

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-382]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the request of Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) to withdraw its October 16, 1996, application for proposed amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.

The proposed amendment would have revised the facility technical specifications (TSs) pertaining to TSs 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 and their surveillance requirements.

The Commission had previously issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment published in the **Federal Register** on April 9, 1997 (62 FR 17232). However, by letter dated August 26, 1997, the licensee withdrew the proposed change.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated October 16, 1996, and the licensee's letter dated August 26, 1997, which withdrew the application for license amendment. The above documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the University of New Orleans Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of September, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323]

Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82 issued to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) for operation of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in San Luis Obispo County, California.

The proposed amendments would approve a modification to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system to bypass approximately 800 feet of Unit 1 and 200 feet of Unit 2 Class 1 ASW pipe, a portion of which is buried below sea level in the tidal zone outside the intake structure. Upgraded flow meter and temperature instrumentation will be included. The project includes approximately 450 feet (both Units) of new pipe inside the intake structure, and 1,400 feet of new buried pipe between the intake and selected tie-in points in the existing pipe. This modification was completed on Unit 1 during the refueling outage completed this year.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system is not identified as the cause, or involved in the initiating event of, any Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) analyzed accidents. Thus, activities addressed herein will not increase the probability of occurrence of any FSAR evaluated accident.

During the construction of the ASW bypass piping, the integrity and performance of the ultimate heat sink will not be affected, nor will the ability of any safety-related system, structure, or component (SSC) to perform their function be compromised. Approved, written procedures are used during construction to assure the functioning of

these SSCs (e.g., heavy load procedures, security procedures, tie-in procedures). The system unavailability due to construction is managed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) limiting conditions for operation (LCO).

The ASW system is a moderate energy system. Since the bypass modification does not significantly change the operating parameters of the system, there is no change in the Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) analysis methodology for this system, and no increase in the probability of occurrence of a pipe crack. The ASW pipes are required to mitigate consequences of FSAR analyzed accidents.

The initial work for the ASW bypass project involved installation of Design Class I removable spool pieces in the existing ASW piping. The spool pieces removed were modified and reinserted into the existing ASW piping. The modifications to the spool pieces did not affect their flow characteristics or structural integrity. Therefore, the removable spool pieces did not cause ASW operating parameters to exceed their design basis, did not change any system interfaces, had no impact on ASW system capability to perform its function, and did not change the system's operation.

The work for this project was performed in a series of steps. For each step, the added work scope was incorporated in a design change package revision and a revised safety evaluation was performed.

The tie-in of the piping to the ASW system is done during separate system clearances during a refueling outage for each train; one train will remain in service during the outage at all times. The cross-tie between the two Units will be available during the work.

When all the work associated with the ASW bypass project is completed, including pipe and pipe support installation, structural modifications, and external protective features, the ASW system will perform its safety function as described in the FSAR. The flow in ASW pipes will not be significantly affected by this work. Per Mechanical Calculation M-988, the increase in head loss for bypass piping is not significant; the design basis flow is maintained with a margin and there is no significant effect on the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat removal capacity.

The newly installed piping has been designed to withstand the appropriate design basis seismic loading and to withstand the effects of external events including flooding, tsunami, and tornadoes. The newly installed piping and associated support components have been evaluated, and where appropriate, designed to withstand system interactions including pipe breaks, internal flooding, seismic interaction, internally generated missiles, and fires.

Since the ASW system design bases parameters are maintained and the newly configured piping has been evaluated and designed to meet established licensing basis considerations, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.