

The ability of the various types and sizes of tugs to perform escort and emergency towing was determined based on existing performance data, computer simulations and available operating experience.

A matrix of simulation cases was developed, representing a full range of combinations of tug types, deployments and associated time delays, geographic locations and tanker sizes and speeds. In addition to the matrix of worst-case scenarios, over 1,000 additional cases, involving parametric reductions in the severity of the defined variables, were performed.

The study's results of the worst-case and parametric studies are summarized below.

- For the worst-case scenario, the larger tractor tug (with additional assist from an untethered ERV tug), or the largest conventional tug tethered as a rudder tug (with additional assist from another conventional tug and an ERV tug both tethered alongside), is capable of controlling all three modeled tankers in the Valdez Narrows if the tanker speed at failure is less than or equal 4 knots.
- All of the current escort tugs have adequate power to tow a disabled tanker in the worst-case climatology of Valdez Arm. However, the simulations show the need for increasing the sea room between the outbound track and Buoy 9 near Pt. Freemantle.
- Both the SEA VOYAGER and the ERV class tugs are capable of towing any of the three sizes of tankers to windward in the modeled worst-case (45-knot wind) conditions for central Prince William Sound. However, there is inadequate sea room from the TSS lane to Naked Island for the tug to rig its towline and begin towing. In lesser wind speed conditions, however, there would be adequate sea room for these tugs to begin towing before any of the three sizes of tankers reached Naked Island. A SEA SWIFT class tug requires additional assistance from an ERV tug to tow any

of the three sizes of tankers to windward.

- There is insufficient sea room to accommodate arrival time delays of existing tugs on standby at the Pilot Station, Naked Island or Port Etches based on the worst-case parameters set for this study. This result supports the current escort policy in Prince William Sound.
- The simulations for Hinchinbrook Entrance in the worst-case climatology show the need for increasing the sea room between the outbound track and Montague Island. For all cases with a right rudder failure occurring in the center of the southbound separation lane, the tanker will enter the red zone around Schooner Rock before an escorting tug can provide effective assistance.
- However, the parametric study for Hinchinbrook Entrance identifies some successful combinations under reduced wind conditions that result in towing control before the disabled vessel enters the red zone.
- None of the tugs investigated in this study can tow the modeled 170,000 and 265,000 DWT vessels to windward in the worst-case climatology identified for the Gulf of Alaska. However, both the simulated SEA VOYAGER class tug and the salvage tug at least have the capability to control its downwind drift direction.
- The simulations indicate that the salvage tug can tow the disabled 90,000 DWT vessel to windward in the Gulf of Alaska given the assumed worst-case conditions.
- The parametric study of reduced wind conditions for the Gulf of Alaska show that all three sizes of tankers can be towed to windward by the SEA VOYAGER class tug in 30 knots of wind or less or by the salvage tug in 50 knots of wind or less.

Dated: January 24, 1995.

**Joseph J. Angelo,**

*Acting Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection.*

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**Research and Special Programs Administration**

[Notice No 95-1]

**Supplemental Emergency Preparedness Grant Program; Correction**

**AGENCY:** Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Correction.

**SUMMARY:** In notice document 95-1720 beginning on page 4657 in the issue of Tuesday, January 24, 1995, make the following corrections:

On page 4657 in the second column, the date comments must be submitted on or before was shown as February 6, 1995. This should be changed to read March 1, 1995.

On page 4657 in the third column the telephone for further information was listed as (202) 366-6601. This should be changed to read (202) 366-0001.

On page 4658 in the second column under Grant and Selection Criteria the fifth paragraph, (4), reads, "A statement of work for the upcoming budget period that describes and sets priorities for the activities and tasks to be conducted, the costs associated with each activity, the number and types of deliverables and products to be completed, and a schedule for implementation." It should read, "A statement of work for the grant program's first budget period (September 15, 1995 to September 15, 1996) that describes and sets priorities for the activities and tasks to be conducted, the costs associated with each activity, the number and types of deliverables and products to be completed, and a schedule for implementation."

Issued in Washington, DC on January 27, 1995.

**Alan I. Roberts,**

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