[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 76 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19626-19666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-9640]
[[Page 19625]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part III
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Part 400 et al.
Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry
Licensing Regulations; Proposed Rule
Proposed Advisory Circular (AC) 431-01, Reusable Launch Vehicle System
Safety Process and AC 431-02, Expected Casualty Calculations for
Commercial Space Launch and Reentry Missions; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 76 / Wednesday, April 21, 1999 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 19626]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 413, 415, 431, 433, and 435
[Docket No. FAA-1999-5535; Notice No. 99-04]
RIN 2120-AG71
Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to amend the commercial space transportation
licensing regulations by establishing operational requirements for
launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the authorized conduct
of commercial space reentry activities. The proposed rule would respond
to advancements in the development of commercial RLV and reentry
capability and enactment of legislation extending the FAA's licensing
authority to reentry activities. The agency is proposing requirements
that limit risk to the public from RLV and reentry operations and seeks
public comment on appropriate measures to carry out its licensing and
safety responsibilities.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before July 20, 1999.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in
duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No.
FAA-1999-5535, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC
20590. Comments also may be sent electronically to the following
Internet address: [email protected]. Comments may be filed and
examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stewart W. Jackson, AST-100, Space
Systems Development Division, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington,
DC 20591, (202) 267-7903; or Ms. Esta M. Rosenberg, Attorney-Advisor,
Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, (202) 366-9320.
Comments Invited
Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the
proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as
they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy,
federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the
proposals in this document also are invited. Substantive comments
should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the
regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the
DOT Rules Docket address specified above.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed
rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for
public inspection before and after the comment closing date.
All comments received on or before the closing date will be
considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed
rulemaking. Comments filed late will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this
document may be changed in light of the comments received.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5535.'' The postcard will be
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
Availability of NPRMs
An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section
of the FedWorld electronic bulletin board service (telephone (703) 321-
3339) or the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board
service (telephone (202) 512-1661).
Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/
avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's web page at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published
rulemaking documents.
Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request
to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1,
800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202)
267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket
number of this NPRM.
Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future
NPRMs should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that
describes the application procedure.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
General
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 (CSA), Public Law 105-303, extends
the licensing authority of the Secretary of Transportation under 49
U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701 (known as the Commercial Space Launch
Act or CSLA), to reentry vehicle operators and the operation of reentry
sites by a commercial or non-Federal entity. Under the CSA, the
Secretary is authorized to license reentry of a reentry vehicle,
including reusable launch vehicles, and the operation of reentry sites
when those activities are conducted within the United States or by U.S.
citizens abroad. The Secretary is charged with exercising licensing
authority protection of public health and safety and the safety of
property as well as consistency with U.S. national security and foreign
policy interests, and treaty obligations entered into by the United
States. By delegation of authority, the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration is responsible for carrying out the Secretary's
licensing and safety mandate with respect to commercial space
transportation and the Administrator has, in turn, delegated regulatory
and related authority to the Associate Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation (AST).
Amendment of the CSLA responds to development of reentry capability
and reusable launch vehicle technology by the commercial space
industry. Market forecasts of launch demand and international launch
competition are driving industry to invest in means of accomplishing
lower cost and more efficient access to space and specifically to low
earth orbit. Reusable, or partially reusable vehicles that are capable
of payload delivery and return to Earth for reflight are considered by
many in industry as integral to reducing launch costs. For years,
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) have successfully provided commercial
payload delivery services; however, the ability to survive the rigors
of launch and the prospect of multiple missions per vehicle may
dramatically lower price-per-pound-to-orbit launch costs. Growing
interest in the ability to provide reliable round-trip space-route
services, such as satellite
[[Page 19627]]
retrieval, package delivery, and ultimately space tourism, is
attracting investment in a new class of space launch vehicle that can
provide orbital launch and reentry services.
A reusable launch vehicle, or RLV, differs from an expendable
launch vehicle in that the vehicle, or a significant portion of it,
would be designed to survive launch and reentry from space and maintain
functional integrity. Proponents of reusable launch technology envision
rapid reconditioning and turn-around time to maximize efficiency and
profitability.
Reusable launch vehicles are one form of reentry capability that
would be subject to FAA licensing and safety requirements under the
Commercial Space Act of 1998. Any vehicle, reusable or not, that is
designed and operated such that it would intentionally return to Earth
from Earth orbit or outer space, substantially intact, would require an
FAA license. A person who offers use of a designated site for purposes
of containing landing impacts would also be subject to FAA licensing to
assure public safety is maintained if that person is a citizen of the
United States or if the reentry site is in the United States.
Launch vehicle survivability poses unique issues for the FAA in
carrying out its safety mandate. Except for the U.S. Space
Transportation System (STS) which transports the space shuttle, only
ELVs are launched from the United States and the vast majority of ELV
launches have been from federally owned and operated launch sites, such
as Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) or Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB). ELVs having an orbital delivery capability are generally
launched over unpopulated ocean areas so that debris generated from a
vehicle failure would impact the Earth away from population. Risk to
public safety is assessed by Federal ranges and launches proceed from
Federal sites only if public risk is contained at an acceptable level.
ELVs rely upon flight termination systems (FTS) that assure safe flight
by destroying a vehicle if it is traveling beyond pre-approved
boundaries so as to endanger the public. The boundaries, or impact
limit lines, are drawn in advance of a launch and ensure that vehicle
debris is confined within an unpopulated area in the event of vehicle
failure or FTS activation.
In contrast, RLVs would be designed for recovery and reuse.
Therefore, launch safety, for the most part, may be assured through
non-destructive means of terminating flight. In the event of a
malfunction, an RLV may be able to return to its launch site or fly to
an alternative landing site where the problem can be corrected and
flight attempted again. Or, in another scenario, thrust termination
combined with a soft or slowed landing may allow a vehicle operator to
recover its vehicle for reconditioning and reuse. If a landing can be
accomplished safely in terms of public risk, the operator would prefer
it to total loss of the vehicle, and may purposely select an in-land
site for the conduct of an RLV launch rather than risk launching over
water where recovery would be difficult and costly.
Return to Earth of a substantially intact vehicle also presents
safety issues for the FAA. Although spent vehicle stages return to
Earth periodically, as does other space debris, it is generally
expected that reentering space objects burn up upon reentry into the
Earth's atmosphere and do not present a threat to public safety.
Reentry vehicles would be designed and controlled to the extent
necessary to avoid burning up upon entry into the Earth's atmosphere
and the FAA's safety program must ensure that they impact Earth in a
manner that does not jeopardize public health and safety or the safety
of property. Until accuracy and reliability of a vehicle's performance
can be demonstrated through rigorous testing and numerous flights,
other risk mitigation measures may be necessary to limit risks to the
public from an off-site landing, explosion or release of toxic
substances.
The proposed rules would establish general performance-based
standards for the launch of an RLV from any launch site and
requirements applicable to commercial reentry activities. The approach
proposed by the FAA in this notice is intended to provide the emerging
commercial space transportation industry with the requisite flexibility
to develop commercially feasible reentry and reusable launch vehicle
systems whose operation would not jeopardize public safety.
Reentry Vehicles and Reusable Launch Vehicle Proposals
Extension of the FAA's licensing authority to cover reentry
operations responds to the development of RLV technology by a number of
commercial entities that have begun to develop and test RLV concepts.
Not all test operations require FAA launch and reentry licensing and
may be covered by other agency authority. A number of RLV technology
developers have begun preliminary consultations with the FAA to
ascertain the nature and extent of FAA safety requirements and
authorization needed for flight of their vehicles and the FAA
encourages early discussion between the agency and aerospace companies
to avoid regulatory obstacles down the road that may delay operations.
The proposed rules would apply to both commercial reentry vehicle
and RLV activities. Not all RLVs are reentry vehicles, and all reentry
vehicles are not RLVs. A reentry vehicle is defined by the Commercial
Space Act of 1998 to mean ``a vehicle designed to return from Earth
orbit or outer space to Earth, or a reusable launch vehicle designed to
return from outer space to Earth, substantially intact.'' Pub. L. 105-
303, Section 102(a)(3). Therefore, an RLV is a reentry vehicle under
specific conditions of design and operation. Similarly, ``reentry'' is
defined to mean ``to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer
space to Earth.'' Pub. L. 105-303, Section 102(a)(3).
An RLV is a launch vehicle designed to be launched more than once;
however its return to Earth would be licensable as a reentry only if
the vehicle achieves Earth orbit or outer space. Some RLVs are designed
to operate in a suborbital fashion in that they do not enter Earth
orbit. Others achieve Earth orbit and remain on orbit anywhere from one
orbital revolution to several days prior to initiating reentry,
depending on the nature of the mission. Some vehicle concepts employ a
fully reusable vehicle that carries the payload to orbit and returns to
Earth with the entire vehicle intact. This category of RLV includes
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicles, such as the VentureStar vehicle
planned by Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin) and Rotary
Rocket's Roton vehicle. For some, only certain stages, or portions, of
the vehicle are designed to reenter . For example, Kistler Aerospace
Corporation's (Kistler) K-1 vehicle relies upon a two-stage-to-orbit
concept in which both the orbital vehicle and booster vehicle return to
Earth for reuse; however only the orbital vehicle would qualify as a
reentry vehicle under the statutory definition. An RLV also may be
designed with one or more stages that are fully reusable and with other
stages that are either partially reusable or even expendable. There are
also airborne launch systems under development, such as that proposed
by Kelly Aerospace, involving RLV and reentry operations.
Further complicating the development of regulations for commercial
space transportation activities is the variety of take-off and landing
concepts that have been proposed. These concepts include
[[Page 19628]]
vertical launch from conventional launch pads, horizontal take-off from
conventional runways, and airborne release using tow or air-drop
configurations. Also included are vertical landing, horizontal landing,
and a variety of ``soft'' landing concepts, such as parachutes,
airbags, parafoils, rotors, water landings, or aerial recovery.
The FAA does not want to constrain the development of emerging
technology as operators seek effective and efficient methods of
operation. Therefore, the regulatory requirements proposed by the FAA
are not, generally speaking, based on type or design of a reentry
vehicle or RLV, nor is the FAA proposing to certificate vehicle design.
Rather, the FAA is proposing to examine closely those critical systems
whose performance or reliability can affect public safety. Except for
certain restrictions deemed critical to assuring public safety, the FAA
proposes to employ a system safety engineering approach that
effectively allows an operator to design its own operational
restrictions and performance envelope within permissible risk
thresholds established by the agency consistent with safety mandate.
Limits and conditions on a licensee's RLV launch and reentry vehicle
operations would be determined through the system safety process and
risk assessments performed by a license applicant. The FAA envisions
that future use of RLV operations may include passenger transport, in
addition to cargo transport, to and from space. This notice is not
intended to address these issues. Future rulemakings will address crew
and passenger safety and other issues.
History of U.S. Commercial Reentry Capability
COMET/METEOR Program
A number of the safety principles reflected in this proposal
originate with the experience gained by the Department's Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST), the predecessor organization to
AST, in evaluating the COMET (Commercial Experiment Transporter)
Program and, later, the METEOR (Multiple Experiment to Earth Orbit and
Return) Program.
The COMET Program began as a commercial program administered
through National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)'s Centers
for the Commercial Development of Space (CCDS). COMET was intended to
provide the services of a reentry vehicle system to carry and return to
Earth experimental payloads. Three reentry missions were originally
planned, with an option for two additional missions. The reentry
vehicle system was comprised of a service module, manufactured by
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and a capsule-shaped reentry
vehicle, manufactured by Space Industries, Inc. Both companies were
under contract with NASA's CCDS. The program was intended to
demonstrate the capability of a low cost, medium-term (30-day) platform
in space for the conduct and return to Earth of microgravity
experiments. The COMET Program and the agency's approach to authorizing
its activity is fully described in several Federal Register Notices .
(See 57 FR 10213, March 24, 1992; 57 FR 55021, November 23, 1992; and
60 FR 39476, August 2, 1995.) EER Systems Corporation (EER), also under
contract to the CCDS, was responsible for launching the COMET reentry
vehicle system into space using a Conestoga expendable launch vehicle.
Upon command from Earth, the COMET would separate into two
components and the reentry vehicle portion (Freeflyer), designed and
operated by Space Industries, Inc., would reenter the Earth's
atmosphere targeting a designated landing site on earth where
experiments could be recovered. Because of funding problems the COMET
Program was terminated and subsequently resurrected under a contract
between NASA and Systems, Inc., which became responsible for both
launch and reentry operations. Flight capability of the reentry vehicle
system, renamed METEOR, was never demonstrated, however, because of the
Conestoga launch failure which destroyed the METEOR system shortly
after lift-off.
The agency's initial approach to the COMET Program was to license
the reentry event separately from the launch event under existing
launch licensing authority. The determination to issue a separate
license for return to Earth of the reentry vehicle was based, in large
measure, on the fact that the reentry vehicle operator was a different
entity than the launch operator, and that responsibility over the
subsequent reentry (30 days following completion of the launch) ought
not be imposed regulatorily on the launch operator, whose
responsibility for launch safety would terminate after delivery of
COMET to orbit and upon safing of the Conestoga expendable launch
vehicle upper stage. Also, under typical circumstances, the launch
provider's obligations to its customer would end upon successful
deployment of the payload or cargo, in this case the COMET reentry
vehicle system. By letter from the Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Space to the Director of OCST, the Department was advised that it
did not have explicit licensing authority over payloads but that it
should continue its safety review of reentry vehicle operations
associated with the Launch. In the letter, dated September 2, 1992, the
House Subcommittee Chairman indicated that the Committee would seek
legislation to address commercial reentry vehicle licensing issues,
including indemnification and liability. OCST continued its evaluation
of the COMET reentry vehicle system, and then METEOR, under its
authority to evaluate missions and payloads not otherwise licensed by
the Federal government, for purposes of assuring whether the launch of
the COMET payload would jeopardize public health and safety or safety
of property.
The Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-303, provides reentry
licensing authority to the Department and imposes the financial
responsibility and risk allocation provisions of 49 U.S.C. 70112 and
70113 on licensed reentries. (Financial responsibility issues
associated with licensed reentry activities are discussed in a separate
rulemaking.)
COMET/METEOR Safety Approval
The COMET Program safety review evaluated safety aspects of the
reentry vehicle system when operated in accordance with certain
operating limits. The review encompassed vehicle design, engineering
analyses, testing, manufacturing, and integration. A vehicle safety
evaluation determined the performance capabilities and limitations of
the integrated reentry vehicle system. OCST did not dictate the
methodology to be used by the applicant in performing the hazard and
risk assessment required for vehicle safety approval; however, the
applicant had to address engineering and safety analyses, component and
system tests and checkouts, quality assurance procedures, manufacturing
processes, and test plans and results. A separate operations review
evaluated the operator's ability to carry out the reentry operation in
a safe manner consistent with the capability and limitations of the
reentry vehicle system. Vehicle safety and operations approvals issued
by OCST were limited to the design and operating limits presented in
the respective applications. Any subsequent changes would require an
amendment of the application and further review and approval by the
agency.
For further assurance of public safety, OCST determined it prudent
to conduct
[[Page 19629]]
independent evaluations of the reliability, design performance, and
operation of the COMET reentry vehicle system in addition to assessing
the data submitted by Space Industries, Inc., and later by EER, to
support the application for vehicle safety approval. These independent
evaluations were designed to serve as a means of ensuring all hazards
had been identified and the applicant had adequately addressed all
potential risks. The evaluation also provided technical verification of
the applicant's analysis of the reliability of the reentry vehicle
system.
COMET/METEOR Safety Approval Criteria
The COMET Program was the first commercial reentry operation that
proposed to land a reentry vehicle in the United States. The designated
landing site for the reentry vehicle was the Utah Test and Training
Range, a Federal facility located in a sparsely populated area.
In fulfilling its statutory mandate to protect public safety, OCST
selected three criteria against which the reentry vehicle system would
be evaluated. The evaluation criteria were performance-based rather
than design standards to afford the COMET Program participants maximum
flexibility in developing a safe and cost-effective product. As a
general matter, performance-based standards also further the public
interest by encouraging innovation and technology development. The
three criteria developed by OCST to evaluate the COMET Program reentry
vehicle system were as follows:
1. The probability of the Reentry Vehicle (RV) landing outside the
designated landing site shall not be greater than 3 in 1,000 missions.
2. The additional risks to the public in the immediate vicinity of
the landing site (that is, the area within 100 miles of the designated
landing site) shall not exceed the normal background risks to which
those individuals ordinarily would be exposed but for the reentry
missions. Normal background risk is characterized as: the probability
of any casualty occurring within the 100-mile zone shall not exceed one
in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the probability of any
casualty occurring within the zone shall not exceed one in a million
for a single mission.
3. The additional risks to the general public beyond the 100-mile
zone around the designed landing site, and to property on orbit, shall
not exceed normal background risks to which the public ordinarily would
be exposed but for the reentry missions. This normal background risk is
characterized as: the probability of any casualty occurring shall not
exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the
probability of any casualty occurring in the area that is both outside
the designated landing site and the 100-mile zone around the site shall
not exceed one in a million for a single mission.
The three criteria, established an acceptable level of risk that
conservatively, did not exceed the normal background risk of
individuals affected by the activity. The criteria were published in
the Federal Register on March 24, 1992 (57 FR 10213).
As explained in the March 24, 1992 Notice, the first criterion was
directed at ensuring vehicle reliability and accuracy within a
controlled area. The second criterion was intended to ensure that as a
result of nominal operations, or in the event of a system error or
deviation from planned trajectory of the vehicle, persons living within
the vicinity of the landing site were not exposed to greater than the
normal background risk that is accepted by the public in daily
activities. The third criterion would limit public risk to normal
background risk even if a major system failure resulted in an
essentially random reentry; however, flight path, design, and limited
cross-range capability of the vehicle made it possible to define the
potential ``footprint'' in which a random reentry could occur.
Believing that it could not satisfy the first criterion in the
absence of flight performance history, Space Industries, Inc.
petitioned for relief from the accuracy and reliability criterion. The
program was discontinued in May 1994, before official action could be
taken on the waiver request. Approximately one year later, NASA
restarted the program, renamed METEOR by EER, which took over
responsibility for development and operation of the reentry vehicle
system in addition to launch of the METEOR, on its Conestoga launch
vehicle. However, unlike the COMET Program, NASA contracted for reentry
services and designated an area in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of
Virginia, for the program's initial reentry attempt. Changing the
landing site from Utah to the Atlantic Ocean significantly reduced the
public's exposure to risk if the vehicle were to land off-site as a
result of a system failure. While analysis showed that the properly
operating reentry vehicle would land within the designated landing area
in 997 out of 1,000 nominal cases, Systems Corporation argued that it
could not demonstrate that the vehicle met the criterion in non-nominal
cases. Non-nominal cases were those that considered the probability of
failure of certain safety critical systems and the resultant errors in
the landing location. Therefore, EER pursued the requested relief from
the accuracy and reliability criterion.
OCST granted the requested waiver for the following reasons: OCST
determined that the three criteria were designed to collectively ensure
public safety, meaning that satisfaction of the second and third
criteria would compensate if the ability of the reentry vehicle system
to meet the accuracy and reliability criterion was marginal. OCST
analyzed failure scenarios and determined that there were circumstances
in which intentional reentry of the METEOR reentry vehicle could occur
and public safety would be assured without the demonstrated level of
accuracy required under the first criterion. Those circumstances were
as follows: (i) if there were well-defined areas within which the
vehicle was most likely to land if it missed the designated landing
site, and the risk to the population within those areas fell within
acceptable limits; (ii) if the condition of the vehicle following an
errant reentry presented little risk to exposed populations because it
would not survive reentry or because of its small size and mass and the
absence of hazardous materials on the vehicle; and (iii) if risk
mitigation measures could be implemented to limit public safety risk to
acceptable levels. Because all of these circumstances were found to
exist, and because criteria two and three were satisfied, OCST
concluded that public safety and U.S. national interests would not be
jeopardized if criterion one were not satisfied for non-nominal cases.
A waiver of the accuracy and reliability criterion was therefore
granted for the METEOR Program's first reentry. However, as a condition
of the waiver, OCST required that the operator implement a public
information communications plan under which the affected public would
be informed of the reentry activity, including its estimated time and
location. The operator also was required to have an emergency response
plan whereby local officials would be notified in the event of an off-
site landing.
The launch vehicle failed shortly after lift-off during first stage
powered ascent and the vehicle and payload were destroyed. No
subsequent application for a launch license or payload determination
has been made under the COMET/METEOR Program and, as yet, no formal
application has been submitted to the FAA to reenter a reentry vehicle.
[[Page 19630]]
Lessons Learned From COMET/METEOR Safety Approval Criteria
The FAA concludes that a collective approach of using a number of
safety standards, in combination, to limit risk is in the public
interest. Accordingly, the FAA is proposing a three-prong interrelated
approach to achieving safe reentry operations, in addition to requiring
certain organizational safeguards derived from the government's
experience in managing safe launch operations. First, the performance
hazards and risks to public safety presented by a reentry vehicle
proposal would be identified through a system safety process that
defines the safe operating envelope for a particular reentry vehicle,
much like the vehicle safety approval process utilized for evaluating
the COMET reentry vehicle system. Second, an applicant for a reentry
license would be required to satisfy a collective risk criteria,
referred to as Ec. Third, as in COMET, the FAA is proposing
certain risk mitigation measures that must be followed even if other
standards are satisfied. These measures take the form of operational
restrictions and are described below.
The FAA proposes that the reentry site must be sufficiently large
so as to encompass the three-sigma footprint of the vehicle, as
explained in greater detail in a subsequent section elsewhere in this
notice under supplementary information. This articulation of the
landing site accuracy standard effectively limits the risk of an off-
site landing but does so in a way that is more readily demonstrable by
an applicant, as it relates only to nominal performance of the vehicle
and its systems.
General Approach to Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing
Purposeful Reentry From Earth Orbit or Outer Space
Prior to enactment of the Commercial Space Act of 1998 (CSA), FAA
licensing authority over launch vehicle flight was limited to launches
of launch vehicles, defined to mean to place or try to place a launch
vehicle and any payload in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in
outer space, or otherwise in outer space. 49 U.S.C. 70102(3). A
``launch vehicle'' is defined in 49 U.S.C. 70102 to mean a vehicle
built to operate in, or place a payload in, outer space, and a
suborbital rocket. 49 U.S.C. 70102(7).
Recent amendment of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701, grants to
the agency explicit licensing authority over reentry operations.
``Reentry,'' an event that must be authorized by the FAA, means the
``return or attempt to return, purposefully, [of] a reentry vehicle and
its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth.''
49 U.S.C. 70102(10). Two elements must be satisfied for an event to
qualify as a ``reentry'' subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction. First,
the vehicle (an undefined term) that is being returned to Earth must
qualify as a ``reentry vehicle'' under the statutory definition. That
is, not only must its reentry originate from Earth orbit or outer
space, but the vehicle must be designed to reenter and land on Earth in
substantially intact condition. Second, deliberate intent to reenter,
or the element of purposefulness, must exist. Absent these two
elements, the unintended, though foreseeable, return to Earth of an
object capable of surviving reentry is not an event that requires
licensing by the FAA.
For example, the return to Earth in 1997 of a major part of a Delta
II launch vehicle, a second stage tank, in substantially intact
condition in a Texas field was foreseeable inasmuch as any object in
orbit, and most immediately in low Earth orbit, will experience the
effects of orbital decay over time and eventually reenter Earth
atmosphere. Most such objects will burn up upon reentry into Earth
atmosphere due to aerodynamic heating caused by atmospheric drag. The
Delta II second stage tank is notorious because it failed to do so,
however it would not require FAA licensing. The event illustrates that
an object that is not intended to survive reentry substantially intact
may in fact do so. The Delta II second stage is not a reentry vehicle
under the statutory definition because it was not designed to survive
reentry. However, even if it were a reentry vehicle, the event would
not be subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction because there was never
any deliberate intent by an operator to return the Delta II second
stage to Earth, even though it was understood that the Delta stage,
just like any other space object, would eventually reenter Earth
atmosphere as a function of orbital decay.
Certain RLV launch concepts operate in a suborbital 1
fashion in that they do not achieve orbital velocity. However, until
passage of the CSA, it remained doubtful (or at best unclear) as to
whether Congress intended for the FAA to impose regulatory controls
over the intact landing of such vehicles returning from outer space and
whether financial responsibility and risk allocation requirements,
specifically the so-called indemnification provisions of 49 U.S.C.
70113, would apply to their landing on Earth. The matter is now
resolved by legislation and, to ensure consistency in its regulatory
approach to assessing and limiting risk to public safety, the FAA
considers a suborbitally operated RLV the same as other reentry
vehicles that return from Earth orbit or outer space. From a safety and
risk standpoint, the difference between a suborbital reentry and an
orbital one is a distinction without a difference, in the agency's
opinion, because both pose comparable risks to public safety as a
result of launch or ascent of the vehicle and intact descent or reentry
of the vehicle. To ensure consistent application of standards in
evaluating ascent and descent risks presented by RLV proposals, the FAA
has determined that the better approach is to regard a suborbitally
operated RLV as the launch and reentry of a reentry vehicle, rather
than as a suborbital launch of a launch vehicle. As explained in the
next section of this supplementary information, because the FAA would
evaluate the safety of the entire mission, regardless of whether one
authorization (launch) or two (launch and reentry) are combined in a
single instrument known as a license, consistency in the agency's
approach to risk assessment is assured.
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\1\ The dictionary definition of the term ``suborbital'' means
of or less than one orbit of the earth. A suborbital trajectory is a
flight path that is not closed, whereas an orbit is a closed path. A
suborbital trajectory may be ballistic, that is, acted on only by
atmospheric drag and gravity, or it can be controlled by external
forces and therefore maneuverable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA concludes that a suborbitally operated RLV that achieves
outer space would satisfy the requisite element of purposefulness and
would thus be subject to FAA reentry licensing authority, even though
an intervening event of human control over vehicle operations is not
required to return that vehicle to Earth. The term ``purposefully''
that appears in the definition of ``reenter'' and ``reentry'' is
intended to include within the FAA's reentry licensing authority those
vehicles whose return to Earth must be deliberately initiated by human
or pre-programmed intervention, as well as those vehicles for which
intentional reentry has been designed into the vehicle's capability
without initiation of a reentry sequence, as is the case in a ballistic
launch and reentry where there is no need to activate a reentry
propulsion system. The term ``purposeful'' is, however, intended to
eliminate from the scope of FAA licensing jurisdiction those spacecraft
that are not designed to, but may, survive reentry into Earth
atmosphere through application of natural deorbiting forces, such as
orbital decay.
[[Page 19631]]
Where the operator's intent, as evidenced through vehicle design
and operation, is to launch and deliberately return to Earth the RLV,
and the vehicle is designed to return from outer space to Earth
substantially intact, the return to Earth is licensable as a
``reentry.'' Thus, suborbitally operated RLVs that reach outer space
are reentry vehicles whose reentry would be subject to FAA reentry
licensing authority.
As previously indicated, not all RLVs will satisfy the statutory
definition of the term ``reenter'' because they do not achieve Earth
orbit or outer space. However, RLVs and reentry vehicles share the
common operational characteristic of intact, targeted reentry and it is
this operational characteristic that presents risks to public safety
warranting regulatory oversight. It is also this operational
characteristic that heightens the risk of U.S. Government international
liability under the Outer Space Treaties and therefore warrants
regulatory supervision by the United States to ensure that reentry
activities are conducted in a manner consistent with international
obligations of the United States.
Therefore, whether or not an RLV is also a reentry vehicle
specifically subject to reentry licensing jurisdiction of the agency,
the FAA is proposing a consistent measure of safety for ascent and
descent flight phases of an RLV. The measure of safety would not vary
on the basis of whether an RLV's flight and return to Earth meet the
statutory definition of a ``reentry.'' In other words, the public
should not be exposed to greater risk because a vehicle achieves Earth
orbit or outer space, or is maneuvered in its return to Earth rather
than returning through ballistic flight. However, where reentry must be
deliberately initiated for de-orbit to occur, certain affirmative
controls or safety standards, as described under a separate heading
elsewhere in this supplementary information, would be imposed on the
operator to ensure conditions for safe reentry are satisfied.
Mission Risk Assessment
For all RLVs and most reentry vehicles, the FAA proposes to
approach safety on an overall mission basis. The FAA would evaluate the
safety of the ascent and descent phases of an RLV mission and would not
allow it to proceed unless the combined risk of the ascent and descent
phases of the mission satisfies the agency's safety criteria. That
criteria is: Ec 30 x 10-6. For risk
assessment purposes, the FAA proposes no distinction among space launch
vehicles that combine expendable and reusable vehicle concepts, or that
reenter in multiple stages (some or all of which may also be reentry
vehicles). A single safety criteria, measured in terms of expected
casualty for the mission, would apply to all public risk exposure from
vehicle operations during both ascent and descent. Thus, a launch
vehicle that utilizes an expendable first stage booster to achieve
altitude and a second reusable stage for delivery on orbit followed by
reentry would be required to satisfy the single Ec criterion
cited above for the FAA to authorize the mission (launch and reentry).
The FAA believes a caveat may be appropriate with respect to the
appropriate public safety risk threshold to apply to a reentry vehicle
that is designed to remain on orbit for an extended period of time and
for which planned reentry is so remote from the launch event that there
is no objective means or rational basis for combining reentry risk with
launch or ascent risk. The FAA requests public comment on the
circumstances, if any, under which it may be appropriate to separately
assess the reentry risks of a reentry vehicle from those presented by
the entire mission of launching a reentry vehicle into space and its
subsequent reentry.
That said, the FAA envisions combining launch and reentry
authorizations under a single license whereby a single operator is
responsible for launch and reentry phases of the mission.2
The FAA would not use a ``wait and see'' approach to authorize a
reentry. Reentry authorization would have to be issued in advance of
launch, signifying the FAA's conclusion that both ascent and descent
flight phases could be performed in a manner that does not expose the
public to unreasonable risk.
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\2\ Separate licenses would be appropriate in circumstances
where different operators are each responsible for a particular
phase of flight, as originally planned in the COMET Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scope of License
The report of the House Committee on Science, Report 105-347,
addresses the intended scope of licensing authority over reentry
operations granted to the FAA by H.R. 1702, the Commercial Space Act of
1997. (The Commercial Space Act of 1998 was enacted into law during the
second session of the 105th Congress as Public Law 105-303. No
substantive changes to FAA reentry licensing authority from that
reported on by the House Science Committee in Report 105-347 appear in
the public law.) It provides that the legislation is not intended to
extend FAA launch licensing authority, as far as the payload is
concerned, beyond placement of the payload in orbit or its planned
trajectory. According to the Committee Report, only the launch of a
launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry vehicle requires FAA licensing
and regulatory oversight. While non-reentry vehicle operations on-
orbit, maneuvers between orbits, and activities following launch that
also precede reentry are not intended to be covered by an FAA license,
the Committee Report recognized that the FAA may need to examine pre-
reentry procedures and activities to evaluate safe reentry capability.
A discussion of launch duration and the commencement point of a
reentry license appears in a separate rulemaking that addresses
financial responsibility and risk allocation for licensed reentry
activities so that space vehicle operators can manage risks
appropriately. Unlicensed events would only be eligible for government
payment of excess claims protection, known as indemnification, to the
extent losses result from and are causally related to a licensed
activity. Therefore, for purposes of insurance and indemnification
under 49 U.S.C. 70112 and 70113, it is critical that the FAA define
those activities to which statutory-based insurance and risk allocation
would be applicable. For purposes of licensing, it is also important
that the agency define the extent of activity that is covered by a
license and is therefore subject to FAA safety standards.
In determining the appropriate scope of a reentry license, the FAA
considered the Committee Report language cited above, the scope of
launch licenses for ELV launches, and reentry risks for which
statutorily mandated financial responsibility and risk allocation are
necessary.
In its report accompanying H.R. 1702, the House Committee on
Science stated that ``[b]y way of definition, the Committee intends
that [``reentry''] begins when the vehicle is prepared specifically for
reentry. By way of definition, the Committee intends the term to apply
to that phase of the overall space mission during which the reentry is
intentionally initiated. Although this may vary slightly from system to
system, as a general matter the Committee expects reentry to begin when
the vehicle's attitude is oriented for propulsion firing to place the
vehicle on its reentry trajectory.'' (Report 105-347 at p. 21, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess.)
The Report acknowledges that to evaluate capability of a reentry
operator to conduct a safe reentry, the agency
[[Page 19632]]
may need to examine certain proposed procedures and activities that
would precede initiation of reentry; however, these procedures and
activities are not events requiring a license or otherwise subject to
regulations. ``Rather, they would represent aspects of an application
that the Department would have to measure against standards and
criteria that the Department has established are necessary to evaluate
capability to conduct the reentry.'' The Committee further allows for
both general and particular (case-by-case) applicability of such
standards and criteria to a reentry proposal.
The FAA proposes regulations adopting the analytical approach to
assessing reentry capability envisioned by the House Science Committee.
The FAA is not proposing design-based or prescriptive requirements
applicable to RLV or reentry vehicle activities while on orbit. As
described below, the agency's system safety approach to reentry risk
requires that a reentry operator establish operating procedures and
specifications that ensure reentry risks are confined within acceptable
limits. Reentry authorization would be granted based on a demonstration
by an applicant that its vehicle and reentry operations satisfy the
agency's safety criteria when operated in accordance with operator-
designed procedures and criteria.
For purposes of measuring reentry safety against FAA criteria
(Ec), however, it remains necessary to define the extent of
activities that enter into the Ec analysis. Most of the RLV
and reentry activities currently contemplated by the aerospace industry
involve very limited time on orbit. RLVs that operate suborbitally, as
discussed above, would spend no time on orbit and would be subject to
continuous FAA licensing. Unlike the COMET situation, RLVs that are
reentry vehicles are not payloads for purposes of launch. Rather, they
are both a launch and reentry vehicle.
Except for extended microgravity experimentation, such as that
contemplated by the COMET Program, regulation of on orbit activity of
orbital reentry vehicles would be limited to that necessary to ensure
reentry readiness, capability and safe return to a designated
destination. Because additional time on orbit would raise costs and
otherwise interfere with RLV objectives of prompt delivery and return
services, the FAA envisions that the only on orbit time spent by an
orbital reentry vehicle would be that required to assure reentry-
readiness through reentry safety-critical system check-out and attitude
and orientation adjustment for return to the reentry site. Because a
non-nominal reentry could occur as a result of or during reentry-
readiness activity following a vehicle's ascent to orbit, the agency
concludes that such activities must necessarily be covered by a license
in order to assure public safety. As discussed in a separate rulemaking
on reentry financial responsibility, licensing reentry-readiness
activity is also critical to a meaningful risk management scheme under
49 U.S.C. 70112 and 70113.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to define reentry and the scope of a
reentry license in a manner similar to that utilized for launch
licensing. The term ``launch'' is characterized in the House Science
Committee Report as including activities that precede flight that
entail critical preparatory steps to initiating flight, are unique to
space launch and are so hazardous as to warrant agency regulatory
oversight, as long as they are conducted at a launch site in the United
States, even if that site is not ultimately the site of the actual
launch. (Report 105-347 at p. 22, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.) The FAA finds
in this report language helpful guidance in attempting to delimit
``that phase of the overall space mission during which the reentry is
intentionally initiated.'' Just as pre-flight launch activities must be
licensed because, among other things, they are critical and particular
to the launch process, the reentry phase may be defined as encompassing
those vehicle operations necessary to assure reentry readiness and
safety that are uniquely associated with the purpose and performance of
the reentry mission.
The FAA also considered the point in time when licensing authority
over a launch is concluded in an effort to define the point after
launch when an authorized reentry may commence for licensing purposes.
In a separate rulemaking governing licensing requirements for launches
from Federal ranges, the FAA defines the end of licensed activity, for
purposes of the launch vehicle, as the point after payload separation
when the last action occurs over which a licensee has direct or
indirect control over the launch vehicle. Typically, this point occurs
when the vehicle's upper stage is rendered inert or safe from explosive
risk. Currently, licensed launches from Federal ranges are exclusively
launches of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), and the licensing rule
definition of the end of licensed launch activity is directed, quite
properly, to ELV launches. If applied to RLV technology, however, a
launch might not be concluded under the terms of this definition until
reentry is complete because the RLV operator would retain (or design
in) certain control over the vehicle in order to ready it for reentry.
Because separate licensing authority over launch and reentry is granted
to the agency by the amended statute, the FAA believes that the defined
end of licensed launch activity for an ELV may not be appropriate in
defining the end of licensed launch activity for an RLV. However, that
portion of the definition that addresses payload delivery is
instructive in defining the end of the launch phase of an RLV mission
that involves both a launch and reentry. In fact, the Committee focuses
on payload delivery in defining the end of launch under the original
intent of the CSLA. ``The original Act intended that a launch ends, as
far as the payload is concerned, once the launch vehicle places the
payload in Earth orbit or in the planned trajectory in outer space.''
(House Science Committee Report 105-347, at p. 22.)
The Committee report language employs terms that describe the
appropriate end of a licensed launch of a reentry vehicle when the
reentry vehicle itself is a payload, as was the case in the COMET/
METEOR experience, in an effort to ensure the FAA does not bootstrap
licensing authority over payloads. If the COMET or METEOR vehicle were
presented today for licensing, the end of launch would properly be
defined as placement of the payload, the COMET or METEOR reentry
vehicle, in Earth orbit or its planned trajectory, and safing of the
ELV upper stage used to launch the reentry vehicle (payload) to orbit,
consistent with FAA licensing rules and Committee report language.
During the 30-day period following launch and preceding planned
reentry, the COMET/METEOR payload would not be subject to FAA
licensing, just as any other payload operating on orbit is not subject
to FAA licensing. However, the intentional reentry to Earth of the
COMET/METEOR reentry vehicle from Earth orbit would require FAA
licensing because it was designed to return to Earth substantially
intact.
Reusable launch vehicles that are also reentry vehicles present a
different situation from COMET/METEOR in that RLV operations on orbit
are not payload operations. Based on pre-application consultations with
RLV developers, the FAA understands that RLV operations on orbit
following payload deployment would be those conducted generally for the
purpose of assuring reentry readiness, such as safety system checkouts,
vehicle orientation for the targeted landing site, and attitude control
and adjustment prior to initiating a deorbit burn or other reentry
[[Page 19633]]
sequence necessary for the intended return to Earth. Accordingly, the
FAA defines the end of licensed launch activity for an RLV launch at
deployment of a payload. The licensed reentry phase of a mission begins
immediately thereafter for vehicles that are intended to reenter when
reentry-readiness is verified. In other circumstances, such as a
planned or designed-in delay of reentry for an extended duration the
FAA requests comments on the appropriate point for commencing reentry
licensing authority.
Public Safety Strategy for Assessing Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Safety
This proposal reflects a three-pronged approach to assuring that
risks to public safety are maintained at or below acceptable levels
during an RLV mission and any licensed reentry. The three prongs, which
are interrelated, are: (1) utilization by an applicant of a systematic,
logical and disciplined system safety process; (2) an analysis that
determines the expected casualty rate per mission; and (3) mandatory
operational restrictions imposed by regulation for risk mitigation
purposes. No single one of these processes is sufficient by itself to
ensure that a reentry operation would not jeopardize public safety. The
FAA believes that the combination of these elements will be effective
in limiting public risk. The following chart demonstrates the
interrelationship of the three elements of the agency's public safety
strategy:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21AP99.003
The first two elements are applied on a case-by-case, or
individual, basis because the factors that comprise the necessary
analyses are uniquely dependent on vehicle capability, design and
intended operation. Mandatory operational restrictions would be
specified in rules of general applicability.
Assessment of expected casualties is a commonly used measure of
launch risk within the aerospace community. The FAA proposes to measure
collective risk, defined as the product of the probability (or
frequency) of occurrence of all events and the severity of each events
impact or consequences on public safety. A quantitative number is
derived through analytic techniques in lieu of empirical launch data,
because the actual number of launches of a particular type of launch
vehicle is too small to be statistically significant. Presented below
is the agency's proposed measure of acceptable casualty risk.
Applicants will be required to utilize a system safety process. In
some respects, this is similar to the FAA systems approach to examining
aviation systems such as that contained in 14 CFR 25.1309. This process
lays the foundation for the system safety engineering effort used in
designing a vehicle and therefore the FAA believes the requirement
would impose no additional burden on an applicant. A system safety
process employs methods and techniques that may be utilized for
identifying: (i) the hazards that result from a particular launch or
reentry vehicle operation, (ii) the effects on or consequences to
public safety of those hazards including vehicle failure, (iii) means
of controlling or mitigating those consequences, and (iv) verification
processes of the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. Part of a
system safety process is the application of techniques and tools to
determine failure probabilities and to estimate the consequences of
such failures, which in turn informs calculation of the expected
casualty rate. Thus, the two analyses are interrelated. Through a
system safety process, an applicant develops operational constraints
and defines the operating envelope that will ensure its mission does
not exceed acceptable risk thresholds .
The FAA does not propose to define acceptable system safety
processes as a regulatory matter; however, the process selected must be
adequate to accomplish its intended purpose. The FAA will issue
guidance material describing an acceptable system safety process and
its elements as a means of compliance with regulations. The FAA will
also issue guidance on acceptable methodology for calculating expected
casualty risk. The FAA believes applying a flexible approach of this
nature to assessing risk to public safety is particularly critical at
this early stage of RLV and reentry technology development to
accommodate, and encourage, the varied operational and design concepts
envisioned within the industry.
Calculation of casualty expectancy and system safety process
analyses are analytical tools. Absent operational proof of vehicle
reliability, the FAA believes that additional constraints on operations
are also necessary to assure public safety until sufficient flight data
is available to validate analytical demonstrations. The FAA is
proposing to impose certain operational
[[Page 19634]]
restrictions on all RLV missions and reentries, and additional
restrictions for unproven vehicles. The FAA will relieve or waive
restrictions once sufficient performance data is available to support
an agency determination that public safety is assured without their
imposition.
1. Calculation of Ec (Acceptable public risk)
Although risk is inherent in the operation of an RLV or reentry
vehicle, this proposal would establish limits on the risk to public
safety that may result from licensed flight of an RLV or reentry
vehicle. Risk analysis has been widely used to support regulatory and
industrial decision-making and to allocate limited resources. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy, for
example, have made extensive use of risk analysis in analyzing,
licensing, and regulating the operation of nuclear power plants;
prioritizing nuclear waste disposal safety issues; and performing
environmental impact analyses. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has
used risk analysis to develop and test nuclear weapons systems.
In the space launch arena, risk analysis is used to evaluate the
hazards and consequences associated with a launch. One measure of
acceptable flight risk used to determine whether a launch can proceed
at a Federal launch range is calculation of the expected number of
casualties (Ec) to the collective members of the public
exposed to debris hazards from a particular launch. A casualty includes
serious injury as well as death. Ec provides the advantage
of a mathematically defined criterion on which to evaluate an event,
such as a launch or reentry, without the necessity of completing
detailed vehicle design analyses. The term ``public'' for purposes of
Ec calculation means all persons who do not participate in
the operation of the vehicle, hence, the term ``public'' would not
include the crew on a manned vehicle.
Federal range safety requirements developed over the last 40 years
safeguard the public by limiting the public's exposure to the risks
associated with launch activities. Because of operator adherence to
Federal range safety requirements and practices, the public has not
suffered any casualty from launches of ELVs. Therefore, it has not been
necessary for the FAA to independently evaluate the design or
manufacture of vehicles and duplicate the evaluation process undertaken
when a vehicle is launched from a Federal range. The FAA has adopted
the Federal range Ec standard of 0.00003 casualties per
launch or Ec 30 x 10-6 in its
licensing regulations and will license launches from non-Federal launch
sites if equivalent safety is demonstrated. The FAA proposes to apply
the same approach to evaluate RLV and reentry risks on a per mission
basis.
There are two fundamental components of Ec analysis: (1)
determination of the probability of a failure event (pi),
and (2) evaluation of the consequence of the failure event
(Ci). The complete equation for Ec is the sum,
over all possible failure events, of the product of the pi
and Ci as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21AP99.004
where ``i'' is a failure event and where there are ``n'' failure events
that could result in a non-zero consequence.
The probability of a failure event is always a fraction between 0
and 1, while the measure of the consequence of the failure event could
be any number. The larger the number, the greater the risk. Reducing
the probability of the failure event could lower the risk. Because the
probability of a failure event is related directly to the reliability
of a vehicle's safety critical systems and subsystems, having a very
reliable vehicle could lower the risk. (Whether a system is safety
critical such that a failure of the system might affect public safety
would depend on a number of factors, including vehicle flight path and
its capability to reach populated areas.)
Lowering the consequence of the failure event also could reduce the
risk. The consequence of the failure event is calculated by multiplying
the surface area population density by the casualty area of the
vehicle. This calculation would have to be made using the casualty area
produced by an intact vehicle or the casualty area created by the
debris fragments produced by a vehicle that has broken up in midair.
The worst-case scenario should be used. The casualty area of the
vehicle would consider the potential for casualties related to
secondary explosions, hazardous material exposure, collateral damage,
and the lateral movement of debris after impact. From the equation it
can be deduced that Ec could be lowered by operating the
vehicle so that a failure event causes few or fewer casualties. (ELVs
generally have a small Ec because planned flight paths are
over unpopulated areas, such as the ocean, and a destructive flight
termination system (FTS) would be used to destroy the vehicle if it
deviates from its planned flight path.)
The basic elements for determining mission risk are discussed
above; however, the real-world process for determining mission risk is
a bit more complicated. The process must account for a large number of
possible events, and there are likely to be many different failure
modes that could affect the characteristics (e.g., size, location) of
the debris and lethal area. Fortunately, the goal in conducting a risk
analysis to determine Ec for a particular mission is not to
determine the actual risk but to determine that the risk is below a
certain threshold Ec of 30 x 10-6. The FAA
believes that Ec calculations are best made using
conservative estimates and worst-case assumptions to identify and limit
the public's risk exposure for improbable hazardous events with high
consequences.
Recognizing that Congress has chosen to accept the risk of RLV
operations and reentry to derive the benefits from evolving commercial
technology, the FAA considered whether to separately assess launch risk
from reentry risk and, if so, whether a different risk threshold should
be used for launch as opposed to reentry. This proposal reflects the
FAA's opinion that a single consistent standard for measuring
acceptable public risk should be applied, and that it should apply on a
per mission basis.
The FAA has met with representatives of the space transportation
industry in pre-application consultation on RLV proposals and to
provide licensing guidance. On May 13, 1998, the FAA met with
representatives of each RLV developer then known to the agency to
discuss RLV and reentry safety assessment issues and to gather
information from industry members who have begun to develop commercial
RLVs and reentry vehicles. A summary of the meeting has been added to
the docket for this proposal. Information obtained by the FAA indicates
that a reentry accident may be comparatively less hazardous than a
launch accident, a risk generally accepted by the public. A reentry
accident could pose less of a risk than a launch accident because a
reentry vehicle could carry substantially less propellant, if any, than
a launch vehicle and could therefore pose less of an explosive or fire
hazard under some circumstances. If this is so, it also could be
expected that the Ec for the reentry of a vehicle of a
particular design would be significantly less than the Ec
for the launch of that same vehicle over any area of the same
population density.
On February 11, 1999, the FAA held a public meeting to discuss
draft interim safety guidance concerning RLV operations and to gather
information from industry representatives who are
[[Page 19635]]
developing commercial RLVs. The draft interim safety guidance, issued
in advance of rulemaking proceedings, was prepared to assist
prospective reentry license applicants in understanding the nature of
the agency's public safety concerns when evaluating proposed RLV
operations. A transcript of comments made at the public meeting have
been added to the docket inasmuch as they may also address aspects of
the agency's proposed regulatory approach to regulating safety of RLV
and reentry operations. Written comments are also placed in the docket.
In light of this information, the FAA considered whether a single
Ec risk threshold should be applied to the mission as a
whole or separately to each segment of the mission (launch and
reentry). If it is assumed that a vehicle will operate at the absolute
extreme allowed by the risk threshold, employing separate risk
thresholds at the level currently tolerated for launch would make the
total maximum risk exposure for an entire RLV mission nearly equal to
60 x 10-6 (30 x 10-6 for launch plus 30 x
10-6 for reentry, assuming independent events). The effect
of using separate, independently applied standards would be to
effectively nearly double the acceptable maximum risk exposure imposed
on the public for an RLV mission in comparison to the public's risk
from the launch of an expendable launch vehicle launching the same
payload. (Note that applying separate risk thresholds for launch and
reentry would result in an increased risk threshold for the mission if
the aggregate risk allowed (launch Ec + reentry
Ec) were greater than 30 x 10-6.)
Next, the FAA considered the appropriate risk threshold to use in
assessing risk on a per-mission basis if a single Ec value
is applied to the mission, that is, whether the level of acceptable
risk should be increased in the interest of technology advancement.
Currently, the FAA's practice in evaluating the collective risks
associated with a launch is to ensure that Ec is not greater
than 30 x 10-6. This value was derived from launch risk
guidance employed by the U.S. Air Force at Cape Canaveral Air Station
and Vandenberg Air Force Base to define acceptable risk. ``Eastern and
Western Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements,'' Section 1.4 (October
31, 1995). Since the beginning of the U.S. space program, the public
has not suffered any serious injuries or fatalities as a result of a
Government or commercial launch under this standard. Expected risks
from eventual reentry of ELV stages due to orbital decay is relatively
small because most are believed to burn up on reentry. While some
components of the stages have been found to have survived, empirical
data seems to support this conclusion.
In fostering the nation's space launch capability, the government
understands that some risk to public safety shall be endured for the
national interest and economic well-being of the United States. And,
the public accepts the very limited risks to which it is exposed, as
evidenced by population growth in the vicinity of Federal launch sites.
However, the FAA is reticent to impose greater risk on the public than
that currently accepted for ELV launches in order to accomplish the
comparable launch mission of placing payloads on orbit, but at reduced
costs. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to continue use of the Federal
range risk standard of Ec 30 x 10-6
on a per mission basis for RLV and other launch and reentry missions.
Nevertheless, the FAA acknowledges that there may be circumstances
under which it would be appropriate to separate launch from reentry
risk, such as where different operators are involved and may be
apportioned allowable risk thresholds, or where intervening events or
time make reentry risks sufficiently independent of launch risks as to
warrant separate consideration.
2. System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
As part of the system safety process and risk analysis, an
applicant would be required to determine the probability and
consequences of events that may affect public safety. Doing so requires
population data, vehicle casualty areas, and vehicle failure modes and
rates. Accurate population data generally are available and casualty
areas could be estimated using accepted industry practices. However,
development of vehicle failure rate is more complicated.
Failure modes and rates for a vehicle are related to the failure
modes and rates of its major systems, which in turn correlate to the
failure modes and rates of major subsystems of a vehicle. To obtain a
conservative risk assessment of a vehicle lacking an adequate flight
history, an applicant could conduct a risk analysis and assume the
probability of a catastrophic failure of 1.0. In the alternative, an
applicant would have to complete a detailed risk analysis. This risk
analysis would be similar to a traditional systems safety analysis used
by DOD and NASA; however, it would not focus on mission success per se.
However, while experience shows that such analyses are helpful, they
are subject to error because of ``unknowns'' for unproven vehicles.
Instead, it would focus solely on identifying and evaluating failure
modes and rates affecting risks to public health and safety and the
safety of property by conducting an evaluation of vehicle systems and
proposed operations.
Because of the variety of RLV and reentry vehicle designs and
operational concepts, the FAA has not enumerated a specific evaluation
methodology. Examples of acceptable techniques for determining failure
conditions include, but are not limited to, the following: Preliminary
Hazards Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Failure Mode Effect
and Criticality Analysis, Fault Hazard Analysis, Event Tree Analysis,
Double Failure Matrix, Hazard and Operability Analysis or Operability
Hazard Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis Methodology for Hazard
Assessment. An applicant would use the evaluation methodology most
appropriate for the system being evaluated. A separate analysis needn't
be performed for each flight of a launch vehicle. If a previously
approved mission utilized a risk assessment for a similar mission with
a substantially similar vehicle, the earlier risk assessment may serve
as the basis of a comparative analysis for the proposed mission.
Potential risks identified in the analysis must be mitigated to
protect public health and safety and the safety of property. The
process of evaluating and mitigating the potential risk of a vehicle or
operation would continue until all risks are mitigated to an acceptable
level. In the aviation industry, typical hazard control and risk
mitigation includes the following:
Design integrity and quality, including life limits, to
ensure intended function and prevent failures;
Proven reliability of systems so that multiple,
independent failures are unlikely to occur during the same flight;
Capability to check a component's condition;
Failure warning or indication to provide failure
detection;
Isolation of systems, components, and elements so the
failure of one does not cause the failure of another;
Redundancy or backup systems to enable continued function
after any failure;
Design failure effect limits, including the capability to
sustain damage and to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure;
Design failure path to control and direct the effects of a
failure in a way that limits its safety impact;
[[Page 19636]]
Margins or factors of safety to allow for any undefined or
unforeseeable adverse conditions;
Error tolerance that considers adverse effects of
foreseeable errors during the vehicle's design, test, manufacture,
operation, and maintenance;
Computer software verification, validation, documentation,
configuration management, and quality assurance;
Personnel qualification and training;
Contingency planning, including operator procedures after
failure detection to enable continued safe flight, evacuating personnel
from high risk areas, and modifying vehicle trajectory to avoid high
risk areas; and
Process approval, including an evaluation of risk
reduction, mitigation strategies, and configuration management.
The system safety process and associated risk analysis that the FAA
proposes to require is substantially similar to the engineering
analysis a vehicle developer would complete to assess the viability and
the probability of success of an intended operation. Developers would
also need this information to convince and assure investors of the
soundness of their investment.
The FAA is developing guidance material to assist the industry in
complying with the proposed system safety approach. In discussions,
industry representatives recommended that the FAA develop an approach
built around engineering documentation during specific program phases,
such as design and development, manufacturing, and vehicle operations.
Others have stated that [an applicant's submission] [the documents]
should outline the applicant's ``philosophy'' but that the FAA should
require evidence supporting the documentation. The FAA invites further
comments and recommendations that would assist in developing an
acceptable analysis to ensure all factors affecting public health and
safety and the safety of property are considered and addressed
specifically.
3. Operational Restrictions on Reusable Launch Vehicle Launch and
Reentry
The system safety process, in combination with quantitative risk
criteria, yields a performance envelope within which an applicant
demonstrates its ability to operate without excessive risk to public
safety. But these are analytical processes only and may not reflect
real world performance even under the best of circumstances.
As noted above, the risk a vehicle poses to public health and
safety and the safety of property is a product of two factors: the
probability of a failure event and the consequences of that failure
event. If the probability of a failure event is related directly to
vehicle reliability and that reliability cannot be determined
accurately, public health and safety and the safety of property can be
protected only by limiting the consequences of a failure event.
Therefore, based on the uncertainties involved in the operation of an
unproven RLV or reentry vehicle and the projected benefits resulting
from the imposition of operational restrictions on such vehicles (based
on a current assessment of probable system failures), the FAA proposes
to impose operational restrictions on a vehicle that has not proven
system performance and reliability through a flight test program or
operational use.
In support of proposed restrictions, the FAA notes that industry
representatives have stated that, historically, predictions of vehicle
performance and failure modes have often overlooked key events or
circumstances. None of the significant failures in the Apollo program
or other ELV programs were predicted. Also, failure rates for the first
launch of new launch vehicles are significant. While a quantitative
risk analysis is an important and necessary tool in the development of
a vehicle concept, the FAA considers it inappropriate in this proposal
to allow the flight of an unproven and untested RLV or reentry vehicle
over populated areas in a manner that can affect public safety based
solely on the favorable results of a quantitative risk analysis.
The FAA does not believe an adequate determination of system
performance and reliability for new flight concepts can be demonstrated
solely through hazard analyses and ground tests. Accidents or other
failures often are the result of an unforeseen combination of hardware
and software failures in combination with external influences, such as
human error. System design validation and functional performance
verification could possibly be accomplished in 10 to 20 flights,
depending on the design unique to each vehicle. However, a relatively
large number of flights may be needed to demonstrate reliability and to
understand unanticipated failure modes. Some industry representatives
have expressed the opinion that one would need to complete 1,000
flights to accurately determine reliability of a vehicle. At the May
1998 FAA meeting with RLV industry representatives, industry noted that
the STS (Space Shuttle) is still in the midst of its test program.
Moreover, because of the costs and disadvantages of flight testing,
the FAA expects that many RLV and reentry vehicle operators will
propose to validate vehicle design through the use of sophisticated
computer simulations, ground testing, or other detailed analyses. The
FAA does not object to this anticipated approach but does believe it
necessary to impose operational restrictions in the interest of public
safety until vehicle performance is proven.
Finally, the FAA is not proposing rules applicable to reuse or
reflight of a particular vehicle. Each flight of a reusable launch
vehicle would be required to satisfy the safety criteria promulgated by
the agency in licensing rules, and an applicant's demonstration that it
has satisfied the criteria would have to account for effects of prior
flight on vehicle performance.
For these reasons, the FAA proposes to impose operational
restrictions that would apply to all RLV launches and reentries, with
an additional restriction on the flights of unproven vehicles at least
until sufficient data is obtained about vehicle performance to warrant
relief from that restriction.
A. Restricting flight over populated areas. The FAA defines flight
restrictions applicable to flight of an RLV or reentry of a reentry
vehicle in terms of its ``dwell time,'' which refers to the measured
period of time during which an area is exposed to hazards from a
vehicle's operation, and its instantaneous impact point, or IIP. The
IIP reflects a projected impact point on the surface of the Earth where
the vehicle or vehicle debris in the event of failure and break-up
would land. A vehicle's IIP is not generally the area immediately under
the vehicle's flight path because the vehicle's momentum and
atmospheric conditions will cause the vehicle to impact in some other
location. The projected IIP of a vehicle can be calculated with some
degree of accuracy if the vehicle's aerodynamic characteristics are
known. The projected IIP of an RLV during ascent to orbit moves across
the surface of the Earth until the vehicle attains orbital velocity.
Once on orbit, a vehicle no longer has an IIP.
The FAA does not believe it would be appropriate to allow the IIP
of an unproven RLV or reentry vehicle to pass over populated areas
unless the risk is very low, even if failure occurs. In other words, if
the vehicle were to fail and the vehicle or debris from vehicle break-
up were dispersed in the course of vehicle
[[Page 19637]]
flight, the flight path and trajectory must be designed to minimize the
risk of debris impacting a populated area. The proposed regulation
therefore limits public risk exposure to an Ec of not
greater than 30 x 10-6 assuming a failure while the IIP is
over each populated area.
Thus, for unproven vehicles, the FAA proposes that during any
segment of flight, the projected IIP of the vehicle shall not have
substantial dwell time over a populated area. The applicant may either
avoid any passage of the vehicle's IIP over populated areas or may
demonstrate that the Ec criteria of 30 x
10-6 would be satisfied even if the vehicle were certain to
fail while its IIP is over a populated area.3 An applicant
can select the approach to limiting public risk that best suits its
proposed operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The proposed restrictions would apply only to those segments
of flight where the IIP touches the surface of the Earth. Certain
reentry-readiness operations performed on orbit during the ``reentry
phase of flight'' do not involve an IIP that touches the surface of
the Earth and therefore would not be affected by the criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a proven vehicle, the FAA proposes that a vehicle may not have
substantial dwell time over densely populated areas but for the time
being proposes to determine what is ``substantial'' and ``densely'' on
a case-by-case basis to afford the agency flexibility in evaluating an
RLV or reentry flight proposal. Substantial dwell time over a populated
area could result from a stationary or slowly moving IIP that remains
over a populated area or a rapidly moving IIP that traverses numerous
populated areas. Typical dwell time for ELV operations ranges from four
to six seconds of flight but varies depending upon the point in vehicle
flight during which it occurs. For example, dwell time in the first
seconds of a launch would not be tolerated because of the risk of
vehicle failure. Later in flight when a vehicle is nearing orbital
velocity, some dwell time over populated areas has historically been
tolerated because the probability of failure and its consequences are
much reduced. Thus, for any particular RLV flight or reentry proposal,
the agency would evaluate on an individual basis the public safety
risks associated with proposed dwell time over populated areas.
However, in any event, vehicle operations would be assessed against
Ec criteria, which may not be exceeded.
The FAA is not prepared to state in a rule of general applicability
the point at which an RLV transitions from an ``unproven'' state to a
proven one. The number of flights necessary to determine the point of
transition will depend on the unique design characteristics of the
vehicle. The FAA believes that, at a minimum, an operator must validate
its risk analysis with flight data in order to ``prove'' the
performance of a vehicle. In this context, the term ``validate'' means
that the vehicle's flight data show that the vehicle operated in a
manner substantially similar to that predicted by the operator's risk
analysis.
As stated earlier, the number of flights necessary to validate a
vehicle's risk analysis also would depend on the nature of the
operations the vehicle would be expected to perform. For example, if an
operator proposes to operate its vehicle over populated areas and to
rely on an abort capability to achieve required levels of safety, the
operator would be required to demonstrate that the vehicle can perform
the critical abort and recovery maneuvers necessary to fly safely.
The agency also believes it prudent to gain practical experience in
observing the stresses of flight on reentry vehicles, particularly
those intended for reuse, before issuing a pronouncement of the point
at which a vehicle is ``proven'' for purposes of safety regulation. In
adopting this stance, the FAA is mindful that the nation's STS,
commonly referred to as the Space Shuttle, is still undergoing a test
program under NASA's purview, despite its many flights. Therefore,
before the FAA would allow an RLV or reentry vehicle to fly over
densely populated areas, an applicant would need to prove that its
vehicle maintains structural and aerodynamic integrity throughout its
proposed flight regime (i.e., flight lifetime), and that the operator
can maintain command and control of the vehicle during flight.
That said, the FAA is not specifically mandating adherence to a
flight test regime to demonstrate vehicle capability. Traditionally,
flight testing has not been required of ELVs. Because ELVs are
generally launched over ocean areas and the flight safety systems are
subject to rigorous design and testing standards such that little
public risk exposure is involved, there is little to be gained in terms
of public safety risk mitigation from a requirement to conduct test
flights of ELVs for the purpose of design validation. Moreover, because
each flight of an ELV is its first flight, and its only flight, little
would be learned about the effects of flight stress on reusability of
the vehicle.
RLV industry representatives have noted that for vehicles currently
under development it would be impractical to require thousands of
flight test hours, and the FAA concurs that a thorough flight test
program similar to that required of commercial aircraft would stifle
the emerging industry and pose a number of difficulties. Furthermore,
by the nature of their operational envelopes, differences between an
RLV or reentry vehicle test flight and operational flight are less
distinct than those of an aircraft test flight and operational flight.
While an aircraft may conduct tests of its full-flight envelope within
a remote site, conducting full-flight tests of an RLV or reentry
vehicle would require suborbital and/or orbital flights over
substantially large areas. Because of the physical range of such
flights, there would be little distinction between a test and an
operational flight with its inherent risks. Imposition of a flight test
requirement also would impose on the industry direct costs to conduct
the tests and indirect costs through lost revenue, reduced life cycles,
and vehicle test flight damage that would have to be repaired to ensure
the vehicle meets regulatory standards for reentry operations. For
these reasons, the FAA is not proposing requirements for the conduct of
a flight test program but rather has proposed a regulatory structure
that would require an applicant to demonstrate that its proposed
operations meet an acceptable level of risk and conform to certain
operational requirements. However, an operator may choose to conduct
flight-testing to ensure its proposed operations meet proposed risk
mitigation criteria.
The FAA requests views on appropriate measures of validating new
vehicle performance and criteria for determining the point at which a
vehicle may be considered ``proven.''
B. Monitoring critical systems. The operator of an RLV or reentry
vehicle must be able to monitor and verify the status of launch and
reentry safety-critical systems before launch, during launch flight,
and before reentry flight. The status of a reentry safety-critical
system before reentry would affect any decision to conduct reentry
operations. To ensure an operator is aware of the status of the
vehicle, the FAA proposes to require procedures for monitoring
performance of on-board, safety critical systems just prior to enabling
reentry. Monitoring would provide an operator with the status of key
systems before conducting public safety critical operations and would
ensure that reentry flight would be initiated only under nominal or
non-nominal conditions that have been assessed through the system
safety process and satisfy the risk threshold. Critical information
would have to be provided perhaps through telemetry to a control
[[Page 19638]]
center or individual with command capacity and decision making
responsibility. Other information used for system validation, system
reuse, performance characterization, or post-flight anomaly
investigation could be recorded for review after flight. This type of
data may facilitate transition from an unproven to proven vehicle;
however, the FAA is not mandating real-time monitoring of non-safety
critical systems.
C. Positive enabling of fail-safe reentry. To further enhance
safety, the FAA proposes a fail-safe operational procedure whereby an
operator must issue a command that enables vehicle reentry unless the
vehicle is designed to operate suborbitally. In the event reentry
cannot be enabled, the vehicle would remain in orbit. Totally
autonomous initiation of reentry would not be allowed to ensure that
certain clearances and system verifications are completed to assure
that a reentering vehicle will not pose safety risks to the public.
These may include clearance of airspace in the reentry corridor,
securing reentry sites, verifying the configuration and status of
reentry safety critical systems, and verifying reentry corridor weather
is within vehicle operational constraints. Such activities would be
external to the vehicle's systems and autonomous control systems would
not verify them.
D. Reentry sites. To minimize public safety risk due to an off-site
landing, the site selected for reentry of a reentry vehicle or as the
landing area for an RLV must be sufficiently large such that the
vehicle will land within it with a certain degree of predictability.
The agency assesses size suitability of a proposed reentry or landing
site by using the three-sigma footprint measure commonly applied to
launch operations. The three-sigma footprint describes the area where
the vehicle will land with a .997 probability rate, assuming no major
system failure.
The statistical term ``three-sigma'' refers to three standard
deviations from the mean, or average point, assuming a standard normal
distribution. The area that is within three standard deviations from
the mean point encompasses the area surrounding it with the mean at its
center. An area within two or even one standard deviation of the mean
point is a smaller, more precise measure; however, statistically there
is less chance of an event falling within that range. The larger the
area, the higher degree of confidence one has of an event falling
within its boundary limits, assuming a normal distribution of events.
For example, if the reentry site were an area on a target, the mid-
point or center point is the mean and the small area around it is the
bulls-eye. The bulls-eye represents one standard deviation from the
mean or center point. The first contour area is two standard deviations
from the mean point and the second contour area is three standard
deviations from that point. Assuming a normal distribution, the three-
sigma area, or the area within two contours of the bulls-eye,
represents the area in which an archer's arrow would strike with a
three-sigma probability.
However, the size of the area must be adjusted for different
conditions or variables, such as distance from the target, wind, or
aerodynamic qualities of different kinds of arrows. If one's ability to
meet the three-sigma probability distribution depends on the existence
of certain conditions, then those conditions become requirements.
From a regulatory standpoint, an applicant would be required to
demonstrate that a proposed reentry or controlled landing site is large
enough to contain the landing impacts of its vehicle with a three-sigma
probability, assuming a nominal reentry, and the conditions or
assumptions on which the demonstration is predicated would become
conditions of the license.
The size of the area must be large enough to accommodate potential
trajectory deviations that may occur. Therefore, in determining the
necessary size of the three-sigma area, an applicant should calculate
the errors associated with physical forces that act on the vehicle to
cause its flight path to deviate from the planned trajectory, if
reentry is intended to occur despite those errors.
Maneuverability of a vehicle is likely to affect the three-sigma
area. For example, the three-sigma area for an airplane may be a narrow
ellipse because the pilot can stand otherwise control the vehicle's
descent such that it touches down within a narrow band. An uncontrolled
or ballistic vehicle, such as the COMET/METEOR reentry vehicle,
required a large three-sigma area because of imprecise orientation of
the vehicle at the point at which reentry was initiated and the varying
effects of atmospheric forces on the vehicle.
In any case, a designated reentry site, including any designated
contingency abort location, would have to be large enough to ensure the
probability of landing outside the designated area is not greater than
.997 for nominal vehicle operations.
Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission and Other Reentry Licenses
For the near term, the FAA envisions that the majority of reentry
activities subject to FAA licensing jurisdiction would involve reusable
launch vehicle technology, as opposed to the COMET/METEOR type of
reentry vehicle. The latter was intended for launch as a payload by an
expendable launch vehicle, would enter its designated orbit and
ultimately perform an unguided ballistic reentry to a designated
reentry site about 30 days later. In the case of such reentries, the
same risk criteria would apply to launch and reentry of the reentry
vehicle as would apply to any other RLV mission, under the FAA's
proposal. However, other regulatory requirements to assure public
safety, such as operational restrictions, would be directed exclusively
to RLV missions. Other safety requirements may only be appropriate for
reentry vehicles resembling the COMET/METEOR vehicle system. Therefore,
to make the requirements ``user friendly,'' the FAA proposes to address
RLV mission licensing requirements in a separate part of the licensing
regulations so that RLV operators can see, at a glance, the commercial
space transportation regulations applicable to their operations. A
separate part is proposed to address unique safety requirements
applicable to licensing other types of reentries, that is, those that
don't involve RLVs, even though policy, payload reentry, and
environmental review requirements would be comparable to those applied
to RLV missions.
1. Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Licensing Overview
Before granting an applicant a safety approval, the FAA would
review the appropriateness for a particular launch activity of the
following items: the location, size, and design configuration of the
proposed launch site; launch operational procedures; personnel
qualifications; range safety equipment and instrumentation; vehicle
safety systems; and the applicant's flight safety analysis.
An RLV launch operator would be required to possess the ability to
monitor the status of launch and reentry safety critical systems during
countdown to launch. The FAA also proposes that an operator have the
ability to activate the vehicle's flight safety system (FSS), if any,
or to invoke contingency plans if the vehicle is not operating within
approved mission parameters and poses an unreasonable risk to public
health and safety. This
[[Page 19639]]
requirement does not mean that an FSS cannot also function
automatically or autonomously. Such systems are desirable where, for
example, a human monitor may not be able to react in sufficient time to
achieve a safe condition.
The term FSS encompasses a variety of devices designed to place a
vehicle in a mode less hazardous to public health and safety and safety
of property. A type of FSS commonly used on ELVs is a destructive-type
FTS, which is used to terminate flight and destroy the vehicle.
However, many reentry vehicles and RLVs do not propose to rely on a
destructive-type FTS as a primary mechanism for protecting public
safety because the vehicle may be capable of attempting a
nondestructive abort. The proposal would not mandate any particular
type of FSS. An applicant for a launch license would be permitted to
use any type of FSS necessary to ensure public safety during the
applicant's proposed operation of the vehicle. Mission rules derived
from the applicant's risk analysis, among other things, would dictate
whether and when to activate the FSS.
Members of the RLV industry have agreed generally that some type of
FSS would be necessary to meet the risk limitations imposed on launch
vehicles by Federal ranges. Many believe that a reentry vehicle or RLV
operator that proposed to operate without an FSS would have to improve
overall vehicle reliability and performance to meet those risk
limitations. Others have also asserted that some type of human
intervention capability would be necessary before a vehicle could be
allowed to operate within controlled airspace.
An RLV may have the capability to abort launch flight to a pre-
planned and approved location. Other vehicles would require emergency
planning so that in the event of a failure or anomaly, they can be
directed to an unpopulated area or attempt a safe landing. Therefore,
an operator without abort capability would be required to plan a flight
path that allows for safe flight abort on an emergency basis before the
vehicle reaches orbit.
Once an RLV achieves orbit, the FAA was concerned that if the
vehicle could not reenter or must abort during reentry, an operator
would have to be able to incapacitate the vehicle so it would not
substantially survive reentry. Agency concern was based on the view
that, unlike an expendable launch vehicle, a reentry vehicle is
designed to survive reentry intact. However, industry representatives
have noted that reentry vehicles are designed to survive reentry under
very specific reentry parameters. An operator must undertake
significant effort to achieve a successful reentry. Industry has
compared successful reentry to ``flying the vehicle through a key
hole.'' Because an uncontrolled RLV or reentry vehicle may be unlikely
to survive reentry, the FAA does not propose a requirement that an
operator would have to be able to incapacitate the vehicle so that it
would not survive a random return to Earth. However, the applicant must
demonstrate that a random reentry will not exceed acceptable risk for
the mission.
The FAA is proposing a quantitative risk measure in evaluating RLV
mission safety because it forces a vehicle designer to consider failure
rates, consequences, and mitigation of unacceptable risks. Acceptable
flight risk would be limited to the standard applied for launches from
Federal launch ranges, that is, that the Ec is not greater
than 30 x 10-6, a collective measure of risk, on a per-
mission basis. Issues related to risk limitation and risk analysis are
discussed above in relation to RLV launch and reentry. An applicant
proposing to conduct an RLV mission would also be subject to
operational requirements and restrictions because the FAA believes them
necessary to limit risk to public safety as the industry conducts
operational flights of innovative vehicle concepts.
The proposal would identify the two types of RLV mission licenses
issued--a mission-specific license and an operator license. The
mission-specific license would authorize an operator to conduct one or
more RLV missions from a designated launch site to a designated reentry
site, using essentially the same type or model of RLV such that it has
substantially similar design, performance, and operational
characteristics. Because more than one flight may be authorized, the
license would be sufficiently broad to allow an operator to conduct a
series of RLV test flights within identified parameters. The license
would terminate automatically with the completion of all authorized
activity or the expiration date of the license, whichever first occurs.
The proposed operator license would authorize an operator to
conduct RLV missions using any of a designated family of vehicles from
any launch site specified in the license to any reentry site specified
in the license. A family of RLVs has similar design and operational
characteristics, but each member of the family may be capable of
different performance characteristics. The term of the operator license
would be set at a 2-year renewable period.
The FAA expects it will first issue a new operator a mission-
specific license to conduct RLV missions. Mission-specific licenses can
be structured so as to accommodate a proposed test program that may
consist of a series of test flights within an envelope of approved
parameters. After the operator has demonstrated several successful
reentries, it may apply to the FAA for an operator license. The FAA has
used a similar licensing approach successfully for new launch operators
and operation of new vehicles.
To receive an RLV license, an applicant would be required to obtain
policy and safety approvals and complete a payload reentry
determination and environmental review, if applicable. Procedural
regulations governing the policy approval, payload reentry
determination, and environmental review generally would be consistent
with the corresponding regulations under part 415, Launch License.
To complete a safety review and receive approval for an RLV
mission, an applicant would need an acceptable safety organization;
mission rules, procedures, and contingency plans; a communications
plan; and a mishap investigation and emergency response plan. In
addition, the proposed operation could not pose an unacceptable risk to
public safety as demonstrated through a risk analysis designed to
ensure compliance with regulations to mitigate risk and protect public
health and safety and the safety of property.
2. Reentry Licensing Overview
A separate part would prescribe reentry licensing and post-
licensing requirements and would be modeled after the RLV mission
license regulations. Unique attributes of reentry vehicles that are not
RLVs would be assessed by the FAA on an individual basis as part of the
safety approval process. The same risk criteria covering launch and
reentry and the system safety process approach would apply to an
applicant for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle. Operational
requirements and restrictions would result from the applicant's system
safety program plan, which would define the safe operating limits and
procedures for reentry vehicle operations. Requirements applicable to
launch of a reentry vehicle would depend on the type of vehicle used to
place the reentry vehicle in orbit or otherwise in outer space. For
example, an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) launched from a Federal
range would be subject to the
[[Page 19640]]
licensing requirements contained in part 415 of this subchapter.
The FAA is proposing a mission approach to reentry licensing by
assessing the combined risk of launch of a reentry vehicle with its
reentry to determine that a reentry may be licensed. The agency
considers that no less stringent safety criteria should be imposed upon
a reentry because it occurs as a separate event, either by time or
function, from the launch that placed it in Earth orbit or outer space.
However, the FAA understands that reentry vehicles resembling the
COMET/METEOR vehicle may remain in space for extended periods and may
be operated under the responsibility of an operator different from that
which launched the vehicle initially. To address these considerations,
the FAA considered whether to apply a COMET/METEOR type of risk
criteria to reentry, leaving launch risk as it currently is stated. The
COMET risk criteria that there shall be no greater than one in a
million probability of a casualty, when combined with acceptable launch
risk, actually imposes a more stringent criteria on reentry than a
combined collective risk measure of Ec 30 x
10-6. The FAA wishes to utilize an appropriate measure of
risk for reentry capability and requests comments on its proposed
approach of applying mission risk.
Section-By-Section Analysis
FAA regulatory and licensing responsibilities have been extended by
statute to include reentry, as well as launch. It is therefore
necessary to add the term ``reentry'' or ``operation of a reentry
site'' to agency procedures and enforcement provisions, as follows.
Section 400.2 Scope
Section 400.2 sets forth the scope of regulations presented in 14
CFR Chapter III. The scope would be revised to refer generally to
commercial space transportation activities subject to 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, chapter 701. The FAA proposes to generalize the scope of
the regulations rather than to add specific reference to reentry
licensing and other authority under the statute.
Section 401.5 Definitions
New terms are added to the list of definitions. They are:
``contingency abort,'' ``emergency abort,'' ``flight safety system,''
``operation of a reentry site,'' ``reenter,'' ``reentry accident,''
``reentry incident,'' ``reentry operator,'' ``reentry site,'' ``reentry
vehicle,'' ``reusable launch vehicle,'' ``safety-critical,'' and
``vehicle safety operations personnel.'' A reusable launch vehicle
would be a reentry vehicle when it is designed to return from Earth
orbit or outer space to Earth substantially intact.
The term ``reentry accident'' refers to unplanned events resulting
in certain consequences listed in the definition. Accordingly, reentry
to a pre-planned abort location would not qualify as a reentry accident
unless it resulted in a casualty to an uninvolved person or damage to
unassociated, off-site property.
The term ``mishap'' would be revised to include reentry events.
Section 404.1 Scope
Section 404.1 sets forth the scope of the agency's procedures for
issuing implementing regulations. Rather than referring to specific
licensing authority of the agency under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter
701, Sec. 404.1 would be revised to refer to commercial space
transportation activities falling within the agency's statutory
authority.
Section 404.3 Filing of Petitions to the Associate Administrator
Section 404.3 would be revised to include rulemaking petitions
regarding reentry and operation of a reentry site.
Section 405.1 Monitoring of Licensed and Other Activities
Reentry sites and reentry vehicle manufacturing, testing, assembly,
and production facilities would be subject to FAA monitoring and
observation and Sec. 405.1 would be revised accordingly.
Section 405.5 Emergency Orders
The agency's authority to terminate, prohibit or suspend a licensed
activity extend to reentry and operation of a reentry site. Section
405.5 would be revised accordingly.
Section 406.1 Hearings
Rights to a hearing extend to an owner or operator of a reentry
payload, as well as a licensee, and section 406.1 is revised
accordingly.
Section 413.1 Scope
The procedures contained in part 413 of 14 CFR Chapter III would
apply to an application for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle or
to operate a reentry site. Reference to reentry licensing requirements
is added to section 413.1 in this proposal.
Section 413.3 Who Must Obtain a License
The proposal would revise paragraph (a) to require any person to
obtain a reentry license to reenter a reentry vehicle in the United
States or to operate a reentry site within the United States.
Under the proposal, paragraph (b) would be revised to require an
individual who is a U.S. citizen or an entity organized under the laws
of the United States or any State to obtain a reentry license to
reenter a reentry vehicle outside the United States or to operate a
reentry site outside the United States.
Proposed paragraph (d) would be added. That paragraph would require
a foreign entity in which a U.S. citizen has a controlling interest to
obtain a reentry license or, if the activity is occurring in certain
locations and subject to certain conditions. The geographic constraints
and conditions in the proposal would be identical to those imposed on
licensed launch activities and launch site operators in current
paragraph (c) of this section.
Section 415.1 Scope
Part 415 contains the approvals necessary to obtain a license to
launch a launch vehicle from a Federal or non-Federal launch site. The
FAA proposes to limit the scope of part 415 to vehicles other than
reusable launch vehicles (RLV) and to place licensing requirements for
the conduct of RLV missions in a separate part of the regulations.
Launch and reentry flight phases of a proposed RLV mission would be
evaluated under a single set of risk criteria applicable to the
mission. Placing RLV mission requirements in a separate part, part 431,
should facilitate understanding of the licensing requirements
applicable to RLV operations.
Part 431 Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)
The proposal would create a new part 431 that prescribes licensing
requirements for the conduct of missions involving reusable launch
vehicles. Part 431 would include subpart A (General), subpart B (Policy
Review and Approval), subpart C (Safety Review and Approval for RLV
Missions), subpart D (Payload Reentry Review and Determination),
subpart E (Post-Licensing Requirements--RLV Mission License Terms and
Conditions), and subpart F (Environmental Review). Part 431 is
organized in the same manner as part 415 ``Launch License'' and has
been modified to address regulatory concerns applicable to RLV
operations. Because safety aspects of an RLV mission would be evaluated
on a per mission basis, commencing upon initiation of vehicle flight,
proceeding through orbital insertion and concluding with the vehicle's
landing on Earth, comprehensive requirements applicable to all licensed
flight phases
[[Page 19641]]
of an RLV mission are included in this part. Specific mention is made
in part 431 where requirements of other parts of the commercial space
transportation regulations are applicable.
Section 431.1 Scope
Proposed Sec. 431.1 would establish the applicability of part 431.
The proposed part would prescribe the requirements for obtaining an RLV
mission license and any continuing requirements to remain licensed.
Section 431.3 Types of Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Licenses
The proposed section would identify the two types of RLV mission
licenses that would be issued and set forth the privileges and
limitations of the licenses. Under the proposal the FAA would issue
either a mission-specific license or operator license, on bases
comparable to that used for issuing launch licenses. A licensed RLV
mission includes launch or ascent, and reentry or descent,
authorization. Both authorizations are necessary to conduct an RLV
mission; however, they would be embodied in a single license. The term
``mission'' is used to characterize both ascent and descent flight
phases of an RLV operation but should not be confused with mission-
specific authorization.
A mission-specific license need not be limited to a single RLV
mission. The license would identify the specific RLV missions to which
it applies and may authorize a proposed flight test program within an
envelope of approved parameters. An expiration date would be stated in
the license so that it is not unlimited as to time.
An operator license would provide broader authority to the licensee
and, as with launch licenses, would be issued to operators that have
demonstrated capability to conduct safe operations on an ongoing basis.
The FAA is proposing an initial two-year license term so that it can
routinely reevaluate licensee qualifications. Operator licenses issued
under part 415 were initially authorized for a two-year term and have
recently been extended to a five-year term. The FAA considers two years
a reasonable duration at the outset of RLV operations.
Section 431.5 Policy and Safety Approvals
Under the proposal, a license applicant would be required to obtain
policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining
these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part.
Section 431.7 Payload and Payload Reentry Determinations
For purposes of launching a payload into earth orbit or outer space
there should be no unique issues presented by the fact that an RLV is
the transportation vehicle that places the payload in space.
Accordingly, proposed paragraph (a) of this section states that the FAA
would require an applicant to obtain a payload determination in
accordance with part 415 requirements unless the proposed payload were
exempt from payload review. Payload reentry issues may be different,
however, and the FAA would require a separate payload reentry
determination, as indicated in paragraph (b), for purposes of returning
a payload to Earth unless it is exempt from FAA review. Payloads exempt
from FAA review include U.S. Government payloads. Payloads subject to
reentry review by another Government agency would not be subject to
duplicative review by the FAA. For a payload that would be
substantially similar to a previously approved payload, the previously
issued payload reentry determination could serve as the basis for a
comparative analysis. Proposed paragraph (c) would allow a previous
payload reentry determination to be used to meet the requirements of
proposed paragraph (b). Proposed paragraph (d) identifies the payload
review procedures applicable to reentering a payload. A payload review
determination may be requested of the agency in advance of or
separately from an RLV mission (or other reentry) license.
Section 431.9 Issuance of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License
The proposal states that the FAA would issue a license to an
applicant who has obtained all approvals and determinations required
under this chapter for an RLV mission license, including a policy and
safety approval and payload reentry determination, if necessary.
Although the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq.) requires the FAA to perform an environmental review of major
Federal actions, such as issuing an RLV mission license, specific
environmental requirements would not be set forth in this section, but
rather in proposed subpart F of this part.
The proposed section also would require a licensee to conduct its
operations in accordance with the representations in its application
and terms and conditions in license orders accompanying the RLV mission
license, including financial responsibility requirements for launch and
reentry activities.
Section 431.11 Additional License Terms and Conditions
Under the proposal, the FAA could amend an RLV mission license by
modifying or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance
with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.
Although standard terms and conditions that apply to most RLV mission
licenses are proposed in subpart E, the unique circumstances of a
particular licensee may require the FAA to impose additional
requirements to protect public health and safety, safety of property,
or U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, or to ensure
compliance with international obligations of the United States.
Section 431.13 Transfer of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License
Under proposed Sec. 431.13, only the FAA would be able to transfer
an RLV mission license. The prospective transferee would need to
satisfy all requirements for obtaining a license as specified in this
chapter. The FAA would amend the license to reflect any changes
necessary as a result of license transfer.
Section 431.15 Rights Not Conferred by a Reusable Launch Vehicle
Mission License
Proposed Sec. 431.15 would state that an RLV mission license would
not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with applicable
laws.
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
This subpart would describe the proposed requirements for a policy
review. An applicant could choose to submit an application for a policy
review with a comprehensive license application or separately in
advance of submitting the complete application.
Section 431.21 General
Under the proposal, the FAA would issue a policy approval to an RLV
mission license applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review;
it would be part of the licensing record.
Section 431.23 Policy Review
Proposed Sec. 431.23 states that the FAA would coordinate the
policy review with other Government agencies, including the Department
of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Commerce
(DOC), NASA, and Federal Communications
[[Page 19642]]
Commission (FCC). Under the policy review, the FAA would determine
whether conduct of an RLV mission, inclusive of launch and reentry
flight, would adversely affect U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests, jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of
property, or be inconsistent with international obligations of the
United States. In determining whether the mission would jeopardize
public health and safety or the safety of property under the policy
review, the FAA would consider safety issues from a policy perspective
rather than an engineering perspective.
Section 431.25 Application Requirements for Policy Review
The proposed section would describe the information an applicant
would be required to provide to obtain a policy review. The FAA would
require this information to effectively begin consultation with other
Government agencies regarding resolution of any potential policy
issues. Proposed paragraphs (a) and (b) would require a basic
identification of the vehicle and its systems. Foreign ownership
information would be required to be identified in proposed paragraph
(c).
Under proposed Sec. 431.25(d), an applicant would be required to
provide the range of proposed launch and reentry profiles, including
reentry sites and any planned contingency abort locations. An applicant
must also provide the sequence of planned events or maneuvers during an
RLV mission. Although these vary by vehicle and mission, the FAA would
expect to be informed of events such as engine burn time; stage
separation events; pitch, yaw, and roll maneuvers; and engine cutoff.
This information could be provided in the form of text, diagrams, or
charts.
For orbital RLVs, proposed Sec. 431.25(e) would require information
concerning intermediate and final orbits intended for the vehicle and
its upper stages, if any, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.
Section 431.27 Denial of Policy Approval
Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing if
a policy approval is denied. The notice would state the reasons for
denial and allow an applicant to respond and request reconsideration.
An applicant could correct the deficiencies identified in the denial
and request reconsideration of the denial. Alternatively, an applicant
could request a hearing upon denial of a license.
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
Subpart C would describe the FAA's safety evaluation process for
reentry license applicants.
Section 431.31 General
The proposal states that the FAA would conduct a safety review to
determine whether an applicant is capable of launching and reentering,
or otherwise landing, a reentry vehicle and payload, if any, from and
to a designated site without jeopardizing public health and safety and
the safety of property. The launch site may be different from the
reentry landing site, but both must be approved by the FAA in the
context of evaluating safety issues presented by a particular RLV
mission. The safety review would be conducted from an engineering
perspective to ensure that all aspects of the proposed RLV mission
would be sufficient to support safe operations. The safety review is
necessarily tailored to the unique attributes and capabilities of a
vehicle and is conducted on an individual basis.
Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing of
any issues that might prevent issuance of a safety approval. The notice
would state the reasons for lack of safety approval and allow an
applicant to respond and correct the deficiencies identified.
Section 431.33 Safety Organization
The FAA concurs with National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
reports and the Rodgers Commission report that indicate an independent
safety organization is key to ensuring safe transportation operations.
The proposal, therefore, would require an RLV mission license applicant
to possess a safety organization. The FAA would evaluate an applicant's
safety organization to determine whether the structure, lines of
communication, and approval authority an applicant establishes would
enable the applicant to identify and address safety issues and to
ensure an applicant conducts operations in accordance with its license
and the proposed regulations.
The experience gained by the FAA in regulating aviation and launch
operations has shown that an independent safety official with direct
access to the person responsible for an applicant's licensed activities
can positively influence safety. Therefore, the FAA also proposes that
the safety official report directly to the person responsible for the
conduct of licensed activity to ensure that management adequately
considers public safety concerns before initiating either flight phase
of the mission. The safety official may be dual-hatted in that he or
she may perform functions other than safety-related or mission-driven
operations for the applicant as long as there is no ``conflict of
interest'' with safety responsibilities.
The safety official would evaluate an applicant's readiness to
safely conduct an RLV mission by conducting operational dress
rehearsals and completing a readiness determination. Rehearsals would
allow an operator to verify that vehicle safety operations personnel
are ready for launch and reentry and can manage non-nominal events,
especially if a considerable period of time has elapsed since the
operator's most recent conduct of a mission. A review typically would
be conducted before launch and, for orbital RLVs, would address reentry
readiness as well. However, before initiating reentry, an operator
would be required to conform with mission rules designed to ensure safe
reentry and verify the status of safety critical systems. The reviews
would ensure all system and personnel readiness problems are identified
and resolved, all systems needed for safe conduct of the mission are
checked and ready, and each participant is cognizant of his or her role
in the operation. While a rehearsal may not be necessary in every case,
it is critical in certain situations, such as operations with a new
vehicle, reentering to a new site, or after significant personnel
changes.
This proposal also would impose an affirmative obligation on the
person responsible for licensed activity to address any hazards and
risks to public safety identified by the safety official. Such action
would help ensure that RLV mission operations satisfy the proposed
expected casualty criteria. The FAA believes that management attitude
influences an organization's safety compliance; therefore, the proposed
regulations would impose a safety obligation on the person responsible
for licensed activity to address identified hazards.
Proposed Sec. 431.33(a) would require an applicant to maintain and
define its safety organization by identifying lines of communication
and approval authority. A number of different individuals typically
have input and decision authority with respect to the readiness of
various vehicle and safety systems. FAA and NTSB investigations have
shown that mishaps could result if the role of each critical individual
in the organization is not defined clearly and understood by all
parties. Therefore, the
[[Page 19643]]
applicant would have to identify these relationships by clearly
establishing and identifying the lines of communication and approval
authority for all mission decisions. An applicant would have to clearly
identify persons with authority to make ``hold'' and ``go/no-go''
decisions and to authorize the resumption of the countdown or a recycle
procedure, for both launch and reentry flight phases. The FAA
recommends using organizational charts as an efficient method of
depicting an applicant's organization, lines of communication, and
other required information.
Proposed Sec. 431.33(b) would require an applicant to designate a
person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV mission
activities.
Proposed Sec. 431.33(c) would require an applicant to identify a
qualified safety official to ensure compliance with the applicant's
safety policies and procedures. The person assigned to the position of
safety official would have the management and technical education,
training, and experience to ensure the highest degree of safety in the
applicant's operations. The safety official must be identified by title
or position and by name and qualifications. Before mission operations
begin, and before initiation of RLV reentry or descent, the person
responsible for an applicant's licensed activities must address all
hazards and risks to public safety identified by the safety official.
The safety official would be responsible for evaluating an
applicant's readiness to safely conduct an RLV mission by monitoring
compliance with the applicant's safety policies and procedures,
completing a readiness determination, and conducting operational dress
rehearsals. Rehearsals would have to simulate both nominal and non-
nominal conditions, under the mission readiness requirements listed in
proposed Sec. 431.37, including vehicle and range safety system
failures.
Section 431.35 Acceptable Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Risk
Under the proposal, paragraph (a) would establish the limits on the
risk the FAA would allow for an RLV mission. The FAA proposes to assess
risk on a per mission basis, commencing with initiation of vehicle
flight through authorized landing on Earth. Application of risk
criteria on a per mission basis means that risks presented by launch of
a reentry vehicle and its subsequent reentry or other return to Earth
are assessed in a cumulative manner. The expected average number of
casualties from a proposed RLV mission could not exceed .00003
(30x10-6) and casualties for any launch and reentry mission
and .000001 (1x(10-6) casualties for persons in the areas
adjacent to the reentry site. Risk criteria are presented in proposed
Sec. 431.35(b). The term ``public'' would include all members of the
general public but would not include the launch operator, reentry
operator, and site personnel. Satisfaction of acceptable risk criteria
under this part includes consideration of the size and configuration of
planned landing sites, including contingency abort locations, and the
surrounding area.
The FAA would establish these risk limitations as a standard for
all licensed RLV mission activities. An applicant proposing a mission
that does not meet the FAA's risk criteria could request a waiver from
requirements (or any requirement) under 14 CFR Sec. 404.3, by
demonstrating that granting the waiver would be in the public interest.
Proposed paragraph (c) would require an applicant to submit an
analysis that assesses public safety risk for the proposed activity
under nominal and non-nominal conditions. The analysis would need to
demonstrate that the applicant's proposed activity would not expose the
general public to an unreasonable level of risk at any time during
vehicle flight, as defined in proposed Sec. 431.35(b), and would not
expose the general public within a 100-mile area surrounding the
reentry site to unreasonable risk, as defined in proposed paragraph
(b). Based on the agency's experience in evaluating the COMET/METEOR
vehicle system, the FAA believes that it is prudent to ensure that
population located within a reasonable area of the intended landing
site is not exposed to greater than normal background risk as a result
of a licensed reentry. The one hundred mile area surrounding the
proposed reentry site was utilized in COMET/METEOR because it limits
public risk exposure in the event of a minor system failure during
reentry causing a somewhat off-site, but not random, landing.
If an applicant previously has submitted a risk assessment for a
similar reentry, the applicant may not need to submit an additional
analysis. An analysis that compares the parameters and assumptions of
previously approved and proposed activities, after review by the FAA,
may be deemed sufficient.
Proposed paragraph (c) would require an applicant to employ a
system safety process that identifies and assesses risks to public
health, safety and property associated with a nominal and non-nominal
mission. The FAA will issue advisory guidance on acceptability of a
system safety process under this requirement. At a minimum, it must
identify and assess the probability and consequences of reasonably
foreseeable hazardous events and safety critical system failures during
a mission including consequences of a random reentry that could
jeopardize public safety.
Proposed paragraph (d) would specify the data that must be provided
by an applicant as part of the demonstration of acceptable risk under
this subpart. Included are drawings and schematics for each safety
critical system, a timeline identifying all safety critical events and
empirical data to substantiate the risk analysis required by this
section.
Section 431.37 Mission Readiness
Under proposed Sec. 431.37, an applicant must include procedures
for verifying mission readiness for both launch and reentry operations
as part of its application. The procedures must enable the person
designated and responsible for the conduct of licensed operations to
make a judgment of mission readiness before initiating the mission,
including launch and reentry site, equipment, vehicle, payload,
personnel, and safety-critical system readiness. Mission rules,
constraints and contingency or abort plans and procedures must be in a
state of readiness as well by ensuring that they are contained in an
approved form and coordinated with launch and reentry site operators.
Launch and reentry readiness procedures must include dress rehearsal
procedures covering nominal and non-nominal situations and provide
bases for doing away with dress rehearsals under certain circumstances.
Launch and reentry readiness procedures must also cover crew rest
requirements and verification.
Section 431.39 Mission Rules, Procedures, Contingency Plans, and
Checklists
To ensure a licensee's procedures would be conducted as planned,
the FAA proposes that an applicant submit as part of its application
written mission rules, procedures, emergency plans, and contingency
abort plans, if applicable, and that vehicle safety operations
personnel have current and consistent mission checklists.
Inconsistencies in critical countdown checklists and procedures can
jeopardize public safety. While all mission participants may not have
identical checklists, an applicant would need some means, such as a
master checklist manual, to ensure participants have current and
consistent
[[Page 19644]]
procedures. This process would ensure that flight safety critical
procedures are completed successfully.
Proposed paragraph (a) would require that an applicant possess
adequate mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and checklists
to execute safe nominal and non-nominal operations throughout the
mission. Proposed paragraph (b) would require that mission rules,
procedures, contingency plans, and checklists be contained in a safety
directive, notebook, or other compilation approved by the safety
official designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this part and concurred in
by the reentry site operator, if applicable. Under proposed paragraph
(c), operations personnel would need current and consistent reentry
checklists.
Section 431.41 Communications Plan
An applicant also would be required to submit a communications plan
that describes personnel communications procedures during the mission.
This requirement would be substantially similar to the current
requirement for a launch license applicant to submit a communications
plan describing communications procedures during launch, but the
procedures would be required to apply throughout the mission. The NTSB
has concluded that effective communications are critical to the conduct
of a safe launch, and the FAA believes the same rationale applies to
RLV and reentry operations.
Personnel would be required to follow communication procedures and
proper protocol to help eliminate confusion and cross talk that could
cause a miscommunication leading to an unsafe condition. Personnel with
decision-making authority over launch and reentry would be available on
the same predetermined channel during launch countdown and reentry
countdown, if any. Safety-critical communications would have to be
recorded and would include hold/resume, go/no go, and emergency and
contingency abort commands, and any other irrevocable decisions that
could affect public safety or the safety of property.
Section 431.43 Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Operational
Requirements and Restrictions
Under proposed Sec. 431.43, the FAA would establish operational
requirements and impose restrictions on RLV missions. Operational
requirements would be implemented through procedures developed by an
applicant to ensure that RLV mission risks are contained within
acceptable levels. In keeping with the preference for performance-
based, rather than design, standards the FAA is not dictating the
content of procedures. An applicant would be afforded flexibility in
developing procedures specific to its vehicle and mission profile that
accomplish certain objectives. Procedures would need to cover such
safety requirements as ensuring that mission risks do not exceed stated
risk criteria for nominal and non-nominal operations, ensuring RLV
operations conform with operator procedures derived through the system
safety process described in proposed Sec. 431.35(c), monitoring and
verifying the status of safety critical systems during mission
operations, and activating a flight safety system during the launch
flight phase to safely terminate flight in the event the vehicle is not
operating within approved limits. The FAA believes that sole reliance
by an operator on an autonomous system to abort launch flight is not
sufficient to ensure public safety and that, as is the case for nearly
all expendable launch vehicles, human control capability is critical to
safety.
A reentry site proposed for use in conducting an RLV mission would
have to be of sufficient size to accommodate the three-sigma landing
dispersion and other landing impacts associated with the reentry
vehicle or vehicle stage. The three-sigma footprint requirement for
determining site suitability would apply to any reentry site
contemplated as part of the mission, that is, the nominal targeted site
as well as any contingency abort location identified in order to
satisfy acceptable risk criteria during launch of an RLV. A broad ocean
area may be a contingency abort location because it would satisfy
requirements for site suitability. An applicant for RLV mission safety
approval would be required to identify such sites and show that they
are attainable given the operational capability of a proposed RLV.
Restrictions are also proposed to further mitigate public safety risks
during flight of any RLV.
The space industry has been voicing a growing concern regarding the
increasing number of objects being placed in orbit that increases the
potential for collisions between objects in space. Collisions in space
create additional objects that add to the orbital debris environment
and increase the potential for damage to other objects. The
requirements of this section serve to mitigate hazards associated with
space debris. A collision avoidance analysis shall be performed prior
to RLV launch to ensure that an RLV, its payload, and any jettisoned
components do not pass closer than 200 kilometers to an inhabitable
spacecraft. Window closures for launch and reentry activities should be
adjusted to account for uncertainties in the predicted positions of
inhabitable spacecraft. The 200 kilometer separation distance is
currently practiced by Federal launch ranges.
To further assure public safety, the FAA is proposing a number of
additional restrictions applicable to all RLVs. The FAA is proposing
that the projected IIP of the vehicle shall not have substantial dwell
time over densely populated areas during any segment of mission flight.
The agency is not setting design-type requirements for determining what
constitutes a densely populated area. This determination is
consequence-driven, in the agency's view. For example, even though an
applicant has satisfied the agency's risk criteria of Ec no
greater than 30 casualties in a million missions, if the consequence of
a mission accident at a particular location would result in a
significant number of actual casualties, then the FAA would view that
area as densely populated for safety purposes. To mitigate debris risks
that would interfere with the safety of other launch and reentry
missions, the FAA proposes that RLV operators ensure no unplanned
physical contact between its RLV and payload with other space objects
and that explosive risks are minimized. The proposed requirement is
intended to mitigate the hazards posed by orbital debris generation to
the integrity of another vehicle and is in furtherance of the agency's
safety responsibility for the conduct of licensed activities. This
requirement is comparable to that imposed on licensed launch of an
expendable launch vehicle involving an upper stage that remains on
orbit.
The proposal contains crew rest requirements for vehicle safety
operations personnel because their performance might affect public
safety. Experience has shown that crew rest criteria for those involved
in supporting space operations are extremely important and would have a
significant impact on organizational safety. Crew rest is of particular
concern when the same crew is involved in pre-launch preparation,
launch, on orbit operations, monitoring reentry-readiness, and reentry
flight of the vehicle. The proposed crew rest rules are based on an
NTSB investigation of an anomaly that occurred during a commercial
launch from a Federal launch range and are intended to ensure RLV
mission personnel readiness. The specific work and rest standards are
similar to those currently used at Federal launch ranges ``Eastern and
Western Range 127-1 Range Safety Requirements,'' Section 6.5.1.4 (March
31, 1995). The FAA has
[[Page 19645]]
not reviewed the impact the proposed crew rest standards might have on
an operator intending to launch and reenter a vehicle in a short time
period. The FAA invites comments from the public on the practicality
and potential burden to industry of the proposed crew rest standards
and also requests information regarding analogous crew rest
requirements in other industries or regulated areas.
Proposed paragraph (d) establishes additional restrictions on an
unproven vehicle. The projected IIP of an unproven reentry vehicle must
not have substantial dwell time over a populated, as opposed to a
densely populated, area during any segment of the mission unless the
applicant can demonstrate that it satisfies stated risk criteria
assuming the vehicle will fail while the IIP is over a populated area.
To further enhance public safety when an RLV reenters from Earth
orbit, the FAA proposes under Sec. 431.43(e) that the operator must be
able to monitor the status of safety critical systems before enabling
reentry and verify that the condition of the vehicle is such that it
can reenter safely. The operator would also be required to issue a
positive command to enable the vehicle's reentry. The FAA is aware that
some RLV operators are contemplating totally autonomous reentry
capability. The agency is concerned that authorizing reentry of such
vehicles would not fulfill adequately its public safety responsibility.
In the absence of active control, those systems and conditions
determined necessary for safe reentry would not be verified before
reentry is initiated and safety could be compromised. Accordingly,
because of the possibility of system anomalies or other non-compliant
conditions, the proposed rules require that an operator enable reentry.
Section 431.45 Mishap Investigation Plan and Emergency Response Plan
The proposal also would require that an applicant prepare a mishap
investigation plan (MIP) and emergency response plan (ERP) to respond
to a launch or reentry accident or incident, or unplanned event during
the mission. In addition to accident investigation plan requirements
applicable to launches under part 415 of the regulations, the MIP would
include procedures covering the reentry phase of a mission, including
immediate notification to the FAA of a mishap and procedures for
minimizing damage, preserving evidence, investigating or cooperating
with an investigation conducted by the FAA or NTSB, reporting
investigation results, and identifying and adopting preventive measures
for avoiding recurrence of the event. This requirement would be
substantially similar to the requirement for a launch license applicant
to submit a plan describing accident and mishap investigation and
emergency response procedures for a launch accident or incident.
Also required would be emergency response plan whereby an RLV
operator would be responsible for contacting local officials in the
event a non-nominal reentry occurs and can be projected to impact at an
identified location.
Section 431.47 Denial of Safety Approval
Under the proposal, the FAA would notify an applicant in writing if
a safety approval application is denied. The notice would state the
reasons for denial and allow an applicant to respond and request
reconsideration. An applicant could correct the deficiencies identified
in the denial and request reconsideration of the denial or, upon denial
of a license, an applicant may request reconsideration.
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
Subpart D would explain when a payload reentry review and
determination would be required and the factors considered in that
review. Either an RLV mission license applicant or a payload owner or
operator may apply for a payload reentry determination separately from
an RLV mission license application. A license applicant could request a
summary determination, if the risks to public safety posed by the
payload proposed for reentry are substantially similar to a previously
approved payload reentry determination issued earlier to the applicant,
the payload owner or operator, or another RLV mission license
applicant. For purposes of launching the payload, payload review
procedures and requirements of part 415 would apply.
Section 431.51 General
The proposed section would describe the scope of an FAA payload
reentry review. Payloads owned and operated by the U.S. Government or
subject to the reentry authority of another Government agency, such as
the Department of Commerce, would be exempt from this subpart. A
payload reentry review and determination is required to address the
unique safety and policy issues presented by the return to Earth of a
payload that has been launched or otherwise operated in outer space. A
hazardous substance may be approved for launch over water or other
unpopulated area, but disapproved for reentry if the consequences of
dispersion cannot be adequately contained for a planned reentry to a
site on land.
Section 431.53 Classes of Payloads
The proposal would permit an applicant to request a payload
determination for a type or class of payload. The applicant would
describe the type or class of payload proposed for reentry under the
license and general characteristics of the payload. If a payload
reentry determination is issued for a class of payloads under this
section, the RLV mission license applicant would have to later provide
additional information regarding the specific payload before reentering
it.
Section 431.55 Payload Reentry Review
Proposed Sec. 431.55 describes how the FAA would coordinate a
payload reentry review with other Government agencies, such as the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and NASA. Other
agencies may include the Department of Commerce and the Federal
Communications Commission. It also would describe those issues that
would be addressed by the FAA in a payload reentry review. The FAA
would notify an applicant of any issue raised during the payload
reentry review that would impede a favorable payload reentry
determination, and the applicant could respond or revise its
application.
Section 431.57 Information Requirements for Payload Reentry Review
The proposal would describe the specific information that an
applicant would be required to provide to the FAA to perform a payload
reentry review and conduct any necessary interagency review. In cases
that present potential unique safety concerns, the FAA would require
considerable detail regarding the physical characteristics, functional
description, and operation of the payload, and its ownership.
Section 431.59 Issuance of Payload Reentry Determination
Proposed Sec. 431.59 would explain that the FAA issues a payload
reentry determination unless policy or safety considerations prevent
reentry of the payload. If an applicant were to fail to obtain a
favorable payload reentry determination, the applicant could attempt to
correct the deficiencies that necessitated the denial and request
reconsideration of the denial or, upon
[[Page 19646]]
denial of an RLV mission license, the applicant could request
reconsideration.
Section 431.61 Incorporation of Payload Reentry Determination in
License Application
The proposal states that a favorable payload reentry determination
may be included in the RLV mission license application. If, prior to a
licensed mission, there is a change in the information submitted for a
payload reentry determination, it is the licensee's responsibility to
report the change to the FAA which may revisit its determination. The
licensee must ensure that the payload owner or operator reports any
such changes to the licensee so that the licensee is in compliance with
the requirement.
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission
License Terms and Conditions
Subpart E would describe post-licensing requirements for an RLV
mission licensee, including license terms and conditions.
Section 431.71 Public Safety Responsibility
Proposed paragraph (a) would state that an RLV mission licensee is
responsible for ensuring a safe mission and protecting public health
and safety and the safety of property at all times during the conduct
of the mission.
Proposed paragraph (b) would require the licensee to conduct its
operations in accordance with representations made in its license
application. Failure to conduct a licensed activity in accordance with
the application would be cause for the FAA to revoke the license or
take other appropriate enforcement action.
Section 431.73 Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application
for Modification of License
The proposal would require a reentry licensee to ensure the
continuing accuracy of representations contained in its application for
the term of its license and to conduct procedures and operations in
accordance with its application. An RLV mission licensee would be
required to apply to the FAA for modification of the license if any
representation material to public health and safety and the safety of
property made in the application is no longer accurate. A license
modification application would have to conform with part 413 of this
chapter and indicate the part of the license or license application
affected. The proposal also would state that the FAA would review its
previous determinations and approvals to determine their continued
validity.
Section 431.75 Agreements
The proposed rules specify a number of agreements that an RLV
mission licensee must have in place before conducting licensed
activities. Just as launches of expendable launch vehicles from Federal
launch ranges must be conducted under an agreement between a licensed
launch operator and the Federal range for the provision of U.S.
Government launch property and services, so must the conduct of an RLV
mission or reentry using Federal range facilities. The FAA also
envisions that licensed launch site operators will, through agreements
with users of its facilities, require adherence to its safety rules and
requirements and such agreements must be finalized before licensed
launch or reentry activity occurs at the licensed site. In either case,
the terms of an agreement between the RLV mission (or reentry) licensee
and the site operator (whether Federal or non-Federal) would be
expected to cover, as appropriate to the flight phase being conducted
at the site, preparation for licensed flight, securing the vehicle
before launch and after reentry, and transporting the vehicle from the
site following its reentry, because these operations must be done in a
manner that does not jeopardize public health and safety. A licensee
would be required to comply with any portions of an agreement that
would affect public health and safety and the safety of property during
the conduct of a licensed RLV mission or reentry.
Federal launch ranges coordinate Notices to Airmen and Notices to
Mariners with the FAA and the U.S. Coast Guard, respectively.
Consequently, there need be no additional responsibility imposed on an
RLV mission or reentry licensee to issue such notices when utilizing a
Federal range facility as the site of a licensed launch or reentry. In
a separate rulemaking, the FAA intends to propose that a licensed
launch site operator undertake responsibility for completing an
agreement with the FAA and Coast Guard, respectively, for the issuance
of such notices when launches are conducted at its launch site in order
to assure a single point of contact. However, in the absence of such
agreements, responsibility for safety coordination with regional FAA
and Coast Guard offices would remain with the vehicle operator. An RLV
mission (or reentry) licensee that utilizes a licensed site would be
relieved of these responsibilities if issuance of notices is covered by
an agreement between the licensed site operator and other modal
administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation. An RLV
mission or reentry licensee authorized to conduct licensed activities
at a private site, or one that is reserved for its exclusive use, would
be obligated to complete such agreements. An example of an exclusive,
although not private, launch and reentry site would be the lot at the
Nevada Test Site authorized for use by Kistler Aerospace Corporation
(Kistler) under a subpermit from the Nevada Test Site Development
Corporation. Although the launch and reentry site to be utilized by
Kistler are located on U.S. Government property and therefore not
privately owned, the Nevada Test Site is not a Federal launch range as
defined in the Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations.
Therefore Kistler would be responsible for completing an agreement with
the appropriate FAA regional office for issuance of Notices to Airmen
and compliance with other public safety measures involving air routes.
Because the Nevada Test Site is an inland location, it is highly
unlikely that a comparable agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard would be
necessary.
Section 431.77 Records
Proposed Sec. 431.77 would require a licensee to maintain for a
period of 3 years all records, data, and other material related to a
licensed RLV mission activity. In the event of a launch or reentry
accident, or launch or reentry incident, the proposal would require a
licensee to preserve all records related to the event until the FAA
advises the licensee that the records need not be retained.
Section 431.79 Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Reporting Requirements
Under the proposal, a licensee would be required to report certain
information to the Associate Administrator at least 60 days before each
RLV mission. Not later than fifteen days before a mission, a licensee
would be required to report the time and date of the planned RLV
mission to the Associate Administrator. The proposal also would require
the immediate submission of accident, incident, and mishap information
to the FAA in accordance with proposed Sec. 431.45. The FAA invites
public comment on the timeframes proposed for reporting requirements in
light of operator plans for rapid RLV launch and reentry services.
Section 431.81 Financial Responsibility Requirements
Proposed Sec. 431.81 would require a licensee to comply with
financial
[[Page 19647]]
responsibility requirements specified in its license.
Section 431.83 Compliance Monitoring
Proposed Sec. 431.83 explains that a licensee is required to
cooperate with the FAA's compliance monitoring policy.
Section 431.85 Registration of Space Objects
Consistent with the recently issued Commercial Space Transportation
Licensing Regulations, certain information must be reported to the FAA
regarding placement of objects in space. Information requirements
applicable to RLV missions and the associated timeframe for reporting
information are consistent with those for ELV launches.
Subpart F--Environmental Review
Subpart F would set forth the FAA's environmental review
requirements. Regulations contained in this subpart would be
substantially similar to the environmental review regulations
applicable to launch licenses under part 415, subpart G.
Section 431.91 General
Under the proposal, an applicant would be required to provide the
FAA with the information necessary for the FAA to comply with
applicable environmental laws and regulations, including 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA; 40 CFR parts 1500-1508;
and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA
Order 1050.1D. The proposal also would indicate how copies of these
documents could be obtained.
Section 431.93 Environmental Information
Proposed Sec. 431.93 would require an applicant to provide the FAA
with required environmental information for a reentry site and
contingency abort locations, if any, and activities that may have new
effects on established reentry sites. Use of a new vehicle, or reentry
of a payload with characteristics falling measurably outside the
parameters of existing environmental documentation, would also be
subject to FAA environmental review requirements.
Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site
The proposal would create a new part 433 that prescribes licensing
requirements and procedures applicable to operation of a reentry site.
Reentry sites may offer an array of reentry services or may simply
provide a secured area within which reentry may occur. Given the
breadth of possibilities, and the agency's desire to allow prospective
reentry site operators to develop unique proposals for operation, the
FAA intends to evaluate the safety of a particular site on an
individual basis. This principle appears in proposed Sec. 433.1.
Section 433.1 General
Proposed section 433.1 reflects the principle that the FAA will
evaluate on an individual basis whether an applicant is capable of safe
operation of a reentry site and whether a proposed site is suitable to
support reentry operations.
Section 433.3 Issuance of a License To Operate a Reentry Site
Under Sec. 433.3, the FAA would license an operator to offer use of
a reentry site if its operation does not jeopardize public health and
safety, safety of property and U.S. national security and foreign
policy interests. As with other licenses, the authorization granted by
an FAA license would be limited to the representations contained in the
licensee's application and subject to terms and conditions stated in
the license.
Section 433.5 Operational Restrictions on a Reentry Site
A reentry vehicle may be authorized to reenter to a site that,
among other things, satisfies within three standard deviations the
probable dispersion of the vehicle upon landing. This measure of
landing dispersion is known as the three-sigma footprint of a vehicle.
A reentry site may be offered to support reentry of a particular
reentry vehicle if the vehicle's three-sigma footprint is contained
entirely within the reentry site.
Section 433.7 Environmental
Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site is a major Federal
action subject to agency review under the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act. Section 433.7 provides that an applicant
shall provide sufficient information to enable the FAA to fulfill its
environmental review responsibilities under Federal law and FAA
procedures.
Section 433.9 Environmental Information
Although a reentry site may be covered by existing environmental
documentation, its use to support licensed reentry activities and other
site operations may not be adequately addressed. Section 433.9 provides
that a reentry site operator must submit information to support
environmental review of reentry impacts at the site, if not already
covered in existing documentation.
Part 435--Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle Other Than a Reusable Launch
Vehicle (RLV)
The proposal would create a new part 435 that addresses FAA's
anticipation that there may be some reentries that will not involve
reusable launch vehicle (RLV) technology. A COMET/METEOR type of
reentry vehicle or other reentry vehicle capability that is not also an
RLV may be proposed for reentry, and regulations are required to
address licensing requirements applicable to those vehicles. Under the
proposal, the FAA would evaluate safety aspects of reentry vehicles of
this nature on an individual basis using the same three-pronged
approach proposed for RLVs. The three-pronged approach consists of a
risk criteria assessed on a per mission basis so that it encompasses
the risks to public safety presented by the launch of a reentry vehicle
in addition to its reentry, operational requirements and restrictions,
and utilization of a system safety process. Compliance with that
portion of regulations and licensing procedures proposed for an RLV
mission that pertain to its reentry would apply to a license to reenter
a reentry vehicle. Any person seeking a license to reenter a reentry
vehicle should refer to part 431 regulations governing RLV missions.
Only those requirements and licensing considerations that are unique to
reentry of a reentry vehicle that is not also an RLV would be expressly
stated in part 435.
Section 435.1 Scope
Proposed Sec. 435.1 would establish the applicability of part 435.
The proposed part would prescribe the requirements for obtaining a
license to conduct a reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV and
any continuing requirements to remain licensed.
Section 435.3 Types of Reentry Licenses
The proposed section would identify the two types of reentry
licenses that would be issued and set forth the privileges and
limitations of the licenses. Under the proposal the FAA would issue
either a reentry-specific or operator license, on bases comparable to
that used for issuing launch.
A reentry-specific license would identify the specific missions to
which it applies. An expiration date would be
[[Page 19648]]
stated in the license so that it is not unlimited as to time.
An operator license would authorize reentry operations on an
ongoing basis, as is currently done for launch. An initial two-year
license term is proposed.
Section 435.5 Policy and Safety Approvals
Under the proposal, a license applicant would be required to obtain
policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining
these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part.
Section 435.7 Payload Reentry Determinations
A payload reentry determination would be required, consistent with
proposed requirements for RLV missions, for purposes of returning a
payload to Earth unless it is exempt from FAA review. As with other
payload determinations, a payload substantially similar to a previously
approved payload may be reviewed using a comparative analysis. Under
paragraph (b), a previous payload reentry determination may be used to
meet the requirements of proposed paragraph (a). Proposed paragraph (c)
identifies the payload review procedures applicable to reentering a
payload. A payload review determination may be requested of the agency
in advance of or separately from a reentry license application.
Section 435.9 Issuance of a Reentry License
The FAA would issue a license to an applicant who has obtained all
approvals and determinations required under this chapter for a reentry
license, including a policy and safety approval and payload reentry
determination, if necessary. The authorization would be limited to
representations contained in an application and subject to licensee
compliance with applicable requirements of the agency.
Section 435.11 Additional License Terms and Conditions
As proposed, the FAA may amend a reentry license by modifying or
adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.
Section 435.13 Transfer of a Reentry License
Consistent with other licensing authority of the agency, only the
FAA would be able to transfer a reentry license. The prospective
transferee would need to satisfy all requirements for obtaining a
license as specified in this chapter.
Section 435.15 Rights Not Conferred by Reentry License
Proposed Sec. 435.15 would state that the license would not relieve
a licensee of its obligation to comply with applicable laws.
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle
This subpart would impose requirements for a policy review
consistent with those for an RLV mission license.
Section 435.21 General
Under the proposal, the FAA would issue a policy approval to a
reentry license applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review;
it would be part of the licensing record.
Section 435.23 Policy Review Requirements and Procedures
An applicant for reentry policy review and approval would be
referred to requirements expressed in proposed part 431, subpart B
concerning policy review for an RLV mission. The FAA reserves authority
to impose additional requirements unique to reentry policy concerns, if
any.
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of Reentry Vehicle
Subpart C would describe the FAA's safety evaluation process for
reentry license applicants. The safety review is conducted to ensure
that all safety aspects of a proposed reentry have been adequately
addressed. The safety review is necessarily based on the unique
attributes and capabilities of a vehicle and is conducted on an
individual basis, measured against a regulatory risk criteria.
Section 435.31 General
The proposal states that the FAA would conduct a safety review to
determine whether an applicant is capable of reentering a reentry
vehicle and payload, if any, to a designated site without jeopardizing
public health and safety and the safety of property. The suitability of
a proposed reentry site would be assessed by the FAA in the context of
evaluating safety issues presented in a particular reentry proposal.
Section 435.33 Safety Review Requirements and Procedures
Safety review requirements proposed for the reentry or descent
flight phase of an RLV mission would apply to the reentry safety
review, unless otherwise stated in proposed subpart C of part 431.
Section 435.35 Acceptable Reentry Risk for Reentry of a Reentry
Vehicle
The FAA is proposing a mission approach to assessment of reentry
safety and risk. As proposed, the risk presented by a proposed reentry,
in combination with the launch of the reentry vehicle into Earth orbit
or outer space, must not exceed acceptable risk for an RLV mission. As
indicated previously in the supplementary information of this proposed
rule, the FAA requests comment on its proposed approach to combined
risk.
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and
Conditions
Subpart F--Environmental Review
Consistent with the FAA's general approach to authorizing reentry,
requirements governing payload reentry review, license terms and
conditions, and environmental review for the reentry or descent phase
of an RLV mission would apply to a reentry license application, unless
otherwise stated in the regulations.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposal contains the following new information collection
requirements subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
Sec. 3507(d)).
Title: Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations.
Summary: The FAA proposes to amend the commercial space
transportation licensing regulations by establishing operational
requirements for launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the
authorized conduct of commercial space reentry activities. The proposed
rule would respond to advancements in the development of commercial
reentry capability and enactment of legislation extending the FAA's
licensing authority to reentry activities. The agency is proposing
requirements that limit risk to the public from RLV and reentry
operations.
Description of Respondents: Applicants seeking licenses to conduct
licensed reentry operations and launches of RLVs.
The proposed rule outlined is in accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The required information
will be used to determine whether applicants satisfy requirements for
obtaining a launch license to protect the public
[[Page 19649]]
from risks associated with RLV missions and other reentries. The
information to be collected includes data required for performing a
safety review, which includes a technical assessment to determine if
the applicant can safely reenter a reentry vehicle, including an RLV
and payload, if any, to a designated reentry site without jeopardizing
public health and safety and safety of property. The frequency of
required submissions may depend upon the frequency of licensed launch
activities; however, a license may authorize more than one launch. The
estimated average burden hours per respondent are 4,384 hours.
The agency is soliciting comments to (1) evaluate whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of
the agency's estimate of the burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) minimize the
burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond,
including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology (for example, permitting electronic
submission of responses). Individuals and organizations may submit
comments on the information collection requirement by June 21, 1999, to
the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.
International Compatibility
The FAA has determined that a review of the Convention on
International Civil Aviation Standards and Recommended Practices is not
warranted because there is not a comparable rule under ICAO standards.
Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Proposed and final rule changes to Federal regulations must undergo
several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that
each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended in May 1996, requires agencies to analyze the economic effect
of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Office of
Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effect of
regulatory changes on international trade. In conducting these
analyses, the FAA has determined that the proposed rule would generate
benefits that justify its costs and is ``not a significant regulatory
action'' as defined in the Executive Order and the Department of
Transportation Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The proposed rule is
not a significant action. The proposed rule would not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities and would
not constitute a barrier to international trade. In addition, this
proposed rule does not contain Federal intergovernmental or private
sector mandates. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply. These analyses,
available in the docket, are summarized below.
Baseline for Economic Analysis
The proposed rule implements certain policies developed by AST in
1992 with respect to public safety for the first commercial space
reentry operation. However, the safety criteria proposed in this
rulemaking uses different measures that better reflect current agency
and range safety practices. The 1992 policy established safety criteria
pertaining to a unique and specific request to conduct a first-of-a-
kind payload reentry mission; that is, the COMET, later renamed METEOR,
reentry vehicle. Accordingly, a comprehensive regulatory (benefit-cost)
analysis was not required. Therefore, the baseline case used for this
analysis views the proposed rule as a new requirement imposed on an
emerging segment of the commercial space transportation industry that
plans to operate reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) or conduct reentry
operations with reentry vehicles (RVs). Doing so implies that, but for
imposition of safety requirements by the agency, some compliance costs
would not have been incurred by entities planning to conduct RLV
missions (launch and reentry) and RV operations that are associated
with launches from Federal ranges. (Regulatory costs and benefits
associated with launches from Federal ranges are assessed as part of a
separate rulemaking on launch licensing requirements for launches from
Federal ranges.)
Costs
The proposed rule is expected to impose a total estimated cost of
$113 million ($65 million, discounted), in 1997 dollars, on the
commercial space transportation industry and the FAA over the 15-year
period from 2000 to 2014. Commercial space transportation industry
operators potentially impacted by the proposed rule would incur
approximately 27 percent (or $30 million) of this total cost estimate
in the form of compliance costs. The FAA would incur about 73 percent
(or $83 million) of the total cost estimate in the form of
administrative costs. All monetary values shown in this regulatory
evaluation summary are expressed in 1997 dollars over the 15-year
period. Due to some of the operational requirements of the proposed
rule, costs may materialize that have not been specifically considered
in this evaluation. For example, the proposed requirement for each
commercial space operator to have an independent safety inspector
could, under certain circumstances, result in costs not examined in
this evaluation. The independent safety inspector could require the
operator to abort a launch or reentry for safety reasons, which would
result in higher operating costs. Due to this additional safety
oversight, it is uncertain whether all cost and benefit considerations
have been captured in this evaluation. Accordingly, the FAA solicits
industry comments on the extent to which this evaluation has captured
critical costs associated with the proposed rule.
Reentry of RLVs and RVs are subject to comparable safety
requirements and therefore regulatory costs for reentry are assessed
collectively. Costs are assessed on the basis that, over the next 15-
year period, five commercial operators of RLVs or RVs would be impacted
by the regulations. It is assumed that five operators would obtain all
necessary approvals to conduct RLV missions or RV reentries and that
market demand is sufficient to support that level of vehicle operation.
Industry Compliance Costs
Section 431.25 Application Requirements for Policy Review and Section
435.23 Policy Review
These sections of the proposed rule would impose an administrative
paperwork burden on each of the five anticipated commercial space
industry operators potentially impacted by requiring them to provide
specific policy review information to the FAA with regard to their
anticipated RLV missions (launch and reentry) or RV reentry operations.
Compliance with this proposed section would result in an estimated cost
of $400 per operator to assemble the data and submit each application
or $2,000 (5 x $400), in 1997 dollars, for all five operators over the
15-year period. The cost estimate of $400 per operator assumes an
employee with an annual loaded salary of approximately $103,000 (with
fringe benefits) and a level of effort of eight hours.
[[Page 19650]]
Section 431.33 Safety Organization and Section 435.33 Safety Review
Requirements and Procedures
Under the baseline, a safety organization with clearly defined
roles, responsibilities, authorities, and lines of communication is
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Rodgers
Commission and National Transportation Safety Board. However, the
proposed requirement to ``* * * designate a qualified safety official *
* * to monitor independently compliance * * * with * * * [all] safety
policies and procedures'' is not necessarily customary and usual
practice. Inclusion of this proposed requirement suggests that it is a
refinement of industry baseline practices designed to mitigate safety
risks to the public. For example, to be ``responsible for the conduct
of all * * * mission activities * * *''implies a degree of
comprehensiveness that may not be common practice in industry. Because
the safety official must be independent, the function cannot be
assigned as a collateral duty to an individual with line responsibility
for launch and reentry operations though it could conceivably be
assigned to an existing employee. Furthermore, the magnitude of
responsibilities of the safety official suggests that the level of
effort required to perform this function would exceed part-time
employment. Assuming that the independent safety official function will
not be performed as a collateral duty, this proposed requirement would
result in a commercial space transportation entity hiring a person to
fulfill the safety official role. An annual loaded salary for this
position would be about $103,000. Therefore, the total incremental
compliance cost to a commercial operator attributable to the proposed
requirement would be about $1.6 million or $8 million (5 x $1.6
million) for all five operators over the 15-year period.
Section 431.35 Acceptable Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Risk, and
Section 435.35 Acceptable Reentry Risk for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle
Commercial space transportation entities are expected to incur
additional costs for performance of risk analyses of vehicle
operations, including reentry, and would incur costs in assessing the
probabilities and consequences of all reentry hazards, events, and
system failures that potentially expose the public to risk.
Additionally, commercial entities would expend effort preparing
documentation and establishing an associated document control system
for drawings and schematics. This compliance activity is expected to
fulfill the level of rigor implied by the requirements contained in the
proposed rule. The cost impact to a commercial entity attributable to
this proposed requirement would be approximately $757,000 in the first
year of operation, with recurring costs of $3,600 annually, in 1997
dollars. Over the 15-year period, from 2000 to 2014, the cost of
compliance for each potentially impacted operator would be about
$800,000. The total cost of compliance for all potentially impacted
operators would be approximately $4 million (5 x $800,000), over the
15-year period.
Section 431.37 Mission Readiness and Section 435.33 Safety Review
Requirements and Procedures
The proposed requirement to provide specific procedures to the FAA
that verify mission readiness presents an administrative paperwork
burden to a commercial entity. This proposed requirement would cause an
operator to incur costs for preparing and submitting the requisite
information to the FAA. A knowledgeable employee having an annual
salary of about $103,000 over a period of 80 hours would perform the
requirement. This exercise would result in a paperwork cost to a
commercial entity of approximately $4,000 per application submittal
over the 15-year period. For all entities, this proposed requirement
would impose an estimated cost of compliance of $20,000 (5 x $4,000)
over the 15-year period.
Section 431.39 Mission Rules, Procedures, Contingency Plans, and
Checklists, and Section 435.33 Safety Review Requirements and
Procedures
Commercial space transportation entities are generally expected to
fulfill the proposed requirements as part of their standard operating
procedures. However, the FAA anticipates that these entities would
incur some additional costs conforming to FAA requirements.
Additionally, commercial entities are expected to incur costs from
submitting updated documents with the FAA periodically, and preparing
for, accommodating and reacting to FAA inspection and compliance
monitoring activities. The cost impact to a single commercial space
transportation entity to comply with this proposed requirement would be
approximately $90,000 or $450,000 (5 x $90,000) for five entities
over the 15-year period.
Section 431.41 Communications Plan and Section 435.33 Safety Review
Requirements and Procedures
Commercial space transportation entities are expected to have in
place a communications plan that, for the most part, are consistent
with proposed regulatory requirement as a matter of standard business
practice. However, they are expected to incur incremental costs
complying with the requirement, annual recurring costs from interfacing
and exchanging documents with the FAA periodically and preparing for,
accommodating, and reacting to FAA inspection and compliance monitoring
activities. The cost impact to a single commercial space transportation
entity to comply would be approximately $90,000 or $450,000 for all
five entities over the 15-year period.
Section 431.43 Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Operational
Requirements and Restrictions, and Section 435.33 Safety Review
Requirements and Procedures
(Mission Operational Requirements: Dwell Time)
Commercial space transportation entities are expected to expend
additional levels of effort to comply with risk mitigation requirements
that, to some extent, may limit vehicle flight path options during
nominal and non-nominal operations, specifically limitations on dwell
time over populated areas and requirements for performing a collision
avoidance analysis during launch windows to maintain adequate
separation from orbiting objects.
(Rest and Duty Restrictions)
This proposed rule would impose work restrictions and personnel
rest requirements on commercial space transportation entities
potentially impacted by this action. For example, an individual having
direct control over reentry or involved in decisions affecting reentry
operations is restricted to working 60 hours over the seven-day period
preceding reentry. Further, the proposed rule would reduce the maximum
permissible hours worked per shift to 12, limits the maximum number of
consecutive workdays to 14, and specifies the minimum rest required (48
hours) between five consecutive days of 12-hour work shifts.
Currently, based on information received from industry, it is
common practice among commercial space transportation entities to
follow Air Force work and rest standards for launches. Those standards
are similar to the proposed requirements. Ordinarily,
[[Page 19651]]
based on industry information, launch mission operations personnel work
less than the maximum currently permissible, such as a 40-hour workweek
comprised of five eight-hour shifts. Hence, the 72-hour workweek is
generally an extreme condition that occurs infrequently.
The duration of a reentry operation is likely to determine the
extent of the impact that the proposed work and rest requirements would
have on commercial space transportation entities. However, this impact
would occur under extreme or limiting conditions only (e.g., one
reentry operations person).
Given the relatively small size of the entities comprising the
emerging RLV segment of the commercial space transportation industry,
staff augmentation of at least one person is not unlikely as a result
of the proposed requirements. Additionally, the FAA anticipates that
additional costs would be incurred for recordkeeping to ensure
compliance with required work and rest standards, and preparing for,
accommodating, and reacting to FAA inspection and monitoring
activities.
The incremental cost to a single commercial entity to comply with
this proposed work and rest requirement would be slightly more than $3
million over the 15-year period. Over this same period, for all five
entities, the cost of compliance would be $16 million ($5 x $3.2
million).
Section 431.45 Mishap Investigation Plan and Emergency Response Plan,
and Section 435.33 Safety Review Requirements and Procedures
As a matter of standard business practice, commercial entities are
expected to have prepared emergency response plans that are consistent
with much of the regulatory requirement. However, the FAA anticipates
that these plans would require additional annual maintenance to comply
with certain elements of the proposed rule. For example, entities are
likely to incur additional costs to establish their ability to
successfully respond to accidents occurring in remote areas having
sparse populations. Furthermore, additional annual maintenance costs
are expected to arise from preparing for, accommodating, and reacting
to FAA inspection and monitoring activities. Accordingly, a commercial
space transportation entity would incur incremental costs of $542,000
or $2.7 million (5 x $542,000) for all five entities over the 15-year
period.
Section 431.57 Information Requirements for Payload Reentry Review and
Section 435.43 Payload Reentry Review Requirements and Procedures
This proposed requirement to provide specific payload information
to the FAA presents an administrative paperwork burden to a commercial
entity. The submission of data to the FAA is estimated to impose costs
of $400 per application or $2,000 for all five entities over the 15-
year period.
Section 431.73 Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application
for Modification of License
The proposed requirement would impose minor costs on a licensee to
advise the FAA of material changes to its application, and RLV and
reentry missions that may impact public safety and property. Depending
upon the types of changes reported, it is assumed based on input
received from FAA and industry technical personnel that, on average, a
licensee would incur incremental compliance costs of approximately
$33,000 per modification application or $165,000 (5 x $33,000) for
five entities over the 15-year period.
Section 431.75 Agreements, and Section 435.51 Post Licensing
Requirements--Reentry License Terms and Conditions (General)
Entities that conduct commercial launches of ELVs from Federal
ranges must enter into formal agreements with the Federal range
authority prior to using such facilities. Entities planning to use
these same facilities for reentry missions would also be required to
enter into such agreements. The proposed requirement has no impact on
commercial entities other than the negligible level of effort expended
(e.g., less than one hour) to advise the FAA of compliance, and the
incremental cost to industry to comply with this requirement would be
negligible.
Section 431.77 Records and Section 435.51 Post Licensing
Requirements--Reentry License Terms and Conditions (General)
It is generally accepted practice among all commercial concerns to
maintain business operations records for some period of time, often
more than three years. Furthermore, the availability and capability of
electronic storage systems renders records retention a manageable task.
Accordingly, the proposed three-year requirement to maintain records
for FAA review, upon request, would not impact commercial space
transportation entities. From a worst case perspective, this evaluation
assumes the FAA would exercise its record request authority. As a
result the cost of compliance is expected to be about $400 per entity
per year. Over the 15-year period, the cost would be $6,000 (400 x
15) per entity or $30,000 (5 x $6,000) for five entities.
Section 431.79 Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission Reporting Requirements,
and Section 435.51 Post Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms
and Conditions (General)
The information to be supplied by a licensee under this proposed
requirement is similar to that supplied previously to the FAA during
the application process in accordance with Section 431.57. The burden
placed on the licensee is to provide more specific mission data than
that supplied previously but closer in time to the actual conduct of
the mission. Because an operator must have this data to perform a
scheduled mission, the incremental cost to industry to comply with this
proposed requirement would be zero.
Section 431.93 Environmental Information, and Section 435.61
Environmental Review (General)
Because licensing is a major Federal action, a commercial space
transportation entity would be required to provide information
addressing the environmental effects of its operations so that the
agency can fulfil its responsibility under NEPA and CEQ environmental
regulations, even in the absence of the proposed rule. Commercial
entities planning to conduct launch and reentry missions must submit
environmental assessment data to the FAA regarding environmental
impacts of its proposed activities. Additional information must be
submitted to evaluate environmental effects not previously assessed by
the agency. This proposed requirement would cause a commercial entity
to incur incremental compliance costs of $271,000 per entity or $1.4
million (5 x $271,000) for five entities over the 15-year period.
Section 433.7 Environmental
An analysis of the environmental impacts of operating a reentry
site is required under NEPA. The proposed requirement, as distinct from
similar requirements for operation of a launch site, would cause a
applicant to incur incremental compliance costs of $162,000 over the
15-year period as a result of the need to submit additional information
to the agency to evaluate environmental effects not previously assessed
by the agency. For all
[[Page 19652]]
operators, the cost of compliance would be about $800,000 over the same
period.
FAA Administrative Costs
The proposed rule would result in the FAA expending great effort in
evaluating RLV mission and reentry license applications and monitoring
licensees for compliance.
This evaluation estimates that the FAA would incur costs of
approximately $83 million ($45 million, discounted), 1997 dollars over
the 15-year period, as the result of administering its review of
license applications and monitoring of licensees compliance in
accordance with the proposed requirements of certain sections of parts
431, 433, and 435.
The FAA's actual experience in evaluating an application to conduct
a reentry mission is limited to the COMET and METEOR programs. Much of
the proposed rule reflects safety policies for reentry developed by the
agency in 1992 to ensure that the COMET/METEOR payload reentry missions
would not jeopardize public health and safety and health and the safety
of property. Consequently, this experience provides a partial basis for
establishing the costs to the FAA for administering the proposed rule.
Using this past experience, AST expects that the costs to be incurred
in performing its RLV mission and reentry licensing pre-application
consultation, application evaluation, and compliance monitoring duties
in the near term to be higher than that incurred for COMET/METEOR for a
single application, with or without a formal reentry licensing
regulation. The extent to which such costs would be higher than that
incurred for COMET/METEOR is unknown since there is no history of U.S.
commercial reentry activity. The assessment of higher application
costs, however, is largely due to the expectation that inherently more
complex RLV programs would dominate reentry missions in the future and
initially these would require greater evaluative effort on the part of
FAA personnel until they have developed experience in this area. While
AST budget estimates for fiscal year 2000 reflect additional funding
needed to exercise its reentry mission approval function, this need
cannot be attributed to the proposed rule, but rather to the complexity
associated with the advancing technology that would be evaluated.
AST fiscal year 2000 budget estimates of the cost to perform its
pre-application consultation and application evaluation licensing
responsibilities may be correlated collectively to sections 431.23,
431.27, 431.31, 431.47, 431.55, 431.59, and 431.91; 433.3, 433.9; and
435.23, 435.31, 435.43, and 435.61 of the proposed regulation. The
costs to be incurred by the FAA to implement its compliance monitoring
responsibilities corresponding to sections 431.73, 431.83, and 435.51
can vary widely, as the spectrum of changes to reentry program
operations can range from minor to major. Therefore, the FAA expects to
spend $2.5 million--an amount equivalent to that expended for COMET/
METEOR--to implement and administer these proposed requirements for a
single application.
Based on projections of the level of application activity over the
15-year period from 2000 to 2014, the FAA is expected to spend
approximately $83 million in administering the safety requirements of
parts 431, 433, and 435. Approximately 94 percent (or $78 million) of
the cost by the FAA to administer these parts would be incurred to
approve the projected reentry license applications and modifications to
be evaluated over the 15-year period. Approximately 6 percent (or $5
million) of the cost to administer parts 431, 433, and 435 would be
expended on the review of application denials and the reconsideration
process.
Unlike the estimates for potential benefits, the costs section of
this evaluation uses a point (or single) estimate rather than a range.
The point estimate approach was chosen in estimating FAA administrative
costs because, due in large measure to the agency's experience with the
COMET/METEOR Program, there is far less uncertainty associated with the
estimation of costs for this proposed rule relative to benefits.
Benefits
The proposed rule is expected to generate safety benefits of $119
million ($66 million, discounted), in 1997 dollars, over the 15-year
period. Benefits include enhanced safety by limiting reentry risk to a
level that does not exceed an expected average number of 30 casualties
per one million RLV missions or reentries for the general public, and
an expected average number of no more than one casualty per million
missions for the public in the vicinity of reentry sites.
The potential safety benefits that are expected to accrue as the
result of this proposed rule stem from two types of safety criteria
implemented and administered by the FAA on commercial space
transportation industry operators who wish to engage in RLV missions or
reentries. The two criteria are:
(1) Ec 30 x 10-6. This
criterion applies on a per mission basis and includes both launch and
reentry phases of an RLV mission. It requires that the risk to the
public associated with each mission incorporate a level of safety that
is equivalent to a probabilistic outcome of no more than an expected
average number of 30 public casualties per one million missions.
(2) Ec 1 x 10-6. This criterion
pertains to the public adjacent to reentry sites. It requires that the
risk to the public associated with each reentry mission incorporate a
level of safety that is equivalent to a probabilistic outcome of no
more than an expected average number of one public casualty per one
million missions.
Compliance by operators with these safety criteria, along with
other restrictions addressed in the proposed rule are intended to limit
risk to public safety. In estimating these potential safety benefits,
the FAA employed the following steps: (First), the agency examined six
accident types, grouped into two categories, related to airborne
explosions and ground point-of-impact crashes. (For the purpose of this
evaluation, the term accident is defined as any unplanned event with
potential casualty losses). For each accident category--airborne or
ground--the population density of the area surrounding the accident
scene or accident zone can be either (1) none, (2) sparse (e.g. rural),
or (3) dense (e.g., urban). An examination of the consequences of these
types of accidents was conducted. To arrive at accident consequences,
the accident scenes or zones for airborne and ground accidents are
characterized in terms of fatalities, injuries, and property damage
under the baseline and the proposed rule. The difference between the
baseline scenario and proposed rule scenario represents the incremental
safety benefits that would be generated by the proposed rule. This
process was performed for each of the steps below: (Second), monetary
values are assigned to each of the various types of accidents expected
to occur during launch or reentry (including accidents at or near
launch sites). (Third), probabilities are assigned to each of the six
accident types based on the percentage of impacted landmass (e.g., no
population, sparse population, and dense population) for the baseline
and the proposed rule. That is, the probability of occurrence for each
accident type over the next 15 years was determined by using the two
types of risk criteria mentioned earlier.
And last, expected values were estimated for each of the accident
types under the baseline and the proposed
[[Page 19653]]
rule. For this proposed rule, the expected benefit values represent the
difference between these two scenarios. One of the more difficult areas
to ascertain is the probability of a reusable launch vehicle (RLV) or
RLV accident in the absence of government regulation in order to
calculate the expected value of an accident under the baseline and
estimate the incremental safety benefits of the proposed rule. This
difficulty stems from the fact there is no empirical evidence or
historical RLV accident history. Because of this difficulty, there is
uncertainty associated with estimating the probability of an RLV or RLV
accident. As a result of this uncertainty, the FAA estimated a range of
accident probabilities, which are based on historical experience with
ELV accidents and incidents, and sorted them into six categories or
types of accidents. In estimating the expected casualty and property
loss values, the probability of each of the six accident types is
multiplied by the accident consequence values (e.g., the cost of an
accident). This process was repeated for all six accident types and
summed. This procedure was done for both scenarios (baseline and
proposal). Thus, the difference in casualty and property losses for
these two scenarios was used as the estimated benefits for this
proposed rule. The results of these calculations generate the potential
safety benefits as discussed below.
Safety benefits--accident costs avoided--are realized as RLV launch
and reentry operations are performed, without incident. Therefore, the
number of completed RLV missions and reentries projected over the 15-
year period is multiplied by incremental safety benefits per mission to
estimate total incremental safety benefits over the period 2000 to
2014. The total safety benefit resulting from the proposed rule is
estimated to be $119 million for the period 2000 to 2014. This estimate
of $119 million represents the midpoint of benefits ranging from $22
million to $217 million over the 15-year period. This midpoint estimate
of benefits was chosen because of the high degree of uncertainty
associated with the wide range of accident probabilities. Uncertainty
stems from the extent to which industry has already adopted and
implemented safety measures similar to those proposed as part of this
rulemaking action. (Based on information obtained from commercial space
industry technical personnel, nearly all of the potentially impacted
operators would be in compliance with the proposed rule to some
degree.) The low end of the range of benefits assumes that practically
all of the potentially impacted operators would be in almost complete
compliance in the absence of the proposed rule. The high end of the
range of benefits assumes the opposite. There is insufficient
information that would support adopting the benefits estimates at
either end of the range. Thus, the median (or midpoint) was chosen as
an appropriate benefits estimate. It suggests that the actual benefits
to be generated by the proposed rule lies somewhere between the lower
and upper end of this range. Since uncertainty is associated with using
a midpoint benefits estimate and range of benefits, the FAA solicits
public comment as to whether its assumptions are appropriate and the
validity of this approach. The agency asks that comments be specific
and supported by quantitative data wherever possible.
Secondary Benefits
The proposed rule would generate secondary benefits in the form of
enhanced operational efficiency, due largely to regulatory and
procedural clarifications that would be facilitated by the iterative
pre-application consultation process, help ensure consistency in
implementing the licensing process, and may result in cost-savings to
the FAA as a result of repetitive operations. These cost-savings would
also reduce the turnaround time between application submittal and
licensing approval, help commercial space transportation entities gain
familiarity with requirements, and facilitate government-industry
interaction. Enhanced operational efficiency, in turn, would lead to
industry cost-savings, possibly due to less rework or paperwork
avoided.
Summary of Total Costs and Benefits
The total potential benefits and costs of this proposed rule are
shown below in Table 1. This Table shows that the potential cost
imposed by the proposed rule would be approximately $113 million over
the 15-year period. Also shown in Table 1, about $30 million of this
total cost would be incurred by industry. The cost estimate of $30
million is lower than the summation of those costs discussed in the
above sections for industry because it takes into account the fact that
certain operators would incur recurring costs for some of the 15-year
period rather than for the entire period. Table 1 also shows that the
proposed rule would generate potential safety benefits of $119 million
over the 15-year period. Due to some of the operational requirements of
the proposed rule, costs and benefits not considered in this evaluation
may materialize. The FAA solicits comments from the commercial space
industry as to what extent this evaluation has captured critical costs
and benefits associated with the proposed rule.
Table 1.--Summary of Total Costs and Benefits
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category (in 1997 dollars, 15 yrs.) Undiscounted Discounted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commercial Space Transportation Industry $30 $20
Compliance Costs.......................
Federal Aviation Administration 83 45
Implementation Costs...................
-------------------------------
Total Costs......................... 113 65
-------------------------------
Accident Costs Avoided: Lower Bound 22 12
(Safety Benefits)......................
Accident Costs Avoided: Upper Bound 217 121
(Safety Benefits)......................
Total Accident Costs Avoided: Midpoint 119 66
(Safety Benefits)......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by
Congress to ensure that small entities (e.g., small business and small
not-for-profit government jurisdictions) are not unnecessarily and
disproportionately burdened by Federal Government regulations. The RFA,
which was amended in March 1996, requires that whenever an agency
publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking, an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis be performed if the proposed rule would
[[Page 19654]]
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The regulatory flexibility analysis must (1) identify the
economic impact on small entities and (2) consider alternatives that
may lessen those impacts.
The Small Business Administration has defined small business
entities relating to space vehicles (Standard Industrial Codes 3761,
3764, and 3769) as entities comprising fewer than 1,000 employees. The
FAA has determined that the proposed rule would impact five small
businesses, imposing on an entity average compliance costs of
approximately $6 million over the 15-year period (in 1997 dollars).
The annualized compliance cost to each small business is
approximately $700,000 (in 1997 dollars). Ordinarily, this section of
the evaluation would be based on typical financial data (for example,
annual net income or losses) as a means to determine any of the
commercial space transportation small entities significantly impacted
by the proposed rule. However, the traditional use of such financial
data for these small entities cannot be employed since RLV operators
(including a number of RV operators) represent relatively new companies
and they have no revenue history. In fact, these small operators are in
the process of raising funds to finance their new ventures. Due to the
lack of data on the financial characteristics of these small RLV
operators, this evaluation uses the 1998 average revenue received per
launch for ELV operators. The revenue that RLV operators would obtain
from their customers is expected to be similar to the revenue that
established ELV operators currently receive from their customers.
Revenue data based on ELV operators' experience would be used for the
purpose of assessing the extent to which compliance with the proposed
rule would impose significant economic impacts on each of the five
potentially impacted small RLV operators. This assessment would be done
by comparing the annualized cost of compliance to the annual average
revenue expected to be received by each of the five small RLV operators
over the next 15 years. While the long-term revenues of RLV operators
are expected to exceed those of ELV operators, which would be due to
inherent lower operating costs, for the purpose of this evaluation they
are assumed to be nearly the same over the 15-year period. For this
reason, the average revenue of about $50 million generated by each ELV
launch in 1998 will be used as an indicator of what RLV operators would
be expected to generate per RLV mission in future years. This
assessment is based primarily on information received for orbital
launch events for ELV operators from the FAA's Office of Commercial
Space Transportation Report entitled, ``Commercial Space
Transportation: 1998 Year In Review'', Table 1 and the Appendix
(January 1999).
Each of the five potentially impacted small RLV entities is
expected to average about seven missions per year over the next 15
years. Using $50 million as an average expected revenue per mission,
each entity would be expected to receive about $350 million in revenue
($50m x 7 missions annually) for all missions annually. The FAA has
determined that none of the five small entities would incur a
significant economic impact, since the average annualized cost of
compliance ($700,000) would be only 0.2 percent of the anticipated
average annual revenues of $350 for missions conducted annually.
The FAA certifies that the proposed rule would not impose a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
businesses. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. Furthermore, the proposed rule is not likely to cause small
business failures or adversely impact their competitive position
relative to larger businesses. However, the FAA requests comments on
the validity of the assertions herein and additional information on the
financial characteristics of these small businesses
International Trade Impact Assessment
The proposed rule contains revisions to commercial space
transportation licensing regulations that would not constitute a
barrier to international trade, including the export of domestic goods
and services out of the United States. The proposed rule would equally
affect domestic and foreign organizations conducting commercial space
transportation operations within the United States. The proposed rule
is not expected to place domestic firms at a disadvantage with respect
to foreign interests competing for similar business in international
markets. Therefore, based on this evaluation and impacts reported
herein, the proposed rule is not expected to affect trade opportunities
for U.S. firms doing business abroad or for foreign firms doing
business in the United States. The FAA invites comments on the validity
of this assertion and any potential impacts related thereto.
Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, enacted as
Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal agency, to
the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the
effects of any Federal mandate by State, local, and tribal governments,
in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of
the Act, Title 2 of the United States Code 1534(a), requires the
Federal agency to develop an effectiveness process to permit timely
input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and
tribal governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental
mandate.'' A significant intergovernmental mandate under the Act is any
provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year. Section 203 of the Act, Title 2 of the United States Code 1533,
which supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any
regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect
small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among
other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small
governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity any
affected small governments to provide input in the development of
proposed rules.
Based on the evaluation and impacts reported herein, the proposed
rule is not expected to meet the $100 million per year cost threshold.
Consequently, it would not impose a significant cost on uniquely affect
small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply to the proposed
regulation.
Federalism Implications
The regulations proposed herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the states, on the relationship between the national
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
[[Page 19655]]
Environmental Assessment
FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS).
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i),
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Proposed sections
431.91, 431.93, 433.7, and 433.9 would require an applicant to submit
sufficient environmental information for the FAA to comply with NEPA
and other applicable environmental laws and regulations during the
processing of each license application. Accordingly, the FAA proposes
that this rule qualifies for a categorical exclusion because no
significant impacts to the environment are expected to result from
finalization or implementation of its administrative provisions for
licensing.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 400
Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 401
Organization and functions (Government agencies), Space
transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 404
Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 405
Investigations, Penalties, Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 406
Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 413
Confidential business information, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 415
Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 431
Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation
and exploration.
14 CFR Part 433
Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation
and exploration.
14 CFR Part 435
Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets, Space transportation
and exploration.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend parts 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 413,
and 415, of Chapter III Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations and add
parts 431, 433 and 435 as follows:
PART 400--BASIS AND SCOPE
1. The authority citation for part 400 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
2. Section 400.2 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 400.2 Scope.
These regulations set forth the procedures and requirements
applicable to the authorization and supervision under 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, of commercial space transportation activities
conducted in the United States or by a U.S. citizen. The regulations in
this chapter do not apply to exempted-class rocket activities.
PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS
3. The authority citation for part 401 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
4. Section 401.5 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 401.5 Definitions.
As used in this chapter--
Act means 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, Commercial Space Transportation,
ch. 701--Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
Amateur rocket activities means launch activities conducted at
private sites involving rockets powered by a motor or motors having a
total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less and a total burning or
operating time of less than 15 seconds, and a rocket having a ballistic
coefficient--i.e., gross weight in pounds divided by frontal area of
rocket vehicle--less than 12 pounds per square inch.
Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, or
any person designated by the Associate Administrator to exercise the
authority or discharge the responsibilities of the Associate
Administrator.
Contingency abort means cessation of vehicle flight during ascent
or descent in a manner that does not jeopardize public health and
safety and the safety of property, in accordance with mission rules and
procedures. Contingency abort includes landing at an alternative
location that has been designated as a contingency abort location in
advance of vehicle flight.
Emergency abort means cessation of vehicle flight during ascent or
descent in a manner that minimizes risk to public health and safety and
the safety of property. Emergency abort involves failure of a vehicle,
safety-critical system, or flight safety system such that contingency
abort is not possible.
Federal launch range means a launch site, from which launches
routinely take place, that is owned and operated by the government of
the United States.
Flight safety system means a system designed to limit or restrict
the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property
presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle while in flight by
initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. A
flight safety system may be destructive resulting in intentional break
up of a vehicle or nondestructive, such as engine thrust termination
enabling vehicle landing or safe abort capability.
Hazardous materials means hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR
172.101.
Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle and any payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth
orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes
activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight,
when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States.
The term launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and pre-flight
ground operations beginning with the arrival of a launch vehicle or
payload at a U.S. launch site. Flight ends after the licensee's last
exercise of control over its launch vehicle.
Launch accident means:
(1) A fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to
any person who is not associated with the flight;
(2) Any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not
associated with the flight that is not located at the launch site or
designated recovery area.
(3) An unplanned event occurring during the flight of a launch
vehicle resulting in the known impact of a launch vehicle, its payload
or any component thereof:
[[Page 19656]]
(i) For an expendable launch vehicle (ELV), outside designated
impact limit lines; and
(ii) for an RLV, outside a designated landing site.
Launch incident means an unplanned event occurring during the
flight of a launch vehicle, other than a launch accident, involving a
malfunction of a flight safety system or safety-critical system or
failure of the licensee's safety organization, design or operations.
Launch operator means a person who conducts or who will conduct the
launch of a launch vehicle and any payload.
Launch site means the location on Earth from which a launch takes
place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under
this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location.
Launch vehicle means a vehicle built to operate in, or place a
payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket.
Mishap means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry
incident, failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned, or an
unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or serious
injury (as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 830.2), or resulting in greater than
$25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a vehicle, a launch or reentry
support facility or government property located on the launch or
reentry site.
Operation of a launch site means the conduct of approved safety
operations at a permanent site to support the launching of vehicles and
payloads.
Operation of a reentry site means the conduct of safety operations
at a fixed site on Earth at which a reentry vehicle and its payload, if
any, is intended to land.
Payload means an object that a person undertakes to place in outer
space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle
specifically designed or adapted for that object.
Person means an individual or an entity organized or existing under
the laws of a state or country.
Reenter means to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer
space to Earth. The term ``reenter'' includes activities conducted in
Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness and are
therefore unique to reentry and critical to ensuring public health and
safety and the safety of property during reentry.
Reentry accident means any unplanned event occurring during the
reentry of a reentry vehicle resulting in the known impact of the
reentry vehicle, its payload, or any component thereof outside a
designated reentry site; a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49
CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated with the reentry; or any
damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the
reentry and not located within a designated reentry site.
Reentry incident means any unplanned event occurring during the
reentry of a reentry vehicle, other than a reentry accident, involving
a malfunction of a reentry safety-critical system or failure of the
licensee's safety organization, procedures, or operations.
Reentry operator means a person responsible for conducting the
reentry of a reentry vehicle as specified in a license issued by the
FAA.
Reentry site means the location on Earth where a reentry vehicle is
intended to return. It includes the area within three standard
deviations of the intended landing point (the predicted three-sigma
footprint).
Reentry vehicle means a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit
or outer space to Earth substantially intact. A reusable launch vehicle
that is designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth
substantially intact is a reentry vehicle.
Reusable launch vehicle (RLV) means a launch vehicle that is
designed to return to Earth substantially intact and therefore may be
launched more than one time or that contains vehicle stages that may be
recovered by a launch operator for future use in the operation of a
substantially similar launch vehicle.
Safety-critical means essential to safe performance or operation. A
safety-critical system, subsystem, condition, event, operation, process
or item is one whose proper recognition, control, performance or
tolerance is essential to safe system operation.
Vehicle safety operations personnel means those persons whose job
performance is critical to public health and safety or the safety of
property during RLV or reentry operations.
State and United States means, when used in a geographical sense,
the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam,
and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States; and
United States citizen means:
(1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(2) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or
other entity organized or existing under the laws of the United States
or any State; and
(3) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or
other entity which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign
nation, if the controlling interest in such entity is held by an
individual or entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this
definition. Controlling interest means ownership of an amount of equity
in such entity sufficient to direct management of the entity or to void
transactions entered into by management. Ownership of at least fifty-
one percent of the equity in an entity by persons described in
paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition creates a rebuttable
presumption that such interest is controlling.
PART 404--REGULATIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
5. The authority citation for part 404 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
6. Section 404.1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 404.1 Scope.
Under section 49 U.S.C. 70105, this part establishes procedures for
issuing regulations to implement the provisions of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle
IX, chapter 701, and for eliminating or waiving requirements of Federal
law otherwise applicable to the licensing of commercial space
transportation activities under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701.
7. Section 404.3 is amended by revising the section title and
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 404.3 Filing of petitions to the Associate Administrator.
(a) Any person may petition the Associate Administrator to issue,
amend, or repeal a regulation to eliminate as a requirement for a
license any requirement of Federal law applicable to commercial space
launch and reentry activities and the operation of launch and reentry
sites or to waive any such requirement in the context of a specific
application for a license.
* * * * *
PART 405--INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
8. The authority citation for part 405 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
9. Section 405.1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 405.1 Monitoring of licensed and other activities.
Each licensee must allow access by and cooperate with Federal
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the Associate
Administrator to observe licensed
[[Page 19657]]
facilities and activities, including launch sites and reentry sites, as
well as manufacturing, production, and testing facilities, or assembly
sites used by any contractor or a licensee in the production, assembly,
or testing of a launch or reentry vehicle and in the integration of a
payload with its launch or reentry vehicle. Observations are conducted
to monitor the activities of the licensee or contractor at such time
and to such extent as the Associate Administrator considers reasonable
and necessary to determine compliance with the license or to perform
the Associate Administrator's responsibilities pertaining to payloads
for which no Federal license, authorization, or permit is required.
10. Section 405.5 is amended by revising the introductory text and
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 405.5 Emergency orders.
The Associate Administrator may immediately terminate, prohibit, or
suspend a licensed launch, reentry, or operation of a launch or reentry
site if the Associate Administrator determines that--
(a) The licensed launch, reentry, or operation of a launch or
reentry site is detrimental to public health and safety, the safety of
property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the
United States; and
* * * * *
PART 406--ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
11. The authority citation for part 406 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
12. Section 406.1 is amended by revising paragraphs (a),
introductory text, (a)(2), and (a)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 406.1 Hearings.
(a) Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 70110, the following are entitled to a
determination on the record after an opportunity for a hearing in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 554.
* * * * *
(2) An owner or operator of a payload regarding any decision to
prevent the launch or reentry of the payload;
(3) A licensee regarding any decision to suspend, modify, or revoke
a license or to terminate, prohibit, or suspend any licensed activity;
and
* * * * *
PART 413--LICENSE APPLICATION PROCEDURES
13. The authority citation for part 413 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
14. Section 413.1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 413.1 Scope.
This part prescribes the procedures applicable to applications
submitted under this chapter to conduct licensed activities. These
procedures apply to all applications for issuance of a license,
transfer of an existing license, and renewal of an existing license.
More specific requirements applicable to obtaining a launch license or
a license to operate a launch site are contained in parts 415 and 417
of this chapter, respectively. More specific requirements applicable to
obtaining a license to launch and reenter a reentry vehicle or to
operate a reentry site are contained in parts 431, 433 and 435 of this
chapter, respectively.
5. Section 413.3 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 413.3 Who must obtain a license.
(a) A person must obtain a license--
(1) To launch a launch vehicle from the United States;
(2) To operate a launch site within the United States;
(3) To reenter a reentry vehicle in the United States; or
(4) To operate a reentry site within the United States.
(b) An individual who is a U.S. citizen or an entity organized
under the laws of the United States or any State must obtain a
license--
(1) To launch a launch vehicle outside the United States;
(2) To operate a launch site outside of the United States;
(3) To reenter a reentry vehicle outside of the United States; or
(4) To operate a reentry site outside of the United States.
(c) A foreign entity in which a United States citizen has a
controlling interest, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, must
obtain a launch license to launch a launch vehicle from or a license to
operate a launch site within--
(1) Any place that is both outside the United States and outside
the territory of any foreign nation, unless there is an agreement in
force between the United States and a foreign nation providing that
such foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the
operation of the launch site; or
(2) The territory of any foreign nation if there is an agreement in
force between the United States and that foreign nation providing that
the United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the launch or the
operation of the launch site.
(d) A foreign entity in which a U.S. citizen has a controlling
interest, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, must obtain a
license to reenter a reentry vehicle or to operate a reentry site in--
(1) Any place that is outside the United States and outside the
territory of any foreign nation, unless there is an agreement in force
between the United States and a foreign nation providing that such
foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over the reentry or the
operation of the reentry site; or
(2) The territory of any foreign nation if there is an agreement in
force between the United States and that foreign nation providing that
the United States shall exercise jurisdiction over the reentry or the
operation of the reentry site.
PART 415--LAUNCH LICENSE
16. The authority citation for part 415 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
17. Section 415.1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 415.1 Scope.
This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to launch
a launch vehicle, other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV), and post-
licensing requirements with which a licensee shall comply to remain
licensed. Requirements for preparing a license application are
contained in part 413 of this subchapter. Requirements for obtaining a
license to launch an RLV and conduct an RLV mission are contained in
part 431 of this subchapter.
18. Part 431 is added to read as follows:
PART 431--LAUNCH AND REENTRY OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV)
Subpart A--General
Sec.
431.1 Scope.
431.3 Types of reusable launch vehicle mission licenses.
431.5 Policy and safety approvals.
431.7 Payload and payload reentry determinations.
431.9 Issuance of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
431.11 Additional license terms and conditions.
431.13 Transfer of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission
license.
431.16-431.20 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
431.21 General.
431.23 Policy review.
431.25 Application requirements for policy review.
431.27 Denial of policy approval.
431.28-431.30 [Reserved]
[[Page 19658]]
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
431.31 General.
431.33 Safety organization.
431.35 Acceptable reusable launch vehicle mission risk.
431.37 Mission readiness.
431.39 Mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and
checklists.
431.41 Communications plan.
431.43 Reusable launch vehicle mission operational requirements and
restrictions.
431.45 Mishap investigation plan and emergency response plan.
431.47 Denial of safety approval.
431.48-431.50 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
431.51 General.
431.53 Classes of payloads.
431.55 Payload reentry review.
431.57 Information requirements for payload reentry review.
431.59 Issuance of payload reentry determination.
431.61 Incorporation of payload reentry determination in license
application.
431.62-431.70 [Reserved]
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission
License Terms and Conditions
431.71 Public safety responsibility.
431.73 Continuing accuracy of license application; application for
modification of license.
431.75 Agreements.
431.77 Records.
431.79 Reusable launch vehicle mission reporting requirements.
431.81 Financial responsibility requirements.
431.83 Compliance monitoring.
431.85 Registration of space objects.
431.86-431.90 [Reserved]
Subpart F--Environmental Review
431.91 General.
431.93 Environmental information.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70119.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 431.1 Scope.
This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a reusable launch
vehicle (RLV) mission license and post-licensing requirements with
which a licensee must comply to remain licensed. Requirements for
preparing a license application are contained in part 413 of this
subchapter.
Sec. 431.3 Types of reusable launch vehicle mission licenses.
(a) Mission-specific license. A mission-specific license
authorizing an RLV mission, authorizes a licensee to launch and
reenter, or otherwise land, one model or type of RLV to a reentry site
approved for the mission. A mission-specific license authorizing an RLV
mission may authorize more than one RLV mission and identifies each
flight of an RLV authorized under the license. A licensee's
authorization to conduct RLV missions terminates upon completion of all
activities authorized by the license or the expiration date stated in
the reentry license, whichever occurs first.
(b) Operator license. An operator license for RLV missions
authorizes a licensee to launch and reenter, or otherwise land, any of
a designated family of RLVs within authorized parameters, including
trajectories, transporting specified classes of payloads to any reentry
site designated in the license. An operator license for RLV missions is
valid for a two-year renewable term.
Sec. 431.5 Policy and safety approvals.
To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must
obtain policy and safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for
obtaining these approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this
part. Only the license applicant may apply for the approvals, and may
apply for either approval separately and in advance of submitting a
complete license application, using the application procedures
contained in part 413 of this subchapter.
Sec. 431.7 Payload and payload reentry determinations.
(a) A payload determination is required to launch a payload unless
the proposed payload is exempt from payload review under Sec. 415.53 of
this chapter. Requirements for obtaining a payload determination are
set forth in part 415, subpart D.
(b) A payload reentry determination is required to transport a
payload to Earth on an RLV unless the proposed payload is exempt from
payload review.
(c) A payload reentry determination made under a previous license
application under this subchapter may satisfy the requirements of
paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) The FAA conducts a review, as described in subpart D of this
part, to make a payload reentry determination. Either an RLV mission
license applicant or a payload owner or operator may request a review
of the proposed payload using the application procedures contained in
part 413 of this subchapter. Upon receipt of an application, the FAA
may conduct a payload reentry review independently of an RLV mission
license application.
Sec. 431.9 Issuance of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
(a) The FAA issues either a mission-specific or operator license
authorizing RLV missions to an applicant who has obtained all approvals
and determinations required under this chapter for the license.
(b) An RLV mission license authorizes a licensee to launch and
reenter, or otherwise land, an RLV and payload, if any, in accordance
with the representations contained in the licensee's application,
subject to the licensee's compliance with terms and conditions
contained in license orders accompanying the license, including
financial responsibility requirements.
Sec. 431.11 Additional license terms and conditions.
The FAA may amend an RLV mission license at any time by modifying
or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49
U.S.C. subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.
Sec. 431.13 Transfer of a reusable launch vehicle mission license.
(a) Only the FAA may transfer an RLV mission license.
(b) An applicant for transfer of an RLV mission license shall
submit a license application in accordance with part 413 of this
subchapter and satisfy the applicable requirements of this part. The
FAA will transfer an RLV mission license to an applicant who has
obtained all of the approvals and determinations required under this
chapter for an RLV mission license. In conducting its reviews and
issuing approvals and determinations, the FAA may incorporate any
findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing
determination. The FAA may modify an RLV mission license to reflect any
changes necessary as a result of a license transfer.
Sec. 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission
license.
Issuance of an RLV mission license does not relieve a licensee of
its obligation to comply with requirements of law that may apply to its
activities.
Secs. 431.16-431.20 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
Sec. 431.21 General.
The FAA issues a policy approval to an RLV mission license
applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review. A policy
approval is part of the licensing record on which the licensing
determination is based.
Sec. 431.23 Policy review.
(a) The FAA reviews an RLV mission license application to determine
[[Page 19659]]
whether the proposed mission presents any issues, other than those
issues addressed in the safety review, that would adversely affect U.S.
national security or foreign policy interests, would jeopardize public
health and safety or the safety of property, or would not be consistent
with international obligations of the United States.
(b) Interagency consultation.
(1) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine
whether an RLV mission license application presents any issues
adversely affecting U.S. national security.
(2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine
whether an RLV mission license application presents any issues
adversely affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international
obligations.
(3) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section, associated with
an applicant's RLV mission proposal.
(c) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised
during a policy review that would impede issuance of a policy approval.
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license
application.
Sec. 431.25 Application requirements for policy review.
In its RLV mission license application, an applicant must--
(a) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any RLV proposed
for launch and reentry, or otherwise landing on Earth, by the
applicant.
(b) Identify all vehicle systems, including structural, thermal,
pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and avionics and guidance systems
used in the vehicle(s), and all propellants.
(c) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:
(1) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign
ownership;
(2) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of
10% or more; and
(3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify any
participating foreign entities.
(d) Identify proposed launch and reentry flight profile(s),
including--
(1) Launch and reentry site(s), including planned contingency abort
locations, if any;
(2) Flight trajectories, reentry trajectories, associated ground
tracks, and instantaneous impact points for nominal operations, and
contingency abort profiles, if any;
(3) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during the mission; and
For an orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of
the vehicle and upper stages, if any, and their estimated orbital life
times.
Sec. 431.27 Denial of policy approval.
The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if the FAA has denied
policy approval for an RLV mission license application. The notice
states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The applicant may
respond to the reasons for the determination and request
reconsideration.
Secs. 431.28-431.30 [Reserved]
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle
Sec. 431.31 General.
(a) The FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether an
applicant is capable of launching an RLV and payload, from a designated
launch site, and reentering the RLV and payload, if any, to a
designated reentry site, or otherwise landing the RLV and payload, if
any, on Earth, without jeopardizing public health and safety and the
safety of property.
(b) The FAA issues a safety approval to an RLV mission license
applicant that satisfies the requirements of this subpart. The FAA
evaluates on an individual basis all public safety aspects of a
proposed RLV mission to ensure they are sufficient to support safe
conduct of the mission. A safety approval is part of the licensing
record on which the FAA's licensing determination is based.
(c) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue raised
during a safety review that would impede issuance of a safety approval.
The applicant may respond, in writing, or revise its license
application.
Sec. 431.33 Safety organization.
(a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document
it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority for all
mission decisions that may affect public safety. Lines of communication
within the applicant's organization, between the applicant and the
launch site, and between the applicant and the reentry site, shall be
employed to ensure that personnel perform RLV mission operations in
accordance with plans and procedures required by this subpart. Approval
authority shall be employed to ensure compliance with terms and
conditions stated in an RLV mission license and with the plans and
procedures required by this subpart.
(b) An applicant must designate a person responsible for the
conduct of all licensed RLV mission activities.
(c) Safety official. An applicant shall designate by name, title,
and qualifications, a qualified safety official authorized by the
applicant to examine all aspects of the applicant's operations with
respect to safety of RLV mission activities and to monitor
independently compliance by vehicle safety operations personnel with
the applicant's safety policies and procedures. The safety official
shall report directly to the person responsible for an applicant's
licensed RLV mission activities, who shall ensure that all of the
safety official's concerns are addressed both before the mission is
initiated and before reentry or descent of an RLV is initiated. The
safety official is responsible for--
(1) Conducting operational dress rehearsals in accordance with
procedures required by Sec. 431.37(a)(4), that ensure the readiness of
vehicle safety operations personnel to conduct a safe mission under
nominal and non-nominal conditions; and
(2) Completing a mission readiness determination as required by
Sec. 431.37 of this subpart before an RLV mission is initiated. The
safety official must monitor and report to the person responsible for
the conduct of licensed RLV mission activities any non-compliance with
procedures listed in Secs. 431.37 and 431.43 or any representation
contained in the application, and the readiness of the licensee to
conduct mission operations in accordance with the license and this
part. The safety official is responsible for compliance with
Secs. 431.37 and 431.43 and with representations contained in the
application.
Sec. 431.35 Acceptable reusable launch vehicle mission risk.
(a) To obtain safety approval for an RLV mission, an applicant must
demonstrate that the proposed mission does not exceed acceptable risk
as defined in this subpart. For purposes of this part, the mission
commences upon initiation of the launch phase of flight, proceeds
through orbital insertion of an RLV or vehicle stage, or flight to
outer space, whichever is applicable, and concludes upon landing on
Earth of the RLV.
(b) Acceptable risk for a proposed mission is measured in terms of
the expected average number of casualties (Ec) to the
collective members of the public exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris
impact hazards. To obtain safety
[[Page 19660]]
approval, an applicant shall demonstrate--
(1) For public risk, the risk level associated with a proposed
mission does not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003
casualties per mission (or Ec criterion of 30 x
10-6) to members of the public from the applicant's proposed
activity; and
(2) For persons within a 100-mile distance from the border of the
designated reentry site and contingency abort locations, if any, the
risk level associated with a proposed mission does not exceed an
expected average number of .000001 casualties per mission (or
Ec criterion of 1 x 10-6).
(c) Hazard identification and risk assessment. To demonstrate
compliance with acceptable risk criteria in this section, an applicant
shall employ a system safety process to identify the hazards and assess
the risks to public health and safety and the safety of property
associated with the mission, including nominal and non-nominal
operation and flight of the vehicle and payload, if any. An acceptable
system safety analysis identifies and assesses the probability and
consequences of any reasonably foreseeable hazardous events, and
safety-critical system failures during launch and reentry that could
result in a casualty to the public.
(d) As part of the demonstration required under paragraph (c) of
this section, an applicant must--
(1) Identify and describe the structure of the RLV, including
physical dimensions and weight;
(2) Identify and describe any hazardous materials, including
radioactive materials, and their container on the RLV;
(3) Identify and describe safety-critical systems;
(4) Identify and describe all safety-critical failure modes and
their consequences;
(5) Provide drawings and schematics for each safety-critical system
identified under paragraph (d) (3) of this section;
(6) Provide a timeline identifying all safety-critical events;
(7) Provide data that validates the applicant's system safety
analyses required in paragraph (c) of this section; and
(8) Provide flight trajectory analyses covering launch or ascent of
the vehicle through orbital insertion and reentry or descent of the
vehicle through landing, including three-sigma dispersion.
Sec. 431.37 Mission readiness.
(a) Mission readiness requirements. An applicant shall submit the
following procedures for verifying mission readiness:
(1) Mission readiness review procedures that involve the
applicant's vehicle safety operations personnel, and launch site and
reentry site personnel involved in the mission. The procedures shall
ensure a mission readiness review is conducted during which the
designated individual responsible for the conduct of licensed
activities under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart is provided with the
following information to make a judgment as to mission readiness--
(i) Readiness of the RLV including safety-critical systems and
payload for launch and reentry flight;
(ii) Readiness of the launch site, personnel, and safety-related
launch property and launch services to be provided by the launch site;
(iii) Readiness of the reentry site, personnel, and safety-related
property and services for reentry flight and vehicle recovery;
(iv) Readiness of vehicle safety operations personnel to support
mission flight, including results of dress rehearsals and simulations
conducted in accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of this section;
(v) Mission rules and constraints, including contingency abort
plans and procedures, if any, as required under Sec. 431.39 of this
part;
(vi) Unresolved safety issues identified during the mission
readiness review and plans for addressing them; and
(vii) Any additional safety information required by the individual
designated under Sec. 431.33(b) of this part to determine launch and
reentry readiness.
(2) Procedures that ensure mission constraints, rules, contingency
abort and emergency abort procedures are listed and consolidated in a
safety directive or notebook approved by the person designated by the
applicant under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart, the launch site
operator, and the reentry site operator, if any;
(3) Procedures that ensure currency and consistency of licensee,
launch site operator, and reentry site operator checklists;
(4) Dress rehearsal procedures that--
(i) Ensure crew readiness under nominal and non-nominal flight
conditions;
(ii) Contain criteria for determining whether to dispense with or
add one or more dress rehearsals; and
(iii) Verify currency and consistency of licensee, launch site
operator, and reentry site operator checklists; and
(5) Procedures for ensuring the licensee's vehicle safety
operations personnel adhere to crew rest rules of this part.
Sec. 431.39 Mission rules, procedures, contingency plans, and
checklists.
(a) An applicant shall submit mission rules, procedures,
checklists, emergency plans, and contingency abort plans, if any, that
ensure safe conduct of mission operations during nominal and non-
nominal vehicle flight.
(b) Mission rules, procedures, checklists, emergency plans, and
contingency abort plans must be contained in a safety directive,
notebook, or other compilation that is approved by the safety official
designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this part and concurred in by the
launch site operator and reentry site operator, if any.
(c) Vehicle safety operations personnel must have current and
consistent mission checklists.
Sec. 431.41 Communications plan.
(a) An applicant shall submit a plan providing vehicle safety
operations personnel communications procedures during the mission.
Procedures for effective issuance and communication of safety-critical
information during the mission shall include hold/resume, go/no go,
contingency abort, if any, and emergency abort commands by vehicle
safety operations personnel. The communications plan shall describe the
authority of vehicle safety operations personnel, by individual or
position title, to issue these commands. The communications plan shall
ensure that--
(1) Communication networks are assigned so that personnel
identified under this section have direct access to real-time, safety-
critical information required for making these decisions and issuing
the commands;
(2) Personnel identified under this section monitor a common
intercom channel for safety-critical communications during launch and
reentry;
(3) A protocol is established for utilizing defined radio
communications terminology; and
(4) Communications affecting the safety of the mission are
recorded.
(b) An applicant shall submit procedures to ensure that licensee
and reentry site personnel, if any, receive a copy of the
communications plan required by this section and that the reentry site
operator, if any, concurs with the communications plan.
Sec. 431.43 Reusable launch vehicle mission operational requirements
and restrictions.
(a) An applicant for RLV mission safety approval shall submit
procedures--
(1) That ensure RLV mission risks do not exceed the criteria set
forth in
[[Page 19661]]
Sec. 431.35 of this part for nominal and non-nominal operations;
(2) That ensure conformance with the system safety process and
associated hazard identification and risk assessment required under
Sec. 431.35(c);
(3) That ensure conformance with operational restrictions listed in
paragraphs (c) through (e) of this section;
(4) To monitor and verify the status of RLV safety-critical systems
immediately before and during mission operations; and
(5) For human activation or initiation of a flight safety system
that safely aborts the launch of an RLV if the vehicle is not operating
within approved mission parameters and the vehicle poses risk to public
health and safety and the safety of property in excess of acceptable
flight risk as defined in Sec. 431.35.
(b) To satisfy risk criteria set forth in Sec. 431.35(b)(1), an
applicant for RLV mission safety approval shall identify suitable and
attainable locations for nominal landing and vehicle staging impact, if
any. An application shall identify such locations for a contingency
abort if necessary to satisfy risk criteria contained in
Sec. 431.35(b)(1) during launch of an RLV. A nominal landing, vehicle
staging impact and contingency abort location are suitable for launch
or reentry if--
(1) For any vehicle or vehicle stage, the area of the predicted
three-sigma dispersion of the vehicle or vehicle stage can be wholly
contained within the designated location; and
(2) The location is of sufficient size to contain landing impacts,
including debris dispersion upon impact and any toxic release.
(c) For an RLV mission--
(1) A collision avoidance analysis shall be performed in order to
maintain at least a 200-kilometer separation from any inhabitable
orbiting object during launch and reentry. The analysis shall address:
(i) For launch, closures in a planned launch window for ascent to
outer space or, for an orbital RLV, to initial orbit through at least
one complete orbit;
(ii) For reentry, the reentry trajectory;
(iii) Expansions of the closure period by subtracting 15 seconds
from the closure start-time and adding 15 seconds to the closure end-
time for each sequential 90 minutes elapsed time period, or portion
there of, beginning at the time the state vectors of the orbiting
objects were determined;
(2) The projected instantaneous impact point (IIP) of the vehicle
shall not have substantial dwell time over densely populated areas
during any segment of mission flight;
(3) There will be no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle
or its components and payload after payload separation and debris
generation will not result from conversion of energy sources into
energy that fragments the vehicle or its payload. Energy sources
include, but are not limited to, chemical, pneumatic, and kinetic
energy; and
(4) Vehicle safety operations personnel shall adhere to the
following work and rest standards:
(i) A maximum 12-hour work shift with at least 8 hours of rest
after 12 hours of work, preceding initiation of a reentry mission or
during the conduct of a mission;
(ii) A maximum of 60 hours worked in the 7 days, preceding
initiation of an RLV mission;
(iii) A maximum of 14 consecutive work days; and
(iv) A minimum 48-hour rest period after 5 consecutive days of 12-
hour shifts.
(d) In addition to requirements of paragraph (c) of this section,
any unproven RLV may only be operated--
(1) Such that the projected instantaneous impact point (IIP) of the
vehicle does not have substantial dwell time over populated areas; or
(2) Such that the expected average number of casualties to members
of the public does not exceed 30 x 10-6 (Ec
30 x 10-6) given a probability of vehicle
failure equal to 1 (pf = 1) at any time the IIP is over a
populated area;
(e) Any RLV that enters Earth orbit may only be operated such that
the vehicle operator is able to--
(1) Monitor the status of safety-critical systems immediately
before enabling reentry flight and verify that the vehicle can reenter
safely to Earth; and
(2) Issue a command enabling reentry of the vehicle. Reentry cannot
be initiated autonomously under nominal circumstances without prior
enable.
Sec. 431.45 Mishap investigation plan and emergency response plan.
(a) An applicant shall submit a mishap investigation plan (MIP)
containing the applicant's procedures for reporting and responding to
launch and reentry accidents, launch and reentry incidents, or other
mishaps, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, that satisfies
requirements of Sec. 415.41 of this subchapter. An applicant shall
submit an emergency response plan (ERP) that contains procedures for
informing the affected public of a planned reentry. An ERP will provide
procedures to notify local officials of an off-site landing. The MIP
and ERP shall be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify
the application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter, the
person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV mission
activities designated under Sec. 431.33(b) of this subpart, and the
safety official designated under Sec. 431.33(c) of this subpart. MIPs
covering launch and reentry flight phases of an RLV mission may be
combined in a single document.
(b) Report requirements. A MIP shall provide for--
(1) Immediate notification to the FAA Washington Operations Center
in case of an event identified in paragraph (a) of this section. In
addition to requirements of Sec. 415.41(b), the notification shall
include:
(i) Date and time of occurrence;
(ii) Description of the event;
(iii) Intended and actual location of reentry, or other landing on
Earth;
(iv) Identification of the vehicle;
(v) Identification of the payload, if applicable;
(vi) Number and general description of any fatalities and injuries;
(vii) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
(viii) Identification of any hazardous material, as defined in
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event, whether on the
vehicle, payload, or on the ground;
(ix) Action taken by personnel to contain the consequences of the
event;
(x) Description of weather conditions at the time of the event; and
(xi) Potential consequences for other vehicles or systems of
similar type and proposed operations.
(2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation in the event of a
reentry accident or reentry incident, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this
chapter, within 5 days of the event. The report shall identify the
event as either a reentry accident or reentry incident and must include
the information specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(c) A mishap investigation plan must contain procedures to--
(1) Ensure the consequences of a reentry accident, reentry
incident, or other mishap are contained and minimized;
(2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
(3) Investigate the cause of a reentry accident, reentry incident,
or other mishap;
(4) Report the mishap to the FAA;
(5) Designate a point of contact for the FAA and the National
Transportation Safety Board;
[[Page 19662]]
(6) Cooperate with investigations conducted by the FAA and the
National Transportation Safety Board;
(7) Delineate responsibilities, including reporting
responsibilities, for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and
for any unrelated entities retained by the licensee to conduct or
participate in investigations.;
(8) Report investigation results to the FAA; and
(9) Identify and adopt preventive measures for avoiding a
recurrence of the event.
(d) An emergency response plan shall provide for--
(1) Notification to local officials in the event of an off-site
landing so that vehicle recovery can be conducted safely and
effectively, with minimal risk to public safety. The plan must provide
for the quick dissemination of up to date information to the public,
and for doing so in advance of reentry to the extent practicable.
(2) A public information dissemination plan for informing the
potentially affected public, in laymen's terms and in advance of a
planned reentry, of the estimated date, time and landing location for
the reentry activity.
(3) An ERP shall be submitted as part of the application process.
Sec. 431.47 Denial of safety approval.
The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if the FAA has denied
safety approval for an RLV mission license application. The notice
states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The applicant may
respond to the reasons for the determination and request
reconsideration.
Secs. 431.48-431.50 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
Sec. 431.51 General.
(a) A payload reentry review is conducted to examine the policy and
safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload, other than
a U.S. Government payload or a payload whose reentry is subject to
regulation by another Federal agency, to determine whether the FAA will
approve reentry of the payload.
(b) A payload reentry review may be conducted as part of an RLV
mission license application review or may be requested by a payload
owner or operator in advance of or separate from an RLV mission license
application.
(c) A payload reentry determination will be made part of the
licensing record on which the FAA's licensing determination is based.
Sec. 431.53 Classes of payloads.
(a) The FAA may approve the return of a type or class of payloads
(for example, communications or microgravity/scientific satellites).
(b) The RLV mission licensee that will return a payload approved
for reentry under this section, is responsible for providing current
information in accordance with Sec. 431.57 regarding the payload
proposed for reentry no later than 60 days before a scheduled RLV
mission involving that payload.
Sec. 431.55 Payload reentry review.
(a) In conducting a payload reentry review to decide if the FAA
should approve reentry of a payload, the FAA determines whether its
reentry presents any issues that would adversely affect U.S. national
security or foreign policy interests, would jeopardize public health
and safety or the safety of property, or would not be consistent with
international obligations of the United States.
(b) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine
whether reentry of a proposed payload presents any issues adversely
affecting U.S. national security.
(c) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine
whether reentry of a proposed payload presents any issues adversely
affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international obligations.
(d) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section.
(e) The FAA advises a person requesting a payload reentry
determination, in writing, of any issue raised during a payload reentry
review that would impede the issuance of a favorable determination to
reenter that payload. The person requesting a payload reentry review
may respond, in writing, or revise its application.
Sec. 431.57 Information requirements for payload reentry review.
A person requesting reentry review of a particular payload or
payload class must identify the following:
(a) Payload name or class and function;
(b) Physical characteristics, dimensions, and weight of the
payload;
(c) Payload owner and operator, if different from the person
requesting the payload reentry review;
(d) Type, amount, and container of hazardous materials, as defined
in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, and radioactive materials in the
payload;
(e) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in
combination with other materials found on the payload or RLV during
reentry;
(f) Designated reentry site(s); and
(g) Method for securing the payload on the RLV.
Sec. 431.59 Issuance of payload reentry determination.
(a) The FAA issues a favorable payload reentry determination unless
it determines that reentry of the proposed payload would adversely
affect U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, would
jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of property, or would
not be consistent with international obligations of the United States.
The FAA responds to any person who has requested a payload reentry
review of its determination in writing. The notice states the reasons
for the determination in the event of an unfavorable determination.
(b) Any person issued an unfavorable payload reentry determination
may respond to the reasons for the determination and request
reconsideration.
Sec. 431.61 Incorporation of payload reentry determination in license
application.
A favorable payload reentry determination issued for a payload or
class of payload may be included by an RLV mission license applicant as
part of its application. Before the conduct of an RLV mission involving
a payload approved for reentry, any change in information provided
under Sec. 431.57 of this subpart must be reported by the licensee in
accordance with Sec. 413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether
a favorable payload reentry determination remains valid and may conduct
an additional payload reentry review.
Secs. 431.62-431.70 [Reserved]
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reusable Launch Vehicle
Mission License Terms and Conditions
Sec. 431.71 Public safety responsibility.
(a) A licensee is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of an
RLV mission and for protecting public health and safety and the safety
of property during the conduct of the mission.
(b) A licensee must conduct a licensed RLV mission and perform RLV
safety procedures in accordance with representations made in its
license application. A licensee's failure to perform safety procedures
in accordance with the representations made in the license application
or comply with any license condition is sufficient basis for
[[Page 19663]]
the revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action.
Sec. 431.73 Continuing accuracy of license application; application
for modification of license.
(a) A licensee is responsible for the continuing accuracy of
representations contained in its application for the entire term of the
license.
(b) After a license has been issued, a licensee must apply to the
FAA for modification of the license if'
(1) The licensee proposes to conduct an RLV mission or perform a
safety-critical operation in a manner not authorized by the license; or
(2) Any representation contained in the license application that is
material to public health and safety or the safety of property is no
longer accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's
procedures governing the actual conduct of an RLV mission. A change is
material to public health and safety or the safety of property if it
alters or affects the--
(i) Mission rules, reentry plans, contingency abort plans, if any,
or emergency plans submitted in accordance with Sec. 431.39 of this
part;
(ii) Class of payload;
(iii) Type of RLV;
(iv) Any safety-critical system;
(v) Type and container of the hazardous material carried by the
vehicle;
(vi) Flight trajectory;
(vii) Launch site or reentry site; or
(viii) Any safety system, policy, procedure, requirement, criteria,
or standard.
(c) An application to modify an RLV mission license must be
prepared and submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. The
licensee must indicate any part of its license or license application
that would be changed or affected by a proposed modification.
(d) The FAA reviews determinations and approvals required by this
chapter to determine whether they remain valid after submission of a
proposed modification.
(e) Upon approval of a modification, the FAA issues either a
written approval to the licensee or a license order amending the
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added,
or deleted. An approval has the full force and effect of a license
order and is part of the licensing record.
Sec. 431.75 Agreements.
(a) Launch and reentry site use agreements. Before conducting a
licensed RLV mission using property and services of a Federal launch
range or licensed launch or reentry site operator, a licensee or
applicant shall enter into an agreement with the Federal launch range
and/or licensed site operator that provides for access to and use of
property and services required to support a licensed RLV mission or
reentry and for public safety related operations and support. The
agreement shall be in effect before any licensed RLV mission or
reentry. A licensee shall comply with any requirements of the agreement
that may affect public health and safety and the safety of property
during the conduct of its licensed activity.
(b) Agreements for notices to mariners and airmen. Unless otherwise
addressed in agreements between a licensed launch site operator and the
U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA, respectively, a licensee authorized to
conduct an RLV mission using a launch site or reentry site other than a
Federal launch range shall complete the following:
(1) An agreement between the licensee and the local U.S. Coast
Guard district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to
Mariners prior to a launch or reentry and other measures as the Coast
Guard deems necessary to protect public health and safety; and
(2) An agreement between the licensee and the FAA regional office
having jurisdiction over the airspace through which a launch and
reentry will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a
Notice to Airmen prior to the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry
and for closing of air routes during the respective launch and reentry
windows and other measures deemed necessary by the FAA regional office
in order protect public health and safety.
Sec. 431.77 Records.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, a
licensee shall maintain for 3 years all records, data, and other
material necessary to verify that a licensed RLV mission is conducted
in accordance with representations contained in the licensee's
application.
(b) In the event of a launch accident, reentry accident, launch
incident or reentry incident, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter,
a licensee shall preserve all records related to the event. Records
must be retained until completion of any Federal investigation and the
FAA advises the licensee that the records need not be retained. The
licensee shall make all records required to be maintained under the
regulations available to Federal officials for inspection and copying.
Sec. 431.79 Reusable launch vehicle mission reporting requirements.
(a) Not less than 60 days before each RLV mission conducted under a
license, a licensee shall provide the FAA with the following
information:
(1) Payload information in accordance with Sec. 431.57 of this
part; and
(2) Flight information, including the vehicle, launch site, planned
launch and reentry flight path, and intended landing sites including
contingency abort sites.
(3) Launch or reentry waivers, approved or pending, from a federal
range for which the launch or reentry will take place, that are unique
and may affect public safety.
(b) Not later than 15 days before each licensed RLV mission, a
licensee must notify the FAA, in writing, of the time and date of the
intended launch and reentry or other landing on Earth of the RLV.
(c) A licensee must report a launch accident, launch incident,
reentry accident, reentry incident, or other mishap immediately to the
FAA Operations Center and provide a written preliminary report in the
event of a launch accident, launch incident, reentry accident, or
reentry incident, in accordance with the mishap investigation and
emergency response plan submitted as part of its license application
under Sec. 431.45 of this part.
Sec. 431.81 Financial responsibility requirements.
A licensee under this part must comply with financial
responsibility requirements specified in its license.
Sec. 431.83 Compliance monitoring.
A licensee shall allow access by, and cooperate with, federal
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to
observe any activities of the licensee, or of the licensee's
contractors or subcontractors, associated with the conduct of a
licensed RLV mission.
Sec. 431.85 Registration of space objects.
(a) To assist the U.S. Government in implementing Article IV of the
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
each licensee shall provide to the FAA the information required by
paragraph (b) of this section for all objects placed in space by a
licensed RLV mission, including an RLV and any components, except:
(1) Any object owned and registered by the U.S. Government; and
(2) Any object owned by a foreign entity.
(b) For each object that must be registered in accordance with this
[[Page 19664]]
section, a licensee shall submit the following information not later
than thirty (30) days following the conduct of a licensed RLV mission :
(1) The international designator of the space object(s);
(2) Date and location of the RLV mission initiation;
(3) General function of the space object; and (4) Final orbital
parameters, including:
(i) Nodal period;
(ii) Inclination;
(iii) Apogee; and
(iv) Perigee.
(c) A licensee shall notify the FAA when it removes an object that
it has previously placed in space.
Secs. 431.86-431.90 [Reserved]
Subpart F--Environmental Review
Sec. 431.91 General.
An applicant shall provide the FAA with sufficient information to
analyze the environmental impacts associated with proposed operation of
an RLV, including the impacts of anticipated activities to be performed
at its reentry site. The information provided by an applicant must be
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 CFR parts 1500-
1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts,
FAA Order 1050.1D. This incorporation by reference was approved by the
Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and
1 CFR part 51. Copies of FAA Order 1050.1D may be obtained from the
Office of Environment and Energy, AEE-300, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591,
(202) 267-3553. Copies of FAA Order 1050.1D may be inspected in the
Rules Docket at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the
Chief Counsel, AGC-200, Room 915G, 800 Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20591 weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., or at
the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., Suite
700, Washington, DC 20001.
Sec. 431.93 Environmental information.
An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning--
(a) A designated reentry site, including contingency abort
locations, if any, not covered by existing FAA environmental
documentation;
(b) A proposed new RLV with characteristics falling measurably
outside the parameters of existing environmental documentation;
(c) A proposed reentry to an established reentry site involving an
RLV with characteristics falling measurably outside the parameters of
existing environmental impact statements covering that site;
(d) A proposed payload that may have significant environmental
impacts in the event of a reentry accident; and
(e) Other factors as necessary to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act.
19. Part 433 is added to read as follows:
PART 433--LICENSE TO OPERATE A REENTRY SITE
Subpart A--General
Sec.
433.1 General.
433.3 Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site.
433.5 Operational restrictions on a reentry site.
433.7 Environmental.
433.9 Environmental information.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121
Sec. 433.1 General.
The FAA evaluates on an individual basis an applicant's proposal to
operate a reentry site.
Sec. 433.3 Issuance of a license to operate a reentry site.
(a) The FAA issues a license to operate a reentry site when it
determines that an applicant's operation of the reentry site does not
jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national
security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of
the United States.
(b) A license to operate a reentry site authorizes a licensee to
operate a reentry site in accordance with the representations contained
in the licensee's application, subject to the licensee's compliance
with terms and conditions contained in any license order accompanying
the license.
Sec. 433.5 Operational restrictions on a reentry site.
A license to operate a reentry site authorizes the licensee to
offer use of the site to support reentry of a reentry vehicle for which
the three-sigma footprint of the vehicle upon reentry is wholly
contained within the site.
Sec. 433.7 Environmental.
An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA to
analyze the environmental impacts associated with proposed operation of
a reentry site. The information provided by an applicant must be
sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's
Procedures for Consideration Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D.
Sec. 433.9 Environmental information.
An applicant shall submit environmental information concerning a
proposed reentry site not covered by existing environmental
documentation for purposes of assessing reentry impacts.
20. Part 435 is added to read as follows:
PART 435--REENTRY OF A REENTRY VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE LAUNCH
VEHICLE (RLV)
Subpart A--General
Sec.
435.1 Scope.
435.3 Types of reentry licenses.
435.5 Policy and safety approvals.
435.7 Payload reentry determinations.
435.9 Issuance of a reentry license.
435.11 Additional license terms and conditions.
435.13 Transfer of a reentry license.
435.15 Rights not conferred by reentry license.
435.16-435.20 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle
435.21 General.
435.23 Policy review requirements and procedures.
435.24-435.30 [Reserved]
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle
435.31 General.
435.33 Safety review requirements and procedures.
435.35 Acceptable reentry risk for reentry of a reentry vehicle.
435.36-435.40 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
435.41 General.
435.43 Payload reentry review requirements and procedures.
435.44-435.50 [Reserved]
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and
Conditions
435.51 General.
435.52-435.60 [Reserved]
Subpart F--Environmental Review
435.61 General.
435.62-435.70 [Reserved]
[[Page 19665]]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70119.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 435.1 Scope.
This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a license to
reenter a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV),
and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee must comply to
remain licensed. Requirements for preparing a license application are
contained in part 413 of this subchapter.
Sec. 435.3 Types of reentry licenses.
(a) Reentry-specific license. A reentry-specific license authorizes
a licensee to reenter one model or type of reentry vehicle, other than
an RLV, to a reentry site. A reentry-specific license may authorize
more than one reentry and identifies each reentry authorized under the
license. A licensee's authorization to reenter terminates upon
completion of all activities authorized by the license or the
expiration date stated in the reentry license, whichever occurs first.
(b) Reentry operator license. A reentry operator license authorizes
a licensee to reenter any of a designated family of reentry vehicles,
other than an RLV, within authorized parameters, including
trajectories, transporting specified classes of payloads to any reentry
site designated in the license. A reentry operator license is valid for
a 2-year renewable term.
Sec. 435.5 Policy and safety approvals.
To obtain a reentry license, an applicant must obtain policy and
safety approvals from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining these
approvals are contained in subparts B and C of this part. Only a
reentry license applicant may apply for the approvals, and may apply
for either approval separately and in advance of submitting a complete
license application, using the application procedures contained in part
413 of this subchapter.
Sec. 435.7 Payload reentry determinations.
(a) A payload reentry determination is required to transport a
payload to Earth on a reentry vehicle unless the proposed payload is
exempt from payload review.
(b) A payload reentry determination made under a previous license
application under this subchapter may satisfy the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) The FAA conducts a review, as described in subpart D of this
part, to make a payload reentry determination. Either a reentry license
applicant or a payload owner or operator may request a review of the
proposed payload using the application procedures contained in part 413
of this subchapter. Upon receipt of an application, the FAA may conduct
a payload reentry review independently of a reentry license
application.
Sec. 435.9 Issuance of a reentry license.
(a) The FAA issues a reentry license to an applicant who has
obtained all approvals and determinations required under this chapter
for a reentry license.
(b) A reentry license authorizes a licensee to reenter a reentry
vehicle and payload, if any, in accordance with the representations
contained in the reentry licensee's application, subject to the
licensee's compliance with terms and conditions contained in license
orders accompanying the reentry license, including financial
responsibility requirements.
Sec. 435.11 Additional license terms and conditions.
The FAA may amend a reentry license at any time by modifying or
adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance with 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, chapter 701, and applicable regulations.
Sec. 435.13 Transfer of a reentry license.
(a) Only the FAA may transfer a reentry license.
(b) An applicant for transfer of a reentry license shall submit a
reentry license application in accordance with part 413 of this
subchapter and satisfy the applicable requirements of this part. The
FAA will transfer a reentry license to an applicant who has obtained
all of the approvals and determinations required under this chapter for
a reentry license. In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and
determinations, the FAA may incorporate any findings made part of the
record to support the initial licensing determination. The FAA may
modify a reentry license to reflect any changes necessary as a result
of a reentry license transfer.
Sec. 435.15 Rights not conferred by reentry license.
Issuance of a reentry license does not relieve a licensee of its
obligation to comply with requirements of law that may apply to its
activities.
Secs. 435.16-431.20 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Policy Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry
Vehicle
Sec. 435.21 General.
The FAA issues a policy approval to a reentry license applicant
upon completion of a favorable policy review. A policy approval is part
of the licensing record on which the licensing determination is based.
Sec. 435.23 Policy review requirements and procedures.
Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, regulations applicable
to policy review and approval of the reentry of an RLV contained in
part 431, subpart B of this subchapter shall apply to the policy review
conducted for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.
Secs. 435.24-435.30 [Reserved]
Subpart C--Safety Review and Approval for Reentry of a Reentry
Vehicle
Sec. 435.31 General.
The FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether an applicant
is capable of reentering a reentry vehicle and payload, if any, to a
designated reentry site without jeopardizing public health and safety
and the safety of property. A safety approval is part of the licensing
record on which the licensing determination is based.
Sec. 435.33 Safety review requirements and procedures.
Unless otherwise stated in this subpart, regulations applicable to
safety review and approval of the reentry of an RLV contained in part
431, subpart C of this subchapter shall apply to the policy review
conducted for a license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.
Sec. 435.35 Acceptable reentry risk for reentry of a reentry vehicle.
To obtain safety approval reentry, an applicant must demonstrate
that risk for the proposed reentry, when assessed in combination with
launch of the reentry vehicle, does not exceed acceptable risk for the
conduct of an RLV mission as defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Sec. 431.35 of this subchapter.
Secs. 435.36-435.40 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Payload Reentry Review and Determination
Sec. 435.41 General.
The FAA conducts a payload reentry review to examine the policy and
safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload, except a
U.S. Government payload, to determine whether the FAA will approve the
reentry of the payload.
Sec. 435.43 Payload reentry review requirements and procedures.
Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, regulations contained
in part 431, subpart B of this subchapter applicable to a payload
reentry review and determination for reentering a payload using an RLV
shall apply to the payload reentry review conducted for a
[[Page 19666]]
license to reenter a reentry vehicle under this part.
Secs. 435.44-435.50 [Reserved]
Subpart E--Post-Licensing Requirements--Reentry License Terms and
Conditions
Sec. 435.51 General.
Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, post-licensing
requirements contained in part 431 subpart E of this subchapter
applicable to a license to reenter an RLV shall apply to a license
issued under this part.
Secs. 435.52-435.60 [Reserved]
Subpart F--Environmental Review
Sec. 435.61 General.
Unless otherwise indicated in this subpart, environmental review
requirements contained in part 431 subpart F, applicable to a license
to reenter an RLV shall apply to an application for a reentry license
under this part.
Secs. 435.62-435.70 [Reserved]
Issued in Washington, DC, on April 13, 1999.
Patricia Grace Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 99-9640 Filed 4-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P