When ordering hard-copy subscription(s), be sure to specify the State(s) of interest, since subscriptions may be ordered for any or all of the seven separate volumes, arranged by State. Subscriptions include an annual edition (issued in January or February) which includes all current general wage determinations for the States covered by each volume. Throughout the remainder of the year, regular weekly updates are distributed to subscribers.

Signed at Washington, D.C. this 18th Day of July 1997.

Terry Sullivan,

Acting Chief, Branch of Construction Wage Determinations.

[FR Doc. 97–19349 Filed 7–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–27–M

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME: 1:00 p.m., Friday, August 1, 1997.

PLACE: EAA Fly-In Convention, Aviation Safety Center, Wittman Regional Airport, Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

STATUS: Open.

MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED:

6886 Briefs of Aviation Accidents—1996 File Nos:
1325—Pueblo, Colorado, 10/4/96
1505—Fairchild AFB, Washington, 09/14/96

6887 Safety Recommendations to FAA Concerning Amateur-Built Experimental Aircraft

NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: Telephone: (202) 314–6100.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Bea Hardesty, (202) 314–6065.

Dated: July 22, 1997.

Bea Hardesty,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–19724 Filed 7–22–97; 4:27 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket Nos. 50–269, 50–270, and 50–287

Duke Power Company Oconee; Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–38, DPR–47, and DPR–55 issued to Duke Power Company (the licensee), for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, located in Oconee County, South Carolina.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action would exempt the licensee from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, which requires a monitoring system that will energize clear audible alarms if accidental criticality occurs in each area in which special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored. The proposed action would also exempt the licensee from the requirements to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored to ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of the alarm, to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and to designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm, and to place radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency.

The proposed action is in response to the licensee's application dated February 4, 1997, as supplemented on March 19, 1997.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate action. At a commercial nuclear power plant the inadvertent criticality with which 10 CFR 70.24 is concerned could occur during fuel handling operations. The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a critical mass at a commercial nuclear power plant is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of other forms of special nuclear material that is stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. Because the fuel is not enriched beyond 5.0 weight percent Uranium-235 and because commercial nuclear plant licensees have procedures and features designed to prevent inadvertent criticality, the staff has determined that it is unlikely that an inadvertent criticality could occur due to the handling of special nuclear material at a commercial power reactor. The requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, therefore, are not necessary to ensure the safety of personnel during the handling of special nuclear materials at commercial power reactors. The proposed exemption is needed, however, for Oconee to continue to operate in accordance with its license and Commission regulations.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that there is no significant environmental impact if the exemption is granted. Inadvertent or accidental criticality will be precluded through compliance with the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, the design of the fuel storage racks providing geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in their storage locations, and administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures. Technical Specifications requirements specify reactivity limits for the fuel storage racks and minimum spacing between the fuel assemblies in the storage racks.

Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50, ''General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Criterion 62, requires the criticality in the fuel storage and handling system to be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe configurations. This is met at Oconee, as identified in the Technical Specification Section 3.8 and in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1, by detailed procedures that must be available for use by refueling personnel. Therefore, as stated in the Technical Specifications, these procedures, the Technical Specifications requirements, and the design of the fuel handling equipment with built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety. In addition, the design of the facility does not include provisions for storage of fuel in a dry location.

UFSAR Section 9.1.1, New Fuel Storage, states that new fuel will normally be stored in the spent fuel pool serving the respective unit and that it may be also be stored in the fuel transfer canal. The fuel assemblies are stored in five racks in a row having a nominal center-to-center distance of 2 feet 1¾ inches. New fuel may also be stored in shipping containers. (Note that in none of these locations would criticality be possible.)

The proposed exemption would not result in any significant radiological impacts. The proposed exemption would not affect radiological plant effluent nor cause any significant occupational exposures since the Technical Specifications, design controls (including geometric spacing and design of fuel assembly storage spaces) and administrative controls

preclude inadvertent criticality. The amount of radioactive waste would not be changed by the proposed exemption.

The proposed exemption does not result in any significant nonradiological environmental impacts. The proposed exemption involves features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded that there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed exemption, the staff considered denial of the requested exemption. Denial of the request would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the ''Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3'' dated March 1972.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on July 17, 1997, the staff consulted with the South Carolina State official, Mr. Henry Porter of the Bureau of Radiological Health, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed exemption. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated February 4, 1997, and supplement dated March 19, 1997, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at local public document room located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of July 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Herbert N. Berkow,

Director, Project Directorate II–2, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–19635 Filed 7–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–461]

Illinois Power Company; Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations to Facility Operating License No. NPF–62, issued to Illinois Power Company (the licensee), for operation of the Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, located in DeWitt County, Illinois.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated July 22, 1997, for a temporary, partial exemption from the requirements contained in General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, ''Electric Power Systems,'' of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. The requested exemption would only be effective through and including October 15, 1997, and would permit plant operation with one fully qualified offsite circuit and one circuit that does not strictly conform to the capacity and capability requirements of GDC 17.

The Need for the Proposed Action

GDC 17 requires that an onsite and an offsite electric power system be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each of these two systems (assuming the other system is not functioning) is to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

The Clinton Power Station (CPS) licensing basis assumes two independent offsite electric power sources that are capable of supplying power to emergency buses. These consist of 138–kV and 345–kV offsite circuits. During the current refueling outage at CPS, the licensee has determined that, for short and intermittent periods of time, voltage on the 345–kV offsite source has not consistently remained above the minimum required value conservatively established for CPS. This is primarily due to the fact that unusually low voltages are occurring as a result of the current lack of operating generators in Illinois, coupled with high load demands during peak hours. The licensee has determined that all practical measures taken to boost voltage, short of interrupting service to customers, are not sufficient to maintain required voltage. Further action to restore voltage would necessitate power interruptions.

Conformance to GDC 17 requires that both offsite sources have sufficient capacity and capability such that voltage is continuously maintained above the minimum values conservatively established for the facility. Due to the intermittent voltage conditions for the 345–kV system described above, the licensee cannot demonstrate that this offsite circuit has sufficient capacity and capability at all times. With this offsite source experiencing intermittent periods of lower than expected voltage, it would have to be declared inoperable. Plant startup or continued plant operation is not permitted with one offsite source inoperable.

The licensee has proposed a temporary, partial exemption to the requirements of GDC 17 that would only be effective through and including October 15, 1997. The exemption would temporarily allow plant operation with one fully qualified offsite circuit and one circuit that does not strictly conform to the capacity and capability requirements of GDC 17. Strict compliance with GDC 17 is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule and would impose undue hardship to the licensee. The licensee has implemented measures to assess when the 345-kV system voltage would be inadequate in the event of a plant trip, performed an analysis to assess the risk associated with continued plant operation for the period of time within which the intermittent condition is likely to occur (i.e., through the end of hot, summer weather), and established procedures that will restore