[House Report 115-620]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
115th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 115-620
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TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR BUSINESS STANDARDS ACT
_______
April 5, 2018.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hensarling, from the Committee on Financial Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3179]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3179) to require the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, when issuing certain prudential regulations that are
substantively more stringent than a corresponding international
prudential standard to publish the rationale for doing so and a
cost-benefit analysis of the difference, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon
without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
Introduced by Representative Trey Hollingsworth on July 11,
2017, H.R. 3179, the ``Transparency and Accountability for
Business Standards Act'' requires Federal banking agencies (the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)) to publish--
whenever issuing certain prudential regulations which are
substantively more stringent than corresponding international
standards--a rationale and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
of the differences between the prudential regulation and the
corresponding international prudential standard, for public
notice and comment.
The cost-benefit analysis must include the following
metrics:
Any impact on pricing and availability of
credit, in the aggregate and for specific types of
borrowers
Any impact on liquidity in markets, in the
aggregate and for specific instruments
Any impact of the effect of the rules on
affected institutions, and
Any impact on employment, economic growth
and monetary policy execution
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), of which
the United States is a member, agreed to modify internationally
negotiated bank regulatory standards known as the Basel Accords
to increase bank capital and liquidity requirements and other
regulatory measures.
The Basel Accords are international banking regulations
negotiated between participating regulators, but they rely on
local implementation to take effect in a nation's financial
regulatory regime. The Basel Committee cannot force individual
nations to adopt its standards, and agreements made in Basel
are subject to interpretation, implementation, and enforcement
by domestic regulators. Nevertheless, both member and non-
member countries largely follow the bank supervisory guidance
issued by the Basel Committee.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (P.L. 111-203) codified the Basel III capital standards and
the U.S. Federal banking regulators--including the FDIC,
Federal Reserve, and OOCC--promulgated rules to implement the
standards on July 9, 2013.
Since 2008, U.S. banks have raised more than $400 billion
in new capital, and regulators in the United States and
elsewhere, working under the aegis of the Basel Committee and
the G-20's Financial Stability Board, have required those
institutions to maintain higher capital buffers than they did
before the crisis. Regulators have also--for the first time--
adopted liquidity regulations that require financial
institutions to maintain ``high quality liquid assets'' that
they can use to satisfy their funding needs if markets seize up
as they did in 2008 and 2009. In several instances, U.S.
regulators have gone beyond the standards set by the Basel
Committee and imposed more stringent capital and liquidity
requirements on U.S. firms, a practice which has come to be
known as ``gold-plating.''
The practice of ``gold-plating'' U.S. financial regulation
than the agreed-to international standards disadvantages the
U.S. economy and the efficiency of the U.S. credit market for
consumers. Capital and liquidity standards affect everyone in
the economy. Appropriate standards can ensure bank stability,
whereas excessive requirements can impede the growth of the
domestic economy and create competitive disadvantages on the
international financial stage. The U.S. Treasury Department
noted in its June 2017 report issued in response to President
Trump's Executive Order 13772 on Core Principles for Regulating
the United States Financial System, ``In many instances, the
U.S. banking agencies have implemented standards for U.S. G-
SIBs and other large internationally active U.S. banks that are
more conservative than the international standards established
by the Basel Committee or the Financial Stability Board.''
As U.S. regulators promulgate rules to require domestic
institutions to maintain nearly double the amount of capital of
their international counterparts, it puts U.S. institutions at
a competitive disadvantage. It further harms consumers by
leaving less capital available for lending and also reducing
the number and types of products consumers can choose from.
With billions of dollars of equity capital capable of
supporting hundreds of billions of dollars in lending capital
unjustifiably locked away under overly-stringent domestic
capital standards, economic growth and consumer welfare are
stifled. The June 2017 Treasury Report also noted,
``International regulatory standards should only be implemented
through consideration of their alignment with domestic
objectives and should be carefully and appropriately tailored
to meet the needs of the U.S. financial services industry and
the American people.''
The Treasury Report also recommended that, ``U.S. rules
that exceed international standards that should be recalibrated
include (i) the U.S. G-SIB risk-based surcharge, including its
focus on short-term wholesale funding reliance; (ii) the
mandatory minimum debt ratio included in the Federal Reserve's
TLAC and minimum debt rules; and (iii) the eSLR.'' This bill
will ensure that if regulators determine that domestic
standards should be more stringent than the standards foreign
institutions adopt under the aegis of the Basel Committee or
any other international standard-setting body, they should do
so only after careful analysis and a transparent, and public
process that allows for consideration of the benefits to safety
and soundness taken together with the potential harm to the
economy and consumer freedom.
HEARINGS
The Committee on Financial Services held a hearing
examining matters relating to H.R. 3179 on December 7, 2017.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on
December 12 and 13, 2017, and ordered H.R. 3179 to be reported
favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 34 yeas
to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-130), a quorum being present.
COMMITTEE VOTES
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The
sole recorded vote was on a motion by Chairman Hensarling to
report the bill favorably to the House with amendment. The
motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of 34 yeas to 26 nays
(Record vote no. FC-130), a quorum being present.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that H.R. 3179
will require Federal banking agencies (the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to publish--whenever
issuing certain prudential regulations which are substantively
more stringent than corresponding international standards--a
rationale and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the
differences between the prudential regulation and the
corresponding international prudential standard, for public
notice and comment.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its
own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate
provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, March 28, 2018.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3179, the
Transparency and Accountability for Business Standards Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Sarah Puro
and Nathaniel Frentz.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 3179--Transparency and Accountability for Business Standards Act
Summary: H.R. 3179 would require three federal banking
regulators--the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the
Federal Reserve--to conduct and publish cost-benefit analyses
of any new regulations they implement related to capital
requirements, leverage requirements, or liquidity requirements
that are substantively more stringent than corresponding
international standards. The bill also would require those
regulators to complete cost-benefit analyses for any similar
regulations they have implemented since January 2007.
CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would increase
the deficit by $8 million over the 2018-2027 period. That
amount comprises an increase in direct spending of $4 million
and a reduction in revenues of $4 million. Because enacting the
bill would affect direct spending and revenues, pay-as-you-go
procedures apply.
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3179 would not increase
net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $2.5
billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods
beginning in 2028.
H.R. 3179 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). Additional fees
imposed by the FDIC and the OCC would increase the cost of an
existing mandate on private entities required to pay those
assessments. However, CBO estimates that the incremental cost
of the mandate would fall well below the annual threshold
established in UMRA for private-sector mandates ($156 million
in 2017, adjusted for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary effect of H.R. 3179 is shown in the following table.
The costs of the legislation fall within budget function 370
(advancement of commerce).
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By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2018-2022 2018-2027
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INCREASES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 0 1 1 * * * * * * * 2 4
Estimated Outlays................................. 0 1 1 * * * * * * * 2 4
DECREASES IN REVENUES
Estimated Revenues................................ 0 -1 -1 * * * * * * * -2 -4
NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT FROM CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES
Impact on Deficit................................. 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 8
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Components may not sun to totals because of rounding.
* = between -$500,000 and $500,000.
Basis of estimate: Costs incurred by the FDIC and the OCC
are recorded in the budget as increases in direct spending.
Those agencies are authorized to collect premiums and fees from
insured depository institutions to fully cover such
administrative expenses, although CBO expects that a portion of
the costs incurred by the FDIC under H.R. 3179 would be
recouped after 2027. Regulatory costs of the Federal Reserve
System have the effect of reducing remittances to the Treasury,
which are recorded in the budget as revenues.
Under current law, a cost-benefit analysis is prepared
before a federal banking regulator adopts a new regulation.
However, CBO estimates that the bill's standards for such
analyses would require additional work. The bill also would
require regulators to prepare cost-benefit analyses for certain
regulations issued since January 2007.
Using information from the financial regulators, CBO
estimates that between 5 and 10 of the regulations issued since
January 1, 2007, would require cost-benefit analyses under the
bill. In addition, CBO estimates that to implement future
regulations, the regulators would have to complete an
additional cost-benefit analysis each year.
CBO estimates that each affected agency would need the
equivalent of one additional full-time employee to complete the
additional work required under the bill. Depending on the
agency, the associated cost of employment would range from
$200,000 to $250,000 annually. As a result, CBO estimates,
enacting the bill would increase deficits by $8 million over
the 2018-2027 period. That amount includes an increase in net
direct spending of $4 million and a decrease in revenues of $4
million because the increased costs for the Federal Reserve
would reduce remittances to the Treasury.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or
revenues. The net changes in outlays and revenues that are
subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in the
following table.
CBO ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR H.R. 3179, THE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR BUSINESS STANDARDS ACT, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES ON DECEMBER 13, 2017
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By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2018-2022 2018-2027
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NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT
Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Impact............................. 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 8
Memorandum:
Changes in Outlays..................................... 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
Changes in Revenues.................................... 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
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Increase in long-term direct spending and deficits: CBO
estimates that enacting H.R. 3179 would not increase net direct
spending or on-budget deficits by more than $2.5 billion in any
of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
Mandates: H.R. 3179 contains no intergovernmental mandates
as defined in UMRA.
CBO expects that the FDIC and the OCC would increase fees
to offset the costs of implementing the additional regulatory
activities required by the bill. Any increase in fees would
increase the cost of an existing mandate on entities required
to pay those assessments. Using information from the federal
banking regulators, CBO estimates that the incremental cost to
comply with the mandate would fall well below the annual
threshold established in UMRA for private-sector mandates ($156
million in 2017, adjusted for inflation).
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sarah Puro; Revenues:
Nathaniel Frentz; Mandates: Jon Sperl.
Estimate approved by: H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
This information is provided in accordance with section 423
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain
Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has
determined that the bill does not impose a Federal
intergovernmental mandate on State, local, or tribal
governments.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of the section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
EARMARK IDENTIFICATION
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the
rule.
DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program; (2) a program included in any report
from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant
to section 21 of Public Law 111-139; or (3) a program related
to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance, published pursuant to the Federal Program
Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95-220, as amended by Pub. L. No.
98-169).
DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING
Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress),
the following statement is made concerning directed
rulemakings: The Committee estimates that the bill requires no
directed rulemakings within the meaning of such section.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section cites H.R. 3179 as the ``Transparency and
Accountability for Business Standards Act.''
Section 2. Cost-benefit analysis requirement for certain prudential
regulations
This section requires that appropriate Federal banking
agencies, when issuing prudential regulations that are
substantively more stringent than corresponding international
standards, must publish, for public notice and comment, a
rationale and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the
differences between the prudential regulation and the
corresponding international prudential standard. The cost-
benefit analysis must include the following metrics:
Any impact on pricing and availability of
credit, in the aggregate and for specific types of
borrowers;
Any impact on liquidity in markets, in the
aggregate and for specific instruments;
Any impact on affected institutions; and
Any impact on employment, economic growth
and monetary policy execution.
This section also require that in order for a Federal
banking agency to supersede an extant prudential regulation by
adopting an international standard, it must first publish, for
public notice and comment, a proposal to repeal or amend the
superseded regulation or a description (including a cost-
benefit analysis) of why it does not intend to repeal or amend
the superseded regulation.
Finally, the section includes a lookback provision
requiring Federal banking agencies to report to Congress within
180 days on any final rule since January 1, 2007, that would
fall into one of the above categories.
This section also defines the various terms utilized within
the Act.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
H.R. 3179 does not repeal or amend any section of a
statute. Therefore, the Office of Legislative Counsel did not
prepare the report contemplated by clause 3(e)(1)(B) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
MINORITY VIEWS
H.R. 3179 would impose a new, onerous administrative burden
on federal banking agencies--specifically the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)--before they could adopt
a prudential regulation, such as requirements regarding how
much capital a bank must maintain, that is more stringent than
a corresponding international prudential standard. Under the
bill, the agencies would first be required to publish for
notice and comment their rationale, among other things, when
issuing a stricter rule than under the international standard
and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the difference between
the proposed regulation and the international standard.
Oddly, H.R. 3179 does not require a similar analysis if
U.S. regulators propose a weaker standard than a corresponding
international prudential standard. In addition, the cost-
benefit analysis under H.R. 3179 would require regulators to
consider the impact on availability of credit and economic
growth, but it would not include other important
considerations, such as the impact on the safety and soundness
of the U.S. banking system and financial stability. Thus, we
are deeply concerned H.R. 3179 could have the net effect of
discouraging regulators from pursuing stronger rules that could
help prevent another financial crisis.
Federal banking agencies participate in the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) at the Bank for
International Settlement.\1\ The purpose of the Basel framework
generally, and the Basel III framework specifically, is to
improve resilience for the banking system during episodes of
financial distress.\2\ Typically, after the Basel Committee
agrees to these prudential standards, U.S. federal banking
agencies implement these standards through the extensive
administrative process of modifying existing rules or issuing
new proposed rules, considering public comments, conducting
extensive analysis and ultimately issuing final rules that
tailor the Basel standards to the U.S. banking system.\3\
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\1\https://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm.
\2\https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
\3\See CRS Report, ``Overview of the Prudential Regulatory
Framework for U.S. Banks: Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act,'' (July 27,
2016), http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44573.
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Despite record profits earned by the banking sector in
recent years,\4\ and business lending up more than 75 percent
since Dodd-Frank was signed into law,\5\ the Trump
Administration and Wall Street banks have argued that U.S.
regulators have gone too far in so-called ``gold-plating''
international standards, which is a term commonly used to
describe the application of stricter standards to U.S. banks
than what is specified in Basel III or other agreements. Many
of the positions articulated in a 2017 Treasury report\6\ to
roll back these prudential safeguards have also been echoed by
the megabank executives. Jamie Dimon, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Office for JPMorgan Chase & Co., for instance, wrote
in his 2016 annual letter to shareholders that: ``America
should eliminate its `gold plating' of international standards.
American regulators took the new Basel standards across a wide
variety of calculations and asked for more.''\7\ This
perspective ignores the benefits from more stringent rules to
promote financial stability, and also ignores how large banks
may use excess cash to buy back shares, pay dividends or pay
out bonuses to executives instead of providing more access to
credit for consumers.\8\
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\4\https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-banking-industry-annual-profit-
hit-record-in-2016-1488295836.
\5\http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/13/investing/bank-business-lending-
dodd-frank-trump/ index.html.
\6\United States Department of the Treasury, ``A Financial System
That Creates Economic Opportunities--Banks and Credit Unions,'' (June
2017), available at: https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-
releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System,pdf.
\7\https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/
document/ar2016-ceoletter shareholders.pdf.
\8\https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/hoenigletter07-31-
2017.pdf.
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While proponents of H.R. 3179 argue the U.S. should not
``gold plate'' international standards, such an effort can lead
to other jurisdictions to follow America's lead in setting
higher, not lower, prudential standards. According to John
Heltman of American Banker, ``It's beginning to look like the
rest of the world may follow the U.S.' lead when it comes to
tougher capital standards. . . . Wall Street critics say it
illustrates their long-standing claims that `gold-plating'--
that is, setting regulatory standards that exceed international
standards--can help influence other countries to agree to
stronger standards.''\9\
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\9\https://www.americanbanker.com/news/basel-move-makes-the-case-
for-gold-plating-capital-standards.
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Furthermore, while there are a wide range of views on the
appropriate stringency of bank capital requirements,\10\ the
United States has been generally recognized as being far more
successful compared to other jurisdictions, such as Europe, in
re-capitalizing and strengthening the resiliency of the banking
sector through robust stress testing and other enhanced
prudential requirements following the financial crisis.\11\ In
fact, U.S. banks have added more than $750 billion in capital
to absorb potential losses and are much less reliant on the
kinds of short-term funding that disappeared in the 2007-2009
financial crisis.\12\
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\10\For example, see: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/
files/2017034pap.pdf; https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/
books/bankers-new-clothes-whats-wrong-banking-what-do-about-it; https:/
/www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/special-studies/endingtbtf;
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmar1317.html; and https://
www.aei.org/publication/ regulation-of-bank-capital-and-liquidity/.
\11\For example, see https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/
21721502-most-european-banks-were-slow-mark-after-crisis-american-
banks-have-recovered; https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/
21721497-international-bank-regulation-grinding-towards-completionor-
possibly-halt-basel-3; and https://www.cnbc.com/id/37237500.
\12\https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2017/01/09/review-
why-president-obama- reformed-wall-street-and-what-reform-has-
accomplished.
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According to Dr. Marcus Stanley in testimony before the
Committee, ``Subordinating U.S. bank regulations to what is
attainable in a Basel consensus would be an extremely dangerous
move.''\13\ Experts have also pointed out the shortcomings with
the current cost-benefit analysis conducted by federal banking
regulators, more generally, noting that compliance burdens are
easier to calculate compared to the more hypothetical and large
benefits to the broader public of preventing a catastrophically
costly, unrealized financial crisis. The financial industry has
repeatedly used these analyses to challenge various rulemakings
in court.\14\
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\13\https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-
ba15-wstate-mstanley-20171207. pdf.
\14\For example, see https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/cost-
benefit-analysis-of-financial-regulation and http://
ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/DENNIS-KELLEHER-
PPT.pdf.
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Because the mandatory review process under the bill is only
triggered when federal banking regulators seek to adopt
stronger prudential regulations, it would create an
administrative disincentive for regulators to pursue more
robust rules that could prevent another financial crisis. At a
minimum, the additional administrative requirements in the bill
would also increase the time-period for certain prudential
rulemakings, which could create safety and soundness risks in
tying the hands of regulators during times of financial stress
or dire economic conditions.
For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 3179.
Maxine Waters.
Nydia M. Velazquez.
Carolyn B. Maloney.
Joyce Beatty.
Keith Ellison.
[all]