[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 214 (Friday, November 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57461-57462]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-26774]
[[Page 57461]]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 2009-2]
Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice, recommendation; correction.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board published a
document in the Federal Register of November 2, 2009, concerning
recommendation 2009-2 to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
2286a(a)(5) which identifies the need to execute both immediate and
long-term actions that can reduce the risk posed by a seismic event at
the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The previous
notice omitted the recommendation. The notice now includes the
recommendation.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before December 7, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Faculties Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau
at the address above or telephone number (202-694-7000).
Correction
In the Federal Register of November 2, 2009, in FR Doc. E9-26304,
on page 56595, immediately following the signature block, the
recommendation should read as follows:
Dated: November 2, 2009.
John E. Mansfield,
Vice Chairman.
Recommendation 2009-2 to the Secretary of Energy
Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended
Dated: October 26, 2009.
Background
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is concerned
about the potential consequences of seismic events at Los Alamos
National Laboratory's (LANL) Plutonium Facility and the adequacy of the
safety strategy currently being pursued to address these events. In
particular, the mitigated offsite consequences predicated on a
seismically induced large fire at this operating nuclear facility
exceed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Evaluation Guideline by more
than two orders of magnitude. The Board believes this situation
warrants immediate attention and action.
The Plutonium Facility has operated for more than a decade with a
1996 Final Safety Analysis Report as its safety basis. DOE issued Title
10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management,
in January 2001, requiring contractors for all its existing facilities
to submit a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). Ultimately, a DSA for the
Plutonium Facility was submitted by LANL and approved by the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Los Alamos Site Office (LASO)
through a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in December 2008. The DSA
identifies an array of planned future upgrades to improve the safety
posture of the facility. However, both the DSA and SER rely
inappropriately on planned seismic upgrades to safety systems that (1)
will not be implemented for many years and (2) are not sufficient to
address adequately the bounding seismic accident scenarios. The only
safety feature that can be credited for these accident scenarios is the
passive confinement provided by the facility structure. Additionally,
appropriate compensatory measures to protect public and worker health
and safety have not been identified. As a result, a major deficiency in
the facility's safety basis exists.
The safety strategy approved by LASO is based on the assumption
that future upgrades to reinforce the support stands for a limited set
of ``high-risk'' gloveboxes (including those containing ignition
sources, such as furnaces) will prevent a large fire from occurring
after a seismic event. While planned seismic upgrades to high-risk
gloveboxes will provide some safety benefit in the future, the Board
believes the critical NNSA assumption that these upgrades are adequate
is flawed and, as a result, the current safety strategy is not
defensible for the following reasons. Not all ignition sources inside
high-risk gloveboxes are seismically secured to the glovebox shell;
therefore, fires could still result from ignition sources toppling
inside gloveboxes during a seismic event, even if the gloveboxes
themselves do not topple. Additionally, ignition sources that could
initiate post-seismic fires exist outside of gloveboxes targeted for
seismic upgrades. DOE must take steps to develop a defensible seismic
safety strategy for the Plutonium Facility.
Near-term actions and compensatory measures to reduce significantly
the consequences of seismically induced events will likely involve
operating the facility with restrictions on material-at-risk, removing
inventory from susceptible locations or storing material in robust
containers, and reducing the likelihood of a fire following a seismic
event by identifying and implementing appropriate safety measures.
Consistent with the Board's Recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement
Systems, one long-term strategy that could provide effective mitigation
for seismic events involves upgrading the facility's confinement
ventilation system to meet seismic performance category 3 criteria.
This strategy would allow the confinement ventilation system to reduce
reliably the consequences of a seismically induced event by many orders
of magnitude to acceptably low values.
In a letter to the Board dated June 16, 2009, the NNSA
Administrator rejected the implementation of some upgrades identified
to address performance gaps uncovered during execution of the
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2004-2 for the Plutonium
Facility's confinement ventilation system on the grounds that these
upgrades were not required under the current DSA/SER strategy. LASO's
present position is that upgrades to ensure post-seismic operability
for active confinement ventilation may be desirable, but LASO does not
expect to develop the information necessary to make a decision (e.g.,
cost, scope, and mitigation benefits) until mid-fiscal year 2011. The
Board believes that NNSA's current safety strategy is flawed and does
not obviate the need for a seismically qualified safety class active
confinement ventilation system at its Plutonium Facility.
Given the magnitude of the potential consequences to the public,
the Board believes DOE must develop expeditiously a defensible safety
strategy for seismically induced events at the Plutonium Facility and a
credible plan for implementing this strategy. DOE's response must
include definite, measurable, and immediate means to substantially
reduce the potential consequences at the site boundary. Implementation
of a sound safety strategy must be pursued on an urgent basis.
Recommendation
In this context, and in recognition of the fact that LANL's
Plutonium Facility has been designated as the center for
[[Page 57462]]
plutonium operations in the complex, which includes the manufacture of
pits for weapon assemblies, the Board recommends that DOE:
1. Implement near-term actions and compensatory measures to reduce
significantly the consequences of seismically induced events, including
clear identification of consequence reduction targets/goals, schedule,
and implementation methods. In planning for and completing these
actions and compensatory measures, DOE should be guided by the need for
immediate actions and mindful of the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
2286d(f)(1) regarding implementation timelines.
2. Develop and implement an acceptable safety strategy for
seismically induced events that includes the following elements:
a. A technically justifiable decision logic and criteria for
evaluating and selecting safety-class structures, systems, and
components that can effectively prevent or mitigate the consequences of
seismic events to acceptably low values.
b. The seismic analysis approach for structures, systems, and
components required to implement the seismic safety strategy.
c. A prioritized plan and schedule, including quarterly briefs to
the Board for the next 12 months, for seismic analyses, necessary
upgrades, and other actions to implement the seismic safety strategy.
The severity of the problems that are the subject of this
Recommendation and the urgency to remediate them argue forcefully for
the Secretary to avail himself of the authority under the Atomic Energy
Act (U.S.C. 2286d(e)) to ``implement any such recommendation (or part
of any such recommendation) before, on, or after the date on which the
Secretary transmits the implementation plan to the Board under this
subsection.''
John E. Mansfield, Ph.D.,
Vice Chairman.
[FR Doc. E9-26774 Filed 11-5-09; 8:45 am]
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