[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 231 (Tuesday, December 2, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63732-63736]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31517]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-382]
Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-38 issued to Entergy Operations Inc., (the licensee) for operation
of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, located in St. Charles
Parish, Louisiana.
The proposed amendment would increase the Spent Fuel Pool storage
capacity and increase the maximum fuel enrichment from 4.9 w/o (nominal
weight percent) to 5.0 w/o U-235. This proposed modification will be
accomplished by removing the existing racks in the Spent Fuel Pool and
replacing them with higher density racks. The neutron absorber (BORAL)
for the new racks, has been licensed by the NRC for use in other
nuclear power plant spent fuel storage applications.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below.
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded pool
storage capacity, the following previously postulated accident
scenarios have been considered:
a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the Spent Fuel Pool.
[[Page 63733]]
b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow.
c. A seismic event.
d. An accidental drop of a fully loaded fuel shipping cask.
The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities of
accidental fuel assembly or shipping cask drops are primarily
influenced by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The method
of handling loads during normal plant operations remains unchanged,
since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel Handling Machine and Cask
Handling Crane) and procedures will be used. A new offset handling tool
will be required to access some storage rack cells located adjacent to
the pool walls. The grapple mechanism, procedures, and fuel
manipulation methods will be very similar to those used by the standard
fuel handling tool on the Spent Fuel Handling Machine. Therefore, this
tool does not represent a significant change in the methods used to
lift or move fuel in the Fuel Handling Building. Since the methods used
to move loads during normal operations remain nearly the same as those
used previously, there is no significant increase in the probability of
an accident.
During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to be
performed to support the modification (e.g., removal and installation
of racks) will be performed in the same manner as during normal
refueling operations. Shipping cask movements will not be performed
during the modification period.
Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool have been re-
evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that the postulated
accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks will
not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The
resulting structural damage to a falling assembly and/or a stored
assembly has been determined to remain unchanged. The minimum
subcriticality margin, Keff less than or equal to 0.95, will be
maintained. The structural damage to the Fuel Handling Building, pool
liner, and fuel assembly resulting from a fuel assembly drop striking
the pool floor or another assembly located within the racks remains
unchanged. The resulting structural damage to these items subsequent to
this event is not influenced by the proposed changes. The radiological
dose at the exclusion area boundary will increase due to the changes in
fuel enrichment and burnup. The previously calculated doses to the
thyroid and whole body were 0.47 and 0.11 rem, respectively. The new
thyroid and whole body doses based on the proposed change will be 0.553
and 0.304, respectively. These dose levels are extremely small when
compared to the levels required by 10 CFR 100. Therefore, the increase
in dose is not considered a significant increase in consequence. Thus,
the results of the postulated fuel drop accidents remain acceptable and
do not represent a significant increase in consequences from any of the
same previously evaluated accidents.
The consequences of a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling have been
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this accident
is a reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water inventory from bulk pool
boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation would
lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in offsite
dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at Waterford 3 is mitigated by
ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss of forced
cooling and uncovering fuel. This period of time is compared against a
reasonable period to re-establish cooling or supply an alternative
water source (such as fire water). Evaluation of this accident usually
includes determination of the time to boil. This time period is much
less than the onset of any significant increase in offsite dose, since
once boiling begins it would have to continue unchecked until the pool
surface was lowered to the point of exposing active fuel. The time to
boil represents the onset of loss of pool water inventory and is
commonly used as a gage for establishing the comparison of consequences
before and after a refueling project. The heat up rate in the Spent
Fuel Pool is a nearly linear function of the fuel decay heat load. The
fuel decay heat load will increase subsequent to the proposed changes
because of the increase in the number of assemblies and higher fuel
burnups. The heat up rate established for the limiting normal heat load
conditions prior to reracking was 5.41 deg.F per hour. This would
result in the pool temperature increasing from the maximum normal
temperature of 140 deg.F to boiling in a period of 13.3 hours. The
heat up rate established for the limiting normal heat load conditions
subsequent to the proposed changes has been determined as 13.6 deg.F
per hour. This would result in the pool temperature increasing from the
maximum normal temperature of 140 deg.F to boiling in a period of 5.3
hours.
This time to boil comparison was made for limiting normal heat load
conditions. However, the end of this period of time does not represent
the onset of any significant increase in offsite doses. As stated
above, this consequence would result subsequent to fuel being uncovered
through unchecked boiling and resulting water level drop of
approximately 24.5 feet from normal surface to the top of the fuel
storage racks. This depth is conservative, since the top of active fuel
is below this level. Subsequent to the proposed changes under limiting
normal heat loads the time lapse between the onset of unchecked boiling
and uncovering of the racks has been determined to exceed 50 hours.
As stated above in the safety assessment, subsequent to reracking,
the time to boil after loss of forced cooling in the most severe
scenario is 2.89 hours (the ensuing rate of evaporative loss would not
result in the fuel being uncovered until after an additional 34 hours,
which is 168 hours after reactor shutdown). However, the design basis
limiting pool heat load under these conditions actually decreases after
the proposed modification, because of conservatisms previously used to
determine the heat load for this condition. Therefore, the calculated
time to boil in this most severe scenario will increase subsequent to
the proposed modification. In the unlikely event that all pool cooling
is lost, sufficient time will be available subsequent to the proposed
changes for the operators to provide alternate means of cooling (i.e.,
fire water) before fuel is uncovered. Therefore, the proposed changes
represents no increase in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not increased.
The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the basis of
subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or building
configurations leading to radiological or criticality concerns. The new
racks have been analyzed in their new configuration and found safe
during seismic motion. Fuel has been determined to remain intact and
the storage racks maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations
[[Page 63734]]
subsequent to a seismic event. The structural capability of the pool
and liner will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of
dead weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel Handling Building
structure will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue
to adequately support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and
pool moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are
not increased.
The consequences of a spent fuel cask drop into the Cask Storage
Pit have been analyzed along with the new rack storage configuration.
This evaluation concluded that there is no increase in consequences.
Administrative controls, appropriate changes in load paths, and crane
travel limits will continue to preclude handling heavy loads above
stored fuel. Therefore, casks impacting stored fuel is not a postulated
event. Potential damage to the cask and contained fuel remain
unchanged, since the pertinent parameters for this analysis (i.e., lift
height, weight, impact zone configurations, etc.) are not affected by
the new rack configurations. The floor was reanalyzed to assess the
effect of the additional loading from higher density fuel storage. It
was determined that the floor remains intact with minor local crushing
of concrete. The liner plate would sustain limited damage, which is
repairable. Leakage would be limited to flow through the leak chase
system and would be collected at the sump. The Fuel Handling Building
integrity would not be compromised; therefore, there would be no
release of contaminated pool water outside of the building. Makeup
water from the Condensate Storage Pool and/or the Refueling Water
Storage Tank would be adequate to offset loss of water inventory due to
any leakages. This accident does not result in any increase in offsite
or Fuel Handling Building doses. Thus, the proposed changes do not
represent any increase in the consequences of a postulated spent fuel
cask drop.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident
previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously analyzed.
To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents, a
list of the critical parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage
was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as providing an
environment which would not present any significant threats to workers
or the general public. In other words, meeting the requirements of 10
CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new events which would modify these
parameters sufficiently to place them outside of the boundaries
analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the boundaries
previously considered for accidents would be considered a new or
different accident. The criticality and radiological safety evaluations
were reviewed to establish the list of critical parameters. The fuel
configuration and the existence of the moderator/coolant were
identified as the only two parameters which were critical to safe fuel
storage. Significant modification of these two parameters represents
the only possibility of an unsafe storage condition. Once the two
critical parameters were established, an additional step was taken to
determine what events (which were not previously considered) could
result in changes to the storage configuration or moderator/coolant
presence during or subsequent to the proposed changes. This process was
adopted to ensure that the possibility of any new or different accident
scenario or event would be identified.
Due to the proposed changes, the following events were considered
as the only events which might represent a new or different kind of
accident:
a. An accidental drop of a rack module during construction activity
in the pool.
b. Draining the Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal through the
floor drains.
c. Fuel assembly mispositioning accident in Region 2.
A construction accident resulting in a rack drop is an unlikely
event. A new rack lifting rig will be introduced to lift and suspend
all but one of the racks using the existing Fuel Handling Building
Cranes. Either a new temporary hoist or a combination of one of the
existing 15 ton cranes and a lifting bag will be used to lift one of
the existing eighty cell racks that is adjacent to the east wall of the
Spent Fuel Pool. The cranes, hoists and lifting rig have been or will
be designed using the guidance of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6. The
postulated rack drop event is commonly referred to as a ``heavy load
drop'' over the pools. Heavy loads will not be allowed to travel over
any racks containing fuel assemblies. The danger represented by this
event is that the pool structure will be compromised leading to loss of
moderator/coolant, which is one of the two critical parameters
identified above. However, although the analysis of this event has been
performed and shown to be acceptable, the question of a new or
different type of event is answered by determining whether heavy load
drops over the pool have been considered previously. The postulated
drop of a pool gate was previously evaluated and represents a heavy
load drop similar to a rack drop. All movements of heavy loads over the
pool will comply with the applicable administrative controls and
guidelines (i.e. plant procedures, NUREG-0612, etc.). Therefore, the
rack drop does not represent a new or different kind of accident.
The Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal both have floor drains
which will be plugged (a welded closed cover plate) prior to
installation of the new storage racks in each of the respective areas.
The plugs will preclude any water loss through the drain system.
Therefore, draining the Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal through
the floor drains is not a postulated event.
Fuel assembly mispositioning in Region 2 is an unlikely event,
since locating assemblies which do not meet the burnup criteria will be
administratively controlled. Administrative controls will consist of
developing a checkerboarding storage pattern in the Region 2 racks
prior to storage or placement of the non-compliant fuel in Region 1
racks. The Region 2 mispositioning event represents a change from the
previously analyzed condition, since Waterford 3 currently has only
Region 1 style storage. Therefore, a new fuel storage configuration is
possible. However, the event does not represent a new or different kind
of accident, since fuel assembly mispositioning is possible with the
existing racks through controlled or uncontrolled (assembly drop)
lowering of an assembly adjacent to the outside of the storage racks.
This condition was previously evaluated and found to be acceptable. The
new event was evaluated using similar techniques with similar
acceptance criteria and was shown to remain acceptable. Therefore, due
to the similarity of this new event with that which was previously
analyzed it is not considered to represent a new or different kind of
accident.
The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design
basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of the
important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. Therefore,
the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident is not
created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The function of the Spent Fuel Pool is to store the fuel assemblies
in a
[[Page 63735]]
subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental and
abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The new
rack design must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage and
be functionally compatible with the Spent Fuel Pool.
EOI has addressed the safety issues related to the expanded pool
storage capacity in the following areas:
a. Material, mechanical, and structural considerations.
b. Nuclear criticality.
c. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling.
The mechanical, material and structural designs of the new racks
have been reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
NRC Guidance entitled ``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and
Handling Applications''. The rack materials used are compatible with
the spent fuel assemblies and the Spent Fuel Pool environment. The
design of the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during
abnormal loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a
stuck assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate
the mechanical design and material selection to safely store fuel in a
coolable and subcritical configuration.
The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded
Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI
standards (GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2, NRC Guidance entitled,
``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling
Applications'', Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin of
safety for subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron
multiplication factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under all accident
conditions, including uncertainties. This criterion is the same as that
used previously to establish criticality safety evaluation acceptance
and remains satisfied for all analyzed accidents. Therefore, the
accepted margin of safety remains the same.
The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during
all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The pool
temperature will not exceed 140 deg.F during the worst single failure
of a cooling pump. The maximum local water temperature in the hot
channel will remain below the boiling point. The fuel will not undergo
any significant heat-up after an accidental drop of a fuel assembly on
top of the rack blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling to the pool
will allow sufficient time (5.3 hours for the limiting normal heat
load) for the operators to intervene and line up alternate cooling
paths and the means of inventory make-up before the onset of pool
boiling. The thermal limits specified for the evaluations performed to
support the proposed change are the same as those which were used in
the previous evaluations. Therefore, the accepted margin of safety
remains the same.
Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By January 2, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the University of New Orleans Library,
Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122. If a request
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above
date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition;
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended
[[Page 63736]]
petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to N.S. Renolds, Esq., Winston & Stran,
1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502, attorney for the
licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
The Commission hereby provides notice that this a proceeding on an
application for a license amendment falling within the scope of section
134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154.
Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of any
party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in
controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of
section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear
Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the
Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The
presiding officer may grant an untimely request for oral argument only
upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure to
file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be
conducted in accordance with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,
apply.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated March 27, 1997, as supplemented on
April 3, and November 13, 1997, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the University of New Orleans Library,
Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of November 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Chandu P. Patel,
Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Reactor
Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-31517 Filed 12-1-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P