subject merchandise; and (3) no compelling reasons for denial exist, we are granting this request and are postponing the final determination until no later than 135 days after the publication of this notice in the Federal Register. Suspension of liquidation will be extended accordingly.

ITC Notification

In accordance with section 733(f) of the Act, we have notified the ITC of the Department’s preliminary affirmative determination. If the Department’s final determination is affirmative, the ITC will determine before the later of 120 days after the date of this preliminary determination or 45 days after our final determination whether imports of copper pipe and tube from Mexico are materially injuring, or threatening material injury to, the U.S. industry. See section 735(b)(2) of the Act. Because we are postponing the deadline for our final determination to 135 days from the date of the publication of this preliminary determination, the ITC will make its final determination no later than 45 days after our final determination.

Public Comment

Interested parties are invited to comment on the preliminary determination. Interested parties may submit case briefs to the Department no later than seven days after the date of the issuance of the last verification report in this proceeding. See 19 CFR 351.309(c)(1)(i). Rebuttal briefs, the content of which is limited to the issues raised in the case briefs, must be filed within five days from the deadline date for the submission of case briefs. See 19 CFR 351.309(d)(1) and 19 CFR 351.309(d)(2). A list of authorities used, a table of contents, and an executive summary of issues should accompany any briefs submitted to the Department. Executive summaries should be limited to five pages total, including footnotes. Further, we request that parties submitting briefs and rebuttal briefs provide the Department with a copy of the public version of such briefs on diskette. In accordance with section 774(1) of the Act, the Department will hold a public hearing, if timely requested, to afford interested parties an opportunity to comment on arguments raised in case or rebuttal briefs, provided that such a hearing is requested by an interested party. See also 19 CFR 351.310. If a timely request for a hearing is made in this investigation, we intend to hold the hearing two days after the rebuttal brief deadline date at the U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230, at a time and in a room to be determined. Parties should confirm by telephone, the date, time, and location of the hearing 48 hours before the scheduled date.

Interested parties who wish to request a hearing, or to participate in a hearing if one is requested, must submit a written request to the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 1870, within 30 days of the publication of this notice.

Requests should contain: (1) the party’s name, address, and telephone number; (2) the number of participants; and (3) a list of the issues to be discussed. At the hearing, oral presentations will be limited to issues raised in the briefs.

This determination is issued and published pursuant to sections 733(f) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.


Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 2010–11342 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–OS–S

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Telecommunications and Information Administration

[Docket No. 100504212–0212–01]

Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons

AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of inquiry.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) seeks comment on technical approaches to preventing contraband cell phone use in prisons. Congress tasked NTIA with developing, in coordination with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection and other technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal and State prison facilities. To assist in its evaluation of these technologies, NTIA requests information from the public on technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety services (including 911 calls and other government radio services) in areas surrounding prisons.

DATES: Comments are requested on or before June 11, 2010.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 20005; telephone (202) 482–9139 or e-mail rorsulak@ntia.doc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Overview

The mobile phone industry has enjoyed significant growth since the inception of the analog wireless cell phone network in the early 1980s.1 The 1990s saw the development of digital networks, and thereafter, high-speed data networks became available to consumers. The growth of the mobile phone industry has been fueled, in part, by consumer demand for instant access anywhere and anytime. Features such as data, image, and video communications have also contributed to the overwhelming demand for mobile

1 For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), the use of the word “cell phone” will refer to any wireless, portable device that is available to the public on a subscription or prepaid basis for delivering voice and/or data services such as text messages. It includes, for example, phones operating within the Cellular Radio Service in the 800 MHz bands; broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) in the 1.9 GHz bands; the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) in the 1.7 GHz band; Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services in the 800 and 900 MHz bands; and any future mobile wireless devices that plan to operate in bands such as the 700 MHz band.
 Recognizing the need to take action to curb contraband cell phone use, the United States Senate passed a bill in 2009 that would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize the FCC to permit the supervisory authority of a correctional facility to operate a system within the facility to prevent, jam, or otherwise interfere with unauthorized wireless communications by individuals held in the facility.\(^6\) Also, legislation has been introduced and passed in the U.S. Senate that would prohibit Federal prisoners from possessing or using cell phones and similar wireless devices.\(^9\)

In December 2009, Congress inserted language in the Conference Report to the Department of Commerce FY 2010 Appropriations Act that directs NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal and State prison facilities.\(^10\) Congress also asked that the plan consider the adverse effects that these technologies impose on commercial wireless and public safety services in areas surrounding the prisons.\(^3\) This NOI seeks public input to assist NTIA with its evaluation of technologies to prevent the use of contraband cell phones in Federal and State facilities.\(^12\)


**H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111–336 (2009), Division B, Title I, Page 619,** available at http://freewaygate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr366.111.pdf. The language specifically refers to methods of preventing contraband cell phone use within prison facilities. Jamming and detecting cell phone uses for other applications (such as within hospitals, schools) are not germane to either this NOI or NTIA’s evaluation.

**Id.**

**12** Although other contraband interdiction technologies may help to prevent the use of, or access to, contraband cell phones in prisons (such as x-rays, dogs, body-scan imaging, and other methods which detect contraband phones hidden on prison employees, visitors, and inmates), this NOI and NTIA’s subsequent report will be limited to radio frequency (RF)-based, wireless technology solutions.


the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. and CTIA have opposed the use of jamming for fear of interference to critical public safety operations and legitimate cell phone use in and around prisons. Others, however, have supported its use in prisons. Stating that it did not have the authority to permit such jamming, the FCC has denied the petitions.

Managed Access

Managed access systems intercept calls in order to allow corrections officials to prevent inmates from accessing carrier networks. The cell signal is not blocked by a jamming signal, but rather, is captured (or re-routed) and prevented from reaching the intended base station, thereby disallowing the completion of the call. This technology permits calls by known users (i.e., prison-authorized cell phone numbers) by handing them off to the network, and prevents others by denying access to the network. It is unclear whether or how well these systems can discriminate among prison-authorized cell phone numbers and “unknown” phones to avoid capturing/cancelling calls that do not involve inmates.

As a tool to deal with contraband cell phone use, some of these systems employ passive technology that detects cell phone use and collects data from active cell phones. Some systems deny access to calls from numbers they do not recognize. Other techniques redirect cell phone transmissions to portable antennas set up specifically around the prison, and only allow communication from prison-authorized cell phones to be forwarded to carrier cell towers. Denial of service approaches use electronic hardware located in the vicinity of the cell phone user to “spoof” the cell phone into thinking it is communicating with the carrier tower. The cell phone user receives a message that indicates that there is no service available. This type of denial of service system operates independently of the carrier and spoofs all cell calls.

In an effort to eliminate the unauthorized use of cell phones in Maryland State prisons, in 2009 the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services hosted a demonstration of various non-jamming technologies, including managed access systems. In January 2010, they issued a follow-on report. The demonstration showed, among other things, that: (1) Several intelligence gathering abilities could be implemented depending upon specific laws governing each State; and (2) the types of technology tested could allow certain phones to operate and allow 911 calls to be processed.

Detection

Detection is the process of locating, tracking, and identifying various sources of radio transmissions—in this case, cell phone signals. Detection, or direction finding, is used in a wide variety of applications including, for example, cell phone assignments, the location of 911 emergency calls and marine distress calls. For accurate position location in an environment such as within a prison facility, detection technology triangulates a cell phone signal and requires the use of correctional staff to physically search a small area (such as a prison cell) and seize the identified cell phone. This may involve placing direction-finding antennas or sensors (connected wireline or wirelessly) to a computer to identify a cell phone call and locate the origin of the call. Additionally, handheld cell phone detectors are able to scan frequencies within correctional facilities and detect the location of the caller. These systems can only detect a cell phone when it is in use—either placing or receiving a call. The devices are generally “passive” receive-only devices, and do not necessarily require any authorization or license for the equipment or the user to operate.

Additionally, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services demonstration included a number of detection technologies, and the report concluded that there were varying degrees of accuracy in terms of cell phone detection based upon each vendor’s technological abilities.

Request for Comments

NTIA requests comment on the questions below in order to assist in evaluating technology solutions to prevent contraband cell phone use in prisons. These questions are not a limitation on comments that may be submitted. When making reference to studies, research, and other empirical data that are not widely published, commenters should provide copies of the referenced material with the submitted comments. Comments will be posted on the NTIA Web site for viewing at http://www.ntia.doc.gov.

1. Technologies or Approaches

We have initially identified three broad categories of approaches that provide solutions for preventing contraband cell phone use: jamming, managed access, and detection. Are these characterizations accurate and complete? Are there technologies other than these categories, and if so, how do they work? What approaches can be taken to jam within irregular structures such as prisons, within indoor and outdoor areas and within rural versus urban settings? What specific types of managed access and detection techniques are available? What risk does each system pose to legitimate cell phone use by the general public outside the prison? What risk does each system pose to public safety and government use of spectrum? How can any of the foregoing risks be mitigated or eliminated? What are the benefits and drawbacks of implementing these techniques? Are certain systems more suitable for certain prison environments or locations? To what extent does the installation of each system require a
customized approach for each prison? How disruptive is the installation process? What approaches can be used in the implementation of systems employing detection techniques? How does each system provide for completion of critical calls or radio communications such as those from public safety officers (including use of handheld two-way radios) or 911? What ability does each of these technologies possess for upgrades to include new frequency bands, technologies, modulation techniques, etc. as they are introduced into the marketplace? How quickly can they be upgraded?

2. Devices and Frequency Bands

Many types of wireless mobile devices are available to consumers from a plethora of commercial carriers (e.g., push-to-talk, cell phones, smart phones, personal digital assistants). These devices operate, consistent with FCC rules, in a number of frequency bands depending upon the types of services and capabilities/features that the wireless carriers offer. To eliminate contraband cell phone use in prisons, techniques must be identified that have the capability to thwart the use from the gamut of devices and spectrum bands/frequencies in which these phones operate. These devices and associated frequency bands are: Cellular (824–849/869–894 MHz); PCS (1850–1990 MHz); AWS (1710–1755/2110–2170 MHz); and SMR (806–824 and 851–869/896–901 and 935–940 MHz). Additionally, spectrum bands, such as the 470–480 MHz band, 2110–2170 MHz, and the 2500–2690 MHz band, will soon offer newer, faster, and more bandwidth-intensive features to the public. Further, other devices that operate in such radio services as the Family Radio (462.5625–467.125 MHz band) and General Mobile Radio (462–467 MHz band) Services present possible avenues for illegal or unauthorized communications by inmates. While the range of these two services is relatively small, both use handheld two-way voice communication and could be attractive to inmates in urban environments. Undoubtedly, any of these devices could find their way to prison inmates as well. What other frequency bands could be used by technologies that inmates could acquire with which to communicate?

Do, or will, the technologies identified above effectively cover all of the bands likely to be used for commercial wireless services and how do, or will, they do so? Specifically, which frequency bands does each approach currently best address, and which could they best address in the future? How can the technologies prevent an inmate from communicating with a device employing proprietary technology (e.g., SMR radios)? Will the technologies deal with phones that plan to operate in other bands where new services will be offered in the future, such as in the 700 MHz band? What will be necessary to extend the capabilities of the technologies to new bands (new hardware or software, new antennas, agreements, etc.)?

3. Interference to Other Radio Services

Avoiding interference to authorized cell phone reception E83A; as well as other radio services outside the cell phone bands E83A; is a critical element in evaluating the various technologies. The longstanding radio spectrum regulation principle, embodied in the Communications Act of 1934, is to preclude harmful interference and not to block access to or receipt of information transmitted wirelessly. In addition to producing emissions in specific bands and within specific areas to deny service, jamming systems also produce unwanted signals outside of their intended operating bands and are not naturally confined to a prescribed area. These signals have the potential to produce interference to other radio services operating in numerous frequency bands (including Federal Government operations) and outside of the prison facility.

If jamming configurations are set up properly (that is, based upon site-specific radio frequency (RF) engineering), can these unwanted emissions be reduced or eliminated at a distance that is based on jammer and site parameters at each individual prison? Is the location of the prison (rural versus urban) also a factor, and if so, why and how would that affect the feasibility or implementation of a jamming system?

What jammer system parameters (e.g., power levels, modulation, antennas) can be used to control out-of-band (OdB) and unwanted emissions? Which of these parameters have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the jammer transmitter? Swept frequency techniques are often employed in jamming systems. What other jamming techniques can be employed to disrupt wireless communication systems? Are filters commercially available that could be used to reduce the OdB and unwanted emission levels from jammer transmitters? Commenters should provide details on the specifications for the filter (e.g., manufacturer, model number). Will jamming multiple frequency bands simultaneously affect the emission characteristics of the jammer transmitter (e.g., generation of intermodulation products)?

NTIA also seeks comment on other techniques that cell phone jammers can implement to reduce interference to other radio services. Can spectrum sensing be used in conjunction with jamming techniques to reduce the transmit duty cycle of the jammer transmitter? Are there variable strength cell phone jammers that are capable of dynamically adjusting their strength? What are the factors that can vary the signal strength of the jammer if it is putting out too much power? The emissions from jammer transmitters can potentially cause interference beyond the intended jamming area. A critical parameter necessary to establish the potential impact to a receiver is the interference protection criteria (IPC). There are currently no industry-adopted or Federally-mandated standards for in-band interference from other systems to wireless mobile handset receivers. How should the IPC for these handsets be established? What IPC values should be used for assessing potential interference to these handset receivers?

An approach to regulating jammer transmitters could be to establish a distance at which the jammer signal must be below a specified level necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers. An alternative approach could be to specify maximum allowable equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP) limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers as a function of frequency. Since the variations in the jammer configurations, effects of multiple jamming transmitters, structural characteristics of buildings, and propagation factors will be different depending on the installation and the facility, can analytical analysis techniques be used to develop the distances or EIRP limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers? If analytical analysis techniques can be employed, explain the methodology to be used and all appropriate conditions considered in the analysis, including, but not limited to, propagation loss modeling and propagation modeling.

22 Supra note 13.
23 A swept frequency jammer transmitter operates by repetitively frequency-sweeping (referred to as chirping) a carrier wave signal across the bands to be jammed.
building attenuation modeling. How should the effect of multiple jammer transmitters and antennas be taken into consideration? Are there other approaches that can be used to regulate jammer systems?

The impact of jamming signals would also depend on the prison environment. Outside of the facility, will the variations in the measured levels of the jammer transmitter signal make it difficult to distinguish such a signal from the cellular and PCS signals in the environment, for example? If so, is this problem exacerbated in areas where there is a high density of cellular and PCS signals, such as in and around an urban prison location. The variations in the measured jammer transmitter signal levels could likely be due to propagation effects and building attenuation losses that will be different at each facility and for each jammer installation. Furthermore, depending on the relative signal levels, it can be difficult to differentiate between the measured jammer transmitter signal and the cellular and PCS signals. Given variations in signal levels and the potential to distinguish the jammer signal from the background signals, is it possible to measure accurately the jammer transmitter signal outside of a facility?

Within a facility, is it possible to distribute the jammer transmitter power spatially across an array of antennas (or, in some cases, lossy cables) in order to provide better control and provide lower power density around individual antennas than could be produced if a single antenna were used to radiate a high-power signal? What techniques can be employed in the design of the jamming system to reduce the potential for interference to in-band and out-of-band receivers? Can restrictions be placed on the jammer transmitter antenna height to minimize the potential for interference outside of the area that is being jammed? Is it possible to employ directional or sector antennas to focus the jammer transmitter signal in the intended areas within a facility while minimizing the signal levels outside of the facility? Can down tilting the antennas be used to minimize the jammer transmitter signal level at the horizon? What restrictions can be placed on the antennas without impacting the effectiveness of the jamming system?

Each prison is unique in size, location and structure. Jammer set-up configurations cannot be applied broadly to all jammer systems in all locations. Variations in the jammer transmitter signal levels outside of the facility depend on a number of factors such as building structures, antenna deployment, and background signals. These factors could have an effect on the ability to measure accurately jammer transmitter emission levels. Given all of the possible variations in a jammer system installation, will operators need to conduct on-site compliance measurements at each facility? What techniques should be used to measure the emissions of a jammer system? Is it possible to accurately measure the jammer transmitter signals in the presence of other background signals? How shall an operator, in its request for authorization of such equipment, be required to demonstrate that it meets any interference protection requirements?

Do other technologies or approaches have the potential to interfere with other authorized radio services within the same bands or adjacent bands? If so, under what conditions and how can an operator mitigate interference? In some of the bands identified above, public safety frequencies are interleaved or operate in close proximity with frequencies used by mobile devices, for instance in the 800 MHz SMR and 700 MHz bands. How will internal and external land mobile systems, including systems used by the prisons themselves, as well as other public safety operations, be protected? Are there other radio communications systems within prisons that could also experience interference, such as internal private land mobile systems used by prison officials or medical telemetry devices in prison infirmaries?

4. Protecting 911 Calls and Authorized Users

The preservation and protection of calls to 911 from cell phones is a paramount concern as more consumers rely on mobile devices. The number of cell phones calling 911 has been steadily increasing as more consumers are using them. The National Emergency Number Association estimates that wireless telephone users account for nearly half of the calls to 911. Jamming radio signals in and around prisons cannot differentiate between normal cell phone traffic and 911 calls. Managed access systems, however, can be selective and designed to ignore 911 calls (i.e., letting them connect to the network), and detection systems typically use passive devices that do not affect transmission or reception. How are 911 calls preserved in areas around the prisons where the public is making a call to 911 if they come in proximity to the prison? Are there any other technologies identified that can protect 911 calls and how do they do so?

Wireless consumers expect their wireless calls to be completed without being dropped or busy. In and around prisons, consumers and public safety officials, as authorized users of the system, will expect their wireless devices to communicate. How are authorized users allowed to make calls with the technologies described? If the caller passes through a “dummy” cell site setup within the prison vicinity, will the call go through if a call is initiated within that cell (e.g., will it result in a busy signal or a dropped call)? Are calls handed off to the carrier cell site and network? How does managed access work if the caller is an authorized user, but the phone number is not known (i.e., in the database of authorized users) to the managed access system?

5. Cost Considerations

The cost of preventing cell phone use in prisons is a factor that must be considered and varies according to the type of technology, area to be covered, and additional features. What factors impact the cost of implementing each of the technologies as described above? Are there on-going or recurring costs associated with each? To what extent will installation costs vary in light of the particular characteristics of each prison (e.g., geographic setting)? What

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26 State governmental entities are eligible to hold authorizations for frequencies in the Public Safety Pool to operate radio stations for transmission of communications essential to its official activities. See 47 CFR 90.20. BOP uses medical telemetry at Federal Medical Centers and at some non-medical prisons. Additionally, some inmates have devices that are monitored and provided by hospitals.


29 However, at some distance away from the prison which is unique to each prison’s features and jammer set-up, jamming contraband cell phone signals should not affect authorized or 911 calls.
characteristics are most likely to affect costs? What are the ancillary costs for each type of approach (e.g., maintaining network connectivity for managed access systems, resources required to physically locate the phone for detection/location systems such as canines, staff time, etc.)? Are there typical costs or a range for each, and if so, what are they? Is training required for prison staff to properly operate the equipment? What staff costs are associated with each technology?

6. Locating Contraband Phones

In order to completely eradicate contraband cell phone use, the cell phone must be physically located and removed, which can be labor-intensive. Inmates may use them for a short period of time and then move them, making the devices more difficult to locate. Jamming cannot identify the specific location of a contraband cell phone. How do managed access and detection technologies locate a cell phone caller? What software and hardware is needed? How accurate are detection technologies? With the insertion of GPS chip-sets into mobile devices, are cell phone locations easily identifiable through managed access or are other means necessary (e.g., hardware or software)? Do managed access and detection technologies have the capability of providing intelligence-gathering information for prison officials, and if so, what type of information? What other means are necessary to physically locate the phones once a position is known?

7. Regulatory/Legal Issues

The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and set specific rules on wireless services. Both the operation of mobile wireless devices, and effective means and solutions to deny the use of them have regulatory and legal implications. The FCC has primary responsibility for regulating spectrum issues for the types of systems typically used within the State and local prisons and jails (for example, private internal radio communications and commercial systems used by prison staff). NTIA, on behalf of the President, authorizes the use of the radio frequencies for equipment operated by Federal entities, including the BOP. While the Communications Act prevents the FCC from authorizing jamming or other acts of intentional interference to the radio communications of authorized stations, the same provisions do not apply to the Federal government itself. Therefore, NTIA is not limited in its authority to permit jamming at Federal prison facilities. We seek comment on State/local or Federal laws, rules, or policies that need clarification or that may hinder deployment of any of these technologies or others that may be raised by commenters. These might include not only radio regulatory issues, such as the approval necessary to operate or conduct experimentations and demonstration, but also ancillary issues such as the privacy and legal implications of trap-and-trace technologies? What agreements, agency relationships, or licensing requirements between the prison, service provider, and access provider would be required for temporary or experimental demonstration or for permanent operation?

8. Technical Issues

The identification of technical issues is another factor in investigating and evaluating contraband cell phone use in prisons. Are there any technical issues to be considered for the technologies identified above? For example, the actual range of a jammer depends on its power, antenna orientation, and the local environment (size and shape), which may include hills or walls of a building (that could be made of a variety of materials) that block the jamming signal. How accurate are the location technologies? Does each site need specific RF engineering for each of the approaches? How do the technologies allow authorized users, including 911 calls, to be protected? How are different modulation schemes or channel access methods (for example, Global System for Mobile Communications—GSM, or Code Division Multiple Access—CDMA) handled for each category and does the solutions depend on the type of access method that the wireless carrier is using?

Text-messaging continues to increase as a form of communication from handheld wireless devices. Wireless handheld devices in the possession of prison inmates afford them this option as an alternative to talking. Is there a need to differentiate between voice and data, such as text messages, and are the technologies discussed above effective against data use by prison inmates? Does shorter air-time use from text messaging present problems with detection and/or capturing the call and ultimately locating the phone? Will the technologies identified above be effective against high-speed, high-capacity data formats, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) for devices that are expected to operate in the 700 MHz band?

Please note that all comments received will be posted on NTIA’s Web site. Commenters that submit any business confidential or proprietary information in response to this notice should clearly mark such information appropriately. Commenters should also submit a version of their comments that can be publicly posted on NTIA’s Web site.

Dated: May 7, 2010.

Kathy D. Smith,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2010–11350 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–60–P

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting Notice

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING:
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

DATE AND TIME: May 19, 2010 at 9:30 a.m.

PLACE: Three Lafayette Center, 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, Lobby Level Hearing Room (Room 1000).

STATUS: Open.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Agenda: (1) Consideration of the trading of futures and binary options based on motion picture box office receipts and to gather the views of interested parties; and (2) Reestablishment of the CFTC Technology Advisory Committee.

CONTACT PERSON: Sauntia Warfield, Assistant Secretary, 202–518–5084.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is undertaking a review of issues related to the trading of futures or options related to motion picture box office receipts. The Commission will have oral presentations by panels of invited witnesses representing Media Derivatives Exchange (MDEX), Cantor Exchange (Cantor), segments of the motion picture industry, and other interested parties.