[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 81 (Monday, April 28, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22968-22972]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-10781]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 95-26]


Leonel Tano, M.D.; Revocation of Registration

    On March 7, 1995, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, (DEA), issued an 
Order to Show Cause to Leonel Tano, M.D., (Respondent) of San Antonio, 
Texas, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why DEA 
should not revoke his DEA Certificate of Registration, AT7513282, and 
deny any pending applications for renewal of such registration as a 
practitioner under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), for reason that his continued 
registration would be inconsistent with the pubic interest pursuant to 
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Order to Show Cause also asserted as a basis 
for the proposed action pursuant to 21 USC 824(a)(1), Respondent's 
material falsification of an application for registration.
    By letter dated May 3, 1995, Respondent, through counsel, filed a 
request for a hearing, and following prehearing procedures, a hearing 
was held in Austin, Texas on December 12 and 13, 1995, before 
Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen Bittner. At the hearing, both 
parties called witnesses to testify and introduced documentary 
evidence. Ultimately, the alleged falsification was not pursued as an 
independent basis for revocation and instead was considered as part of 
the overall public interest issue. After the hearing, counsel for both 
parties submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
argument. On September 17, 1996, Judge Bittner issued her Opinion and 
Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, 
recommending that Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration be 
revoked. Neither party filed exceptions to her decision, and on October 
18, 1996, Judge Bittner transmitted the record of these proceedings to 
the Acting Deputy Administrator.
    The Acting Deputy administrator has considered the record in its 
entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issues his final order 
based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set 
forth. The Acting Deputy Administrator adopts, in full, the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Ruling of the Administrative 
Law Judge, and his adoption is in no manner diminished by any 
recitation of facts, issues and conclusions herein, or of any failure 
to mention a matter of fact or law.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent is a 
physician who has maintained a general practice in San Antonio, Texas 
since 1978. Respondent testified that he practices in a low income 
neighborhood and that ninety percent of his patients has been seeing 
him for sixteen or seventeen years.
    In 1987, DEA conducted a routine inspection of a local narcotic 
treatment program. During that inspection, it was learned that some of 
the clients in the program had tested positive for controlled 
substances, other than methadone, including Valium, Darvon, Xanax, and 
Phenephan with codeine, and that they admitted receiving the 
prescriptions for those substances from Respondent.
    Subsequently, in August 1990, the Texas State Board of Medical 
Examiners (Board) entered an Order, which was agreed to by Respondent, 
that found that Respondent prescribed controlled substances, including 
Xanax, Halcion, Darvocet N-100, Restoril and Valium to two individuals 
who were in a methadone treatment program. The Board found that as a 
result, Respondent was subject to disciplinary action pursuant to Texas 
Health & Safety Code Art. 4495b, section 3.08(4)(C) for ``writing 
prescriptions for a dispensing to a person known to be a habitual user 
of narcotic drugs, controlled substances, or dangerous drugs or to a 
person who the physician should have known was a habitual user of the 
narcotic drugs, controlled substances or dangerous drugs.'' It should 
be noted that the statute also provides that the section ``does not 
apply to those persons being treated by the physician for their 
narcotic use after the physician notifies the board in writing of the 
name and address of the person so treated.'' Respondent apparently did 
not provide such notice to the Board. Therefore, the Board ordered, 
among other things, that Respondent ``shall not prescribe or dispense 
controlled substances to any known drug abuser, including methadone 
patients.''
    At the hearing in this matter, Respondent testified that his 
problems with the Board began when ``somebody'' came to his office and 
asked if he was treating any patients who were taking methadone. 
According to Respondent, he told the person that for the last two or 
three years he had been treating two patients he knew were on 
methadone. Respondent testified that he did not believe that his 
actions warranted restrictions being placed on his medical license by 
the Board, but instead, he should have been reprimanded or advised 
about the limitations on prescribing to methadone patients.
    In September 1990, DEA conducted a routine inspection of a local 
narcotic treatment program. During the course of the inspection, the 
program's director noted that several of the program's patients had 
tested positive for controlled substances other than methadone, and 
that some of the

[[Page 22969]]

patients stated that they had received the prescriptions for the 
controlled substances from Respondent.
    Thereafter, in January 1992, DEA initiated an undercover 
investigation of Respondent's controlled substance handling practices. 
On January 9, 1992, a cooperating individual introduced an undercover 
DEA task force officer to K.B. who had obtained controlled substances 
from Respondent in the past. The officer's true identity was not 
revealed to K.B. The officer and K.B. then went to Respondent's office. 
K.B. filled out a form, telling the officer that she knew what to put 
down on the form in order to get Xanax, however that form is not in 
evidence in this proceeding. When he saw Respondent, the officer asked 
for Xanax, but it is unclear from the officer's testimony what reason, 
if any, was given for wanting the drug. Respondent asked the officer 
whether he was an alcoholic or drug abuser, and whether he knew that 
Xanax was addictive. Respondent performed a cursory physical 
examination and then issued the officer a prescription for 30 dosage 
units of Xanax. The Government does not contend that this prescription, 
in and of itself, was improper.
    The officer returned to Respondent's office on February 7, 1992, 
this time accompanied by another undercover DEA task force officer. On 
this occasion, the undercover officers represented that they were truck 
drivers. The first officer asked Respondent for a prescription for 60 
dosage units of Xanax, but Respondent gave him a prescription for forty 
dosage units instead, saying that it would be too risky to prescribe a 
larger quantity. After writing the prescription, Respondent then 
performed a cursory physical examination, not asking the officer any 
questions about his medical history or current problems.
    A nurse took the second officer's weight and blood pressure. The 
officer told Respondent that he was having trouble meeting his work 
deadlines because he frequently had to stop to eat and rest, so he 
asked for something that could keep him awake and something that could 
bring him back down when he finished driving. The officer also told 
Respondent that he was constantly hungry and needed to stop too 
frequently to eat. He told Respondent that he had been buying drugs at 
truck stops. At the hearing in this matter the second officer testified 
that he always needed to lose weight, but that he and Respondent did 
not discuss any weight problems. Respondent issued the officer 
prescriptions for 30 dosage units of Zantryl (brand name for a product 
containing phentermine) and 25 dosage units of Xanax, both Scheduled IV 
controlled substances. Respondent testified at the hearing that he 
prescribed the Zantryl to the officer because it is an appetite 
suppressant and the officer had stated that he was a compulsive eater 
and was overweight, and that he prescribed the Xanax to calm him down 
at the end of the day.
    On February 26, 1993, a third undercover DEA task force officer 
went to Respondent's office. On the patient history form, the officer 
listed her complaints as headache, back pain, and weight gain. She 
indicated to Respondent that she was tired and that she had gained five 
pounds. When Respondent asked her what was wrong with her, she replied, 
``I am tired, bored, no energy to do anything. I was falling asleep 
outside while waiting.'' At some point during the visit, the undercover 
officer began crying. Respondent issued the officer a prescription for 
a non-controlled antidepressant. As to her headaches, the officer told 
Respondent that Tylenol did not help her. Respondent then issued a 
prescription for Fiorinal, a Schedule III controlled substance. The 
Government does not contend that these prescriptions were illegitimate.
    The officer returned to Respondent's office on March 26, 1993. 
During this visit she asked Respondent for phentermine, which 
Respondent refused stating that she was not overweight. Respondent 
issued the officer another prescription for the non-controlled 
antidepressant, since according to Respondent, the officer appeared 
``anxious or down.'' The officer next went to Respondent's office on 
April 15, 1993. She told Respondent that the drugs that he had 
previously prescribed for her were not strong enough. Respondent 
advised the officer not to purchase drugs on the street, because she 
would not know what she was buying. Respondent then prescribed the 
officer a non-controlled substance and 20 dosage units of Xanax. 
Respondent told the officer to take one Xanax per day and if that did 
not help to take two, but to try not to take it at all. Respondent also 
told the officer to take the Xanax only if she needed it to sleep, not 
to relax.
    The officer's fourth undercover visit was on April 28, 1993. The 
day before, the officer, while acting in an undercover capacity, 
attempted to purchase Xanax from an individual on the street. The 
individual stated that he did not have any Xanax, but that he could get 
some from Respondent. The officer and the individual went to 
Respondent's office together on April 28, 1993. The officer saw 
Respondent first. She asked Respondent for more Xanax, and Respondent 
asked her if she wanted it to help her sleep. The officer responded 
affirmatively, and then Respondent said he would give her ``something 
else,'' because ``they don't want us to write Xanax.'' There was then 
some discussion about giving the officer Valium or Restoril, both 
Schedule IV controlled substances, but instead Respondent gave the 
officer three sample packages each containing two tablets of Halcion, 
also a Schedule IV controlled substance. Before leaving the examination 
room, the officer asked Respondent if she could buy some Xanax from him 
since she could not buy it on the streets. Respondent stated. ``I don't 
know how much they charge,'' but refused to sell it to her. The 
individual who had accompanied the officer then went into the 
examination room. The officer stood outside the room listening to the 
individual's conversation with Respondent. Respondent told the 
individual that he could not write any prescriptions for Xanax because 
he was being investigated. After some discussion, it was decided that 
Respondent could issue the individual a prescription since Respondent 
had not seen him in a while. The individual offered Respondent $25.00 
and Respondent then wrote a prescription which turned out to be for 30 
dosage units of diazepam 10 mg. (the generic form of Valium), not 
Xanax. Respondent testified at the hearing in this matter that he 
confronted the officer about not seeing a psychiatrist as he had 
recommended and was confused by the officer's requests for different 
drugs at different visits. Respondent did not offer any explanation for 
the diazepam prescription issued for the individual on this occasion.
    This officer made her final undercover visit on June 30, 1993. The 
officer indicated that nothing was wrong with her, that she had not 
gone to see a psychiatrist, and that she had finished the drugs he had 
given her a long time ago. The officer offered to buy Xanax from 
Respondent, but Respondent told her that he could not write a 
prescription, and that she would have to see a psychiatrist. 
Nonetheless, Respondent wrote the officer a prescription for 25 tablets 
of Xanax.
    Finally, a fourth undercover DEA task force officer made two visits 
to Respondent's office. The officer testified that when he first went 
to Respondent's office on October 15, 1993, the nurse would not let him 
see Respondent unless he indicated that something was wrong with him, 
so he put down on the medical history form that he had bad headaches. 
However, when he saw Respondent, he indicated that he had

[[Page 22970]]

headaches a long time ago, but was now trying to get off Vicodin (a 
Schedule III controlled substance containing hydrocodone). The officer 
also told Respondent that he used to use marijuana, but not anymore. 
Respondent testified that he was suspicious that the officer had 
Medicaid coverage since ``he looked a healthy person to me.'' 
Respondent wrote a prescription for the officer for 20 dosage units of 
hydrocodone with APAP, and told him ``don't take it if you don't need 
it,'' and ``don't give this to anybody.'' Respondent testified at the 
hearing in this matter that he prescribed the hydrocodone to the 
officer in case he had headaches in the future, and that he did not 
think that the officer was addicted to Vicodin. Respondent also 
testified that ``I wouldn't call Vicodin a narcotic.''
    The officer returned to Respondent's office on October 21, 1993. 
During this visit, the officer indicated that was not having headaches, 
but that he was going out of town and did not want to be ``short of 
pills.'' Respondent continued to be suspicious of the officer's 
Medicaid coverage. Respondent issued the officer a prescription for 25 
tablets of Vicodin and told him to ``[t]ry not to take these things if 
you don't need them.'' The officer then asked Respondent for some 
Xanax. Respondent refused, offering to give him something else. 
Respondent stated that, ``[t]here are a lot of problems with Xanax.'' 
The officer next offered to buy some Xanax from Respondent, but again 
Respondent refused, saying, ``they check on everything.'' Respondent 
testified at the hearing that the officer's insistence on obtaining 
Xanax caused him to suspect that the officer was seeking the drug for 
other than medical purposes.
    In addition to the undercover visits, DEA's investigation of 
Respondent included a review of the records of three local narcotic 
treatment programs to determine whether Respondent had continued to 
treat methadone patients with controlled substances after the Board's 
1990 order precluding him from doing so. The records of one program 
showed that Respondent issued a total of 29 controlled substance 
prescriptions to 21 different patients between February 1991 and 
January 1994. The records from the second program indicated that 
Respondent prescribed controlled substances a total of 52 times to six 
different patients between September 1990 and January 1994. Finally, 
the third program's records showed that Respondent prescribed 
controlled substances a total of 50 times to 18 patients between 
January 1991 and February 1994. Except for five of these patients, it 
is unclear whether Respondent knew that he was prescribing controlled 
substances to individuals undergoing methadone treatment.
    Respondent testified at the hearing that while he had never 
received notification from the Board that the order restricting his 
medical license had expired or been modified, he had received copies of 
a form letter from the program director of one of the narcotic 
treatment programs which he believed justified his prescribing of 
controlled substances to individuals undergoing methadone treatment. 
This letter, dated September 30, 1992, and addressed to ``Dear 
Colleague'', was to be provided by a client of the program to a 
physician who prescribed the client controlled substances, if the 
client tested positive for drugs other than methadone. The letter 
states that the bearer is in a methadone maintenance treatment program 
and explains the effect of methadone maintenance treatment and 
considerations in treating methadone patients with drugs for other 
conditions.The letter advises the prescribing physician that state law 
requires that methadone patients provide documentation to the narcotic 
treatment program from the prescribing physician as to the necessity of 
the prescription and that the prescribing physician is aware that the 
patient is receiving methadone treatment. The letter specifically 
states that, ``[t]he intention of the regulation is not to restrict 
physicians in the exercise of their professional judgment in the 
practice of medicine but to require [methadone maintenance] patients to 
inform other physicians of this information which is vital to the 
prescribing physician.''
    Respondent testified that approximately 15 of his patients 
presented him with a copy of this letter, and that he continued 
treating four of them because they had been longtime patients. 
Respondent admitted that he signed notes for these four patients saying 
that he knew that they were on methadone. Respondent further testified 
that he did not think that his prescribing of controlled substances to 
the patients on methadone in any way violated the standard of care, 
because he did not increase the dosages and some of the patients ``got 
into trouble with the law.''
    Notwithstanding the Board's order precluding Respondent's 
prescribing of controlled substances to methadone patients, as 
discussed above, Texas law precludes such prescribing unless the 
physician notifies the Board in writing of the name and address of the 
patient that the physician is treating for narcotic use. The Government 
introduced into evidence an affidavit dated November 28, 1995, from the 
Board's Assistant Custodian of Records stating that the Board had no 
records indicating that Respondent had notified the Board of the name 
and address of any person he was treating for his or her narcotic use.
    Respondent testified at the hearing that he never knowingly 
violated any standards of care with respect to prescribing for patients 
who were in methadone treatment programs; that he has never caused a 
patient to become addicted to any medication; that he was never a 
``heavy writer'' of prescriptions, but that he has nonetheless become 
more cautious; and that in the past five years, he has refused to treat 
patients he thought were abusing drugs unless they agreed to a 
urinalysis.
    On November 30, 1994, Respondent executed an application for 
renewal of his DEA Certificate of Registration. On this application, he 
answered ``No'' to a question asking, among other things, if he ``ever 
had a State professional license or controlled substance registration 
revoked, suspended, denied, restricted or placed on probation?'' During 
a discussion on March 22, 1995, a DEA investigator asked Respondent 
whether his medical license had ever been suspended or had any other 
action taken against it. Respondent answered that no such action had 
been taken. At the hearing in this matter, Respondent did not offer any 
explanation for the response on his 1994 renewal application or his 
representations to the DEA investigator.
    The Government contends that Respondent's registration should be 
revoked based upon his prescribing of controlled substances to the 
undercover officers; his violation of the Board's 1990 order not to 
prescribe controlled substances to methadone treatment patients; and 
his falsification of his 1994 renewal application for DEA registration. 
Respondent contends that his registration should not be revoked because 
he did not engage in any misconduct serious enough to warrant 
restricting his authority to handle controlled substances; that 
questions of medical judgment are not within the purview of this forum 
and should be decided by the state medical board; and that he does the 
best he can practicing in a ``war zone'' of drug activity.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4), the Deputy 
Administrator may revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration and deny any 
pending applications, if he determines that the continued registration 
would be inconsistent with the public interest. Section 823(f)

[[Page 22971]]

requires that the following factors be considered:
    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws 
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health or 
safety. These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the 
Deputy Administrator may rely on any one or a combination of factors 
and may give each factor the weight he deems appropriate in determining 
whether a registration should be revoked or an application for 
registration be denied. See Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., Docket No. 88-
42, 54 FR 16422 (1989).
    Regarding factor one, in August 1990, the Board restricted 
Respondent's license to practice medicine by prohibiting him from 
prescribing or dispensing controlled substances to any known drug 
abuser, including methadone patients. There is no evidence in the 
record that the Board's order has been terminated or modified, and in 
fact, Respondent testified that as far as he knew, it was still in 
effect. The recommendation of the appropriate state licensing board is 
just one of the factors to be considered and is not dispositive of 
whether Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with the 
public interest. Therefore, the Acting Deputy Administrator rejects 
Respondent's argument that consideration of the undercover visits 
should be left to the state medical board.
    As to Respondent's experience in dispensing controlled substances, 
Judge Bittner concluded that, excluding the prescriptions issued on 
January 9, 1992, February 26, 1993, and March 26, 1993, the 
prescriptions that Respondent issued to the undercover officers were 
not for a legitimate medical purpose. Respondent issued prescriptions 
to the undercover officers with little, if any, discussion regarding 
the medical need for the drug, and with little or no physical 
examination. On one occasion the officer asked for 60 dosage units of 
Xanax, however Respondent only prescribed 40 dosage units noting that 
it would be ``too risky'' to prescribe more. On several occasions, 
Respondent issued the prescriptions even after the officers indicated 
that there was nothing wrong with them. Specifically, one officer, 
while noting on the patient history form that he suffered from 
headaches, told Respondent during his first visit that had suffered 
from headaches in the past, but was now trying to get off Vicodin. On 
his second visit, the officer stated that he was not having headaches. 
The only reason given by the officer for wanting Vicodin was that he 
was going out of town and he was ``short of pills.'' Nonetheless, 
Respondent issued the officer a prescription for 20 hydrocodone with 
APAP and six days later issued another prescription for 25 dosage 
units.
    Not only did Respondent issue prescriptions to the undercover 
officers, but he also issued a prescription to another individual for 
no legitimate medical reason. Of particular note regarding this 
prescription is that Respondent at first refused to issue the 
individual a prescription stating that he (Respondent) was under 
investigation. Nevertheless, Respondent issued the individual a 
prescription for Xanax after the individual pointed out that he had not 
seen Respondent in a while.
    Respondent asserts that he practices in a virtual ``war zone'' of 
drug activity. The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that in light 
of this assertion, Respondent should have been all the more vigilant in 
ensuring that controlled substances were prescribed only for legitimate 
medical purposes. Instead, Respondent prescribed controlled substances 
to the officers even though he admitted that he was confused by their 
repeated requests for different drugs. Two of the officers asked to 
purchase Xanax from Respondent after he refused to prescribe it for 
them. Although Respondent refused to sell the officers Xanax, he 
nonetheless issued them prescriptions for other controlled substances. 
Respondent admitted during his testimony that he was suspicious of one 
of the officer's Medicaid coverage, since the officer appeared healthy. 
Respondent also admitted that he refused to issue this officer a 
prescription for Xanax because he was suspicious of the officer's 
request. Yet Respondent issued this officer prescriptions for 
hydrocodone, in case the officer had headaches in the future, even 
though the officer denied suffering from headaches. The Acting Deputy 
Administrator concludes that these are not actions of a DEA registrant 
who is trying to prevent controlled substances from being diverted. 
Instead, Respondent's prescribing during the undercover investigation 
demonstrates a disregard for his responsibilities as a DEA registrant.
    Of equal concern to the Acting Deputy Administrator is Respondent's 
continued prescribing of controlled substances to methadone patients 
after the Board entered an order in 1990, specifically prohibiting such 
prescribing. As Judge Bittner noted, it is undisputed that ``between 
February 1991 and January 1994, Respondent prescribed controlled 
substances a total of 131 times to a total of forty-five patients who 
were clients of various methadone treatment programs.'' While Judge 
Bittner found it unclear whether Respondent knew or should have known 
that all of these individuals were in narcotic treatment, she did find 
the evidence clear that ``Respondent was aware of five such patients. * 
* *'' Respondent asserted that a form letter, presented to him by some 
of his patients, that was addressed to ``Dear Colleague'' from the 
program director of a local narcotic treatment program, constituted 
permission for Respondent to issue prescriptions for controlled 
substances to methadone treatment patients. Like Judge Bittner, the 
Acting Deputy Administrator finds no merit to this assertion. This 
letter was a form letter from a narcotic treatment program, not from 
the Board that had restricted his medical license. There is no evidence 
in the record that Respondent sought to ascertain from the Board 
whether he was permitted to issue such prescriptions.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator is extremely troubled by the number 
of prescriptions that Respondent issued to narcotic treatment patients 
after the Board issued its order prohibiting such prescribing. The 
Acting Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge Bittner that the evidence 
in the record shows that Respondent only actually knew that five of 
these individuals were undergoing narcotic treatment. However, as Judge 
Bittner stated in her opinion, ``one would expect that after the 
Medical Board disciplined Respondent and restricted his medical license 
for prescribing controlled substances to addicts and habitual users, 
Respondent would have been especially careful to avoid engaging in that 
conduct again.''
    Regarding factors three and four, the Acting Deputy Administrator 
finds that Respondent has no convictions under Federal or state law 
relating to controlled substances. However, between 1987 and 1990, 
Respondent violated the Texas Medical Practice Act by prescribing 
controlled substances to patients who were in methadone maintenance 
treatment. Respondent continued to prescribe controlled substances to 
such patients after the Board prohibited him from doing so in 1990. In 
addition, Respondent issued

[[Page 22972]]

prescriptions during the undercover investigation for no legitimate 
medical purpose in violation of 21 CFR 1306.04.
    Finally, as to factor five, the Acting Deputy Administrator finds 
relevant Respondent's representation on his 1994 application for 
renewal of his DEA registration that his state medical license had not 
been restricted, when in fact the Board had restricted his license in 
1990. As stated previously, ``[s]ince DEA must rely on the truthfulness 
of information supplied by applicants in registering them to handle 
controlled substances, falsification cannot be tolerated.'' Bobby 
Watts, M.D. 58 FR 46995 (1993). In addition, the Acting Deputy 
Administrator finds it significant that in 1995, when specifically 
asked by a DEA investigator whether any action had been taken against 
his state medical license, Respondent replied that no such action had 
been taken. Respondent has not offered any explanation for these 
misstatements.
    Judge Bittner concluded that Respondent's continued registration 
would be inconsistent with the public interest at this time in light of 
his prescribing of controlled substances during the undercover 
investigation for no legitimate medical purpose; his prescribing of 
controlled substances to patients enrolled in methadone treatment 
programs that resulted in the Board's 1990 order restricting his 
medical license; his continued prescribing of controlled substances to 
at least several patients he knew were in methadone treatment programs 
after the Board prohibited such prescribing; and his false statements 
on his renewal application and to the DEA investigator regarding the 
Board's action against his medical license. Judge Bittner concluded 
that ``Respondent is not fully capable and/or willing to accept and 
carry out the responsibilities inherent in DEA registration. * * *'' 
The Acting Deputy Administrator concurs with Judge Bittner's findings 
and conclusions.
    Accordingly, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 
21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders that 
DEA Certificate of Registration AT7513282, issued to Leonel Tano, M.D., 
be, and it hereby is, revoked. The Acting Deputy Administrator further 
orders that any pending applications for renewal of such registration, 
be, and they hereby are, denied. This order is effective May 28, 1997.

    Dated: April 16, 1997.
James S. Milford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-10781 Filed 4-25-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M