[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 152 (Tuesday, August 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40390-40400]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-19510]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-160]
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) Georgia Tech
Research Reactor; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a
Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor in response to a Petition received from Ms.
Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (Petitioner), dated October 23, 1994. The
Partial Director's Decision also considered subsequent letters from the
Petitioner dated November 12, and December 4, 1994, February 21,
February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, and July 18,
1995.
On October 23, 1994, the Petitioner requested (1) the shutdown and
decontamination of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech)
Research Reactor, (2) the revocation of liquid radioactive material
release authority to all licensees, (3) the revocation of licenses that
use the principle of as low as reasonably achievable, (4) the
termination of transportation of radioactive material by mail, and (5)
the modification to posting requirements for radioactive material. With
regard to request (1), the enclosed Partial Director's Decision
addressed the Petitioner's issues which are not currently being
considered as part of a license renewal proceeding. The remaining
Petitioner's issues relating to request (1) will be addressed under
separate cover upon completion of the ongoing adjudicatory proceedings
and NRC staff review. The Partial Director's Decision also addresses
requests (2) through (5). The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation found that the Petitioner's concerns, addressed to date, do
not raise a substantial health and safety concern warranting the
requested actions. The reasons for this denial are explained in the
``Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-15), the
complete text of which follows this notice, and which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c). As provided in that regulation, the Decision will constitute
the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the
issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes a review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Appendix
Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On October 23, 1994, Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (the Petitioner)
filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, that requested that the NRC staff
revoke the license of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia
Tech) Research Reactor, shut down this research reactor and its support
facilities, and remove all radioactive material and contamination
offsite to a government created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as
the Savannah River or Oak Ridge facilities. In addition, the Petitioner
requested that the NRC staff withdraw all license authority nationwide
involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive
material to all the sewers or waters in the United States or oceans of
the world, and withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities,
including nuclear power plants (NPPs), which operate under as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles. Finally, the Petitioner
requested both that the NRC staff modify every license issued to
transporters of radioactive materials and builders of NPPs so that
these parties must put two foot high letters on everything transported
or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in smaller letters ``there
is no safe level of radiation, any exposure can [a]ffect health,'' and
prohibit the transportation of radioactive material by mail. The NRC
staff received additional letters dated November 12, December 4, 1994,
February 21, February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27,
and July 18, 1995, from the Petitioner and also considered these
letters in this Partial Director's Decision. All letters related to
this Petition have been placed in the Public Document Room and docketed
under the Georgia Tech Research Reactor Docket No. 50-160, in
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10
CFR 2.206 Petitions.''
As bases for the request to shut down and decontaminate the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor, the Petitioner asserted that (1) a water flume
comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the reactor and the ground in
some way;'' (2) ``(r)adiation levels in soil and vegetation climb
markedly in GA EPD documents'' around the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor; (3) there is no record of air monitoring ever having been
done; (4) heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and
drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus,
as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and
welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off; (5) radioactive
contaminants have been routinely discharged into the sanitary sewer
from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water holding tank and
contamination spread by backup of the sewage system; (6) should the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further destabilized, the reactor and
the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break apart,'' causing radioactive
contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/down sewers/into the runoff
ditch;'' (7) the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake
[[Page 40391]]
zone; (8) there is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor operating; (9) security at the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor is extremely lax; and (10) in case of an accident or terrorist
attack, evacuation of the campus and downtown Atlanta would be
impossible both now and during the Olympics.1
\1\ Issue (8) includes concerns that substantial management
deficiencies persist. Issue (9) involves concerns on general
security and, particularly, security during the period of the 1996
Olympics. Issue (10) includes concerns on evacuation in case of a
terrorist attack. Since these concerns are the subject of an ongoing
license renewal proceeding before an Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, these concerns will be addressed in a Final Director's
Decision at an appropriate time after considering the decisions
reached in the license renewal process. All other issues related to
this 2.206 Petition were considered in this Partial Director's
Decision.
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As the bases for the request to withdraw all license authority
nationwide involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of
radioactive material to all the sewers or waters in the United States,
to withdraw all licenses for all nuclear facilities, including NPPs,
which operate under ALARA principles, and to change labeling
requirements for radioactive material, the Petitioner asserted that
there is no safe level of radiation, that storage and disposal of
radioactive waste is inadequate, and that the NRC's new sewage dumping
guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner also asserted that
the request to restrict mailing of radioactive materials relates to the
occurrence of transportation accidents.
II. Discussion
A. Revocation of Georgia Tech Research Reactor License
The following discussion relates to the request that the NRC staff
revoke the license of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, shut down this
research reactor and its support facilities, and remove all radioactive
materials and contamination offsite. This Partial Director's Decision
addresses NRC licensed activities.2
\2\ The 10 CFR 2.206 Petition included some mention of the
cobalt-60 irradiation facility which is not licensed by the NRC and
is, therefore, not covered in this discussion except as it may
affect research reactor safety. The 2.206 Petition and this Partial
Director's Decision have been transmitted to the State of Georgia,
the licensing authority for the cobalt-60 facility and for other
state licensed material also mentioned in the Petition.
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(1) A water flume comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the
reactor and the ground in some way.'' The Petitioner stated that
``(d)etailed maps show that a water flume comes out of the ground
directly next to and west of the reactor.'' On request, the Petitioner
identified the ``detailed maps'' as City of Atlanta, Department of
Public Works (DPW) Sheets I-11 and H-11, which show ``flumes'' or
``storm drain inventory.''
The NRC staff reviewed these drawings. Drawing I-11 did not show a
flume indication. Drawing H-11 does indicate a ``flume'' to the west of
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff discussed this drawing
and indication of a ``flume'' with DPW, the agency responsible for the
sewer system and the drawings. The DPW indicated that the word
``flume'' in the drawing means a surface drainage path. Physical onsite
examination of this location showed a surface drainage path consisting
of a concrete lined channel extending along the back retaining wall of
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility site, approximately where
the ``flume'' was indicated on the drawing.
Furthermore, physical examination of the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor facility and site have found no evidence of an underground
water flume or destabilization of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
facility or ground. Additional factors related to stability of the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor are addressed under issues (4), (6), and
(7).
The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that there is an
underground water flume destabilizing the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
and surrounding ground. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude
otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's
concerns do not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting
the action requested by the Petitioner.
(2) ``Radiation levels in soil and vegetation climb markedly in GA
EPD documents'' around the reactor. The State of Georgia (GA)
Environmental Protection Division (EPD) provided the NRC staff with its
environmental radiation monitoring results as compiled on November 23,
1994. These results included data from environmental monitoring for
radioactivity with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), and from soil
and vegetation sampling around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
The NRC staff discussed the results with EPD. EPD stated that its
monitoring found no evidence of release of radioactive material from
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. EPD further indicated that the
values and variations in monitored radiation exposures and
concentrations were typical of environmental monitoring results and
showed no increasing trend.
The NRC staff has concluded based on the types, quantities and
relative concentrations of the isotopes measured by EPD that they are
not from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Some of the isotopes
measured by EPD are naturally occurring. Specifically, beryllium-7 is
from reactions of cosmic rays with air, potassium-40 is from primordial
sources, radium-226 is from the decay of naturally occurring uranium-
238, and radium-228 is from decay of naturally occurring thorium-
232.3 Additionally, radiation monitoring of effluents from the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor and of areas within the research reactor
containment by Georgia Tech, as required by the Technical
Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b, provided further evidence that the
measurements by EPD of other isotopes (i.e., cesium-137, cerium-141,
cerium-144, ruthenium-103, zirconium-95, and niobium-95) were not from
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Rather, EPD indicated that the
radioisotopes were from other sources, such as fallout from nuclear
weapons testing around the world. Furthermore, as measured by EPD,
there is no indication of other radioisotopes, which would be expected
if the radioactivity were from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
\3\ Kathren, R. L., ``Radioactivity in the Environment: Sources,
Distribution, and Surveillance.''
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The conclusion, that there is no evidence that the release of
radioactive material from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has
contributed to the monitored radiation levels in the soil and
vegetation, is also corroborated by the Georgia Tech environmental
monitoring program. This environmental monitoring program has used film
badges, and currently uses TLDs, at various locations around the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The film badges were provided by a
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certified vendor.
The TLDs meet American National Standards Institute Standards. One
monitored location in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor stack measured
the direct radiation for airborne releases from operation of the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This monitor has indicated airborne
effluent releases generally below detectable levels and always well
below the limits of 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against
Radiation,'' as verified most recently in NRC staff Inspection Report
Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 4. These results
are consistent with the EPD data and further confirmed the conclusions
of the State of Georgia EPD that its monitoring
[[Page 40392]]
found no evidence of release of radioactive material from the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor which has contributed to the monitored radiation
levels in soil and vegetation.
\4\ These, and the other inspection reports referenced in this
Partial Director's Decision are available from the NRC's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20037.
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The NRC staff evaluation of the data confirmed the EPD conclusion
that the EPD data showed no increasing trend in radiation levels around
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The values and variations of all
monitored locations around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor were
typical of environmental monitoring results at other locations, were
attributable to non-reactor sources, and showed no record of an
increasing trend. Further corroboration of this conclusion was provided
in the discussion addressing issues (3) and (5) in this Partial
Director's Decision in that releases of radioactive isotopes from the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor are well within NRC regulatory limits and
do not correspond to the radioisotopes found in the soil or vegetation
samples.
The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor is contributing to radiation levels in soil or
vegetation. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's concern does
not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting the action
requested by the Petitioner.
(3) There is no record of air monitoring ever having been done. The
Petitioner asserted that monitoring for airborne radioactive releases
from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is inadequate. However, in
addition to the environmental monitoring programs previously discussed,
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is required by its Technical
Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b to monitor and restrict radioactive
releases, including airborne releases. The monitoring system includes
instruments to monitor gaseous and particulate radioactivity and to
initiate safety related functions (e.g., containment isolation). All
radioactive releases are required to be within the limits established
in 10 CFR Part 20. NRC staff inspections, as documented most recently
in Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02
related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, have found that the
effluent releases have been within 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Therefore,
there is neither a technical need nor a regulatory requirement for
additional monitoring of air samples outside the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor, since all releases are controlled, as required by Technical
Specifications and in accordance with NRC regulations.
The Petitioner also raised a concern related to the storage of
waste at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The concern is that there
is a large amount of waste material stored at the facility and this
storage is generally unsafe. Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-
160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 have verified that storage of radioactive
waste has been maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory
requirements (10 CFR part 20) at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
The Petitioner also raised concerns about various health effects
around the Atlanta area and in other localities (e.g., around the Three
Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), but did
not provide correlation to conditions related to the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. Therefore, the Petitioner did not provide bases for
further action based on these concerns. Further, the data and
information from EPD, the licensee, the Oak Ridge Institute for Science
and Education (ORISE) and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL), as evaluated by the NRC staff in this issue and on issues (2)
and (5), indicate little potential for the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor to have contributed to such health effects.
The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor radiation monitoring program is unacceptable. The
Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise or bases to conclude
that additional monitoring should be required. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial
health or safety issue warranting the action requested by the
Petitioner.
(4) Heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and
drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus,
as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and
welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off. The Petitioner indicated
that a major sinkhole of the Orme Street line (a major sewer line in
the area) caused a backup and flooding in 1993 on the Georgia Tech
Campus at the North parking lot at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
facility site. This flooding had no effect on the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor, since the research reactor structures, systems and components
are isolated from the sewer by a series of valves. Further, the
containment steel-reinforced concrete floor is approximately 8 feet
thick.5 This structure supports containment internals and provides
weight to protect against the buoyancy of ground water. The structure
is designed to withstand the effects of buoyancy due to ground water
which has been found on test borings at levels ranging from 11 to 40
feet.6 Further, DPW stated that the work that is being done on the
Orme Street line and related construction activities minimize the
potential for such future flooding or other problems associated to that
line.
\5\ ``Safety Analysis Report for the 5 MW Georgia Tech Research
Reactor,'' Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332-
0425, April 1994 (hereinafter SAR), Section 4.3, Description of
Reactor Containment Building, page 43.
\6\ SAR, Section 2.3, Hydrology and Geology, page 23.
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As also indicated by the Petitioner, there is a 72 inch diameter
storm drain/sanitary sewer line that could be a potential source of
flooding or a sinkhole near the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This
sewer line is approximately 100 feet from the containment.7 By
letter,8 DPW confirmed that the line had been inspected to ensure
integrity and was found in ``very good condition'' on a May 24, 1994,
walk-through. The DPW was ``not aware of any problems with this storm
sewer'' and did not ``anticipate any problem with the maintenance or
operation of this sewer in the foreseeable future.'' This conclusion
was reverified with DPW, including consideration of the construction
(e.g., blocks and concrete pipe) and configuration (e.g., on old
drainage paths) of the sewer. DPW also indicated that this drain line
is considered to be a private sewer and is not part of the City system,
although DPW also indicated that they have been involved in the
inspection and maintenance of such lines and there is no plan to
discontinue that practice.
\7\ SAR, Figure 4.3, page 30.
\8\ Letter dated January 9, 1995, from L. Chambers of the
Department of Public Works for the City of Atlanta to R. Karam of
Georgia Tech.
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The Petitioner raised related issues on the structural capability
of the foundation bearing material and water intrusion around the
containment foundation potentially causing destabilization of the
structure. This concern referenced three Georgia Geologic Survey
documents.9 The Georgia Geologic Survey was requested to evaluate
the Petitioner's references to these reports with respect to the
geology and seismology related to the Georgia
[[Page 40393]]
Tech Research Reactor. By letter dated May 11, 1995, the State
Geologist responded to the NRC staff.10 The letter stated, in
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part, that:
\9\ ``Geology of the Greater Atlanta Area'' McConnell and
Abrams, Georgia Geologic Survey Bulletin 96, ``Groundwater in the
Greater Atlanta Region'' by Cressler, Thurmond and Hester, Georgia
Geologic Survey, Bulletin Information Circular 63 and ``Geology and
Groundwater Resources of the Atlanta Area, Georgia,'' Herrick and
Legrand, Georgia Geological Survey Bulletin 55.
\10\ Letter from William H. McLemore, State Geologist, Georgia
Department of Natural Resources, to Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC Staff,
May 11, 1995.
I have reviewed the letters from a petition to shut down the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The letters suggest (1) that the
reactor overlies the Wahoo Creek Formation, which is not a suitable
nor a stable foundation material; (2) that there is an earthquake
risk, particularly from the Brevard Zone; (3) that unique geologic
fractures, particularly horizontal fractures, might cause large
quantities of ground water to seep into the reactor and cause
problems. My review indicates that the petition's suggestions are
specious.
The Wahoo Creek formation is one of many geologic formations of
the Piedmont Physiographic Province. The fact that the Wahoo Creek
Formation weathers into ``slabs'' is not relevant; in situ, it is a
competent rock adequate to provide suitable foundation for the
reactor. Comparison of the foundation characteristics of weathered
and in situ rock material is not reasonable nor appropriate.
Georgia is a relatively aseismic state and earthquakes are rare.
The Brevard Zone should not be considered as an ``earthquake
fault''.
The proximity of the Brevard Zone to the reactor is not
relevant. Fractured rock, which is ubiquitous to the Piedmont,
underlies the reactor. There are no data to suggest that horizontal
fractures having high water yielding characteristics underlie or are
even near the reactor. From a hydrogeological point of view, there
are no known unique features of the reactor site to suggest that
ground water would affect reactor safety.
The Piedmont extends from Alabama to New Jersey and occupies
many tens of thousands of square miles. The comments made in the
petition would apply at virtually any location in the Piedmont. In
addition, the petition cites several reports published by the
Geologic Survey Branch of The Georgia Environmental Protection
Division. The reports cited were prepared under my direction; I
personally reviewed and approved them. There are no data in these
reports that indicate the reactor at Georgia Tech is not safe or
poses an environmental threat.
These findings confirm the NRC staff geologic and seismic
conclusions presented in issue (7), and further support the related
data and design for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor as discussed
under this issue. These findings confirm that further analysis or
testing is not needed for hydrogeological conditions at the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor.
The Petitioner also indicated that ``* * * a sinkhole appeared next
to the reactor years ago and was filled in. A [w]itness to that is
still very much alive.'' The Petitioner provided the NRC staff with
information to contact the witness. This individual said that while he
and two other individuals were walking from the facility, one of the
individuals fell into a sinkhole to the armpits or so, and the two
other individuals helped him get out. This individual also stated that
the sinkhole was near the waste storage tank facility and that the time
frame was somewhere between the late 1960s and middle 1970s. The area
near the waste storage tank facility was physically examined while
going over the area on foot at about 3 feet intervals. No sinkhole was
observed.
In addition, the NRC staff questioned several members of the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor staff. One of these Georgia Tech Research
Reactor staff members recalled the sinkhole referred to by the
Petitioner. However, none of the questioned Georgia Tech staff members
recalled any other sinkholes at the research reactor facility. This was
further confirmed by discussions with selected NRC staff members with
experience related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These NRC
staff members were not aware of any sinkholes at the facility other
than the one of concern to the Petitioner.
Additionally, drawings of the research reactor site 11 and
physical examination of the research reactor facility and site showed
no major drainage paths (other than the 72 inch storm drain line
previously discussed) that could impact the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor.
\11\ SAR, Figures 4.2 and 4.3, pages 29 and 30.
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Construction drawings and records 12 were also reviewed and
selected portions of the installation examined by the NRC staff to
determine the vulnerability of the foundation structure for the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor to the phenomena that were raised in the
Petition. The drawings showed the bottom of the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor containment building steel shell about 25 feet below finished
grade. The drawings indicated that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
containment building is anchored by bolts to a steel-reinforced
concrete pad about 1 foot thick and to a ring foundation that extends
approximately another 12 feet down under the concrete pad. Further,
examination of selected portions of the foundation and containment
structure found the structure consistent with the construction and
drawing details. Construction test boring records also showed that the
pad and ring foundation rest on material that meets or exceeds
construction specifications for safe bearing capacity. The construction
test boring records showed the material at the bottom of the foundation
ring to be moderately hard to hard gray gneiss. As previously discussed
in issue (4) and in this issue, no information has been provided by the
Petitioner or is known to the NRC staff to suggest that this foundation
and support structure are not as designed or are not acceptable.
\12\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to D. M. Collins,
U.S.N.R.C., dated October 22, 1993.
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Sinkholes develop in soils or in limestone as solution cavities.
Although sinkholes could develop in the soil fill material surrounding
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility, there is no credible source
for sinkhole development. Sinkholes cannot develop in or significantly
affect gneiss such as that on which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
foundation is built. Therefore, the development of sinkholes near or
underneath the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not a credible event.
Even in the unlikely event of failures of the 72 inch storm drain
line or the Orme Street line previously mentioned, erosion or sinkhole
effects could not be expected to affect the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor, since the lines are far from the research reactor containment
relative to these potential effects, and the design of the reactor
facility is such that it would not be impacted by such phenomena. The
72 inch storm drain is about 100 feet from the reactor containment and
passes below the northwest corner of the laboratory and office building
which is adjacent to the containment building. The footings for the
office building, which measures approximately 90 by 130 feet, were
founded on the partially weathered rock. Assuming the 72 inch line did
collapse where it passes under the building, approximately a 20 feet
square section of the northwest corner of the building could be
affected. This section of the building houses laboratories, offices,
and storage areas. Radioactive materials are not stored in this area.
The remaining portion of the facility, particularly the research
reactor containment building, would not be affected because of the
design characteristics of the foundation and support material as
previously discussed.
DPW verified that the Orme Street line is 10 to 12 feet in diameter
and is about 1200 feet from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The
sinkhole that resulted from the failure of the Orme Street line was a
sinkhole approximately 50 feet in radius, which is at the upper limit
of sinkhole size in the Atlanta area based on DPW experience. Based on
this experience
[[Page 40394]]
(which is consistent with NRC staff information on such phenomena) it
is not credible to consider that a sinkhole from the Orme Street line,
at a distance of 1200 feet, could affect the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor.
The containment foundation for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is
considered to be impervious to the effects of sinkholes as the
foundation rests on relatively hard material to depths and distances
well beyond the credible influence of any potential source for a
sinkhole.
Puff-ups are heaves, or upward expansion, which occur when locked-
in stress in soil, usually clay, exceeds the load above it. The most
common occurrence of puff-ups is in regions that were overlain by
glaciers and the soils beneath (till, lake beds, etc.) were over-
consolidated. When the glaciers melted there was still enough material
over these clays to lock-in the stress. Removal of some of this
overlying material, either by erosion or excavation, allows the clays
to expand. Puff-ups can occur in unglaciated regions generally soon
after either erosion or excavation removes the overlying material.
Research reactor construction was completed in the 1960s, and
considering this time interval, occurrence of a puff-up at the facility
is highly unlikely. Further, puff-ups are near surface, soil
deformation phenomena. As discussed above, the relatively hard,
relatively deep foundation structure and gray gneiss bearing material
of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor could not be expected to be
affected by the geologic phenomenon of puff-ups.
With regard to the welded manhole covers that were thrown up to 8
feet as alleged by the Petitioner by sewer backup problems, the
distance from the containment to the nearest manhole cover has been
verified by physical examination of the site to be greater than 50
feet. This physical examination found no other potential impact point
related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor that was closer than 50
feet. The Petitioner has neither provided nor does the NRC staff
possess any information or experience which would suggest that a
manhole cover could be thrown the distance and have the force necessary
to damage the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Therefore, the potential
for damage to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor due to this asserted
phenomenon is not credible.
Based on the above, these design features and conditions provide
assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not be adversely
affected by flooding, sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' or thrown welded manhole
covers. These phenomena could not be expected to affect the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor given the design and configuration of the
facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's
concern does not present a substantial health or safety issue
warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
(5) Radioactive contaminants have been routinely discharged into
the sanitary sewer from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water
holding tank and contamination spread by backup of the sewage system.
Radioactive materials can be released to the sanitary sewer system from
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor in accordance with 10 CFR
20.2003.13 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor licensee monitors
releases to the sewage system, and NRC staff inspections (e.g.,
Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02)
have confirmed that the radioactive releases (primarily cobalt-60 and
tritium) to the sanitary sewer have met NRC discharge limits.14
\13\ Radioactive releases to the sanitary sewer was previously
permitted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.303, which was superseded by
10 CFR 20.2003 on January 1, 1994.
\14\ It should also be noted that revisions to the NRC's
regulations with regard to release to sewage systems are under
consideration (Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ``Disposal of
Radioactive Material by Release Into Sanitary Sewer Systems,'' 59 FR
9146, February 25, 1994).
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The Petitioner expressed a concern that the release to the sanitary
sewer system could expose individuals, including sewer workers, to
radiation. The releases from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to the
sanitary sewer have generally been several orders of magnitude less
than NRC regulatory limits. Further, the assumption in the regulation
of ingestion directly at the point of release from the campus provides
considerable conservatism to ensure that individuals, such as sewer
workers or other individuals, would be exposed to a lesser degree even
in the event of a potential backup of the sewer system with large
quantities of water.
Furthermore, in response to a request from the State of Georgia,
the NRC staff had ORISE perform an independent analysis for
radioisotopes in process sludge and ash samples from the City of
Atlanta's R. M. Clayton sewer treatment facility. The samples were
taken from the sewer treatment facility on March 13, 1995. This
analysis detected naturally occurring and accelerator produced
radioisotopes (used primarily for medical diagnostic and therapeutic
treatments). There were no detected radioisotopes from the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. Similarly, the NRC staff had an independent analysis
performed by INEL of liquid waste samples from the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. This analysis found no indication of the
contamination suggested by the Petitioner (e.g., plutonium or uranium).
Georgia EPD and Georgia Tech analysis on waste water are consistent
with these results. This sampling and analysis verified that a
relatively small amount of radioactive material has been released from
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility to the sanitary sewer
system, and any material that has been released is well within NRC
regulatory limits. These facts, and the regulatory conservatism and
monitoring results, as previously discussed, establish that no further
sampling of the sewer releases or system is necessary to ensure that
the health and safety of the public is protected.
An issue was also raised by the Petitioner regarding the need for
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to have a sewer discharge permit from
the City of Atlanta. The City of Atlanta does not deal with
radiological health and safety issues over which NRC has regulatory
authority (See 10 CFR 8.4). The City of Atlanta is responsible for the
release of materials to the sanitary sewer system for other than
radiological health and safety reasons. With regard to the concern
about compliance with city ordinances, the City of Atlanta is the
appropriate regulatory body to deal with the implementation of its
requirements.
Since there is no evidence of the spread of unacceptable
contamination from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor effluents to the
sewage system, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that
unacceptable radioactive contamination was released or could be spread
by the backup of the sewage system. The Petitioner provided no facts to
conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the
Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial health or safety
issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
(6) Should the Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further
destabilized, the reactor and the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break
apart,'' causing radioactive contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/
down sewers/into the runoff ditch.'' 15 From the evaluations and
inspections to date, there is no evidence that the Georgia Tech
Research
[[Page 40395]]
Reactor has been ``destabilized'' in any manner. The Georgia Tech
Research Reactor is designed to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the
consequences of uncontrolled releases of radiation. For example, the
design and configuration features as discussed for issue (4) provides
considerable assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has not
and will not be ``destabilized'' due to the previously postulated
concerns expressed by the Petitioner.
\15\ ``Destabilized'' in the context of this Petition issue has
been defined as some condition that would result in the uncontrolled
release of radioactive material.
A recent safety evaluation of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor by
the NRC staff is associated with the Order to Convert from High
Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).16 The
associated safety evaluation considered all potential safety analyses
that are effected by the change out of the fuel, including potential
design basis accident scenarios. This safety evaluation was issued on
the bases that the pertinent reactor design features (1) continue to
acceptably ensure that the health and safety of the public is protected
for the HEU fuel and (2) have also been demonstrated to be acceptable
for the LEU fuel.
\16\ ``Georgia Institute of Technology, (Georgia Tech Research
Reactor); Order Modifying Facility Operating License No. R-97,'' 60
FR 32516, June 22, 1995.
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The Petitioner raised concerns on various structures, systems and
components at the research reactor. First, the ability of the
containment building steel structure at the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor to control releases of radioactive material was questioned. In
this regard, the containment leak rate is tested, in accordance with
Technical Specification 4.3.b, for at least 2.0 pounds per square inch
gauge (psig), which is the design basis pressure. Technical
Specification 4.3.b requires that leakage from the containment building
shall not exceed 1.0 percent of the building air volume in 24 hours at
2.0 psig over-pressure. Actual test results show that leakage is about
one-half of that value. Containment building structural requirements
based on expected external pressures have been estimated capable of
withstanding internal pressures of at least 7.5 psig.17 This
leakage integrity, and the testing and design margin, provide assurance
that radioactive materials will not be released in an uncontrolled
manner from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor containment.
\17\ SAR, Section 4.3.2, Provisions for Insuring Leak-Tightness,
page 49.
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The design function of the shield and crane support wall to
mitigate potential radiation exposures was also questioned by the
Petitioner. The steel-reinforced concrete wall inside the containment
extends about 34 feet above the outside ground level. A safety function
of the steel-reinforced concrete wall is shielding during potential
design basis accident conditions.18 The design calculations for
this shielding function have been reviewed and independently verified.
This review finds that the calculations conservatively modeled
radioactive source terms and containment configuration.
\18\ SAR, Section 4.3 Description of Reactor Containment
Building, Section 4.3.1 General Layout, pages 42-9.
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The Petitioner also raised an issue of a potential ``runaway chain
reaction.'' The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is designed with two
independent and diverse shut down systems: the reactor scram system and
the top reflector drain system. These systems have significant shut
down capability and have been shown, both analytically and
experimentally, capable of withstanding any excess reactivity
condition.19 These analyses show that the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor can meet (with substantial margin) the Technical Specification
3.1.a requirements to be shut down (i.e., subcritical by at least 1.0
percent delta k/k with both the highest reactivity worth shim-safety
blade and the regulating rod fully withdrawn). Further, specific design
features of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor prevent or mitigate
reactivity and power increase conditions. Analyses 20 show that
both the HEU and LEU fuels are designed to withstand maximum credible
reactivity worth/power excursion conditions without damage, including
maximum reactivity addition conditions. As indicated in SAR, this
analysis technique has been verified by test data.21 This degree
of shut down capability and provisions for mitigation of design basis
accidents is consistent with other U.S. research reactor designs, has
been verified by data and NRC staff review, and provides assurance that
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor can be safely shut down for any
credible condition, including analyzed accident conditions.
\19\ SAR, Section 5.6, Shutdown Margins.
\20\ SAR, Section 5.10, Accident Analyses, page 139-144.
\21\ SAR, Section 5.9.1 Comparison of Calculations with SPERT-II
Experiments, pages 137-8.
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The Petitioner also raised concern that a previous accident
analysis assumed a fuel loading accident that was considered
``incredible'' and no analysis of this scenario was performed in the
current SAR.22 The SAR states: During refueling operations, all
control elements are required to be fully inserted and the top D2O
reflector drained to storage. Following the refueling operation, the
reactor startup will be accomplished with standard practice. Under
these conditions, a sudden introduction of reactivity is impossible.''
23 Although the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that this
accident is not credible, the NRC staff did verify that the results
would be acceptable in the unlikely event of such an accident.
Specifically, in the safety evaluation for the Order to Convert from
HEU to LEU,24 the NRC staff found that (1) the previous safety
evaluation 25 remained valid in that the HEU fuel would not be
damaged by the fuel loading accident and (2) the reactivity
characteristics of the LEU compared to the HEU fuel are such that the
maximum fuel temperatures of the LEU fuel would be less than the
temperature for the HEU fuel during the potential fuel loading
accident. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that, although the fuel
loading accident analysis was not and need not be performed in the
current SAR for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the potential
results, if the analysis were to be performed in the current SAR, would
remain acceptable for both fuel types.
\22\ SAR, Section 5.10.3 Fuel Loading Accident.
\23\ SAR, Section 8.4.2 Fuel Loading Accidents.
\24\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,
Georgia Institute of Technology, ``Issuance of Order Modifying
License No. R-97 to Convert from High- to Low-Enriched Uranium--
Georgia Institute of Technology (TAC No. M85896),'' Enclosure 3
Safety Evaluation, Section 2.14.5 Fuel Loading Accident.
\25\ U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Safety Evaluation by the
Directorate of Licensing, Docket No. 50-160, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Section 6.0 Accident Analysis, page 12, dated December
19, 1972.
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The Petitioner also raised a concern regarding the emergency
cooling capabilities at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The research
reactor is designed with an emergency cooling system.26 The
system, as required by Technical Specification 3.7, consists of a
passive tank capable of providing cooling for 30 minutes, and two
separate long term supplies, only one of which is required for a total
of 12 hours of cooling. (It should be noted that in the SAR the
licensee assumed that (1) the long term cooling supply connections are
prevented or interrupted, (2) a complete core meltdown and conservative
fission product release occurred, and (3) conservative radiological
exposure conditions existed. These assumptions were used in a
calculation to demonstrate
[[Page 40396]]
acceptable design bases for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
containment, that is leakage rate and shielding functions, as
previously discussed.) The Petitioner's concern relates to the time
required to make the manual connections to the backup water supplies
and potential radiation exposures during this process. These
connections are made outside the containment structure. The 30 minutes
cooling period flow is designed to be provided by gravity flow from the
previously mentioned passive tank through two redundant fast acting,
fail safe valves. This cooling ensures no fuel damage or radiation
release effect in the event of the loss of coolant accident in that 30
minute time period. The NRC staff concludes, based on a walk through
with the licensee, that 30 minutes continues to be an acceptable time
to make the connections. The long term emergency cooling connections
could be accomplished within the 30 minute time period and there would
be no increased radiation exposure while making these connections.
Therefore, the previous NRC staff conclusion in licensing the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor remains valid, that is, there will be acceptable
emergency cooling of the core in the event of the loss of coolant
accident.
\26\ SAR, Section 4.4.8.3, Emergency Cooling System, pages 87-
90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner also raised a concern on the reduction in shielding
for the cobalt-60 storage pool, caused by the use of water from this
storage pool to provide one of the two alternate long term water
supplies for emergency cooling of the research reactor. The emergency
cooling function effect on radiation levels from the cobalt-60 pool was
reviewed and independently verified. This evaluation has found that the
reduction in water above the cobalt-60 sources for the long term
reactor emergency cooling function would not significantly affect the
shielding of the cobalt-60 source, i.e., there will remain sufficient
water for shielding. This was confirmed with the Georgia EPD, the
licensing authority for the cobalt-60 source, and the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor licensee. Therefore, the use of the cobalt-60 pool for
emergency cooling of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not
adversely impact that function or radiation safety.
The Petitioner raised a concern regarding the use of hot channel
factors and engineering uncertainty factors. The SAR analyzed the fuel
design to establish safety limits considering power peaking conditions
(hot channel factors) and conservative fuel manufacturing tolerance
(engineering uncertainty factors). Consistent with research reactor
regulatory policy, the SAR verified that these safety limits would not
be exceeded or even approached, so that no fuel damage would
occur.27 The NRC staff finds that these conclusions remain valid
for both the current HEU fuel and for the LEU fuel as documented in the
Order to convert from HEU fuel.28
\27\ SAR, Section 5.7, Thermal--Hydraulic Safety Parameters,
pages 127-135.
\28\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,
Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation,
Section 2.11 Thermal-Hydraulics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner also had a concern related to the reasonableness of
assuming a scram after pump failures in the SAR. The SAR paragraph in
question states: ``The loss of the primary D2O pump or the
secondary cooling water pump can result in undesirable reactor
operating conditions. These systems are therefore provided with high
temperature and low flow interlocks with the reactor scram circuitry.
Of the two pump failures, the loss of the D2O pump is the more
serious. Two independent low D2O flow scram interlocks, and loss
of electrical power interlocks have been provided in the reactor safety
instrumentation. It is therefore acceptable to assume that the reactor
will scram because of low flow shortly after an electrical power
failure or the more serious case of pump seizure.'' 29 These
interlocks provide redundant and diverse scram functions for the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff concludes that in the
unlikely event that one of the independent low D2O flow scram
interlocks were to fail or be inoperable, the other low D2O flow
scram interlock would scram the reactor. These redundant scram
interlocks are required by Technical Specification 3.2.a. Additionally,
the high D2O temperature and loss of electrical power scram
interlocks provide additional assurance that the reactor will scram on
potential pump failure events. Based on the redundancy of the low
D2O flow scram interlocks and the additional redundancy from
diverse scram interlocks such as the high D2O temperature scram
interlocks, the NRC staff concludes that it is acceptable to assume
that the reactor will scram for the potential pump failure analysis.
\29\ SAR, Section 8.2.2 Pump Failures
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner also asserted that plutonium and cesium-137 were not
included in the core burnout analysis. For the core burnout analysis,
data show that the assumed release fractions from the fuel of isotopes
in the SAR are conservative and that plutonium, cesium, or other
particulate isotopes would not be released.30 Furthermore, page
196 of the SAR states that the source term includes daughter products
of the released volatile fission products, which would include cesium-
137 as a daughter product of released isotopes. Based on the above
quoted data and consideration of volatile fission product decay
daughters, the release assumptions are acceptable.
\30\ SAR, page 196 and Reference B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner also indicated that there were errors in the Georgia
Tech Research Reactor SAR. These alleged errors include the following:
That the half-life of iodine-131 was incorrectly specified; that the
geologic data are inadequate; that population data are outdated; that
the radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to
estimate design basis accident radiological doses are outdated; that
incorrect names were used for State of Georgia organizations; and that
a 30 year wind rose was needed.
Regarding the half-life of iodine-131, there was a typographical
error where 1.92 hours was typed instead of 192 hours. This has been
corrected by the licensee in a January 1995 SAR revision.
The geologic data presented by the licensee in the SAR, along with
other data and information that were provided by the Petitioner, DPW,
the Georgia Geologic Survey and the licensee, have been evaluated and
discussed by the NRC staff in issues (4) and (7) of this Partial
Director's Decision. Based on these evaluations by the NRC staff, the
geologic data do not change the previous staff conclusions in licensing
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor and the NRC staff does not possess
any information which would suggest that the geologic information for
the research reactor is not acceptable.
The population data presented by the licensee were from the 1990
census rather than from current City of Atlanta or other estimates on
population as stated by the Petitioner. The use of the 1990 census data
are acceptable because it is the latest official U.S. census data. The
use of such data as implemented in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
SAR and the Technical Specifications is consistent with reactor
licensing practices for restricted area, exclusion area and low
population zones.
The radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to
estimate design basis accident radiological doses (SAR Appendices B and
C) were reviewed and found to be conservative and therefore acceptable
for use.
Regarding the use of incorrect names for State of Georgia
organizations, this was a failure of the licensee to
[[Page 40397]]
completely update its SAR and will be corrected in the license renewal
process.
Finally, the use of a 5 year wind rose, rather than a 30 year wind
rose, is not significant to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor safety
analysis or emergency planning because, conservative assumptions, which
are independent of the wind rose data, are used for dose assessments in
the SAR.31 In addition, the Georgia Tech emergency preparedness
plan uses actual measurements, rather than wind rose assumptions, to
determine necessary protective actions.32 Also, as previously
discussed in issues (2) and (3), the environmental, effluent, and area
radiation monitoring for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, provides
acceptable verification of compliance to Technical Specification and 10
CFR Part 20 requirements, and further wind direction data or wind rose
accuracy for environmental monitoring is not required.
\31\ SAR, Appendix B.
\32\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, dated April 19, 1994, Attachment 6, Emergency
Preparedness Plan.
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The design and analysis features, as documented in the SAR and
appropriately required and verified in the Technical Specifications for
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, reduce the potential for or mitigate
the consequences of design basis accidents and provide acceptable
assurance that there will be no uncontrolled release of radioactive
material. Therefore, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the
radioactive contaminants would be spread by any credible event or
condition at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided
no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
the Petitioner's concern does not raise a substantial health or safety
issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
(7) The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake zone. The
NRC staff has continued to closely follow the seismic and geologic
developments in the tectonic province in which the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor is located. The site is located in the southeastern
Piedmont, which, along with the Blue Ridge, comprises the southern
portion of the broad region designated by the NRC staff as the ``New
England-Piedmont Tectonic Province.'' The New England-Piedmont Province
is bounded on the northwest by the Southern Valley and Ridge Tectonic
Province and on the southeast by the Coastal Plain Tectonic Province.
The NRC staff has extensively reviewed the geology and seismology
of this region (e.g., the Safety Analysis Reports for McGuire, Catawba,
North Anna, Shearon Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants).
These studies include considerations of the New Madrid, Charleston,
east Tennessee, and Brevard seismic zones that were mentioned in the
Petition. These evaluations by the NRC staff, as documented in the
safety evaluations for the McGuire, Catawba, North Anna, Shearon
Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants, and other, nuclear and
non-nuclear-related evaluations during the last two decades, have
identified no capable faults 33 in this region.
\33\ Capable faults are defined in 10 CFR Part 100, ``Seismic
and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Appendix A,
Section III ``Definitions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC also has supported regional seismic networks in the
southeast.34 In 1990, the NRC began to transfer support from these
regional networks to the National Seismic Network operated by the
United States Geological Survey. The NRC staff continues to review the
results from these networks, and finds no new information which would
change previous conclusions on the seismicity of the southeastern
Piedmont (i.e., there are no capable faults and the potential for a
damaging earthquake is very remote).
\34\ These Networks include, the Charleston network, first
operated in 1973 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Others were
added during the mid and late 1970's and early 1980's, which were
operated by Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Central
Virginia and Giles County Seismic Zones), the University of Memphis
(Southern Appalachians and New Madrid Seismic Zones), Georgia
Institute of Technology (Georgia and Alabama), and St. Louis
University (New Madrid Seismic Zone).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seismology has been considered in the licensing of the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. The New Madrid, Missouri and the Charleston, South
Carolina earthquakes (that were mentioned in this Petition issue) were
considered, as were lesser magnitude earthquakes in and near Georgia.
The Petitioner has presented no new seismic information for the region.
The NRC staff evaluation continues to support the conclusion that the
seismology for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has been acceptably
considered in the licensing of this facility.
A study of seismic hazards has been performed for Georgia Tech and
referenced in the Petition.35 This study reviewed seismic history,
performed probabilistic and deterministic seismic ground motion
studies, and made estimates of potential ground motion. The report
validated Standard Building Code seismic coefficient requirements for
the Georgia Tech campus, and did not change the conclusion on the
acceptability of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
\35\ ``Seismic Hazard Study for the Georgia Institute of
Technology Campus, Atlanta, Georgia,'' Law Engineering Project No.
57704495.01, March 16, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above conclusions, as previously discussed in issue (4), are
further supported by the Georgia State Geologist in a letter dated May
11, 1995.
The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the seismic
characteristics for the site are unacceptable for the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude
otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's
concern does not raise a substantial health or safety issue warranting
the action requested by the Petitioner.
(8) There is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor operating. The license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
was issued in accordance with all applicable requirements. The licensee
programs in education, research and development are consistent with the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor license. Specifically, the Georgia Tech
license renewal request dated April 19, 1994, discussed activities at
the research reactor, including nuclear education in nuclear
engineering and health physics. It also discussed contributions to the
community, such as plant irradiation experiments for high school
science classes and use by the Boy Scouts of America for nuclear merit
badges at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Georgia Tech Research
Reactor has capability for bio-medical irradiation research and
development, isotope production, neutron diffraction, and activation
analysis. The license renewal request specified programs evaluating
radiation decomposition of chemicals, characterizing neutron absorbing
materials, and characterizing soil samples.
The Petitioner also raised concerns on the monitoring and
calibration of neutron beams for medical therapy. At this time, the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not authorized to conduct medical
therapy,36 so the specific concern is not applicable.
\36\ The Georgia Tech Research Reactor cannot perform medical
therapy without specific authorization under the provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act Section 104(a). Georgia Tech may perform
experiments, such as the characterization of irradiation conditions
for potential, future medical therapy as long as the experiments and
research reactor are within the provisions of the current license
and other NRC regulatory requirements. In order to perform medical
therapy at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, an associated license
under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.21(a) would be required, as well
as associated modifications to the Technical Specifications from the
NRC.
[[Page 40398]]
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The Petitioner has asserted that substantial management
deficiencies persist, including concerns on the problems related to the
1987/1988 time frame. This concern on the persistence of substantial
management deficiencies may be addressed in the pending license renewal
proceeding. As previously outlined in the Introduction to this Partial
Director's Decision, the Final Director's Decision will take into
account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding at
an appropriate time after completion of the NRC staff review.
The NRC staff finds no reason at this time to conclude that the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not continuing to conduct research and
development activities in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and NRC
regulations. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that no information has been
provided on this issue to conclude that a substantial health or safety
issue exists warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.
(9) Security at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is extremely lax.
The concerns on security issues, as previously outlined in the
Introduction to this Partial Director's Decision, may be addressed in a
pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will be addressed in a
Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time after taking into
account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding and
after completion of the NRC staff reviews.
(10) In case of an accident or terrorist attack, evacuation of the
campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible both now and during the
Olympics.37 With respect to potential accident conditions for the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), the
area within which predetermined protective actions are established, is
a 100 meters radius from the facility. This EPZ is in accordance with
NRC emergency preparedness guidance applicable to research
reactors.38 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor accident analyses
39 demonstrates that this 100 meter EPZ is conservative for the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These analyses have been found
acceptable most recently in the safety evaluation for the Order to
convert from HEU fuel.40 These analyses demonstrate that the
potential need for protective actions outside the EPZ is highly
unlikely. The specification of emergency classifications (e.g., no
general emergency classification) for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
has also been reviewed by the NRC staff and found to be consistent with
the NUREG-0849 guidance. The Georgia Tech Research Reactor emergency
plan has been previously verified by the NRC staff to be acceptable in
accordance with this regulatory guidance and applicable regulations.
\37\ That portion of the issue that deals with potential
terrorist attacks will be included in issue (9) on security.
\38\ ``Standard Review Plan for Review and Evaluation of
Emergency Plans for Research and Test Reactors,'' NUREG-0849,
Appendix II.
\39\ SAR, Section 5.10 Accident Analyses, pages 139-144 and
Section 8, Reactor Hazards Evaluation, and Appendices A, B, and C,
pages 176-214.
\40\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,
Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation,
Section 2.14 Potential Accident Scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Georgia Tech Research Reactor has conducted emergency response
drills in accordance with its emergency plan (the last three drills
were on October 19, 1994, November 4, 1993, and November 9, 1992). The
drills have included involvement of onsite or offsite agencies, such as
the Georgia Tech Police Department, the Atlanta Fire Department, the
Atlanta/Fulton County Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia
Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia Environmental Protection
Division, and the Grady Memorial Hospital. Training, equipment, and
contingency planning for onsite and offsite personnel have been
acceptably in accordance with emergency plan requirements, as verified
most recently in NRC staff Inspection Reports 50-160/94-04, 50-160/93-
03, and 50-160/92-04. Police, fire, and medical personnel have been
observed by NRC staff to acceptably perform their responsibilities.
Other recent discussions with these emergency response organizations
demonstrate that they acceptably understand and feel capable of
discharging their responsibilities under emergency conditions at the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
With regard to emergency preparedness during the Olympics,41
the NRC staff and the licensee have been discussing the necessary steps
to take for reactor safety during this event for some time before this
Petition was raised. The licensee has decided to not operate the
research reactor during the 1996 Olympics and to remove the spent fuel
from the facility prior to the Olympics.42 This would eliminate
the potential for radiological releases during the Olympics related to
the presence of such fuel onsite, and would reduce the potential for
any emergency response to be taken due to radiological conditions for
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor during the Olympics.
\41\ As previously noted, the implications of terrorist acts
during the Olympics relative to emergency preparedness may be
addressed in a pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will
be addressed in a Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time
after taking into account any relevant findings from this license
renewal proceeding and after completion of the NRC staff reviews.
\42\ Georgia Institute of Technology's Response to Commission's
Order Issuing Housekeeping Stay, dated June 21, 1995, and letter
from Patricia Guilday, Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia,
Department of Law, to the Secretary of the NRC dated July 25, 1995.
Georgia Tech has indicated that there are no events or additional
resident population that are planned to be within the EPZ, and that the
entire campus is to be controlled for access such that increased
transient population through the EPZ is not expected. Further,
supplemental emergency provisions for the Olympics are being planned by
Georgia Tech in coordination with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Georgia State Patrol, Georgia Department of
Transportation, City of Atlanta Police, and City of Atlanta Fire
Department.
Additionally, the Petitioner in her July 18, 1995 letter, raised a
concern on emergency preparedness for power reactor licenses, including
emergency preparedness during the Olympics. NRC regulations require the
development of emergency preparedness plans for all reactor licenses.
The Petitioner presented no information and the NRC staff does not know
of any information which would suggest that reactor emergency
preparedness is not acceptable, including emergency preparedness during
the Olympics.
The Petitioner also raised an issue addressing the location of the
emergency command center within the Georgia Tech Research Reactor
building. However, the emergency command center is outside the
containment structure in which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is
housed. The emergency command center is isolated from the containment
structure, which, as previously discussed on issue (6), is capable of
withstanding pressures greater than would result from any analyzed
accident. The discussions on
[[Page 40399]]
the preceding issues also demonstrate that there is little likelihood
that the emergency command center could be affected by a radiological
event related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The emergency
command center is monitored for radiation so that in the unlikely event
of an indication of unacceptable radiation in the emergency command
center, or if it were to otherwise become unavailable, alternative
actions could be taken (e.g., relocation of emergency response
personnel). The above is consistent with the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor emergency plan and previous NRC acceptance of the emergency
plan, continues to acceptably implement the requirements of NUREG-0849,
and, therefore, provides acceptable emergency preparedness for the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor.
Based on the above, the 100 meter EPZ at the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor is acceptable as a planning basis to ensure the protection of
the public health and safety both now and during the Olympics, and the
likelihood of evacuation or other protective action beyond the EPZ is
acceptably low. During the Olympics, Georgia Tech's plans to not
operate and to remove spent fuel ensure that there will be minimal
potential of radiological related emergencies arising in connection
with the NRC license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Further,
during the Olympics, the conditions around the research reactor, access
controls to the campus, and planning for supplementary emergency
provisions ensure that the provisions of the emergency plan will not be
adversely affected by the Olympics.
The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the emergency
planning zone for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not acceptable,
including during the time period of the Olympics. The Petitioner
provided no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that no information has been presented to conclude that a
substantial health or safety issue exists warranting the action
requested by the Petitioner.
B. Revocation of Liquid Radioactive Material Release Authority;
Revocation of Licenses Using the Principle of As Low As Reasonably
Achievable; Prohibition of Transportation of Radioactive Material by
Mail; and Modification to Posting Requirements for Radioactive Material
The following are general requests by the Petitioner for actions
related to various categories of licenses:
1. The request to withdraw all license authority nationwide
involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive
material to all the sewers or waters in the United States;
2. The request to withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities,
including nuclear power plants, which operate under as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles;
3. The request that the NRC staff prohibit the transportation of
radioactive material by mail; and
4. The request that the NRC staff modify every license issued to
transporters of radioactive materials and builders of nuclear power
plants so that these parties must put two-foot high letters on
everything transported or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in
slightly smaller letters ``there is no safe level of radiation, any
exposure can [a]ffect health.''
The bases for these requests are that there is no safe level of
radiation, that storage and disposal of radioactive waste is
inadequate, and that the NRC sewage discharge guidelines are totally
inadequate. The Petitioner has also indicated that the basis for the
request related to transportation by mail is that accidents have
occurred while transporting radioactive materials. The issues
enumerated by the Petitioner are broadly framed requests to take
actions to prohibit discharging all radioactive material into sewers
and waters of the U.S., to create a zero release limit of radioactive
material, and to modify the transportation regulations under 10 CFR
part 71.\43\ The Petitioner also raises concerns over the adequacy of
current NRC regulations related to radiation protection.\44\ Finally,
the Petitioner questions the adequacy of NRC and Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on allowed radioisotopes in the
environment.
\43\ The NRC's packaging and transportation regulations in 10
CFR part 71 are part of a broad regulatory scheme for the packaging
and transportation of radioactive materials. The packaging and
transportation of radioactive materials are also subject to the
regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S.
Postal Service. See 10 CFR 71.0(b).
\44\ These concerns include that the release limits to the sewer
systems is established as a monthly concentration and allows release
of soluble material, that the brain and ovaries are not specifically
mentioned in the organ dose weighting factors, that an individual is
not considered a member of the public any time in which the
individual receives an occupational dose, that special exposures
should not be allowed, that no dose be allowed to the embryo/fetus
whether the woman is declared pregnant or not, and that radiological
release limits are established assuming a ``Reference Man.''
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For each of the Petitioner's concerns cited directly above, the
Petitioner has provided no specific information or basis which would
support taking action on the Petitioner's four requests cited in this
section. The Petitioner's request to withdraw all license authority for
the discharging of any quantity of radioactive materials to all sewers
and waters is based on a general assertion that the NRC's sewer dumping
guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner offers no support for
this assertion. In addition, the Petitioner's stated bases for the
request to withdraw all licenses which operate under ALARA principles
(i.e., there is no safe level of radiation and the storage and disposal
of radioactive materials, as well as the regulations, are inadequate)
have not been substantiated by any data or references in the Petition.
Finally, no information was provided that transportation accidents had
not been evaluated and issues resolved under the provision of current
regulations or that present regulations regarding the use of mail to
transport radioactive material is not acceptable. Because these stated
concerns are general and are not supported by additional information in
the Petition, these concerns do not provide the basis for taking
enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206.
No specific information was provided to support the Petitioner's
general statements on the inadequacy of NRC regulations. The Petitioner
has provided no information that would lead to a conclusion that the
packaging and transportation regulations in 10 CFR part 71, the
radiation protection regulations in 10 CFR part 20, and the NRC's and
EPA's environmental protection regulations, are not providing
acceptable protection to the public health and safety, as well as to
the environment. Since the Petitioner has not submitted any relevant
technical, scientific or other data to support any of the general
requests for the actions enumerated in this section, or raised a
substantial health and safety concern based on these issues, the
Petitioner's general requests for such actions are denied. However,
should this Petitioner, or anyone, wish to provide relevant technical,
scientific or other data and grounds to support any change to NRC
regulations, a Petition for Rulemaking can be submitted in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.802.
III. Conclusion
The institution of proceedings pursuant to Section 2.206 is
appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been
raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1,
2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975); Washington Public Power
Supply
[[Page 40400]]
System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 924 (1984).
This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns raised by
the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by the
Petitioner is warranted.
With regard to the requests made by the Petitioner discussed
herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking such actions. Rather,
as explained above, the NRC staff concludes that no substantial health
and safety issues have been raised by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the
Petitioner's requests for action, pursuant to Section 2.206 on the
Georgia Tech Research Reactor, are denied on issues A(1) through A(8)
and A(10), insofar as the issues on A(8) do not relate to the
Petitioner's concerns on the persistence of substantial management
deficiencies and the issues on A(10) do not relate to the Petitioner's
security issues. As previously noted in the Introduction and Discussion
to this Partial Director's Decision, the issue related to the
persistence of management problems [part of A(8)] and the issue related
to security [A(9) and part of A(10)] will be decided after taking into
account the results of the licensing proceeding on the license renewal
application. In addition, the Petitioner's requests on general license
and authority revocation, as discussed in Section B of this Partial
Director's Decision, are denied.
A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the
Commission as provided by 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's
regulations. The Decision will become the final action of the
Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-19510 Filed 8-7-95; 8:45 am]
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