[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 191 (Friday, October 2, 1998)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 52990-52992] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 98-26421] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 RIN 3150-AF98 Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors; Meeting AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing a public meeting on November 13, 1998 to discuss rulemaking to modify power reactor reporting requirements. DATES: Friday, November 13, 1998. ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be held in the auditorium of NRC's headquarters at Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Washington DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6835, e-mail [email protected] or his alternate, Bennett M. Brady, telephone (301) 415-6363, e-mail [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On July 23, 1998 (63 FR 39522) the NRC published in the Federal Register an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to announce a contemplated rulemaking that would modify reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. Among other things, the ANPR requested public comments on whether the NRC should proceed with rulemaking to modify the event reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors,'' and 50.73, ``Licensee event report system,'' and several [[Page 52991]] concrete proposals were provided for comment. A public meeting was held to discuss the ANPR at NRC Headquarters on August 21, 1998. The ANPR was also discussed, along with other topics, at a public meeting on the role of industry in nuclear regulation in Rosemont, Illinois on September 1, 1998. The public comment period on the ANPR closed on September 21, 1998. A comment from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) proposed conducting ``table top exercises'' early in the development and review process to test key parts of the requirements and guidance for clarity and consistency. This meeting is being conducted in response to that comment. Purpose The purpose of the meeting is to test key aspects of the contemplated amendments to 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 for clarity and consistency, early in the process of drafting them, by discussing how reportability decisions could be made for example events. This discussion will provide insights to NRC staff, which can then be used in drafting the proposed requirements and associated guidance. Topics The following topics will be discussed: Loss of function: As discussed in the ANPR, any design or analysis defect or deviation that results in a system not being capable of performing its specified safety functions would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v), ``Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'' Comments have raised questions about how to determine when a system is ``not capable of performing.'' An example relevant to this issue is provided in LER #28997001, Three Mile Island 1, ``Potential Overpressurization of Piping Between Closed Reactor Building Isolation Valves Due to Inadequate Design Code Guidance.'' Stresses for postulated accident conditions would exceed the allowable values in the design code (ANSI B 31.1-1967). However, they would remain within the limits of ASME Section III, Appendix F, which demonstrates that the piping is capable of maintaining containment integrity (and, as a result, the piping was considered operable). Partial loss of function: As discussed in the ANPR, any design or analysis defect or deviation that results in one train of a multi-train system not being capable of performing its specified safety functions for a period of time in excess of that allowed by the plant's TS would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), ``Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.'' Comments have raised questions about how to determine the ``specified safety function.'' An example relevant to this issue is provided in LER #26697014, Point Beach 1, ``Auxiliary Feedwater System Inoperability Due to Loss of Instrument Air.'' It was found that a loss of offsite power could cause a loss of instrument air and, as a result, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow control valves could fail open. Then for low steam generator pressure, such as could occur for certain main steam line breaks, high AFW flow rates could result in tripping the motor driven AFW pumps on thermal overload. The single turbine driven AFW pump would not be affected. Unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety: No changes were proposed in the ANPR. However, comments have questioned the clarity of the current requirement with regard to the meaning of the term significant. The two examples relevant to this issue that are provided in the current guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 1 are: (a) Accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions and (b) voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to misunderstand the true condition of the plant. Another relevant example would be an unanalyzed condition that warrants declaration of an emergency class, such as an unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators for longer than 15 minutes. Also, a relevant example is provided in LER #24797006, Indian Point 2, ``Open Electric Penetration Area Door Creates Unanalyzed Condition.'' Equipment in the electrical penetration area was not qualified on the basis that a closed door would protect the area from a harsh environment. The door was improperly left open during plant operation; however, the condition lasted less than 6 hours before it was discovered and corrected. Compliance with technical specification surveillance requirements: As proposed in the ANPR, reporting would be eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance tests provided there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS, the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented. Comments have questioned whether the proposed conditions (i.e., ``provided there is no systematic non-compliance * * *'') are clear and appropriate. One example of an event relevant to this issue would be a case where review of a surveillance procedure indicates inadequate circuit overlap, so that a relay has not been included in the testing for some time. When tested, the relay is functional. Another relevant example would be a case where review of a surveillance procedure indicates that a component has not been tested for some time. When tested, the component is not functional; however, upon discovery that the component is not operable, the TS action statements are met by correcting the condition within the allowed time. A third relevant example would be a case where, because of an oversight, a surveillance test was not performed within the time required. This is the third case of a similar oversight in one calendar quarter. Condition that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function: In the ANPR it was proposed to clarify this criterion by revising it to require reporting any event or condition that alone or in combination with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, etc. However, comments have suggested that the proposed change would detract from clarity. An example relevant to this issue is provided in NUREG-1022, Revision 1. While one EDG was out of service for maintenance, the second EDG failed its surveillance test (and, as a result, was declared inoperable). Nuclear power plant, including its principal barriers, being in a seriously degraded condition: No changes were proposed in the ANPR. However, comments have indicated that this criterion is redundant and should be deleted. The following guidance and examples are relevant to this issue. The current guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 1 states that this criterion includes material (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety [[Page 52992]] barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the containment) such as: (a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, or that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of fission products. (b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc). (c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system, such as items which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, ``Analytical Evaluation of Flaws'' or ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1, ``Acceptance Standards.'' (d) Serious temperature or pressure transients, such as low temperature over pressure transients where the pressure-temperature relationship violates pressure-temperature limits derived from appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 (e.g., TS pressure-temperature curves). (e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation. (f) Loss of containment function or integrity including: (A) Containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits, including containment leak rate tests where the total containment as-found, minimum-pathway leak rate exceeds the limiting condition for operation (LCO) in the facility's TS, (B) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation, (C) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or operation, or (D) loss of containment cooling capability. Participation The meeting is scheduled for 9 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. and is open to the general public. Interested individuals may address relevant remarks or comments to the NRC staff at the meeting. To facilitate the scheduling of available time for and orderly conduct of the meeting, members of the public who wish to request the opportunity to speak and/or introduce particular examples for discussion should contact the cognizant NRC staff member listed in the For Further Information Contact section before the meeting. Indicate as specifically as possible the topic(s) of your comment and/or the example(s) you wish to introduce. Provide your name and a telephone number at which you can be reached, if necessary, before the meeting. Agenda for November 13, 1998 9:00 a.m.-9:30 a.m. Introductory remarks by NRC staff members 9:30 a.m.-10:00 a.m. Introductory comments by industry representatives and members of the general public 10:00 a.m.-12:00 noon Discussion among NRC staff members and public on how reportability decisions could be made for example events 12:00 noon-1:00 p.m. Lunch Break 1:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m. Continued discussion on how reportability decisions could be made for example events 3:00 p.m.-3:15 p.m. Concluding remarks Note that the discussions may be completed earlier than indicated and, if so, the meeting will be concluded earlier. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of September, 1998. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Patrick W. Baranowsky, Acting Director, Safety Programs Division, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. [FR Doc. 98-26421 Filed 10-1-98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P