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Comments and questions should be directed to the NRC Clearance Officer, Brenda Jo Shelton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, T-6 F33, Washington, D.C., 20555-0001, (301) 415-7233, or by Internet electronic mail at BJS@NRC.GOV.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of November, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
Gerald F. Cranford,  
*Designated Senior Official for Information Resources Management.*

[FR Doc. 95-29424 Filed 12-1-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

**[Docket Nos. 50-344 and 50-412]**

**Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, The Toledo Edison Company, Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Notice of Partial Withdrawal of Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License**

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the request by Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) to withdraw a portion of its September 13, 1995, application for a proposed amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and BVPS-2), located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment involved revision of the Administrative Controls section (Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.6.a.2), 6.8.6.a.7), and 6.14.a.2)) and the Bases section for TS 3/4.11.1.4 of the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 TSs to be consistent with the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The ODCM was recently updated to reflect the radioactive liquid

and gaseous effluent release limits and the liquid holdup tank activity limit of BVPS-1 License Amendment No. 188 and BVPS-2 License Amendment No. 70 which were issued June 12, 1995.

On October 16, 1995, the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC requesting withdrawal of the proposed changes to TS 6.14.a.2) and to the Bases for TS 3/4.11.1.4 because these changes incorrectly referenced superseded sections of 10 CFR Part 20.

The Commission has previously issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing, which was published in the Federal Register on September 22, 1995 (60 FR 49292).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated September 13, 1995, and the licensee's letter of October 16, 1995, which withdrew the portion of the application for license amendment. The above documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the B.F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 21st day of 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
Donald S. Brinkman,  
*Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 95-29423 Filed 12-1-95; 8:45 am]

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**[Docket No. 50-245]**

**Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-21 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, located in Waterford, Connecticut.

The proposed amendment would remove the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements for the loss-of-normal power (LNP) trip function from Tables 3.2.2 and 4.2.1 and insert new LCO 3.2.F and Surveillance Requirement

4.2.F. In addition, the proposed amendment will add a new table to specify the required LNP instrumentation for each bus, will update the Table of Contents, will make some editorial changes, and will revise the associated Bases section.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

NNECO has reviewed the proposed change against the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the change does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC). The bases for this conclusion are that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c), discussed separately below, are not compromised. The proposed change does not involve an SHC because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed:

These changes do not increase the probability of a loss of offsite power event or the occurrence of any accidents which assume loss of offsite power. This is ensured by the LNP instrumentation system design which uses multiple sensing relays and qualified Class 1E components, as well as conservative operability and surveillance requirements.

The LNP instrumentation for a safety division consists of discrete voltage sensing, time delay, initiation, and auxiliary logic relaying. The LNP instrumentation for a safety division is a single trip system (initiation channel) controlled by two instrument channels. Each instrument channel consists of a loss of voltage trip function and a degraded voltage trip function. The two instrument channels each provide a trip signal. The LNP trip signal is comprised of two instrument channels made up of a loss of voltage relay and its timer, and a degraded voltage relay and its timer. The signals from the two instrument channels feed into a delay timer, producing the LNP initiation system for the safety division. The S1 LNP instrumentation is powered from the

S1 125V dc bus, and the S2 LNP instrumentation is powered from the S2 125V dc bus. The loss of voltage, and degraded voltage, sensing relays can be placed in the tripped condition by removing the relay from the case. To minimize the likelihood of an inadvertent safety division initiation, the loss of voltage trip requires 3/3 relays and the degraded voltage trip requires 2/3 relays.

If the LNP instrumentation senses that the preferred offsite power source has been lost for that safety division, the safety related buses for that safety division are disconnected from the offsite source and connected to their emergency power source. If the LNP instrumentation determines that the preferred offsite power source is in a degraded condition for that safety division, and that an ECCS [emergency core cooling system] signal is present, then the safety related buses for that safety division are disconnected from the offsite source and connected to their emergency power source. For a degraded voltage condition on either safety division, without ECCS actuation, the operators are alerted to this condition by an annunciator and will initiate the appropriate corrective actions. This design fulfills the safety functions assumed in the accident analyses relating to loss of normal power/loss of offsite power.

If one instrument channel for a safety division were to fail in the non-conservative state, the safety division's other instrument channel would provide the loss of voltage trip and the degraded voltage trip for that safety division. The ability of the safety division to detect an undervoltage condition and respond is maintained. Each instrument channel has a separate feed, from separate breakers, from the 125 V dc power supply associated with that safety division. The seven day LCO of section 3.2.F.2 is justified based on continued operability of the safety division's redundant trip channel. Seven days allows reasonable time to perform repairs.

The time delays and voltage setpoints specified in Table 3.2.4 ensure that the emergency power source starting and loading times continue to meet the current technical specification requirements. Also, these time delays are long enough to preclude false trips due to voltage transients (e.g., during motor starts). The relay calibration surveillance procedure will establish acceptance criteria for each relay to ensure that the total times specified in Table 3.2.4 are not exceeded. The proposed surveillance testing and calibration frequency of every refueling outage is consistent with the requirements in the current technical specification.

Some of the redundancy in the existing LNP logic will be lost as a result of separating the two divisions of LNP logic, yielding a small increase in the probability of failure of certain portions of LNP logic. However, this impact is not significant, and is outweighed by the beneficial automatic repowering of a deenergized division following an LNP.

Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated:

Following the proposed changes, plant response to an LNP on one division would be improved, since a deenergized division would be automatically repowered by its emergency power source while the other division remains aligned to offsite power. There are no malfunctions which would adversely impact both safety divisions while in this alignment.

There are no new failure modes associated with these changes which will prevent the LNP instrumentation from performing its intended safety function. Each individual voltage sensing relay, when removed from its case, provides the tripped contact configuration. The proposed technical specifications would allow relays to be placed in the tripped condition as long as this would not inhibit the LNP function or cause an inadvertent initiation. Additionally, since the design function to ensure that adequate power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment has not changed, no new accident or accident of a different kind is created.

The test switches provided for load shed logic testing are similar to the existing test switches on the secondary side of the Potential Transformers. Moreover, they require preplanned removal of a switch box cover, and require the switch to be in its original position before the switch box cover can be replaced. These switches help to avoid operator error in the present practice of sleeving contacts, installing jumpers, and pulling fuses. Administrative controls and personnel training ensure that there are no new failure modes or new or different accident scenarios than those previously evaluated.

A keylock bypass switch when placed in the "Bypass" position will block LNP actuation, thus, preventing the starting and loading of the emergency generator for the associated division, if an LNP were to occur. This is not a new failure mode since similar blocking mechanisms currently exist for each of the emergency generators. Currently, the EDG [emergency diesel generator] and GTG [gas turbine generator] can be prevented from starting on an ECCS signal by placement of an existing keylock switch in the "Off-Normal" position. To minimize the impact of inadvertent use of the bypass switch, an annunciation is provided. Also, these switches would be strictly administratively controlled to prevent their use during power operation. This restriction on the use of the keylock bypass switches during non-power operation is discussed in the Bases section of these proposed technical specifications. Operation of a keylock switch will result in the emergency power source being declared inoperable per proposed Technical Specification 3.2.F.3. The current logic will not actuate the LNP logic if power is removed from bus 14E or bus 14F individually. These switches will help avoid inadvertent actuation of equipment during surveillance testing by eliminating the need for sleeving of relay contacts, installing jumpers and pulling fuses to perform testing. Administrative controls and personnel

training ensure that there are no new failure modes. Careful isolation of a bus for preplanned maintenance is part of the existing maintenance and surveillance activities, and the provision of the keylock switches does not change the infrequent need for these activities. Administrative controls and personnel training ensure that there are no new failure modes or new or different accident scenarios than those previously evaluated.

Although the proposed design does not provide an LNP signal if the 14C/E tie breaker is inadvertently opened, the loss of voltage on bus 14E (which would result from the failure or the inadvertent opening of the tie breaker) is enveloped by the single failure of one safety division. This would be mitigated by the redundant safety division. For a division S1 loss of normal power, plus LOCA [loss of coolant accident], the S2 division is available to power the A and C LPCI [low pressure coolant injection] trains and the A train of core spray. This scenario is no different than the existing design.

Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The protective boundaries (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, containment building) are not affected because the consequences of a design basis accident are not changed. Since the protective boundaries are not affected, any margin of safety is also unaffected. The proposed changes ensure that adequate electrical power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment. By maximizing the operability of the LNP Instrumentation without requiring high risk testing, the proposed changes will improve the margin of safety as related to availability of electric power to safety related loads.

Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed NNECO's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By January 03, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following message addressed to Phillip F. McKee: petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated October 3, 1995,

which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of November 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
James W. Andersen,

*Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3,  
Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of  
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 95-29422 Filed 12-1-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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## OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

### Notice of Meeting of the Industry Policy Advisory Committee

**AGENCY:** Office of the United States  
Trade Representative.

**ACTION:** Notice that the December 8, 1995 meeting of the Industry Policy Advisory Committee will be held from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. The meeting will be closed to the public from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m.

**SUMMARY:** The Industry Policy Advisory Committee will hold a meeting on December 8, 1995 from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. The meeting will be closed to the public. The meeting will include a review and discussion of current issues which influence U.S. trade policy. Pursuant to Section 2155(f)(2) of Title 19 of the United States Code, I have determined that this portion of the meeting will be concerned with matters the disclosure of which would seriously compromise the development by the United States Government of trade policy, priorities, negotiating objectives or bargaining positions with respect to the operation of any trade agreement and other matters arising in connection with the development, implementation and administration of the trade policy of the United States.

**DATES:** The meeting is scheduled for December 8, 1995, unless otherwise notified.

**ADDRESSES:** The meeting will be held at the White House Conference Center, located at 726 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., unless otherwise notified.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**  
Michaëlle Burstin, Director of Public

Liaison, Office of the United States  
Trade Representative, (202) 395-6120.

Michael Kantor,

*United States Trade Representative.*

[FR Doc. 95-29419 Filed 12-1-95; 8:45 am]

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## SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-36516; File No. SR-CBOE-  
95-16]

### Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., Relating to Multi-Market Orders

November 27, 1995.

#### I. Introduction

On June 1, 1995, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated ("CBOE" or "Exchange") filed a proposed rule change with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act")<sup>1</sup> and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,<sup>2</sup> to amend CBOE Rule 6.48 to specify certain duties of CBOE members in effecting an options transaction on the CBOE that is part of a stock-option or stock-option combination order. The Exchange filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposal on June 22, 1995.<sup>3</sup>

Notice of the proposal, as amended, was published for comment and appeared in the Federal Register on August 16, 1995.<sup>4</sup> No comment letters were received on the proposed rule

<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

<sup>2</sup> 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

<sup>3</sup> In Amendment No. 1, the Exchange proposes to amend subparagraph (b)(ii) of CBOE Rule 6.48 to clarify that the existence of market conditions that prevent the execution of the non-option leg(s) at the agreed upon price(s) would be the only basis for any one party to a trade representing the options leg of a multi-market order to cancel such trade. See Letter from Michael Meyer, Attorney, Schiff Hardin & Waite, to John Ayanian, Attorney, Office of Market Supervision, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, dated June 22, 1995 ("Amendment No. 1").

The types of "market conditions" arising in a no-CBOE market that would be sufficient under proposed Rule 6.48(b)(ii) to justify cancellation of the CBOE leg(s) of a multi-market order, include, but are not limited to, a sudden change in the price of the underlying Securities prior to execution of the stock trade, and a trading halt or systems failure that precludes immediate execution of the stock trade at the agreed upon price. See Letter from Dan Schneider, Attorney, Schiff Hardin & Waite, to John Ayanian, Attorney, OMS, Market Regulation, Commission, dated June 30, 1995 ("June 30 Letter").

<sup>4</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 36082 (August 10, 1995), 60 FR 42636.

change. This order approves the Exchange's proposal, as amended.

#### II. Description of the Proposal

The purpose of this proposal is to set forth in existing CBOE Rule 6.48 the duties of CBOE members executing an options order that is a component of a "package" stock-option order, as defined by CBOE Rule 1.1(ii)(a) ("stock-option order") or stock-option combination order, as defined by CBOE Rule 1.1(ii)(b) ("stock-option combination order"),<sup>5</sup> the execution of which involves transactions in CBOE's options market and in another market (a "multi-market" order), and to specify the sole basis on which an options trade that is a component of a multi-market order may be cancelled by the members that are parties thereto. The proposed rule change would also make it inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and consequently a violation of Exchange Rule 4.1, for a member to fail to fulfill the new requirements.

CBOE Rule 6.48 currently provides that bids or offers made and accepted in accordance with Exchange rules constitute binding contracts, but that Rule does not address the execution and cancellation of complex multi-market orders. Because such orders have become more prevalent at the CBOE as trading strategies have become more intricate, and because such orders involve concurrent executions at the CBOE and in markets other than the CBOE, the Exchange proposes to adopt new paragraph (b) to Rule 6.48. The Exchange believes that this amendment should establish well-defined conditions and requirements in its Rules that members must observe in executing and cancelling such transactions.

Proposed CBOE Rule 6.48(b) would apply to stock-option and stock-option combination orders, other than orders respecting index options,<sup>6</sup> and would impose two requirements on CBOE members who are parties to such multi-market orders. First, a member

<sup>5</sup> A stock-option order is an order to buy or sell a stated number of units of an underlying or a related security coupled with either (a) the purchase or sale of option contract(s) of the same series on the opposition side of the market representing the same number of units of the underlying or related security or (b) the purchase and sale of an equal number of put and call option and numbers of units of the underlying or related Securities, on the opposite side of the market representing in the aggregate twice the number of units of the underlying related security. See CBOE Rule 1.1.(ii).

<sup>6</sup> The CBOE believes that paragraph (iii) of proposed Rule 6.48(b) makes it clear that the proposed rule change will not apply to bids or offers included in combination orders that entail the purchase or sale of index options.