[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60275-60282]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28770]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A-588-804]
Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings
From Japan
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews:
antifriction bearings from Japan.
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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders
on ball bearings (``BBs''), cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs''), and
spherical plain bearings (``SPBs'') (collectively, antifriction
bearings) from Japan pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended (``the Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to
participate and an adequate response filed on behalf of a domestic
interested party and inadequate response from respondent interested
parties in each of these reviews, the Department conducted expedited
sunset reviews. As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that
revocation of the antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the
Final Result of Review section of this notice.
For Further Information Contact: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.
Effective Date: November 4, 1999.
Statute and Regulations
These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR 351(1998) in
general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies Regarding the Conduct of
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy
Bulletin'').
Scope
The products covered by these orders, antifriction bearings (other
than tapered roller bearings), mounted or unmounted, and parts thereof
(AFBs), constitute the following three types of subject merchandise:
Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof: These products include all AFBs
that employ balls as the roller element. Imports of these products are
classified under the following categories: antifriction balls, ball
bearings with integral shafts, ball bearings (including radial ball
bearings) and parts thereof, and housed or mounted ball bearing units
and parts thereof. Imports of these products are classified under the
following Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) subheadings: 3926.90.45,
4016.93.00, 4016.93.10, 4016.93.50, 6909.19.5010, 8431.20.00,
8431.39.0010, 8482.10.10, 8482.10.50, 8482.80.00, 8482.91.00,
8482.99.05, 8482.99.35, 8482.99.2580, 8482.99.6595, 8483.20.40,
8483.20.80, 8483.50.8040, 8483.50.90, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30,
8483.90.70, 8708.50.50, 8708.60.50, 8708.60.80, 8708.70.6060,
8708.70.8050, 8708.93.30, 8708.93.5000, 8708.93.6000, 8708.93.75,
8708.99.06, 8708.99.31, 8708.99.4960,
[[Page 60276]]
8708.99.50, 8708.99.5800, 8708.99.8080, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00,
8803.30.00, 8803.90.30, and 8803.90.90.
Cylindrical Roller Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts
Thereof: These products include all AFBs that employ cylindrical
rollers as the rolling element. Imports of these products are
classified under the following categories: antifriction rollers, all
cylindrical roller bearings (including split cylindrical roller
bearings) and parts thereof, housed or mounted cylindrical roller
bearing units and parts thereof. Imports of these products are
classified under the following HTS subheadings: 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00,
4016.93.10, 4016.93.50, 6909.19.5010, 8431.20.00, 8431.39.0010,
8482.40.00, 8482.50.00, 8482.80.00, 8482.91.00, 8482.99.25, 8482.99.35,
8482.99.6530, 8482.99.6560, 8482.99.70, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80,
8483.50.8040, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30, 8483.90.70, 8708.50.50,
8708.60.50, 8708.93.5000, 8708.99.4000, 8708.99.4960, 8708.99.50,
8708.99.8080, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00, 8803.30.00, 8803.90.30, and
8803.90.90.
Spherical Plain Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof:
These products include all spherical plain bearings that employ a
spherically shaped sliding element and include spherical plain rod
ends. Imports of these products are classified under the following HTS
subheadings: 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.10,
4016.93.50, 6909.50,10, 8483.30.80, 8483.90.30, 8485.90.00,
8708.93.5000, 8708.99.50, 8803.10.00, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00,
8803.30.00, and 8803.90.90.
The Department notes that the HTS subheadings are provided for
convenience and customs purposes. The written description of the scope
of this proceeding is dispositive. Furthermore, we note that the size
or precision grade of a bearing does not influence whether the bearing
is covered by the orders. These orders cover all the subject bearings
and parts thereof (inner race, outer race, cage, rollers, balls, seals,
shields, etc.) outlined above with certain limitations. With regard to
finished parts, all such parts are included in the scope of these
orders. For unfinished parts, such parts are included if (1) they have
been heat-treated, or (2) heat treatment is not required to be
performed on the part. Thus, the only unfinished parts that are not
covered by these orders are those that will be subject to heat
treatment after importation.
The ultimate application of a bearing also does not influence
whether the bearing is covered by the orders. Bearings designed for
highly specialized applications are not excluded. Any of the subject
bearings, regardless of whether they may ultimately be utilized in
aircraft, automobiles, or other equipment, are within the scopes of
these orders.1
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\1\ There have been a number of clarifications to the scopes of
these orders. For a complete listing, see Appendix A.
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History of the Orders
The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'')
determination of antifriction bearings from Japan on May 3,
1989.2 In this determination, the Department published the
following weighted-average dumping margins for these companies with
respect to BBs: 73.55 for Koyo; 106.61 for Minebea; 48.69 for Nachi;
42.99 for NSK; 21.36 for NTN; and 45.83 for all other producers and/or
exporters. The Department also published the following weighted-average
dumping margins for these companies with respect to CRBs: 51.21 for
Koyo; 4.00 for Nachi; 12.28 for NSK; 9.30 for NTN; and 25.80 for all
other producers and/or exporters. In addition, the Department published
the following weighted-average dumping margins for these companies with
respect to SPBs: 84.26 for Minebea; 92.00 for NTN; and 84.33 for all
other producers and/or exporters. Since that time, the Department has
conducted nine administrative reviews.3 With respect to duty
absorption, the Department issued duty absorption findings in the 1995-
1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews.4
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\2\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Japan, 54 FR 19101 (May 3, 1989).
\3\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value;
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Japan, 54 FR 19101 (May 3, 1989); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 56 FR
31754 (July 11, 1991); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR
32755 (June 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France; et al.; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360
(June 24, 1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14,
1992); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23,
1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and
Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July
26, 1993); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom;
Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 58 FR 42288 (August 9, 1993); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan;
Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 59 FR 9469 (February 28, 1994); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial
Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of
Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From Japan and Germany; Amendment to Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 60 FR 10967 (February 28,
1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof From Japan; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 65264 (December 19, 1995);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR
66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany, Italy, Japan, and
the United Kingdom: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 3003 (January 21, 1997); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 2081
(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Singapore; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 14391 (March 26, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan and the
United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 45795 (August 29, 1997); Antifriction
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the
United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United
Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews, 62 FR 61963 (November 20, 1997); Antifriction Bearings
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews,
63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
\4\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17,
1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64
FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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Background
On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the
antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Japan, pursuant to section 751(c)
of the Act. By April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section
[[Page 60277]]
351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset Regulation, we received notices of
intent to participate from the following: Link-Belt Bearing Division
(``Link-Belt''); The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and MPB
Corporation (``MPB''); Koyo Corporation of U.S.A.--Manufacturing
Division (``KCUM''); NTN Bearing Corporation of America (``NBCA''),
American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corporation (``ANBM'') and NTN-BCA
Corporation (``NTN-BCA'') (collectively (``NTN''); Roller Bearing
Company of America, Inc. (``RBC''); New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc.
(``NHBB''), and NSK Corporation. Each of these parties claimed status
as domestic interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic
producer, manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products
subject to these orders.5
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\5\ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs,
and SPBs. Link-Belt, MPB, and NTN filed with respect to BBs and
CRBs. KCUM and NSK filed with respect to BBs only.
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Within the deadline specified in the Sunset Regulations under
section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received
complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested
parties, with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, Koyo Seiko Corp.
Ltd., and Koyo Corporation of the U.S.A. (collectively ``Koyo'')
notified the Department that they would not file a substantive response
in the reviews of the AFB orders. Finally, we received a complete
substantive response on behalf of Nippon Pillow Block Manufacturing
Company Limited, Nippon Pillow Block Sales Company Limited, and FYH
Bearing Units USA, Inc. (collectively ``Nippon Pillow Block''). Nippon
Pillow Block asserts that it is a foreign manufacturer and exporter of
BBs and is, therefore, an interested party within the meaning of
section 771(9)(A) of the Act. We received rebuttal comments from
Torrington and MPB (collectively ``the companies'') and from NTN on May
12, 1999, within the deadline.
On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission
(``Commission'') that, on the basis of inadequate response from
respondent interested parties, we were conducting expedited sunset
reviews of these orders consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2).
(See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations
from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)
In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1,
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the
sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Japan are
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion
of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28,
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.6
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\6\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan,
et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination
In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department
conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the
antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty
order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall
provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail
if the order is revoked.
The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation
or recurrence of dumping, and magnitude of the margin are discussed
below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the
continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin
are addressed within the respective sections below.
Adequacy
As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to
conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our
determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK Corporation
also submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were
warranted. In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the
domestic interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in
favor of revocation of the orders. These parties also offered new
argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of the orders.
The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the
statutory provision that, if there is no domestic industry interest in
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46
(2nd Session)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy determinations
in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine whether to issue a
determination based on the facts available without further fact-
gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1), specifies that
the Department is to determine whether revocation of an order would be
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c)
specifies that the Department is to consider the weighted-average
dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews,
as well as the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the
period before and the period after the issuance of the order.
Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping
Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on
methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department
indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the
[[Page 60278]]
subject merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that
revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de
minimis levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that
given that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the
orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to
continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB also
assert that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because
dumping continued. Using pre-and post-order statistics for complete
unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only category for
which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they nonetheless
argue that post-order declines in import volume provide strong
additional support for a determination the dumping is likely to
continue or recur were the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington
and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to consider other factors,
such as sales below the cost of production. However, if the Department
were to consider other factors, it should acknowledge that, in each
review period, it has found that home market sales by Japanese
producers were below the cost of production, requiring that such sales
be disregarded for purposes of determining foreign market value or
normal value.
NHBB and NSK Corporation assert that revocation of the orders is
not likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB
bases its assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S.
domestic price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of
which foreign owners are a part. NSK Corporation appears to support its
assertion on the basis that the margin of dumping would be no higher
than the margin found in the most recent administrative review (i.e.,
2.30 percent). KCUM and NTN argue that revocation of the antidumping
duty orders would not be likely to have much of an effect on the U.S.
market, prices, or the industry, or would it result in no or minimal
impact upon the U.S. market. In addition, the respondent interested
party in the review of Bbs, Nippon Pillow Block, asserts that
revocation or the order would have minimal or de minimis effects on the
BB market in the United States and the operations of the domestic
producers. Further, Nippon Pillow Block argues that dumping would not
be likely to continue or resume, although it also suggests that, if the
order were revoked, the antidumping duty margin likely to prevail is
2.30 percent.
In their rebuttal comment, Torrington and MPB assert that the
Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its
consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic
producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From
Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800
(May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that
domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers
and exporters do not have a common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the
maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that
other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import
volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish ``good
cause'' to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews,
they have not done.
In its rebuttal comments, NTN argues that the factors discussed in
Torrington's, MPB's, and RBC's responses do not indicate that
revocation of the orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or
recurrence of dumping. NTN asserts that the inclusion by RBC of margins
from companies which do not currently ship to the United States and
which have not been the subject of recent reviews is distortive of the
current situation. Further, NTN asserts that the responses rely heavily
on duty absorption determinations that are the subject of litigation
before the Court of International Trade.
As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were
removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an
order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the
Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and
subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever
relevance the arguments of NHBB, NSK Corporation, KCUM, and NTN
concerning possible disincentives for producers and/or exporters to
dump in the U.S. market might have had is mooted by the evidence that
dumping continues and has continued over the lives of the orders.
In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above de minimis
continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given
that dumping has continued over the life of the orders, the Department
determines that dumping is likely to continue if the orders were
revoked. Because we have based this determination on the fact that
dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not addressed the
comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to ``good
cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other interested
parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.
Magnitude of the Margin
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,
consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department will normally
provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that
is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior or exporters
without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not
specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping
until after the order was issued, the Department wil normally provide a
margin based on the ``all others'' rate from the investigation. (See
section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this
policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where
appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (See
sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)
In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the
margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are the
dumping margins found for each company in the original investigation
(as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative
reviews), including margins based on best information available, except
where the most current margin, increased by the Department's duty
absorption determination, exceeds the original investigation margin.
With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins from the original
investigation are the margins likely to prevail were the order revoked.
NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the
orders were revoked are de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments
to undercut that investment by dumping. In
[[Page 60279]]
addition, NHBB argues that the Department should not report margins
from the original investigation, asserting that the SAA provides that,
in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently
calculated margin. NHBB also asserts that one such instance is where,
as in the AFB cases, dumping margins have declined over the lives of
the orders and imports have remained steady or increased. Finally, NHBB
argues that, in light of changes in the methodology used to calculate
antidumping duty margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of
margins calculated by the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair
and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Similarly, NSK Corporation argues that the margins likely to
prevail are de minimis. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, were
the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the average-to-
average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to the
transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews to
measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation
states that it believes any margin found would be below the two percent
de minimis level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues
that further that the Department's unorthodox approach during the
original investigation, plus the liberal use of best information
available, skewed the results of the original investigation seriously,
rendering those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of
the margin likely to prevail were the orders revoked. Finally, NSK
Corporation also argues that dumping margins have declined over time
with respect to importations of BBs while, at the same time,
importations have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market.
As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900,
Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26--14-31 (June 1995).
KCUM argues that it cannot predict the effect revocation would have
on the margins because the existence of the orders does not have much
of an effect on prices. Further, KCUM states that any likely margins
are dependent on an entirely exogenous factor, such as the fluctuation
in the exchange rate between the dollar and the Japanese yen. KCUM
asserts that the Department cannot rely on the margins from the
original investigation as (1) the final determinations were almost 10
years ago and thus are far too old to serve as realistic indicators,
and (2) Koyo's rate was based in large part on best information
available and thus is enormously inflated when compared to actual
margins from administrative reviews. KCUM argues that, therefore, the
Department must use the results of more recent administrative reviews
to determine the margins likely to prevail for Koyo.
NTN argues that, were the orders revoked, the dumping margins that
would likely prevail would be zero percent. In the alternative, NTN
requests that the Department employ margins that were determined during
the more recent administrative reviews.
Nippon Pillow Block argues that, in cases where imports have
increased and the magnitude of dumping has declined since the
imposition of the order, as is the case with respect to exports of BBs
by Nippon Pillow Block, consistent with the Sunset Policy Bulletin the
Department should find that a dumping margin no higher than the margin
found in the most recent review is likely to prevail. Therefore, Nippon
Pillow Block suggests that the magnitude of the margin likely to
prevail with respect to its exports if the order on BBs were revoked is
the 2.30 percent margin from the administrative review covering May 1,
1996, through April 30, 1997.
In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other
parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the
selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty
absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington
and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear--normal reliance
on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that reflect
the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order and
rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the
Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the two
percent de minimis standard is not applicable to sunset reviews.
Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize
or justify the rejection of the investigation rates on the basis of the
particular methodology used at the time of the investigation.
Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent
margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the
responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding
companies' relative market share. Since no such information was
provided, the Department should not accept these assertions. In fact,
imports of certain BBs have actually declined since the imposition of
the order.
In their rebuttal comments NTN asserts that the inclusion by RBC of
margins from companies which do not currently ship to the United States
and which have not been the subject of recent reviews is distortive of
the current situation. Further, NTN asserts that the responses rely
heavily on duty absorption determinations that are the subject of
litigation before the Court of International Trade.
We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration
of duty absorption determinations.
With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best
reflected by our dumping margins calculated in the original
investigations. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no
basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of
subsequent changes in methodology. Such changes do not invalidate
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order,
regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use
of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).
With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that
dumping margins have declined over the lives of the orders and imports
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence
to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of this sunset
proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. In
fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that imports of
the subject merchandise have decreased. Regardless of the level of
imports, dumping margins above de minimis levels continue as do imports
of the subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.
[[Page 60280]]
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we
will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter's behavior
absent the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the
company's relative market share, with such information to be provided
by the parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a
more recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of
exporters were the order revoked, the Department considers company-
specific exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although
we expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, the
Department relied on changes in import volumes between the periods
before and after the issuance of the order. See, e.g., Final Results of
Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658
(December 8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews:
Certain Iron Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the
People's Republic of China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).
In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission.
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping
coupled with increased market share.
In these reviews, only Nippon Pillow Block provided statistics
regarding its company-specific exports of BBs both prior to the
issuance of the order and for the most recent five years. We reviewed
the statistics provided and found that, although its export volume and
values fluctuated during the period 1994 through 1998, its exports
during 1996 were at an all-time high. Coinciding with this increase,
the Department calculated margins for Nippon Pillow Block of 7.87
percent for the May 1995 through April 1996 review and 2.30 percent for
the May 1996 through April 1997 review. Further, the Department
calculated a margin of 1.20 percent for Nippon Pillow Block during the
most recently completed review covering the period May 1997 through
April 1998. Given the correlation between increased exports and the
decreased margin in the 1996/97 administrative review, we agree with
Nippon Pillow Block that a more recently calculated margin may be an
appropriate indicator of the magnitude of margin likely to prevail were
the order revoked.
The SAA at 885 and the House Report at 60 provide, however, that
duty absorption is a strong indicator that the current dumping margins
calculated in reviews may not be indicative of the margins that would
exist in the absence of an order. Once an order is revoked, the
importer could achieve the same pre-revocation return on its sales by
lowering its prices in the United States in the amount of the duty that
was previously being absorbed. Therefore, in the Sunset Policy Bulletin
the Department indicated that it normally will determine that a
company's current dumping margin is not indicative of the margin likely
to prevail were the order revoked. Further, we indicated that we
normally will provide to the Commission the higher of the margin that
we would otherwise have reported to the Commission or the most recent
margin for that company adjusted to account for our findings on duty
absorption.
In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Sunset Policy
Bulletin requires that the Department report to the Commission the
higher of the margin from the original investigation or the margin from
a more recent administrative review adjusted to reflect duty absorption
findings. We do not agree. As noted above, the Sunset Policy Bulletin
provides that, where we have found duty absorption in an administrative
review initiated in 1998 (for transition orders such as these) we will
normally select the higher of the margin we would otherwise have
reported or the margin adjusted to account for duty absorption
findings. With respect to Nippon Pillow Block, as noted above, we would
otherwise report to the Commission the margin from the 1996/97
administrative review. The Department was not required to investigate
duty absorption during the 1996/97 administrative review; in the 1995/
96 and the 1997/98 administrative reviews, the Department found that
Nippon Pillow Block was absorbing duties on 55.46 and 9.75 percent of
its U.S. affiliate's sales, respectively. Because all of Nippon Pillow
Block's U.S. sales were constructed export price sales, total sales and
U.S. affiliate's sales are the same. Therefore, for purposes of
considering duty absorption, we relied on the level of duty absorption
found in the administrative review initiated in 1998. Consistent with
the methodology described in the Sunset Policy Bulletin and we used in
Preliminary Results of Sunset Review: Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware
from Mexico, 64 FR 46651 (August 26, 1999), and Final Results of
Expedited Sunset Review: Brass Sheet and Strip from Germany, 64 FR
49767 (September 14, 1999), we adjusted Nippon Pillow Block's margin
from the 1996/97 administrative review (the year corresponding to the
highest volume of imports) to account for duty absorption. Because the
result is higher than the rate we would otherwise report to the
Commission, we will report the adjusted rate.
With respect to all other producers/exporters of the subject
merchandise, as noted above, there is no evidence on the record to
indicate that the margin of dumping for any particular producer/
exporter decreased at the same time that it was increasing or
maintaining U.S. market share nor is there evidence on the record to
indicate corresponding increases in dumping margins and exports.
Therefore, we are relying on the margins from the original
investigations as probative of the behavior of producers/exporters
without the discipline of the orders.
Based on the above analysis, we will report to the Commission the
margins indicated in the Final Results of the Review section of this
notice.
Final Results of Review
As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation
of the antidumping orders would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:
[[Page 60281]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturers/Exporters (Percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ball Bearings:
Nippon Pillow Block.................................... 2.55
Koyo................................................... 73.55
Minebea................................................ 106.61
Nachi.................................................. 48.69
NSK.................................................... 42.99
NTN.................................................... 21.36
All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 45.83
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:
Koyo................................................... 51.21
Nachi.................................................. 4.00
NSK.................................................... 12.28
NTN.................................................... 9.30
All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 25.80
Spherical Plain Bearings:
Minebea................................................ 84.26
NTN.................................................... 92.00
All Other Producers/Exporters.......................... 84.33
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with section 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's
regulation. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials
or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure
to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is sanctionable
violation.
This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are published in
accordance with sections 751(c) 777(i)(1) of the Act.
Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
Appendix A
*The following includes clarifications to the scopes of the
Department's various antidumping duty orders on antifriction
bearings.
Scope Determinations Made in the Final Determinations of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value; Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, 54 FR
19006, 19019 (May 3, 1989):
Products covered:
Rod end bearings and parts thereof
AFBs used in aviation applications
Aerospace engine bearings
Split cylindrical roller bearings
Wheel hub units
Slewing rings and slewing bearings (slewing rings and
slewing bearings were subsequently excluded by the International
Trade Commission's negative injury determination (See International
Trade Commission: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof from the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand and the
United Kingdom, 54 FR 21488 (May 18, 1989))
Wave generator bearings
Bearings (including mounted or housed units and flanged
or enhanced bearings) ultimately utilized in textile machinery
Products excluded:
Plain bearings other than spherical plain bearings
Airframe components unrelated to the reduction of
friction
Linear motion devices
Split pillow block housings
Nuts, bolts, and sleeves that are not integral parts of
a bearing or attached to a bearing under review
Thermoplastic bearings
Stainless steel hollow balls
Textile machinery components that are substantially
advanced in function(s) or value
Wheel hub units imported as part of front and rear axle
assemblies; wheel hub units that include tapered roller bearings;
and clutch release bearings that are already assembled as parts of
transmissions
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1990, and June 30, 1990 (See
Scope Rulings, 55 FR 42750 (October 23, 1990))
Products excluded:
Antifriction bearings, including integral shaft ball
bearings, used in textile machinery and imported with attachments
and augmentations sufficient to advance their function beyond load-
bearing/friction-reducing capability
Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1990, and September 30, 1990
(See Scope Rulings, 55 FR 43020 (October 25, 1990))
Products covered:
Rod ends
Clutch release bearings
Ball bearings used in the manufacture of helicopters
Ball bearings used in the manufacture of disk drives
Scope Rulings Published in Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof; Final Results of Antidumping
Administrative Review (AFBs I), 56 FR 31692, 31696 (July 11, 1991)
Products covered:
Load rollers and thrust rollers, also called mast guide
bearings
Conveyor system trolley wheels and chain wheels
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1991, and June 30, 1991 (See
Notice of Scope Rulings, 56 FR 36774 (August 1, 1991))
Products excluded:
Textile machinery components including false twist
spindles, belt guide rollers, separator rollers, damping units,
rotor units, and tension pulleys
Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1991, and September 30, 1991
(See Scope Rulings, 56 FR 57320 (November 8, 1991)):
Products covered:
Snap rings and wire races
Bearings imported as spare parts
Custom-made specialty bearings
Products excluded:
Certain rotor assembly textile machinery components
Linear motion bearings
Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1991, and December 31, 1991
(See Notice of Scope Rulings, 57 FR 4597 (February 6, 1992))
Products covered:
Chain sheaves (forklift truck mast components)
Loose boss rollers used in textile drafting machinery,
also called top rollers
Certain engine main shaft pilot bearings and engine
crank shaft bearings
Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1992, and March 31, 1992
(See Scope Rulings, 57 FR 19602 (May 7, 1992))
Products covered:
Ceramic bearings
Roller turn rollers
Clutch release systems that contain rolling elements
Products excluded:
Clutch release systems that do not contain rolling
elements
Chrome steel balls for use as check valves in hydraulic
valve systems
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1992, and June 30, 1992 (See
Scope Rulings, 57 FR 32973 (July 24, 1992))
Products excluded:
Finished, semiground stainless steel balls
Stainless steel balls for non-bearing use (in an
optical polishing process)
Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1992, and September 30, 1992
(See Scope Rulings, 57 FR 57420 (December 4, 1992))
Products covered:
Certain flexible roller bearings whose component
rollers have a length-to-diameter ratio of less than 4:1
Model 15BM2110 bearings
Products excluded:
Certain textile machinery components
Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992
(See Scope Rulings, 58 FR 11209 (February 24, 1993))
Products covered:
Certain cylindrical bearings with a length-to-diameter
ratio of less than 4:1
Products excluded:
Certain cartridge assemblies comprised of a machine
shaft, a machined housing and two standard bearings
Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1993, and March 31, 1993
(See Scope Rulings, 58 FR 27542 (May 10, 1993))
Products covered:
Certain cylindrical bearings with a length-to-diameter
ratio of less than 4:1
[[Page 60282]]
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1993, and June 30, 1993 (See
Scope Rulings, 58 FR 47124 (September 7, 1993))
Products covered:
Certain series of INA bearings
Products excluded:
SAR series of ball bearings
Certain eccentric locking collars that are part of
housed bearing units
Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1993, and December 31, 1993
(See Scope Rulings, 59 FR 8910 (February 24, 1994))
Products excluded:
Certain textile machinery components
Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1994, and March 31, 1994
Products excluded:
Certain textile machinery components
Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994
(See Scope Rulings, 60 FR 12196 (March 6, 1995))
Products excluded:
Rotek and Kaydon--Rotek bearings, models M4 and L6, are
slewing rings outside the scope of the order.
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1995 and June 30, 1995 (See
Scope Rulings, 60 FR 36782 (July 18, 1995))
Products covered:
Consolidated Saw Mill International (CSMI) Inc.--Cambio
bearings contained in CSMI's sawmill debarker are within the scope
of the order.
Nakanishi Manufacturing Corp.--Nakanishi's stamped
steel washer with a zinc phosphate and adhesive coating used in the
manufacture of a ball bearing is within the scope of the order.
Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 1996 (See
Scope Rulings, 61 FR 18381 (April 25, 1996))
Products covered:
Marquardt Switches--Medium carbon steel balls imported
by Marquardt are outside the scope of the order.
Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1996 and June 30, 1996 (See
Scope Rulings, 61 FR 40194 (August 1, 1996))
Products excluded:
Dana Corporation--Automotive component, known variously
as a center bracket assembly, center bearings assembly, support
bracket, or shaft support bearing, is outside the scope of the
order.
Rockwell International Corporation--Automotive
component, known variously as a cushion suspension unit, cushion
assembly unit, or center bearing assembly, is outside the scope of
the order.
Enkotec Company, Inc.--``Main bearings'' imported for
incorporation into Enkotec Rotary Nail Machines are slewing rings
and, therefore, are outside the scope of the order.
[FR Doc. 99-28770 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P