the Committee 
four deliberative documents regarding the Gambino commutation 
decision.\425\ Both of these decisions are disturbing. Lindsey 
and Cabe would be able to shed light on whether the President 
was receptive to his brother's pleas and how close the Gambino 
commutation came to being granted. It is difficult to 
understand why the Bush Administration would want to withhold 
from the Committee key documents about the Gambino matter. The 
documents have a direct bearing on an apparent attempt by the 
former President's brother to sell his access to the White 
House to an alleged member of the Sicilian Mafia. Documents 
like these, which have a direct bearing on a case involving the 
sale of access to the clemency process by a presidential 
sibling, should not be withheld from Congress. The decision of 
the Bush Administration to withhold these documents has kept 
the Committee from determining how the Gambino commutation 
request was handled at the White House. These documents likely 
would inform the Committee whether the Gambino commutation was 
seriously considered, what position White House staff took on 
the matter, and whether the President was receptive to the 
Gambino request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \425\ Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives 
and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, 
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The few documents received by the Committee suggest that 
the Gambino commutation may have received serious consideration 
at the White House. Two documents located in the files of 
Meredith Cabe indicate that Cabe requested a National Crime 
Information Center (``NCIC'') background check on Rosario 
Gambino.\426\ Cabe was the primary attorney in the White House 
Counsel's office handling clemency-related matters in the 
waning days of the Clinton Administration.\427\ The two 
documents were printed from a computer diskette labeled, 
``pardon lists.'' \428\ One of the documents reads as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
    \427\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House 
Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
    \428\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NCIC for Michael Mahoney?

        NCIS [sic] \429\ for Rosario Gambino, [date of birth 
        redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at 
        Terminal Island, CA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \429\ The reference ``NCIS'' is apparently a typographical error by 
Cabe. Supporting this conclusion first is the fact that there is no 
relevant database called ``NCIS.'' Second, the preceding sentence 
references NCIC. Third, another document prepared by Cabe indicates 
that she was requesting an NCIC check on Gambino.

        Please provide all information known regarding Kimberly 
        Johnson's incident report for ``threatening bodily 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        harm''

        Ask DOJ to contact sentencing judge in Diana G. Nelson 
        case?

        NCIC: Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social 
        security number deleted]: what happened if we commute 
        entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state 
        custody??? \430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \430\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other document prepared by Cabe reads as follows:

        1. NCIC Checks

        Michael Mahoney,

        Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social 
        security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA

        Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social 
        security number deleted]:

        John Bustamente, [date of birth redacted], [social 
        security number deleted]

        2. Follow up questions

        Kimberly Johnson: please provide all information known 
        regarding incident report for ``threatening bodily 
        harm''

        Diana G. Nelson: Please contact sentencing judge 
        regarding position on commutation.

        Peter Ninemire: can you determine what happened if we 
        commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to 
        state custody??? \431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \431\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).

These documents suggest that Gambino may have been a serious 
candidate for clemency. Cabe was interviewed by Committee staff 
prior to the discovery of the Clinton-Gambino matter and 
explained that she was responsible for obtaining NCIC checks on 
serious candidates for clemency.\432\ The purpose of such a 
background check was to ensure that there was no further 
criminal activity on the part of the petitioner that had not 
been disclosed on the petition.\433\ The fact that the White 
House was requesting a background check on Gambino suggests 
that his name had passed some level of serious scrutiny, and 
the White House was considering the commutation. The other 
names listed with Gambino's also suggest that the commutation 
was being seriously considered. Gambino's name is listed with 
Michael Mahoney, Peter Ninemire, John Bustamente, Kimberly 
Johnson, and Diana G. Nelson.\434\ Three of those five 
individuals received executive clemency.\435\ This fact 
indicates that Cabe's list was not some preliminary list of 
individuals whose names had been received by the White House. 
Rather, since sixty percent of those on the list with Gambino 
actually received executive clemency, the list appears to 
consist of individuals receiving serious consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \432\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House 
Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
    \433\ Id.
    \434\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).
    \435\ See ``Clemency Recipients''  (Pardons Granted by President Clinton and Commutations 
Granted by President Clinton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee has not been able to determine exactly when 
the President decided not to grant clemency to Rosario Gambino. 
However, Roger Clinton's telephone records make it appear that 
he was holding out hope for a commutation until the final 
moments of the Clinton Administration. The very first call 
placed by Roger Clinton after the expiration of his brother's 
term as President on January 20, 2001, was to the cell phone of 
Tommy Gambino. It seems likely that the call was to break the 
news to Tommy Gambino that his father would not be receiving a 
commutation. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that 
Clinton also placed telephone calls to three other individuals 
immediately after his call to Gambino, informing them that they 
did not receive the pardons that Roger Clinton had been 
attempting to get them. After he called Tommy Gambino, Roger 
Clinton called Dan Lasater, George Locke, and Joseph ``Jay'' 
McKernan and informed them that the President had not granted 
them pardons, despite Roger's request.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001); Telephone 
Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001); Telephone Interview with 
Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). See also Verizon Document 
Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001) at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Rosario Gambino case is one of the most disturbing 
matters reviewed by the Committee as part of its clemency 
investigation. The President's brother worked to free a 
convicted heroin dealer and member of organized crime from 
prison. The President's brother engaged in these activities 
because of his friendship with Tommy Gambino, himself a reputed 
senior organized crime member. He also engaged in these efforts 
because of the promise of a lucrative reward from the Gambino 
family, a reward that Clinton received in part, even though he 
did not succeed in winning Rosario Gambino's release. Moreover, 
when questioned by the FBI, Roger Clinton lied repeatedly in 
order to cover up the true nature of his relationship with the 
Gambino family. This episode sets a new low for presidential 
siblings.
III. THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER
    Among the first public reports of Roger Clinton's pardon-
related activities was the story of Garland Lincecum. Garland 
Lincecum has claimed that he and his family were bilked out of 
$235,000 by Roger Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey 
Morton and George Locke, who claimed that they could sell 
presidential pardons.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \437\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Garland Lincecum was convicted in July 1998 along with 
three co-defendants for wire fraud and mail fraud in connection 
with a scheme to defraud investors of $8 million.\438\ 
Lincecum's co-defendants were Valerie Miremadi, Anthony 
Miremadi, and Paul Eggers, a former general counsel to the 
Treasury Department in the Nixon Administration and candidate 
for the governorship of Texas.\439\ All were convicted for 
their roles in the scheme. Lincecum was sentenced to 87 months 
in prison, which he began serving in April 1999.\440\ According 
to the government, the defendants had engaged in a ``prime 
bank'' fraud, a common scheme described by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as involving ``the purported issuance, 
trading, or use of so-called `prime' bank, `prime' European 
bank or `prime' world bank financial instruments, or other 
`high yield investment programs[.]' '' \441\ Investors are told 
that ``prime banks'' use their funds for short-term loans and 
that they will be able to earn a return of 100 percent or 
more.\442\ Lincecum, however, maintains that little or no money 
was actually lost in this investment scheme and that all 
investors' funds were treated with care.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \438\ Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for