DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Air Force

Supplemental Record of Decision for Disposal and Reuse; Pease Air Force Base (AFB), New Hampshire

On April 14, 1997, the Air Force issued a Supplemental Record of Decision (SROD) for Pease Air Force Base. The SROD, signed by Mr. Rodney A. Coleman, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment, completes the disposal and reuse decisions for Pease AFB. The SROD was developed based upon review and consideration of the June 1991 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and the August 1995 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). The SEIS was prepared in response to the U.S. District Court's Order in *CLF* v. *Air Force*. The SEIS also includes a sensitivity analysis of the special excepted use of a performing arts center which is based upon data contained in the SEIS. Potential environmental impacts addressed in the FEIS and SEIS were taken into consideration prior to making the decisions put forth in the SROD. The SROD does not change property disposal decisions made in previous Records of Decisions, however, it does change the method of conveyance for some of the parcels. All referenced documents are maintained at Pease Air Force Base and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence offices at Brooks Air Force Base, TX for public review.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. John Corradetti, Program Manager, Division B, Air Force Base Conversion Agency, 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 2300, Arlington, VA 22209–2809.

Carolyn A. Lunsford,

Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–14083 Filed 5–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3910–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy, DoD

Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School; Open Meeting

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. app. 2), notice is hereby given that the Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, will meet on July 15–16, 1997, in Hermann Hall (Bldg 220) at the School. All sessions will be open to the public.

The purpose of the meeting is to elicit the advice of the board on the Navy's Postgraduate Education Program. The board examines the effectiveness with which the Naval Postgraduate School is accomplishing its mission. To this end, the board will inquire into the curricula; instruction; physical equipment; administration; state of morale of the student body, faculty, and staff; fiscal affairs; and any other matters relating to the operation of the Naval Postgraduate School as the board considers pertinent.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS MEETING CONTACT: CDR Richard Grahlman, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943–5000, Telephone: (408) 656–2512.

Dated: May 20, 1997.

D.E. Koenig, Jr.,

LCDR, JAGC, USN, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–14084 Filed 5–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3810–FF–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 97–2]

Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning continuation of critically safety at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before June 30, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 208–6400.

Dated: May 21, 1997.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex

May 19, 1997.

In the first two or three decades following the Manhattan Project, nearly every laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had an active program addressing some phase of the physics of neutron chain-reacting systems. Each such study included a balance of experiment and theoretical analysis, as in common in engineering research. Some of the programs supported the design of nuclear weapons, some were directed at the design of nuclear reactors, and some were conducted simply as basic engineering research.

As a result of these programs, expertise in neutron chain-reacting systems was widespread; there was an abundance of individuals skilled in achieving and controlling neutron chain reactions. These individuals usually became expert as well in methods of avoiding a chain reaction when this is not desired. The state of a self-sustaining chain reaction is commonly called ''criticality.'' Guidance by these knowledgeable individuals helped establish an admirable record of criticality safety in the many programs the AEC conducted with fissionable material. While occasional accidental criticality did occur at the peace of AEC activity, it seldom caused injury to workers, and never led to radiation affecting individuals off site. Furthermore, the last such instance of inadvertent criticality in the United States occurred about 20 years ago.

Some criticality research continued to replenish the supply of these experts through the era of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and into the period of the Department of Energy (DOE), though at a steadily reduced rate. Today there is almost no theoretical research in criticality being conducted, although university courses continue to instruct students in the theoretical expertise that has already been developed. However, most of the early experts in criticality safety control were drawn from experimental research programs. For a number of years, the DOE complex placed its reliance for criticality safety on the diminishing number of such criticality control experts developed in earlier years. Recently, however, DOE has been forced to supplement that group with engineers trained on the job in the conduct of criticality calculations. The latter group contains few individuals who have conducted critical mass experiments. Thus collectively they have little practical experience

pertinent to avoiding chain reactions in nonreactor environments.

In 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) sensed that the source of experimental competence in prevention of inadvertent criticality was in danger of being lost entirely as a result of DOE's impending closure of this last critical mass facility in the country. That closure would have ended the hands-on education of new generations of scientists and engineers in the properties and behavior of critical systems. However, expertise in criticality safety will continue to be needed as long as fissionable material is used and stored. The Board viewed the end of experimental criticality studies as a threat to criticality safety in future DOE activities, and issued Recommendations 93–2, which advised against such action. As stated in that Recommendation,

> The Board believes it is important to maintain a good base of information for criticality control, covering the physical situations that will be encountered in handling and storing fissionable material in the future, and to ensure retaining a community of individuals competent in practicing the control.

The Secretary accepted Recommendations 93–2 on May 12, 1993, noting the importance of (1) improving and maintaining a criticality control information base, especially to support future operations in handling, processing, and storage or disposal of fissionable material; (2) retaining a cadre of individuals competent in practicing criticality control and safety; (3) continuing an experimental program; (4) continuing an education program for criticality safety professionals; (5) coordinating the criticality program among various users; (6) performing a criticality assessment with respect to defense nuclear facilities to determine the scope of current and future requirements for criticality experiments, predictability, and training, and (7) investigating the mission requirements, program funding, and landlord issues.

Since Recommendation 93–2 was issued, DOE has made substantial progress in coordination and implementation of the criticality experiments program. Funding for the program has stabilized, albeit at a low level, and work has been initiated on a prioritized list of experiments. However, a basic set of problems continues to exist throughout the DOE complex with regard to criticality control. Among the problems are the following:

1. In the past, it was found that only a few experienced criticality engineers were needed to guide criticality safety at even the most complex facilities. However, at the majority of DOE facilities where accidental criticality is currently a potential issue, the number of engineers assigned to criticality control is surprisingly large. The Typical criticality safety staff consists mainly of individuals who have no prior first-hand experience in criticality, and who have been trained on the job in analytical aspects of criticality control after being hire. They lack background in neutron physics on a fundamental level, and are not familiar with work on assemblies near the critical state, activities that would foster intuitive approaches to criticality control. Therefore, when faced with the need to determine what must be done to avoid a chain reaction, they most frequently fall back on complex multidimensional Monte Carlo calculations. Their use of simplified methods and their reliance on published data are minimal. The Board points out that complex analysis may be needed for some cases, such as those with difficult geometry, but such analysis is time-consuming and may dramatically slow preparation for the activities being evaluated.

2. Operational practices at some DOE facilities place criticality control in a central position in operations, with the criticality engineer establishing certain aspects of operation for safety reasons. Effectively, the criticality engineer, with all the shortcomings described in 1 above, becomes the critical path for line management. This causes delays in the ability of the line management to develop overall safety requirements.

3. In the past, most of the criticality safety data in guidance documents has been directed to activities involving production of nuclear weapons. The guidance has incorporated data from several experimental programs established to ensure avoidance of unintentional criticality in weapons programs. The experimental data has often been generalized by analysis of the experimental results and by theory benchmarked against experiments. The missions of DOE have changed substantially, however, and guidance for other types of activities is not needed. It is particularly important that guidance be developed to help in analyzing the safety of cleanup operations and the handling, storage, and shipping of miscellaneous containers that include fissionable material mixed with other material.

The above problems have had a significant effect on the productivity of several DOE operations. They have adversely affected safety by extending the period of time required for meeting safety commitments, such as those responding to Board Recommendation 94–1. In so doing, they have absorbed resources potentially needed for other safety-related activities at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. In this light, the Board believes action should be taken to eliminate these problems and to ensure that criticality safety can continue to be achieved efficiently in DOE's future operations.

Therefore the Board recommends that DOE:

1. Restructure the program of experimental research in criticality established under the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 93–2 to emphasize determination of bounding values for criticality of systems most important in the current programs at DOE facilities.

2. Organize the records of calculations and experiments conducted to ensure the criticality safety of DOE's past operations so as to provide guidance for criticality safety in similar situations in the future and avoid repetition of past problems.

3. Establish a program to interpolate and extrapolate such existing calculations and data as a function of physical circumstances that may be encountered in the future, so that useful guidance and bounding curves will result.

4. Collect and issue the experimental and theoretical data from the above in a publications as guidance for future activities.

5. Clarify in guidance that simple, bounding methods of analysis can be used in place of specific theoretical analysis in setting criticality limits for processes, and that limits derived in this manner are even preferable where they serve the purpose. The decreasing order of preference should be experimental data, theory benchmarked against experimental data, and nonbenchmarked criticality analysis with an adequate safety margin.

6. Develop and institute a short but intensive course of instruction in criticality and criticality safety at DOE's criticality experiments facility to serve as the foundation for a program of formal qualification of criticality engineers. This course should instill in students a familiarity with the factors contributing to criticality, the physical behavior of systems at and near criticality, and a theoretical understanding of neutron multiplication processes in critical and subcritical systems. A goal would be for reliance for criticality safety at any DOE facilities to rest in a group of individuals endowed with such experience.

7. Where not already done, assign criticality safety as a staff function

assisting line management, with safety responsibility residing in line management.

8. Identify a core group of criticality experts experienced in the theoretical experimental aspects of neutron chain reactions to advise on the above steps and assist in resolving future technical issues.

9. Organize funding of the criticality research and instruction program to improve its stability and to recognize the cross-cutting importance of this activity.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 97–13977 Filed 5–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3670–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

AGENCY: Department of Education.

ACTION: Submission for OMB review; comment request.

SUMMARY: The Director, Information Resources Management Group, invites comments on the submission for OMB review as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before June 30, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be addressed to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Dan Chenok, Desk Officer, Department of Education, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street, NW., Room 10235, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503. Requests for copies of the proposed information collection requests should be addressed to Patrick J. Sherrill, Department of Education, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Room 5624, Regional Office Building 3, Washington, DC 20202–4651.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick J. Sherrill (202) 708–8196. Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time, Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. OMB may amend or waive the requirement for public consultation to the extent that public participation in the approval process would defeat the purpose of the information collection, violate State or Federal law, or substantially interfere with any agency's ability to perform its statutory obligations. The Director of the Information Resources Management Group publishes this notice containing proposed information collection requests prior to submission of these requests to OMB. Each proposed information collection, grouped by office, contains the following: (1) Type of review requested, e.g., new, revision, extension, existing or reinstatement; (2) Title; (3) Summary of the collection; (4) Description of the need for, and proposed use of, the information; (5) Respondents and frequency of collection; and (6) Reporting and/or Recordkeeping burden. OMB invites public comment at the address specified above. Copies of the requests are available from Patrick J. Sherrill at the address specified above.

Dated: May 22, 1997.

Gloria Parker,

Director, Information Resources Management Group.

Office of Postsecondary Education

Type of Review: Revision.

Title: Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).

Frequency: Annually.

Affected Public: Individuals and families.

Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Hour Burden:

Responses: 9,395,776.

Burden Hours: 7,625,993.

Abstract: The FAFSA collects identifying and financial information about a student and his or her family if the student applies for Title IV, Higher Education Act (HEA) Program funds. This information is used to calculate the student's expected family contribution, which is used to determine a student's financial need. The information is also used to determine the student's eligibility for grants and loans under the Title IV, HEA Programs. It is further used for determining a student's eligibility and need for State and institutional financial aid programs.

Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services

Type of Review: Reinstatement.

Title: Captioned Films/Videos for the Deaf: Application for Loan Service and Response Form.

Frequency: On Occasion.

Affected Public: Individuals or households; Business or other for-profit; Non-profit institutions; State, local or Tribal Gov't, SEAs or LEAs.

Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Hour Burden:

Responses: 23,000.

Burden Hours: 5,100.

Abstract: This package provides an application form for prospective users of the Captioned Films and Videos and response cards to evaluate satisfaction with films/videos.

[FR Doc. 97–13990 Filed 5–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Office of Vocational and Adult Education School-to-Work Opportunities Act; State and Territory Implementation Grants

AGENCIES: Department of Labor and Department of Education.

ACTION: Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 for School-to-Work Opportunities State and Territory Implementation Grants (State and Territory Implementation Grants).

SUMMARY: The Departments of Labor and Education jointly invite applications for new awards in FY 1997, as authorized under section 212 of the School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 (the Act). These State Implementation Grants will enable States and Territories to carry out their plans for statewide and jurisdiction-wide School-to-Work Opportunities partnership systems, offering young Americans access to programs designed to prepare them for a first job in high-skill, high-wage careers, and for achievement in further postsecondary education and training.

DATES: In order to ensure review and processing of applications recommended for award prior to the expiration of FY 1997 appropriations, applications must be submitted by May 31, 1998. (FY 1997 appropriations expire in September of 1998.)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Departments of Labor and Education are reserving funds appropriated for FY 1997 under the Act (Pub. L. 103–329) for awarding State and Territory Implementation Grants authorized under section 212 of the Act.

This notice contains the selection criteria and describes the review and