[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 127 (Thursday, July 2, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36275-36276]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-17611]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-333]
Power Authority of the State of New York; James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant; Exemption
I
The Power Authority of the State of New York (the Licensee), also
known as the New York Power Authority is the holder of Facility
Operating License No. DPR-59, which authorizes operation of the James
A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (the facility). The license
provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all the
rules, regulations and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
now or hereafter in effect.
The facility is a boiling-water reactor located at the licensee's
site in Oswego County, New York.
II
Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee
authorized to possess special nuclear material maintain a criticality
accident monitoring system in each area in which such material is
handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24
specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must
meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to
criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors.
Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain
emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed special
nuclear material is handled, used, or stored and requires that (1) the
procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon
the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the
procedures include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation
plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for
determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey
instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency.
Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to provide the
means of identifying quickly any personnel who have received a dose of
10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees
to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, arrangements for a
physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation
emergencies, and arrangements for the transportation of contaminated
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary.
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for special nuclear
material used or to be used in the reactor. Subsection (d) of 10 CFR
70.24 states that any licensee that believes that there is good cause
why it should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24
may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the
reasons for the relief requested.
III
The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a
critical mass at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant is in the
form of nuclear fuel. The quantity of special nuclear material other
than fuel that is stored on site in any given location is small enough
to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff
has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the
nuclear fuel at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant and has
determined that it is extremely unlikely that such an accident will
occur if the licensees meet the following seven criteria:
1. Only three boiling-water reactor new fuel assemblies are allowed
out of a shipping cask or a storage rack at one time;
2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95-percent
probability, 95-percent confidence level, in the event that the fresh
fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-
235 enrichment and flooded with pure water;
3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, the k-
effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95-percent probability, 95-percent
confidence level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and
flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum
moderation;
4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95-percent
probability, 95-percent confidence level, in the event that the spent
fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-
235 enrichment and flooded with pure water;
5. The quantity of special nuclear material, other than nuclear
fuel, stored on-site in any given area is less than the quantity
necessary for a critical mass;
6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion
(GDC) 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect
excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions;
and
7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight
percent.
By letter dated April 24, 1998, the licensee requested an exemption
from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request, the licensee addressed the seven
criteria previously stated. The licensee stated that James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant does not analyze optimum moderation
conditions as addressed in Criteria 3 above, but has used a standard
industry practice by implementing administrative and physical controls
in accordance with General Electric Service Information Letter 152,
``Criticality margins for the Storage of New Fuel.'' To preclude the
existence of an optimum moderation condition in the new fuel storage
vault area, the following controls are used: the new fuel storage vault
is equipped with drains; the pre-fire plans have been updated to
prevent the use of fire fighting foam or fire house streams in a fog
pattern during the storage and transfer of new nuclear fuel; and the
new fuel storage vault plugs are installed during prolonged work
delays. The staff has found this practice acceptable.
The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's
submittal and has determined that James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power
Plant meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent
criticality.Therefore, the staff has determined that it is extremely
unlikely that an inadvertent criticality will occur in the handling of
special nuclear materials or in their storage areas at the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of
special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and
would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is
extremely unlikely that such an accident could occur. Although James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant is not licensed to GDC 63, the licensee
has radiation monitors consistent with the standards of GDC 63 in fuel
storage and handling areas. These monitors will
[[Page 36276]]
alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to
initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an
inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to GDC
63 standards, constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
IV
The Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse
environmental impact (63 FR 34205).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of June 1998
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-17611 Filed 7-1-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M