DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
[Transmittal Nos. 10–20, 10–23, and 10–42]
36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notifications

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of three section 36(b)(1) arms sales notifications to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104–164, dated 21 July 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–3740.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The following are copies of letters to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 10–20, 10–23, and 10–42 with associated attachments.

Dated: October 6, 2010.

Mitchell S. Bryman.
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

Transmittal No. 10–20

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 10–20 with attached transmittal and policy justification.

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 10-20 concerning the Department of the Air Force’s proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services estimated to cost $350 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a press statement to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Genaille, Jr.
Deputy Director

Enclosures:
1. Transmittal
2. Policy Justification
3. Regional Balance (Classified Document Provided Under Separate Cover)
Transmittal No. 10-20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act

(i) **Prospective Purchaser:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

(ii) **Total Estimated Value:**

   - Major Defense Equipment* $0 million
   - Other $350 million
   - **TOTAL** $350 million

(iii) **Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:** continuation of a blanket order training program inside and outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that includes, but is not limited to, flight training, technical training, professional military education, specialized training, mobile training teams, and English Language training. Also provided are site surveys, trainers, simulators, program management, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor technical and logistical support services, and other related program requirements necessary to sustain a long-term training program.

(iv) **Military Department:** Air Force (TGP, Amd #10 and THE, Amd #3)

(v) **Prior Related Cases, if any:**

   - FMS Case TGP (Amd 1-9)-$49 million- 28Sep01
   - FMS Case THE (Amd 1-2)-$49 million-8Mar08

(vi) **Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:** None

(vii) **Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:** None

(viii) **Date Report Delivered to Congress:** SEP 18 2010

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Blanket Order Training Program

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of a blanket order training program inside and outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that includes, but is not limited to, flight training, technical training, professional military education, specialized training, mobile training teams, and English Language training. Also provided are site surveys, trainers, simulators, program management, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor technical and logistical support services, and other related program requirements necessary to sustain a long-term CONUS training program. The estimated cost is $350 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia intends to use the training to enhance its security posture and maintain its operational readiness. This will allow the Royal Saudi Air Force to develop and enhance standardization and operational capability, and interoperability with the USAF, Gulf Cooperation Council, and other coalition air forces. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing these services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this service will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

There is no prime contractor involved in this program. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to recipient.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 10–23

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 10–23 with attached transmittal, policy justification, and sensitivity of technology.
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi  
Speaker  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515  

Dear Madam Speaker:  

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 10-23, concerning the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to Iraq for defense articles and services estimated to cost $4.2 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a press statement to notify the public of this proposed sale.  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]

Richard A. Genaille, Jr.  
Deputy Director

Enclosures:  
1. Transmittal  
2. Policy Justification  
3. Sensitivity of Technology  
4. Regional Balance (Classified Document Provided Under Separate Cover)
Transmittal No. 10-23

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) **Prospective Purchaser:** Iraq

(ii) **Total Estimated Value:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Major Defense Equipment*</td>
<td>$3.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$1.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$4.2 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) **Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:**

- (18) F-16IQ aircraft
- (26) F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines
- (36) LAU-129A Common Rail Launchers
- (24) APG-68(V)9 radar sets
- (19) M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons
- (200) AIM-9L/M-8/9 SPARROW Missiles
- (150) AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles
- (50) AGM-65D/G/H K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles
- (200) GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound)
- (50) GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound)
- (50) GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound)
- (22) Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver)
- (20) AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIF) Systems (without Mode IV)
- (20) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only)
- (20) AN/AAC-33 SNIPER or AN/AAC-28 LITENING Targeting Pods
- (20) AN/AAS-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS), (20) Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs)

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

Also included: site survey support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.

(iv) **Military Department:** Air Force (SAE)

(v) **Prior Related Cases, if any:** none

(vi) **Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:** none

(vii) **Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:** See Annex attached

(viii) **Date Report Delivered to Congress:** SEP 13 2010
POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Iraq — F-16 Aircraft

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (18) F-16IQ aircraft, (24) F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, (36) LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, (24) APG-68(V)9 radar sets, (19) M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, (200) AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, (150) AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, (50) AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, (200) GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), (50) GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (50) GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (22) Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), (20) AN/AFX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), (20) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), (20) AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, (4) F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECE), (22) AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS); (20) Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs). Also included: site survey, support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $4.2 billion.

The proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by enhancing the capability of Iraq. The proposed aircraft and accompanying weapon systems will greatly enhance Iraq’s interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO nations, making it a more valuable partner in an important area of the world, as well as supporting Iraq’s legitimate need for its own self-defense.

The proposed sale will allow the Iraqi Air Force to modernize its air force by acquiring western interoperable fighter aircraft, thereby enabling Iraq to support both its own air defense needs and coalition operations. The country will have no difficulty absorbing this new capability into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAE Advanced Systems</td>
<td>Greenlawn, New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing Corporation</td>
<td>Seattle, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing Integrated Defense Systems</td>
<td>St Louis, Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(three locations)</td>
<td>Long Beach, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raytheon Company</td>
<td>San Diego, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(two locations)</td>
<td>Lexington, Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raytheon Missile Systems</td>
<td>Goleta, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company</td>
<td>Tucson, Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control</td>
<td>Fort Worth, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed Martin Simulation, Training</td>
<td>Dallas, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And Support</td>
<td>Fort Worth, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrop-Grumman Electro-Optical Systems</td>
<td>Garland, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrop-Grumman Electronic Systems</td>
<td>Baltimore, Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt &amp; Whitney United Technology Company</td>
<td>East Hartford, Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Aircraft Engines</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodrich ISR Systems</td>
<td>Danbury, Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3 Communications</td>
<td>Arlington, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITT Defense Electronics and Services</td>
<td>McLean, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symetrics Industries</td>
<td>Melbourne, Florida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no known offset agreements in connection with this proposed sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Iraq involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, program management, and training over a period of 15 years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 10-23

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex
Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. This sale will involve the release of sensitive technology to Iraq. The F-16IQ is Unclassified, except as noted below. The aircraft utilizes the F-16 airframe and features advanced avionics and systems. It contains the Pratt and Whitney F-100-PW-229 or the General Electric F-110-GE-129 engine, AN/APG-68(V)9 radar, digital flight control systems, internal electronic warfare equipment, Advanced IFF (without Mode IV), operational flight program, and software computer programs.

2. Sensitive and/or classified (up to Secret) elements of the F-16IQ aircraft proposed for sale include hardware, accessories, components, and associated software: AN/APG-68(V)9 Radar, AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIF) without Mode IV capability, AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures (Chaff and Flare) set, SNIPER and/or LITENING Targeting Pods, F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) and/or DB-110 RECCE Pods, Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System with Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only, Advanced Countermeasures Electronic System (ACES), Advanced Interference Blanker Unit, Modular Mission Computer, Have Glass I Digital Flight Control System, and F-100 or F-110 engines. Additional sensitive areas include operating manuals and maintenance technical orders containing performance information, operating and test procedures, and other information related to support operations and repair. The hardware, software, and data identified are classified to protect vulnerabilities, design and performance parameters, and other similar critical information.

3. The AN/APG-68(V)9 radar is the latest model of the APG-68 radar and was specifically designed for foreign military sales. This model contains the latest digital technology available for a mechanically scanned antenna, including higher processor power, higher transmission power, more sensitive receiver electronics, and a new capability, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), which creates higher-resolution ground maps from a much greater distance than previous versions of the APG-68. The upgrade features a 30% increase in detection range of air targets, a five-fold increase in processing speed, a ten-fold increase in memory, as well as significant improvements in all modes, jam resistance and false alarm rates. Complete hardware is classified Confidential; major components and subsystems are
classified Confidential; software is classified Secret; and the technical data and documentation are classified up to Secret.

4. The AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Targeting System is Unclassified but contains state-of-the-art technology. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified Secret. The software (object code) is classified Confidential. Sensitive elements include the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors, and the AGM-65 Missile Boresight Correlator.

5. The AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting System hardware is Unclassified but contains state-of-the-art technology. Information on performance and inherent vulnerabilities is classified Secret. The software (object code) is classified Confidential. Sensitive elements include the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors, and the AGM-65 Missile Boresight Correlator.

6. The AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing System is a software reprogrammable dispenser of chaff and flares. It provides for either automatic (via integrated Missile Warning System input) or aircrew commanded response dispense capabilities. Specific dispense routines are sensitive. The export version uses a country unique "look-up decision tree" for determining dispense routines. This software when loaded in the ALE-47 is classified Confidential. Increased risk of exploitation is significantly reduced given that the software is in executable form only, i.e., binary code, and the actual dispense routines can be gained through visual observation.

7. The AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe System is Unclassified unless MODE IV operational evaluator parameters are loaded into the equipment.

8. The AN/ALQ-187 Advanced Countermeasures Electronic System (ACES) provides passive radar warning, wide spectrum radio frequency jamming, and control and management of the entire electronic warfare (EW) system. It is an internally mounted suite. The commercially developed system software and hardware is Unclassified. The system is classified Secret when loaded with a U.S. derived EW database.

9. The AIM-9M-8/9 SIDEWINDER is a supersonic, heat-seeking, air-to-air missile carried by fighter aircraft. Advanced technology in the AIM-9M includes Active Optical Target Detector, Gyro Optics Assembly within the Guidance Control Section, Infrared Countermeasures, Detection and Rejection Circuitry, and a reduced smoke rocket motor. The hardware, software, and maintenance are classified Confidential. Pilot training, technical data and documentation, which are necessary for performance and operating information, are classified Secret.
10. The AIM-7M (F or H Build) SPARROW is a semiactive, medium range air-to-air missile designed to be either rail or ejection launched. Semiactive, continuous wave, homing radar, and hydraulically-operated control surfaces direct and stabilize the missile on a proportional navigational course to the target. The highest classification level for the AIM-7 missile is Secret.

11. The PAVEWAY II/III (GBU-10/12/24) series of laser guided bombs consists of a guidance kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into precision-guided “smart” munitions. At the core of each PAVEWAY II/III Munitions Kit is a dumb bomb. A laser guidance kit is integrated with each dumb bomb to add the requisite level of accuracy. The kit consists of a computer-controlled group at the front end of the weapon and an airfoil group at the back. When a target is illuminated by a laser, either airborne or ground-based, the guidance fins react to signals from the control group and steer the weapon to the target. This precision-guided munition offers improved accuracy over free-fall bombs, thus providing the potential for reduced collateral damage.

12. The AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK air-to-ground missile has an overall classification of Secret. The Secret aspects of the Maverick system are tactics, information revealing its vulnerability to countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures. Manuals and technical documents, which are necessary for operational use and organizational maintenance have portions that are classified Confidential. Performance and operating logic of the countermeasures circuits are Secret.

13. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

Transmittal No. 10–42
The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 10–42 with attached transmittal, policy justification, and sensitivity of technology.
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
201 12TH STREET SOUTH, STE 203
ARLINGTON, VA  22202-6408

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding corrected letters, concerning the Department
of the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to Canada for defense
articles and services. On September 14, 2010 we notified this sale with an estimated
value of $72 million. Subsequently, we discovered an administrative error in the letters
addressed to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives and to the Chairman, Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The enclosed revised letters supersede letters dated
September 14, 2010, which incorrectly cited Army as the responsible military department.
The responsible military department is the U.S. Air Force. We regret the error.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William E. Landay III
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

Enclosures:
1. Transmittal
2. Policy Justification
3. Sensitivity of Technology
Transmittal No. 10-42

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Canada

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Defense Equipment*</td>
<td>$38 million</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>$34 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$72 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:
8 AN/AAQ-24(V) Directional Infrared Countermeasure Systems (DIRCMs), which consist of: 16 Small Laser Transmitter Assemblies (SLTA), 54 Missile Approach Warning Sensors AAR-54(V) (MAWS), 11 AN/AAQ-24(V) Processors, 12 AN/AAQ-24(V) Control Indicator Units, and 21 AAQ-24(V) Smart Cards; 2 SLTA, additional spare components which consist of 6 AAR-54(V) (MAWS), 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Processors, 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Control Indicator Units, and 4 AN/AAQ-24(V) Smart Cards; support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government (USG) and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (QCC)

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: FMS Case QZZ-$568M-31Jan07

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: SEP 24 2010

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Canada – AN/AAQ-24(V) Directional Infrared Countermeasure Systems

The Government of Canada has requested a possible sale of 8 AN/AAQ-24(V) Directional Infrared Countermeasure Systems (DIRCMs), which consist of: 16 Small Laser Transmitter Assemblies (SLTA), 54 Missile Approach Warning Sensors AAR-54(V) (MAWS), 11 AN/AAQ-24(V) Processors, 12 AN/AAQ-24(V) Control Indicator Units, and 21 AAQ-24(V) Smart Cards; 2 SLTA, additional spare components which consist of 6 AAR-54(V) (MAWS), 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Processors, 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Control Indicator Units, and 4 AN/AAQ-24(V) Smart Cards; support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government (USG) and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is $72 million.

The proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in North America.

The upgrade of Canada’s CH-47F CHINOOK helicopters with the DIRCM system will allow Canada to use this capability to enhance the survivability of its aircraft and crew for its medium-high lift helicopter (MHLH) mission at home and abroad. The upgraded CH-47F helicopters will be used during deployments into Afghanistan supporting coalition goals and U.S. national objectives. Canada, which already has AN/AAQ-24(V) systems as part of its CC177 (C-17 equivalent) fleet, will have no difficulty absorbing these additional systems.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Rolling Meadows, Illinois. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Canada.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 10-42

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

Annex
Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AN/AAQ-24(V) Directional Infrared Countermeasure System (DIRCM) is a multi-configuration system readily adaptable to a variety of aircraft. The AN/AAQ-24(V) User Data Module (UDM) and the Control Indicator Unit (CIU) are classified Secret. The system consists of a CIU, Missile Warning System, System Processor, and a Small Laser Transmitter Assembly (SLTA). The DIRCM System increases effectiveness against threats from modern Man-Portable Air Defense Systems and provides fast, accurate threat detection, processing, tracking, and countermeasures to defeat current and future generations of infrared missile threats. Anti-tampering security measures have been incorporated into the AN/AAQ-24(V) System to prevent exploitation of the software.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.