[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 213 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60291-60295]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28773]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-475-801]


Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Cylindrical Roller 
Bearings From Italy

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: cylindrical 
roller bearings from Italy.

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SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the 
Department'') initiated a sunset review of the antidumping duty order 
on cylindrical roller bearings (``CRBs'') from Italy (64 FR 15727) 
pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the 
Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate 
substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and 
inadequate response from respondent interested parties, the Department 
determined to conduct an expedited review. As a result of this review, 
the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty order 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the 
levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, 
Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

    This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of 
the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews 
are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'') 
Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 
(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''), and 19 CFR Part 351(1998) in 
general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to 
the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the 
Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3-- Policies Regarding the Conduct of 
Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (``Sunset Policy 
Bulletin'').

Scope

    The products covered by this order are CRBs and parts thereof from 
Italy. For a detailed description of the products covered by this 
order, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, 
refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews on 
antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently 
with this notice.

History of the Order

    The Department published its less-than-fair-value (``LTFV'') 
determination on CRBs from Italy on May 3, 1989.1 In this 
determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping 
margin of 212.45 percent for SKF Industrie S.p.A. (``SKF''). The 
Department also published an all others rate of 212.45 percent. Since 
that time, the Department has conducted nine administrative 
reviews.2 This sunset

[[Page 60292]]

review covers imports from all Italian producers and/or exporters of 
CRBs, excluding those imports from SKF.3 We note that, to 
date, we have made no duty absorption findings with regards to CRBs 
from Italy.4
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    \1\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of 
Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and 
Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This 
determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of 
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy 
and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).
    \2\ See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 56 FR 31751 (July 11, 1991); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, 
and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 32969 (July 24, 1992); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 57 FR 59080 (December 14, 1992); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in 
Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 58 FR 53914 (October 19, 1993); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France and Italy; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 58 FR 65576 (December 15, 1993); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Germany, Italy, and Sweden; Amended Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 38369 (July 16, 
1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From Italy; Amended Final Results of Antidumping 
Duty Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 70100 (December 18, 1998); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From Italy; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 
10959 (February 28, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany and Italy; Amended 
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 60 FR 
31142 (June 13, 1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Italy; Amended Final Results 
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 33791 (June 29, 
1995); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative 
Reviews, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996); Antifriction Bearings 
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom: Amended Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 3003 (January 21, 
1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) 
and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and 
the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 62 FR 2081(January 15, 1997); Antifriction Bearings (Other 
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Singapore; Amended Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, (March 26, 1997); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Reviews, 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); Antifriction Bearings (Other 
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy, Romania, 
and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, 63 FR 40878 (July 31, 1998).
    \3\ The order was revoked with respect to SKF. See Antifriction 
Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From 
Italy; Final Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in 
Part of Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).
    \4\ The Department has issued duty absorption findings for two 
producers and/or exporters of ball bearings from Italy in the 1995-
1996 and 1997-1998 administrative reviews. However, no duty 
absorption findings have been issued with respect to CRBs from 
Italy. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 
1997); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, 64 
FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).
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Background

    On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of the 
antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy (64 FR 15727), pursuant to 
section 751(c) of the Act. The Department received Notices of Intent to 
Participate on behalf of The Torrington Company (``Torrington'') and 
MPB Corp. (``MPB''), and on behalf of the Roller Bearing Company of 
America (``RBC''), New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (``NHBB''), and 
Link-Belt Bearing Division (``Link-Belt'') on April 16, 1999, within 
the deadline specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Sunset 
Regulations. We received a complete substantive response from the 
domestic interested parties on May 3, 1999, within the 30-day deadline 
specified in the Sunset Regulations under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). We 
did not receive a complete substantive response from Link-Belt.
    Torrington, MPB, RBC, and NHBB claimed interested party status 
under 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C) as U.S. manufacturers of CRBs. In addition, 
Torrington stated that it was the petitioner in the original 
investigation and has participated actively in all administrative 
reviews of this order. MPB stated that it participated in the 
Commission's injury investigation. RBC and NHBB stated that they had 
not previously participated in any segment of this proceeding before 
the Department.
    The Department also received a complete substantive response from 
FAG Italia S.p.A and FAG Bearings Corporation (collectively, ``FAG'') 
on May 3, 1999. FAG stated that it participated in the original 
investigation and each subsequent administrative review of the 
Department's proceeding on CRBs from Italy.
    Based on the information submitted by FAG concerning the volume and 
value of its exports and volume of imports as reported in U.S. Census 
Bureau IM146 Reports, the Department determined that FAG's exports of 
subject merchandise to the United States accounted for less than 50 
percent of the total volume of subject merchandise to the United States 
over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of this sunset 
review.5 Therefore, respondent interested parties provided 
inadequate response to the notice of initiation and, pursuant to 19 CFR 
351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C), the Department determined to conduct an 
expedited, 120-day, review of this order.6
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    \5\ FAG stated that it has not sold any CRBs in the United 
States over the past five years.
    \6\ On May 24, 1999, the Department informed the Commission 
that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested 
parties, it was conducting an expedited sunset review of this order 
consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn 
Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A. 
May, Director, Office of Policy.)
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    In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the 
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a 
review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January 1, 
1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the 
sunset review of the antidumping duty order on CRBs from Italy is 
extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion 
of the final results of this review until not later than October 28, 
1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.7
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    \7\ See Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, 
et al.; Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year 
Reviews, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).
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Determination

    In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department 
conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the 
antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in 
making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-
average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent 
reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the 
period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty 
order, and it shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the 
margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order is revoked.
    The Department's determinations concerning continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are discussed 
below. In addition, interested parties' comments with respect to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin 
are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

    As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to 
conduct an expedited review of this order. On June 10, 1999, we 
received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our 
determination to conduct an expedited review. NHBB also submitted 
comments on whether an expedited sunset review was warranted. In its 
submission, it asserts that most of the domestic interested parties 
that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation of the 
Department's various

[[Page 60293]]

antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings. NHBB also offered new 
argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of these orders.
    The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of 
an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination 
of adequacy of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's 
determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its 
regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic 
interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing 
a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or 
legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic 
industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the 
statutory provision that if there is no domestic industry interest in 
continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order 
automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46 
(2nd Session 1994)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy 
determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine 
whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without 
further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1), 
specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. 
Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the 
weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and 
subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject 
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of 
the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

    Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), specifically 
the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 
103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 
(1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the 
Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on 
methodological and analytical issues, including the bases for 
likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on 
an order-wide basis (see section II.A.3). In addition, the Department 
indicated that it will normally determine that revocation of an 
antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence 
of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis 
after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise 
ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated 
after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject 
merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).
    In their substantive responses, Torrington and MPB argue that 
revocation of the antidumping duty order on the subject merchandise 
would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this 
conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above de 
minimis after the issuance of the order. RBC also argues that, given 
that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the order, 
the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue 
or recur if the order were revoked. Torrington and MPB assert further 
that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because dumping 
continued.
    Arguing that the Department's import statistics do not permit a 
comparison of pre- and post-order import volumes of CRBs, Torrington 
and MPB suggest that the Department examine data regarding the import 
value of all roller bearings, the narrowest category of products for 
which a consistent set of data is available regarding pre- and post-
order imports. Torrington and MPB suggest that these data are 
conservative because declines in import volumes could be obscured by 
increases in import values and inclusion of non-covered products. They 
argue that the data will demonstrate that total import value of CRBs 
dropped dramatically following the order, from more than $6 million in 
1988 to less than $1 million in 1993 and import values were below 1988 
totals in every year until (and including) 1995.8 This data, 
they argue, provides strong additional support for a determination that 
dumping is likely to continue or recur were the order revoked. In 
conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no ``good cause'' exists to 
consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production.
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    \8\ Torrington and MPB note that imports of CRBs from Italy 
increased sharply after 1995, coincident with the revocation of the 
order on CRBs exported by SKF. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than 
Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final Results 
of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty 
Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995).
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    NHBB assert that revocation of the order is not likely to result in 
continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its assertion on the 
fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure, 
thus causing injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a 
part.
    FAG asserts that the dumping margin likely to prevail if the order 
were to be revoked would be 0.00 percent, the dumping margin it has 
maintained since the 1993-1994 administrative review. With respect to 
whether import volumes ceased following the imposition of the order, 
FAG states that it has not shipped subject merchandise to the United 
States over the past five years. In addition, FAG indicates that total 
exports of the subject merchandise from Italy have continued throughout 
the life of the order (see May 3, 1999, substantive response of FAG, 
Appendix 2).
    Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, state that the 
cessation of imports from FAG strongly supports an affirmative 
determination of likelihood of dumping in this case. Further, 
Torrington and MPB note that the Department's sunset determinations are 
made on an order-wide basis.
    In addition, Torrington and MPB assert that the Department should 
take into account the submitter's affiliation in its consideration of 
comments of various parties filing as domestic producers. Further, 
citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Thailand; Final Results 
of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Review and Revocation of 
Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 (May 8, 1996), they argue 
that the Department has recognized that domestic producers who are 
affiliated with subject foreign producers and exporters do not have a 
common ``stake'' with the petitioner in the maintenance of the order. 
Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that other parties' comments 
addressing issues other than margins and import volumes should not be 
considered unless such parties establish ``good cause'' to consider 
such additional factors, which, in these reviews, they have not done.
    As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the 
SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins 
after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation 
or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the 
discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer 
that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were 
removed. Further, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of 
an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, 
the Department considers the margins determined in the

[[Page 60294]]

investigation and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of 
imports. Therefore, the arguments of NHBB with respect to the effect 
revocation would have on the U.S. market, even if correct, do not rebut 
the fact that dumping continues and has continued over the life of the 
order.
    In the instant proceeding, dumping margins above de minimis 
continue to exist for at least one known producer and/or exporter. 
Therefore, given that dumping has continued over the life of the order, 
the Department determines that dumping is likely to continue if the 
order were revoked. Because we have based this determination on the 
fact that dumping continued at levels above de minimis, we have not 
addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to 
``good cause,'' nor have we addressed the arguments of other interested 
parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will 
normally provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in 
the final determination in the original investigation. Further, for 
companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not 
begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department 
normally will provide a margin based on the ``all others'' rate from 
the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) 
Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated 
margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption 
determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin.)
    The Department, in its LTFV investigation of CRBs from Italy, 
published a weighted-average dumping margin of 212.45 percent for SKF. 
In addition, the Department also published a weighted-average dumping 
margin of 212.45 percent on all other imports of the subject 
merchandise from Italy.9 As noted above, the Department has 
not issued any duty absorption findings with respect to CRBs from 
Italy.
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    \9\ See Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Spherical Plain and Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; and Final Determination of 
Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value; Spherical Plain Bearings and 
Parts Thereof, From Italy, 54 FR 19096 (May 3, 1989). This 
determination was subsequently amended. See Notice of 
Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 
Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy 
and Sweden, 54 FR 20910 (March 8, 1993).
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    In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the 
margins likely to prevail are those from the Department's original 
investigation. Specifically, Torrington and MPB argue that the dumping 
margins found for each company in the original investigation (as 
opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative 
reviews) are the dumping margins likely to prevail, including margins 
based on best information available, except where the most current 
margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption determination, 
exceeds the original investigation margin. Furthermore, RBC states that 
the margins from the original investigation are most probative of the 
rates likely to prevail as they are the only calculated rates that 
reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order 
in place.
    NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the order 
were revoked would be de minimis. NHBB goes on to argue that it would 
be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments 
to undercut that investment by dumping. In addition, NHBB argues that 
the Department should not report margins from the original 
investigation. In support of this argument, NHBB notes that the SAA 
provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on 
a more recently calculated margin. NHBB asserts that one such instance 
is where, as in the antifriction bearings cases, dumping margins have 
declined over the life of the order and imports have remained steady or 
increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the 
methodology used to calculated antidumping duty margins introduced by 
the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to 
the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994.
    As noted above, FAG argues that the dumping margin likely to 
prevail if the order were revoked is its current dumping margin of 0.00 
percent. FAG states that it has remained at a 0.00 percent dumping 
level since the 1993-1994 administrative review period. FAG states 
further that this is due principally to the absence of any imports of 
Italian CRBs by FAG Bearings Company. Lastly, FAG states that, were the 
dumping order revoked, there would be no change in FAG's current 
sourcing and resale patterns of Italian CRBs.
    Torrington and MPB, in their rebuttal comments, stated that FAG's 
reliance on its current rate ignores the fact that current rates do not 
reflect the behavior of producers and/or exporters without the 
discipline of the antidumping duty order. As such, they contend, the 
Department should not rely on this current rate.
    Additionally, in their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue 
that other parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies 
regarding the selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the 
Department's duty absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are 
clear--normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the 
only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the 
discipline of the order and rejection of margins from administrative 
reviews in which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and 
MPB argue that there is no authority which would authorize or justify 
the rejection of the investigation rate on the basis of the particular 
methodology used at the time of the investigation. Additionally, with 
respect to claims that more recent margins should be used based on 
declining margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports, 
Torrington and MPB argue that it is the responsibility of such 
claimants to provide information regarding companies' relative market 
share. Since no such information was provided, they contend the 
Department should not accept these assertions since imports of CRBs 
from Italy have actually declined since the imposition of the order.
    We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will 
provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the 
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of 
the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of 
a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration 
of duty absorption determinations.
    With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the 
margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find 
that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. 
Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best 
reflected by the Department's dumping margins we calculated in the 
original investigation. Specifically, the Department finds that there 
is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of 
subsequent changes in methodology since such changes do not invalidate 
margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping 
margins from the original investigation are the only rates which 
reflect the behavior of exporters without the

[[Page 60295]]

discipline of the order, regardless of the methodology used to 
calculate that margin or the use of best information available (see 
section 752(c)(3) of the Act).
    With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin 
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that 
dumping margins have declined over the life of the order and imports 
have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence 
to support these claims and nothing submitted in the course of this 
sunset proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or 
increased. In fact, FAG submitted information claiming that it ceased 
exporting subject merchandise, indicating that import volumes may have 
decreased. Furthermore, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB 
indicate that post-order import volumes (1989-1998) are lower than pre-
order volumes (1989) in each year.
    In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with 
the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in 
cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady 
or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects 
that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the 
United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue 
or recur if the order were revoked. Alternatively, if a company chooses 
to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the 
Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated 
margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we 
will entertain such considerations in response to arguments from an 
interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of an exporters behavior absent 
the discipline of an order, we normally will consider the company's 
relative market share, with such information to be provided by the 
parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more 
recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters 
were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific 
exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we 
expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past 
sunset reviews where market share information was not available, we 
relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and 
after the issuance of the order. (See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited 
Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 
8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron 
Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of 
China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).)
    In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an 
order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the 
magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific 
information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of 
the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market 
remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular 
company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time 
maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument 
may disguise company-specific behavior demonstrating increased dumping 
coupled with increased market share.
    With respect to FAG's arguments concerning the dumping margin 
likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. FAG participated in and 
had shipments during both the 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 administrative 
reviews. The SAA at 890 and the House Report at 63-64 state that the 
cessation of imports after the order is highly probative of the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. Furthermore, if 
imports ceased after the order is issued, it is reasonable to assume 
that exporters could not sell in the United States without dumping and 
that, to reenter the U.S. market, they would have to resume dumping. As 
such, we find that the 0.00 percent dumping margin we calculated for 
FAG for the 1993-1994 administrative review is not probative of the 
dumping margin likely to prevail if the order were to be revoked. The 
cessation of imports by FAG following the establishment of this margin 
strongly suggests to the Department that FAG cannot sell subject 
merchandise in the United States without dumping. Consequently, we find 
that the dumping margins calculated in the original investigation are 
the only calculated rates that reflect the behavior of exporters 
without the discipline of the order. Consistent with the Sunset Policy 
Bulletin, we determine that the margins we calculated in the 
Department's original investigation is probative of the behavior of 
Italian producers and exporters of CRBs if the order were revoked. 
Therefore, we will report to the Commission the ``all others'' rate 
from the original investigation contained in the Final Results of 
Review section of this notice.10
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    \10\ The Department calculated only one company-specific rate in 
the original investigation. The order was subsequently revoked with 
respect to this one company, SKF (see Antifriction Bearings (Other 
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Italy; Final 
Results of Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of 
Antidumping Duty Order, 60 FR 10959 (February 28, 1995). Because of 
this, the Department will report to the Commission only the ``all 
others'' rate from the original investigation.
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Final Results of Review

    As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of 
the antidumping duty order would likely lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping at the margin listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Manufacturer/ Exporter                 Margin  (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SKF........................................  Revoked
All Other Producers/Exporters..............  212.45
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. 
Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or 
conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to 
comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable 
violation.
    This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance 
with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: October 28, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 99-28773 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P