[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 249 (Friday, December 28, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76574-76578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-31152]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-68493; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-133]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change to
Modify a Level 2 Subscriber Fee and Related Rule Clarifications
December 20, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on December 18, 2012, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which
Items have been prepared by NASDAQ. The Commission is publishing this
notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested
persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change
NASDAQ proposes to modify the NASDAQ Level 2 Professional
Subscriber fee, as well as to make certain clarifications to NASDAQ
Rule 7023(b)(1). NASDAQ will implement the proposed revised fee on
January 1, 2013.
* * * * *
7023. NASDAQ Depth-of-Book Data
(a) No change.
(b) Subscriber Fees.
(1) NASDAQ Level 2
(A) Non-Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee of $9 each;
(B) Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee of $ [3]40 each
for [any] Display Usage based upon Direct or Indirect Access, or for
Non-Display Usage based upon Indirect Access only;
(C) Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee as set forth in
subsection (4) below for Non-Display Usage based upon Direct Access;
[and]
(D) The [monthly Subscriber] fees for NASDAQ Level 2 are
separate from the fees for NASDAQ Level 1 as set forth in the NASDAQ
UTP Plan[.] ; and
(E) Direct Access has the same meaning as set forth in NASDAQ
Rule 7019(d).
(b)(2)--(4) No change.
(c)--(e) No change.
* * * * *
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. NASDAQ has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A,
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
NASDAQ is proposing a change to modify the NASDAQ Level 2
Professional Subscriber fee (``Level 2 fee''), as well as to make
certain modifications for clarity to NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1). NASDAQ
Rule 7023(b)(1) currently provides for a monthly fee of $30 for
Professional Subscribers each for any Display Usage or for Non-Display
Usage based upon Indirect Access. Specifically, NASDAQ proposes to
increase the display fee from $30 per month to $40 per month for
Professional Subscribers each for Direct or Indirect Access, or for
Non-Display usage based upon Indirect Access. NASDAQ Level 2 Non-
[[Page 76575]]
Professional Subscriber fees will remain unchanged.
The NASDAQ Level 2 product is completely optional. NASDAQ has
enhanced this product through capacity upgrades and regulatory data
sets over the last approximately 30 years, but has not increased the
associated Professional Subscriber fee. During this year time period,
the network capacity for NASDAQ Level 2 has increased from a 56 Kb feed
in 1983 to the current 30 Mb feed. Additionally, since NASDAQ Level 2
is also used for market making functions, NASDAQ has invested over the
years to add regulatory data sets, such as Market Maker Mode and
Trading Action status. Such investments will continue in 2013 by the
addition of limit up--limit down and IPO data elements to the feed. The
only usage fee change NASDAQ has made in the last approximately 30
years was to add a Non-Professional fee option for NASDAQ Level 2,
which is widely used by online brokerage firms today. This increase
represents the first Professional Subscriber price change for display
usage of NASDAQ Level 2 user fees since its introduction in 1983.
NASDAQ is also making certain clarifications to NASDAQ Rule
7023(b)(1). By specifically including the access methods for display
data into NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1)(B), it should serve to assist firms in
understanding the fees based upon access. This conforms to how other
Subscriber fees are described within the NASDAQ rules. Additionally,
the words ``monthly Subscriber'' are being deleted from NASDAQ Rule
7023(b)(1)(D) to clarify that not only Subscriber fees are separate
from the fees for NASDAQ Level 1 as set forth in the NASDAQ UTP Plan,
but distributor fees, access fees or any fees set forth in the NASDAQ
UTP Plan. Finally, NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1)(E) is a definitional
reference for the term ``Direct Access'' that is being added to improve
the clarity of the section.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\3\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\4\ in particular, in that it provides
an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and
recipients of NASDAQ data and is not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between them. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission
granted self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased
authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the
public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of
data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition
for the provision of market data.
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\3\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\5\
\5\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
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By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability
of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals
of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If
the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is
sold should be set by the market as well. Level 2, TotalView and
OpenView are precisely the sort of market data products that the
Commission envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173,
the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all self-regulatory
organization (``SRO'') rule proposals establishing or changing dues,
fees, or other charges are immediately effective upon filing regardless
of whether such dues, fees, or other charges are imposed on members of
the SRO, non-members, or both. Section 916 further amended paragraph
(C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any
time within the 60-day period beginning on the date of filing of such a
proposed rule change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1)
[of Section 19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend
the change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization made
thereby, if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the
Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute
proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine
whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.''
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (D.C. Cir.
2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' ''
NetCoalition, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
For the reasons stated above, NASDAQ believes that the proposed fee
is fair and equitable in accordance with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,
and not unreasonably discriminatory in accordance with Section 6(b)(5)
of the Act. As described above, the proposed fee is based on pricing
conventions and distinctions that exist in NASDAQ's current fee
schedule, and the fee schedules of other exchanges. These distinctions
(top-of-book versus Depth-of-Book, Professional versus non-Professional
Subscribers, Direct versus Indirect Access, Internal versus External
Distribution) are each based on principles of fairness and equity that
have helped for many years to maintain fair, equitable, and not
unreasonably discriminatory fees, and that apply with equal or greater
force to the current proposal.
As described in greater detail below, if NASDAQ has calculated
improperly and the market deems the proposed fees to be unfair,
inequitable, or unreasonably discriminatory, firms can diminish or
discontinue the use of their data because the proposed product is
entirely optional to all parties. Firms are not required to purchase
Depth-of-Book
[[Page 76576]]
data or to utilize any specific pricing alternative if they do choose
to purchase Depth-of-Book data. NASDAQ is not required to make Depth-
of-Book data available or to offer specific pricing alternatives for
potential purchases. NASDAQ can discontinue offering a pricing
alternative (as it has in the past) and firms can discontinue their use
at any time and for any reason (as they often do), including due to
their assessment of the reasonableness of fees charged. NASDAQ
continues to establish and revise pricing policies aimed at increasing
fairness and equitable allocation of fees among Subscribers.
NASDAQ believes that periodically it must adjust the Depth-of-Book
Enterprise Data Subscriber fees to reflect market forces. Given that
this fee change represents the first Professional Subscriber price
change for display usage of NASDAQ Level 2 user fees since its
introduction in 1983, NASDAQ believes it is an appropriate time to
adjust this fee to more accurately reflect the investments made to
enhance this product through capacity upgrades and regulatory data sets
added. Given that this fee could have been justifiably increased at any
point over the course of the past 29 years, NASDAQ believes that such
an increase is now long overdue. This also reflects that the market for
this Depth-of-Book information is highly competitive and continually
evolves as products develop and change.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoalition court found that the Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. NASDAQ
believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate the
competitive nature of the market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end Subscribers only
insofar as they provide information that end Subscribers expect will
assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, an increase in the fees charged for either transactions or
data has the potential to impair revenues from both products. ``No one
disputes that competition for order flow is `fierce'.'' NetCoalition at
24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies
a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers with
order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders
toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its
order flow from one platform to another in response to order execution
price differentials would both reduce the value of that platform's
market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the disfavored
platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data fees, the
change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the
platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can
lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby
lessening the need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
[[Page 76577]]
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing
broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various forms of alternative trading
systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and electronic communication
networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction
reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting
Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to attract internalized transaction
reports. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of
proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE''), NYSE MKT LLC,
NYSE Arca LLC, and BATS Exchange, Inc. (``BATS'').
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing Depth-of-Book data on the Internet. Second, because a single
order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a
non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in proprietary
products is exponentially greater than the actual number of orders and
transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon
their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and
Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to
offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in
sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a
discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract
``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail
broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers
proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient
commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these
vendors' pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to
purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient
value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary data products must
understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing
disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
Depth-of-Book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow.
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly
demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. For
example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100 broker-dealers by shares
executed on NASDAQ consumed Level 2 and 80 of the top 100 broker-
dealers consumed TotalView. During that month, the Level 2-Subscribers
were responsible for 94.44% of the orders entered into NASDAQ and
TotalView Subscribers were responsible for 92.98%.
Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and/
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to
better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its
data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and
streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as
a percent of total Subscriber costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen
relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, programming,
and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true for execution
services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's trading platform,
absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition
has intensified as new
[[Page 76578]]
entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for
data.
The vigor of competition for Depth-of-Book information is
significant and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly
evidences such competition. NASDAQ is increasing the fee in order to
keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs.
This product is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new
customers, as well as retaining existing customers.
The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and
innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year.
NASDAQ continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the
Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from
other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on
how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total
cost of interacting with NASDAQ or other exchanges. Of course, the
explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis.
Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and
others are vice versa. The market for this Depth-of-Book information is
highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and
change.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received from Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\6\ At any time within 60 days of the filing
of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily
suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the
protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of
the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
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\6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of NASDAQ. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133 and should
be submitted on or before January 18, 2013.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\7\
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\7\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-31152 Filed 12-27-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P