[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 211 (Wednesday, November 2, 1994)]
[Notices]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-27127]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: November 2, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Proposed Generic Letter Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant
Security Requirements for an Internal Threat
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of opportunity of public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue
a generic letter to notify all holders of operating licenses or
construction permits for nuclear power reactors that NRC is
reconsidering its positions about certain security measures to protect
against an internal threat at nuclear power plants. NRC expects
recipients to review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions
contained in this draft generic letter are not NRC requirements;
therefore, recipients are not required to take specific action or make
a written response to the NRC. NRC is seeking comment from interested
parties regarding both the technical and regulatory aspects of the
proposed generic letter presented herein.
NRC will consider comments received from interested parties in the
final evaluation of the proposed generic letter and will review the
technical position and, when appropriate, analyze the value/impact on
licensees. If NRC issues this generic letter, it will become available
for public inspection in the Public Document Rooms.
The comment period expires December 2, 1994. Comments submitted
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but
assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and
Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal
workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the
NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington,
DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert F. Skelton, (301) 504-3208.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
NRC Generic Letter XXXX: Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant
Requirements Associated With an Internal Threat.
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for
nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this
generic letter to notify you that it is reconsidering its positions
concerning certain security measures to protect against an internal
threat at nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in
this generic letter are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Background
The fitness-for-duty rule (10 CFR Part 26) published on June 7,
1989, required power reactor licensees to implement fitness-for-duty
programs. The access authorization rule (10 CFR 73.56) published on
April 25, 1991, required power reactor licensees to implement access
authorization programs. One objective of these regulations was to
ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of persons granted
unescorted access to protected areas at power reactor facilities. In
light of these regulations, the NRC evaluated security requirements for
protection against the insider threat at nuclear power plants to verify
that they remain appropriate. The staff discussed the initial results
of this review in SECY 92-272, ``Re-examination of Nuclear Power Plant
Security Requirements Associated With the Internal Threat,'' of August
4, 1992. The staff then recommended reducing or eliminating certain
security requirements that gave marginal protection against the insider
threat.
The Commission reviewed SECY 92-292 and asked the staff to re-visit
the subject and explore alternatives for allowing reductions in
unnecessary or marginally effective security measures. The staff
discussed the results of this re-evaluation in SECY 93-326,
``Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements
Associated with an Internal Threat,'' December 2, 1993.
Description of Circumstances
In a staff requirements memorandum of February 18, 1994, the
Commission endorsed staff recommendations to (1) issue generic
correspondence informing licensees of the opportunity to revise certain
commitments in their security plan and (2) proceed with rulemaking
regarding specific changes to reduce or eliminate certain security
requirements. This generic letter discusses those areas in which
licensees may choose to revise their plans.
Discussion
NRC may accept changes to a licensee security plan in the following
four areas:
(I) Vital Area Access Control Measures
NRC may accept the changes to vital area (VA) access control
measures in security plans discussed below upon confirmation that (1)
certain other site-specific measures are in place or will be
implemented to demonstrate (e.g., through contingency drills) a
capability, including a protective strategy, to protect against an
external adversary after making any of the changes and (2) measures are
in place to examine hand-carried packages for explosives using
equipment specifically designed for that purpose.
A. Compensatory Measures
1. Eliminate compensatory measures for failure of vital area
mechanical lock hardware if the access control hardware and alarms are
operable.
2. Extend the timeliness requirements for implementing compensatory
measures for any malfunctioning element of the vital area access
control system from 10 minutes to a period similar to that which
technical specifications permit for safety equipment to be out of
service while the plant is in Mode 1 until required to be in Mode 3.
The licensee could extend the time to implement compensatory
measures only if either the VA door lock or alarms are operable. The
most restrictive limiting condition for the timeliness of the
compensatory measure(s) would be the most restrictive safety equipment
in the vital areas accessed by the VA door needing compensatory
measures.
B. Maintenance of Discrete Vital Area Access Lists
Eliminate separate access authorization lists for each vital area
of the facility. As an alternative, maintain a single list of persons
who have access to any vital area. This list would have to be revised
as status of persons changes in order to maintain its accuracy,
especially for removing vital area access authorization from
individuals.
C. Alarm Response
Modify the response to vital area access control alarms (doors).
Response would only be needed to vital area access control alarms that
coincide with an unresolved alarm at the protected area perimeter, a
known intrusion, or a constant alarm, such as that caused by an open
door.
D. Locked Condition of Door
Although locking mechanisms and access control systems, including
door alarms, would be retained, doors to vital areas could be left
unlocked. A licensee choosing this option would be expected to have the
capability to remotely lock the door(s) from both alarm stations, as
necessary, in response to an external threat. Licensees choosing this
option would be expected to demonstrate, as part of the demonstration
of their capability to protect against an external adversary, the
ability to remotely lock doors in time to delay the adversary where
delay was essential in the protective strategy. Access control systems
retained on vital area doors would continue to maintain a record of
personnel access and generate alarms if the door was open without a
proper access.
The process for licensees to revise their security plans to
implement the changes to security measures in vital areas will depend
on the content of their present security plans. Since these changes
would reduce slightly the effectiveness of the security program, most
changes would need to be processed in accordance with the provisions of
10 CFR 50.90. Some of the changes may be processed by an exemption
request or in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). If appropriate, changes
in security plans should include commitments to the measures described
in paragraph (I) above. To ensure unrestricted emergency access, the
NRC staff notes the advantages of (1) having the ability to remotely
unlock doors to vital areas from each alarm station, (2) ensuring that
malfunctions result in doors failing unlocked rather than locked, and
(3) allowing all operators and auxiliary operators to carry metal keys
that can override keycard-operated lock mechanisms.
(II) Access Search of On-duty Armed Security Guards
NRC may accept changes to allow armed security officers who (1) are
on duty and carry a weapon in accordance with assigned duties, (2) have
already been searched during their current shift, and (3) have left the
protected area on official business, to reenter the protected area
without being subject to the metal detector searches (but still be
subjected to explosive searches). If search equipment is a single unit
containing both metal and explosive detection equipment, alarms from
the metal detector may be disregarded. This change could be made to
security plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
(III) Containment Access Control Measures
NRC may accept changes to allow persons other than security
personnel, provided they are appropriately trained in access control
procedures in accordance with the security plan, to control access for
personnel and materials entering the containment any time frequent
access is permitted to the containment. This change could be made to
security plans in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
(IV) Alternative Measures for Control of Security Badges
NRC may accept changes to allow for alternative approaches for
accountability of picture badges used for unescorted access so that
certain types of badges may be taken outside the protected area.
Alternative approaches need to include the ability to ensure positive
identification of individuals upon entry to the protected area and to
ensure the badge is disabled of its access function when taken out of
the protected area. For employees, such changes can be made under 10
CFR 50.54(p) because the regulations currently allow licensee employees
to take badges off site. Changes to security plans to allow contractors
to take security picture badges off site would require a request for
exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5). Coincident with
receiving approval of the exemption request, the licensee would be able
to implement the change in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
This generic letter requires no specific action or written
response.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of October, 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulations.
[FR Doc. 94-27127 Filed 11-1-94; 8:45 am]
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