[House Report 109-600]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Rept. 109-600
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 2
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WRIGHT AMENDMENT REFORM ACT
_______
September 15, 2006.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 5830]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 5830) to amend section 29 of the International Air
Transportation Competition Act of 1979 relating to air
transportation to and from Love Field, Texas, having considered
the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Wright Amendment Reform Act''.
SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROVISIONS REGARDING FLIGHTS TO AND FROM LOVE
FIELD, TEXAS.
(a) Expanded Service.--Section 29(c) of the International Air
Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-192; 94 Stat. 35)
is amended by striking ``carrier, if (1)'' and all that follows and
inserting the following: ``carrier. Air carriers and, with regard to
foreign air transportation, foreign air carriers, may offer for sale
and provide through service and ticketing to or from Love Field, Texas,
and any United States or foreign destination through any point within
Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, and Alabama.''.
(b) Repeal.--Section 29 of the International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979 (94 Stat. 35), as amended by subsection (a), is
repealed on the date that is 8 years after the date of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 3. TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL NONSTOP FLIGHTS TO AND FROM LOVE
FIELD, TEXAS.
No person shall provide, or offer to provide, air transportation of
passengers for compensation or hire between Love Field, Texas, and any
point or points outside the 50 States or the District of Columbia on a
nonstop basis, and no official or employee of the Federal Government
may take any action to make or designate Love Field as an initial point
of entry into the United States or a last point of departure from the
United States.
SEC. 4. CHARTER FLIGHTS AT LOVE FIELD, TEXAS.
(a) In General.--Charter flights (as defined in section 212.2 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations) at Love Field, Texas, shall be
limited to--
(1) destinations within the 50 States and the District of
Columbia, and
(2) no more than 10 per month per air carrier for charter
flights beyond the States of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Alabama.
(b) Carriers Who Lease Gates.--Except for any flights operated by any
agency of the Federal Government or by any air carrier under contract
with any agency of the Federal Government and except in irregular
operations described in the agreement referred to in section 5(a), all
flights operated to or from Love Field by air carriers that lease
terminal gate space at Love Field shall depart from and arrive at one
of those leased gates.
(c) Carriers Who Do Not Lease Gates.--Charter flights from Love
Field, Texas, operated by air carriers that do not lease terminal space
at Love Field may operate from nonterminal facilities or one of the
terminal gates at Love Field.
SEC. 5. AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
(a) In General.--Any action taken by the city of Dallas, the city of
Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and the Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport Board (referred to in this section as the
``parties'') that is reasonably necessary to implement the provisions
of the agreement dated July 11, 2006, and entitled ``CONTRACT AMONG THE
CITY OF DALLAS, THE CITY OF FORT WORTH, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., AND DFW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD
INCORPORATING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE JUNE 15, 2006 JOINT
STATEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THE `WRIGHT AMENDMENT'
ISSUES'', and the agreement, shall be deemed to comply in all respects
with the parties' obligations under title 49, United States Code.
(b) Love Field Gates.--
(1) In general.--The city of Dallas, Texas, shall reduce, as
soon as practicable, the number of gates available for
passenger air service at Love Field to no more than 20 gates.
Thereafter, the number of gates available for such service
shall not exceed a maximum of 20 gates.
(2) Permissible airport costs.--Costs associated with
reduction of gates under paragraph (1) are permissible airport
costs and shall not be considered as revenue diversion.
(c) General Aviation.--Nothing in the agreement referred to in
subsection (a) and this Act shall affect general aviation service at
Love Field, including flights to or from Love Field by general aviation
aircraft for air taxi service, private or sport flying, aerial
photography, crop dusting, corporate aviation, medical evacuation,
flight training, police or fire fighting, and similar general aviation
purposes, or by aircraft operated by any agency of the Federal
Government or by any air carrier under contract to any agency of the
Federal Government.
(d) Enforcement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration may not make findings or determinations, issue
orders or rules, withhold airport improvement grants or approvals
thereof, deny passenger facility charge applications, or take any other
action, either self-initiated or on behalf of third parties, that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the agreement referred to in
subsection (a) or that challenges the legality of any of its
provisions.
(e) Limitations on Statutory Construction.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed--
(A) to limit the obligations of the parties under the
programs of the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration relating to aviation
safety, labor, environmental, national historic
preservation, civil rights, small business concerns
(including disadvantaged business enterprise),
veteran's preference, disability access, and revenue
diversion;
(B) to limit the authority of the Department of
Transportation or the Federal Aviation Administration
to enforce the obligations of the parties under the
programs described in subparagraph (A);
(C) to limit the obligations of the parties under the
aviation security programs of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration at Love Field, Texas;
(D) to authorize the parties to offer marketing
incentives that are in violation of Federal law, rules,
orders, agreements, and other requirements; or
(E) to limit the authority of the Federal Aviation
Administration or any other Federal agency to enforce
requirements of law and grant assurances (including
subsections (a)(1), (a)(4), and (s) of section 47107 of
title 49, United States Code) that impose obligations
on Love Field to make its facilities available on a
reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis to air carriers
seeking to use such facilities, or to withhold grants
or deny applications to applicants violating such
obligations with respect to Love Field.
(2) Facilities.--Paragraph (1)(E)--
(A) shall only apply with respect to facilities that
remain at Love Field after implementation of subsection
(b); and
(B) shall not be construed to require the city of
Dallas, Texas--
(i) to construct additional gates beyond the
20 gates referred to in subsection (b); or
(ii) to modify or eliminate preferential
leases with air carriers in order to allocate
gate capacity to new entrants or to create
common use gates, unless such modification or
elimination is implemented on a nationwide
basis.
SEC. 6. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REVIEW.
The Department of Transportation shall have exclusive authority to
review actions taken under this Act (including the agreement referred
to in section 5(a)), and actions taken to implement the agreement, with
respect to all provisions of title 49, United States Code.
SEC. 7. APPLICABILITY.
(a) Limitation.--The provisions of this Act shall apply only to
actions taken by the parties to the agreement referred to in section
5(a) of this Act at Love Field, Texas, and shall have no application to
any other airport (other than an airport owned or operated by the city
of Dallas or the city of Fort Worth, Texas, or both).
(b) Preservation of Antitrust Laws.--Nothing in this Act, or any
amendment made by this Act, shall modify, impair, or supersede the
operation of the antitrust laws.
SEC. 8. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Sections 1 through 7 and the amendments made by such sections shall
take effect on the date that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration notifies Congress that aviation operations in the
airspace serving Love Field and the Dallas-Fort Worth area, Texas,
occurring as a result of the agreement referred to in section 5(a) and
this Act can be accommodated in full compliance with Federal Aviation
Administration safety standards in accordance with section 40101 of
title 49, United States Code, and, based on current expectations,
without adverse effect on use of airspace in such area.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 5830 was introduced on July 18, 2006. The legislation
was referred to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and reported by that Committee on July 26, 2006.
The legislation would implement a compromise agreement reached
by: the City of Dallas, Texas; the City of Fort Worth, Texas;
American Airlines; Southwest Airlines; and Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) on July 11, 2006, regarding air
service at Dallas Love Field. The Judiciary Committee sought
and received a sequential referral of the legislation pursuant
to its rule XI(1)(1)(16) jurisdiction over the ``protection of
trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies.''
As introduced, section 5 of the legislation provides that
the agreement shall be deemed to comply in all respects with
the parties obligations under title 49 United States Code, and
any competition laws.'' While not explicitly defined in the
legislation, ``competition laws'' encompass those related to
the protections of trade against unlawful restraints, price
discrimination, price fixing, abuse of market for
anticompetitive purposes, and monopolies. Principle competition
laws in the United States include the Sherman Act of 1890,
Clayton Act of 1914, and Federal Trade Commission Act.
Competition-related aspects of the agreement to which section
5(a) of this legislation pertains are presently being litigated
in Federal district court.\1\ As introduced, section 6 of the
legislation provides the Department of Transportation exclusive
authority to review actions taken to implement the agreement
``with respect to any Federal competition laws * * * that may
otherwise apply.'' This provision would have stripped authority
from Federal antitrust enforcement agencies (Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission) to review competitive
aspects of the agreement.
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\1\ See Love Terminal Partnership, L.P. and Virginia Aerospace v.
City of Dallas, et. al, Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Texas (306-CV1279-D).
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To ensure that this agreement is not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny, the Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment
offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner (with the support of Ranking
Member Conyers) to strike the antitrust exemption contained in
section 5. The amendment also strikes language in section 6 of
the underlying bill providing the Department of Transportation
exclusive authority to review or enforce competition-related
aspects of the agreement. Finally, the amendment adopted by the
Committee contained a clear savings clause to preserve an
antitrust remedy for competitive violations stemming from the
July 11, 2006 agreement and the implementation of this
legislation. It is the view of the Committee that competitive
aspects of the July 11, 2006 agreement must be assessed in
accordance with Federal antitrust law and established antitrust
principles, and that any perceived or actual conflict between
the July 11, 2006 and the antitrust laws must be resolved in
favor of the antitrust laws.
Background and Need for the Legislation
GENESIS OF THE ``WRIGHT AMENDMENT''
During the 1960s, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth
engaged in a protracted airport rivalry, which resulted from
the operation of separate airports just 12 miles from each
other.\2\ In 1964, Federal regulators ordered the cities to
build a single regional airport that served both cities, and
the resulting agreement to construct Dallas-Forth Worth
International Airport (DFW) included a joint bond ordinance
providing for the project's financing and for the eventual
phase-out of commercial passenger flights at competing airports
in the area, including Dallas' Love Field.\3\
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\2\ See City of Dallas v. S.W. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015,
1019 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
\3\ See generally, Jennifer Wang, Time for Congress to Spread Love
in the Air: Why the Wright Amendment, and Why it Deserves Repeal Today,
Journ. of Air Law and Comm., (Spring 2005).
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The bond ordinance was adopted in 1968, and in 1970, the
eight airlines then servicing the region signed agreements to
move their operations to DFW. Southwest Airlines, which then
served intrastate destinations originating from Love Field,
refused to move its operations to DFW, and was sued by the
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, which alleged that permitting
Southwest to operate at Love Field threatened the financial
security of DFW. However, the court held in favor of Southwest
Airlines, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision in two
separate opinions.\4\
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\4\ See City of Dallas v. S.W. Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773, 775 (5th
Cir. 1974) and S.W. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d
84, 103 (5th Cir. 1977).
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In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act to
foster airline competition. Shortly thereafter, Southwest
Airlines applied for the right to start a Love Field-to-New
Orleans route, which the Civil Aeronautics Board granted. In
order to prevent Southwest from expanding service from Love
Field, former House Speaker Jim Wright, attached the ``Wright
Amendment'' to the International Air Transportation Competition
Act of 1979. The law, often called a ``compromise'' between the
parties, contains a general prohibition on interstate
commercial aviation to or from Love Field in Dallas, Texas,
with four exceptions. The Wright Amendment:
Permits ten interstate charter flights each
month to and from Love Field;
Allows flights by ``commuter airlines
operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of 56
passengers or less;''
Specifically grandfathers in the existing
interstate service that Southwest was providing between
Love Field and New Orleans, and;
Allows ``turnaround service'' from Love
Field to one or more points within the States of
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, provided
that the carrier does not offer through or connecting
service with any other air carrier outside the listed
States.
In 1997, Congress passed the Shelby Amendment, which added
Kansas, Alabama and Mississippi to the list of states that
airlines could serve directly from Love Field.\5\ In 2005, the
Senate passed H.R. 3058, the Transportation, Treasury, Housing
and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia,
and Independent Agencies: FY2006 Appropriations Act. The
legislation prohibits funds from being used to enforce the
Wright Amendment with respect to flights between Love Field,
Texas, and one or more points within the State of Missouri,
thereby adding Missouri to the list of exempted states.
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\5\ Department of Transportation & Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-66, Sec. 337, 111 Stat. 1425.
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LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
In 1989, the Wright Amendment was challenged in Federal
court on the grounds that it violated the right to interstate
travel and violated the First Amendment by limiting information
passengers could receive from airlines at Love Field. The Fifth
Circuit found that a law violates the right to interstate
travel only if it actually deters such travel and upheld the
restriction on commercial speech because it advanced the
government's substantial interest in providing ``a fair and
equitable settlement for [the] dispute'' between Dallas and
Fort Worth.\6\ The State of Kansas also challenged the
constitutionality of the Wright Amendment asserting similar
violations. However, these claims were rejected.\7\
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\6\ Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1022 (5th Cir. 1991).
\7\ Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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AIRLINE DEREGULATION, COMPETITION AND THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
When enacting the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), Congress
sought ``maximum reliance on competitive market forces, and on
actual and potential competition,'' to bring ``efficiency,
innovation, and low prices,'' to the air travel industry.\8\
Through the ADA, Congress aimed to provide better
transportation services to consumers by strengthening
``competition among air carriers [and] * * * to prevent
unreasonable concentration in the air carrier industry.'' \9\
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\8\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40101(a).
\9\ See id. at Sec. 40101(f).
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The Wright Amendment expressly protects DFW from
competition from Love Field and establishes a monopoly on long-
haul air travel at DFW, dominated by American Airlines. DFW has
grown into the third-busiest airport in the world, with
American Airlines controlling 82 percent of outgoing flights.
Consequently, the Wright Amendment may be viewed as
inconsistent with the pro-competitive goals of the Airline
Deregulation Act, which was enacted to prevent ``unreasonable
industry concentration, excessive market domination, monopoly
powers, and other conditions that would tend to allow at least
one air carrier or foreign air carrier unreasonably to increase
prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air
transportation.'' \10\ In addition, the entry of low cost
carriers, such as Southwest, has been found to reduce average
prices in a market by as much as 54 percent, and can stimulate
traffic by as much as 174 percent.\11\
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\10\ 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 40101(a)(10).
\11\ See Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry: Issues
and Opportunities, Transportation Research Board, Special Report 255,
(1999), p. 52.
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CURRENT MARKET FEATURES OF DALLAS-FORTH WORTH AIR TRANSPORTATION
MARKETPLACE
The Dallas-Fort Worth region is served by one large hub
airport, DFW, and one medium hub airport, Love Field.\12\ The
airports rank 3rd and 56th nationally in total passengers.
Between April 2005 and March 2006, the most recent period for
which data is available from the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS), DFW enplaned 51.5 million passengers while
enplanements at Love Field were about 5.99 million.
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\12\ See H.R. Rep. No. 109-600 Part 1.
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According to the BTS, American is the nation's largest
airline having an almost 15 percent share of the U.S. market in
the year running from April 2005 to March 2006. Southwest,
which controls about 10.9 percent of the U.S. market, is the
nation's most profitable airline and is one of a very small
number of airlines that has remained profitable throughout the
post-September 11th period. American is clearly the dominant
air carrier at DFW. According to the BTS, between April 2005
and March 2006, approximately 85 percent of all passengers at
DFW boarded American and American regional air carrier flights.
Delta Airlines accounts for about 2.78 percent and the next
largest air carrier share is United Airlines at about 2
percent. Southwest is clearly the dominant air carrier at Love
Field. According to the BTS, between April 2005 and March 2006,
Southwest had a 95 percent market share at Love Field.
Continental Express accounted for roughly 4.5 percent of the
passengers. American, which leases three gates at the main
terminal, accounted for 0.5 percent of the passengers.\13\ This
data demonstrates considerable market power by American
Airlines at DFW and Southwest Airlines at Love Field.
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\13\ See supra, note 2.
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``AGREEMENT AMONG CITIES OF DALLAS, FORT WORTH, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, AND THE DALLAS-FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
BOARD''
On June 15, 2006, the mayors of Dallas and Fort Worth and
other officials held a press conference to announce that the
cities, the DFW Airport Board, Southwest Airlines, and American
Airlines had reached an agreement on a future configuration of
Love Field (DAL) that contains the following provisions.
Love Field capacity
Repeals the Wright Amendment in 2015 by lifting
all existing domestic flight restrictions at Love Field; until
2015, existing domestic flight restrictions will remain at Love
Field (direct flights will be limited to: Missouri, Alabama,
Mississippi, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Arkansas, and
Oklahoma).
Immediately reduces the number of gates at Love
Field from 32 to 20, with Southwest receiving 16 of the
remaining gates (it has 21 now), American Airlines two (it has
three now), and Continental Airlines two (same as today). Six
unused gates in a secondary terminal would be demolished.
Immediately allows through-ticketing from Love
Field. Southwest, American and Continental may also market
connecting service from Love Field to cities outside the Wright
Amendment's geographic area. Previously, in what is known as
the ``Wright two-step'', a passenger who wanted to fly from
Love Field to an airport outside the Amendment's geographic
area would have to purchase a second ticket from that city to a
city within the Amendment's geographic area.
Limits all future commercial passenger service out
of Love Field to domestic operations.
Commits the City of Dallas to invest up to $200
million in airport improvements at Love Field, including
development of new main terminal; and immediately raises
landing fees to help pay for new terminal and other
infrastructure improvements.
Penalties
If Congress expands the Wright Amendment's
geographic area between now and 2015 and Southwest Airlines
begins service to points outside the geographic area in
response to such action, Southwest would lose eight gates at
Love Field.
If Southwest or American choose to operate from
another airport within an 80-mile radius of Love Field
(excluding DFW for American), each airline would surrender an
equivalent number of gates at Love Field (which would be made
available to other airlines).
Effective date
The agreement must be codified by Congress.
The agreement is null and void if Congress fails
to codify the agreement by December 31, 2006, unless the
parties agree otherwise.
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT
On July 17, 2006, an antitrust suit was filed by Love
Terminal Partners against the parties to the agreement (see
Love Terminal Partnership, L.P. and Virginia Aerospace v. City
of Dallas, et. al, Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Texas (306-CV1279-D). The suit asserts that the
agreement represents an illegal restraint of trade expressly
intended to allocate geographic markets between American
Airlines and Southwest Airlines, to limit competition by other
competitors, and to destroy a privately-owned terminal that
competes directly with facilities owned by the ``conspiring
parties.'' The suit further alleges that this illegal
combination in restraint of trade will significantly reduce
competition and produce immediate harm to consumers. It also
alleges that the agreement would significantly reduce
competition by prohibiting Southwest from competing with
American Airlines in the provision of non-stop long haul
flights for another eight years. Finally, the complaint states
that Southwest Airlines agreed to this limitation in return for
the City of Dallas' commitment to limit gate capacity at Love
Field, a restriction that would protect Southwest Airlines'
dominant position at Love Field for the next 22 years and award
it a monopoly over long-haul flights in and out of Love Field
beginning in eight years.
Proponents of H.R. 5830 assert that the legislation
provides congressional approval to an agreement that pertains
to a ``local issue,'' but the agreement has national
consequences. Specifically, the agreement directly impacts all
airlines that would otherwise compete from Love Field, and has
a direct impact on all airline passengers who might utilize
Dallas-Forth Worth Airport or Love Field for flights throughout
the United States. Moreover, any effort to undermine the
Federal antitrust law is an inherently national exercise. The
agreement contained in H.R. 5830 provides that the number of
gates at Love Field would be immediately and permanently
reduced from 32 to 20. In order to accomplish this end,
existing gate facilities would be physically demolished.
Southwest would control 16 of these remaining gates, while
American and Continental would get two each. No international
flights to or from Love Field would be permitted. The agreement
also prohibits Southwest Airlines from providing air passenger
service from DFW for nearly two decades. These restrictions
raise clear competitive considerations.
To ensure that this agreement is not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny, the Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment
offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner (with the support of Ranking
Member Conyers) to strike the antitrust exemption contained in
section 5 of the legislation and to strike language in section
6 of the underlying bill that would have provided the
Department of Transportation exclusive authority to review or
enforce competition-related aspects of the agreement. In
addition, the amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner
adopted by the Committee by voice vote contained a clear
savings clause to preserve an antitrust remedy for competitive
violations stemming from the July 11, 2006 agreement contained
in H.R. 5830.
The antitrust saving clause states: ``Nothing in this Act,
or any amendment made by this Act, shall modify, impair, or
supersede the operation of the antitrust laws.'' It is the view
of the Committee that competitive aspects of the July 11, 2006
agreement must be assessed in accordance with Federal antitrust
law and established antitrust principles, and that any
perceived or actual conflict between the July 11, 2006
agreement, this legislation, and the antitrust laws be resolved
in favor of the operation and application of the antitrust
laws.
Hearings
The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R.
5830.
Committee Consideration
On September 13, 2006, the Committee met in open session
and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 5830, as amended,
by voice vote, a quorum being present.
Vote of the Committee
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that there
were no recorded votes during the committee consideration of
H.R. 5830.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax
expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with
respect to the bill, H.R. 2679, the following estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974:
September 14, 2006.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5830, the Wright
Amendment Reform Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Megan
Carroll.
Sincerely,
Donald B. Marron,
Acting Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5830--Wright Amendment Reform Act
H.R. 5830 would amend provisions of federal law that set
certain restrictions on commercial air transportation to and
from Love Field, an airport located near the cities of Dallas
and Forth Worth, Texas. Based on information from the
Department of Transportation, CBO estimates that enacting H.R.
5830 would have no significant impact on the federal budget.
The bill would not affect direct spending or revenues.
H.R. 5830 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The
bill would make the necessary changes in federal law to
implement an agreement among the cities of Dallas and Forth
Worth and American and Southwest Airlines. Any costs to those
cities of the state of Texas would be incurred voluntarily.
On July 21, 2006, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S.
3661, a bill to amend section 29 of the International Air
Transportation Competition Act of 1979 relating to air
transportation to and from Love Field, Texas, as ordered
reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation on July 19, 2006. On July 24, 2006, CBO
transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 5830 as ordered reported
by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on
July 19, 2006. S. 3661 and the two versions of H.R. 5830 are
similar, and our cost estimates are the same.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Megan Carroll.
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.
5830 will provide congressional approval of an agreement among
the City of Dallas, Texas; the City of Fort Worth, Texas;
American Airlines; Southwest Airlines; and Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) on July 11, 2006, regarding air
service at Dallas Love Field.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article I section 8 of the Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
Sec. 1. Short title
This title provides that the short title of the legislation
is the ``Wright Amendment Reform Act.''
Sec. 2. Modification of provisions regarding flights to and from Love
Field, Texas
Subsection (a) amends section 29 of the International Air
Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (the `Wright Amendment')
to allow air carriers serving Love Field to offer for sale and
provide through service and ticketing to or from Love Field and
any United States or foreign destination, through any point
within Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri and Alabama.
Subsection (b) repeals section 29 of the International Air
Transportation Competition Act of 1979 on the date that is
eight years after the date of enactment of this Act.
Sec. 3. Treatment of international nonstop flights to and from Love
Field, Texas
This section prohibits nonstop commercial air service
between Love Field and any foreign destination.
Sec. 4. Charter flights at Love Field, Texas
Subsection (a) limits charter flights at Love Field to
destinations within the United States. Subsection (b) limits
charter flights at Love Field beyond the States of Texas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri and Alabama to no more than 10 per month per air
carrier. Subsection (c) requires that charter flights operated
by air carriers leasing gates at Love Field depart from and
arrive at a leased gate.
Sec. 5. Agreement of the parties
As introduced, this section provides that any action taken
by the parties that is reasonably necessary to implement the
provisions of the July 11, 2006 agreement, and the agreement
itself, is deemed to comply in all respects with the parties
obligations under title 49, United States Code, and any
``competition laws.'' The Committee adopted by voice an
amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner to strike the
reference to competition laws. The amendment struck this
provision to ensure that the July 11, 2006 agreement be
assessed in accordance with all applicable antitrust laws.
This section also requires the City of Dallas to reduce, as
soon as practicable, the number of gates available for
passenger air service at Love Field to no more than 20 gates.
Provides that costs associated with reduction of gates are
permissible airport costs and not to be considered revenue
diversion. Subsection (c) of this section assures that nothing
in the July 11, 2006 agreement or the legislation affects
general aviation service at Love Field. Subsection (d) provides
that no action is to be taken by DOT or FAA that is
inconsistent with the local agreement or that challenges its
legality. Subsection (e) clarifies the scope of legal
protection afforded under Section 5(a).
Sec. 6. Department of Transportation review
As introduced, this section would have provided the
Department of Transportation with exclusive authority to review
actions taken under the legislation and the July 11, 2007
agreement, and action to implement the agreement with respect
to any Federal competition laws not included in title 49,
United States Code. The Committee adopted by voice vote an
amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner to strike
``competition laws'' from this section of the legislation. The
Committee took this action to preserve the enforcement
authority of Federal antitrust agencies--including the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission--over
competitive aspects of the July 11, 2006 agreement.
Sec. 7. Applicability
This section limits applicability of the legislation to
actions taken by the parties to the July 11 agreement at Love
Field and any airport owned or operated by the City of Dallas
or the City of Fort Worth. The amendment offered by Chairman
Sensenbrenner and adopted by the Committee by voice vote added
an antitrust saving clause to this section. The amendment
provides: ``Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this
Act, shall modify, impair, or supersede the operation of the
antitrust laws.'' It is the view of the Committee that Any
perceived or actual conflict between this legislation or the
July 11, 2006 agreement and the antitrust laws shall be
resolved in favor of the operation and application of the
antitrust laws.
Sec. 8. Effective date
This section provides that the legislation takes effect on
the date FAA notifies Congress that aviation operations in the
airspace serving Love Field and the Dallas-Fort Worth area can
be accommodated in full compliance with FAA safety standards
and without adverse effect on use of airspace in the area. The
Committee expects that FAA will complete the evaluations
required for this one-time notification as soon as practicable.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION ACT OF 1979
* * * * * * *
Sec. 29. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to,
and it is found consistent with the public convenience and
necessity to authorize, transportation of individuals, by air,
on a flight between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points
within the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Kansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas by an air
[carrier, if (1) such air carrier does not offer or provide any
through service or ticketing with another air carrier or
foreign air carrier, and (2) such air carrier does not offer
for sale transportation to or from, and the flight or aircraft
does not serve, any point which is outside any such State.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to give authority
not otherwise provided by law to the Secretary of
Transportation, the Civil Aeronautics Board, any other officer
or employee of the United States, or any other person.]
carrier. Air carriers and, with regard to foreign air
transportation, foreign air carriers, may offer for sale and
provide through service and ticketing to or from Love Field,
Texas, and any United States or foreign destination through any
point within Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Alabama.
* * * * * * *
[Effective on the last day of the 8 year period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act (Wright Amendment Reform Act), section 29
of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, as
amended by section 2(a) of such Act, is repealed, shown below.]
[Sec. 29. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c),
notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the
Secretary of Transportation, the Civil Aeronautics Board, nor
any other officer or employee of the United States shall issue,
reissue, amend, revise, or otherwise modify (either by action
or inaction) any certificate or other authority to permit or
otherwise authorize any person to provide the transportation of
individuals, by air, as a common carrier for compensation or
hire between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points outside
the State of Texas, except (1) charter air transportation not
to exceed ten flights per month, and (2) air transportation
provided by commuter airlines operating aircraft with a
passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less.
[(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c),
notwithstanding any other provision of law, or any certificate
or other authority heretofore or hereafter issued thereunder,
no person shall provide or offer to provide the transportation
of individuals, by air, for compensation or hire as a common
carrier between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points
outside the State of Texas, except that a person providing
service to a point outside of Texas from Love Field on November
1, 1979, may continue to provide service to such a point.
[(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to,
and it is found consistent with the public convenience and
necessity to authorize, transportation of individuals, by air,
on a flight between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points
within the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Kansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas by an air
carrier. Air carriers and, with regard to foreign air
transportation, foreign air carriers, may offer for sale and
provide through service and ticketing to or from Love Field,
Texas, and any United States or foreign destination through any
point within Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Alabama.
[(d) This section shall not take effect if enacted after the
enactment of the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of
1979.]
Markup Transcript
BUSINESS MEETING
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
[Intervening business.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Pursuant to notice, I now call up
the bill, H.R. 5830, the ``Wright Amendment Reform Act,'' for
purposes of markup and move its favorable recommendation to the
House.
Without objection, the bill will be considered as read and
open for amendment at any point.
[The bill, H.R. 5830, follows:]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The text as reported by the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, which the
Members have before them, will be considered as read,
considered as the original text for purposes of amendment, and
open for amendment at any point.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes to explain the
bill.
H.R. 5830, the ``Wright Amendment Reform Act,'' was
introduced on July 8, 2006 and reported from the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure 8 days later. House Rule
11(1)(1)(16), provides the Committee on the Judiciary with
jurisdiction over the protection of trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopoly.
As Chairman of this Committee, I have sought to forcefully
assert the Committee's mandate to ensure that antitrust laws
continue to serve the pro-competitive purposes for which they
were established. That is why the Judiciary Committee sought
and received a sequential referral of this legislation, which
expires on Friday of this week.
The Wright Amendment has a long and colored history. It was
enacted into law in the late 1970's and is named after its
primary House backer, former Speaker Jim Wright. The amendment
generally prohibits interstate and international commercial
flights to and from Love Field, Texas, with certain exceptions.
Specifically, the amendment permits commuter airlines
operating with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less to
operate out of Love Field, and presently allows passenger
interstate air service between Love Field and Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico. In 1997, Alabama, Kansas and
Mississippi were added to this list, and Missouri was
effectively added last year.
According to the Bureau of Transportation statistics,
between April, 2005 and March, 2006, approximately 85 percent
of all passengers at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport boarded American
Airlines flights, while Southwest had a 95 percent market share
at Love Field. On June 15, 2006, the cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth, the Airport Board, Southwest Airlines and American
Airlines reached an agreement that would preserve current
limitations on flights from Love Field under 2015, while
requiring the immediate elimination of 12 gates at Love Field,
thus reducing the number of gates from 32 to 20.
Under the agreement, Southwest would control 16 of the
remaining gates, while American and Continental would get two
each. No international flights to or from Love Field would be
permitted. The agreement would be nullified if Congress fails
to codify it by December 31, 2006. The legislation we consider
today would codify the agreement.
Section 5 of the bill creates an antitrust exemption that
provides that the agreement ``shall be deemed to comply in all
respects with any competition laws.'' In addition to depriving
all private and public litigants from seeking judicial relief
for anti-competitive claims stemming from the agreement,
section 6 of the legislation provides the Department of
Transportation with ``exclusive authority to review actions
taken under this act with respect to any Federal competition
laws not included in such title that might otherwise apply.''
These matters clearly affect the jurisdiction of this
Committee, and at the appropriate time I will be offering an
amendment with Ranking Member Conyers to address the antitrust
immunity created by the legislation.
I yield back the balance of my time and recognize the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This bill, the codification of a private agreement between
private parties, contains language explicitly designed to
shield it from any challenge under antitrust laws. This
agreement preserves the Wright Amendment for 8 more years,
restricts the number of gates at Love Field from 32 to 20, and
creates a shield from any antitrust scrutiny.
Both sides of those interested in the bill have made
arguments about the relative pro-competitive and anti-
competitive aspects of the agreement. Those in favor argue that
through ticketing provisions will greatly benefit consumers by
eliminating the existing requirement that passengers must
purchase two separate tickets to get to Dallas Love Field.
But at the same time, some consumer groups, as well as a
coalition that consists of business groups, minority interest
groups, elected officials and taxpayers, argue that there are
countervailing anti-competitive aspects of the agreement that
outweigh any pro-competitive benefits.
For example, many believe that by eliminating 12 gates at
Love Field, the agreement severely restricts the ability of
competitors to provide service, either now or 8 years from now,
when the Wright Amendment is abolished completely. I am not
here to day whether or not this agreement is pro-competitive or
anti-competitive. It is my jobs to make sure that the Congress
doesn't pass legislation that harms the integrity of antitrust
laws.
Legislation codifying a private agreement between parties
that provides a blanket immunity from any antitrust challenges
is exactly the kind of legislation I am talking about. Vigorous
enforcement of our antitrust laws is a cornerstone of
preserving our free market economy. For over a century, the
antitrust laws have provided the ground rules for fair
competition, our economic bill of rights, if you will.
Antitrust principles are necessary to preserve competition
and to prevent monopolies from stifling innovation. Competition
produces better products and lower prices, all to the benefit
of consumers.
I urge we give careful consideration to H.R. 5830, and I
return any unused time, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members may
include opening statements in the record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Committee on the Judiciary
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I support H.R. 5830,
the Wright Amendment Reform Act. This legislation implements a locally
achieved compromise resolving the longstanding controversy over the
1979 Wright Amendment, which imposed federal restrictions on commercial
airline service to and from Dallas Love Field. An identical bill,
S.3661, is pending in the Senate.
I note Mr. Chairman that all of the key stakeholders--Southwest
Airlines, Fort Worth, DFW Airport, American Airlines, and the City of
Dallas--support the locally achieved Wright Amendment compromise and
urge Congress to approve this legislation. But as Southwest CEO, Herb
Kelleher, states: ``The only victor, the only sure fire winner from
this locally achieved agreement, is the public--the public citizens who
will find it easier and far less expensive to travel to and from North
Texas for business and personal reasons; the citizens who will reap
vast economic benefits in their communities from enhanced travel and
tourism, at a lower cost.''
A key component of the compromise is the change in federal law
embodied in the legislation allowing Southwest Airlines to immediately
begin selling ``through tickets'' for travel to and from Dallas Love
Field. This change will enable Love Field customers to travel on a one-
stop basis to and from cities within our nationwide system which are
outside the limited number of states Southwest currently is allowed to
serve under the terms of the Wright Amendment.
A recent study indicates that through ticketing at Dallas Love
Field will increase passengers traveling to and from North Texas by 2
million annually and produce $259 million per year in fare savings.
Additionally, the study found that through ticketing will generate over
$2 billion annually in spending and related economic activity for North
Texas and for many communities outside the current Wright Amendment
perimeter.
Because of through ticketing, the local compromise will have a very
significant and widespread economic impact from the beginning. Further,
the local compromise calls for the Wright Amendment to be repealed in
its entirety in eight years, allowing airlines serving Love Field to
fly nonstop to any domestic destination--generating substantial
additional economic benefits for consumers nationwide.
Approval of this legislation by the Congress will bring to a close
a dispute that preoccupied the Dallas Metroplex for nearly 30 years all
the while negatively impacting the rest of the nation. I applaud
Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson and other members of the Texas
congressional delegation for their yeoman work in bringing this saga to
a happy conclusion. I also ask unanimous consent that a letter dated
September 11, 2006 from Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas to
me in support of the Wright Amendment be made part of the record.
I ask my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation. I
ask you to vote for H.R. 5830.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
[Additional material submitted by Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there amendments?
The Chair has an amendment, and the clerk will report that
amendment.
The Clerk. ``Amendment to H.R. 5830, offered by Mr.
Sensenbrenner and Mr. Conyers. Page 4, line 17, strike `and any
competition laws' ''----
[The amendment offererd by Mr. Sensenbrenner and Mr.
Conyers follows:]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is
considered as read. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
This amendment, which I offer with the support of Ranking
Member Conyers, strikes the antitrust exemption contained in
section 5 of the legislation. It also amends the legislation to
preserve the authority of the antitrust enforcement agencies to
monitor competitive aspects of the agreement.
When enacting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
Congress sought ``maximum reliance on competitive market forces
to bring efficiency, innovation and low prices'' and to prevent
``unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market
domination, monopoly powers, and other conditions that would
tend to allow at least one air carrier or foreign air carrier
to unreasonably increase prices, reduce services, or exclude
competition in air services.''
With limited exceptions, the Wright Amendment expressly
insulates Dallas-Fort Worth from interstate and international
air passenger competition from Dallas Love Field. The
legislation we consider today codifies an agreement among
private and local government parties that raises serious
competitive concerns. Specifically, the agreement would require
the demolition of existing gates at Love Field that might be
utilized by airlines to offer additional air passenger services
to points across the United States.
The agreement would also prohibit Southwest Airlines, a
low-cost carrier that has brought robust competition to cities
throughout the country, from offering service from DFW until
the year 2025. As a result, the agreement directly limits the
ability of all airlines to offer service from Love Field and
directly impacts consumers throughout the country who fly to,
from or through the Dallas airports.
These restrictions clearly implicate the antitrust laws,
and legislative efforts to defeat the antitrust laws are of
national significance. I urge Members to support this amendment
and to assure that this agreement is not immunized from the
antitrust scrutiny it deserves.
The Chair yields back the balance of his time and
recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in support of this amendment, after a good deal of
reflection and discussion with my colleagues. I believe that by
striking the language creating a shield from any challenges
under antitrust law, or other competition laws, this amendment
preserves the agreement made by the parties, while at the same
time protecting the integrity of the antitrust laws themselves.
This agreement is touted as being good for consumers and
pro-competitive. I believe that. If this is indeed the case,
then shielding it from any challenges under the antitrust laws
is unnecessary. This Committee seldom blesses requests for
antitrust exemptions. I see no reason for that to happen now.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield
back the time.
Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Conyers. Of course.
Ms. Lofgren. I appreciate the gentleman for yielding.
I just want to raise a concern. I know this is probably
surprising to some because I have been historically such an
advocate for antitrust, but I do note that this Committee has
supported much broader exemptions in other arenas, for example
baseball and football. While I am a cosponsor of the bill that
would repeal the Wright Amendment completely, my concern is
this, that if we do not support the agreement that has been
made, we will fail in opening up this market at all.
That is detrimental to consumers. Southwest has I think
unfairly been precluded from this market. Although ordinarily I
would be sympathetic to the amendment, from a practical matter
I fear that if this amendment passes we may in fact see the
situation that currently exists continue, which is a much worse
constraint on consumer rights and on trade.
It is on that basis that I do not support the amendment,
but I do appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in yielding to me.
I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman from Michigan
yield to me?
Mr. Conyers. Yes. I hope you don't shock me like the
gentlelady from California did.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair knows that Mr. Conyers
knows that in 5\1/2\ years I have minimized the number of
surprises to him. This will not be a surprise.
What this amendment does is simply state that the antitrust
aspects will be litigated. Rather than taking to the Committee
the issue of whether there is an antitrust violation, it ought
to be taken to the judge. So I guess what we are saying is that
the antitrust laws are there for a purpose. They are working
and there should not be a legislative determination of what is
or is not anticompetitive. The standard antitrust standards
that have been applied to commercial arrangements for over 100
years should be applied to this one as well.
I thank the gentleman from Michigan for giving me the time.
Mr. Conyers. May I close by pointing out that the baseball
exemption was given by the courts. I have not supported any of
these antitrust exemptions. I think the Consumer Federation of
America letter to us describes the circumstance. I think the
Chairman is correct that this will be litigated and determined
in the courts of this coming to pass.
But I ask unanimous consent to put the Consumer Federation
of America letter in the record.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
[The letter follows:]
Mr. Conyers. I return my time.
Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Bachus, for what purpose do you seek recognition?
Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman, just to clarify.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman, I agree with a lot of what you
say philosophically, but as a practical matter, it is the
Wright Amendment which is anti-consumer and anti-competition.
What we have here is we have an agreement in this legislation
that we are considering is an agreement that a lot of us
encouraged the airlines and the city of Dallas and the local
folks to come up with a consensus.
What their agreement does is, and I think it is in 2015,
does away with the Wright Amendment. That is really what all
our goals ought to be.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
There are certain parts of this agreement that go on until
2025.
Mr. Bachus. Well, I will say this, as a practical matter, I
think what you said is absolutely true. If we adopt this
amendment, we will litigate this thing for the next 10 or 15
years. It will be tied up in court. If we pass this
legislation, the citizens of Dallas and North Texas and people
that are flying in and out of that area, will immediately see
some relief from the Wright Amendment.
Now, my State already is exempted from this agreement, so
we already get a lot of benefit. But I think that benefit ought
to be extended to the others. I think about eight or nine
States are exempted. It ought to be extended to all 50 States.
I understand philosophically where you are coming from, but we
ought to encourage local folks to work things out. The
agreement that Southwest and American Airlines and the city of
Dallas have made, the estimates are it is going to save the
people of that area of Dallas-Fort Worth, it is going to save
them hundreds of millions of dollars in lower tickets and lower
fares.
We all know that when you put in, and what the Chairman
says is absolutely right. This amendment is going to put it in
the courts for the next 10 years and tie it up. It is basically
going to do away with an agreement that I didn't think would
ever be made, that the airlines and the city have gotten
together with the local folks, and done what they think is
best. For us to intervene and sort of pose a legal technicality
and put that in their way, I think is to handicap a good
agreement that the cities made, an agreement that is going to
benefit consumers.
What this amendment does unwittingly is it allows the
Wright Amendment to stay on the books as is, while it is
litigated for the next 10 or 15 years. So I am going to oppose
the amendment.
Mr. Berman. Will the gentleman yield for one sentence?
Mr. Bachus. I think my time is up.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No, it isn't, but if you yield
back, I will recognize the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Bachus. I will yield to Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Just one comment. I would agree with the
gentleman. I didn't think an agreement between these diverse
airlines, the people of these cities that have been warring
over this issue for so long, was possible. But them coming to
an agreement has given me hope for the Middle East.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I missed the profound comment by
the gentleman. I just couldn't hear him.
Mr. Gohmert. All these diverse parties, the two airlines,
American and Southwest, the people of Dallas, the surrounding
communities that have been at war over this issue, the fact
that they could come together with an agreement at all gives me
great hope for the Middle East.
Mr. Bachus. I would yield to the gentleman, but I think the
gentleman, I would like his assessment of if this is put in the
courts, his assessment of how long it will take the courts to
litigate this thing and come to an agreement.
Mr. Berman. Would the gentleman yield on that issue?
Mr. Bachus. Yes.
Mr. Berman. I don't understand. The Wright Amendment
passes. It does not have a shield.
Mr. Bachus. The Wright Amendment is law today.
Mr. Berman. Yes.
Mr. Bachus. The Wright Amendment is anti-consumer. It costs
the traveling public.
Mr. Berman. In some Congresses, only Mr. Lungren and I
are----
Mr. Bachus. And this begins to do away with it.
Mr. Berman. The Wright Amendment passes. It doesn't have a
shield. It has been litigated for years and it is in effect. If
we take the shield out of this bill, and this bill passes, the
bill will go into effect and maybe it will be litigated for
years, but it won't be the Wright Amendment that will be
litigated, it will be this law.
Mr. Bachus. No, we will just change what we are litigating.
Mr. Berman. Well, but I don't understand.
Mr. Bachus. The bottom line will be----
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Michigan and the Chair.
Those in favor will say ``aye.''
Opposed, ``no.''
The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment
is agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
If there are no further amendments, a reporting quorum is
present. The question occurs on the motion to report the bill,
H.R. 5830.
Excuse me. Without objection, the version of the bill
reported by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
and laid down as the base text is adopted as amended.
A reporting quorum is present. The question occurs on the
motion to report the bill, H.R. 5830, favorably as amended.
All in favor will say ``aye.''
Opposed, ``no.''
The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The motion to
report the bill favorably as amended is adopted.
Without objection, the bill will be reported favorably to
the House in the form of a single amendment in the nature of a
substitute, incorporating the amendments adopted here today.
Without objection, the staff is directed to make any
technical and conforming changes. And all Members will be given
2 days, as provided by the House rules, in which to submit
additional, dissenting, supplemental or minority views.
[Intervening business.]
The purpose for this markup having been completed, without
objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:46 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]