RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:

See ''Notification'' above.

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:

See ''Notification'' above.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:

Science and Technology Centers.

SYSTEM EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT:

None.

[FR Doc. 95–12632 Filed 5–23–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–443]

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from Facility Operating License No. NPF–86, issued to North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (the licensee or North Atlantic), for operation of the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook) located in Rockingham County, New Hampshire.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

This Environmental Assessment has been prepared to address potential environmental issues related to North Atlantic's application of February 17, 1995. The proposed action would exempt North Atlantic from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Paragraph III.D.1.(a), to the extent that a one-time interval extension would be granted for Type A testing. The interval between the first and second Type A tests in the first 10-year containment inservice inspection period would be extended by approximately 22 months from the November 1995 refueling outage to the September 1997 refueling outage.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action would permit North Atlantic to defer the Type A test from the November 1995 refueling outage, thereby saving the cost of performing the test and eliminating the test period from the critical path time of the outage. North Atlantic has stated that the exemption request meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2)(ii). The historical Type A tests have demonstrated that Seabrook has a low leakage containment. All three Type A tests have been performed without a single failure with as-found leak rates being significantly lower than the acceptance and design limits. The Type B and C testing programs, i.e., the local leak rate tests, are not being modified and will continue effectively to detect containment leakage caused by the degradation of active containment isolation components as well as containment penetrations. It has been the experience at Seabrook that any significant containment leakage paths are detected by the Type B and C tests and that the Type A test results have only been confirmatory of the results of the Type B and C test results.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that the proposed one-time exemption would not increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously analyzed and the proposed one-time exemption would not affect facility radiation levels or facility radiological effluents. North Atlantic has analyzed the results of previous Type A tests performed at Seabrook to show good containment performance and they will conduct the Type B and C local leak rate tests which historically have been shown to be the principal means of detecting containment leakage paths with the Type A tests confirming the Type B and C test results. It is also noted that North Atlantic will perform the visual containment inspection although it is only required by Appendix J to be conducted in conjunction with Type A tests. The NRC staff considers that these inspections, though limited in scope, provide an important added level of confidence in the continued integrity of the containment boundary. The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action involves features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on April 11, 1995 the NRC staff consulted with the New Hampshire state official, Mr. George Iverson of the New Hampshire Emergency Management Agency regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. On April 12, 1995 the NRC staff consulted with the Massachusetts state official, Mr. James Muckerheid of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The state officials had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see North Atlantic's letter dated February 17, 1995, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Exeter Public Library, Fonders Park, Exeter, NH 03833.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of May 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Phillip F. McKee,

Director, Project Directorate I–3 Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–12665 Filed 5–23–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446]

Texas Utilities Electric Company; (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

Texas Utilities Electric Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–87 and NPF–89 for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit Nos 1 and 2 (CPSES) respectively. The operating licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facilities consists of two pressurized water reactors at the licensee's site in Somervell County, Texas.

II

It is stated in 10 CFR 73.55, ''Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage,'' paragraph (a), that ''The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''

It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d), ''Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), that ''the licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.'' It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that ''A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort * * *'' It also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual ''receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''

The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges with them when departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated January 16, 1995 (TXX–95012), as supplemented by letters dated March 1 (TXX–95064), and April 3, 1995 (TXX–95089), the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ''Specific exemptions,'' the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to provide measures for protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the measures have ''the same high assurance objective'' and meet ''the general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ''the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the regulation.

At the CPSES site, unescorted access into protected areas is controlled through the use of a photograph on a combination badge and keycard. (Hereafter, these are referred to as badges.) The security officers at the entrance station use the photograph on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for both licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted access are issued upon entrance at the entrance/exit location and are returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are retrievable at the entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractor individuals are not allowed to take badges offsite. In accordance with the plant's physical security plan, neither licensee employees nor contractors are allowed to take badges offsite.

Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for unescorted access into protected areas would have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their badge number in the access control system. When an individual enters the badge into the card reader and places their hand on the measuring surface, the system would record the individual's hand image. The unique characteristics of the extracted hand image would be compared with the previously stored template in the access control system to verify authorization for entry. Individuals, including licensee employees and contractors, would be allowed to keep their badges with them when they depart the site and thus eliminate the process to issue, retrieve and store badges at the entrance stations to the plant. Badges do not carry any information other than a unique identification number.

All other access processes, including search function capability, would remain the same. This system would not be used for persons requiring escorted access, i.e., visitors.

Based on a Sandia report entitled, ''A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification Devices'' (SAND91–0276 UC–906 Unlimited Release, printed June 1991), and on the licensee's experience with the current photo-identification system, the licensee stated that the false acceptance rate for the hand geometry system is comparable to that of the current system. The biometric system has been in use for a number of years at several sensitive Department of Energy facilities. The licensee will implement a process for testing the proposed system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that specified in the regulation. The Physical Security Plan for CPSES will be revised to include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system and to allow licensee employees and contractors to take their badges offsite.

The licensee will control all points of personnel access into a protected area under the observation of security personnel through the use of a badge and verification of hand geometry. A numbered picture badge identification system will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized unescorted access to protected areas. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area.

Since both the badges and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected areas, the proposed system would provide for a positive verification process and the potential loss of a badge by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed