[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 199 (Monday, October 16, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53588-53596]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-25596]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of
Decision (ROD) regarding the DOE's proposed Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) in northern New Mexico. DOE has decided to complete and operate
the DARHT facility at LANL while implementing a program to conduct most
tests inside steel containment vessels, with containment to be phased
in over ten years. The environmental analysis to support this decision
was issued by DOE in the August 1995, DARHT Facility Final
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-0228, which identified
the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative
as DOE's preferred alternative. DOE has decided to implement the
preferred alternative.
DATES: This ROD is effective immediately. On January 27, 1995, DOE was
enjoined from further procurement or construction of the DARHT facility
pending completion of the DARHT EIS
[[Page 53589]]
and this ROD. Actions to implement this ROD will not occur unless and
until the injunction is dissolved; DOE will seek immediate dissolution
of the injunction.
ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the DARHT EIS or this ROD should be
addressed to: Ms. Elizabeth Withers, NEPA Compliance Officer, Los
Alamos Area Office, Department of Energy, 528 35th Street, Los Alamos
NM 87544. Ms. Withers may be contacted by telephone at (505) 667-8690
or by facsimile at (505) 665-4872.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE
NEPA process, please contact Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office
of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW., Washington DC 20585. Ms. Borgstrom may be
contacted by leaving a message at (800) 472-2756 or by calling (202)
586-4600.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
DOE is responsible for ensuring that the United States nuclear
weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. As part of its
mission to ensure the safety and reliability of the weapons in the
stockpile, DOE and its predecessor agencies have conducted a
hydrodynamic testing program at LANL since the late 1940's. The
existing hydrodynamic testing facility at LANL is the Pulsed High-
Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX), which has been in
operation since 1963. In 1983, DOE began hydrodynamic testing operation
of the Flash X-Ray (FXR) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) in California.
In September 1992, President Bush declared a moratorium on all
nuclear testing by the United States. In July 1993, President Clinton
extended the moratorium, and in August 1995 the President announced
that the United States will seek a ``zero-yield'' Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. He further stated that the conduct of a science-based
stockpile stewardship program is a condition of U.S. entry into such a
treaty.
PHERMEX and FXR historically have been used in conjunction with
underground nuclear testing to identify and correct potential problems
with the stockpile. Neither PHERMEX nor FXR can provide the degree of
radiographic resolution, x-ray intensity, or three-dimensional or time-
sequenced views that are needed to provide answers to current questions
regarding weapons condition or performance necessary for science-based
stockpile stewardship. Although DOE expects to operate and upgrade the
FXR facility as described in section 3.3.4 of the final EIS, and also
expects to operate and appropriately upgrade PHERMEX until use of the
latter is phased out after initial DARHT operation, neither facility
can fully meet DOE's purpose and need to provide enhanced high-
resolution radiography capability. In addition to its radiographic
performance limitations, PHERMEX is over thirty years old, and DOE does
not expect it to remain a viable facility over an extended time because
of the increasing difficulty and cost of maintaining and operating the
facility as it ages.
To conduct an effective science-based stockpile stewardship
program, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced capability to conduct
radiographic hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. The capability
to obtain high-resolution, multiple-time, multiple-view information is
needed to assess the safety, performance, and reliability of nuclear
weapons; evaluate aging weapons; obtain information about plutonium
through dynamic experiments; and for other uses. Such an enhanced
capability cannot be obtained at either PHERMEX or FXR, as currently
configured. Accordingly, DOE has decided to complete and operate the
DARHT facility to provide an enhanced high-resolution radiographic
capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in
support of its historical mission and the near-term stewardship of the
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
DOE began construction of the DARHT facility in April 1994. In
October 1994, three citizen groups requested of the Secretary of Energy
that DOE prepare an EIS on the DARHT facility, and halt further
construction until an EIS was completed. On November 16, 1994, two of
these groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin DOE from proceeding with the
DARHT project until completion of an EIS and associated ROD. On
November 22, 1994, DOE published a notice of its intent to prepare the
DARHT EIS [59 FR 60134]. On January 27, 1995, the court issued a
preliminary injunction of further construction of the DARHT facility,
and related activities such as the procurement of special facility
equipment, pending completion of the EIS and ROD. The court entered
final judgment on May 5, 1995. No construction or procurement for DARHT
has taken place since January 27, 1995; in January and February, 1995,
DOE took actions allowed by the court to stabilize the construction
site.
The DARHT EIS was prepared pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.], the Council on
Environmental Quality NEPA regulations [40 CFR Parts 1500-1508] and the
DOE NEPA regulations [10 CFR Part 1021]. DOE issued the final DARHT
Facility Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0228, in August 1995
following the issuance of the draft DARHT EIS for public review in May
1995. The Environmental Protection Agency published its Notice of
Availability regarding the final DARHT EIS on September 8, 1995 [60 FR
46833].
The DARHT EIS includes a classified supplement that provides
additional information and analyses. The NEPA regulations provide that
EISs which address classified proposals may be restricted from public
dissemination; however, the document may be organized so that
classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified
portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR Part 1507.3(c); 10
CFR Part 1021.340(a)]. NEPA's public disclosure requirements are
subject to the exceptions spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552; 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)]. FOIA exempts materials
from public disclosure where specified by statute. Under the Atomic
Energy Act [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], material pertaining to nuclear
weapons design or related national security matters is classified and
exempted from public disclosure under FOIA and therefore under NEPA.
Accordingly, DOE prepared a classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, and
relied on information in that supplement to make this decision. The
classified supplement has been withheld from public dissemination, but
DOE provided the draft classified supplement for review by
appropriately cleared representatives of parties with a need to know
the classified information. These representatives include the
Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State
of New Mexico and certain American Indian tribal governments, so that
in accordance with the provisions of NEPA, these government agencies
could ensure that the public health and welfare are being adequately
protected.
DOE invited the public to comment on the adequacy and accuracy of
the draft EIS, and on any other matter concerning the DARHT review. The
public comment period on the draft DARHT EIS ended on June 26, 1995;
[[Page 53590]]
DOE held public hearings on the draft EIS in Los Alamos, New Mexico, on
May 31, 1995, and in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on June 1, 1995. The final
DARHT EIS includes transcripts of the public hearings and copies of
written comments, and explains how DOE considered all comments
received.
Alternatives Considered
The DARHT EIS analyzed six alternative ways to implement DOE's
proposed action to obtain enhanced radiographic capability. DOE
considered, but did not analyze in detail, other alternatives which DOE
determined would not meet the Department's purpose and need for
enhanced testing capability.
Certain aspects of the DOE hydrodynamic testing and dynamic
experiment program would not change regardless of the course of action
selected, and were considered to be common to all alternatives. These
include: the way hydrodynamic tests are conducted; the conducting of
contained dynamic experiments with plutonium; infrastructure
requirements; continued operation of the FXR Facility at LLNL;
continued operation of the LANL Radiographic Support Laboratory at
Technical Area 15; waste management considerations; decontamination and
decommissioning considerations; and other operational and site
characteristics of LANL. (Aside from the provisions in this ROD
regarding PHERMEX and DARHT, this ROD does not affect operation of any
other facility at LANL or any other DOE site, including the continued
operation of the FXR facility at LLNL or the continued operation of the
Radiographic Support Facility at LANL.)
Alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS are as follows:
--No Action Alternative. DOE would continue to use PHERMEX at LANL and
FXR at LLNL in support of its stockpile stewardship mission. The DARHT
structure would be completed for other uses.
--DARHT Baseline Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the DARHT
facility and phase out operations at PHERMEX, but would not pursue a
program of enhanced containment.
--Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. The DARHT facility would be completed
for other uses. DOE would construct major upgrades at PHERMEX,
including installing the high-resolution radiography planned for DARHT
and constructing a second accelerator for two-axis imaging.
--Enhanced Containment Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the
DARHT facility and phase out operations of PHERMEX as under the DARHT
Baseline Alternative; in addition, some or all tests would be conducted
inside a containment vessel or structure. Three options were
considered: (1) Vessel Containment Option (most tests would be
contained in modular steel vessels, starting with operation of the
first axis of DARHT); (2) Building Containment Option (all tests would
be contained inside a permanent building starting with operation of the
first axis of DARHT); and (3) Phased Containment Option, the DOE's
preferred alternative (most tests would be contained in modular steel
vessels, to be implemented over a ten-year period). Under options 1 and
3, DOE would construct and operate a Vessel Cleanout Facility to clean
the portable steel vessels and recycle materials as appropriate; under
option 2, DOE would construct and operate a separate cleanout facility
to assist in maintaining the containment building and recycling
materials as appropriate.
--Plutonium Exclusion Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT
Baseline Alternative; however, plutonium would not be used in any of
the experiments at DARHT. Under this alternative, in the future, DOE
may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; those involving
radiography would be conducted at PHERMEX and would be contained in
double-walled vessels.
--Single Axis Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT Baseline
Alternative; however, only one accelerator hall (single axis) would be
operated for hydrodynamic tests or dynamic experiments. The other hall
would be completed for other uses.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
While some of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS were
unacceptable in that they did not meet programmatic needs, none posed
unacceptable environmental impacts. The analyses in the DARHT EIS
indicate very little difference in the environmental impacts among the
alternatives analyzed. The major discriminators would be contamination
of soils near the firing point, health effects to workers, and the
amount of construction materials consumed. After consideration of the
environmental impacts identified through the EIS, DOE has determined
that the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative,
including DOE's preferred alternative (the Phased Containment Option),
would be somewhat environmentally preferable. These three options,
particularly the building containment option, would result in
considerably less release of depleted uranium and other metals to the
general environment than would the other alternatives analyzed
(including No Action because of the continued use of PHERMEX). However,
these options would result in a higher radiation dose to workers over
the life of the project compared to the other alternatives analyzed
(although the dose would be well below regulatory and administrative
limits). The benefit of reducing the amounts of materials released is
directly related to DOE's responsibility for environmental stewardship
and the desire to minimize cleanup activities at the end of the
facility's lifetime.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision
making process regarding the DARHT facility. DOE considered the impacts
from construction and operation of alternative facilities, and the
consequences that might be expected under accident scenarios. After
consideration of the environmental impacts identified and analyzed in
the DARHT EIS, DOE concludes that for the most part, environmental
impacts would be expected to be similar among all six of the
alternatives analyzed. None of these alternatives would present an
unacceptable level of adverse environmental impact to the human
environment.
DOE analyzed the potential impacts that might occur to land
resources, air quality, noise, water resources, soils, biotic
resources, cultural resources, socioeconomics, and human health. DOE
considered impacts that might occur from use of plutonium; facility
accidents, and transportation of radioactive materials. DOE considered
the amount of waste that would be generated under different
alternatives; irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources;
and the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. For all
alternatives analyzed, DOE determined that some contamination of soils
could occur and would present an unavoidable adverse impact.
Most impacts identified were essentially the same for all
alternatives analyzed. For the Vessel Containment Option and the Phased
Containment Option, one additional acre of land would be disturbed to
construct the Vessel Cleanout Facility. All three
[[Page 53591]]
options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would result in less
materials dispersed (the amount of depleted uranium released to the
environment is of particular interest because of its potential to
result in soil or water contamination); therefore, soils and water
resources would be less contaminated under that alternative. Under the
postulated testing program analyzed in the DARHT EIS, the amount of
materials released from the firing point under any of the action
alternatives would be 15% lower than under the No Action Alternative.
Because all of the action alternatives would provide an enhanced
radiographic capability, less material would need to be expended to
obtain more and better data. An even greater reduction would be
achieved under the Enhanced Containment Alternative options (a total of
95% reduction for Building Containment, 75% for Vessel Containment, and
50% for Phased Containment). Annual releases of depleted uranium would
be up to 90 pounds (41 kilograms) under the Building Containment
Option; up to 450 pounds (205 kilograms) under the Vessel Containment
Option; and up to 720 pounds (327 kilograms) (averaged over the
lifetime of the project with a range of from 1,460 pounds [664
kilograms] to 450 pounds [205 kilograms] per year) under the Phased
Containment Option. Under the other five alternatives, up to 1,540
pounds (700 kilograms) would be released annually. Compared to the
other five alternatives, the Enhanced Containment Alternative would
result in an unquantified beneficial impact to noise levels, wildlife
habitat and cultural resources; the benefit would be greatest under the
Building Containment Option.
The adverse impact to the health of the uninvolved public would be
less under the Enhanced Containment Alternative than the other five
alternatives: the dose to the affected population would be 8 person-rem
over the 30-year life of the project under the Building Containment
Option, 13 person-rem under the Vessel Containment Option, and 17
person-rem under the Phased Containment Option, compared to 30 person-
rem under all other alternatives. However, due to the concentration of
depleted uranium and other hazardous materials inside the Vessel
Cleanout Facility, the health hazard to workers would be greater under
the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative when compared
to the other alternatives, although doses would be well below
regulatory and administrative limits. The average annual dose to
workers under the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative
would be 0.6 rem compared to 0.3 rem for the other five alternatives
and the collective dose over the 30-year life of the project would be
60 person-rem compared to 9 person-rem. No additional latent cancer
fatalities would be expected over 50 years to the general population or
workers under normal operations under any of the six alternatives
analyzed.
Under the accident scenarios examined, an unexpected high-
explosives detonation would result in 15 fatalities (all personnel
present) at the facility under all alternatives analyzed. No additional
latent cancer fatalities would be expected over 50 years among members
of the general public from accidental release of depleted uranium under
any of the alternatives. Between 5 and 12 additional latent cancer
fatalities could occur from the accidental release of vaporized
plutonium. Such an accident is extremely unlikely (estimated to occur
once in every 10,000 to 1,000,000 years).
The two alternatives involving major additional construction (the
Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative and the Building Containment Option of the
Enhanced Containment Alternative) would result in considerably greater
commitment of construction resources (concrete and diesel fuel); the
Vessel Cleanout Facility under the Vessel Containment Option and the
Phased Containment Option would result in a slightly greater commitment
of construction resources.
Socioeconomic impacts would vary for each alternative, primarily
driven by duration and timing of new construction and whether PHERMEX
would be phased out of operation. More people would be employed under
any other alternative than under the No Action Alternative. The Vessel
Containment Option would result in the greatest increase in employment
(321 additional full-time jobs generated in the regional economy).
Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, 273 additional jobs would be
generated, compared with 253 under the Phased Containment Option, 238
under the Building Containment Option, 199 under the Upgrade PHERMEX
Alternative, 191 under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and 104 under the
Single Axis Alternative.
Review of Final EIS
DOE distributed approximately 800 copies of the final EIS to the
State of New Mexico, American Indian tribal governments, local
governments, other federal agencies, and the general public. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency commented that selection of the
Phased Containment Option as the preferred alternative should provide
additional environmental protection over the life of the project. No
other written comments specific to the final DARHT EIS were received.
However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in a letter to DOE dated
September 12, 1995, clarified the language of its August 3, 1995 letter
regarding mitigation measures to protect the nesting habitat of the
Mexican spotted owl, a federally-listed threatened species. (The August
3, 1995 letter concurred with the DOE determination that operation of
DARHT would not be likely to adversely affect the Mexican spotted owl,
and the September 12, 1995 letter does not affect that concurrence.)
A member of the public telephoned DOE and pointed out a typographic
and calculational error in the tables regarding air quality in the
final EIS. An error was noted in the conversion of the three-hour
standard for sulfur dioxide from parts per million to micrograms per
cubic meter in calculating the percent of regulatory standard in
conjunction with potential air quality impacts. The corrected
calculated percent of regulatory standard is a factor of 10 higher for
sulfur dioxide concentrations. For tables S-1, 3-3, and C1-8 the
percent of regulatory standard in the most restrictive case increases
from 2.2 to 22%; this is constant across all alternatives and does not
change the overall analysis of air quality impacts. In addition, the
caller pointed out a typographic error in table 5-1 regarding the
calculated annual concentration of nitrogen dioxide; it should be 0.04
micrograms per cubic meter rather than 0.004. None of these changes
affect the results of the environmental analysis.
DOE also identified an additional typographic error in the
document. The DARHT EIS provides a comparison of costs for the reader's
information; there is an inconsistency between the cost figures shown
in the summary table 3-4 and the corresponding table in the body of the
analysis, table 5-19. The cost estimates in table 3-4 are correct
(those in table 5-19 are from the draft EIS but inadvertently were not
updated).
Decision
DOE has decided to complete and operate the DARHT facility at LANL
to provide enhanced high-resolution radiography (x-ray photography)
capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in
[[Page 53592]]
support of the Department's historical mission and the near-term
stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE will mitigate
potential environmental effects by implementing an enhanced approach to
containing expended test materials. This will be done by conducting
tests in modular steel containment vessels to be phased in over ten
years. DOE will also construct and operate a separate Vessel Cleanout
Facility in conjunction with the operation of the DARHT facility. This
is the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment
Alternative, identified as the preferred alternative in the DARHT Final
EIS.
DOE will complete construction of the DARHT facility with the
intent to operate both axes of the facility. As soon as possible, DOE
will resume construction of the firing site facility, complete both of
the two accelerator halls (dual axes), and will resume procurement,
testing and installation of equipment required for operating the DARHT
firing site facility with the first axis x-ray machine. DOE will equip
the first axis with an accelerator capable of achieving a nominal 20
million electron volts (MeV) of electron- beam energy, and an output x-
ray dose of up to 1,650 roentgens (R). The DARHT facility will be
completed to the original plans, with minor modifications if necessary
to accommodate the accelerator and x-ray equipment and the use of the
portable modular containment vessels.
DOE intends to eventually operate DARHT in a dual axis mode, and
will procure, test and install equipment for the second axis. Based on
the results of installing, testing and proving the linear accelerator
equipment in the first axis, DOE may incorporate modified or improved
technology for the second axis or retrofit the equipment previously
installed in the first axis. As long as no substantial change to the
building footprint is required, and as long as the energy output of
both the first and second accelerator falls within the range analyzed
in the DARHT EIS (electron beam energies of up to 30 MeV and output x-
ray dose of up to 2,000 R for each accelerator), no additional NEPA
review will be required for modifications to equipment for the first or
second axis.
DOE will operate the DARHT facility to provide high-speed, high-
resolution flash radiographs which will be used to measure or diagnose
the results of tests and experiments involving high explosives and
other systems. Other types of portable low- energy x-ray, electronic,
optical, and photographic diagnostic equipment may be used at the
facility. DARHT may be operated with one or two x-ray beams from one or
both axes, either simultaneously or with a timing variation.
DOE plans to conduct some dynamic experiments using plutonium.
Dynamic experiments with plutonium will always be conducted in
specially-designed double- walled containment vessels. DOE will
maintain the capability to stage, maintain, and clean out plutonium
containment vessels at LANL. The Vessel Cleanout Facility will not be
used for this purpose.
DARHT will have the following uses and potential uses:
--To study the implosion of mock nuclear weapons primaries. This
information would be used to assist the DOE with its stockpile
stewardship and management mission in order to ensure the continued
safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile,
and to further a basic scientific understanding of the behavior of
nuclear weapons.
--To conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in order to obtain more
information regarding the physical and chemical properties of
plutonium. All such experiments will be conducted in specially-
designed, double-walled steel containment vessels.
--To continue to assist other nations in evaluating the condition,
safety and reliability of their existing nuclear weapons under current
international agreements, and any future agreements.
--To assess the condition, safety and performance reliability of other
nuclear weapons, such as those that might be designed by a non-friendly
nation or a terrorist and obtained by the United States.
--To continue to assist the Department of Defense with evaluations of
conventional weapons and other military equipment.
--To continue to study explosives-driven materials and high-velocity
impact phenomena for non-weapons applications and other uses of
interest to industry.
--To pursue other applications of the radiography or accelerator
technology and other equipment developed for high-resolution
radiography.
In 1991, President Bush stated that the United States would not
design new nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. However, in the
event that this nation decides, as a matter of policy, that new nuclear
weapons should be developed, or in the event that retrofit components
need to be developed for existing nuclear weapons, DARHT could be used
to assist in the development of weapons or weapons components. Any
decision to develop new nuclear weapons would be made by the President
subject to the review and approval of Congress. Neither DARHT nor any
other facility operated by DOE will be used for this purpose unless
such a Presidential determination is made.
The completed DARHT facility will be operated with a 2,500 foot
(950 meter) radius exclusion zone as a safety feature to provide
protection to personnel and structures while testing takes place. The
completed DARHT facility will include the already-constructed earthen
berm on the northern side of the facility to serve as a radiation
protection measure. Explosives or special nuclear materials will not be
stored, handled or processed inside the DARHT firing site building.
As soon as the first axis of the DARHT facility becomes
operational, DOE will phase out operation of the PHERMEX facility over
approximately four years and, at the end of that time, will
decommission and decontaminate the PHERMEX facility unless an
alternative use is identified for the structure or facility equipment.
Activities needed to decommission and decontaminate the structure, or
to convert it to another use, may be subject to further NEPA review or
other environmental review.
DOE will use a modular containment vessel system to contain the
materials released from tests and experiments--materials such as
depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and other materials that
would otherwise be released to the general environment. As discussed
previously, DOE has always in the past, and will continue in the
future, to conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in special
double-walled containment vessels. However, these vessels are not
appropriate for tests not involving plutonium. They are limited to high
explosive charges of 44 pounds (20 kilograms); a containment system for
non-plutonium tests must accommodate much larger charges (see below).
The existing vessels also impose substantial limitations on experiment
configurations and diagnostic capabilities. Therefore, DOE will
undertake a development program to design, test, and build containment
vessels specifically for tests that do not use plutonium. This modular
system will allow the containment vessel to be modified to meet size
and configuration needs for a given test. Containment of tests not
involving plutonium will be phased into DOE's long-term hydrodynamic
testing program at LANL according to the following plan, with
[[Page 53593]]
the first phase starting when the first axis of DARHT becomes
operational. The first three phases will involve tests that use up to
110 pounds (50 kilograms) of high explosives.
--Phase 1--Demonstration (years 1 through 5). DOE will put into place
at DARHT a prototype vessel system and portable cleanout unit as part
of a process to reduce the material released to the open air over this
5-year period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects
that such a reduction would be at least 5% compared to the releases
expected from the testing program if containment were not used.) During
this period, DOE will design and build an additional vessel system,
incorporating experience gained during this phase. Based on the final
vessel design, DOE will design and start construction of the Vessel
Cleanout Facility.
--Phase 2--Containment (years 6 through 10). Over the second 5-year
period DOE will put into place a 5-vessel containment system which will
be used to further reduce the material released over this 5-year
period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that
this reduction would be at least 40%.) DOE will start to operate the
Vessel Cleanout Facility.
--Phase 3--Enhanced Containment (years 11 through 30). Based on DOE's
experience gained from the first two phases, the modular containment
vessels will be continually improved. DOE will use the vessel system to
further reduce the material released over the next 20-year period.
(Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that this
reduction would be at least 75%.)
--Phase 4--440-lb (200-kg) Containment Option. If justified by the
development effort and operating experience after Phase 1, DOE may
develop and use a vessel to contain material from tests and experiments
larger than 110 pounds (50 kilograms). These could include tests of up
to 440 pounds (200 kilograms) of high explosives, thus allowing DOE to
contain a greater percentage of material. Phase 4 may be implemented at
any time after Phase 1.
DOE will design, construct, and operate the Vessel Cleanout
Facility to support use of the portable modular containment vessels.
DOE analyzed two alternative locations for this facility in the DARHT
EIS. DOE's intention is to locate and construct the Vessel Cleanout
Facility at the southernmost location analyzed, because that location
is closest to the DARHT facility and closest to existing utility lines.
However, if during the detailed design stage DOE determines that it
would be more beneficial (from the standpoint of operating conditions
or environmental protection) to construct or operate the cleanout
facility at the northernmost location, DOE may construct and operate
the Vessel Cleanout Facility there without performing additional NEPA
review. DOE will improve an existing firebreak (dirt) road to provide
access to the Vessel Cleanout Facility at either of the two locations.
Road improvements will be located to avoid adverse impact to cultural
resource sites, if any, in the vicinity. If, after designs are
completed, neither location analyzed in the DARHT EIS proves to be
suitable, a decision to locate the Vessel Cleanout Facility somewhere
else may be subject to further NEPA review.
The modular containment vessel intended for non-plutonium tests has
not previously been used by DOE, and the operation of this system is
not well-established. Although DOE expects a highly effective vessel
design to be achievable, if technological problems were to be
encountered in fabricating or using the vessel system, or if for some
other reason the vessels cannot be deployed according to the phased
schedule, DOE will conduct testing operations at DARHT in such a way as
to continue to reduce, to the extent practicable, the amount of
materials released to the environment. Such a reduction may be achieved
by other methods, including (but not limited to) altering the number of
experiments or tests, and picking up the expended materials.
Some non-plutonium tests or experiments of the type anticipated for
DARHT cannot be conducted inside containment vessels due to diagnostic
equipment limitations or the type of diagnostic information needed.
Although DOE will eventually conduct most tests and experiments inside
containment vessels, DOE may conduct any given test or experiment that
does not involve plutonium in an open-air configuration, so long as the
above percentages of material containment are met.
Other Decision Factors
In addition to environmental factors, DOE considered costs, timing,
technology, national security, and infrastructure availability. DOE
considered classified information, including the information and
analyses in the classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, in making its
decision. The environmental impacts identified in the classified
supplement, specifically those relating to human health, were not in
and of themselves classified, and were therefore also included in the
environmental analyses in the unclassified portion of the DARHT EIS.
However, the specific details of the operations that would produce
those impacts are classified, and are presented only in the classified
supplement. The factors discussed here include information from the
classified as well as the unclassified portions of the DARHT EIS.
Cost
Because DOE must be fiscally prudent, DOE considered construction
and operating costs. DOE estimates that the total capital cost for
construction and equipment would vary considerably among alternatives.
The capital cost for the Phased Containment Option would be the highest
and that for the No Action Alternative would be the lowest. Over the
predicted 30 year life of the facility, the Phased Containment Option
has the lowest estimated total cost of all containment options when
considering capital cost plus annual operating costs. The total capital
construction and equipment cost for the Phased Containment Option would
be about $187 million; on the average, operating costs would be about
$9.8 million per year. For comparison, DOE estimates the approximate
total capital costs and operating costs, respectively, for other
alternatives at $181 million and $10.4 million for the Building
Containment Option; $176 million and $10.4 million for the Vessel
Containment Option; $167 million and $6.5 million for the Upgrade
PHERMEX Alternative; $145 million and $6.5 million for either the DARHT
Baseline Alternative or the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative; $97
million and $5.4 million for the Single Axis Alternative; and $49
million and $4.2 million for the No Action Alternative. As documented
in the draft DARHT EIS, DOE originally calculated project capital costs
based on installing 16 MeV linear accelerators. DOE estimates that the
additional cost to install 20 MeV accelerators would be about $8
million per machine.
Timing
Because DOE needs to begin establishing baseline conditions of
weapons in the enduring stockpile as soon as possible, DOE considered
when it could achieve that level of enhanced capability provided by a
single axis, and then considered if it could achieve the full enhanced
multiple-view capability as well. PHERMEX and FXR are now in
[[Page 53594]]
use, so under the No Action Alternative the existing (non-enhanced)
capability is currently available and multiple-view capability would
never be available. Under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and all other
alternatives except the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, the first axis
would be ready 38 months after construction resumes; for the DARHT
Baseline Alternative and all other alternatives except as noted, the
second axis would be available in 66 months (an additional 28 months).
Under the Building Containment Option, dual axis capability would be
ready in 77 months without interim single axis capability due to the
additional time to construct the containment building. (Under this
option, no tests would be conducted until the containment building was
operational.) Under the Single Axis Alternative, a multiple-axis
capability would never be available. Under the Upgrade PHERMEX
Alternative, the existing operating capability would be lost for 51
months due to construction, and the second axis would be ready 71
months after construction began.
DOE considered whether it would be prudent to wait for development
of the technology and design of an even more advanced multiple-view
hydrodynamic testing capability instead of pursuing DARHT. Although DOE
has conceptualized the next generation of advanced hydrodynamic testing
capability, potential technologies for such a facility have not yet
been selected, developed or proven. DOE would incur additional risk to
its ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile if, instead of obtaining a known enhanced capability in the
near-term, it waited the several years necessary to identify and
develop an advanced technology.
DOE also considered whether it would be prudent to wait until it
has made the programmatic decisions expected to follow the completion
of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS [60 FR
31291] or the LANL Sitewide EIS [60 FR 25697] now under preparation.
The DARHT EIS notes that the actions needed to improve DOE's capability
to conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments are included
within the stockpile stewardship mission defined by the President and
Congress. The DOE proposal to provide enhanced high-resolution
multiple-view radiographic capability responds to Presidential and
Congressional direction. For the reasons noted below, DOE finds that
this decision to acquire enhanced capability will not prejudice its
future decisions regarding stockpile stewardship and management, or
regarding providing an environmentally-sound operating envelope for
LANL.
DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic testing program,
and will need the enhanced capability provided by DARHT to implement
that program, regardless of any other decisions to be made regarding
stockpile stewardship and management. Thus, the courses of action
analyzed in the DARHT EIS, and the action decided upon in this ROD, are
justified independently of the stockpile stewardship and management
program, and will not prejudice any ultimate decision on the program,
nor will they be influenced by the expected programmatic decisions. The
LANL Sitewide EIS will assist with decisions on how to operate LANL in
an environmentally-sound manner; this ROD will not prejudice any
decisions expected to result from the LANL Sitewide EIS. Accordingly,
DOE finds that it would not be consistent with the nation's need to
obtain enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic capability as quickly as
possible if the Department delayed its decisions on DARHT until after
completion of the other two EISs, nor would the Department benefit
programmatically from such a delay.
Technology
DOE could achieve enhanced high-resolution radiographic capability
under any of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS except the No
Action Alternative. While still operating adequately at this time, the
existing equipment at PHERMEX is approaching the end of its design life
and DOE is concerned that it will become increasingly difficult and
expensive to continue to maintain the aging accelerator over time.
Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not achieve the three-
dimensional or sequential capability that could be achieved with dual
axis capability, thus defeating a key component of the purpose and need
for the project.
The three options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would
impede the image quality somewhat, but not to an unacceptable level.
Containment also decreases testing efficiency in that it would take
more time to prepare and execute a new test and would not allow for
overhead diagnostics.
National Security
DOE needs to achieve high-resolution, high-speed multiple-axis
radiographic hydrodynamic capability as soon as possible to ensure the
greatest degree of confidence in the continued safety and reliability
of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE needs to be able to use this type
of capability to perform contained dynamic experiments with plutonium
in support of its nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and management
mission. The existing hydrodynamic facilities at PHERMEX and FXR cannot
provide the needed level of confidence to support our national security
goals. Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not obtain the
three-dimensional or rapid-time-sequenced images needed to provide the
maximum amount of diagnostic information to meet national security
goals. Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, DOE could not use the
enhanced capability to diagnose the effects of dynamic experiments
involving plutonium, which would not meet national security goals.
Under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, DOE would lose the ability to
perform any hydrodynamic testing at LANL, and the capability to perform
dynamic experiments with plutonium for 51 months, which would encumber
national security goals.
Infrastructure
DOE needs to be able to use an enhanced radiographic capability for
dynamic experiments involving plutonium. These experiments will always
be conducted in special double-walled steel containment vessels.
Special facilities are needed to fabricate plutonium shapes; store and
handle plutonium; perform plutonium chemistry diagnostics; process
material for experiments and for storage; and to ensure worker safety
and security. The large, heavy, double-walled containment vessels that
would be used for dynamic experiments with plutonium would be difficult
to handle or to transport over long distances. While LANL already has
the requisite plutonium storage and handling infrastructure at its
Plutonium Facility and other facilities, no other DOE site currently
has a plutonium storage and handling capability sufficient to support
dynamic experiments with plutonium. DOE has determined that it would be
unreasonably costly (up to about $10,000 per square foot) to construct
new plutonium handling and storage facilities at another site when
adequate operating technical facilities are already in place and in use
at LANL. In addition, LANL already has an infrastructure in place to
support the ongoing (non-plutonium) testing program at PHERMEX.
Balancing Decision Factors
In order to be able to continue to ensure the safety and
reliability of the existing stockpile, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced
capability to perform
[[Page 53595]]
hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments, and to obtain that
capability as soon as possible. DOE cannot afford to wait for
development of future advanced technologies, but instead must make use
of known technology.
Because DOE needs to be able to perform contained dynamic
experiments with plutonium, DOE needs to have a plutonium handling
capability to support the dynamic experiments; this support
infrastructure is already in place at LANL and it would be too costly
(several hundred million dollars) to replicate these facilities at
another site solely to support an enhanced radiographic capability.
Similarly, the safe transport of containment vessels that have been
used for dynamic experiments with plutonium from another site to LANL
would be prohibitively expensive. For these reasons, DOE needs to
provide an enhanced radiographic capability at LANL.
DOE has concluded that the existing radiography equipment at
PHERMEX (the No Action Alternative) does not meet the Department's need
for enhanced high-resolution multiple-view radiographic capability.
Enlarging the existing PHERMEX facility or constructing a second axis
at PHERMEX would require DOE to forego its hydrodynamic capability at
LANL for 51 months. DOE finds that a 51-month loss of its ability to
conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments at LANL is an
unacceptable situation. Therefore DOE decided not to upgrade the
existing PHERMEX facility to achieve enhanced single or dual axis
radiographic capability (the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative).
DOE needs to obtain high-resolution multiple-view radiographic
capability to obtain the best information about nuclear weapons
primaries. To equip only one axis of the dual axis DARHT facility would
not allow DOE to obtain three-dimensional or time-sequenced
information. Although there would be a cost reduction of about one-
third if DOE did not equip the second axis, there would be very little
difference in environmental impact, and national security goals would
not be met. Therefore, DOE decided against installing accelerator
equipment in only one axis of the DARHT facility (the Single Axis
Alternative).
DOE needs to obtain high-resolution radiographic capability to
conduct, among other things, contained dynamic experiments with
plutonium. It would be inconsistent with national security goals to go
to the expense of obtaining the high-resolution radiographic equipment
planned for DARHT and to not use it for dynamic experiments with
plutonium. In the event that DOE decided to operate DARHT without
conducting plutonium experiments, DOE would have to maintain PHERMEX
into the indefinite future to provide a capability to conduct plutonium
experiments without taking advantage of DARHT's enhanced capability.
This would neither be cost-effective nor meet national security goals.
Accordingly, DOE decided against the option of completing DARHT but
limiting the use of the facility to exclude the use of plutonium while
maintaining PHERMEX indefinitely (the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative).
DOE initially preferred the DARHT Baseline Alternative. However,
after examining the environmental impacts identified in the DARHT EIS,
and the public and agency comments on the draft DARHT EIS, DOE
recognized that achieving an enhanced level of containment provides an
opportunity to increase the quality of DOE's environmental stewardship
by decreasing contamination from expended test materials (the Enhanced
Containment Alternative). Therefore DOE has decided against
implementing the DARHT Baseline Alternative by itself, even though
providing an enhanced level of containment is more expensive. From a
programmatic standpoint, the immediate use of vessel or building
containment could have serious design or operating limitations. Phasing
a program of vessel containment over ten years would allow DOE to take
advantage of the environmental mitigation effect of enhanced vessel
containment while still allowing the DARHT facility to be completed
relatively quickly to meet national security needs as soon as possible.
Under the Building Containment Option, the concrete containment
structure would have to be very large in comparison to the firing site
to contain the overpressure from an explosive test; DOE would forego
the capability for experiments or tests using large amounts of high
explosives or other specific types of large-scale tests because of the
structural limitations of the building. Also, this option would place
serious constraints on DOE's ability to conduct dynamic experiments
with plutonium because of the difficulty in moving the large, double-
walled steel containment vessels needed for plutonium experiments in
and out of the containment building.
The DARHT EIS analysis of the Vessel Containment Option assumed
that the DARHT facility would operate from the outset with most tests
and experiments conducted inside modular single-walled steel
containment vessels. If this limitation were imposed, the number of
tests that could be conducted early in the operating life of the
facility would be significantly reduced. Although some conceptual work
has been done, DOE has not yet designed the modular vessels. DOE would
have to perfect a prototype vessel before fabricating all the vessels
needed. The use of modular vessels depends on construction and
operation of the Vessel Cleanout Facility; the design for this building
could not be finalized until after the prototype vessels were perfected
in order to determine the specific details of cleanout equipment and
techniques. DOE estimates that it would take approximately 10 years
beyond the available date of the DARHT facility to complete these
activities and be able to conduct a full schedule of contained tests.
DOE finds that a delay of five or ten years to implement the modular
vessel containment system before operating the DARHT facility would be
unacceptable and would not meet the Department's need to obtain the use
of DARHT's capability as soon as possible.
By phasing the implementation of the vessel prototyping program,
within about 10 years DOE could achieve the same environmental
protection results as could be obtained under the Vessel Containment
Option without delaying or adversely affecting its ability to operate
DARHT. Therefore, DOE developed the Phased Containment Option. Under
this option, for the first 10 years environmental mitigation would be
greater than would occur under the DARHT Baseline Alternative but less
than would occur under the Vessel Containment Option; after that point,
environmental mitigation would be the same for the Phased Containment
Option and the Vessel Containment Option. Accordingly, DOE has decided
to implement the Phased Containment Option rather than delay operation
of DARHT, as would have been the case under the Vessel Containment
Option.
For some tests, DOE cannot meet programmatic objectives if vessel
containment is used. Therefore, on a case-by case basis, DOE may opt to
conduct certain types of non-plutonium tests as uncontained, such as
those using a very large explosive charge (larger than the containment
vessel rating); those requiring complex diagnostics (such as certain
optics or laser tests) that cannot be achieved using a containment
vessel; those requiring measurement of material movement beyond the
confines of the vessel; or those using a very small
[[Page 53596]]
explosives charge or small amounts of hazardous materials in which use
of the vessel would not be practical, cost-effective, or
environmentally significant. After the phased containment program is
fully implemented, DOE expects to reduce by at least 75% the emissions
from test assemblies made from beryllium, depleted uranium, or Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act characteristic metals. For any experiment
that is contained, DOE expects that at least 99% by mass of these
materials would be retained inside the vessel.
Mitigation Measures
Through the environmental impact analysis process, and in
conjunction with consultations with affected American Indian tribes and
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, DOE developed several
mitigation measures to protect soils, water, wildlife, biotic, and
cultural resources. Some mitigation measures would apply during
construction activities, and some for the duration of the project. DOE
has agreed to an ongoing consultation process with affected American
Indian tribes to ensure protection of cultural resources and sites of
cultural, historic or religious importance to the tribes. DOE will take
special precautions to protect the Mexican spotted owl, a federally-
listed threatened species, and in consultation with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, will prepare a laboratory-wide habitat management
plan for all threatened and endangered species occurring throughout
LANL in order to determine long-range mitigation actions to protect the
habitats for these species. The habitat management plan will be
completed within 3 years from the date of this decision, and will be
updated as necessary. DOE will implement the mitigation measures
discussed in section 5.11 of volume 1 of the DARHT EIS. In accordance
with 10 CFR 1021.331, DOE is preparing a Mitigation Action Plan that
will identify specific actions needed to implement these mitigation
measures, and provide schedules for completion. These mitigation
measures represent all practicable means to avoid or minimize harm from
the alternative selected.
Conclusion
In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing
regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, and consistent with the U.S.
District Court Order of May 5, 1995, I have considered the information
contained within the final DARHT EIS, including the classified
supplement to that EIS, and the public comments received in response to
the draft DARHT EIS. Being fully apprised of the environmental
consequences of the proposal and its several alternatives, as well as
the cost considerations and other decision factors described above, I
have concluded the following:
--Completing and operating the DARHT facility at LANL would meet the
need of the Department and this nation to obtain as soon as possible an
enhanced capability to perform high-resolution, multiple-image
radiography to diagnose hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments.
--Conducting most tests and experiments inside modular steel
containment vessels will reduce the potential for contamination from
dispersal of materials from the explosive-driven tests.
--Phasing in the implementation of the modular vessel system over a
ten-year period will allow DOE to gain the benefit of operating the
DARHT facility as quickly as possible.
--The incrementally higher impacts during the phase-in period do not
pose an unacceptable risk to public health and welfare, or to the
environment.
I have therefore determined that DOE will implement the Phased
Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, identified
as the preferred alternative in the DARHT EIS. As part of this action,
DOE will take additional mitigation measures, specified herein,
including those to protect the habitat of threatened or endangered
species, and to protect cultural resource sites and other locations of
interest to affected American Indian tribes. These actions will allow
DOE to meet its responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons stockpile, while meeting its additional
responsibility for environmental stewardship of the lands and resources
entrusted to its care.
Issued at Washington, D.C. October 10, 1995.
Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.
[FR Doc. 95-25596 Filed 10-13-95; 8:45 am]
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