[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 58 (Wednesday, March 26, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14452-14456]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-7638]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-32; License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79; EA 96-
269]
Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and
2); Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty
I
Tennessee Valley Authority (Licensee) is the holder of Operating
License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission) on September 17, 1980, and September 15,
1981, respectively. The licenses authorize the Licensee to operate the
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the conditions
specified therein.
II
An inspection of the Licensee's activities at the Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant was conducted during the period of July 8 through August 22,
1996. The results of this inspection indicated that the Licensee had
not conducted its
[[Page 14453]]
activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was
served upon the Licensee by letter dated November 19, 1996. The Notice
stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's
requirements that the Licensee had violated, and the amount of the
civil penalty proposed for the violations.
The Licensee responded to the Notice in a letter dated December 19,
1996. In its response, the Licensee agreed that the violations occurred
but contested NRC's application of the Enforcement Policy and requested
the NRC to reconsider its decision to categorize the violations as a
Severity Level III problem and mitigate the proposed civil penalty in
its entirety. The Licensee based its requests on the history of
extensive activities it has undertaken to upgrade the Sequoyah fire
protection program, the minimal safety and regulatory significance of
the individual violations, and the corrective actions taken following
identification.
III
After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements
of fact, explanation, and argument for mitigation contained therein,
the NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this
Order, that the violations occurred as stated and that the penalty
proposed for the violations designated in the Notice should be imposed.
IV
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205,
it is hereby ordered that:
The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 within 30
days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, money order, or
electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the United States
and mailed to James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
V
The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and include
a statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing
should be clearly marked as a ``Request for an Enforcement Hearing''
and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to
the Commission's Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and
Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC
Region II, 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia
30323.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to
request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order (or if
written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing
has not been granted), the provisions of this Order shall be effective
without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time,
the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the
issue to be considered at such hearing shall be: Whether on the basis
of the violations admitted by the Licensee, this Order should be
sustained.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 17th day of March 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Edward L. Jordan,
Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, Program
Oversight, Investigations and Enforcement.
Appendix--Evaluations and Conclusion
On November 19, 1996, the NRC issued to Tennessee Valley Authority
(Licensee or TVA) a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalty (Notice) for four violations identified during an NRC
inspection conducted during the period July 8 through August 22, 1996,
at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. In its response dated December 19, 1996,
the Licensee agreed that the violations occurred but stated that the
NRC's categorization of the four individual violations as a Severity
Level III problem, and proposed imposition of a $50,000 civil penalty,
was inconsistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy as it was applied. The
Licensee requested the NRC to reconsider its decision regarding the
severity level of the violations and mitigate the proposed civil
penalty in its entirety. The NRC's evaluation and conclusion regarding
the Licensee's requests are as follows.
Summary of Licensee's Request for Reduction in Severity Level
In its request for reconsideration of the severity level of the
four violations comprising the Severity Level III problem, the Licensee
maintained that (1) extensive activities have been taken to upgrade the
Sequoyah fire protection program, (2) the actual and potential safety
significance of the violations are minimal, (3) the regulatory
significance of the violations should be assessed in the context of
TVA's actions to improve its performance in this area, and (4) the use
of fire watches at Sequoyah is consistent with NRC policy and
regulatory requirements.
Regarding TVA's history of activities to upgrade the Sequoyah fire
protection program, the Licensee maintained that beginning in 1991, it
implemented a four-phase Fire Protection Improvement Plan (FPIP) to
address important engineering items such as evaluating the hydraulic
performance of the fire protection water system, updating the fire
hazards analysis, and completing the fire protection report. Of the 63
items in the initial plan, 61 items had been completed. The two
remaining items involved (1) replacing the fire pumps and upgrading the
existing raw water fire protection system to a potable water system and
(2) completing the evaluation of approximately 1,500 fire barrier
penetration seals. These two items were scheduled to be completed in
1997. The Licensee stated that the NRC's Notice did not acknowledge the
considerable resources expended on the upgrades to the fire protection
program since 1991 which demonstrated both management's attention and
that the overall fire protection program was being treated as a high
priority item.
Second, the Licensee contended that the four violations had only
minimal potential safety significance, and when considered either
individually or in the aggregate, were not significant enough to
constitute a Severity Level III problem. The Licensee's position on
each of the violations is as follows:
Violation A: This violation involved quality assurance (QA)
findings for which the Licensee had delayed implementing corrective
action. The Licensee addressed the actions taken on the QA findings
related to 1,500 degraded fire barrier penetration seals (of the 24,500
penetrations inspected), 326 degraded fire dampers, and deviations from
procedures for controlling transient fire loads. The Licensee
considered that these violations were of minimal safety significance
and of low regulatory significance due to the management
[[Page 14454]]
attention that had been applied to the site's fire protection program
since 1991. In particular, the Licensee stated that an evaluation of
the 326 fire dampers found that only eight of the dampers required
additional work. The Licensee concluded that the actions taken do not
indicate a lack of management attention.
Violation B: This violation involved an inoperable carbon dioxide
system in the computer room which was scheduled to be repaired as part
of the upgrade of the computer room. The Licensee stated that the
minimal safety significance associated with this situation did not
warrant rearranging priorities to perform part of the computer room
upgrades out of sequence.
Violation C: This violation involved the failure to perform a
surveillance of fire barrier penetrations in high radiation areas. The
Licensee stated that a subsequent review found these penetrations
acceptable.
Violation D: This violation involved the failure to hydrostatically
test nine of 119 fire hoses. The Licensee stated that subsequent
testing found these hoses to be capable of performing their intended
function. The Licensee concluded that this violation involved limited
procedural non-adherence which has traditionally not been the subject
of escalated enforcement.
The Licensee concluded that the regulatory significance of the
violations should be determined by considering the safety significance
of the violations in context with the actions initiated by the Licensee
to assure regulatory compliance and enhance performance in the fire
protection area. The Licensee stated that the NRC has traditionally
taken a much broader view in exercising discretion to tailor an
enforcement action to the particular situation, and such an approach
would be appropriate in this case given the minimal actual safety
significance of the violations.
Lastly, the Licensee took exception to the NRC's letter of November
19, 1996, which stated that the use of fire watch patrols was intended
for interim, short-term compensatory measures until degraded fire
protection features can be repaired or replaced. The Licensee argued
that the use of fire watch patrols for degraded fire protection
features: (1) Provides an acceptable level of safety; (2) is permitted
by Technical Specifications without time limitations; (3) does not
challenge the fire protection defense-in-depth concept; (4) restores
the margin of safety that is lost with degraded conditions; (5)
provides an acceptable substitute as opposed to an additional level of
protection; (6) does not increase the vulnerability of equipment to
potential fire exposure or fire damage, and (7) does not violate NRC
requirements. In summary, the Licensee stated that enforcement action
should not be taken unless the reliance on fire watch patrols for
degraded conditions could be shown to result in a violation of
regulatory requirements.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Request for Reduction in Severity
Level
In reviewing the Licensee's response, no additional information was
provided that was not previously considered by the NRC in its
deliberations regarding this matter.
Contrary to the Licensee's response, the NRC did consider the
Licensee's past efforts to improve the Sequoyah fire protection program
through the four-phase FPIP. Specifically, Section F1.3 of NRC
Inspection Report No. 50-327, 328/96-10 acknowledged that the actions
associated with the FPIP had enhanced the fire protection program.
However, prior to issuance of the Notice that is the subject of this
action, the NRC had also expressed various concerns with the adequacy
of the fire protection program and corrective action on fire protection
issues. These instances include: (1) The Systematic Assessment of
Licensee Performance report dated February 21, 1995, which stated that
``Correction of long-standing deficiencies in the material condition of
the fire protection system was slow and management exhibited a
tolerance for poor conditions;'' (2) the July/August 1996 inspection
documented in Inspection Report No. 50-327, 328/96-10, describing new
problems and discrepancies identified as not receiving appropriate
management attention for resolution; and (3) a February 1996
inspection, documented in Inspection Report No. 50-327, 328/96-02,
which identified problems with the untimely implementation of portions
of the FPIP, such as deferment of the construction of the upgrades to
the fire protection water supply system until 1997, and also identified
a violation involving the lack of adequate protective or preventive
measures for the construction portions of the system.
As evidenced by the violations cited in the Notice and the specific
circumstances surrounding them, as described in the inspection report,
the NRC concluded that the Licensee's corrective actions associated
with the fire protection program have not been fully effective in
assuring timely resolution of long-standing issues as described below:
Violation A: The violations included nine examples of inadequate or
untimely corrective action for previously identified deficiencies.
These included quality assurance (QA) findings, issues from the FPIP,
and concerns identified following establishment of the FPIP. QA
findings were identified as early as 1992, yet corrective action had
not been completed at the time of the inspection. At the time of the
July/August 1996 inspection, completion dates had not been established
for several of the items and some items had completion dates extending
into 1997. Other issues, such as the control of combustibles, evidenced
the Licensee's inability to achieve compliance. The control of
transient combustibles was identified as an area of concern in QA
audits, but ineffective corrective action resulted in repeated
violations in 1996. In some instances, corrective actions for items
identified since the 1991 FPIP had been developed, but were not being
completed in a timely manner. For example, in September 1993, the
Licensee initially identified 326 fire dampers which were not installed
in accordance with the vendor's installation requirements. Further
engineering evaluation and review reduced this number to eight, which
the Licensee considered needing replacement. Although the evaluation
which found 318 of these dampers to be satisfactory was completed in
December 1994, the eight dampers identified for replacement were not
scheduled to be replaced until 1997, even though the dampers are
readily accessible for replacement during any mode of plant operation.
The scheduled replacement of these dampers, in excess of two years
after identification of the need for replacement, was considered a
failure of the Licensee's management to place adequate emphasis on
correcting deficiencies.
Violation B: The inoperability of the carbon dioxide system in the
computer room was identified by the Licensee in December 1995. This
system had been inoperable since completion of a heating ventilation
and air conditioning system modification in May 1990. Although
surveillance tests were performed on this system in April 1991, August
1992, June 1994, and December 1995, they failed to identify this
deficiency. Although the violation in itself has low safety
significance, the combination of design oversight and an inadequate
surveillance inspection and test program for this system, which should
have identified this deficiency, is of concern and is another example
of weak management oversight of the fire protection program.
[[Page 14455]]
Violation C: The violation involving the failure to inspect the
fire barrier penetrations in the high radiation areas was identified by
the Licensee. The fact that subsequent inspections did not identify any
problems with these penetrations is fortuitous. The root cause of this
problem was considered to be an error on the part of personnel
performing the procedure in conjunction with inadequate management
oversight. Additionally, resolution of this issue had not been timely.
Violation D: This violation, involving the failure to inspect the
fire hose installed on the fire hose stations within the reactor
buildings, was identified by the Licensee. The fact that subsequent
inspections found the hydrostatic tests on only nine of the 119 fire
hose sections to be out of date and that testing found the hoses to be
capable of performing their intended function is fortuitous. The cause
of this problem was improper procedure revision, inadequate procedure
review, and inadequate management oversight.
The NRC acknowledges the Licensee's position that individually
these violations are of low safety significance. However, as stated in
the Section IV.A of the Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), a group of
Severity Level IV violations may be evaluated in the aggregate and
assigned a single, increased severity level, thereby resulting in a
Severity Level III problem, if the violations have the same underlying
cause or programmatic deficiencies. The purpose of aggregating
violations is to focus the Licensee's attention on the fundamental
underlying causes for which enforcement action appears warranted and to
reflect the fact that several violations with a common cause may be
more significant collectively than individually, and may therefore
warrant a more substantial enforcement action. In this case, the NRC
determined that the violations have the same underlying cause, namely
the lack of attention and priority given to the fire protection
program.
The Licensee's characterization of the root cause as ``insufficient
management involvement in the oversight of the fire protection
program,'' is consistent with the NRC's conclusion, except in one
important respect: it fails to recognize management acceptance of
unresolved issues and the failure to assign the necessary priority to
the fire protection program issues to assure their timely resolution.
In addition, although the Licensee appeared to focus resources on the
resolution of many of the 1991 FPIP issues, not all items have yet been
resolved and newly identified items were not resolved in a timely
manner. The NRC considers this failure to be significant because
program ownership and ineffective management performance were
identified as underlying causes of performance weaknesses in the
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Restart Plan of May 20, 1993. Ineffective
oversight is also indicated by the fact that there has not been
consistent management of the fire protection program. Specifically,
since 1990, there have been a number of personnel changes in the
position of Fire Protection Manager. In that inadequate oversight of
the fire protection program continues to persist, escalation of the
violations is consistent with Supplement I.C.7 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy.
The Licensee's position that the NRC should exercise discretion due
to the improvements and enhancements being made in the fire protection
program cannot be supported due to multiple problems identified by both
the Licensee and the NRC which were outside the scope of the 1991 Fire
Protection Improvement Plan. These problems indicate a continued lack
of management oversight and control of the fire protection program.
The Licensee's position that fire watch patrols for degraded fire
protection features were equivalent to fully functioning features is
not correct. It is the NRC's opinion that fire watch patrols, in
combination with the fire protection defense in depth features, provide
an adequate level of fire protection safety on an interim basis until
permanent corrective actions are implemented. Therefore, a fire watch
patrol can only supplement a degraded fire protection feature and is an
approved compensatory measure for the identification of fire and
notification of a fire to the appropriate response personnel. However,
a fire watch is not equivalent to the fire protection feature in
question.
The Licensee indicated that there was no time limitation on how
long a fire watch patrol can be used in lieu of restoring a degraded
system to service. To the contrary, there is, in fact, a recognized
regulatory impact that can result from the use of long-term fire
watches. If the protection features are described in the Final Safety
Analysis Report, long-term or permanent fire watches could be
considered a modification which would require a 10 CFR 50.59 safety
analysis, which could result in limiting the fire watches use. Second,
although not specifically limiting the use of fire watches, the
Sequoyah Technical Specifications clearly indicate the need to restore
degraded features as soon as possible. The Sequoyah Technical
Specifications require that a Special Report be issued to the NRC if a
degraded fire protection feature cannot be repaired within a designated
time. In general, the Sequoyah Technical Specifications require
degraded fire protection suppression systems to be restored to
operability within 14 days and fire barrier penetration seals restored
to operability within 7 days, or alternatively, within the next 30 days
a Special Report is required to be submitted to the NRC outlining the
cause of the system inoperability and the plans or schedule for
restoring the system to operable status. The Technical Specifications
requirements clearly indicate that the NRC does not sanction the long
term use of fire watch patrols for degraded fire protection features
and that restoration to full fire protection capability is required.
Regardless of the NRC's stated position regarding Sequoyah's use of
fire watch patrols, none of the violations were based on their
utilization.
Summary of Licensee's Request for Mitigation of Civil Penalty
The Licensee believes the civil penalty should be mitigated in its
entirety because the problems were identified by the Licensee and
corrective actions were taken prior to NRC enforcement action. These
actions included:
--Implementation of the 1991 Fire Protection Improvement Plan.
--Improved management responsiveness to identified problems by
centralization of fire protection program ownership and responsibility
into one department, establishment of fire protection program
priorities and performance expectations, and appointment of a new fire
protection manager.
--Establishment in June 1996 of an integrated schedule designed to
track fire protection issues to closure.
--Performance of a self-assessment of the fire protection program which
evaluated and found the correction actions and improvements implemented
to have been effective.
--Direction provided for the QA organization to escalate its concerns
to management in order to assist management in collectively analyzing
individual problems to facilitate corrective action.
The Licensee stated that the lack of timeliness associated with the
individual fire protection issues was identified and corrective action
was
[[Page 14456]]
initiated prior to NRC enforcement action. Therefore, these factors
should be taken into consideration prior to the NRC pursuing escalated
enforcement and imposition of a civil penalty. The Licensee believes
that to issue a civil penalty after action was taken to reorganize the
fire protection program and provide enhanced management oversight would
be contrary to the NRC Enforcement Policy. Furthermore, the imposition
of a civil penalty under these circumstances would serve no purpose
other than to punish the Licensee and would be contrary to the NRC
Enforcement Policy to focus on current performance.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Request for Mitigation of Civil
Penalty
The NRC does not agree with the Licensee's position that the fire
protection program problems were identified by the Licensee and
corrective action was taken prior to NRC involvement. Program oversight
weaknesses were highlighted by the NRC in the February 1995 SALP
Report, as discussed previously. In addition, concerns with the
timeliness and adequacy of fire protection program corrective actions
were also identified by the NRC in February 1996. Although a QA audit
completed in May 1996 elevated the significance of the programmatic
issues to upper TVA management, a follow-up NRC inspection in July 1996
found that these issues had not been resolved. Once the NRC focused on
the multiple fire protection deficiencies in an inspection conducted in
July and August 1996, the Licensee placed additional emphasis on this
area, made organizational and personnel changes, and implemented plans
to correct the deficiencies. The actions were initiated by the Licensee
after the February 1996 identification by the NRC of: (1) A related
violation and (2) inadequate responses to QA findings; but these
actions were limited and did not ensure lasting corrective actions.
Section VI.B.2.c of the Enforcement Policy discusses the
application of the factor of Corrective Action in the civil penalty
assessment process. The purpose of this factor is to encourage
licensees to (1) take the immediate actions necessary upon discovery of
a violation that will restore safety and compliance with the license,
regulations, or other requirements; and (2) develop and implement (in a
timely manner) the lasting corrective actions that will not only
prevent recurrence of the violation at issue, but will be appropriately
comprehensive, given the significance and complexity of the violations,
to prevent recurrence of violations with similar root causes. In
assessing Corrective Action, consideration is given to the timeliness
of the action (including the promptness in developing the schedule for
long term corrective action), the adequacy of the licensee's root cause
analysis, and the comprehensiveness of the corrective action. Clearly,
in this case, the program deficiencies at issue in the Notice were
discovered by TVA as early as 1991, but corrective actions were not
promptly taken, and since the issues were primarily licensee-
identified, the time of reference used in assessing this factor is
discovery, not when the issues were identified as apparent violations
by the NRC. Further, although in most cases, schedules for long-term
corrective actions were developed, management had not placed the
appropriate priority on meeting schedules, which resulted in
substantial deferments. Continued unjustifiable deferral of known
deficiencies is unacceptable to the NRC.
NRC Conclusion
The NRC concludes that the violations occurred as stated and that
collectively they represent a Severity Level III problem. Since the
July/August 1996 NRC inspection, it appears that the licensee has
implemented appropriate corrective actions to address these problems
and is now appropriately focused on this program area. However, no
adequate basis for either a reduction of the severity level or for
mitigation of the civil penalty was provided by the licensee.
Consequently, the proposed civil penalty in the amount of $50,000
should be imposed.
[FR Doc. 97-7638 Filed 3-25-97; 8:45 am]
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