§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Boeing: Docket No. FAA–2008–0012;
Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–204–AD.

Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by February 28, 2008.

Affected ADs
(b) None.

Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 767–200, –300, and –400ER series airplanes, certified in any category, as identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767–35–0054, dated July 6, 2006.

Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a report that several passenger masks with broken in-line flow indicators were found following a mask deployment. We are issuing this AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event.

Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Inspection and Related Investigative/Corrective Actions if Necessary
(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, do a general visual inspection to determine the manufacturer and manufacture date of the oxygen masks in the passenger service units and the flight attendant and lavatory oxygen boxes, as applicable, and do the applicable related investigative and corrective actions, by accomplishing all of the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767–35–0054, dated July 6, 2006; except where the service bulletin specifies installing a new oxygen mask, replace the oxygen mask with a new or modified oxygen mask having an improved flow indicator. The related investigative and corrective actions must be done before further flight.

Note 1: The service bulletin refers to B/E Aerospace Service Bulletin 174080–35–01, dated February 6, 2006; and Revision 1, dated May 1, 2006, as additional sources of service information for modifying the oxygen mask assembly by replacing the flow indicator with an improved flow indicator.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lack a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 26, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–378 Filed 1–11–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2008–0017; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–268–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will not consider any comment that is not submitted in accordance with this process.

Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued Airworthiness Directive 2007–0248, dated September 7, 2007 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on [the] ground, the FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR–88) in June 2001 [which] required [conducting] a design review against explosion risks.

In their Letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01–L296, dated March 4, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03–L04, dated May 2, 2003, the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).

Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds (3402 kg) or more, which have received their certification since January 1, 1958, are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

As a consequence of the design review mentioned above, this Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires a modification to install extra protection of wiring installed in fuel tank conduits.

The modification includes an inspection for any damage of the wiring to the fuel pumps, fuel level switches, the refuel shutoff valves, and optical sensors/mechanical switches, and if any damage is found, contacting SAAB for repair and repair. These fuel pumps, fuel switches, refuel shutoff valves, and optical sensors/mechanical switches are potential ignition sources. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled “Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements” (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (“SFAR 88,” Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–84 through 21–83). Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tank. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

SAAB has issued Service Bulletin 340–28–028, dated July 5, 2007. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 218 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 80 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts would cost about $0 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here.

Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be $1,395,200, or $6,400 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
   Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends §39.13 by adding the following new AD:


Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by February 13, 2008.

AFFECTED ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Saab Model SAAB-Fairchild SF340A (SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight *** and on [the] ground, the FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR–88) in June 2001 [which] required [conducting] a design review against explosion risks.

In their Letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01–L296, dated March 4, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03–L024, dated February 3, 2003 the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).

Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds (3402 kg) or more, which have received their certification since January 1, 1958, are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

As a consequence of the design review mentioned above, this Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires a modification to install extra protection of wiring installed in fuel tank conduits.

The potential of ignition sources (in certain fuel pumps, fuel switches, refuel shutoff valves, and optical sensors/mechanical switches), in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. The modification includes an inspection for any damage of the wiring to the fuel pumps, fuel level switches, the refuel shut off valves, and optical sensors/mechanical switches, and if any damage is found, contacting SAAB for repair.

Actions and Compliance

(f) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already done, perform Modification No. 3164 (right-hand wing) and Modification No. 3165 (left-hand wing) in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340–28–026, dated July 5, 2007. The modifications include the following actions.

(1) Removal of the fuel pumps 5QM and 6QM, the fuel switches 37EM, 32ED, 9QA, 10QA, 11QA, and 12QA, and the refuel shutoff valves 15QA and 16QA, and the optical sensors/mechanical switches 13QA and 14QA.

(2) Inspection of the wiring to the fuel pumps, fuel level switches, the refuel shutoff valves, and optical sensors/mechanical...
switches, and if any damage is found, contact SAAB for repair instructions and repair before further flight.

(3) Twisting of the fuel pump wiring, fuel level switches wiring, refuel shutoff valves wiring, and optical sensors/mechanical switches wiring.

(4) Installation of a shrinkable tube to the fuel pumps wiring, fuel level switches wiring, refuel shutoff valves wiring and optical sensors/mechanical switches wiring.

(5) Installation of fuel pumps, the fuel level switches, the refuel shutoff valves, and the optical sensors/mechanical switches.

(6) Operational and functional test of the fuel measuring/indicating system.

FAA AD Differences

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows:

(1) The MCAI does not specify corrective action for the inspection specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD. This AD requires contacting SAAB for repair instructions and repairing before further flight.

(2) The MCAI does not include actions for optical sensors/mechanical switches 13QA and 14QA; however, paragraph (f) of this AD includes modification of those optical sensors/mechanical switches.

Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1108; fax (425) 227–1140. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

Related Information


Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This proposed AD would require an inspection to determine the manufacturer and manufacture date of the oxygen masks in the passenger service units and the lavatory and attendant box assemblies, and corrective action if necessary. This proposed AD results from a report that several passenger masks with broken in-line flow indicators were found following a mask deployment. We are proposing this AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by February 28, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov; follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202–493–2251.

• Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airlines, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2008–0011; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–203–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

We have received a report indicating that several passenger masks with broken in-line flow indicators were found following a mask deployment on a Boeing Model 777–200 series airplane. Operators subsequently found several more broken in-line flow indicators after examining the oxygen mask assemblies on other Model 777 series airplanes and on Model 747–400 series airplanes. Investigation revealed that certain flow indicators are weaker and can fracture because of internal residual stresses caused by the flow indicator joint.