Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 25.571(b) and 25.671(c)(1).

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To allow the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, now a wholly owned subsidiary of The Boeing Company, three years to analyze, redesign, and retrofit, as necessary, the flap system on the Model 717–200 airplane, in order to show compliance with the subject regulations.

GRANT, 8/20/99, Exemption No. 6951.

Docket No.: 29619.

Petitioner: Helicopter Experts, Inc.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.143(c)(2).

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit HEI to operate certain aircraft under part 135 without a TSO–C112 (Mode S) transponder installed in each aircraft.

GRANT, 7/30/99, Exemption No. 6933.

Docket No.: 29621.

Petitioner: Ravenaire Aviation Services.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit RAS to conduct sightseeing rides at Genesee County Airport for a pancake breakfast on July 18, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with the drug testing and alcohol abuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 7/15/99, Exemption No. 6923.

Docket No.: 29627.

Petitioner: Canton Airport Board.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 1135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit CAB to conduct local sightseeing rides at Ellingson Field, Canton, South Dakota, for the annual Canton Car Show on July 25, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with the drug testing and alcohol abuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 7/15/99, Exemption No. 6924.

Docket No.: 29637.

Petitioner: South Haven Area Regional Airport Authority.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit SHARAA to conduct sightseeing rides at South Haven Area Regional Airport for an annual, charity fly-in breakfast on August 15, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with the drug testing and alcohol abuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 8/10/99, Exemption No. 6937.

Docket No.: 29646.

Petitioner: CREST–AERO.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit CREST–AERO to conduct sightseeing rides at Crest Airpark, during the annual fundraising event, ''Covington Days,'' on July 17 and 18, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with certain anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 7/15/99, Exemption No. 6925.

Docket No.: 29653.

Petitioner: Punxsutawney Municipal Airport Authority.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit PMAA to conduct local sightseeing rides at Punxsutawney Municipal Airport for its airport awareness days on July 24 and 25, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with certain anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 7/21/99, Exemption No. 6927.

Docket No.: 29679.

Petitioner: Historical Aviation Organization of Logan County.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit HAOLC to conduct local sightseeing rides Bellefontaine Municipal Airport, for ''Airfest 99'' on August 7 and 8, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with certain anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 8/5/99, Exemption No. 6936.

Docket No.: 29699.

Petitioner: Skyfest Michiana and Goshen Air Center.

Section of the FAR Affected: 14 CFR 135.251, 135.255, 135.353, appendices I & J of part 121.

Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition: To permit GAC to conduct local sightseeing rides at Goshen Municipal Airport, for the Goshen Air Show hosted by Skyfest Michiana, August 13, 14 and 15, 1999, for compensation or hire, without complying with certain anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention requirements of part 135.

GRANT, 8/13/99, Exemption No. 6939.

Petition for Exemption

Docket No.: 29583.

Petitioner: Dassault Aviation.

Regulations Affected: 25.785(b).

Description of Petition: Relief is requested to allow installation of one or more side-facing divans on Falcon Model 2000 airplanes.

[FR Doc. 99–23393 Filed 9–8–99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Policy Statement Number ANM–99–1]

Improving Flightcrew Awareness During Autopilot Operation

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of policy statement; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document announces an FAA proposed general statement of policy applicable to the type certification of transport category airplanes. This document advises the public, in particular manufacturers of transport category airplanes and automatic flight control (autopilot) systems, that FAA, when certifying automatic pilot installations, intends to evaluate various items that will improve the flightcrew's awareness during autopilot operation. This notice is necessary to advise the public of FAA policy and give all interested persons an opportunity to present their views on the policy statement.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 12, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Send all comments on this policy statement to the individual identified under **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.**

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dale Dunford, Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Transport Standards Staff, Airplane & Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2239; fax (425) 227–1100; e-mail: Dale.Dunford@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to comment on this policy statement by submitting such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire. Commenters should identify the Policy Statement Number of this policy statement, and submit comments, in duplicate, to the address specified above. The Transport Airplane Directorate will consider all communications received on or before the closing date for comments.

Background

Recent incidents and accidents that have occurred worldwide involving pilot/autopilot interactions have emphasized to the FAA the need to reexamine the current certification policy relative to autopilot issues.

In 1991, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) began an investigation as a result of an incident involving a transport category airplane that experienced an inflight upset. When the airplane was in cruise at flight level 310, the flightcrew noted that the inertial navigation system ''FAIL'' lights had illuminated. When the flightcrew crosschecked the instrument panel, they determined that the airplane was in a steep right-wing-down banking angle. The flight lost approximately 10,000 feet of altitude and the airplane approached supersonic speeds before recovery could be completed. The airplane eventually made a successful landing, and there were no injuries.

Investigation of the incident revealed, among other things, that a failure in the autopilot system could cause an airplane to slowly roll into a banking attitude. The roll rate induced from such a failure of the autopilot system may be barely perceptible to the flightcrew; it also may be difficult to detect without external visual attitude references or continuous close monitoring of the flight attitude instruments.

The NTSB has advised the FAA of its concern that some autopilot failures can result in changes in attitude at rates that may be imperceptible to the flightcrews, and thus remain undetected until the airplane reaches significant attitude deviations.

FAA Evaluation of Flight Crew/Flight Deck Automation Interfaces

In 1994, the FAA launched an in-depth study to evaluate all flightcrew/flight deck automation interfaces of current generation transport category airplanes. The FAA charted a Human Factor Team to conduct the study. Team members included experts from the FAA, the European Joint Airworthiness Authorities (JAA), and academia. The objective of the study was to look beyond the label of ''flightcrew error,'' and investigate the contributing factors from the perspective of design, flightcrew training/qualifications, operations, and regulatory processes. The team also was tasked to develop recommendations to address any problems identified.

With regard to autopilot issues, the Team identified several specific problematic issues, including:

- Pilot/autopilot interactions that create hazardous out-of-trim conditions;
- Autopilots that can produce hazardous speed conditions and may attempt maneuvers that would not normally be expected by a pilot; and
- Insufficient wording in the Airplane Flight Manual regarding the capabilities and limitations of the autopilot.

Regulatory Initiatives

The FAA has acknowledged the autopilot issues raised by both the NTSB and the Human Factor Team, and has taken steps to address them. For example, the FAA has tasked a new Aviation Regulation Advisory Committee (ARAC) working group to review and propose harmonized revisions to the following three conditions:

- *14 CFR 25.1329* (''Automatic Pilot System''), which contains FAA's standard for certifying automatic pilot systems on transport category airplanes;
- *Advisory Circular (AC) 25–1329–1A* (''Automatic Pilot System Approval''), dated July 8, 1968, which describes an acceptable means by which compliance with the automatic pilot installation requirements of § 25.1329 may be shown; and
- *14 CFR 25.1335* (''Flight Director Systems''), which contains FAA's standards for certifying flight director systems on transport category airplanes.

The work of this ARAC working group, known as the Flight Guidance Systems Harmonization Working Group (FGSHWG), currently is in progress.

Current Certification Standards

In general, automatic pilot systems on transport category airplanes traditionally have been certified in accordance with § 25.1329 on the basis that they are conveniences to reduce flightcrew workload, and that they do not relieve the flightcrew of any responsibility for assuring proper flight path management. As a result, the autopilot evaluation criteria contained in AC 25.1329–1A, are primarily concerned with the effects of autopilot failures on the airplane. The most recent revision to AC 25–7A, ''Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes,'' also defines some evaluation criteria for determining whether the autopilot is performing its intended function of relieving the flightcrew of some of their control functions.

Accordingly, even when the flightcrew is not manually performing a specific flight path control function, the FAA expected the flightcrew to be ''aware'' when this function is not being performed safely, and to take appropriate and timely corrective action. The installation certification guidelines presented in AC 25.1329–1A, for example, state ''* * * at least one pilot (should) monitor the behavior of the airplane and associated autopilot performance at all times.''

In certifying all autopilot systems to date, the FAA has accepted the premise that the capability for this flightcrew ''awareness'' comes from either:

- Adherence to operational training and/or procedures,
- A dedicated failure detection and annunciation feature on the flight deck; or
- Inherent aircraft operational cues (e.g., a perceived change of aircraft attitude or change of engine noise).

As evidenced by recent relevant accident and incident cases, one cannot assume that the flightcrew will reliably detect and accommodate adverse autopilot behavior solely from inherent operational cues; other cues are needed.

Inherent operational cues can be insufficient because:

1. During normal autopilot operations, the flightcrew may not be able to detect operational cues related to significant changes in aerodynamic characteristics, such as drag and controllability, as effectively as during manual operation. One specific example of this is the change of control response or ''feel'' during low speed operations as ice accumulates on the airplane surfaces, gradually and imperceptibly reducing control authority. This condition can progress, intangible to the flightcrew, until the autopilot exhausts its control authority and automatically disengages. The flightcrew then is suddenly required to take manual control of the airplane, which (1) is not in proper trim, (2) is at a low margin-to-stall, and (3) has significantly degraded aerodynamic performance.

2. As pointed out by the NTSB, and acknowledged by the FAA, some autopilot failures can result in changes in attitude at rates that may be imperceptible to the flightcrew, and thus remain undetected until the airplane reaches significant attitude deviations.

Neither the certification standards nor the relevant advisory material currently contain actions or detailed guidance to address these types of scenarios. In light

of this, the FAA finds it necessary and appropriate to provide additional guidelines for the provision of design features needed to enable flightcrew control and awareness of the unintended changes of speed and attitude during the operation of the autopilot system. This information, presented here in the form of a general statement of policy, clarifies, details, and formally states items that the FAA:

- Assumes concerning the flightcrew's awareness capability;
- Employs or accepts on an on-going basis in making compliance findings relative to autopilot systems; and
- Considers frequently in the development of a means to prevent recurrences of the accident/incident scenarios described previously, or to enable an appropriate and timely response to other situations that could result in similar circumstances.

Effect of General Statement of Policy

Much of the information presented has been developed from service experience garnered and flightcrew conventions practices throughout the years since the guidance contained in AC 25.1329–1A was published in 1968. The FAA has assembled this information and is presenting it in this general statement of policy as a set of ''guidelines'' that are appropriate for use with § 25.1329 for autopilot certification.

Additionally, as discussed previously, actions currently are underway to revise the applicable airworthiness standards (§ 25.1329) and associated advisory material (AC 25.1329–1A) to more fully address the autopilot system and other flight deck issues. Until then, the guidance provided in this general statement of policy would serve as a reference to assist in the certification of new autopilot systems.

However, the general policy stated in this document is not intended to establish a binding norm; it does not constitute a new regulation and the FAA would not apply or rely upon it as a regulation. The FAA Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) that certify transport category airplanes and/or the automatic pilot systems installed on them should generally attempt to follow this policy, when appropriate. However, in determining compliance with certification standards, each ACO has the discretion not to apply these guidelines where it determines that they are inappropriate. The ACO should coordinate with the Transport Airplane Directorate, for purposes of standardization, whenever the ACO determines that some deviation from this policy is appropriate. Applicants should expect that the certificating officials would consider this information when making findings of compliance relevant to new certificate actions. Applicants also may consider the material contained in this proposed policy statement as supplemental to that currently contained in AC 25.1329–1A when developing a means of compliance with the relevant certification standards.

Also, as with all advisory material, this statement of policy identifies one means, but not the only means, of compliance.

Because this proposed general statement of policy only announces what the FAA seeks to establish as policy, the FAA considers it to be an issue for which public comment is appropriate. Therefore, the FAA requests comment on the following proposed general statement of policy relevant to certification standards for autopilot systems.

For the convenience of the reader, this proposed general statement of policy has been formatted in outline form.

General Statement of Policy

1. General

1.a. Operational experience has shown that flightcrews may not have adequate awareness of potentially hazardous aircraft states or adequate capability to anticipate sudden, unexpected actions of the autopilot. In this regard, the autopilot design should take into consideration conditions that could create hazardous deviations in the flight path, specifically:

- Conditions that could make continued autopilot operation unsafe, or
- Conditions that could cause manual control of an upset following autopilot disengagement to require exceptional piloting skill or alertness. (Refer to 14 CFR § 25.1329(f), ''Automatic Pilot System''.)

Note that automatic disengagement may not be the safest autopilot response for all cases, particularly with trim conditions that could lead to a significant upset.

1.b. If automatic functions are provided that may be used with the autopilot (e.g., automatic thrust control or yaw damper), and use of the autopilot is permitted with any of these functions inoperative, then the design of the autopilot should comply with the provisions of this general policy statement and Advisory Circular 25.1329–1A, ''Automatic Pilot Systems Aproval'' with these functions operative and inoperative.

1.c. The auto pilot should perform its intended function in all configurations in which it may be used throughout all appropriate maneuvers and environmental conditions, including turbulence and icing, unless an appropriate operating limitations or statement is included in the Airplane Flight Manual.

2. Definitions

2.a. The term *autopilot* is synonymous with the term *automatic pilot.* The term autopilot includes the sensors, computers, power supplies, servo-motors, servo-actuators, and associated wiring necessary for its function. It includes any displays and controls necessary for the pilot to manage and supervise the system.

2.b. The term *autothrust* is synonymous with the term *autothrottle* or *automatic throttle control.*

2.c. The term *hazardous flight path deviations* includes deviations from the intended flight path that may lead to a hazardous state, aircraft attitude and attitude rates that will place the airplane in a hazardous state, and extreme high and low energy conditions that place the airplane in a hazardous state.

2.d. The term *extemely improbable* is defined as the average probability per flight hour of the occurrence of an event (e.g., a failure condition) which is on the order of 1×10^{-9} or less. Catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbably (ref. § 25.1309(b)(1)).

2.e. The term *warning* is defined as an indication for a hazard requiring immediate corrective action by the flightcrew.

2.f. The term *caution* is defined as an indication for an event requiring immediate crew awarness and possibly requiring subsequent timely corrective crew action.

3. Design, Installation, and Maintenance

3.a. The autopilot system design should not possess characteristics, in normal operation or when failed, that would degrade safety or lead to an unsafe condition, unless such failures can be limited by design or the effects can be limited and mitigated by the pilot response within a reasonable time. The allowable probability of any failure should be based on its safety effects in accordance with the requirement of § 25.1309.

3.b. Adequate precautions should be taken in the design process, and adequate procedures should be specified in the maintenance manual, to prevent the incorrect installation, connection, or adjustment of parts of the autopilot if such errors would create a hazard to the airplane (e.g., torque clutches or limit switches with a range

of adjustment such that maladjustment could be hazardous).

3.c. The autopilot should be designed and installed so that the tolerances demonstrated during certifcation tests can be maintained in service.

4. System Response

4.a. The autopilot should not cause nuisance oscillations, undue control activity, or sudden large attitude changes, especially, when configuration or power changes are taking place. All maneuvers should be accomplished smoothly, accurately, and in a manner similar to normal pilot control.

4.b. The autopilot should not command a maneuver resulting in an unsafe attitude such that the pilot, without using exceptional skill or strength, cannot safely take over control of the airplane.

4.c. The engagement of the autopilot should be transient-free in both steady and dynamic conditions.

4.d. Except for failure conditions that are shown to be extremely improbable, the pilot should be able to disengage the autopilot at any time without unacceptable out-of-trim forces. Forces on the manual controls, that result from an out-of-trim condition occurring after autopilot disconnect, are considered unacceptable if the sudden application of these forces:

- Require exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength; and
- Risk exceeding the airplane limit loads.

These forces should be less than the maximum one-hand force limits specified in § 25.143(c) (''Controllability and maneuverability, General'').

4.e. Any automatic system disengagement of the autopilot should not result in an unsafe attitude, attitude-rate, or energy condition such that the pilot, without using exceptional skill or strength, cannot safely take over control of the airplane.

4.f. Transients occurring during autopilot disengagement in normal conditions, including operations at the boundaries of the normal operational parameters, should not cause unacceptable airplane responses. An airplane response is unacceptable if the flightcrew cannot return the airplane to its normal flight condition under full manual control:

- Without exceeding the loads or speed limits appropriate to the flight condition,
- Without engaging in any dangerous maneuver during recovery, and
- Without forces greater than those given in § 25.143(c).

5. Controls, Displays, and Alerting

5.a. Unless the probability of failure of the quick-disconnect button on the control wheel, or equivalent, is shown to be extremely improbable, an alternative means of disengagement, that is readily accessible in flight, should be provided.

5.b. The controls, displays, and alerts should be designated to minimize crew errors.

5.c. Mode, state, status, and malfunction indications should be presented in a manner compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flightcrew. The indications should be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible from each pilot's station under all expected lighting conditions.

5.d. *Autopilot Disconnect Warning*:

5.d.(1) Disengagement of the autopilot, whether intended by the pilot or not, should trigger both an aural and visual warning during any phase of flight, since immediate pilot action is required.

5.d.(2) The aural alert associated with the autopilot disconnect should be unique and distinct. The aural alert should be cancelable by the pilot pushing the quick-disconnect button on the control wheel or stick. The aural alert should sound until canceled by the pilot, except that a minimum cycle should sound. If the autopilot is disengaged by means of the quick-disconnect button, then an additional push of this button should be required to cancel the aural alert.

5.e. An aural alert and visual caution should be provided to the flightcrew for conditions that:

- Could make continued autopilot operation unsafe, or
- Could cause the manual control of an upset following autopilot disengagment to require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.

5.e.(1) The flightcrew alert should be generated before the conditions lead to an automatic disconnect, unsafe attitude, or stall warning.

5.e.(2) Whenever possible, the alert should provide the flightcrew enough time to be prepared with hands of the controls and to take appropriate corrective action (e.g., change thrust, set trim, disconnect autopilot).

5.e.(3) The thresholds for triggering the flightcrew alert should be designed carefully, with consideration for undue distraction (e.g., nuisance alerts) and potential ''rippling'' of multiple alerts triggered by the same or related conditions, which could mask or override the sounding of this alert.

5.e.(4) Conditions that should be considered for the flightcrew alert, and possibly automatic disengagement, include, but are not limited to:

- Limits of autopilot control authority;
- Out-of-trim;
- Excessive trim rates;
- Airspeeds greater than those intended for autopilot operations;
- Low speeds, (less than 1.2 V_{S1} for the current flap configuration, but greater than 1.07 V_S); and
- Bank and pitch angles beyond those intended for autopilot operation.

5.f. The means provided to comply with § 25.1329(h) (mode indications when coupled with airborne navigation equipment) should also give an appropriate indication when:

5.f.(1) The autopilot cannot engage the mode selected by the flightcrew; and

5.f.(2) The system automatically makes a mode change or mode disengagement that is considered operationally significant and, perhaps, unexpected. (For example, a change from altitude capture to altitude hold is significant, but expected; while a change from vertical path mode to vertical speed mode is both operationally significant and unexpected.)

5.g. If the autopilot has envelope limiting or protection capability, the system should trigger an alert to indicate to the pilots when envelope limiting or protection is invoked.

6. Engagement

If a flight director is available and active, the autopilot should engage in the same models as the flight director and provide consistent flight path guidance.

7. Airplane Flight Manual

Operating procedures for use with the autopilot should be established (see § 25.1585 (''Operating Procedures'')) and documented. In this regard, the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) should:

7.a. Identify conditions under which the autopilot will or will not engage, will disengage, or will revert to another mode. These conditions should include, but not be limited to:

7.a.(1) engagement above and below design speeds,

7.a.(2) engagement in a specific mode versus speed,

7.a.(3) engagement in a specific configuration versus speed,

7.a.(4) engagement in a specific configuration versus speed,

7.a.(5) engagement asymmetric configuration,

7.a.(6) engagement with asymmetric thrust,

7.a.(7) disengagement due to excessive low and high energy conditions, and

7.a.(8) disengagement due to forces applied to the control wheel or stick by the pilot.

7.b. Define the circumstances in which the autopilot should be engaged, disengaged, or used in a mode with greater or lesser authority.

7.c. Identify appropriate combinations of autopilot and manual/autothrust usage.

7.d Identify inappropriate combinations of autopilot and manual/autothrust usage.

7.e. Define the characteristics and principles of the autopilot design that have operational safety considerations.

7.f. Identify all prohibitions in the use of the autopilot regarding:

7.f.(1) loss or degradation of equipment,

7.f.(2) specific phases of flight,

7.f.(3) specific environmental conditions (e.g., icing, turbulence), and

7.f.(4) specific operational conditions (e.g., low or high speed, extreme attitudes).

7.g. Identify all limitations in the use of the autopilot regarding:

7.g.(1) loss or degradation of equipment,

7.f.(2) specific phases of flight,

7.f.(3) specific environmental conditions (e.g., icing, turbulence), and

7.f.(4) specific operational conditions (e.g., low or high speed, extreme attitudes), and

7.g.(5) unique indications of limiting conditions (e.g., unusual lateral trim or a ''RETRIM ROLL'' message due to icing conditions).

Conclusion

As discussed previously, the FAA intends to update 14 CFR 25.1329 and associated Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1329–1A to more fully address the autopilot issues found in this proposed general statement of policy and others. Until then, this general statement of policy, when finalized, will serve as a reference to supplement § 25.1329, and for use in the certification of new autopilot systems. Please inform the appropriate flight controls and systems designated engineering representatives (DER) of this proposed general statement of policy.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 30, 1999.

Dorenda D. Baker,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 99–23394 Filed 9–8–99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

Environmental Impact Statement: Dubuque County, Iowa/ Jo Daviess County, Illinois.

AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent (cancellation).

SUMMARY: The FHWA is issuing this notice to advise the public that the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposed highway capacity improvement project in Dubuque County, Iowa and Jo Daviess County, Illinois is cancelled. The NOI was originally published in the **Federal Register** on December 11, 1998. The cancellation is based on a decision to complete an Environmental Assessment (EA) for this project.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebecca Hiatt, Environmental Coordinator, Federal Highway Administration, 105 Sixth Street, Ames, Iowa 50010–6337, Telephone (515) 233–7300. Roger Larsen, Project Manager, Iowa Department of Transportation, 800 Lincoln Way, Ames, Iowa 50010, Telephone (515) 239–1791.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Electronic Access

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Service at (202)512–1661. Internet users may reach the office of the **Federal Register**'s home page at: *http://www.nara.gov/fedreg* and the Government Printing Office's database at *http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara.*

Background

The NOI was originally published in the **Federal Register** on December 11, 1998 63FR68498. The cancelled EIS included alternatives located in a new corridor south of Dubuque and East Dubuque. Any alternative in this location would have significant environmental impacts. However, the study alternatives have been reduced to alignments following existing U.S. Route 20 (U.S. 20), and potentially significant environmental impacts have been avoided. Therefore, the Federal Highway Administration along with Federal and State resource agencies, has determined that an Environmental Assessment is the appropriate investigative process for this project. The FHWA, in cooperation with the Iowa Department of Transportation, will prepare an EA on a proposal to improve the capacity of U.S. 20 in Dubuque County, Iowa and Jo Daviess County, Illinois.

Comments or questions concerning this proposed action and EA should be directed to the FHWA or Iowa DOT at the addresses provided in the caption **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.**

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.205, Highway Planning and Construction. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities apply to this program.)

(Authority: 23 U.S.C. 315; 49 CFR 1.48)

Issued on: August 30, 1999.

Bobby W. Blackmon,

Division Administrator.

[FR Doc. 99–23405 Filed 9–8–99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA–99–5683; Notice 2]

Dan Hill & Associates, Inc.; Grant of Application for Renewal of Temporary Exemption From Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 224

For the reasons explained below, we are granting the application by Dan Hill & Associates, Inc. (''Dan Hill''), of Norman, Oklahoma, for a renewal of its existing temporary exemption from Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 224, *Rear Impact Protection.* As it did in applying for the existing exemption, Dan Hill asserts that compliance would cause substantial economic hardship and that it has tried in good faith to comply with the standard.

We published notice of receipt of the application in the **Federal Register** on May 19, 1999, and afforded an opportunity for comment 64 FR 27353). No comments were received.

We granted Dan Hill a 1-year temporary exemption from Standard No. 224 on January 26, 1998 (63 FR 3784). The exemption was to expire on February 1, 1999, but Dan Hill filed a timely application for renewal. Under 49 CFR 555.8(e), the timely filing of a renewal application had the effect of automatically extending the exemption until we make a decision on the application. The company has requested an extension of this exemption until February 1, 2001.

The information below is based on material from Dan Hill's original and renewal applications.