[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 197 (Friday, October 10, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 61439-61541]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-22520]



[[Page 61439]]

Vol. 79

Friday,

No. 197

October 10, 2014

Part III





Department of the Treasury





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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency





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12 CFR Part 50





Federal Reserve System





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12 CFR Part 249





Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





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12 CFR Part 329





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Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards; Final 
Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 197 / Friday, October 10, 2014 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 61440]]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 50

[Docket ID OCC-2013-0016]
RIN 1557-AD74

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 249

[Regulation WW; Docket No. R-1466]
RIN 7100-AE03

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 329

RIN 3064-AE04


Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Department of the 
Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are adopting a final rule that 
implements a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the 
liquidity coverage ratio standard established by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). The requirement is designed to promote the 
short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of large and 
internationally active banking organizations, thereby improving the 
banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, and to further improve the measurement and management 
of liquidity risk. The final rule establishes a quantitative minimum 
liquidity coverage ratio that requires a company subject to the rule to 
maintain an amount of high-quality liquid assets (the numerator of the 
ratio) that is no less than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows 
over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the denominator of the 
ratio). The final rule applies to large and internationally active 
banking organizations, generally, bank holding companies, certain 
savings and loan holding companies, and depository institutions with 
$250 billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more in on-
balance sheet foreign exposure and to their consolidated subsidiaries 
that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets. The final rule focuses on these financial 
institutions because of their complexity, funding profiles, and 
potential risk to the financial system. Therefore, the agencies do not 
intend to apply the final rule to community banks. In addition, the 
Board is separately adopting a modified minimum liquidity coverage 
ratio requirement for bank holding companies and savings and loan 
holding companies without significant insurance or commercial 
operations that, in each case, have $50 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets but that are not internationally active. The final 
rule is effective January 1, 2015, with transition periods for 
compliance with the requirements of the rule.

DATES: Effective Date: January 1, 2015. Comments must be submitted on 
the Paperwork Reduction Act burden estimates only by December 9, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act 
burden estimates only. Comments should be directed to:
    OCC: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC 
is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments by 
email if possible. Comments may be sent to: Legislative and Regulatory 
Activities Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Attention: 1557-0323, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-
11, Washington, DC 20219. In addition, comments may be sent by fax to 
(571) 465-4326 or by electronic mail to regs.comments@occ.treas.gov. 
You may personally inspect and photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th 
Street SW., Washington, DC 20219. For security reasons, the OCC 
requires that visitors make an appointment to inspect comments. You may 
do so by calling (202) 649-6700. Upon arrival, visitors will be 
required to present valid government-issued photo identification and to 
submit to security screening in order to inspect and photocopy 
comments.
    For further information or to obtain a copy of the collection 
please contact Johnny Vilela or Mary H. Gottlieb, OCC Clearance 
Officers, (202) 649-5490, for persons who are hard of hearing, TTY, 
(202) 649-5597, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218, 
Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket R-1466, by any 
of the following methods:
     Agency Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/proposedregs.aspx.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     E-Mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
     Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
     Mail: Robert deV. Frierson, Secretary, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20551.

All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/proposedregs.aspx as submitted, 
unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your comments will 
not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information. Public 
comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper form in Room MP-
500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th and C Street NW.) between 9:00 
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
    A copy of the PRA OMB submission, including any reporting forms and 
instructions, supporting statement, and other documentation will be 
placed into OMB's public docket files, once approved. Also, these 
documents may be requested from the agency clearance officer, whose 
name appears below.
    For further information contact the Federal Reserve Board Acting 
Clearance Officer, John Schmidt, Office of the Chief Data Officer, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, 
(202) 452-3829. Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) users may 
contact (202) 263-4869, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, DC 20551.
    FDIC: You may submit written comments by any of the following 
methods:
     Agency Web site: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments on the FDIC 
Web site.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     E-Mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. Include ``Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio Final Rule'' on the subject line of the message.
     Mail: Gary A. Kuiper, Counsel, Executive Secretary 
Section, NYA-5046, Attention: Comments, FDIC, 550 17th Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: The guard station at the rear of 
the 550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on

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business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
     Public Inspection: All comments received will be posted 
without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/ 
including any personal information provided.

For further information or to request a copy of the collection please 
contact Gary Kuiper, Counsel, (202) 898-3719, Legal Division, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 
20429.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: Kerri Corn, Director, (202) 649-6398, or James Weinberger, 
Technical Expert, (202) 649-5213, Credit and Market Risk Division; 
Linda M. Jennings, National Bank Examiner, (980) 387-0619; Patrick T. 
Tierney, Assistant Director, or Tiffany Eng, Attorney, Legislative and 
Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 649-5490, for persons who are 
deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, (202) 649-5597; or Tena Alexander, Senior 
Counsel, or David Stankiewicz, Senior Attorney, Securities and 
Corporate Practices Division, (202) 649-5510; Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Constance Horsley, Assistant Director, (202) 452-5239, David 
Emmel, Manager, (202) 912-4612, Adam S. Trost, Senior Supervisory 
Financial Analyst, (202) 452-3814, or J. Kevin Littler, Senior 
Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 475-6677, Credit, Market and 
Liquidity Risk Policy, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation; 
April C. Snyder, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-3099, Dafina Stewart, Senior 
Attorney, (202) 452-3876, Jahad Atieh, Attorney, (202) 452-3900, Legal 
Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C 
Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only, 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), (202) 263-4869.
    FDIC: Kyle Hadley, Chief, Examination Support Section, (202) 898-
6532; Eric Schatten, Capital Markets Policy Analyst, (202) 898-7063, 
Capital Markets Branch Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 
898-6888; Gregory Feder, Counsel, (202) 898-8724, or Suzanne Dawley, 
Senior Attorney, (202) 898-6509, Supervision Branch, Legal Division, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, 
DC, 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Overview
    A. Background and Summary of the Proposed Rule
    B. Summary of Comments on the Proposed Rule and Significant 
Comment Themes
    C. Overview of the Final Rule and Significant Changes From the 
Proposal
    D. Scope of Application of the Final Rule
    1. Covered Companies
    2. Covered Depository Institution Subsidiaries
    3. Companies that Become Subject to the LCR Requirements
II. Minimum Liquidity Coverage Ratio
    A. The LCR Calculation and Maintenance Requirement
    1. A Liquidity Coverage Requirement
    2. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio Stress Period
    3. The Calculation Date, Daily Calculation Requirement, and 
Comments on LCR Reporting
    B. High-Quality Liquid Assets
    1. Liquidity Characteristics of HQLA
    2. Qualifying Criteria for Categories of HQLA
    3. Requirements for Inclusion as Eligible HQLA
    4. Generally Applicable Criteria for Eligible HQLA
    5. Calculation of the HQLA Amount
    C. Net Cash Outflows
    1. The Total Net Cash Outflow Amount
    2. Determining Maturity
    3. Outflow Amounts
    4. Inflow Amounts
III. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Shortfall
IV. Transition and Timing
V. Modified Liquidity Coverage Ratio
    A. Threshold for Application of the Modified Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio Requirement.
    B. 21 Calendar-Day Stress Period
    C. Calculation Requirements and Comments on Modified LCR 
Reporting
VI. Plain Language
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act
VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act
IX. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

I. Overview

A. Background and Summary of the Proposed Rule

    On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the 
agencies) invited comment on a proposed rule (proposed rule or 
proposal) to implement a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement 
that would be consistent with the international liquidity standards 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).\1\ The 
proposed rule would have applied to nonbank financial companies 
designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) for 
supervision by the Board that do not have substantial insurance 
activities (covered nonbank companies), large, internationally active 
banking organizations, and their consolidated subsidiary depository 
institutions with total assets of $10 billion or more (each, a covered 
company).\2\ The Board also proposed to implement a modified version of 
the liquidity coverage ratio requirement (modified LCR) as an enhanced 
prudential standard for bank holding companies and savings and loan 
holding companies with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets 
that are not internationally active and do not have substantial 
insurance activities (each, a modified LCR holding company).
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    \1\ The BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities 
that was established by the central bank governors of the G10 
countries in 1975. It currently consists of senior representatives 
of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The OCC, Board, and FDIC actively participate in BCBS and 
its international efforts. Documents issued by the BCBS are 
available through the Bank for International Settlements Web site at 
http://www.bis.org.
    \2\ 78 FR 71818 (November 29, 2013).
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    The BCBS published the international liquidity standards in 
December 2010 as a part of the Basel III reform package \3\ and revised 
the standards in January 2013 (as revised, the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework).\4\ The agencies are actively involved in the BCBS 
and its international efforts, including the development of the Basel 
III Revised Liquidity Framework.
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    \3\ BCBS, ``Basel III: International framework for liquidity 
risk measurement, standards and monitoring'' (December 2010), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf (Basel III 
Liquidity Framework).
    \4\ BCBS, ``Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
liquidity risk monitoring tools'' (January 2013), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm.
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    To devise the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the BCBS 
gathered supervisory data from multiple jurisdictions, including a 
substantial amount of data related to U.S. financial institutions, 
which was reflective of a variety of time periods and types of 
historical liquidity stresses. These historical stresses included both 
idiosyncratic and systemic stresses across a range of financial 
institutions. The BCBS determined the LCR parameters based on a 
combination of historical data analysis and supervisory judgment.
    The proposed rule would have established a quantitative minimum LCR 
requirement that builds upon the liquidity coverage methodologies 
traditionally used by banking organizations to assess exposures to 
contingent liquidity events. The

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proposed rule was designed to complement existing supervisory guidance 
and the requirements of the Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR part 252) on 
internal liquidity stress testing and liquidity risk management that 
the Board issued, in consultation with the OCC and the FDIC, pursuant 
to section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).\5\ The proposed rule also 
would have established transition periods for conformance with the 
requirements.
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    \5\ See Board, ``Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding 
Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations,'' 79 FR 17240 (March 
27, 2014) (Board's Regulation YY); OCC, Board, FDIC, Office of 
Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration, 
``Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk 
Management,'' 75 FR 13656 (March 22, 2010) (Interagency Liquidity 
Policy Statement).
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    The proposed LCR would have required a covered company to maintain 
an amount of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA amount) 
sufficient to meet its total stressed net cash outflows over a 
prospective 30 calendar-day period, as calculated in accordance with 
the proposed rule. The proposed rule outlined certain categories of 
assets that would have qualified as high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) 
if they were unencumbered and able to be monetized during a period of 
stress. HQLA that are unencumbered and controlled by a covered 
company's liquidity risk management function would enhance the ability 
of a covered company to meet its liquidity needs during an acute short-
term liquidity stress scenario. A covered company would have determined 
its total net cash outflow amount by applying the proposal's outflow 
and inflow rates, which reflected a standardized stress scenario, to 
the covered company's funding sources, obligations, and assets over a 
prospective 30 calendar-day period. The net cash outflow amount for 
modified LCR holding companies would have reflected a 21 calendar-day 
period. The proposed rule would have been generally consistent with the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework; however, there were instances 
where the agencies believed supervisory or market conditions unique to 
the United States required the proposal to differ from the Basel III 
standard.

B. Summary of Comments on the Proposed Rule and Significant Comment 
Themes

    Each of the agencies received over 100 comments on the proposal 
from U.S. and foreign firms, public officials (including state and 
local government officials and members of the U.S. Congress), public 
interest groups, private individuals, and other interested parties. In 
addition, agency staffs held a number of meetings with members of the 
public and obtained supplementary information from certain commenters. 
Summaries of these meetings are available on the agencies' public Web 
sites.\6\
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    \6\ See http://www.regulations.gov/index.jsp#!docketDetail;D=OCC-2013-0016 (OCC); http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/2013_liquidity_coverage_ae04.html 
(FDIC); http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_systemic.htm 
(Board).
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    Although many commenters generally supported the purpose of the 
proposed rule to create a standardized minimum liquidity requirement, 
most commenters either expressed concern regarding the proposal overall 
or criticized specific aspects of the proposed rule. The agencies 
received a number of comments regarding the differences between the 
proposed rule and the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, together 
with comments on the interaction of this proposal with other 
rulemakings issued by the agencies. Comments about differences between 
the proposed rule and the Basel III standard were mixed. Some 
commenters expressed support for the areas in which the proposed rule 
was more stringent than the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework and 
others stated that having more conservative treatment for assessing the 
LCR could disadvantage the U.S. banking system. Commenters questioned 
whether the proposal should impose heightened standards compared to the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework and requested that the final 
rule's calculation of the LCR conform to the Basel III standard in 
order to maintain consistency and comparability internationally. A 
commenter noted that the proposed rule would create a burden for those 
institutions required to comply with more than one liquidity standard 
throughout their global operations. Another commenter argued that the 
proposed rule's divergence from the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework would make it more difficult to harmonize with global 
standards. Commenters also expressed concern about the interaction 
between the proposed rule and other proposed or recently finalized 
rules that affect a covered company's LCR, such as the agencies' 
supplementary leverage ratio \7\ and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's liquidity requirements for derivatives clearing 
organizations.\8\
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    \7\ 79 FR 24528 (May 1, 2014).
    \8\ 76 FR 69334 (November 8, 2011).
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    Additionally, a few commenters expressed concerns about the overall 
impact of the requirements, citing the impact of the standard on 
covered companies' costs, competitiveness, and existing business 
practices, as well as the impact upon non-financial companies more 
broadly. As described in more detail below, the agencies have addressed 
these issues by reducing burdens where appropriate, while ensuring that 
the final rule serves the purpose of promoting the safety and soundness 
of covered companies. The agencies found that certain comments 
concerning the costs and benefits of the proposed rule to be relevant 
to their deliberations, and, on the basis of these and other 
considerations, made the changes discussed below.
    The proposed rule would have required covered companies to comply 
with a minimum LCR of 80 percent beginning on January 1, 2015, 90 
percent beginning on January 1, 2016, and 100 percent beginning on 
January 1, 2017, and thereafter. These transition periods were similar 
to, but shorter than, those set forth in the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, and were intended to preserve the strong liquidity 
positions many U.S. banking organizations have achieved since the 
recent financial crisis. The proposed rule also would have required 
covered companies to calculate their LCR daily, beginning on January 1, 
2015. A number of commenters expressed concerns with the proposed 
transition periods as well as the operational difficulties of meeting 
the proposed requirement for daily calculation of the LCR. 
Additionally, some commenters expressed concerns regarding the scope of 
application of the proposed rule, with regard to both the application 
of the proposed rule to covered nonbank companies and the proposed 
rule's delineation between covered companies and modified LCR holding 
companies.
    Commenters generally expressed a desire to see a wider range of 
asset classes included as HQLA or to have some asset classes and 
funding sources treated as having greater liquidity than proposed. The 
agencies received comments that highlighted the differences between the 
types of assets included as HQLA under the U.S. proposal and those that 
might be included under the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. For 
example, the agencies proposed excluding some asset classes from HQLA 
that may have qualified under the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework 
given the agencies' concerns about their relative lack of liquidity. 
Many of these comments related to the exclusion in

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the proposed rule of state and municipal securities from HQLA. 
Commenters expressed concern that the exclusion of municipal securities 
from HQLA could lead to higher funding costs for municipalities, which 
could affect local economies and infrastructure.
    Likewise, the agencies' proposed method for determining a covered 
company's HQLA amount elicited many comments. A number of these 
comments focused on the treatment of deposits from public sector 
entities that are required by law to be secured by eligible collateral 
and would have been treated as secured funding transactions under the 
proposed rule. Commenters expressed concern that the treatment of 
secured deposits in the calculation of a covered company's HQLA amount 
would lead to distortions in the LCR calculation and to reduced 
acceptance of public deposits by covered companies.
    The proposed rule would have required covered companies to hold an 
amount of HQLA to meet their greatest liquidity need within a 
prospective 30 calendar-day period rather than at the end of that 
period. By requiring a covered company to calculate its total net cash 
outflow amount using its peak cumulative net outflow day, the proposal 
would have taken into account potential maturity mismatches between a 
covered company's contractual outflows and inflows during the 30 
calendar-day period. The agencies received many comments on the 
methodology for calculating the peak cumulative net cash outflow 
amount, specifically in regard to the treatment of non-maturity 
outflows. Some commenters felt that the approach had merits because it 
captured potential liquidity shortfalls within the 30 calendar-day 
period, whereas others argued that that it was overly conservative, 
unrealistic, and inconsistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework.
    Generally, commenters expressed that the outflow rates used to 
determine total net cash outflows were too high with respect to 
specific outflow categories. Commenters also expressed concern that 
specific outflow rates were applied to overly narrow or overly broad 
categories of exposures in certain cases. Several commenters requested 
the agencies to clarify whether the outflow and inflow rates under the 
final rule are designed to reflect an idiosyncratic stress at a 
particular institution or general market distress. The agencies 
received a number of comments on the criteria for determining whether a 
deposit was an operational deposit and on the definitions of certain 
related terms. Commenters generally approved of the potential 
categorization of certain deposits as operational deposits but 
expressed concern that other deposits were excluded from the category. 
Similarly, some commenters expressed concern that the outflow rates 
assigned to committed facilities extended to special purpose entities 
(SPEs) did not differentiate between different types of SPEs.
    Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed modified LCR 
would have required net cash outflows to be calculated over a 21 
calendar-day stress period. Commenters argued that using a 21 calendar-
day period would create significant operational burden as it is an 
atypical period that does not align well with their existing systems 
and processes. Commenters also expressed concerns regarding the 
transition periods and the daily calculation requirement applicable to 
modified LCR holding companies.

C. Overview of the Final Rule and Significant Changes From the Proposal

    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule establishes a 
minimum LCR requirement applicable, on a consolidated basis, to large, 
internationally active banking organizations with $250 billion or more 
in total consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in total on-balance 
sheet foreign exposure, and to consolidated subsidiary depository 
institutions of these banking organizations with $10 billion or more in 
total consolidated assets.\9\ Unlike the proposed rule, however, the 
final rule will not apply to covered nonbank companies or their 
consolidated subsidiary depository institutions. Instead, as discussed 
further below in section I.D, the Board will establish any LCR 
requirement for such companies by order or rule. The final rule does 
not apply to foreign banking organizations or U.S. intermediate holding 
companies that are required to be established under the Board's 
Regulation YY, other than those companies that are otherwise covered 
companies.\10\
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    \9\ Like the proposed rule, the final rule does not apply to 
institutions that have opted to use the advanced approaches risk-
based capital rule. See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 12 CFR part 217 
(Board), and 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).
    \10\ 12 CFR 252.153.
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    As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, and consistent with the proposal, the Board also is separately 
adopting a modified version of the LCR for bank holding companies and 
savings and loan holding companies without significant insurance 
operations (or, in the case of savings and loan holding companies, also 
without significant commercial operations) that, in each case, have $50 
billion or more in total consolidated assets, but are not covered 
companies for the purposes of the final rule.\11\
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    \11\ Total consolidated assets for the purposes of the proposed 
rule would have been as reported on a covered company's most recent 
year-end Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income or 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, 
Federal Reserve Form FR Y-9C. Foreign exposure data would be 
calculated in accordance with the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council 009 Country Exposure Report. The agencies have 
retained these standards in the final rule as proposed.
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    The final rule requires a covered company to maintain an amount of 
HQLA meeting the criteria set forth in this final rule (the HQLA 
amount, which is the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 
percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-
day period (the denominator of the ratio). The agencies recognize that, 
under certain circumstances, it may be necessary for a covered 
company's LCR to fall briefly below 100 percent to fund unanticipated 
liquidity needs.\12\ However, a LCR below 100 percent may also reflect 
a significant deficiency in a covered company's management of liquidity 
risk. Therefore, consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule 
establishes a framework for a flexible supervisory response when a 
covered company's LCR falls below 100 percent. Under the final rule, a 
covered company must notify the appropriate Federal banking agency on 
any business day that its LCR is less than 100 percent. In addition, if 
a covered company's LCR is below 100 percent for three consecutive 
business days, the covered company must submit to its appropriate 
Federal banking agency a plan for remediation of the shortfall.\13\ 
These procedures, which are described in further detail in section III 
of this Supplementary Information section, are intended to enable 
supervisors to monitor and respond appropriately to the unique 
circumstances that give rise to a covered company's LCR shortfall.
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    \12\ During the transition period, for covered companies, the 
agencies will consider a shortfall to be a liquidity coverage ratio 
lower than 80 percent in 2015 and lower than 90 percent in 2016.
    \13\ During the period when a covered company is required to 
calculate its LCR monthly, the covered company must promptly consult 
with the appropriate Federal banking agency to determine whether a 
plan would be required if the covered company's LCR is below the 
minimum requirement for any calculation date that is the last 
business day of the calendar month.
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    The agencies emphasize that the LCR is a minimum requirement and 
organizations that pose more systemic risk to the U.S. banking system 
or whose liquidity stress testing indicates a need

[[Page 61444]]

for higher liquidity reserves may need to take additional steps beyond 
meeting the minimum ratio in order to meet supervisory expectations. 
The LCR will complement existing supervisory guidance and the more 
qualitative and internal stress test requirements in the Board's 
Regulation YY.
    Under the final rule, certain categories of assets may qualify as 
eligible HQLA and may contribute to the HQLA amount if they are 
unencumbered by liens and other restrictions on transfer and can 
therefore be converted quickly into cash without reasonably expecting 
to incur losses in excess of the applicable LCR haircuts during a 
stress period. Consistent with the proposal, the final rule establishes 
three categories of HQLA: level 1 liquid assets, level 2A liquid assets 
and level 2B liquid assets. The fair value, as determined under U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), of a covered company's 
level 2A liquid assets and level 2B liquid assets are subject to 
haircuts of 15 percent and 50 percent respectively. The amount of level 
2 liquid assets (that is, level 2A and level 2B liquid assets) may not 
comprise more than 40 percent of the covered company's HQLA amount. The 
amount of level 2B liquid assets may not comprise more than 15 percent 
of the covered company's HQLA amount.
    Certain adjustments have been made to the final rule to address 
concerns raised by a number of commenters with respect to assets that 
would have qualified as HQLA. With respect to the inclusion of 
corporate debt securities as HQLA, the agencies have removed the 
requirement that corporate debt securities have to be publicly traded 
on a national securities exchange in order to qualify for inclusion as 
HQLA. Additionally, in response to requests by several commenters, the 
agencies have expanded the pool of publicly traded common equity shares 
that may be included as HQLA. Consistent with the proposed rule, the 
final rule does not include state and municipal securities as HQLA. As 
discussed fully in section II.B.2 of this Supplementary Information 
section, the liquidity characteristics of municipal securities range 
significantly and many of these assets do not exhibit the 
characteristics for inclusion as HQLA. With respect to the calculation 
of the HQLA amount and in response to comments received, the agencies 
are removing collateralized deposits, as defined in the final rule, 
from the calculation of amounts exceeding the composition caps, as 
described in section II.B.5, below.
    A covered company's total net cash outflow amount is determined 
under the final rule by applying outflow and inflow rates, which 
reflect certain standardized stressed assumptions, against the balances 
of a covered company's funding sources, obligations, transactions, and 
assets over a prospective 30 calendar-day period. Inflows that can be 
included to offset outflows are limited to 75 percent of outflows to 
ensure that covered companies are maintaining sufficient on-balance 
sheet liquidity and are not overly reliant on inflows, which may not 
materialize in a period of stress.
    As further described in section II.C of this Supplementary 
Information section and discussed in the proposal, the measure of net 
cash outflow and the outflow and inflow rates used in its determination 
are meant to reflect aspects of historical stress events including the 
recent financial crisis. Consistent with the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework and the agencies' evaluation of relevant 
supervisory information, these net outflow components of the final rule 
take into account the potential impact of idiosyncratic and market-wide 
shocks, including those that would result in: (1) A partial loss of 
unsecured wholesale funding capacity; (2) a partial loss of secured, 
short-term financing with certain collateral and counterparties; (3) 
losses from derivative positions and the collateral supporting those 
positions; (4) unscheduled draws on committed credit and liquidity 
facilities that a covered company has provided to its customers; (5) 
the potential need for a covered company to buy back debt or to honor 
non-contractual obligations in order to mitigate reputational and other 
risks; (6) a partial loss of retail deposits and brokered deposits from 
retail customers; and (7) other shocks that affect outflows linked to 
structured financing transactions, mortgages, central bank borrowings, 
and customer short positions.
    The agencies revised certain elements of the calculation of net 
cash outflows in the final rule, which are also described in section 
II.C below. The methodology for determining the peak cumulative net 
outflow has been amended to address certain comments relating to the 
treatment in the proposed rule of non-maturity outflows. The revised 
methodology focuses more explicitly on the maturity mismatch of 
contractual outflows and inflows as well as overnight funding from 
financial institutions.
    The agencies have also changed the definition of operational 
services and the list of operational requirements. In making these 
changes, the agencies have addressed certain issues raised by 
commenters relating to the types of operational services that would be 
covered by the rule and the requirement to exclude certain deposits 
from being classified as operational. Additionally, the agencies have 
limited the outflow rate that must be applied to maturing secured 
funding transactions such that the outflow rate should generally not be 
greater than the outflow rate for an unsecured funding transaction with 
the same wholesale counterparty. The agencies have also revised the 
outflow rates for committed credit and liquidity facilities to SPEs so 
that only SPEs that rely on the market for funding receive the 100 
percent outflow rate. This change should address commenters' concerns 
about inappropriate outflow rates for SPEs that are wholly funded by 
long-term bank loans and similar facilities and do not have the same 
liquidity risk characteristics as those that rely on the market for 
funding.
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
final rule is effective as of January 1, 2015, subject to the 
transition periods in the final rule. Under the final rule, covered 
companies will be required to maintain a minimum LCR of 80 percent 
beginning January 1, 2015. From January 1, 2016, through December 31, 
2016, the minimum LCR would be 90 percent. Beginning on January 1, 
2017, and thereafter, all covered companies would be required to 
maintain an LCR of 100 percent. Transition periods are described fully 
in section IV of this Supplementary Information section.
    The agencies made changes to the final rule's transition periods to 
address commenters' concerns that the proposed transition periods would 
not have provided covered companies enough time to establish the 
required infrastructure to ensure compliance with the proposed rule's 
requirements, including the proposed daily calculation requirement. 
These changes reflect commenters' concern regarding the operational 
challenges of implementing the daily calculation requirement, while 
still requiring firms to maintain sufficient HQLA to comply with the 
rule. Although the agencies will still require compliance with the 
final rule starting January 1, 2015, the agencies have delayed 
implementation of the daily calculation requirement. With respect to 
the daily calculation requirements, covered companies that are 
depository institution holding companies with $700 billion or more in 
total consolidated assets or $10 trillion or more in assets under 
custody, and any depository institution that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of such depository institution holding

[[Page 61445]]

companies that has total consolidated assets equal to $10 billion or 
more, are required to calculate their LCR on the last business day of 
the calendar month from January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2015, and 
beginning on July 1, 2015, must calculate their LCR on each business 
day. All other covered companies are required to calculate the LCR on 
the last business day of the calendar month from January 1, 2015, to 
June 30, 2016, and beginning on July 1, 2016, and thereafter, must 
calculate their LCR each business day.
    As detailed in section V of this Supplementary Information section, 
in response to comments, the Board is also adjusting the transition 
periods and calculation frequency requirements for the modified LCR in 
the final rule. Modified LCR holding companies will not be subject to 
the final rule in 2015 and will calculate their LCR monthly starting 
January 1, 2016. Furthermore, the Board is increasing the stress period 
over which modified LCR net cash outflows are to be calculated from 21 
calendar days to 30 calendar days and is amending the methodology 
required to calculate total net cash outflows under the modified LCR.
    The Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework also establishes 
liquidity risk monitoring mechanisms to strengthen and promote global 
consistency in liquidity risk supervision. These mechanisms include 
information on contractual maturity mismatch, concentration of funding, 
available unencumbered assets, LCR reporting by significant currency, 
and market-related monitoring tools. At this time, the agencies are not 
implementing these monitoring mechanisms as regulatory standards or 
requirements. However, the agencies intend to obtain information from 
covered companies to enable the monitoring of liquidity risk exposure 
through reporting forms and information the agencies collect through 
other supervisory processes.
    The final rule will provide enhanced information about the short-
term liquidity profile of a covered company to managers, supervisors, 
and market participants. With this information, the covered company's 
management and supervisors should be better able to assess the 
company's ability to meet its projected liquidity needs during periods 
of liquidity stress; take appropriate actions to address liquidity 
needs; and, in situations of failure, implement an orderly resolution 
of the covered company. The agencies anticipate that they will 
separately seek comment upon proposed regulatory reporting requirements 
and instructions pertaining to a covered company's disclosure of the 
final rule's LCR in a subsequent notice under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act.
    The final rule is consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, with some modifications to reflect the unique 
characteristics and risks of the U.S. market and U.S. regulatory 
frameworks. The agencies believe that these modifications support the 
goal of enhancing the short-term liquidity resiliency of covered 
companies and do not unduly diminish the consistency of the LCR on an 
international basis.
    The agencies note that the BCBS is in the process of reviewing the 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) that was included in the Basel III 
Liquidity Framework when it was first published in 2010. The NSFR is a 
standard focused on a longer time horizon that is intended to limit 
overreliance on short-term wholesale funding, to encourage better 
assessment of funding risks across all on- and off-balance sheet items, 
and to promote funding stability. The agencies anticipate a separate 
rulemaking regarding the NSFR once the BCBS adopts a final 
international version of the NSFR.

D. Scope of Application of the Final Rule

1. Covered Companies
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
proposed rule would have established a minimum LCR applicable to all 
U.S. internationally active banking organizations, and their 
consolidated subsidiary depository institutions with total consolidated 
assets of $10 billion or more. In implementing internationally agreed 
upon standards in the United States, such as the capital framework 
developed by the BCBS, the agencies have historically applied a 
consistent threshold for determining whether a U.S. banking 
organization should be subject to such standards. The threshold, 
generally banking organizations with $250 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in total on-balance sheet 
foreign exposure, is based on the size, complexity, risk profile, and 
interconnectedness of such organizations.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See e.g., OCC, Board, and FDIC, ``Regulatory Capital Rules: 
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, 
Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized 
Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure 
Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and 
Market Risk Capital Rule,'' 78 FR 62018 (October 11, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters asserted that the agencies' definition of 
internationally active would apply the quantitative minimum liquidity 
standard to an inappropriate set of companies. Several commenters 
argued that the internationally active thresholds would capture several 
large banking organizations even though the business models, 
operations, and funding profiles of these organizations have some 
characteristics that are similar to those bank holding companies that 
would be subject to the modified LCR proposed by the Board. Commenters 
stated that it would be more appropriate for all ``regional banks'' to 
be subject to the modified LCR as described under section V of the 
Supplementary Information section to the proposed rule. One commenter 
requested that the agencies not apply the standard based on the foreign 
exposure threshold, but use a threshold that takes into account changes 
in industry structure, considerations of competitive equality across 
jurisdictions, and differences in capital and liquidity regulation.
    The Board also proposed to apply the proposed rule to covered 
nonbank companies as an enhanced liquidity standard pursuant to its 
authority under section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Board believed 
those organizations should maintain appropriate liquidity commensurate 
with their contribution to overall systemic risk in the United States 
and believed the proposal properly reflected such firms' funding 
profiles. One commenter stated that the proposed rule would adversely 
impact covered nonbank companies that own banks to facilitate customer 
transactions, and would create a mismatch of regulations that will 
hamper the ability of such businesses to operate. This commenter 
further noted that because of their different business models, covered 
nonbank companies are likely to engage in significantly less deposit-
taking than large bank holding companies, which generally translates 
into less access to one of a few sources of level 1 liquid assets, 
Federal Reserve Bank balances. The commenter requested specific 
tailoring of the LCR or a delay in the implementation of the final rule 
for covered nonbank companies.
    One commenter noted that although the proposed rule would have 
exempted depository institution holding companies with substantial 
insurance operations and savings and loan holding companies with 
substantial commercial operations, it would not have exempted 
depository holding companies with significant retail securities 
brokerage operations, which the commenter argued also have liquidity 
risk profiles that should not be covered by the

[[Page 61446]]

liquidity requirements. Another commenter suggested that the agencies 
consider waiving the LCR requirement for certain covered companies, 
subject to satisfactory compliance with other metrics such as capital 
ratios, stress tests, or the NSFR.
    The final rule seeks to calibrate the net cash outflow requirement 
for a covered company based on the composition of the organization's 
balance sheet, off-balance sheet commitments, business activities, and 
funding profile. Sources of funding that are considered less likely to 
be affected at a time of a liquidity stress are assigned significantly 
lower 30 calendar-day outflow rates. Conversely, the types of funding 
that are historically vulnerable to liquidity stress events are 
assigned higher outflow rates. Consistent with the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, in the proposed rule, the agencies expected that 
covered companies with less complex balance sheets and less risky 
funding profiles would have lower net cash outflows and would therefore 
require a lower amount of HQLA to meet the proposed rule's minimum 
liquidity standard. For example, under the proposed rule, covered 
companies that rely to a greater extent on retail deposits that are 
fully covered by deposit insurance and less on short-term unsecured 
wholesale funding would have had a lower total net cash outflow amount 
when compared to a banking organization that was heavily reliant on 
wholesale funding.
    Furthermore, systemic risks that could impair the safety of covered 
companies were also reflected in the minimum requirement, including 
provisions to address wrong-way risk, shocks to asset prices, and other 
industry-wide risks that materialized in the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. Under the proposed rule, covered companies that have greater 
interconnectedness to financial counterparties and have liquidity risks 
related to risky capital market instruments may have larger net cash 
outflows when compared to covered companies that do not have such 
dependencies. Large consolidated banking organizations engage in a 
diverse range of business activities and have a liquidity risk profile 
commensurate with the breadth of these activities. The scope and volume 
of these organizations' financial transactions lead to 
interconnectedness between banking organizations and between the 
banking sector and other financial and non-financial market 
participants.
    The agencies believe that the proposed scope of application 
thresholds were properly calibrated to capture companies with the most 
significant liquidity risk profiles. The agencies believe that covered 
depository institution holding companies with total consolidated assets 
of $250 billion or more have a riskier liquidity profile relative to 
smaller firms based on their breadth of activities and 
interconnectedness with the financial sector. Likewise, the foreign 
exposure threshold identifies firms with a significant international 
presence, which may also be subject to greater liquidity risks for the 
same reasons. In finalizing this rule, the agencies are promoting the 
short-term liquidity resiliency of institutions engaged in a broad 
variety of activities, transactions, and forms of financial 
interconnectedness. For the reasons discussed above, the agencies 
believe that the consistent scope of application used across several 
regulations is appropriate for the final rule.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies believe that providing a waiver to covered companies 
that meet alternate metrics would be contrary to the express purpose of 
the proposed rule to provide a standardized quantitative liquidity 
metric for covered companies. Moreover, with respect to commenters' 
requests to exclude certain covered companies with large retail 
securities brokerage and other non-depository operations from the scope 
of the final rule, the agencies believe that such companies have 
heightened liquidity risk profiles due to the range and volume of 
financial transactions entered into by such organizations and that the 
LCR is appropriately calibrated to reflect those business models.
    The proposed rule exempted depository institution holdings 
companies and nonbank financial companies designated by the Council for 
Board supervision with large insurance operations or savings and loan 
holding companies with large commercial operations, because their 
business models differ significantly from covered companies. The Board 
recognizes that the companies designated by the Council may have a 
range of businesses, structures, and activities, that the types of 
risks to financial stability posed by nonbank financial companies will 
likely vary, and that the enhanced prudential standards applicable to 
bank holding companies may not be appropriate, in whole or in part, for 
all nonbank financial companies. Accordingly, the Board is not applying 
the LCR requirement to nonbank financial companies supervised by the 
Board through this rulemaking. Instead, following designation of a 
nonbank financial company for supervision by the Board, the Board 
intends to assess the business model, capital structure, and risk 
profile of the designated company to determine how the proposed 
enhanced prudential standards should apply, and if appropriate, would 
tailor application of the LCR by order or rule to that nonbank 
financial company or to a category of nonbank financial companies. The 
Board will ensure that nonbank financial companies receive notice and 
opportunity to comment prior to determination of the applicability of 
any LCR requirement.
    Upon the issuance of an order or rule that causes a nonbank 
financial company to become a covered nonbank company subject to the 
LCR requirement, any state nonmember bank or state savings association 
with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets that is a 
consolidated subsidiary of such covered nonbank company also would be 
subject to the final rule. When a nonbank financial company parent of a 
national bank or Federal savings association becomes subject to the LCR 
requirement by order or rule, the OCC will apply its reservation of 
authority under Sec.  _--.1(b)(1)(iv) of the final rule, including 
applying the notice and response procedures described in Sec.  
_--.1(b)(5) of the final rule, to determine if application of the LCR 
requirement is appropriate for the national bank or Federal savings 
association in light of its asset size, level of complexity, risk 
profile, scope of operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic 
covered entities, or risk to the financial system.
    As in the proposed rule, the final rule does not apply to a bridge 
financial company or a subsidiary of a bridge financial company, a new 
depository institution or a bridge depository institution, as those 
terms are used in the resolution context.\16\ The agencies believe that 
requiring the FDIC to maintain a minimum LCR at these entities would 
inappropriately constrain the FDIC's ability to resolve a depository 
institution or its affiliated companies in an orderly manner.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See 12 U.S.C. 1813(i); 5381(a)(3).
    \17\ Pursuant to the International Banking Act (IBA), 12 U.S.C. 
3102(b), and OCC regulation, 12 CFR 28.13(a)(1), the operations of a 
Federal branch or agency regulated and supervised by the OCC are 
subject to the same rights and responsibilities as a national bank 
operating at the same location. Thus, as a general matter, Federal 
branches and agencies are subject to the same laws and regulations 
as national banks. The IBA and the OCC regulation state, however, 
that this general standard does not apply when the IBA or other 
applicable law or regulations provide other specific standards for 
Federal branches or agencies, or when the OCC determines that the 
general standard should not apply. This final rule would not apply 
to Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks operating in the 
United States. At this time, these entities have assets that are 
substantially below the proposed $250 billion asset threshold for 
applying the proposed liquidity standard to an internationally 
active banking organization. As part of its supervisory program for 
Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks, the OCC reviews 
liquidity risks and takes appropriate action to limit such risks in 
those entities.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 61447]]

    A company will remain subject to this final rule until its 
appropriate Federal banking agency determines in writing that 
application of the rule to the company is not appropriate. Moreover, 
nothing in the final rule limits the authority of the agencies under 
any other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or 
enforcement actions, including actions to address unsafe or unsound 
practices or conditions, deficient liquidity levels, or violations of 
law.
    As proposed, the agencies are reserving the authority to apply the 
final rule to a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
or depository institution that does not meet the asset thresholds 
described above if it is determined that the application of the LCR 
would be appropriate in light of a company's asset size, level of 
complexity, risk profile, scope of operations, affiliation with foreign 
or domestic covered companies, or risk to the financial system. The 
agencies also are reserving the authority to require a covered company 
to hold an amount of HQLA greater than otherwise required under the 
final rule, or to take any other measure to improve the covered 
company's liquidity risk profile, if the appropriate Federal banking 
agency determines that the covered company's liquidity requirements as 
calculated under the final rule are not commensurate with its liquidity 
risks. In making such determinations, the agencies will apply the 
notice and response procedures as set forth in their respective 
regulations.
2. Covered Depository Institution Subsidiaries
    The proposed rule would have applied the LCR requirements to 
depository institutions that are the consolidated subsidiaries of 
covered companies and have $10 billion or more in total consolidated 
assets. Several commenters argued that the agencies should not apply a 
separate LCR requirement to subsidiary depository institutions of 
covered companies. Another commenter noted that foreign banking 
organizations would be subject to separate liquidity requirements for 
the entire organization, for any U.S. intermediate holding company that 
the foreign banking organization would be required to form under the 
Board's Regulation YY, and for depository institution subsidiaries that 
would be subject to the proposed rule, which, the commenter asserted, 
could result in unnecessarily duplicative holdings of liquid assets 
within the organization. In addition, several commenters argued that 
the separate LCR requirement for depository institution subsidiaries 
would result in excess liquidity being trapped at the covered 
subsidiaries, especially if the final rule capped the inflows from 
affiliated entities at 75 percent of their outflows. To alleviate this 
burden, one commenter requested that the final rule permit greater 
reliance on support by the top-tier holding company.
    One commenter argued that excess liquidity at the holding company 
should be considered when calculating the LCR for the subsidiary in 
order to recognize the requirement that a bank holding company serve as 
a source of strength for its subsidiary depository institutions. The 
commenter also argued that requiring subsidiary depository institutions 
to calculate the LCR does not recognize the relationship between 
consolidated depository institutions that are subsidiaries of the same 
holding company and requested that the rule permit a depository 
institution to count any excess HQLA held by an affiliated depository 
institution, consistent with the sister bank exemption in section 23A 
of the Federal Reserve Act.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 12 U.S.C. 371c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that the rule should not require less complex 
banking organizations to calculate the LCR for consolidated subsidiary 
depository institutions with total consolidated assets of $10 billion 
or more. Another commenter expressed concern that although subsidiary 
depository institutions with total consolidated assets between $1 
billion and $10 billion would not be required to comply with the 
requirements of the proposed rule, agency examination staff would 
pressure such subsidiary depository institutions to conform to the 
requirements of the final rule. A few commenters requested that the 
agencies clarify that these subsidiary depository institutions would 
not be required by agency examination staff to conform to the rule.
    In promoting short-term, asset-based liquidity resiliency at 
covered companies, the agencies are seeking to limit the consequences 
of a potential liquidity stress event on the covered company and on the 
broader financial system in a manner that does not rely on potential 
government support. Large depository institution subsidiaries play a 
significant role in a covered company's funding structure, and in the 
operation of the payments system. These large subsidiaries generally 
also have access to deposit insurance coverage. Accordingly, the 
agencies believe that the application of the LCR requirement to these 
large depository institution subsidiaries is appropriate.
    To reduce the potential systemic impact of a liquidity stress event 
at such large depository institution subsidiaries, the agencies believe 
that such entities should have a sufficient amount of HQLA to meet 
their own net cash outflows and should not be overly reliant on inflows 
from their parents or affiliates. Accordingly, the agencies do not 
believe that the separate LCR requirement for certain depository 
institution subsidiaries is duplicative of the requirement at the 
consolidated holding company level, and the agencies have adopted this 
provision of the final rule as proposed.
    The Board is not applying the requirements of the final rule to 
foreign banking organizations and intermediate holding companies 
required to be formed under the Board's Regulation YY that are not 
otherwise covered companies at this time. The Board anticipates 
implementing an LCR-based standard through a future separate rulemaking 
for the U.S. operations of some or all foreign banking organizations 
with $50 billion or more in combined U.S. assets.
3. Companies That Become Subject to the LCR Requirements
    The agencies have added Sec.  _.1(b)(2) to address the final rule's 
applicability to companies that become subject to the LCR requirements 
before and after September 30, 2014. Companies that are subject to the 
minimum liquidity standard under Sec.  _.1(b)(1) as of September 30, 
2014 must comply with the rule beginning January 1, 2015, subject to 
the transition periods provided in subpart F of the final rule. A 
company that meets the thresholds for applicability after September 30, 
2014, based on an applicable regulatory year-end report under Sec.  
_.1(b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iii) must comply with the final rule 
beginning on April 1 of the following year.
    The final rule provides newly covered companies with a transition 
period for the daily calculation requirement, recognizing that a daily 
calculation requirement could impose significant operational and 
technology demands.

[[Page 61448]]

Specifically, a newly covered company must calculate its LCR monthly 
from April 1 to December 1 of its first year of compliance. Beginning 
on January 1 of the following year, the covered company must calculate 
its LCR daily.
    For example, a company that meets the thresholds for applicability 
under Sec.  _.1(b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iii) based on its regulatory 
report filed for fiscal year 2017 must comply with the final rule 
requirements beginning on April 1, 2018. From April 1, 2018 to December 
31, 2018, the final rule requires the covered company to calculate its 
LCR monthly. Beginning January 1, 2019, and thereafter, the covered 
company must calculate its LCR daily.
    When a covered company becomes subject to the final rule after 
September 30, 2014, as a result of an agency determination under Sec.  
_.1(b)(1)(iv) that the LCR requirement is appropriate in light of the 
covered company's asset size, level of complexity, risk profile, scope 
of operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic covered entities, 
or risk to the financial system, the company must comply with the final 
rule requirements according to a transition period specified by the 
agency.

II. Minimum Liquidity Coverage Ratio

A. The LCR Calculation and Maintenance Requirement

    As described above, under the proposed rule, a covered company 
would have been required to maintain an HQLA amount that was no less 
than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows.
1. A Liquidity Coverage Requirement
    One commenter argued that the proposed rule's requirements would 
reduce incentives to maintain diversified liquid asset portfolios and 
other funding sources, which would result in the loss of 
diversification in banking organizations' sources of funding and liquid 
asset composition. Another commenter asserted that restoring and 
strengthening the authorities of the Federal Reserve as the lender of 
last resort would be a more effective and efficient alternative to 
bolstering a covered company's liquidity reserves. One commenter stated 
that the LCR requirement would introduce additional system complexities 
without taking into account the benefits of long-term funding stability 
afforded by the NSFR.
    The agencies believe that the most recent financial crisis 
demonstrated that large, internationally active banking organizations 
were exposed to substantial wholesale market funding risks, as well as 
contingent liquidity risks, that were not well mitigated by the then-
prevailing liquidity risk management practices and liquidity portfolio 
compositions. For a number of large financial institutions, this led to 
failure, bankruptcy, restructuring, merger, or only maintaining 
operations with financial support from the Federal government. The 
agencies believe that covered companies should not overly rely on 
wholesale market funding that may be elusive in a time of stress, not 
rely on expectations of government support, and not rely on asset 
classes that have a significant liquidity discount if sold during a 
period of stress. The agencies do not believe that the final rule's 
minimum standard will constrain the diversity of a covered company's 
funding sources or unduly restrict the types of assets that a covered 
company may hold for general liquidity risk purposes. Covered companies 
are expected to maintain appropriate levels of liquidity without 
reliance on central banks acting in the capacity of lenders of last 
resort. With respect to the NSFR, the agencies continue to engage in 
and support the ongoing development of the ratio as an international 
standard, and anticipate the standard will be implemented in the United 
States at the appropriate time. In the meantime, the agencies expect 
covered companies to maintain appropriate stable structural funding 
profiles.
    For these reasons, the overall structure of the LCR requirement is 
being adopted as proposed. Under the final rule, a covered company is 
required to maintain an HQLA amount that is no less than 100 percent of 
its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period, 
in accordance with the calculation requirements for the HQLA amount and 
total net cash outflows, as discussed below.
2. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio Stress Period
    The proposed rule would have required covered companies to 
calculate the LCR based on a 30 calendar-day stress period. Some 
commenters requested that the liquidity coverage ratio calculation 
instead be based on a calendar-month stress period. Another commenter 
noted that supervisors should be attentive to the possibility that 
excess liquidity demands can build up just outside the 30 calendar-day 
window.
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
final rule uses a standardized 30 calendar-day stress period. The LCR 
is intended to facilitate comparisons across covered companies and to 
provide consistent information about historical trends. The agencies 
are retaining the prospective 30 calendar-day period because a calendar 
month stress period is not compatible with the daily calculation 
requirement, which requires a forward-looking calculation of liquidity 
stress for the 30 calendar days following the calculation date, and a 
30 calendar-day stress period would provide for an accurate historical 
comparison. Furthermore, while the LCR would establish one scenario for 
stress testing, the agencies expect companies subject to the final rule 
to maintain robust stress testing frameworks that incorporate 
additional scenarios that are more tailored to the risks within their 
companies.\19\ The agencies also expect covered companies to 
appropriately monitor and manage liquidity risk both within and beyond 
the 30-day stress period. Accordingly, the agencies are adopting this 
aspect of the final rule as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Covered companies that are subject to the Board's 
Regulation YY are required to conduct internal liquidity stress 
tests that include a minimum of four periods over which the relevant 
stressed projections extend: Overnight, 30-day, 90-day, and one-year 
time horizons, and additional time horizons as appropriate. 12 CFR 
253.35 (domestic bank holding companies); (12 CFR 235.175 (foreign 
banking organizations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Calculation Date, Daily Calculation Requirement, and Comments on 
LCR Reporting
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company would have been required 
to calculate its LCR on each business day as of that date (the 
calculation date), with the horizon for each calculation ending 30 days 
from the calculation date. The proposed rule would have required a 
covered company to calculate its LCR on each business day as of a set 
time selected by the covered company prior to the effective date of the 
rule and communicated in writing to its appropriate Federal banking 
agency.
    The proposed rule did not include a proposal to establish a 
reporting requirement for the LCR. The agencies anticipate separately 
seeking comment on proposed regulatory reporting requirements and 
instructions pertaining to a covered company's disclosure of the final 
rule's LCR in a subsequent notice under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
    A number of commenters stated that the daily calculation 
requirement imposes significant operational burdens on covered 
companies. These include costs associated with building and testing new 
information technology systems, developing governance and

[[Page 61449]]

internal control frameworks for the LCR, and collecting and reviewing 
the requisite data to comply with the requirements of the proposed 
rule. Commenters argued that developing systems is challenging, 
expensive, and time consuming for those organizations that do not 
currently have such reporting capabilities in place. For example, one 
commenter said that capturing the data to perform the LCR calculation 
on a daily basis would require banking organizations to implement 
entirely new and custom data systems and mechanics. Several commenters 
expressed concerns generally that the additional system development 
costs would outweigh the benefits from the LCR to supervisors.
    In addition to the costs of developing new systems, commenters also 
raised concerns about the time frame between the adoption of the final 
rule and the effective date of the proposed rule and indicated that 
there would be insufficient time in which to develop operational 
capabilities to comply with the proposed rule. For instance, one 
commenter argued that because the rule was not yet final, there would 
not be enough time to implement systems before the January 1, 2015 
compliance date. Several commenters echoed a similar concern and 
contended that the burden associated with implementing and testing 
systems for the daily calculation is heightened by a short time frame. 
Some of these commenters requested a delay in the implementation of the 
final rule to better develop operational capabilities for compliance.
    Several commenters argued that the requirement to calculate the LCR 
daily would require large changes to data systems, processes, 
reporting, and governance and were concerned that their institutions 
would not have the capability to perform accurately the required 
calculations. In particular, the commenters expressed concern with the 
level of certainty required for such calculation and its relation to 
their disclosure obligations under securities laws. Other commenters 
observed that there are limits to the number of large scale projects 
that covered companies can implement at one time, and building LCR 
reporting systems would require significant resources.
    Other commenters preferred a monthly calculation given the 
significant information technology costs and short time frame until 
implementation. Further, several commenters stated that much of the 
data necessary to calculate a daily LCR currently is available only on 
systems that report monthly, rather than daily. These commenters also 
expressed concern over developing the necessary internal controls to 
ensure that the data is sufficiently accurate. Several commenters 
requested that the agencies require certain ``regional'' banking 
organizations that met the proposed rule's scope of applicability 
threshold, but have not been identified as Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs) by the Financial Stability Board, to calculate 
the LCR on a monthly, rather than daily, basis. Commenters argued that 
the daily calculation for such organizations is unnecessary and that 
the monitoring of daily liquidity risk management should be established 
through the supervisory process. One commenter argued that it may not 
be necessary to perform detailed calculations every business day during 
periods of ample liquidity and suggested that the agencies impose the 
daily requirement only during periods of stress.
    Covered companies that would not be subject to supervisory daily 
liquidity reporting requirements under the Board's information 
collection and Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report (FR 
2052a) liquidity reporting program \20\ raised concerns about the time 
needed to develop systems to comply with a daily LCR requirement. Those 
companies asserted they should not be subject to a daily calculation 
or, in the alternative, that they should be provided with additional 
time to develop operational capabilities relative to those institutions 
submitting the FR 2052a report. A commenter suggested that covered 
companies that have not previously been subject to bank or bank holding 
company liquidity reporting requirements should be given additional 
time to develop the necessary systems. Another commenter requested that 
the agencies clarify the mechanics for calculating the LCR and 
reporting it to regulators. Several commenters requested that, if the 
final rule would require daily calculation of the LCR, the agencies 
establish a transition period for firms to implement this calculation 
methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Board, ``Agency Information Collection Activities: 
Announcement of Board Approval Under Delegated Authority and 
Submission to OMB,'' 79 FR 48158 (August 15, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies recognize that a daily calculation requirement for a 
new regulatory requirement imposes significant operational and 
technology demands upon covered companies. However, the agencies 
continue to believe the daily calculation requirement is appropriate 
for covered companies under the final rule. Covered companies with $250 
billion or more in total consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in 
total on-balance sheet foreign exposures are large, complex 
organizations with significant trading and other activities. Moreover, 
idiosyncratic or market driven liquidity stress events have the 
potential to become significant in a short period of time even for 
covered companies that have not been designated as G-SIBs by the 
Financial Stability Board and that have relatively less complex balance 
sheets and more consistent funding profiles than G-SIBs in the normal 
course of business. In contrast to the entities that would be subject 
to the Board's modified LCR requirement discussed in section V of this 
Supplementary Information section, such organizations tend to have more 
significant trading activities, interconnectedness in the financial 
system, and are a significant source of credit to the areas of the 
United States in which they operate. Supervisors expect an organization 
that is a covered company under this rule to have robust, forward-
looking liquidity risk monitoring tools that enable the organization to 
be responsive to changing liquidity risks. These tools are expected to 
be in place even during periods when the organization considers that it 
has ample liquidity, so that emerging risks may be identified and 
mitigated. The agencies also note that during periods of stress, it may 
be difficult for companies to implement a daily reporting requirement 
if the necessary technological systems have not previously been 
established.
    Therefore, the agencies continue to believe the daily calculation 
requirement is appropriate for covered companies under the final rule. 
However, the agencies recognize that the calculation requirements under 
this rule, including the daily calculation requirement, may necessitate 
certain enhancements to a covered company's liquidity risk data 
collection and monitoring infrastructure. Accordingly, the agencies 
have changed the proposed rule to include certain transition periods as 
described fully in section IV of this Supplementary Information 
section. With these revisions, the agencies believe that the final rule 
achieves its overall objective of promoting better liquidity management 
and reducing liquidity risk. To that end, the agencies have sought to 
achieve a balance between operational concerns and the overall 
objectives of the LCR by providing covered companies with additional 
time to implement the daily calculation requirement. Likewise, with 
respect to the level of precision

[[Page 61450]]

required, the agencies believe that the transition period should 
provide covered companies with an appropriate time frame to upgrade 
systems, develop controls, train employees, and enhance other 
operational capabilities so that covered companies will have the 
requisite operational tools to effectively implement a daily 
calculation requirement.
    With respect to reporting frequencies, the agencies continue to 
anticipate that they will separately seek comment on proposed 
regulatory reporting requirements and instructions for the LCR in a 
subsequent notice.

B. High-Quality Liquid Assets

    The agencies received a number of comments on the criteria for HQLA 
and the designation of the liquidity level for various assets. Under 
the proposed rule, the numerator of the LCR would have been a covered 
company's HQLA amount, which would have been the HQLA held by the 
covered company subject to the qualifying operational control criteria 
and compositional limitations. These proposed criteria and limitations 
were meant to ensure that a covered company's HQLA amount would include 
only assets with a high potential to generate liquidity through 
monetization (sale or secured borrowing) during a stress scenario.
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
agencies proposed classifying HQLA into three categories of assets: 
Level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid assets. Specifically, the 
agencies proposed that level 1 liquid assets, which are the highest 
quality and most liquid assets, would have been included in a covered 
company's HQLA amount without a limit and without haircuts. Level 2A 
and 2B liquid assets have characteristics that are associated with 
being relatively stable and significant sources of liquidity, but not 
to the same degree as level 1 liquid assets. Accordingly, the proposed 
rule would have subjected level 2A liquid assets to a 15 percent 
haircut and, when combined with level 2B liquid assets, they could not 
have exceeded 40 percent of the total HQLA amount. Level 2B liquid 
assets, which are associated with a lesser degree of liquidity and more 
volatility than level 2A liquid assets, would have been subject to a 50 
percent haircut and could not have exceeded 15 percent of the total 
HQLA amount. All other classes of assets would not qualify as HQLA.
    Commenters expressed concerns about several proposed criteria for 
identifying the types of assets that qualify as HQLA. Commenters also 
suggested that the agencies designate certain additional assets as HQLA 
and change the categorization of certain assets as level 1, level 2A, 
or level 2B liquid assets. A commenter cautioned that the proposed 
rule's stricter definition of HQLA compared to the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework could lead to distortions in the market, such as 
dramatically increased demand for limited supplies of asset classes and 
hoarding of HQLA by financial institutions.
    The final rule adopts the proposed rule's overall structure for the 
classification of assets as HQLA and the compositional limitations for 
certain classes of HQLA in the HQLA amount. As discussed more fully 
below, the agencies considered the issues raised by commenters and 
incorporated a number of modifications in the final rule to address 
commenters' concerns.
1. Liquidity Characteristics of HQLA
    Assets that qualify as HQLA should be easily and immediately 
convertible into cash with little or no expected loss of value during a 
period of liquidity stress. In identifying the types of assets that 
would qualify as HQLA in the proposed and final rules, the agencies 
considered the following categories of liquidity characteristics, which 
are generally consistent with those of the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework: (a) Risk profile; (b) market-based characteristics; and (c) 
central bank eligibility.
a. Risk Profile
    Assets that are appropriate for consideration as HQLA tend to have 
lower risk. There are various forms of risk that can be associated with 
an asset, including liquidity risk, market risk, credit risk, inflation 
risk, foreign exchange risk, and the risk of subordination in a 
bankruptcy or insolvency. Assets appropriate for consideration as HQLA 
would be expected to remain liquid across various stress scenarios and 
should not suddenly lose their liquidity upon the occurrence of a 
certain type of risk. Another characteristic of these assets is that 
they generally experience ``flight to quality'' during a crisis, which 
is where investors sell their other holdings to buy more of these 
assets in order to reduce the risk of loss and thereby increase their 
ability to monetize assets as necessary to meet their own obligations.
    Assets that may be highly liquid under normal conditions but 
experience wrong-way risk and that could become less liquid during a 
period of stress would not be appropriate for consideration as HQLA. 
For example, securities issued or guaranteed by many companies in the 
financial sector have been more prone to lose value when the banking 
sector is experiencing stress and become less liquid due to the high 
correlation between the health of these companies and the health of the 
financial sector generally. This correlation was evident during the 
recent financial crisis as most debt issued by such companies traded at 
significant discounts for a prolonged period. Because of this high 
potential for wrong-way risk, and consistent with the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, the final rule excludes from HQLA assets that are 
issued by companies that are primary actors in the financial sector. 
Identification of these companies is discussed in section II.B.2, 
below.
b. Market-Based Characteristics
    The agencies also have found that assets appropriate to be included 
as HQLA generally exhibit certain market-based characteristics. First, 
these assets tend to have active outright sale or repurchase markets at 
all times with significant diversity in market participants, as well as 
high trading volume. This market-based liquidity characteristic may be 
demonstrated by historical evidence, including evidence observed during 
recent periods of market liquidity stress. Such assets should 
demonstrate: Low bid-ask spreads, high trading volumes, a large and 
diverse number of market participants, and other appropriate factors. 
Diversity of market participants, on both the buying and selling sides 
of transactions, is particularly important because it tends to reduce 
market concentration and is a key indicator that a market will remain 
liquid during periods of stress. The presence of multiple committed 
market makers is another sign that a market is liquid.
    Second, assets that are appropriate for consideration as HQLA 
generally tend to have prices that do not incur sharp declines, even 
during times of stress. Volatility of traded prices and bid-ask spreads 
during normal times are simple proxy measures of market volatility; 
however, there should be historical evidence of relative stability of 
market terms (such as prices and haircuts) as well as trading volumes 
during stressed periods. To the extent that an asset exhibits price or 
volume fluctuation during times of stress, assets appropriate for 
consideration as HQLA tend to increase in value and experience a flight 
to quality during these periods of stress because historically market 
participants move into more liquid assets in times of systemic crisis.

[[Page 61451]]

    Third, assets that can serve as HQLA tend to be easily and readily 
valued. The agencies generally have found that an asset's liquidity is 
typically higher if market participants can readily agree on its 
valuation. Assets with more standardized, homogenous, and simple 
structures tend to be more fungible, thereby promoting liquidity. The 
pricing formula of more liquid assets generally is easy to calculate 
when it is based upon sound assumptions and publicly available inputs. 
Whether an asset is listed on an active and developed exchange can 
serve as a key indicator of an asset's price transparency and 
liquidity.
c. Central Bank Eligibility
    Assets that a covered company can pledge at a central bank as 
collateral for intraday liquidity needs and overnight liquidity 
facilities in a jurisdiction and in a currency where the bank has 
access to the central bank generally tend to be liquid and, as such, 
are appropriate for consideration as HQLA. In the past, central banks 
have provided a backstop to the supply of banking system liquidity 
under conditions of severe stress. Central bank eligibility should, 
therefore, provide additional assurance that assets could be used in 
acute liquidity stress events without adversely affecting the broader 
financial system and economy. However, central bank eligibility is not 
itself sufficient to categorize an asset as HQLA; all of the final 
rule's requirements for HQLA must be met if central bank eligible 
assets are to qualify as HQLA.
d. Comments About Liquidity Characteristics
    In their proposal, the agencies requested comments on whether the 
agencies should consider other characteristics in analyzing the 
liquidity of an asset. Although several commenters expressed concerns 
about the agencies' evaluation of the proposed liquidity 
characteristics to designate certain assets as HQLA, the agencies 
received only a few comments on the set of liquidity characteristics. 
One commenter suggested that the agencies evaluate secondary trading 
levels over time, specifically for level 1 liquid assets. The commenter 
also recommended that the agencies consider various factors to assess 
security issuances, including the absolute size of parent issuer 
holdings, credit ratings, and average credit spreads. Another commenter 
expressed its belief that the inclusion of an asset as HQLA should be 
determined based on objective criteria for market liquidity and 
creditworthiness.
    In response to the commenter's concerns, the agencies agree that 
trading volume is an important characteristic of an asset's liquidity. 
The agencies believe that high trading volume across dynamic market 
environments is one of several factors that evidences market-based 
characteristics of HQLA. The final rule continues to consider trading 
volume to assess the liquidity of an asset.
    In response to the commenter's suggestion for the final rule to 
include factors such as credit ratings and average credit spreads, the 
agencies recognize that indicators of credit risk include credit 
ratings and average credit spreads. The risk profile of an asset also 
includes many other types of risks. The agencies note that the final 
rule incorporates assessments of credit risk in certain level 1 and 
level 2A liquid assets criteria by referring to the risk weights 
assigned to securities under the agencies' risk-based capital rules. 
The agencies are not including the additional factors suggested by the 
commenter because in some cases, it would be legally impermissible, and 
additionally, the agencies believe the link to risk weights in the 
risk-based capital rules for level 1 and level 2A qualifying criteria 
sufficiently captures credit risk factors for purposes of the LCR.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ A credit rating is one potential perspective on credit risk 
that may be used by a covered company in its assessment of the risk 
profile of a security. However, covered companies should avoid over 
reliance upon credit ratings in isolation. In addition, the Dodd-
Frank Act prohibits the reference to or reliance on credit ratings 
in an agency's regulations. Public Law 111-203, section 939A, 124 
Stat 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, in response to one commenter's request that the agencies 
incorporate objective criteria in the liquidity characteristics of the 
final rule, the agencies highlight that certain objective criteria 
relating to price decline scenarios are included as qualifying criteria 
for level 2A and level 2B liquid assets, as discussed in section 
II.B.2. The agencies believe that the liquidity characteristics in the 
final rule, combined with certain objective criteria for specific 
categories of HQLA, provide an appropriate basis for evaluating a 
variety of asset classes for inclusion as HQLA.
2. Qualifying Criteria for Categories of HQLA
    Based on the analysis of the liquidity characteristics above, the 
proposed rule would have included a number of classes of assets meeting 
these characteristics as HQLA. However, within certain of the classes 
of assets that the agencies proposed to include as HQLA, the proposed 
rule would have set forth a number of qualifying criteria and specific 
requirements for a particular asset to qualify as HQLA. With certain 
modifications to address commenters' concerns regarding certain classes 
of assets, discussed below, the agencies are adopting these criteria 
and requirements generally as proposed.
a. The Liquid and Readily-Marketable Standard
    Most of the assets in the HQLA categories would have been required 
to meet the proposed rule's definition of ``liquid and readily-
marketable'' in order to be included as HQLA. Under the proposed rule, 
an asset would have been liquid and readily-marketable if it is traded 
in an active secondary market with more than two committed market 
makers, a large number of committed non-market maker participants on 
both the buying and selling sides of transactions, timely and 
observable market prices, and high trading volumes. The agencies 
proposed this ``liquid and readily-marketable'' requirement to ensure 
that assets included as HQLA would exhibit a level of liquidity that 
would allow a covered company to convert them into cash during times of 
stress and, therefore, to meet its obligations when other sources of 
funding may be reduced or unavailable.
    Commenters raised several concerns with the proposed rule's 
definition of ``liquid and readily-marketable.'' Several commenters 
urged the agencies to provide more detail on the liquid and readily-
marketable standard. One of these commenters highlighted that the 
definition included undefined terms and suggested that the agencies 
either provide specific securities or asset classes or refer to 
instrument characteristics similar to those listed in the Board's 
Regulation YY. One commenter urged the agencies to pursue a more 
quantitative approach to identifying securities that would meet the 
standard. Another commenter noted that the agencies did not provide 
guidance on how to document that HQLA meets the market-based 
characteristics or the liquid and readily-marketable standard. 
Separately, another commenter suggested that the liquid and readily-
marketable standard should account for indicators of liquidity other 
than those related to the secondary market. In particular, the 
commenter highlighted that covered companies can monetize securities 
outside of the outright sales market through repurchase transactions 
and through posting securities as collateral

[[Page 61452]]

securing over-the-counter or exchange-traded derivative transactions. 
Another commenter interpreted the liquid and readily-marketable 
standard to require a security-by-security analysis incorporating data 
on market makers and market participants and trading volumes to 
determine eligibility under the criteria. The commenter contended that 
such analysis could be burdensome on covered companies with significant 
trading operations. One commenter requested that the agencies remove 
this standard for all level 1 and level 2A liquid assets. Another 
stated that there was a difference between the regulatory text of the 
proposed rule and the discussion in the Supplementary Information 
section to the proposed rule, which indicated that HQLA would need to 
exhibit certain market-based characteristics, such as no sharp price 
declines, and standardized, homogeneous, and simple securities 
structures. The commenter stated that these characteristics were not 
included in the liquid and readily-marketable standard and requested 
clarification on how much the structure of a security would be 
questioned by the supervisors of a covered company.
    After reviewing the comments, the agencies have determined to 
retain the proposed definition of ``liquid and readily-marketable'' in 
the final rule. The agencies believe that defining an asset as liquid 
and readily-marketable if it is traded in an active secondary market 
with more than two committed market makers, a large number of committed 
non-market maker participants on both the buying and selling sides of 
transactions, timely and observable market prices, and high trading 
volumes provides an appropriate standard for determining whether an 
asset can be readily sold in times of stress. These elements of the 
requirement are meant to ensure that assets included as HQLA are traded 
in deep, active markets to allow a covered company to convert them into 
cash by sale or repurchase transactions during times of stress. In 
particular, the agencies believe that an active secondary market for an 
asset is an indicator of the ease with which a covered company may 
monetize that asset. In response to a commenter's concern that a 
covered company may only monetize securities through outright sales to 
meet the liquid and readily-marketable standard, the agencies are 
clarifying that a covered company may monetize assets through 
repurchase transactions in addition to outright sales.
    Although one commenter requested that the final rule include 
specific securities or instrument characteristics to further define 
``liquid and readily-marketable,'' the agencies believe that the 
specific types of securities set forth in the categories of level 1, 
level 2A, and level 2B liquid assets provide sufficient detail of the 
types of securities and instruments that may be liquid and readily-
marketable and may be considered HQLA. In addition, the final rule 
retains from the proposed rule certain price decline scenarios to 
identify certain level 2A and level 2B liquid assets.\22\ The agencies 
believe that price decline scenarios are appropriate for certain types 
of assets included in level 2A and 2B liquid assets to evaluate the 
liquidity and market-based characteristics of those assets. As the 
criteria for these categories of HQLA incorporate price decline 
scenarios, the agencies do not believe it is necessary to separately 
include price decline scenarios as part of the liquid and readily-
marketable standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See Sec.  _--.20(b) and (c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter requested that the agencies clarify the Supplementary 
Information section discussion in the proposed rule indicating that 
HQLA should exhibit standardized, homogeneous, and simple security 
structures. The agencies believe that the criteria for HQLA set forth 
in Sec.  _--.20 of the final rule includes assets that meet these 
criteria. The final rule continues to require that certain HQLA 
categories meet the final rule's definition of liquid and readily-
marketable. The agencies emphasize that securities with unique, 
bespoke, or complex structures which are difficult to value on a 
routine basis, regardless of issuer or capital risk weight, may not 
meet the liquid and readily-marketable standard.
    In response to a commenter's concern about the burden of a 
security-by-security analysis to demonstrate that a security qualifies 
as liquid and readily-marketable, the agencies recognize that certain 
companies may trade or hold a significant number of different 
securities. Although the exercise of assessing unique securities for 
the purpose of determining whether they are liquid and readily-
marketable may involve operational burden, the agencies believe this 
analysis and determination is critical to ensuring that only securities 
that will serve as a reliable source of liquidity during times of 
stress are included in a company's HQLA. A covered company may choose 
not to determine whether a security is liquid and readily-marketable 
for LCR purposes if it determines that the cost of performing the 
analysis exceeds the benefit of including the security as HQLA. Thus, 
the agencies decline to remove the liquid and readily-marketable 
standard for all level 1 and level 2A liquid assets, as requested by 
one commenter.
    Furthermore, in response to requests that the agencies clarify any 
documentation requirements in determining whether an asset is liquid 
and readily-marketable, the agencies expect that a covered company 
should be able to demonstrate to its appropriate Federal banking agency 
its security-by-security analysis (which may include time-series 
analyses about the specific security or comparative analysis of similar 
securities from the same issuer) that HQLA held by the covered company 
meets the liquid and readily-marketable standard.
b. Financial Sector Entities
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
proposed rule would have provided that assets that are included as HQLA 
could not be issued by a financial sector entity, because these assets 
could exhibit similar risks and correlation with covered companies 
(wrong-way risk) during a liquidity stress period. In the proposed 
rule, financial sector entities would have included regulated financial 
companies, investment companies, non-regulated funds, pension funds, 
investment advisers, or a consolidated subsidiary of any of the 
foregoing. In addition, under the proposed rule, securities issued by 
any company (or any of its consolidated subsidiaries) that an agency 
has determined should, for the purposes of the proposed rule, be 
treated the same as a regulated financial company, investment company, 
non-regulated fund, pension fund, or investment adviser, based on its 
engagement in activities similar in scope, nature, or operations to 
those entities (identified company) would not have been included as 
HQLA.
    The term regulated financial company under the proposed rule would 
have included bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies (depository institution holding companies); nonbank financial 
companies supervised by the Board; depository institutions; foreign 
banks; credit unions; industrial loan companies, industrial banks, or 
other similar institutions described in section 2 of the Bank Holding 
Company Act (BHC Act); national banks, state member banks, and state 
nonmember banks (including those that are not depository institutions); 
insurance companies; securities holding companies (as defined in 
section 618 of the Dodd-

[[Page 61453]]

Frank Act); \23\ broker-dealers or dealers registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); futures commission merchants 
and swap dealers, each as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act; \24\ 
or security-based swap dealers defined in section 3 of the Securities 
Exchange Act.\25\ It would also have included any designated financial 
market utility, as defined in section 803 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\26\ 
The proposed definition would have also included foreign companies that 
are supervised and regulated in a manner similar to the institutions 
listed above.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ 12 U.S.C. 1850a(a)(4).
    \24\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(28) and (49).
    \25\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(71).
    \26\ 12 U.S.C. 5462(4).
    \27\ Under paragraph (8) of the proposed rule's definition of 
``regulated financial company,'' the following would not be 
considered regulated financial companies: U.S. government-sponsored 
enterprises; small business investment companies, as defined in 
section 102 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 
661 et seq.); entities designated as Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) under 12 U.S.C. 4701 et seq. and 12 CFR part 
1805; and central banks, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, or a multilateral development bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed definition of regulated financial company 
would have included a company that is included in the organization 
chart of a depository institution holding company on the Form FR Y-6, 
as listed in the hierarchy report of the depository institution holding 
company produced by the National Information Center (NIC) Web site, 
provided that the top-tier depository institution holding company was 
subject to the proposed rule (FR Y-6 companies).\28\ FR Y-6 companies 
are typically controlled by the filing depository institution holding 
company under the BHC Act. Although many of these companies may not be 
consolidated on the financial statements of a depository institution 
holding company, the links between the companies are sufficiently 
significant that the agencies believed that it would have been 
appropriate to exclude securities issued by FR Y-6 companies (and their 
consolidated subsidiaries) from HQLA, for the same policy reasons that 
other regulated financial companies' securities would have been 
excluded from HQLA under the proposal. The organizational hierarchy 
chart produced by the NIC Web site reflects (as updated regularly) the 
FR Y-6 companies a depository institution holding company must report 
on the form. The agencies proposed this method for identifying these 
companies in order to reduce burden associated with obtaining the FR Y-
6 organizational charts for all depository institution holding 
companies subject to the proposed rule, because the charts are not 
uniformly available by electronic means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ See National Information Center, A repository of financial 
data and institution characteristics collected by the Federal 
Reserve System, available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters suggested that the proposed definition of ``regulated 
financial company'' was overly broad. For example, one commenter stated 
that for the purposes of deposit classification, the definition of 
``financial institution'' needs to be limited to those entities that 
contribute to the risk of interconnectedness to ensure the accurate 
capture of the underlying risk of the depositor, noting that the NAICS 
codes for ``Finance and Insurance'' and ``Commercial Banking'' include 
over 816,000 and 79,000 business, respectively. The commenter stated 
that, depending on the definition, certain financial institutions may 
have operational needs and transactional deposits that are more similar 
to a non-financial institution.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The agencies note that the proposed rule would have 
recognized that financial sector entities have operational needs and 
deposits that are similar to non-financial entities by treating the 
deposits of financial sector entities that meet the operational 
deposit criteria as operational deposits. The non-operational 
deposits of a financial would have been subject to a higher outflow 
rate than a non-financial wholesale counterparty due to correlation 
of liquidity risks between financial sector entities and covered 
companies. The final rule retains each of these provisions as 
discussed below under section II.C.3.h.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Overall, the agencies believe that the overall scope of the 
proposed definition of ``regulated financial company'' appropriately 
captured the types of the companies whose assets could exhibit similar 
risks and correlation with covered companies during a liquidity stress 
period. Although the number of financial entities are large, due to the 
prominence of the financial services industry to the economy of the 
United States, the agencies continue to believe that the liquidity 
risks presented by securities and obligations of such companies would 
be difficult to monetize during a period of significant financial 
distress, as shown in the recent financial crisis. Accordingly, similar 
to the proposed rule, the final rule will exclude the securities and 
obligations of financial sector entities from being HQLA.
    In addition to comments regarding the scope of the entities that 
would have been included under the proposed rule, several commenters 
expressed concerns regarding the specific inclusion of certain 
entities.
i. Companies Listed on a Covered Company's FR Y-6
    Commenters expressed concern about the definition's inclusion of 
any company that is included in the organizational chart of a covered 
company as reported on the Form FR Y-6 and reflected on the NIC Web 
site within the definition of regulated financial company. These 
commenters contended that the FR Y-6 is an expansive form that captures 
a substantial range of activities and investments of depository 
institution holding companies, including companies in which the covered 
company has a minority, non-controlling interest, as well as merchant 
banking investments. Commenters reasoned that merchant banking 
investments may be non-financial enterprises and may not contribute to 
the ``wrong-way risk'' contemplated by the agencies in defining 
regulated financial company. The commenters believed that such entities 
should not be included as regulated financial companies and requested 
that the final rule's definition of regulated financial company not 
include all companies reported by a covered company on the Form FR Y-6.
    The agencies recognize that there are certain shortcomings in the 
scope of the entities that are listed on a covered company's FR Y-6, 
including the potential capture of non-financial, passive merchant 
banking subsidiaries. The Board is actively considering options to 
adjust the reporting mechanism which may be used in determining the 
population of regulated financial companies. Moreover, because entities 
listed on a covered company's FR Y-6 that are non-financial, merchant 
banking investments or that do not meet the definition of control under 
the BHC Act are not currently separated from other entities controlled 
by a covered company, the agencies do not believe it would be 
appropriate at this time to provide a blanket exemption for merchant 
banking or non-control investments. The Board anticipates that it will 
revise the reporting requirements used for this purpose in the near 
future. However, because any revisions to reporting requirements would 
be subject to public comment, for purposes of the final rule, the 
agencies are finalizing the definition of regulated financial company 
as proposed. The agencies do not believe that any change to the 
definition of regulated financial company would be appropriate without 
subjecting such a revision to public

[[Page 61454]]

comment, together with other revisions to the reporting requirements 
that would be used to identify regulated financial companies.
ii. Foreign Regulated Financial Entities
    The definition of regulated financial company under the proposed 
rule would have included a non-U.S.-domiciled company that is 
supervised and regulated in a manner similar to the other entities 
described in the definition, including bank holding companies. One 
commenter requested that the agencies clarify that the definition of 
regulated financial company would not include non-U.S. government-
sponsored entities and public sector entities. The commenter argued 
that certain public sector entities are not engaged in a full range of 
banking activities, but are, however, typically subject to prudential 
regulation. Two commenters also requested that the preamble to the 
final rule explain how the ``supervised and regulated in a similar 
manner'' standard should be construed.
    The final rule adopts this provision of the rule as proposed. The 
agencies are clarifying that, for purposes of the final rule, a foreign 
company, including a non-U.S. public sector entity, that is similar in 
structure to a U.S. regulated financial company (e.g., a foreign bank 
or foreign insurance company) and that is subject to prudential 
supervision and regulation in a manner that is similar to a U.S. 
regulated financial company would be considered a regulated financial 
company under the final rule. In considering the similarity of the 
supervision and regulation of a foreign company, a covered company can 
consider whether the non-U.S. activities and operations of the company 
would be subject to supervision and regulation in the United States and 
whether such activities are subject to supervision and regulation 
abroad.
iii. Investment Companies and Investment Advisers
    Under the proposed rule, investment companies would have included 
companies registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 \30\ and investment advisers would have included companies 
registered with the SEC as investment advisers under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940,\31\ as well as the foreign equivalent of such 
companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.
    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed concern with the proposed rule's treatment 
of investment companies as financial sector entities. The commenter 
argued that if an investment company does not invest in financial 
sector entities, the value of its shares would not correlate with 
covered companies. The commenter recommended that an investment 
company's HQLA eligibility should be based on the investment company's 
investment policies, such that if an investment company has a policy of 
investing 80 percent of its assets in HQLA or in securities and 
obligations of non-financial sector entities, its securities would be 
treated as HQLA of the same level as the lowest level HQLA permitted 
under the policy.
    After considering the commenter's concerns, the agencies decline to 
adopt the commenter's recommendation in the final rule. Similar to 
other entities in the financial sector, investment companies have been 
more prone to lose value and, as a result, become less liquid in times 
of liquidity stress regardless of the investment company's investment 
policies or portfolio composition, due to the potentially higher 
correlation between the health of these companies and the health of the 
financial markets generally. The agencies believe that a covered 
company can be exposed to the interconnectedness of financial markets 
through its investment in investment companies. Thus, consistent with 
the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the final rule would exclude 
assets issued by companies that are primary actors in the financial 
sector from HQLA, including investment company shares.
iv. Non-Regulated Funds
    Under the proposed rule, non-regulated funds would have included 
hedge funds or private equity funds whose investment advisers are 
required to file SEC Form PF (Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to 
Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity 
Trading Advisors), and any consolidated subsidiary of such fund, other 
than a small business investment company, as defined in section 102 of 
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters expressed concerns about the proposed definition of 
``non-regulated fund.'' One of these commenters stated that the 
proposed definition would have included the undefined terms ``hedge 
fund'' and ``private equity fund.'' The commenter also argued that the 
definition should not include portfolio companies that are consolidated 
subsidiaries of non-regulated funds and those funds that invest 
primarily in real estate and related assets. The commenter suggested 
that the definition exclude any fund that does not issue redeemable 
securities that provide investors with redemption rights in the 
ordinary course and should also exclude closed-end funds. The commenter 
also stated that although the definition requires a banking 
organization to determine whether the investment adviser of a fund is 
required to file Form PF, this information on whether a particular fund 
is the subject of a Form PF is not publicly available.
    Generally, a manager of a ``private fund'' that is required to 
register with the SEC as an investment adviser and manages more than 
$150 million in private fund assets is required to file SEC Form PF. 
Although the final rule does not define hedge funds or private equity 
funds, the agencies believe that such terms are commonly understood in 
the financial services industry and note that the instructions to the 
SEC's Form PF provide a definition for private equity funds and hedge 
funds that are captured under the form.\33\ Therefore the agencies 
believe that defining ``non-regulated fund'' by referencing the private 
equity and hedge funds whose investment advisers are required to file 
SEC Form PF adequately defines the universe of hedge funds and private 
equity funds captured under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds 
and Certain Commodity Pool Operations and Commodity Trading Advisors 
(Form PF), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenter concerns that the definition of ``non-
regulated fund'' includes portfolio companies that are consolidated 
subsidiaries of private funds, the agencies have modified the 
definition of ``non-regulated fund.'' The agencies recognize that 
consolidated subsidiaries of private funds may not conduct financial 
activities, but would have received treatment as financial sector 
entities under the proposed rule. Accordingly, the final rule's 
definition of ``non-regulated fund'' no longer includes consolidated 
subsidiaries of hedge funds and private equity funds whose investment 
adviser is required to file SEC Form PF.
    With respect to the commenter's request to exclude any fund that 
does not issue redeemable securities and closed-end funds from the 
definition of non-regulated fund, although investors in these funds are 
unable to redeem securities and may not appear to present liquidity 
risk, the agencies believe these obligations and securities do pose 
similar liquidity risks and will behave similarly to those of other 
financial entities.

[[Page 61455]]

    Finally, the agencies recognize that Form PF filings are not 
publicly disclosed. However, the agencies expect that a covered company 
should understand whether its customer is a private equity fund or a 
hedge fund. The agencies further expect that when identifying HQLA a 
covered company should undertake the necessary diligence to confirm 
whether an investment adviser to such fund, which is typically the 
manager of the fund, is required to file Form PF and meets the final 
rule's definition of ``non-regulated fund.''
c. Level 1 Liquid Assets
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company could have included the 
full fair value of level 1 liquid assets in its HQLA amount.\34\ The 
proposed rule would have recognized that these assets have the highest 
potential to generate liquidity for a covered company during periods of 
severe liquidity stress and thus would have been includable in a 
covered company's HQLA amount without limit. The proposed rule would 
have included the following assets as level 1 liquid assets: (1) 
Federal Reserve Bank balances; (2) foreign withdrawable reserves; (3) 
securities issued or unconditionally guaranteed as to the timely 
payment of principal and interest by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury; (4) liquid and readily-marketable securities issued or 
unconditionally guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and 
interest by any other U.S. government agency (provided that its 
obligations are fully and explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and 
credit of the United States government); (5) certain liquid and 
readily-marketable securities that are claims on, or claims guaranteed 
by, a sovereign entity, a central bank, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank 
and European Community, or a multilateral development bank; and (6) 
certain debt securities issued by sovereign entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Assets that meet the criteria of eligible HQLA may be held 
by a covered company designated as either ``available-for-sale'' or 
``held-to-maturity,'' but must be included in the HQLA amount 
calculation at fair value (as determined under GAAP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in more detail below, a number of commenters suggested 
including additional assets in the level 1 liquid asset category. After 
considering the comments received, the final rule includes the criteria 
for the level 1 liquid asset category substantially as proposed.
i. Reserve Bank Balances
    Under the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, ``central bank 
reserves'' are included as HQLA. In the United States, Federal Reserve 
Banks are generally authorized under the Federal Reserve Act to 
maintain balances only for ``depository institutions'' and for other 
limited types of organizations.\35\ Pursuant to the Federal Reserve 
Act, there are different kinds of balances that depository institutions 
may maintain at Federal Reserve Banks, and they are maintained in 
different kinds of Federal Reserve Bank accounts. Balances that 
depository institutions must maintain to satisfy a reserve balance 
requirement must be maintained in the depository institution's ``master 
account'' at a Federal Reserve Bank or, if the institution has 
designated a pass-through correspondent, in the correspondent's master 
account. A ``reserve balance requirement'' is the amount that a 
depository institution must maintain in an account at a Federal Reserve 
Bank in order to satisfy that portion of the institution's reserve 
requirement that is not met with vault cash. Balances in excess of 
those required to be maintained to satisfy a reserve balance 
requirement, known as ``excess balances,'' may be maintained in a 
master account or in an ``excess balance account.'' Finally, balances 
maintained for a specified period of time, known as ``term deposits,'' 
are maintained in a term deposit account offered by the Federal Reserve 
Banks. The proposed rule used the term ``Reserve Bank balances'' as the 
relevant term to capture central bank reserves in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See 12 U.S.C. 342.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule, all balances a depository institution 
maintains at a Federal Reserve Bank (other than balances that an 
institution maintains on behalf of another institution, such as 
balances it maintains on behalf of a respondent or on behalf of an 
excess balance account participant) would have been considered level 1 
liquid assets, except for certain term deposits as explained below.
    Consistent with the concept of ``central bank reserves'' in the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the proposed rule included in 
its definition of ``Reserve Bank balances'' only those term deposits 
offered and maintained pursuant to terms and conditions that: (1) 
Explicitly and contractually permit such term deposits to be withdrawn 
upon demand prior to the expiration of the term; or that (2) permit 
such term deposits to be pledged as collateral for term or 
automatically-renewing overnight advances from a Federal Reserve Bank. 
Regarding the first point, term deposits offered under the Federal 
Reserve's Term Deposit Facility that include an early withdrawal 
feature that allows a depository institution to obtain a return of 
funds prior to the deposit maturity date, subject to an early 
withdrawal penalty, would be included in ``Reserve Bank balances'' 
because such term deposits would be explicitly and contractually 
repayable on notice. The amount associated with a term deposit that 
would be included as ``Reserve Bank balances'' is equal to the amount 
that would be received upon withdrawal of such a term deposit. Those 
term deposits that do not include this feature would not be included in 
``Reserve Bank balances.'' The terms and conditions for each term 
deposit offering specify whether the term deposits being offered 
include an early withdrawal feature. Regarding the second point, 
although term deposits may be pledged as collateral for discount window 
borrowing, the Federal Reserve's current discount window lending 
programs do not generally provide term or automatically-renewing 
overnight advances.
    Commenters suggested various assets related to Reserve Bank 
balances to include as level 1 liquid assets or to be reflected in the 
level 1 liquid asset amount. One commenter recommended that the final 
rule include required reserves in the level 1 liquid asset amount, 
alleging that the proposed rule circumvented Regulation D, which allows 
covered companies to manage their reserves over a 14-day period.\36\ A 
few commenters argued that the final rule should include vault cash, 
whether held in branches or ATMs, as a level 1 liquid asset. The 
commenter argued that the final rule should be consistent with the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, which recognizes the intrinsic 
liquidity value of cash and includes coins and banknotes as level 1 
liquid assets. Commenters further contended that vault cash, which can 
be used to satisfy the bank's reserve requirement under Regulation D, 
is a fundamental feature of daily liquidity management for banks and 
should be included as level 1 liquid assets.\37\ One commenter 
requested confirmation whether gold bullion meets the definition of 
level 1 liquid assets, arguing that it is low risk, highly liquid, has 
an active outright sale market, high trading volumes, a diverse number 
of

[[Page 61456]]

market participants, and has historically been a flight-to-quality 
asset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 12 CFR part 204.
    \37\ 12 CFR 204.5(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering the comments, the agencies are adopting the 
proposed criteria in the final rule with respect to central bank 
reserves. The agencies are not adopting a commenter's suggestion to 
include required reserves in the level 1 liquid asset amount because 
the assets held to satisfy required reserves, whether vault cash or 
balances maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank, are required for the 
covered company to manage reserves over the maintenance period pursuant 
to Regulation D and the agencies do not believe that the assets held to 
satisfy a covered company's required reserves would entirely be 
available for use during a liquidity stress event due to the reserve 
requirements.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ 12 CFR 204.5(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule does not include cash, whether held in branches or 
ATMs, in level 1 liquid assets, as such cash may be necessary to meet 
daily business transactions and due to logistical concerns associated 
with ensuring that the cash can be immediately used to meet the covered 
company's outflows. However, as noted in section II.B.5 of this 
Supplementary Information section, the final rule does modify the 
calculation of the HQLA amount. Under the proposed rule, the level 1 
liquid asset amount would have equaled the fair value of all level 1 
liquid assets held by the covered company as of the calculation date, 
less required reserves under section 204.4 of Regulation D (12 CFR 
204.4). Under the final rule, agencies have clarified that the amount 
to be deducted from the fair value of eligible level 1 assets is the 
covered company's reserve balance requirement under section 204.5 of 
Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5). A reserve balance requirement is the 
amount that a depository institution must maintain in an account at a 
Federal Reserve Bank in order to satisfy that portion of the 
institution's reserve requirement that is not met with vault cash.
    The agencies also decline to adopt a commenter's suggestion to 
include gold bullion as a level 1 liquid asset given the concerns about 
the volatility in market value of the asset and the logistical factors 
associated with holding and liquidating the asset.
ii. Foreign Withdrawable Reserves
    The agencies proposed that reserves held by a covered company in a 
foreign central bank that are not subject to restrictions on use 
(foreign withdrawable reserves) would have been included as level 1 
liquid assets. Similar to Reserve Bank balances, foreign withdrawable 
reserves should be able to serve as a medium of exchange in the 
currency of the country where they are held. The agencies received no 
comments on the definition of foreign withdrawable reserves. The final 
rule includes foreign withdrawable reserves as level 1 liquid assets as 
proposed.
iii. United States Government Securities
    The proposed rule would have included as level 1 liquid assets 
securities issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as to the timely 
payment of principal and interest by, the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. Generally, these types of securities exhibited high levels of 
liquidity even in times of extreme stress to the financial system, and 
typically are the securities that experience the most flight to quality 
when investors adjust their holdings. Level 1 liquid assets would have 
also included securities issued by any other U.S. government agency 
whose obligations are fully and explicitly guaranteed by the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. government, provided that they are liquid and 
readily-marketable.
    One commenter suggested that the agencies' inclusion in level 1 
liquid assets of only agency securities that are fully and explicitly 
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government was too 
narrow and this would increase the demand for Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) securities by large banking organizations, 
resulting in increased market pricing for such securities that would 
impact the profitability of investments at smaller banking 
organizations. The agencies believe that securities that are issued by, 
or unconditionally guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and 
interest by, a U.S. government agency whose obligations are fully and 
explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government have credit and liquidity risk that is comparable to 
securities issued by the U.S. Treasury. Thus, due to the inherent low 
risk of such securities and obligations, the agencies believe that it 
is appropriate to classify such securities as level 1 liquid assets. 
The agencies believe that any increased holdings of such securities by 
covered companies should not result in significant price increases for 
the securities due to the requirement of the final rule that each 
covered company ensure that it maintains policies and procedures that 
ensure the appropriate diversification of its HQLA by asset type, 
counterparty, issuer, and other factors. The final rule adopts this 
provision as proposed and continues to include U.S. government 
securities as level 1 liquid assets.
iv. Certain Sovereign and Multilateral Organization Securities
    The proposed rule would have included as level 1 liquid assets 
securities that are a claim on, or a claim unconditionally guaranteed 
by, a sovereign entity, a central bank, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank 
and European Community, or a multilateral development bank, provided 
that such securities met the following four requirements.
    First, these securities must have been assigned a zero percent risk 
weight under the standardized approach for risk-weighted assets of the 
agencies' risk-based capital rules.\39\ Generally, securities issued by 
sovereigns that are assigned a zero percent risk weight have shown 
resilient liquidity characteristics. Second, the proposed rule would 
have required these securities to be liquid and readily-marketable, as 
discussed above. Third, these securities would have been required to 
have been issued by an entity whose obligations have a proven record as 
a reliable source of liquidity in the repurchase or sales markets 
during stressed market conditions. A covered company could have 
demonstrated a historical record that met this criterion through 
reference to historical market prices during times of stress, such as 
the period of financial market stress experienced from 2007 to 2009. 
Covered companies should also have looked to other periods of systemic 
and idiosyncratic stress to see if the asset under consideration has 
proven to be a reliable source of liquidity. Fourth, these securities 
could not be an obligation of a regulated financial company, non-
regulated fund, pension fund, investment adviser, or identified company 
or any consolidated subsidiary of such entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 12 CFR part 217 (Federal Reserve), 
and 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed concern about the inclusion of all 
sovereign obligations that qualify for a zero percent risk weight as 
level 1 liquid assets. The commenter argued that a broad range of 
sovereign debt may receive a zero percent risk weight under the Basel 
III capital accord and may include sovereign entities whose commitments 
pose credit, liquidity, or exchange rate risk, and suggested that the 
agencies include a minimum sovereign rating classification.
    The agencies considered the commenter's concerns, but are adopting

[[Page 61457]]

the criteria for sovereign obligations to be included as level 1 liquid 
assets as proposed. The agencies believe that sovereign obligations 
that continue to qualify for a zero percent risk weight have shown 
resilient liquidity characteristics. The agencies believe that the risk 
weight assigned to sovereign obligations under the agencies' risk-based 
capital rules is an appropriate standard and decline to require a 
minimum sovereign rating classification. The agencies continue to 
retain the proposed criteria for determining whether sovereign and 
multilateral organization securities qualify as level 1 liquid assets 
under the final rule such as requiring them to be liquid and readily-
marketable.\40\ The agencies believe that these criteria limit the 
concerns raised by the commenter that capital risk weight alone is 
insufficient to preclude all illiquid foreign debt issuances. 
Consistent with the inclusion of level 1 liquid assets as HQLA, the 
agencies believe that qualifying sovereign securities should continue 
to be includable in a covered company's HQLA amount without limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ The agencies note that an asset's ability to qualify under 
this criterion may change over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Certain Foreign Sovereign Debt Securities
    Under the proposed rule, debt securities issued by a foreign 
sovereign entity that are not assigned a zero percent risk weight under 
the standardized approach for risk-weighted assets of the agencies' 
risk-based capital rules could have served as level 1 liquid assets if 
they were liquid and readily-marketable, the sovereign entity issued 
such debt securities in its own currency, and a covered company held 
the debt securities to meet its cash outflows in the jurisdiction of 
the sovereign entity, as calculated in the outflow section of the 
proposed rule. These assets would have been appropriately included as 
level 1 liquid assets despite having a risk weight greater than zero 
because a sovereign often is able to meet obligations in its own 
currency through control of its monetary system, even during fiscal 
challenges. The agencies received no significant comments on this 
section of the proposed rule and so the final rule adopts this standard 
as proposed.
vi. Level 1 Liquid Assets at a Foreign Parent
    Several commenters requested that the agencies permit a covered 
company that is a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign company subject to the 
LCR in another country to treat assets that are permitted to be 
included as level 1 liquid assets under the laws of that country as 
level 1 liquid assets for purposes of the final rule. After considering 
the commenters' request, the agencies decline to adopt the commenter's 
request. The agencies believe that assets should exhibit the liquidity 
characteristics required in the final rule, which have been calibrated 
for the outflows of U.S. covered companies, to be included as level 1 
liquid assets for purposes of the U.S. LCR requirement. The agencies 
intend to ensure that the requirements for level 1 liquid assets are 
consistent for all covered companies, regardless of the ownership of an 
individual covered company. As noted above, the agencies have included 
certain foreign sovereign obligations as level 1 liquid assets and 
believe that these asset classes appropriately reflect the outflows of 
U.S. covered companies.
vii. Deposits by Covered Nonbank Companies in Third-Party Commercial 
Banks
    One commenter requested that the agencies permit covered nonbank 
companies to include as level 1 liquid assets, subject to a haircut, 
overnight deposits in third-party commercial banks or holding companies 
that are subject to the final rule or a foreign equivalent standard, so 
long as the deposits are not concentrated in any one affiliated group 
of banks. After considering the commenter's request, the agencies have 
decided not to adopt the suggestion and believe all covered companies 
have several investment options to fulfill their HQLA requirement. The 
agencies recognize that covered nonbank companies do not have access to 
certain services available to banking entities and may place 
significant deposits with third-party banking organizations. Such 
deposits do not meet the agencies' criteria for level 1 liquid assets 
because during a liquidity stress event many commercial banks may 
exhibit the same liquidity stress correlation and wrong-way risk 
discussed above in relation to excluded financial sector entity 
securities. However, the agencies note that amounts in these deposits 
may qualify as an inflow, with a 100 percent inflow rate, to offset 
outflows, depending upon their operational nature.
viii. Liquidity Up-Front Fee
    The proposed rule briefly noted there has been ongoing work on the 
Basel III LCR and central bank operations. The BCBS announced on 
January 12, 2014, an amendment to the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework that included allowing capacity from restricted committed 
liquidity facilities of central banks as HQLA. One commenter stated 
that any concerns expressed by the banking industry regarding the 
availability of liquid assets could be addressed by permitting 
financial institutions to pay the Federal Reserve an up-front fee for a 
committed liquidity line.
    The agencies are considering the merits of including central bank 
restricted committed facility capacity as HQLA for purposes of the U.S. 
LCR requirement and may propose at a future date to include such 
capacity as HQLA.
d. Level 2A Liquid Assets
    Under the proposed rule, level 2A liquid assets would have included 
certain obligations issued or guaranteed by a U.S. government sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) \41\ and certain obligations issued or guaranteed by a 
sovereign entity or a multilateral development bank. Assets in these 
categories would have been required to be liquid and readily-
marketable, as described above, to be considered level 2A liquid 
assets. The agencies received a number of comments on the treatment of 
GSE securities under the proposed rule. After reviewing the comments 
received, for the reasons discussed below, the agencies are adopting 
the proposed criteria for level 2A liquid assets in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ GSEs currently include the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (FHLMC), the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA), the Farm Credit System, and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
(FHLB) System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. U.S. GSE Securities
    Commenters suggested a variety of approaches to change the final 
rule's treatment of U.S. GSE securities. Under the proposed rule, U.S. 
GSE securities are classified as level 2A liquid assets, which are 
subject to a 15 percent haircut and, when combined with level 2B liquid 
assets, have a 40 percent maximum composition limit in the HQLA amount, 
as discussed in section II.B.5 of this Supplementary Information 
section.
    Several commenters requested that the agencies designate debt 
securities issued and guaranteed by a U.S. GSEs as level 1 liquid 
assets in the final rule. Commenters also stated that the 15 percent 
haircut for such obligations was too high. A few commenters recommended 
that the agencies remove the 40 percent composition cap on level 2 
liquid assets for U.S. GSE securities if the final rule does not 
include U.S. GSE securities as level 1 liquid assets. Other commenters 
suggested that the agencies

[[Page 61458]]

remove the ``liquid and readily-marketable'' requirement for the 
inclusion of U.S. GSE securities as level 2A liquid assets because the 
securities clearly meet these requirements. One commenter suggested a 
graduated cap approach, whereby U.S. GSE securities in excess of the 40 
percent composition limit in the HQLA amount would be subject to a 
haircut that would increase as the proportion of U.S. GSE securities to 
total HQLA increases.
    To support their request, commenters made various observations 
about the liquidity characteristics of U.S. GSE securities. Many 
commenters highlighted that the market for U.S. GSE securities is one 
of the deepest and most liquid in the world, with over $4 trillion in 
GSE mortgage backed securities (MBS) outstanding and a daily trading 
volume in GSE MBS that averages almost $230 billion. In particular, 
some commenters argued that MBS issued by FNMA and FHLMC are among the 
highest quality and most liquid assets. A number of commenters 
mentioned that U.S. GSE securities comprise a significant amount of the 
liquidity portfolios of banking organizations because they are 
recognized by the market as trading in deep and liquid markets. 
Commenters also contended that GSE securities, like U.S. Treasury 
securities, have the highest potential to generate liquidity for a 
covered company during periods of severe liquidity stress. For example, 
one commenter pointed out that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
demand for FHLB consolidated obligations increased during the dramatic 
flight-to-quality event.
    Commenters also urged the agencies to consider the potential 
adverse impact of classifying GSE securities as level 2A liquid assets. 
These commenters argued that the level 2A liquid asset designation 
would discourage banking organizations from investing in the securities 
and would therefore decrease liquidity in the secondary mortgage 
market. A commenter asserted that the 40 percent cap on level 2A and 
level 2B liquid assets would result in U.S. banking industry positions 
being concentrated in the U.S. Treasury and U.S. agency markets, rather 
than being more broadly diversified across those markets and the GSE 
market. Another commenter suggested that the agencies assess the impact 
to the value of U.S. GSE securities should banking organizations 
liquidate their holdings, which could in turn increase mortgage funding 
costs and decrease the availability of credit for mortgages.
    Some commenters argued that other agency guidance and rules 
consider or imply that U.S. GSE securities are highly liquid. For 
example, one commenter stated that the agencies have provided previous 
guidance encouraging institutions to hold an amount of high-quality 
liquid assets and cited securities issued by U.S. GSEs as an example of 
such assets and urged the agencies to explain any deviation from this 
guidance.\42\ Another commenter raised the issue that the Board's then-
proposed enhanced liquidity standards under section 165 of the Dodd-
Frank Act classified U.S. GSE securities as ``fully liquid.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See Interagency Liquidity Policy Statement.
    \43\ See 12 CFR 252.35(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also urged the agencies to consider the fact that 
certain U.S. GSEs currently operate under the conservatorship of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and receive capital support from 
the U.S. Treasury. These commenters argued that GSE securities should 
receive level 1 liquid asset designation while the U.S. GSEs receive 
support from the U.S. government because the obligations are 
effectively guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government. One commenter suggested that, while the U.S. GSEs are in 
conservatorship, the agencies permit these securities to receive a 10 
percent risk weight under the capital rules and permit them to be in 
level 1 liquid assets.
    Finally, commenters compared the treatment of U.S. GSE securities 
as level 2A liquid assets under the proposed rule to the classification 
of securities issued by certain multilateral development banks, such as 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the 
German Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the German 
Agriculture Bank, and the Asian Development Bank as level 1 liquid 
assets. Commenters argued that the size and liquidity of the markets 
for these securities is much less than the size and liquidity of the 
market for U.S. GSE securities.
    The agencies recognize that some securities issued and guaranteed 
by U.S. GSEs consistently trade in very large volumes and generally 
have been highly liquid, including during times of stress, as indicated 
by commenters. The agencies also recognize that certain U.S. GSEs 
currently operate under the conservatorship of FHFA and receive capital 
support from the U.S. Treasury. However, the obligations of the U.S. 
GSEs are currently effectively, but not explicitly, guaranteed by the 
full faith and credit of the United States. Under the agencies' risk-
based capital rules, the obligations and guarantees of U.S. GSEs--
including those operating under conservatorship of FHFA--continue to be 
assigned a 20 percent risk weight, rather than the zero percent risk 
weight assigned to securities explicitly guaranteed by the full faith 
and credit of the United States. The agencies have long held the view 
that obligations of U.S. GSEs should not be accorded the same treatment 
as obligations that carry the explicit, unconditional guarantee of the 
U.S. government and that are assigned a zero percent risk weight. 
Moreover, the agencies feel that the events related to the 2007-2009 
financial stress that required these entities to be placed under 
conservatorship do not support temporarily improving GSE securities' 
HQLA status.
    Consistent with the agencies' risk-based capital rules, the 
agencies are not assigning the most favorable regulatory treatment to 
securities issued and guaranteed by U.S. GSEs under the final rule, 
even while certain GSEs temporarily operate under the conservatorship 
of FHFA. The final rule assigns GSE securities to the level 2A liquid 
asset category, as long as they are investment grade consistent with 
the OCC's investment securities regulation (12 CFR part 1) as of the 
calculation date and are liquid and readily-marketable. Additionally, 
consistent with the agencies' risk-based capital rules' higher risk 
weight for the preferred stock of U.S. GSEs, the final rule excludes 
such preferred stock from HQLA.
    The agencies are aware that certain previous agency guidance and 
rules recognize the liquid nature of U.S. GSE securities; \44\ however, 
the guidance and rules do not specifically address the types of 
diversification requirements that are being required by the final 
rule's inclusion of different levels of HQLA. The final rule continues 
to recognize U.S. GSE securities as highly liquid instruments that 
trade in deep and active markets by including them as a level 2A liquid 
asset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See, e.g., Interagency Liquidity Policy Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters' suggestions to remove the 40 percent 
composition cap, or apply a graduated cap to U.S. GSE securities 
included as level 2A liquid assets, the agencies believe that the 
proposed 40 percent cap (when combined with level 2B liquid assets) 
should continue to apply to all level 2A liquid assets, including U.S. 
GSE securities. In this regard, commenters also expressed concerns

[[Page 61459]]

that the cap on level 2A liquid assets would result in concentrated 
positions in U.S. Treasury and agency markets. The agencies continue to 
believe that the 40 percent composition cap is appropriate to ensure 
that level 2 liquid assets comprise a smaller portion of a covered 
company's total HQLA amount, such that the majority of the HQLA amount 
is comprised of level 1 liquid assets, which are the assets that have 
consistently demonstrated the most liquidity during periods of market 
distress. The designation of certain assets as level 2A liquid assets 
indicates that the assets have characteristics that are associated with 
being relatively stable and significant sources of liquidity, but not 
to the same degree as level 1 liquid assets. The agencies believe that 
the level 2 liquid asset cap appropriately prevents concentrations of 
less liquid assets and ensures a sufficient stock of the most liquid 
assets to meet stressed outflows during a period of significant market 
distress. As a result, level 2A liquid assets, when combined with level 
2B liquid assets, cannot exceed 40 percent of the HQLA amount under the 
final rule.
    Commenters expressed concerns that the proposed designation of U.S. 
GSE securities as level 2A liquid assets would result in broad market 
consequences, including decreased liquidity in the secondary mortgage 
market, increased mortgage funding costs, and impact to the fair value 
of U.S. GSE securities. The agencies do not believe the treatment of 
U.S. GSE securities will have broad market consequences as the largest 
market participants generally have already adjusted their funding 
profile and assets in anticipation of the LCR requirement with little 
impact on the overall market. Furthermore, the agencies highlight that 
the final rule does not prohibit covered companies from investing in 
U.S. GSE securities and instead continues to allow covered companies to 
participate fully in U.S. GSE securities markets.
ii. Certain Sovereign and Multilateral Organization Securities
    The proposed rule also would have included as a level 2A liquid 
asset a claim on, or a claim guaranteed by, a sovereign entity or a 
multilateral development bank that was: (1) Not included in level 1 
liquid assets; (2) assigned no higher than a 20 percent risk weight 
under the standardized approach for risk-weighted assets of the 
agencies' risk-based capital rules; \45\ (3) issued by an entity whose 
obligations have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in 
repurchase or sales markets during stressed market conditions; and (4) 
not an obligation of a regulated financial company, investment company, 
non-regulated fund, pension fund, investment adviser, identified 
company, or any consolidated subsidiary of the foregoing. A covered 
company would have been required to demonstrate that a claim on or 
claims guaranteed by a sovereign entity or a multilateral development 
bank had a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in 
repurchase or sales markets during stressed market conditions through 
reference to historical market prices during times of stress.\46\ 
Covered companies should have looked to multiple periods of systemic 
and idiosyncratic liquidity stress in compiling such records. The 
agencies did not receive any comments on the proposed treatment of 
sovereign and multilateral organization securities that would have 
qualified as level 2A liquid assets under the proposed criteria. Thus, 
the final rule classifies them as level 2A liquid assets as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 12 CFR part 217 (Board), and 12 
CFR part 324 (FDIC).
    \46\ This would be demonstrated if the market price of the 
security or equivalent securities of the issuer declined by no more 
than 10 percent or the market haircut demanded by counterparties to 
secured funding or lending transactions that are collateralized by 
such security or equivalent securities of the issuer increased by no 
more than 10 percentage points during a 30 calendar-day period of 
significant stress.
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e. Level 2B Liquid Assets
    Under the proposed rule, level 2B liquid assets would have included 
certain publicly traded corporate debt securities and publicly traded 
shares of common stock that are liquid and readily-marketable. The 
limitation of level 2B liquid assets to those that are publicly traded 
was meant to ensure a minimum level of liquidity, as privately traded 
assets are typically less liquid. Under the proposed rule, the 
definition of ``publicly traded'' would have been consistent with the 
definition used in the agencies' regulatory capital rules and would 
identify securities traded on registered exchanges with liquid two-way 
markets. A two-way market would have been defined as a market where 
there are independent bona fide offers to buy and sell, so that a price 
reasonably related to the last sales price or current bona fide 
competitive bid and offer quotations can be determined within one day 
and settled at that price within a relatively short time frame, 
conforming to trade custom. This definition was designed to identify 
markets with transparent and readily available pricing, which, for the 
reasons discussed above, is fundamental to the liquidity of an asset.
    The agencies received comments requesting clarification on the 
types of publicly traded corporate debt securities that may be included 
in level 2B liquid assets. Several commenters also suggested that the 
agencies broaden the scope of publicly traded corporate debt securities 
and publicly traded shares of common stock to be included in level 2B 
liquid assets. After considering commenters' concerns, the agencies 
adopted several modifications to the final rule's criteria for level 2B 
liquid assets, as discussed below.
i. Corporate Debt Securities
    Publicly traded corporate debt securities would have been 
considered level 2B liquid assets under the proposed rule if they met 
three requirements (in addition to being liquid and readily-
marketable). First, the securities would have been required to meet the 
definition of ``investment grade'' under 12 CFR part 1 as of the 
calculation date.\47\ This standard would ensure that assets that did 
not meet the required credit quality standard for bank investment would 
not have been included in HQLA. The agencies believed that meeting this 
standard is indicative of lower overall risk and, therefore, higher 
liquidity for a corporate debt security. Second, the securities would 
have been required to be issued by an entity whose obligations have a 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in repurchase or sales 
markets during stressed market conditions. A covered company could have 
demonstrated this record of liquidity reliability and lower volatility 
during times of stress by showing that the market price of the publicly 
traded debt securities or equivalent securities of the issuer declined 
by no more than 20 percent during a 30 calendar-day period of 
significant stress, or that the market haircut demanded by 
counterparties to secured lending and secured funding transactions that 
were collateralized by such debt securities or equivalent securities of 
the issuer increased by no more than 20 percentage points during a 30 
calendar-day period of significant stress. As discussed above, a 
covered company could demonstrate a historical record that meets this 
criterion through reference to historical market prices and available 
funding haircuts of the debt security during times of stress. Third, 
the proposed rule also provided that the debt securities could not be 
obligations of a regulated financial company,

[[Page 61460]]

investment company, non-regulated fund, pension fund, investment 
adviser, identified company, or any consolidated subsidiary of the 
foregoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 12 CFR 1.2(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would have defined ``publicly traded'' consistent 
with the definition used in the agencies' regulatory capital rules and 
would have identified securities traded on registered exchanges with 
liquid two-way markets. Commenters stated that the proposed rule's 
definition of ``publicly traded'' would exclude a substantial portion 
of corporate debt securities because they were not traded on a public 
market or exchange. Commenters pointed out that unlike equity 
securities, corporate debt securities are not generally listed on a 
national securities exchange. Instead, corporate debt securities are 
generally traded in active, liquid secondary markets. Commenters argued 
that applying the ``publicly traded'' requirement to corporate debt 
securities would severely limit the universe of corporate debt 
securities that could be included as level 2B liquid assets.
    To address concerns that the ``publicly traded'' requirement is 
overly restrictive for corporate debt securities, some commenters 
suggested that the final rule include non-publicly traded debt if the 
issuer's equity is publicly traded. These commenters noted that 
unlisted debt securities of public companies are actively traded in 
liquid markets.
    After considering the comments received, the agencies have decided 
to remove the ``publicly traded'' requirement for corporate debt 
securities to be included as level 2B liquid assets. The agencies 
acknowledge that corporate debt securities are frequently traded in 
over-the-counter secondary markets and are less frequently listed and 
regularly traded on national securities exchanges, as required by the 
``publicly traded'' definition. Thus, the ``publicly traded'' 
requirement would have unduly narrowed the scope of corporate debt 
securities that can be designated as level 2B liquid assets.
    The final rule continues to impose certain other requirements that 
the agencies proposed on level 2B corporate debt securities. First, the 
final rule continues to require that the securities meet the liquid and 
readily-marketable standard to be included in level 2B assets. Second, 
the final rule also continues to require that the securities meet the 
definition of ``investment grade'' under 12 CFR part 1 as of a 
calculation date.\48\ Third, the securities are required to be issued 
by an entity whose obligations have a proven record as a reliable 
source of liquidity in repurchase or sales markets during stressed 
market conditions. The covered company must demonstrate that the market 
price of the securities or equivalent securities of the issuer declined 
by no more than 20 percent or the market haircut demanded by 
counterparties to secured lending and secured funding transactions that 
were collateralized by such debt securities or equivalent securities of 
the issuer increased by no more than 20 percentage points during a 30 
calendar-day period of significant stress, or that the market haircut 
demanded by counterparties to secured lending and secured funding 
transactions that were collateralized by such debt securities or 
equivalent securities of the issuer increased by no more than 20 
percentage points during a 30 calendar-day period of significant 
stress. Lastly, the final rule provides that the debt securities may 
not be obligations of a regulated financial company, investment 
company, non-regulated fund, pension fund, investment adviser, 
identified company, or any consolidated subsidiary of the foregoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 12 CFR 1.2(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Publicly Traded Shares of Common Stock
    Under the proposed rule, publicly traded shares of common stock 
could have been included as level 2B liquid assets if the shares met 
the five requirements set forth below (in addition to being liquid and 
readily-marketable).
    First, to be considered a level 2B liquid asset under the proposed 
rule, publicly traded common stock would have been required to be 
included in: (1) The Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500); (2) if the 
stock is held in a non-U.S. jurisdiction to meet liquidity risks in 
that jurisdiction, an index that the covered company's supervisor in 
that jurisdiction recognizes for purposes of including the equities as 
level 2B liquid assets under applicable regulatory policy; or (3) any 
other index for which the covered company can demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of its appropriate Federal banking agency that the equity 
in such index is as liquid and readily-marketable as equities traded on 
the S&P 500.
    As discussed in the Supplementary Information section to the 
proposed rule, the agencies believed that listing of a common stock in 
a major stock index is an important indicator of the liquidity of the 
stock, because such stock tends to have higher trading volumes and 
lower bid-ask spreads during stressed market conditions than those that 
are not listed. The agencies identified the S&P 500 as being 
appropriate for this purpose given that it is considered a major index 
in the United States and generally includes the most liquid and 
actively traded stocks.
    Second, to be considered a level 2B liquid asset, the publicly 
traded common stock would have been required to have been issued in: 
(1) U.S. dollars; or (2) the currency of a jurisdiction where the 
covered company operated and the stock offset its net cash outflows in 
that jurisdiction. This requirement was meant to ensure that, upon 
liquidation of the stock, the currency received from the sale would 
match the outflow currency.
    Third, the common stock would have been required to have been 
issued by an entity whose common stock has a proven record as a 
reliable source of liquidity in the repurchase or sales markets during 
stressed market conditions. Under the proposed rule, a covered company 
could have demonstrated this record of reliable liquidity by showing 
that the market price of the common stock or equivalent securities of 
the issuer declined by no more than 40 percent during a 30 calendar-day 
period of significant stress, or that the market haircut, as evidenced 
by observable market prices, of secured funding or lending transactions 
collateralized by such common stock or equivalent securities of the 
issuer increased by no more than 40 percentage points during a 30 
calendar-day period of significant stress. This requirement was 
intended to exclude volatile equities from inclusion as level 2B liquid 
assets, which is a risk to the preservation of liquidity value. As 
discussed above, a covered company could have demonstrated this 
historical record through reference to the historical market prices of 
the common stock during times of stress.
    Fourth, as with the other asset categories of HQLA and for the same 
reasons, common stock included in level 2B liquid assets may not have 
been issued by a regulated financial company, investment company, non-
regulated fund, pension fund, investment adviser, identified company, 
or any consolidated subsidiary of the foregoing. During the recent 
financial crisis, the common stock of such companies experienced 
significant declines in value correlated to other financial 
institutions and the agencies believe that such declines indicate those 
assets would be less likely to provide substantial liquidity during 
future periods of stress in the banking system and, therefore, are not 
appropriate for inclusion in a covered company's HQLA.

[[Page 61461]]

    Fifth, if held by a depository institution, the publicly traded 
common stock could not have been acquired in satisfaction of a debt 
previously contracted (DPC). Because of general statutory prohibitions 
on holding equity investments for their own account,\49\ depository 
institutions subject to the proposed rule would not be able to include 
common stock as level 2B liquid assets. In general, publicly traded 
common stock may be acquired by a depository institution to prevent a 
loss from a DPC. However, in order for a depository institution to 
avail itself of the authority to hold DPC assets, such as by holding 
publicly traded common stock, such assets typically must be divested in 
a timely manner.\50\ The agencies believe that depository institutions 
should make a good faith effort to dispose of DPC publicly traded 
common stock as soon as commercially reasonable, subject to the 
applicable legal time limits for disposition. The agencies are 
concerned that permitting depository institutions to include DPC 
publicly traded common stock in level 2B liquid assets may provide an 
inappropriate incentive for depository institutions to hold such assets 
beyond a commercially reasonable period for disposition. Therefore, the 
proposal would have prohibited depository institutions from including 
DPC publicly traded common stock as level 2B liquid assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. 1464(c) 
(federal savings associations); 12 U.S.C. 1831a (state banks); 12 
U.S.C. 1831e (state savings associations).
    \50\ See generally 12 CFR 1.7 (OCC); 12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(2) 
(Board); 12 CFR 362.1(b)(3) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, under the proposed rule, a depository institution could 
have eligible publicly traded common stock permissibly held by a 
consolidated subsidiary as level 2B liquid assets if the assets were 
held to cover the net cash outflows for the consolidated subsidiary. 
For example, if Subsidiary A holds level 2B publicly traded common 
stock of $200 in a legally permissible manner and has net outflows of 
$80, the parent depository institution could not count more than $80 of 
Subsidiary A's level 2B publicly traded common stock in the parent 
depository institution's consolidated level 2B liquid assets after the 
50 percent haircut discussed below.
    The agencies received several comments on the criteria for publicly 
traded equity securities to be included in level 2B liquid assets. Some 
commenters suggested that the agencies broaden the scope of eligible 
equity securities beyond those included in the S&P 500. One of these 
commenters stated that the proposed rule favors a small group of equity 
issuers included in the S&P 500, which could lead to market distortions 
and unforeseeable consequences. Several commenters suggested that the 
agencies consider other major stock indices for the level 2B liquid 
asset criteria. For U.S. equities, a few commenters recommended that 
the final rule include equities that comprise the Russell 3000 index. 
Another commenter suggested the Russell 1000 index. These commenters 
provided analysis of the volatility and trading volumes of stocks 
within these indices showing the comparability of the most and least 
liquid securities in these indices with the S&P 500.
    In addition, although the proposed rule would have provided that 
common equities in any other index for which the covered company can 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the agencies that the index is as 
liquid and readily-marketable as the S&P 500 may be included in level 
2B liquid assets, commenters argued that identifying specific indices 
in the final rule would allow covered companies to avoid waiting for 
agency approval of indices and promote certainty for banking 
organizations structuring secured financing transactions. Accordingly, 
some commenters suggested that the final rule designate all equities 
included in major equity indices in G-20 jurisdictions as level 2B 
liquid assets under the final rule. Finally, other commenters argued 
that exchange traded funds (ETFs) based on the indices included as HQLA 
should be included, because the ETFs add incremental liquidity on top 
of that seen in the market for the underlying equities.
    After considering commenters' concerns and the liquidity 
characteristics of the indices commenters proposed to be included as 
HQLA, the agencies have determined to adjust the scope of U.S. equities 
that may be included as level 2B liquid assets. Specifically, the final 
rule includes common equity securities of companies included in the 
Russell 1000 index in the criteria for level 2B liquid assets in place 
of the companies included in the S&P 500. The proposed rule identified 
the S&P 500 as being appropriate for this purpose, given that it is 
considered a major index in the United States and generally includes 
the most liquid and actively traded stocks. The agencies have 
determined that the Russell 1000 index would be a more appropriate 
index after considering comments evidencing the similarities in trading 
volumes, volatilities, and price movements of the two indices. 
Moreover, stocks that are included in the Russell 1000 index are 
selected based on predetermined criteria, whereas a committee evaluates 
and selects stocks for inclusion in the S&P 500. The agencies believe 
that the systematic selection of stocks for inclusion in the Russell 
1000 index, combined with the liquidity characteristics of stocks 
included in the index, support replacing the S&P 500 index with the 
Russell 1000 index in the criteria for level 2B liquid assets.
    As mentioned above, some commenters recommended including equities 
in the Russell 3000 index in level 2B liquid assets. The agencies 
evaluated the Russell 3000 index and were concerned that it includes a 
wider universe of stocks and captures the equities of certain smaller 
U.S. companies by market capitalization. As a result, equities in the 
Russell 3000 index exhibit a greater range of liquidity characteristics 
and include equities that demonstrate less favorable trading volumes, 
volatilities, and price changes. Thus, the agencies believe that the 
Russell 1000 index, which includes a broader set of stocks than the S&P 
500, provides an appropriate universe of stocks that may be eligible as 
level 2B liquid assets.
    The agencies emphasize, however, that equities included in the 
Russell 1000 index must also meet certain other requirements to be 
level 2B liquid assets, which the final rule adopts as proposed. Thus, 
to be considered a level 2B liquid asset, an equity included in the 
Russell 1000 index must meet other requirements provided in the final 
rule, such as meeting the liquid and readily-marketable standard and 
being issued by an entity whose shares have a proven record as a 
reliable source of liquidity in the sales or repurchase market during a 
stressed scenario.
    In response to commenters' requests for the final rule to identify 
other indices that include equities that may be designated as level 2B 
liquid assets, the agencies have determined that the final rule should 
no longer include the provision to allow a covered company to 
demonstrate that the equity securities included in another index should 
be eligible for level 2B liquid assets because the final rule includes 
the significantly broader Russell 1000 index. In addition, the agencies 
are unaware of another existing index the components of which would be 
appropriate for inclusion as level 2B liquid assets.
    The final rule does not include ETFs that are based on the indices 
as level 2B liquid assets. The agencies believe that the liquidity 
characteristics of ETFs are

[[Page 61462]]

not identical to the liquidity characteristics of the underlying index 
or the individual components of the fund. Rather, ETFs have their own 
risk profiles, trading volumes, and market-based characteristics 
separate from the underlying index. Accordingly, the final rule does 
not include ETFs as level 2B liquid assets.
    The proposed rule would have required publicly traded common stocks 
to have been issued in: (1) U.S. dollars; or (2) the currency of a 
jurisdiction where the covered company operated and the stock offset 
its net cash outflows in that jurisdiction in order to be considered a 
level 2B liquid asset. The final rule adopts the provision as proposed. 
The agencies clarify that the provision's second requirement limits a 
covered company to including as level 2B liquid assets equities issued 
in the currency of a jurisdiction where the covered company operates. 
For example, a covered company may hold a stock issued in Japanese yen 
as a level 2B liquid asset only if: (1) The covered company operates in 
Japan, and (2) the stock is available to support the covered company's 
yen denominated net cash outflows in Japan.
iii. Assets Securing a Transaction
    Lastly, one commenter suggested that there are narrow situations 
where the agencies should expand level 2B liquid asset recognition for 
purposes of the LCR denominator, even when those assets are not 
recognized as HQLA in the LCR numerator. Specifically, the commenter 
requested that the agencies include additional classes of assets as 
level 2B liquid assets solely for the purposes of determining the 
applicable outflow and inflow rates for transactions secured by the 
asset. The commenter argued that failure to do so would result in 
anomalous LCR results even with otherwise reliable secured lending 
transactions. After considering the commenters' suggestion, the 
agencies believe that assets should be designated consistently as HQLA 
for purposes of calculating both the LCR numerator and denominator. In 
determining HQLA designation, the agencies considered the liquidity 
characteristics of assets to ensure that a covered company's HQLA 
amount only includes assets with a high potential to generate liquidity 
during a stress scenario. The agencies believe that such an approach is 
appropriate for determining the designation of assets as HQLA for all 
aspects of the LCR calculation, including the determination of outflow 
and inflow rates for transactions secured by the asset.
f. Assets Recommended for HQLA Designation
    A number of commenters requested that the agencies consider 
designating additional assets as HQLA. In particular, commenters 
suggested including as HQLA municipal securities, asset-backed 
securities (ABS), state and local authority housing bonds backed by 
Federal Housing Association and Department of Veterans Affairs 
guarantees, covered bonds, private label MBS, and investment company 
shares. Several commenters also argued that permissible collateral 
pledged to FHLBs, FHLB letters of credit, and unused borrowing 
commitments from FHLBs should be considered as HQLA. The agencies 
considered commenters' requests and have declined to designate 
additional assets as HQLA for the reasons discussed below.
i. Municipal Securities
    Many commenters urged the agencies to include municipal securities 
as HQLA, noting that the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework would 
include them in its definition of HQLA. Commenters raised a number of 
policy justifications to support the inclusion of investment grade 
municipal securities as HQLA, either as level 2A or level 2B liquid 
assets, including assertions that municipal securities exhibit 
liquidity characteristics consistent with HQLA status and that the 
exclusion of municipal securities from HQLA could lead to higher 
funding costs for municipalities, which could affect local economies 
and infrastructure.
    Several commenters contended that U.S. municipal securities should 
satisfy the proposed rule's qualifying criteria for HQLA. Many of these 
commenters argued that municipal bonds meet the liquid and readily-
marketable requirement of HQLA because they exhibited limited price 
volatility particularly during the recent financial crisis, high 
trading volumes, and deep and stable secured funding markets. 
Commenters also focused on the high credit quality and low historical 
default rates of these securities. Furthermore, commenters asserted 
that the risk and liquidity profiles of municipal securities were 
comparable, if not superior, to the profiles of other types of assets 
the agencies proposed for inclusion as HQLA, such as corporate bonds, 
equities, certain foreign sovereign obligations, and certain securities 
of GSEs. A number of commenters expressed concerns that the proposed 
rule would have included certain sovereign securities for countries 
that have smaller GDPs than some U.S. states as HQLA while excluding 
obligations of U.S. states and local governments. Some of these 
commenters argued that the credit ratings of certain states compare 
favorably with those of countries whose obligations could be included 
as level 1 or level 2A liquid assets. Commenters also contended that 
municipal securities perform well and experience increased demand 
during times of stress. Several commenters asserted that banking 
organizations could liquidate large holdings of municipal securities 
with minimal market or price disruption during a crisis scenario.
    Many commenters asserted that municipal securities have active 
markets with high trading volumes, a large number of registered broker-
dealers who make markets in the municipal securities, and significant 
diversity in market participants. These commenters maintained that 
certain large issuers of municipal securities markets have regular and 
active trading. In particular, commenters argued that municipal 
securities are actively traded by a number of nonbank financial sector 
entities and retail customers and have a low degree of 
interconnectedness with banking organizations. A few commenters 
acknowledged that the municipal bond market includes numerous, diverse 
issuers and that certain individual municipal securities may have low 
trading volumes. However, these commenters argued that the securities 
typically trade on a per issuer basis rather than a per security basis 
and urged the agencies to evaluate the municipal security market as a 
whole when assessing their liquidity characteristics for HQLA status.
    Several commenters asserted that many municipal securities exhibit 
the HQLA characteristics of being easily and readily valued. Some of 
these commenters highlighted that although municipal securities are not 
traded on an exchange, most of them can be readily valued on a daily 
basis from a variety of pricing services. Certain commenters 
highlighted that municipal securities are eligible collateral for loans 
at the Federal Reserve discount window.
    Many commenters focused on the potential consequences of excluding 
municipal securities from HQLA. Commenters asserted that their 
exclusion would discourage banking organizations from purchasing the 
securities. Consequently, state and local entities would face increased 
funding costs for infrastructure and essential public services. 
Commenters stated that municipal securities are a vital source of 
credit for local communities, and the proposed rule's exclusion of the

[[Page 61463]]

securities from HQLA would have limited a source of funding for local 
economies. Some commenters stated that the proposed rule's treatment of 
municipal securities would have led states and municipalities to pass 
on increased funding costs for infrastructure and essential public 
services to local businesses and the general public in the form of 
increased taxes.
    Several commenters asserted that although municipal securities are 
not typically used as collateral for repurchase agreements, they are 
rehypothecated by tender options bonds, which did not see significant 
haircuts or price changes during the recent financial crisis.
    Commenters also compared the proposed rule's treatment of municipal 
securities to the standards of other jurisdictions. A few of these 
commenters noted that the proposed rule's exclusion of municipal 
securities was inconsistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, which potentially recognizes securities issued by state and 
municipal governments that qualify for 20 percent risk weighting under 
the Basel capital standards as level 2A assets. One commenter noted 
that the European Bank Authority has recommended including certain 
bonds issued by European local government institutions as HQLA.
    Some commenters noted that encouraging covered companies to invest 
in municipal securities would compel covered companies to diversify 
their holdings of HQLA with securities that have a varied investor 
base. Commenters pointed out that the financial sector is underexposed 
to the municipal securities market and asserted that this 
diversification would improve the liquidity risk profiles of banking 
organizations.
    Finally, several commenters argued that the agencies could limit 
municipal securities included as HQLA through a number of criteria 
including: (1) Only those securities that would be ``investment grade'' 
under 12 CFR part 1 as of a calculation date; (2) only those securities 
that have a 20 percent risk-weighting under the agencies risk-based 
capital rules; or (3) a separate 25 percent composition cap on 
municipal securities included in a covered company's HQLA amount.
    Under the final rule, securities issued by public sector entities, 
such as a state, local authority, or other government subdivision below 
the level of a sovereign (including U.S. states and municipalities) do 
not qualify as HQLA. The goal of the LCR is to ensure that covered 
companies are able to meet their short-term liquidity needs during 
times of stress. Inability to meet those liquidity needs proved to be a 
significant cause of the failure or near failure of several large 
financial firms during the recent financial crisis. To ensure adequate 
liquidity, the final rule only includes as HQLA securities that can be 
easily and immediately convertible into cash with little or no loss of 
value during a period of stress, either by sale or through a repurchase 
transaction.
    With respect to municipal securities, the agencies have observed 
that the liquidity characteristics of municipal securities range 
significantly, and overall, many municipal securities are not ``liquid 
and readily-marketable'' in U.S. markets as defined in Sec.  _--.3 of 
the final rule. For instance, many securities issued by public sector 
entities exhibit low average daily trading volumes and have generally 
demonstrated less favorable price changes and volatility 
characteristics. In addition, the agencies have found that the funding 
of many municipal securities is very limited in the repurchase market, 
which indicates that the securities may not be able to be quickly 
converted into cash during a period of stress. Generally, the agencies 
believe that covered companies would be limited in their ability to 
rapidly monetize many municipal securities in the event of a severe 
systemic liquidity stress scenario.
    Several commenters pointed to other characteristics, such as credit 
quality, default rates, and central bank eligibility, in urging the 
agencies to include municipal securities as HQLA. As discussed, the 
final rule considers certain liquidity characteristics, including risk 
profile, market-based characteristics, and central bank eligibility to 
identify types of assets that would qualify as HQLA. Although the 
agencies consider the credit risk and central bank eligibility 
associated with an asset in determining HQLA eligibility, the agencies 
also consider other characteristics, such as trading volumes, price 
characteristics, and the presence of active sales or repurchase markets 
for the securities at all times. After considering the relevant 
characteristics taken together, the agencies believe that many 
municipal securities do not demonstrate the requisite liquidity 
characteristics to qualify as HQLA under the final rule.
    Some commenters questioned the basis for excluding municipal 
securities from HQLA when the agencies proposed to include corporate 
bonds, equities, and securities of sovereign countries that have 
recently experienced financial difficulties. The agencies note that 
although the credit risk of a security may be an important aspect for 
determining the liquidity of a class of assets, the agencies also 
believe that trading volumes and the presence of deep, active sale or 
repurchase markets for an asset class are important aspects of any 
potential class of HQLA. As discussed above, the agencies have 
determined that the liquidity characteristics of other assets, such as 
corporate bonds, equities, and certain sovereign securities, meet the 
requirements for HQLA eligibility because of their trading volumes and 
the presence of deep, active sale or repurchase markets for those 
assets. For many municipal securities, the agencies have not found that 
the markets and trading volume is as deep and active on an ongoing 
basis such that there is a high level of confidence that a banking 
organization could quickly convert these municipal securities into cash 
during a severe liquidity stress event. The agencies observe that the 
final rule's treatment of municipal securities is consistent with the 
treatment of other assets that also, as a class, significantly vary in 
trading volume and lack access to deep and active repurchase markets 
and therefore do not qualify as HQLA, such as covered bonds and ABS.
    Commenters also compared the proposed rule's treatment of municipal 
securities to the potential standards of other jurisdictions and the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, which contemplate that certain 
securities issued by public sector entities such as states and 
municipalities may be included as HQLA. However, for the reasons 
discussed above, the agencies believe that many municipal securities 
are not liquid and readily-marketable in U.S. markets and thus do not 
exhibit the liquidity characteristics necessary to be included as HQLA 
under the final rule.
    In response to commenters' suggested criteria for including certain 
municipal securities as HQLA, although some commenters noted that 
pricing services can offer daily values for certain municipal 
securities, the agencies recognize that financial data from municipal 
issuers can be inconsistent and vary in timing. The agencies believe 
that challenges in data availability can impact the ability of covered 
companies and supervisors to determine the eligibility of certain 
municipal securities based on suggested sets of criteria. Furthermore, 
generally, the agencies have concluded that the criteria suggested by 
commenters would lead to inclusion of municipal securities that exhibit 
a range of liquidity characteristics, including those with

[[Page 61464]]

less favorable characteristics that are not compatible with HQLA 
eligibility and that would not be a sufficiently reliable source of 
liquidity for a banking organization during a period of stress.
    Finally, as discussed above, commenters expressed concerns about 
the market impact of excluding municipal securities from HQLA. A few 
commenters also stated that encouraging covered companies to invest in 
municipal securities would help diversify the covered companies' 
holdings. The agencies highlight that the final rule does not prohibit 
covered companies from investing in municipal securities and 
diversifying their investment portfolios. The agencies are aware that 
covered companies continue to actively invest in municipal securities, 
evidenced by covered companies' increased holdings of municipal 
securities since the financial crisis, for reasons unrelated to 
liquidity risk management practices. Under the final rule, covered 
companies may continue to participate fully in municipal security 
markets. The agencies continue to believe that municipal securities can 
be appropriate investments for covered companies and expect the banking 
sector to continue to participate in this market. Many covered 
companies did not include municipal securities in their holdings of 
liquid assets for contingent liquidity stress purposes prior to the 
LCR, yet continued to invest in municipal securities for yield, credit 
quality, and other factors; therefore, the agencies do not believe the 
final rule will have a significant impact on overall demand for 
municipal securities.
ii. ABS, Covered Bonds, Private Label MBS, and Mortgage Loans
    A number of commenters recommended that the agencies designate 
certain securitization exposures, specifically certain high credit 
quality ABS, covered bonds, and private label MBS (commercial, 
multifamily, and residential real estate), as level 2B liquid assets. 
Commenters asserted that banking organizations are key investors in 
these securitization products that serve as important long-term 
financing instruments supporting the economy. These commenters warned 
that failure to include these securities as HQLA could adversely impact 
the private U.S. mortgage market.
    Some commenters suggested that the final rule include ``high-
quality'' ABS as level 2B liquid assets. For example, one commenter 
suggested that the final rule include a set of criteria to identify 
high-quality ABS having liquidity characteristics similar to those of 
corporate debt securities that are included as level 2B liquid assets, 
so that the ABS meeting those criteria could also be included as level 
2B liquid assets. In support of that recommendation, some commenters 
asserted that certain publicly traded ABS exhibited similar historical 
performance to investment grade publicly traded corporate debt 
securities, even during the recent financial crisis. Some commenters 
asserted that excluding ABS from HQLA could undermine investment in the 
ABS market and increase the cost of securitization financing available 
to customers of banking organizations. A commenter requested that the 
final rule include investment grade senior unsubordinated ABS 
collateralized or otherwise backed solely by loans originated under the 
Federal Family Education Loan Program as level 2A liquid assets.
    Some commenters recommended that the agencies include covered bonds 
as level 2B liquid assets. Commenters argued that the proposed rule's 
exclusion of covered bonds from HQLA deviated from the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework's designation of certain high credit 
quality covered bonds as level 2A liquid assets with a 15 percent 
haircut. One commenter suggested a set of criteria to identify high 
credit quality covered bonds that could be included as level 2B liquid 
assets.\51\ The commenter suggested that the agencies consider 
including covered bonds that meet the criteria and have a proven track 
record as a reliable source of liquidity in a stressed market 
environment as level 2B liquid assets. Another commenter noted that the 
risk characteristics of covered bonds are fundamentally different from 
other securitizations and highlighted that the liquidity of covered 
bonds in Europe during recent crises was not significantly impaired. 
One commenter acknowledged that the U.S. covered bond market is not 
highly developed, but supported including covered bonds as HQLA to 
encourage development of the market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Specifically, the commenter suggested that a covered bond 
should qualify as a level 2B liquid asset if the security: (1) Is 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or exempt under the 
SEC's Rule 144A; (2) is senior debt that is issued by a regulated, 
unaffiliated financial institution located in an Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development country; (3) grants the 
holders the right to sell the covered asset pool upon default and 
that the sale could not be stayed or delayed due to the insolvency 
of the issuer; and (4) meets the other criteria required for a level 
2B liquid asset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggested that the final rule include private label 
MBS as level 2B liquid assets. A few commenters argued that the 
proposed rule's exclusion of private label MBS from HQLA deviated from 
the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, which includes certain high 
credit quality private label residential MBS (RMBS) as level 2B liquid 
assets with a 25 percent haircut, and suggested that the agencies 
follow the Basel standard. One of these commenters suggested that the 
agencies adopt a set of criteria to identify high credit quality RMBS 
that could be considered level 2B liquid assets that is similar to the 
criteria the agencies proposed to adopt for corporate debt securities 
that would have been level 2B liquid assets under the proposed rule. 
The commenter recommended that the eligible RMBS would qualify for 
level 2B treatment to the extent that the RMBS could be shown to have a 
proven track record as a reliable source of liquidity during stressed 
market environments as demonstrated by: (i) The market price of the 
RMBS or equivalent securities of the sponsor declining by no more than 
20 percent during a 30 calendar-day period of significant stress, or 
(ii) the market haircut demanded by counterparties to secured lending 
and secured funding transactions that are collateralized by the RMBS or 
equivalent securities of the sponsor declining no more than 20 
percentage points during a 30-calendar day period of significant 
stress.
    A few commenters stated that in the agencies' proposed rule on 
credit risk retention, the agencies have proposed to exempt from risk 
retention certain RMBS backed by ``qualified mortgages'' as defined 
under the Truth in Lending Act in part because of their credit 
characteristics and requested that the agencies consider including RMBS 
backed by ``qualified mortgages'' as HQLA.\52\ Some commenters asserted 
that failing to include RMBS as HQLA could negatively impact the 
residential mortgage market by impeding the return of private capital. 
Commenters also requested that mortgage loans be included as HQLA, 
arguing that the failure to do so could have unintended consequences 
for the mortgage market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, SEC, U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, ``Credit Risk Retention,'' 78 FR 57989 
(September 20, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering the comments, the agencies have determined not to 
include ABS, covered bonds, private label MBS and mortgage loans as 
level 2B liquid assets. The agencies are aware that specific issuances 
of ABS, RMBS, or covered bonds may exhibit some liquidity 
characteristics that are similar

[[Page 61465]]

to those of assets included as HQLA. However, the agencies continue to 
believe that ABS, covered bonds, private label MBS, and mortgage loans 
do not meet the liquid and readily-marketable standard in U.S. markets, 
and thus do not exhibit the liquidity characteristics necessary to be 
included as HQLA under the final rule. Evidence from the 2007-2009 
financial crisis and the period following indicates that the market 
demand for a variety of securitization issuances can decline rapidly 
during a period of stress, and that such demand may not rapidly 
recover. ABS may be dependent on a diverse range of underlying asset 
classes, each of which may be impacted in a period of significant 
stress. Furthermore, the bespoke characteristics of securitization 
structures may be tailored to a limited range of investors. The ability 
to monetize securitization issuances and whole loans through or in the 
repurchase market may be limited in a period of stress.
    Moreover, although certain ABS issuances, such as ABS backed by 
loans under the Federal Family Education Loan Program and RMBS backed 
solely by securitized ``qualified mortgages'' or mortgages guaranteed 
by the Federal Housing Authority or the Department of Veterans Affairs, 
may have lower credit risk, the liquidity risk profile of such 
securities, including the inability to monetize the issuance during a 
period of stress, would not warrant treatment as HQLA. The agencies 
note that ABS and RMBS issuances have substantially lower trading 
volumes than MBS that are guaranteed by U.S. GSEs and demand for such 
securities has decreased, as shown by the substantial decline in the 
number of issuances since the recent financial crisis. The agencies 
note that the inclusion of RMBS under the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework was limited to those securitizations where the underlying 
mortgages were full recourse loans, which is not permissible in a 
number of states, and therefore would complicate any inclusion of RMBS 
as HQLA in the United States.
    Likewise, with respect to mortgage loans, including qualified 
mortgage loans or those guaranteed by the Federal Housing Authority or 
the Department of Veterans Affairs, the agencies note that due to legal 
requirements for transfer and the lack of use of mortgages as 
collateral for repurchase agreements, such loans cannot typically be 
rapidly monetized during a period of financial stress, prohibiting 
their classification as HQLA. Moreover, although such assets can be 
pledged to the FHLB, the agencies do not believe that the FHLB should 
represent the sole method of rapid monetization for any class of assets 
included as HQLA, as discussed further below.
    As one commenter mentioned, the U.S. market for covered bonds is 
not highly developed, with few issuances. The agencies do not believe 
that it is appropriate for the agencies to use the LCR as the mechanism 
for encouraging or developing the liquidity of an asset class. Rather, 
the LCR is designed to ensure that covered institutions have sufficient 
liquid assets that already have been proven sources of liquidity in the 
event of a liquidity crisis. Furthermore, the agencies observe that 
covered bonds, which are typically issued by companies in the financial 
sector, exhibit significant risks regarding interconnectedness and 
wrong-way risk among companies in the financial sector.
    Several commenters highlighted that excluding RMBS and covered 
bonds from HQLA could cause a detrimental impact on the U.S. 
residential mortgage market. The agencies recognize the importance of 
capital funding to the U.S. residential mortgage markets and highlight 
that the final rule does not prohibit covered companies from continuing 
to invest in ABS, covered bonds, and private label MBS, and does not 
restrict a covered company from making mortgage loans or loans 
underlying ABS and covered bonds. As discussed above, the agencies do 
not expect, and have not observed, that banking organizations base 
their investment decisions solely on regulatory considerations and do 
not anticipate that exclusion of these assets from HQLA will 
significantly deter investment in these assets.
iii. Investment Company Shares
    A few commenters requested that the agencies consider including 
certain investment company shares, such as shares of mutual funds and 
money market funds (MMFs), as HQLA. Commenters argued that investment 
companies should not be treated as financial sector entities for 
purposes of determining whether shares of the investment company may be 
included as HQLA. As discussed above, the proposed rule would have 
excluded securities issued by a financial sector entity from HQLA to 
avoid the potential for wrong-way risk. Commenters suggested that the 
agencies look through to the investments of the fund to determine HQLA 
eligibility. In particular, a commenter requested clarification that 
mutual funds such as open-end GNMA funds should be considered level 1 
liquid assets, because the underlying assets are zero percent risk 
weighted GNMA securities.
    Specifically for MMFs, one commenter highlighted that the SEC 
introduced enhanced liquidity requirements for MMFs in 2010. The 
commenter contended that the new regulations have sufficiently improved 
the stability of MMFs to justify their inclusion in HQLA. The commenter 
also suggested that the agencies include certain high-quality MMFs, 
such as government MMFs and tax-exempt funds, as HQLA.
    After considering these comments, the agencies have determined not 
to include shares of investment companies, including mutual funds and 
MMFs, as HQLA. The agencies recognize that certain underlying 
investments of the investment companies may include high-quality 
assets. However, similar to securities issued by many companies in the 
financial sector, shares of investment companies have been prone to 
lose value and become less liquid during periods of severe market 
stress or an idiosyncratic event involving the fund's sponsor. As 
recognized by some commenters, certain shares in MMFs exhibited 
liquidity stress during the recent financial crisis. Further, the 
recently finalized SEC rules regarding money markets may impose some 
barriers on investors' ability to withdraw all of their funds during a 
stress.\53\ Therefore, the agencies do not believe that shares of 
investment companies demonstrate the liquidity characteristics 
necessary to be included as HQLA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See SEC, ``Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form 
PF,'' 79 FR 47736 (August 14, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. FHLB Collateral and Commitments
    Certain commenters urged the agencies to consider including 
collateral pledged to FHLBs and unused borrowing capacity from FHLBs as 
HQLA. One commenter supported the agencies' proposal to treat as 
unencumbered those HQLA currently pledged to a U.S. GSE that are 
subject to a blanket, but not asset-specific, lien, where potential 
credit secured by the HQLA is not currently extended. However, the 
commenter requested that the agencies also consider including any 
assets that are pledged to FHLBs in support of FHLB advance 
availability as HQLA, rather than only those assets that are currently 
specified as level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid assets. The 
commenter contended that FHLB-eligible collateral is highly liquid 
because it can be readily converted into cash advances from a FHLB. 
Separately,

[[Page 61466]]

a few commenters recommended that the agencies include FHLB 
collateralized advance availability, FHLB letters of credit, or FHLB 
borrowing capacity as HQLA. The commenters emphasized that depository 
institutions have the ability to access liquidity from FHLBs even 
during times of stress and therefore argued that FHLB capacity would be 
a reliable source of liquidity during a crisis.
    The agencies have considered the commenters' suggestions and have 
determined not to include as HQLA collateral pledged to FHLBs that are 
not otherwise HQLA under the proposed rule, FHLB letters of credit, or 
FHLB collateralized advance availability. In determining the types of 
assets that would qualify as HQLA, the agencies considered certain 
liquidity characteristics that are reflected in the criteria in Sec.  
_--.20 of the final rule, as discussed above. The agencies have 
determined that assets, including those that are considered permissible 
collateral for FHLB advances, must meet the criteria set forth in Sec.  
_--.20 of the final rule to qualify as HQLA, including low bid-ask 
spreads, high trading volumes, a large and diverse number of market 
participants, and other appropriate factors. As discussed above, 
although certain collateral, such as mortgages, may be accepted by the 
FHLB, a covered company may not be able to rapidly liquidate a 
portfolio of such assets other than as collateral for the extension of 
credit by the FHLB. The agencies do not believe that it would be 
appropriate to rely on the extension of credit by the FHLB as the sole 
method of monetization during a period of market distress.
    Separately, the agencies believe that FHLB collateralized advance 
availability and FHLB letters of credit should not be included as HQLA. 
The LCR is designed to encourage the holding of liquid assets that may 
be immediately and reliably converted to cash in times of liquidity 
stress as borrowing capacity may be constrained, particularly borrowing 
capacity tied to lower quality assets. The agencies observe that 
reliance on market borrowing capacity has proved problematic in the 
past for many covered companies during periods of severe market stress. 
Accordingly, the LCR is designed to ensure that companies hold 
sufficient assets to cover outflows during a period of market distress. 
Thus the final rule would not include such borrowing capacity as HQLA.
v. Including Other Securities
    One commenter requested that the agencies adopt in the final rule 
provisions from the Board's Regulation YY's liquidity risk-management 
requirements that permit covered institutions to hold certain ``highly 
liquid assets'' for purposes of its liquidity stress tests under that 
rule. Unlike the proposed rule, the Board's Regulation YY includes 
certain government securities, cash, and any other assets that the bank 
holding company demonstrates to the Board are highly liquid. 
Specifically, the commenter requested that the agencies incorporate 
each of the criteria set forth in Regulation YY for assets that are 
demonstrated to be ``highly liquid'' and to also permit assets that 
meet such criteria to qualify as HQLA in the final rule.
    The proposed rule and Regulation YY were designed to complement one 
another. Whereas the Regulation YY's internal liquidity stress-test 
requirements provide a view of an individual firm under multiple 
scenarios, and include assumptions tailored to the idiosyncratic 
aspects of the company's liquidity profile, the standardized measure of 
liquidity adequacy under the proposed rule would have facilitated a 
transparent assessment of covered companies' liquidity positions under 
a standard stress scenario and comparison across covered companies. Due 
to the tailoring of the liquidity stress assumptions under Regulation 
YY to the risk profile of the company, Regulation YY provided companies 
discretion to determine whether an asset would be liquid under a 
particular scenario. Although the criteria set forth in Regulation YY 
share broad themes with the final rule's requirements for determining 
HQLA, the agencies believe that the final rule's standardized asset 
requirements are appropriate for determining the assets that would be 
easily and immediately convertible to cash with little or no loss of 
value during a period of liquidity stress and are designed to provide 
for comparability across covered companies due to the standardized 
outflow assumptions. Thus, the final rule does not incorporate specific 
criteria from Regulation YY.
3. Requirements for Inclusion as Eligible HQLA
    For HQLA to be eligible to be included in the HQLA amount (LCR 
numerator), the proposed rule would have required level 1 liquid 
assets, level 2A liquid assets and level 2B liquid assets to meet all 
the operational requirements and generally applicable criteria set 
forth in Sec.  _.20(d) and (e) of the proposed rule. Because certain 
assets may have met the high-quality liquid asset criteria set forth in 
Sec.  _.20(a)-(c) of the proposed rule, but may not have met the 
operational or generally applicable criteria requirements (and thus not 
be eligible to be included in the calculation of the HQLA amount), the 
agencies are adding a new construct in the final rule (eligible HQLA). 
The purpose of this addition is to more clearly draw a distinction 
between those assets that are HQLA under Sec.  _.20 (a)-(c) of the 
final rule and eligible HQLA which also meet the operational, generally 
applicable criteria, and maintenance of U.S. eligible requirements 
which have been adopted in Sec.  _.22 of the final rule. In other 
words, only eligible HQLA meeting all the necessary requirements set 
forth in Sec.  _.22 are to be included in the calculation steps to 
determine the HQLA amount. For the purpose of consistency and ease of 
reference, this Supplementary Information section also uses this 
distinction between HQLA and eligible HQLA when referring to the 
requirements that the proposed rule would have implemented.
    The final rule continues to permit a covered company to include 
assets in each HQLA category as of a calculation date without regard to 
the asset's residual maturity. For all HQLA, the residual maturity of 
the asset will be reflected in the asset's fair value and should not 
have an effect on the covered company's ability to monetize the asset.
a. Operational Requirements
    Under the proposed rule, an asset that a covered company could have 
included in its HQLA amount would have needed to meet a set of 
operational requirements. These operational requirements were intended 
to better ensure that a covered company's eligible HQLA can be 
liquidated in times of stress. Several of these requirements related to 
the monetization of an asset, meaning the receipt of funds from the 
outright sale of an asset or from the transfer of an asset pursuant to 
a repurchase agreement. A number of commenters requested clarification 
on the operational requirements. The final rule retains the proposed 
operational requirements and clarifies certain aspects of the 
requirements as discussed below.
i. Operational Capability To Monetize HQLA
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to have the 
operational capability to monetize the HQLA held as eligible HQLA. This 
capability would have been demonstrated by: (1) Implementing and

[[Page 61467]]

maintaining appropriate procedures and systems to monetize the asset at 
any time in accordance with relevant standard settlement periods and 
procedures; and (2) periodically monetizing a sample of eligible HQLA 
that reasonably reflects the composition of the covered company's total 
eligible HQLA portfolio, including with respect to asset type, 
maturity, and counterparty characteristics. This requirement was 
designed to ensure a covered company's access to the market, the 
effectiveness of its processes for monetization, the availability of 
the assets for monetization, and to minimize the risk of negative 
signaling during a period of actual stress. The agencies would have 
monitored such procedures, systems, and periodic sample liquidations 
through their supervisory process.
    One commenter requested that the agencies clarify that a covered 
company may demonstrate its operational capacity to monetize HQLA 
through its ordinary business activities. The commenter claimed that 
requiring monetization solely to demonstrate access to the market for 
purposes of the rule could lead the covered company to incur a profit 
and loss for a transaction that lacks a business purpose. A separate 
commenter questioned whether actual sales of assets were required to 
meet the requirement that a covered company have the operational 
capacity to monetize HQLA.
    Commenters requested that the agencies include additional methods 
of monetization. One commenter argued that monetization of an asset 
should include transfer of the asset in exchange for cash in the 
settlement of an overnight reverse repurchase agreement. The commenter 
clarified that the counterparty of the overnight reverse repurchase 
agreement could be a Federal Reserve Bank or another entity that 
provides the reliable monetization of assets held under the reverse 
repurchase agreement. The commenter contended that such assets should 
be eligible HQLA even when they do not meet all other requirements 
related to the monetization of the asset.
    After considering commenters' concerns, the agencies are retaining 
the proposed requirement that a covered company demonstrate its 
operational capacity to monetize HQLA by periodically monetizing a 
sample of the assets either through an outright sale or pursuant to a 
repurchase agreement. The agencies expect actual sales or repurchase 
agreements to occur for a covered company to demonstrate periodic 
monetization. Furthermore, as requested by commenters and as discussed 
above, the agencies clarify that monetization includes receiving funds 
pursuant to a repurchase agreement. To the extent that a covered 
company monetizes certain assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities, on 
a regular, frequent basis through business-as-usual activities, the 
company may rely on evidence of sales during the ordinary course of 
business and repurchase transactions of those assets to demonstrate its 
operational capability to monetize them. However, the agencies are 
aware that a company may monetize certain assets on a sporadic or less 
frequent basis due to the nature of the assets or business. The 
agencies expect that in order to meet the operational capability 
requirement for eligible HQLA, the covered company monetize those types 
of assets through specific steps that go beyond ordinary business 
activities. In particular, to meet the requirement, the agencies expect 
a covered company to more thoroughly demonstrate the periodic 
monetization of assets that exhibit less favorable liquidity 
characteristics than other HQLA.
    Under the proposed and final rules, reverse repurchase agreements 
subject to a legally binding agreement at the calculation date are 
secured lending transactions and these transactions do not count as 
HQLA. The assets that are provided to the covered company by some 
overnight reverse repurchase agreements may potentially meet the 
operational requirements for eligible HQLA described in the rule. The 
agencies do not believe that the presence of the overnight reverse 
repurchase agreement and the anticipated exchange of the assets for 
cash is sufficient in itself to meet the monetization standard, as for 
operational or business reasons such transactions may be required to be 
rolled over on an ongoing basis. The agencies are clarifying that in 
order to meet this monetization standard, covered companies must show 
that they are not rolling over the overnight reverse repurchase 
agreement indefinitely and must hold or use the cash received from the 
maturing transaction for a sustained period; or the covered company 
must periodically monetize the underlying asset through outright sale 
or transfer pursuant to a repurchase agreement.
    Another commenter expressed concern that the requirement to 
periodically monetize HQLA conflicted with a previous interagency 
policy statement on liquidity risk management that provided that 
``affirmative testing . . . may be impractical.'' \54\ This statement 
in the 2010 Interagency Liquidity Policy Statement referred to a 
banking organization's required contingency funding plan (CFP) that set 
forth strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency 
scenarios. The policy statement acknowledged that while affirmative 
testing of certain components of the CFP may be impractical, 
``institutions should be sure to test operational components of the 
CFP.'' Therefore, the proposed rule's requirement that a covered 
company demonstrate its operational capability to monetize assets did 
not conflict with the previous interagency policy statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See Interagency Liquidity Policy Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. HQLA Under the Control of the Liquidity Management Function
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company would have been required 
to implement policies that required all eligible HQLA to be under the 
control of the management function of the covered company that is 
charged with managing liquidity risk. To do so, a covered company would 
have been required either to segregate the HQLA from other assets, with 
the sole intent to use them as a source of liquidity, or to demonstrate 
its ability to monetize the HQLA and have the resulting funds available 
to the risk management function, without conflicting with another 
business or risk management strategy. Thus, if an HQLA had been used to 
hedge a specific transaction, such as holding an asset to hedge a call 
option that the covered company had written, it could not have been 
included in the covered company's eligible HQLA if the sale of the 
asset or its use in a repurchase transaction would have conflicted with 
another business or risk management strategy. If the use of the asset 
in the repurchase transaction would not have conflicted with the hedge, 
the HQLA may have been eligible under the proposed rule. If HQLA had 
been used as a general macro hedge, such as interest rate risk of the 
covered company's portfolio, it could still have been included as 
eligible HQLA. This requirement was intended to ensure that a central 
function of a covered company had the authority and capability to 
liquidate eligible HQLA to meet its obligations in times of stress 
without exposing the covered company to risks associated with specific 
transactions and structures that had been hedged. There were instances 
during the recent financial crisis where unencumbered assets of some 
firms were not available to meet liquidity demands because the firms' 
treasuries did not have access to such assets.
    A few commenters requested that the agencies clarify the 
requirement for

[[Page 61468]]

segregating assets. One commenter questioned whether an electronic flag 
was adequate to demonstrate segregation or whether separate accounts 
are required. Another commenter requested clarification on whether 
segregated assets could be placed in multiple consolidated 
subsidiaries. The agencies continue to believe that a covered company 
may demonstrate that the eligible HQLA is under the control of the 
liquidity risk management function by segregating the HQLA with the 
sole intent to use the HQLA as a source of liquidity. Although the 
agencies have not adopted a preferred method of showing such 
segregations, a covered company should be able to demonstrate that the 
segregated assets are under the control of the management function 
charged with managing liquidity risk at the covered company. The 
agencies expect a covered company to be able to demonstrate that the 
chosen form of segregation facilitates the liquidity management 
function's use of the assets for liquidity purposes.
iii. Termination of Transaction Hedging HQLA
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to have 
included in its total net cash outflow amount the amount of cash 
outflow that would have resulted from the termination of any specific 
transaction hedging eligible HQLA. The proposal would have required a 
covered company to include the impact of the hedge in the outflow 
because if the covered company were to liquidate the asset, it would be 
required to close out the hedge to avoid creating a risk exposure. This 
requirement was not intended to apply to general macro hedges such as 
holding interest rate derivatives to adjust internal duration or 
interest rate risk measurements, but was intended to cover specific 
hedges that would become risk exposures if the asset were sold. The 
agencies did not receive comments on this operational requirement. 
However, the agencies are clarifying that, consistent with the Basel 
III Revised Liquidity Framework, the amount of the outflow resulting 
from the termination of the hedging transaction should be deducted from 
the fair value of the applicable eligible HQLA instead of being 
included as an outflow in the LCR denominator. Section _.22(a)(3) of 
the final rule has been amended to clarify this requirement.
iv. Policies and Procedures To Determine Eligible HQLA Composition
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company would have been required 
to implement and maintain policies and procedures that determined the 
composition of the assets held as eligible HQLA on a daily basis by: 
(1) Identifying where its eligible HQLA were held by legal entity, 
geographical location, currency, custodial or bank account, and other 
relevant identifying factors; (2) determining that the assets included 
as eligible HQLA continued to qualify as eligible HQLA; and (3) 
ensuring that the HQLA held by a covered company as eligible HQLA are 
appropriately diversified by asset type, counterparty, issuer, 
currency, borrowing capacity or other factors associated with the 
liquidity risk of the assets.
    The agencies also recognized that significant international banking 
activity occurs through non-U.S. branches of legal entities organized 
in the United States and that a foreign branch's activities may give 
rise to the need to hold eligible HQLA in the jurisdiction where it is 
located. While the agencies believed that holding HQLA in a geographic 
location where it is needed to meet liquidity needs such as those 
envisioned by the LCR was appropriate, they were concerned that other 
factors such as taxes, rehypothecation rights, and legal and regulatory 
restrictions may encourage certain companies to hold a disproportionate 
amount of their eligible HQLA in locations outside the United States 
where unforeseen impediments may prevent timely repatriation of HQLA 
during a liquidity crisis. Nonetheless, establishing quantitative 
limits on the amount of eligible HQLA that can be held abroad and still 
count towards a U.S. domiciled legal entity's LCR requirement is 
complex and may be overly restrictive in some cases. Therefore, the 
agencies proposed to require a covered company to establish policies to 
ensure that eligible HQLA maintained in foreign locations was 
appropriate with respect to where the net cash outflows could arise. By 
requiring that there be a correlation between the eligible HQLA held 
outside of the United States and the net cash outflows attributable to 
non-U.S. operations, the agencies intended to increase the likelihood 
that eligible HQLA would be available to a covered company in the 
United States and to avoid repatriation concerns from eligible HQLA 
held in another jurisdiction.
    Commenters did not express significant concerns about the 
requirement to implement and maintain policies and procedures to 
determine the composition of the assets in eligible HQLA.
    The agencies incorporated two clarifying changes in the final rule. 
Although the proposed rule would have required a covered company to 
have policies and procedures to determine its eligible HQLA composition 
on a daily basis, the final rule clarifies that the requirement applies 
on each calculation date. The agencies incorporated the modification to 
clarify that the requirement applies on each date a covered company 
calculates its LCR, subject to the transition provisions in subpart F 
of the final rule. The agencies also emphasized in Sec.  _.22(a)(5) of 
the final rule that the methodology a covered company uses to determine 
the eligibility of its HQLA must be documented and must be applied 
consistently. For example, a covered company cannot make inconsistent 
determinations in terms of eligible HQLA requirements for HQLA with the 
same operational characteristics, either across different assets or 
across time. Additionally, a covered company cannot treat the same 
asset as eligible HQLA for one part of the final rule, while not 
treating it as eligible HQLA for another part of the final rule.
4. Generally Applicable Criteria for Eligible HQLA
    Under the proposed rule, assets would have been required to meet 
the following generally applicable criteria to be considered as 
eligible HQLA.
a. Unencumbered
    The proposed rule required that an asset be unencumbered in order 
for it to be included as eligible HQLA. First, the asset would have 
been required to be free of legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restrictions on the ability of a covered company to monetize the asset. 
The agencies believed that, as a general matter, eligible HQLA should 
only include assets that could be converted easily into cash. Second, 
the asset could not have been pledged, explicitly or implicitly, to 
secure or provide credit-enhancement to any transaction, except that 
the asset could be pledged to a central bank or a U.S. GSE to secure 
potential borrowings if credit secured by the asset has not been 
extended to the covered company or its consolidated subsidiaries. This 
exception was meant to account for the ability of central banks and 
U.S. GSEs to lend against the posted HQLA or to return the posted HQLA, 
in which case a covered

[[Page 61469]]

company could sell or engage in a repurchase agreement with the assets 
to receive cash. This exception was also meant to permit collateral 
that is covered by a blanket (rather than asset-specific) lien from a 
U.S. GSE to be included as eligible HQLA.
    The final rule includes a clarifying change to the proposed 
requirement. The final rule adopts the proposed exception that an asset 
may be considered unencumbered if the asset is pledged to a central 
bank or a U.S. GSE to secure potential borrowings and credit secured by 
the asset has not been extended to the covered company or its 
consolidated subsidiaries. Under the final rule, the agencies clarify 
that the assets may also be considered unencumbered if the pledge of 
these assets is not required to support access to the payment services 
of a central bank. In certain circumstances, a central bank may have 
the ability to encumber the pledged assets to avoid losses that may 
occur when a troubled institution fails to fulfill its payments. The 
agencies are concerned that such a scenario is more likely to occur 
during a period of market stress. Thus, the agencies believe that 
assets pledged by a covered company to access a central bank's payment 
services are considered encumbered. This provision of the final rule 
would apply only to assets that a covered company is required to pledge 
to receive access to the payment services of a central bank, and would 
not encompass assets that are voluntarily pledged by a covered company 
to support additional services that may be offered by the central bank, 
such as overdraft capability.
    One commenter expressed concerns that segregated funds held by a 
covered company pursuant to SEC's customer protection rule 15c3-3 (Rule 
15c3-3) would be considered encumbered assets. The commenter noted that 
Rule 15c3-3 is an SEC rule requiring the segregation of customer assets 
and places limits on the broker-dealer's use of customer funds. After 
reviewing the commenter's concerns, the agencies believe that funds 
held in a Rule 15c3-3 segregated account should be considered 
encumbered assets. Rule 15c3-3 requires a covered company to set aside 
assets in a segregated account to ensure that broker-dealers have 
sufficient assets to meet the needs of their customers. Accordingly, 
the assets in Rule 15c3-3 segregated accounts are not freely available 
to the covered company to meet its liquidity needs and are not 
considered unencumbered for purposes of the final rule. However, while 
these accounts are excluded from eligible HQLA, the agencies are 
including treatment of an inflow amount with respect to certain amounts 
related to broker-dealer segregated accounts as detailed in Sec.  
_.33(g) of the final rule.
    Some commenters noted that the subsidiaries of some covered 
companies are subject to the SEC's proposed rules to implement 
liquidity requirements on broker-dealers and security-based swap 
dealers that use the alternative net capital computation methodology. 
The SEC's proposed rule would be a potential regulatory restriction on 
the transfer of HQLA and the commenter expressed concern that the 
proposed rule would lead to broad disqualification of the HQLA of SEC-
regulated entities. The agencies believe it is appropriate that in 
cases where legal restrictions exist that do not allow the transfer of 
HQLA between entities, that only HQLA that is equal to the amount of 
the net outflows of that legal entity should be included in the 
consolidated LCR, as discussed further below in section II.B.4.c and 
II.B.4.d. However, the agencies clarify that in cases where such 
restrictions would result in an amount of HQLA subject to restrictions 
on transfer that is less than the amount of net outflows as calculated 
under the final rule for the legal entity, the covered company may 
include all of the HQLA of the legal entity subject to the restriction 
in its consolidated LCR HQLA amount, assuming that the HQLA meets the 
operational requirements specified above, as well as other requirements 
in the final rule.
    One commenter requested that the agencies clarify that securities 
acquired through reverse repurchase agreements that have not been 
rehypothecated and are legally and contractually available for a 
covered company's use are unencumbered for purposes of the rule. Two 
commenters requested that the agencies clarify that all borrowed assets 
are legally and contractually available for the covered company's use. 
The agencies clarify that borrowed securities, including those that are 
acquired through reverse repurchase agreements, that have not been 
rehypothecated may be considered unencumbered if the covered company 
has rehypothecation rights with respect to the securities and the 
securities are free of legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restrictions on the ability of the covered company to monetize them and 
have not been pledged to secure or provide credit-enhancement to any 
transaction, with certain exceptions. The agencies highlight that HQLA, 
including assets received through reverse repurchase agreements and 
other borrowed assets, must meet all requirements set forth in Sec.  
_.22 of the final rule to qualify as eligible HQLA.
b. Segregated Client Pool Securities
    Under the proposed rule, an asset included as eligible HQLA could 
not have been a client pool security held in a segregated account or 
cash received from a repurchase agreement on client pool securities 
held in a segregated account. The proposed rule defined a client pool 
security as one that is owned by a customer of a covered company and is 
not an asset of the organization, regardless of the organization's 
hypothecation rights to the security. Because client pool securities 
held in a segregated account are not freely available to meet all 
possible liquidity needs of the covered company, they should not count 
as a source of liquidity.
    Commenters did not raise significant concerns on the exclusion of 
assets in client pool securities from HQLA. The agencies have therefore 
largely adopted the proposed requirement in the final rule.
c. Treatment of HQLA Held by U.S. Consolidated Subsidiaries
    Under the proposal, HQLA held in a legal entity that is a U.S. 
consolidated subsidiary of a covered company would have been included 
as eligible HQLA subject to specific limitations depending on whether 
the subsidiary was subject to the proposed rule and was therefore 
required to calculate a LCR under the proposed rule.
    If the consolidated subsidiary was subject to a minimum LCR under 
the proposed rule, then a covered company could have included eligible 
HQLA held in the consolidated subsidiary in an amount up to the 
consolidated subsidiary's net cash outflows, as calculated to meet its 
LCR requirement. The covered company could also have included in its 
HQLA amount any additional amount of HQLA if the monetized proceeds 
from that HQLA would be available for transfer to the top-tier covered 
company during times of stress without statutory, regulatory, 
contractual, or supervisory restrictions. Regulatory restrictions would 
include, for example, sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 
\55\ and Regulation W.\56\ Supervisory restrictions may include, but 
would not be limited to, enforcement actions, written agreements, 
supervisory directives or requests to a particular subsidiary that 
would directly or indirectly restrict the

[[Page 61470]]

subsidiary's ability to transfer the HQLA to the parent covered 
company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 12 U.S.C. 371c, 371c-1.
    \56\ 12 CFR part 223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the consolidated subsidiary was not subject to a minimum LCR 
under Sec.  _.10 of the proposed rule, a covered company could have 
included the HQLA held in the consolidated subsidiary in an amount up 
to the net cash outflows of the consolidated subsidiary that would have 
been included in the covered company's calculation of its LCR, plus any 
additional amount of HQLA held by the consolidated subsidiary the 
monetized proceeds from which would be available for transfer to the 
top-tier covered company during times of stress without statutory, 
regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions.
    Section _.22(b)(3) of the final rule adopts the treatment of HQLA 
held by U.S. consolidated subsidiaries as proposed. This treatment is 
consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework and ensures 
that assets in the pool of eligible HQLA can be freely monetized and 
the proceeds can be freely transferred to a covered company in times of 
a liquidity stress. In response to a commenter's request for 
clarification, the agencies clarify that a covered company is required 
only to apply the statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory 
restrictions that are in effect as of the calculation date.
d. Treatment of HQLA Held by Non-U.S. Consolidated Subsidiaries
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
proposed rule provided that a covered company could have included 
eligible HQLA held by a non-U.S. legal entity that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of the covered company in an amount up to: (1) The net cash 
outflows of the non-U.S. consolidated subsidiary that are included in 
the covered company's net cash outflows, plus (2) any additional amount 
of HQLA held by the non-U.S. consolidated subsidiary that is available 
for transfer to the top-tier covered company during times of stress 
without statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory 
restrictions. The proposed rule would have required covered companies 
with foreign operations to identify the location of HQLA and net cash 
outflows in foreign jurisdictions and exclude any HQLA above the amount 
of net cash outflows for those jurisdictions that is not freely 
available for transfer due to statutory, regulatory, contractual or 
supervisory restrictions. Such transfer restrictions would have 
included LCR requirements greater than those that would be established 
by the proposed rule, counterparty exposure limits, and any other 
regulatory, statutory, or supervisory limitations.
    One commenter supported the proposed rule's approach to permitting 
a covered company to include as eligible HQLA a certain level of HQLA 
of its non-U.S. consolidated subsidiary. One commenter argued that the 
final rule should permit a covered company to include as eligible HQLA 
assets held in a non-U.S. consolidated subsidiary that qualify as HQLA 
in the host jurisdiction of that subsidiary. The commenter contended 
that jurisdictions adopting the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework 
would consider certain assets as HQLA depending on the liquidity 
characteristics of the assets in the market of the relevant 
jurisdiction. This approach, the commenter noted, is also consistent 
with the recommendation of the European Banking Authority for the 
treatment of HQLA in jurisdictions outside of the Eurozone.
    Another commenter requested that the agencies acknowledge that HQLA 
held in foreign entities that are not subject to prudential regulation 
or capital requirements are less likely to present repatriation issues.
    After reviewing commenters' concerns, the agencies have determined 
to adopt the proposed liquidity requirements for non-U.S. consolidated 
subsidiaries without change. The agencies have declined to adopt a 
commenter's suggestion that the final rule permit a covered company's 
eligible HQLA to include the HQLA of its non-U.S. consolidated 
subsidiaries as defined in the host jurisdiction of the subsidiary. The 
agencies recognize that jurisdictions will likely vary in their 
adoption of the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. However, the 
final rule was designed to implement the LCR standard as appropriate 
for the United States and its markets, and, for the purposes of the LCR 
in the United States, only those assets that meet the liquidity 
characteristics and criteria of the final rule can be included as HQLA. 
The agencies decline to differentiate between foreign entities that are 
subject to prudential regulation or capital requirements and those that 
are not for purposes of determining whether HQLA is more or less 
subject to risk of restriction on transfer from those jurisdictions. 
The agencies believe that generally HQLA held in foreign entities may 
encounter challenges during a severe period of stress that prevent the 
timely repatriation of assets. Furthermore, the agencies do not believe 
it would be appropriate to provide favorable regulatory treatment for 
assets held in a jurisdiction where there is less, rather than more, 
explicit prudential regulation.
e. Maintenance of Eligible HQLA in the United States
    The agencies believe it is appropriate for a covered company to 
hold eligible HQLA in a particular geographic location in order to meet 
local liquidity needs there. However, they do not believe it is 
appropriate for a covered company to hold a disproportionate amount of 
eligible HQLA in locations outside the United States, given that 
unforeseen impediments may prevent timely repatriation of liquidity 
during a crisis. Therefore, under the proposal, a covered company would 
have been generally expected to maintain in the United States an amount 
and type of eligible HQLA that is sufficient to meet its total net cash 
outflow amount in the United States.
    A commenter requested that the agencies confirm that that the 
general expectation that a covered company maintain in the United 
States an amount and type of HQLA that is sufficient to meet its total 
net cash outflow amount in the United States would be monitored through 
a supervisory approach.
    The final rule maintains the requirement that a covered company is 
generally expected to maintain as eligible HQLA an amount and type of 
eligible HQLA in the United States that is sufficient to meet its total 
net cash outflow amount in the United States. In response to the 
commenter's request for clarification, the agencies expect to monitor 
this requirement through the supervisory process.
f. Exclusion of Certain Rehypothecated Assets
    Under the proposed rule, assets that a covered company received 
under a rehypothecation right where the beneficial owner has a 
contractual right to withdraw the asset without remuneration at any 
time during a 30 calendar-day stress period would not have been 
included in HQLA. This exclusion extended to assets generated from 
another asset that was received under such a rehypothecation right. If 
the beneficial owner had such a right and were to exercise it within a 
30 calendar-day stress period, the asset would not be available to 
support the covered company's liquidity position.
    The agencies have included a clarifying change to the proposed 
requirement in the final rule. The final rule provides that any asset 
which a covered company received with rehypothecation rights would not 
be considered eligible HQLA if the

[[Page 61471]]

counterparty that provided the asset, or the beneficial owner, has a 
contractual right to withdraw the asset without paying non-de minimis 
remuneration at any time during the 30 calendar days following the 
calculation date.
g. Exclusion of Assets Designated To Cover Operational Costs
    In the proposed rule, assets specifically designated to cover 
operational costs could not be included as eligible HQLA. The agencies 
believe that assets specifically designated to cover costs such as 
wages or facility maintenance generally would not be available to cover 
liquidity needs that arise during stressed market conditions.
    The agencies did not receive comment on this provision and are 
adopting the proposed requirement in Sec.  _.22(b)(6) of the final rule 
without change. The treatment of outflows for operational costs are 
discussed in section II.C.3.l of this Supplementary Information 
section.
5. Calculation of the HQLA Amount
    Instructions for calculating the HQLA amount, including the 
calculation of the required haircuts and caps for level 2 liquid 
assets, were set forth in Sec.  _--.21 of the proposed rule. The 
agencies received several comments relating to the calculation of the 
HQLA amount, particularly relating to the calculations of the adjusted 
level 1, adjusted level 2A, and adjusted level 2B liquid asset amounts 
that are used to calculate the adjusted excess HQLA amount and that 
incorporate the unwind of certain secured transactions as described 
below. After considering the comments, the agencies adopted the HQLA 
amount calculation instructions largely as proposed, with two 
modifications to the treatment of collateralized deposits and reserve 
balance requirements. The final rule sets forth instructions for 
calculating the HQLA amount in Sec.  _.21.
    Under the final rule, the HQLA amount equals the sum of the level 
1, level 2A and level 2B liquid asset amounts, less the greater of the 
unadjusted excess HQLA amount or the adjusted excess HQLA amount, as 
described below.
a. Calculation of Liquid Asset Amounts
    For the purposes of calculating a covered company's HQLA amount 
under the proposed rule, each of the level 1 liquid asset amount, the 
level 2A liquid asset amount, and the level 2B liquid asset amount 
would have been calculated using the fair value of the eligible level 1 
liquid assets, level 2A liquid assets, or level 2B liquid assets, 
respectively, as determined under GAAP, multiplied by the appropriate 
haircut factor prescribed for each level of HQLA.
    Under the proposed rule, the level 1 liquid asset amount would have 
equaled the fair value of all level 1 liquid assets held by the covered 
company as of the calculation date, less required reserves under 
section 204.4 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.4). Consistent with the Basel 
III Revised Liquidity Framework, and as discussed in section II.B.2 of 
this Supplementary Information section, the proposed rule would have 
applied a 15 percent haircut to level 2A liquid assets and a 50 percent 
haircut to level 2B liquid assets. These haircuts were meant to 
recognize that level 2 liquid assets generally are less liquid, have 
larger haircuts in the repurchase markets, and may have more volatile 
prices in the outright sales markets, particularly in times of stress. 
Thus, the level 2A liquid asset amount would have equaled 85 percent of 
the fair value of the level 2A liquid assets held by the covered 
company as eligible HQLA, and the level 2B liquid asset amount would 
have equaled 50 percent of the fair value of the level 2B liquid assets 
held by the covered company as eligible HQLA.
    The agencies are adopting under Sec.  _.21(b) of the final rule the 
calculation of the level 1, level 2A and level 2B liquid asset amounts 
largely as proposed, with one clarification. In the calculation of the 
level 1 liquid asset amount, the agencies have clarified that the 
amount to be deducted from the fair value of all eligible level 1 
liquid assets is the covered company's reserve balance requirement 
under section 204.5 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5), not its entire 
reserve requirement. Therefore, under the final rule, the level 1 
liquid asset amount equals the fair value of all level 1 liquid assets 
that are in the covered company's eligible HQLA as of the calculation 
date, less the covered company's reserve balance requirement under 
section 204.5 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5). Similarly, the level 2A 
liquid asset amount equals 85 percent of the fair value of all level 2A 
liquid assets, and the level 2B liquid asset amount equals 50 percent 
of the fair value of all level 2B liquid assets, that are held by the 
covered company as of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA. All 
assets that are eligible HQLA at the calculation date are therefore to 
be included in these three liquid asset amounts.
b. Calculation of Unadjusted Excess HQLA Amount
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
proposed rule would have capped the amount of level 2 liquid assets 
that could be included in the HQLA amount. Specifically, level 2 liquid 
assets could account for no more than 40 percent of the HQLA amount and 
level 2B liquid assets could account for no more than 15 percent of the 
HQLA amount. Under Sec.  _.21 of the proposed rule, if the amounts of 
level 2 liquid assets or level 2B liquid assets had exceeded their 
respective caps, the excess amounts as calculated under the proposed 
rule would have been deducted from the sum of the level 1 liquid asset, 
level 2A liquid asset, and level 2B liquid asset amounts. The level 2 
caps were meant to ensure that level 2 liquid assets, which may provide 
less liquidity as compared to level 1 liquid assets, comprise a smaller 
portion of a covered company's total HQLA amount such that the majority 
of the HQLA amount is composed of level 1 liquid assets.
    The unadjusted excess HQLA amount, under the proposed rule, equaled 
the sum of the level 2 cap excess amount and the level 2B cap excess 
amount. The calculation of the unadjusted excess HQLA amount applied 
the 40 percent level 2 liquid asset cap and the 15 percent level 2B 
liquid asset cap at the calculation date by subtracting from the sum of 
the level 1, level 2A and level 2B liquid asset amounts, the amount of 
level 2 liquid assets that is in excess of the limits. The unadjusted 
HQLA excess amount would have enforced the cap limits at the 
calculation date without unwinding any transactions.
    The methods of calculating the level 2 cap excess amount and level 
2B cap excess amounts were set forth in Sec.  _.21(d) and (e) of the 
proposed rule, respectively. Under those provisions, the level 2 cap 
excess amount would have been calculated by taking the greater of: (1) 
The level 2A liquid asset amount plus the level 2B liquid asset amount 
that exceeds 0.6667 (or 40/60, which is the ratio of the maximum 
allowable level 2 liquid assets to the level 1 liquid assets) times the 
level 1 liquid asset amount; or (2) zero. The calculation of the level 
2B cap excess amount would have been calculated by taking the greater 
of: (1) The level 2B liquid asset amount less the level 2 cap excess 
amount and less 0.1765 (or 15/85, which is the maximum ratio of 
allowable level 2B liquid assets to the sum of level 1 and level 2A 
liquid assets) times the sum of the level 1 and level 2A liquid asset 
amount; or (2) zero. Subtracting the level 2 cap excess amount from the 
level 2B liquid asset amount when applying the 15 percent level 2B cap 
is appropriate because the level 2B liquid assets should be excluded 
before the level 2A liquid

[[Page 61472]]

assets when applying the 40 percent level 2 cap.
    Several commenters requested that the agencies modify the level 2 
and level 2B liquid assets caps, arguing that the agencies have not 
provided any analysis on the appropriateness of the caps. In 
particular, these commenters argued that the caps could cause banking 
organizations to ``hoard'' level 1 liquid assets, reducing the 
liquidity and volume of level 2A and level 2B liquid assets.
    The agencies continue to believe that the majority of a covered 
company's HQLA amount should consist of the highest quality liquid 
assets, namely, level 1 liquid assets. In establishing the requirement 
that the level 1 liquid asset amount should represent at least 60 
percent of the HQLA amount, the agencies are seeking to ensure that a 
covered company will be able to rapidly meet its liquidity needs in a 
period of stress. The agencies recognize that covered companies may 
make investment decisions pertaining to individual assets within HQLA 
categories and the agencies believe that there is adequate availability 
of level 1 liquid assets. In choosing the assets that would have 
qualified as level 1 liquid assets under the proposed rule, the 
agencies considered whether there would be adequate availability of 
such assets during a stress period, to ensure the appropriateness of 
the asset's designation as the highest quality asset under the proposed 
rule. Further, given the liquidity characteristics of the asset classes 
included in level 2B liquid assets, the agencies continue to believe 
that these assets should constitute no more than 15 percent of a 
covered company's HQLA amount. Therefore the final rule adopts the 
unadjusted calculations as proposed in Sec.  _.21(c)-(e).
c. Calculation of Adjusted Excess HQLA Amount
    The agencies believed that the proposed level 2 caps and haircuts 
should apply to the covered company's HQLA amount both before and after 
the unwinding of certain types of secured transactions where eligible 
HQLA is exchanged for eligible HQLA in the next 30 calendar days, in 
order to ensure that the HQLA amount is appropriately diversified and 
not the subject of manipulation. The proposed calculation of the 
adjusted excess HQLA amount on this basis sought to prevent a covered 
company from being able to manipulate its eligible HQLA by engaging in 
transactions such as certain repurchase or reverse repurchase 
transactions because the HQLA amount, including the caps and haircuts, 
would be calculated both before and after unwinding those transactions.
    Under the proposed rule, to determine its adjusted HQLA excess 
amount, a covered company would have been required to unwind all 
secured funding transactions, secured lending transactions, asset 
exchanges, and collateralized derivatives transactions, as defined by 
the proposed rule, in which eligible HQLA, including cash, were 
exchanged and that would have matured within 30 calendar days of the 
calculation date. The unwinding of these transactions and the 
calculation of the adjusted excess HQLA amount was intended to prevent 
a covered company from having a substantial amount of transactions that 
would have created the appearance of a significant level 1 liquid asset 
amount at the beginning of a 30 calendar-day stress period, but that 
would have matured by the end of the 30 calendar-day stress period. For 
example, absent the unwinding of these transactions, a covered company 
that held only level 2 liquid assets could have appeared to be 
compliant with the level 2 liquid asset composition cap at the 
calculation date by borrowing on an overnight term a level 1 liquid 
asset (such as cash or U.S. Treasuries) secured by level 2 liquid 
assets. While doing so would have lowered the covered company's amount 
of level 2 liquid assets and increased its amount of level 1 liquid 
assets, the covered company would have had a concentration of level 2 
liquid assets above the 40 percent cap after the transaction was 
unwound. Therefore, the calculation of the adjusted excess HQLA amount 
and, if greater than unadjusted excess HQLA amount, its subtraction 
from the sum of the level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid asset 
amounts, would have prevented a covered company from avoiding the level 
2 liquid asset cap limitations.
    In order to calculate the adjusted excess HQLA amount, the proposed 
rule would have required a covered company, for this purpose only, to 
calculate adjusted level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid asset 
amounts. The adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount would have been the 
fair value, as determined under GAAP, of the level 1 liquid assets that 
are held by a covered company upon the unwinding of any secured funding 
transaction, secured lending transaction, asset exchanges, or 
collateralized derivatives transaction that matures within a 30 
calendar-day period and that involves an exchange of eligible HQLA, or 
cash. Similarly, the adjusted level 2A and adjusted level 2B liquid 
asset amounts would only have included the unwinding of those 
transactions involving an exchange of eligible HQLA or cash. After 
unwinding all the appropriate transactions, the asset haircuts of 15 
percent and 50 percent would have been applied to the level 2A and 2B 
liquid assets, respectively.
    The adjusted excess HQLA amount calculated pursuant to Sec.  
_.21(g) of the proposed rule would have been comprised of the adjusted 
level 2 cap excess amount and adjusted level 2B cap excess amount 
calculated pursuant to Sec.  _.21(h) and Sec.  _.21(i) of the proposed 
rule, respectively.
    The adjusted level 2 cap excess amount would have been calculated 
by taking the greater of: (1) The adjusted level 2A liquid asset amount 
plus the adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount minus 0.6667 (or 40/60, 
which is the maximum ratio of allowable level 2 liquid assets to level 
1 liquid assets) times the adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount; or (2) 
zero. The adjusted level 2B cap excess amount would be calculated by 
taking the greater of: (1) The adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount 
less the adjusted level 2 cap excess amount less 0.1765 (or 15/85, 
which is the maximum ratio of allowable level 2B liquid assets to the 
sum of level 1 liquid assets and level 2A liquid assets) times the sum 
of the adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount and the adjusted level 2A 
liquid asset amount; or (2) zero. The adjusted excess HQLA amount would 
have been the sum of the adjusted level 2 cap excess amount and the 
adjusted level 2B cap excess amount.
    One commenter requested that the agencies remove the unwind 
requirement from the rule because of the operational complexity 
required to calculate the covered institution's HQLA both before and 
after the unwind. Another commenter asked whether the agencies have 
considered permitting covered companies to calculate the value of their 
HQLA under the International Financial Reporting Standards method of 
accounting rather than GAAP.
    The agencies believe that it is crucial for a covered company to 
assess the composition of its HQLA amount both on an unadjusted basis 
and on a basis adjusted for certain transactions that directly impact 
the composition of eligible HQLA. The agencies believe that these 
calculations are justified in order to ensure an HQLA amount of 
adequate quality of composition and diversification and to ensure that 
covered companies actually have the ability to monetize such assets 
during a stress period. The agencies do not

[[Page 61473]]

believe that it would be appropriate to use alternative methods of 
accounting beyond GAAP in determining the HQLA amount. The agencies 
note that for regulatory reporting purposes, generally, a covered 
company must report data using GAAP. It would likely increase burden on 
covered companies that typically apply GAAP, which includes the vast 
majority of covered companies, to use another method of accounting to 
calculate HQLA. In addition, to permit certain covered companies to use 
an alternate method of accounting would reduce the comparability of the 
information across covered companies. As noted above, the LCR is 
intended to be a standardized liquidity metric, designed to promote a 
consistent and comparable view of the liquidity of covered companies. 
The agencies are finalizing the adjusted excess HQLA amount calculation 
with two amendments to the proposed rule. First, the agencies are 
clarifying that, in a manner similar to the calculation of the level 1 
liquid asset amount, the adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount (used 
solely for the purpose of calculating the adjusted excess HQLA amount) 
must include the deduction of the covered company's reserve balance 
requirement under section 204.5 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5). Second, 
the agencies are exempting certain secured funding transactions from 
inclusion in the unwind as described below.
d. Unwind Treatment of Collateralized Deposits
    A number of commenters pointed out that certain deposits are 
legally required to be collateralized. For instance, deposits placed by 
states and municipalities, known as preferred deposits, are often 
required to be collateralized under state law. Commenters further 
pointed out that in some instances, deposits are required to be 
collateralized by specific collateral which would not have been HQLA 
under the proposed rule. Additionally, federal law requires certain 
corporate trust deposits to be collateralized.\57\ Several commenters 
highlighted that these types of collateralized deposits would have been 
treated as secured funding transactions under the proposed rule, 
requiring a covered company to unwind these deposit relationships when 
determining the adjusted excess HQLA amount. Commenters argued that the 
unwind treatment effectively leads covered companies to exclude from 
their HQLA amounts both the cash from the deposits, which would be 
eligible HQLA, and also any collateral pledged to secure the deposit.
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    \57\ Pursuant to OCC regulations, a national bank or federal 
savings association may place funds for which the bank is a 
fiduciary on deposit in the bank (such deposits are often referred 
to as ``self-deposits''). The regulations require that the bank set 
aside collateral to secure self-deposits to the extent they are not 
insured by the FDIC. See 12 CFR 9.10(b) (national banks); 12 CFR 
150.300-50.320 (federal savings associations).
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    Several commenters pointed out that the agencies proposed the 
unwind treatment of secured transactions to ensure that banking 
organizations do not manipulate their HQLA amounts through repurchase 
and reverse repurchase transactions. These commenters contended that 
covered companies would not use preferred deposits and collateralized 
corporate trust deposits to inflate their HQLA amounts because of the 
long-term nature of the banking relationships. Commenters expressed the 
opinion that collateralized deposits represent stable, relationship-
based deposits and are generally placed in connection with certain 
operational services provided by the bank. These commenters maintained 
that collateralized deposits are very different in nature from other 
secured funding transactions, such as repurchase agreements where 
collateralization is a function of the transaction between 
counterparties, rather than imposed by a third party, and should not 
raise the concerns the agencies were seeking to address with the unwind 
calculation relating to the manipulation of the HQLA amount.
    Commenters urged the agencies to exclude collateralized deposits 
from the requirement to unwind secured funding transactions for the 
purposes of determining a covered company's adjusted excess HQLA 
amount. These commenters contended that the proposed unwind treatment 
of municipal fund deposits would have a major impact, limiting the 
choice of banks from which state and municipal treasurers could obtain 
treasury management and other banking services. Certain commenters 
asserted that the proposed rule would lead banks to accept limited 
municipal fund deposits, thereby increasing the costs to municipalities 
who rely on earning credits generated by deposits to pay for banking 
services. Commenters also were concerned that applying the unwind 
mechanism to preferred public sector deposits would discourage banks 
from accepting these deposits because of the potential negative impact 
on their LCR calculations. This in turn could raise the cost of capital 
for municipalities and undermine public policy goals of infrastructure 
maintenance and development. These commenters stated that banking 
organizations likely would have to limit the amount of preferred 
deposits and collateralized corporate trust deposits they accept, 
further reducing the interest paid on preferred deposits and corporate 
trust deposits, or eliminating earnings credits extended to state and 
municipal depositors. Furthermore, as preferred deposits may be 
collateralized with municipal securities, commenters contended that 
banks' decreased appetite for accepting municipal fund deposits would 
also lead to reduced investments in municipal securities.
    Finally, several commenters requested that, if the agencies do not 
exclude collateralized deposits from the secured transaction unwind, 
that the agencies should apply a maximum outflow for such deposits that 
(for example, 15 or 25 percent), irrespective of the collateral being 
used to secure the deposit.
    In response to commenters' concerns, the final rule does not 
require a covered company to unwind certain secured funding 
transactions that are collateralized deposits. As several commenters 
noted, the proposed unwind methodology was intended to prevent a 
covered company from manipulating the composition of its HQLA amount by 
engaging in transactions such as repurchase or reverse repurchase 
agreements that could ultimately unwind within the 30 calendar-day 
stress period. The agencies are aware that certain preferred deposits 
and corporate trust deposits are required to be collateralized under 
applicable law and agree with commenters that the longer-term, deposit 
banking relationships associated with preferred deposits and 
collateralized corporate trust deposits can be different in nature from 
shorter-term repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements. After 
considering commenters' concerns, the agencies believe that certain 
collateralized deposits do not raise the concerns the agencies were 
seeking to address with the unwind calculation. The agencies believe 
that a covered company would be unlikely to pursue these collateralized 
deposit relationships for the purposes of manipulating the composition 
of their HQLA amounts. Therefore, the final rule does not require a 
covered company to unwind secured funding transactions that are 
collateralized deposits as defined in the final rule when determining 
its adjusted excess HQLA amount. The agencies highlight that these 
deposits continue to be subject to an outflow assumption, as addressed 
in section II.C.3.j.(ii) of this Supplementary Information section.

[[Page 61474]]

    In the final rule, the agencies included a definition for 
collateralized deposits in order to implement the exclusion of these 
specific types of transactions from the unwind calculation and to 
identify the transactions as potentially eligible for certain outflow 
rates. The final rule defines collateralized deposits as either: (1) A 
deposit of a public sector entity held at the covered company that is 
secured under applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the covered 
company and that gives the depositor, as holder of the lien, priority 
over the assets in the event the covered company enters into 
receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or 
similar proceeding, or (2) a deposit of a fiduciary account held at the 
covered company for which the covered company is a fiduciary and sets 
aside assets owned by the covered company as security under 12 CFR 9.10 
(national banks) or 12 CFR 150.300 through 150.320 (Federal savings 
associations) and that gives the depositor priority over the assets in 
the event the covered company enters into receivership, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding.
e. Unwind Treatment of Transactions Involving Eligible HQLA
    One commenter requested that the agencies clarify that only 
transactions that are conducted by or for the benefit of the liquidity 
management function receive unwind treatment when a covered company 
calculates its adjusted excess HQLA amount. The commenter expressed the 
view that the proposed rule did not limit the unwind methodology to 
only transactions involving the eligible HQLA that were under the 
control of the liquidity management function for purposes of Sec.  
_.20(d)(2) in the proposed rule. This commenter urged that transactions 
undertaken outside of the liquidity management function would be 
reflected in the calculation of net cash outflows and should not be 
incorporated in the HQLA amount calculation. Moreover, the commenter 
contended that excluding secured funding transactions that are not 
under the liquidity management function is consistent with the 
agencies' intent to capture only those transactions that a covered 
company may use to manipulate its HQLA amount. Lastly, the commenter 
noted that the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework only applied the 
unwind methodology to transactions that met operational requirements.
    In response to the commenter's request, the agencies are clarifying 
that a covered company should apply the unwind treatment to secured 
funding transactions (other than secured funding transactions that are 
collateralized deposits), secured lending transactions, asset exchanges 
and collateralized derivatives where the maturity of the transaction 
within 30 calendar days of the calculation date will involve the 
covered company providing an asset that is eligible HQLA or cash and 
the counterparty providing an asset that will be eligible HQLA or cash. 
Eligible HQLA meet the operational requirements set forth in Sec.  _.22 
of the final rule, including the requirement that the eligible HQLA are 
under the control of the liquidity management function. Consistent with 
the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the agencies believe that a 
covered company should not be required to unwind transactions involving 
assets that do not meet or will not meet these operational requirements 
when calculating its adjusted excess HQLA amount. A covered company 
should, however, consider all such transactions in determining its net 
cash outflow amount under the final rule.
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework and Sec.  
_.32(j)(1) of the final rule, secured funding transactions maturing 
within 30 calendar days of the calculation date that involve the 
exchange of eligible HQLA are those where the HQLA securing the secured 
funding transaction would otherwise qualify as eligible HQLA if they 
were not already securing the particular transaction in question.
    Similarly, and consistent with Sec.  _.33(f)(1) of the final rule, 
secured lending transactions that involve the exchange of eligible HQLA 
are those where the assets securing the secured lending transaction 
are: (1) Eligible HQLA at the calculation date, or (2) would be 
eligible HQLA at the calculation date if they had not been reused to 
secure a secured funding transaction, or delivered in an asset 
exchange, maturing within 30 calendar days of the calculation date and 
which is also being unwound in determining the adjusted level 1, 
adjusted level 2A, and adjusted level 2B liquid asset amounts.
    Consistent with Sec.  _.32(j)(3) and Sec.  _.33(f)(2) of the final 
rule, asset exchange transactions involving the exchange of eligible 
HQLA are those where the covered company will, at the maturity of the 
asset exchange transaction within 30 calendar days of the calculation 
date: (1) Receive assets from the asset exchange counterparty that will 
be eligible HQLA upon receipt, and (2) the assets that the covered 
company must post to the counterparty are either: (a) eligible HQLA at 
the calculation date, or (b) would be eligible HQLA at the calculation 
date if they were not already securing a secured funding transaction, 
or delivered in an asset exchange, that will mature within 30 calendar 
days of the calculation date and which is also being unwound in 
determining the adjusted level 1, adjusted level 2A, and adjusted level 
2B liquid asset amounts.
f. Example HQLA Calculation
    The following is an example calculation of the HQLA amount that 
would be required under the final rule. Note that the given liquid 
asset amounts and adjusted liquid asset amounts already reflect the 
level 2A and 2B haircuts.

    (a) Calculate the liquid asset amounts (Sec.  _.21(b))
    The following values are given:

Fair value of all level 1 liquid assets that are eligible HQLA: 17
Covered company's reserve balance requirement: 2
Level 1 liquid asset amount (Sec.  _.21(b)(1)): 15
Level 2A liquid asset amount: 25
Level 2B liquid asset amount: 140
Sum of level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid asset amounts: 180

    (b) Calculate unadjusted excess HQLA amount (Sec.  _.21(c))
    Step 1: Calculate the level 2 cap excess amount (Sec.  _.21(d)):

Level 2 cap excess amount = Max (level 2A liquid asset amount + 
level 2B liquid asset amount--0.6667*level 1 liquid asset amount, 0)
    = Max (25 + 140-0.6667*15, 0)
    = Max (165--10.00, 0)
    = Max (155.00, 0)
    = 155.00

    Step 2: Calculate the level 2B cap excess amount (Sec.  
_.21(e)).

Level 2B cap excess amount = Max (level 2B liquid asset amount--
level 2 cap excess amount--0.1765*(level 1 liquid asset amount + 
level 2A liquid asset amount), 0)
    = Max (140-155.00--0.1765*(15+25), 0)
    = Max (-15--7.06, 0)
    = Max (-22.06, 0)
    = 0

    Step 3: Calculate the unadjusted excess HQLA amount (Sec.  
_.21(c)).

Unadjusted excess HQLA amount = Level 2 cap excess amount + Level 2B 
cap excess amount
    = 155.00 + 0
    = 155
    (c) Calculate the adjusted liquid asset amounts, based upon the 
unwind of certain transactions involving the exchange of eligible 
HQLA or cash (Sec.  _.21(f)).
    The following values are given:

Adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount: 120
Adjusted level 2A liquid asset amount: 50
Adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount: 10

    (d) Calculate adjusted excess HQLA amount (Sec.  _.21(g)).

[[Page 61475]]

    Step 1: Calculate the adjusted level 2 cap excess amount (Sec.  
_.21(h)).

Adjusted level 2 cap excess amount = Max (adjusted level 2A liquid 
asset amount + adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount--
0.6667*adjusted level 1 liquid asset amount, 0)
    = Max (50 + 10--0.6667*120, 0)
    = Max (60--80.00, 0)
    = Max (-20.00, 0)
    = 0

    Step 2: Calculate the adjusted level 2B cap excess amount (Sec.  
_.21(i)).

Adjusted level 2B cap excess amount = Max (adjusted level 2B liquid 
asset amount--adjusted level 2 cap excess amount--0.1765*(adjusted 
level 1 liquid asset amount + adjusted level 2A liquid asset amount, 
0)
    = Max (10--0--0.1765*(120+50), 0)
    = Max (10--30.00, 0)
    = Max (-20.00, 0)
    = 0

    Step 3: Calculate the adjusted excess HQLA amount (Sec.  
_.21(g)).

Adjusted excess HQLA amount = adjusted level 2 cap excess amount + 
adjusted level 2B cap excess amount
    = 0 + 0
    = 0

    (e) Determine the HQLA amount (Sec.  _.21(a)).

HQLA Amount = Level 1 liquid asset amount + level 2A liquid asset 
amount + level 2B liquid asset amount--Max (unadjusted excess HQLA 
amount, adjusted excess HQLA amount)
    = 15 + 25 + 140--Max (155, 0)
    = 180--155
    = 25

C. Net Cash Outflows

    Subpart D of the proposed rule established the total net cash 
outflows (the denominator of the LCR), which sets the minimum dollar 
amount that is required to be offset by a covered company's HQLA 
amount. As set forth in the proposed rule, a covered company would have 
first determined outflow and inflow amounts by applying a standardized 
set of outflow and inflow rates to various asset and liability 
balances, together with off-balance-sheet commitments, as specified in 
Sec. Sec.  _.32 and 33 of the proposed rule. These outflow and inflow 
rates reflected key aspects of liquidity stress events including those 
experienced during the most recent financial crises. To identify when 
outflow and inflow amounts occur within the 30 calendar-day period 
following the calculation date, a covered company would have been 
required to employ a set of maturity assumptions, as set forth in Sec.  
_.31 of the proposed rule. A covered company would have then calculated 
the largest daily difference between cumulative inflow amounts and 
cumulative outflow amounts over a period of 30 calendar days following 
a calculation date (the peak day approach) to arrive at its total net 
cash outflows.
    The agencies received comments requesting modification to the 
calculation of net cash outflows and to the maturity assumptions set 
forth in the proposed rule. In addition, commenters argued that some of 
the proposed outflow and inflow rates should be adjusted. To address 
commenters' concerns, the agencies are modifying the net outflow 
calculation by including an add-on, as well as modifying the provisions 
on determining maturity. With respect to outflow and inflow rates, the 
agencies are generally finalizing the rule as proposed with few 
changes.
1. The Total Net Cash Outflow Amount
    Under the proposed rule, the total net cash outflow amount would 
have equaled the largest daily difference between cumulative inflow and 
cumulative outflow amounts, as calculated over the 30 calendar days 
following a calculation date. For purposes of this calculation, 
outflows addressed in Sec.  _.32(a) through Sec.  _.32(g)(2) of the 
proposed rule that did not have a contractual maturity date would have 
been assumed to occur on the first day of the 30 calendar-day period. 
These outflow amounts included those for unsecured retail funding, 
structured transactions, net derivatives, mortgage commitments, 
commitments, collateral, and certain brokered deposits. Also, the 
proposed rule treated transactions in Sec.  _.32(g)(3) through Sec.  
_.32(l) as maturing on their contractual maturity date or on the first 
day of the 30 calendar-day period, if such transaction did not have a 
contractual maturity date. These transactions included certain brokered 
deposits, unsecured wholesale funding, debt securities, secured funding 
and asset exchanges, foreign central bank borrowings, and other 
contractual and excluded transactions. Inflows, which would have been 
netted against outflows on a daily basis, included derivatives, retail 
cash, unsecured wholesale funding, securities, secured lending and 
asset exchanges, and other inflows. Inflows from transactions without a 
stated maturity date would have been excluded under the proposed rule 
based on the assumption that the inflows from such non-maturity 
transactions would occur after the 30 calendar-day period. Allowable 
inflow amounts were capped at 75 percent of aggregate cash outflows.
    The proposed rule set the denominator of the LCR as the largest 
daily net cumulative cash outflow amount within the following 30 
calendar-day period rather than using total net cash outflows over a 30 
calendar-day period, which is the method employed by the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework. The agencies elected to employ this peak 
day approach to take into account potential maturity mismatches between 
a covered company's outflows and inflows during the 30 calendar-day 
period; that is, the risk that a covered company could have a 
substantial amount of contractual inflows that occur late in a 30 
calendar-day period while also having substantial outflows that occur 
early in the same period. Such mismatches have the potential to 
threaten the liquidity position of the organization during a time of 
stress and would not be apparent under the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework denominator calculation. By requiring the recognition of the 
largest net cumulative outflow day within the 30 calendar-day period, 
the proposed rule aimed to more effectively capture a covered company's 
liquidity risk and foster more sound liquidity management.
    As noted above, cumulative cash inflows would have been capped at 
75 percent of aggregate cash outflows in the calculation of total net 
cash outflows. This limit would have prevented a covered company from 
relying exclusively on cash inflows, which may not materialize in a 
period of stress, to cover its liquidity needs and ensure that covered 
companies maintain a minimum HQLA amount to meet unexpected liquidity 
demands during the 30 calendar-day period.
    Comments related to the method of calculation of the total net cash 
outflow amount in Sec.  _.30 of the proposed rule focused around two 
general concerns: the peak day approach calculation and the 75 percent 
inflow cap.
a. Peak Day Approach
    Commenters expressed mixed views on the requirement to calculate 
the total net cash outflow amount using the largest daily difference 
between cumulative cash outflows and inflows. Some commenters 
recognized the concerns of the agencies in addressing the risk that a 
banking organization may not have sufficient liquidity to meet all its 
obligations throughout the 30 calendar-day period. One commenter 
supported the approach, noting the importance of measuring a covered 
company's ability to withstand the largest liquidity demands within a 
30 calendar-day period. However, several commenters expressed concern 
that the

[[Page 61476]]

approach deviated too far from the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework and was unrealistic or impractical in assuming that cash 
flows without contractual maturity dates would occur on the first day 
of a 30 calendar-day period, thereby effectively rendering a 30-day 
liquidity standard a one-day standard. Some of these commenters 
suggested that the agencies adopt a different treatment for non-
maturity outflows, such as assuming that the outflows occur 
consistently throughout the month, i.e., a straight-line approach, or 
more rapidly at the beginning of the month, i.e., a front-loaded 
approach. Further, a number of commenters asserted that the peak day 
approach created operational complexities and requested that the 
agencies perform additional diligence before implementing this 
requirement in the final rule.
    Many commenters argued that the peak day approach was a significant 
departure from the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework that could 
have international competitive repercussions, as U.S. covered companies 
could be required to hold more HQLA than their foreign counterparts. 
Several commenters indicated that requirements to determine net cash 
outflows using the ``worst day'' over the 30 calendar-day period was 
not contemplated in the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, and thus 
should not be incorporated into the final rule. Other commenters were 
concerned about the international challenges that could result from a 
divergence and argued that the peak day approach should first be 
implemented internationally to provide a greater acceptance and 
understanding of the requirement. A few commenters requested that the 
agencies conduct a quantitative study and analysis to form the basis of 
any net cash outflow calculation that addresses maturity mismatches.
    Commenters indicated that assumptions underlying the net cumulative 
peak day approach were unrealistic, involved significant operational 
challenges, and could cause unintended consequences. Commenters argued 
that deposits with indeterminate maturities, including operational 
deposits, could not all be drawn on the first day of a stress scenario 
because a banking organization does not have the necessary operational 
capability to fulfill such outflow requests. Several commenters had 
specific concerns relating to retail deposits being drawn on the first 
day of a 30 calendar-day period, arguing that such an assumption 
materially overstates a banking organization's liquidity needs in the 
early portion of a 30 calendar-day period. Another commenter stated 
that the largest U.S. banking organizations did not experience a 100 
percent runoff on any single day for any class of deposits during the 
most recent financial crisis and that such a runoff would be impossible 
because withdrawals of that magnitude could not be processed by the 
U.S. Automated Clearing House system. Commenters further argued that 
certain assumptions were unrealistic by stating that no market would 
even be deep enough to absorb the volume of HQLA monetized to meet the 
assumed outflows. Another commenter argued that the proposed rule could 
reduce banking organizations' provision of non-deposit, non-maturity 
funding, such as floating rate demand notes, due to the higher outflow 
assumption and the accelerated maturity assumption.
    The agencies are addressing commenters' concerns by modifying the 
proposed net cumulative peak day approach. First, as in the proposed 
rule, a covered company would calculate its outflow and inflow amounts 
by applying the final rule's standardized set of outflow and inflow 
rates to various asset and liability balances, together with off-
balance-sheet commitments. However, unlike the proposed rule and in 
response to commenters' concerns, the modified calculation does not 
assume that all transactions and instruments that do not have a 
contractual maturity date have an outflow amount on the first day of 
the 30 calendar-day period. Instead, the calculation would use an add-
on approach that would substantively achieve the proposal's goal of 
addressing potential maturity mismatches between a covered company's 
outflows and inflows.
    The add-on approach involves two steps. First, cash outflows and 
inflows over the 30 calendar-day period are aggregated and netted 
against one another, with the aggregated inflows capped at 75 percent 
of the aggregated outflows. This first step is similar to the method 
for calculating net cash outflows in the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework. The second step calculates the add-on, which requires a 
covered company to identify the largest single-day maturity mismatch 
within the 30 calendar-day period by calculating the daily difference 
in cumulative outflows and inflows that have set maturity dates, as 
specified by Sec.  _.31 of the final rule, within the 30 calendar-day 
period. The day with the largest difference reflects the net cumulative 
peak day. The covered company then calculates the difference between 
that peak day amount and the net cumulative outflow amount on the last 
day of the 30 calendar-day period for those same outflow and inflow 
categories that have maturity dates within the 30 calendar-day period. 
This difference equals the add-on.
    In calculating the add-on, both the net cumulative peak day amount 
and the net cumulative outflow amount on the last day of the 30 
calendar-day period cannot be less than zero. The categories of inflows 
and outflows included in the add-on calculation comprise those 
categories that are the most likely to expose covered companies to 
maturity mismatches within the 30 calendar-day period, such as 
repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements with financial 
sector entities, whereas outflows such as non-maturity retail deposits 
are not a part of the add-on calculation. The final rule clarifies that 
the only non-maturity outflows included in the calculation of the add-
on are those that are determined to have a maturity date of the day 
after the calculation date, pursuant to Sec.  _.31(a)(4) as described 
below.
    The amounts calculated in steps one and two are then added together 
to determine the total net cash outflow. This approach ensures that the 
final rule avoids potential unintended consequences by eliminating the 
proposed rule's assumption that all non-maturity outflows occur on the 
first day of a 30 calendar-day period while still achieving the 
underlying goal of recognizing maturity mismatches. The agencies 
recognize that the revised approach involves calculations and 
operational complexity not contemplated by the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework and could potentially require some covered 
companies to hold more HQLA than under the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework. However, the agencies have concluded that the liquidity 
risks posed by maturity mismatches are significant and must be 
addressed to ensure that the LCR in the U.S. will be a sufficiently 
rigorous measure of a covered company's liquidity resiliency.
    Table 1 illustrates the final rule's determination of the total net 
cash outflow amount using the add-on approach. Using Table 1, which is 
populated with similar values as the corresponding table in the 
proposed rule, a covered company would implement the first step of the 
add-on approach by aggregating the cash outflow amounts in columns (A) 
and (B), as calculated under Sec.  _.32, and subtract from that 
aggregated amount the lesser of 75 percent of that aggregated amount 
and the aggregated

[[Page 61477]]

cash inflow amounts in columns (D) and (E), as calculated under Sec.  
_.33. The second step of the add-on approach calculates the add-on. The 
covered company would cumulate the cash outflows determined under Sec.  
_.32(g), (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(5), (j), (k), and (l) (column C) and cash 
inflows determined under Sec.  _.33(c), (d), (e), and (f) (column F) 
that have maturity dates pursuant to Sec.  _.31 for each day within the 
30 calendar-day period. The covered company would then determine (G), 
the net cumulative cash outflows, by subtracting column (F) from column 
(C) for each day. The net cumulative peak day amount would be the 
largest value of column (G). The greater of that peak value and zero 
less the greater of the day 30 value of column (G) and zero is the add-
on. To determine the total net cash outflow amount, the covered company 
would add the aggregated net cash outflow amount calculated in the 
first step and the add-on.

                                                           Table 1--Determination of Total Net Cash Outflow Using the Add-On Approach
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Non-maturity
                                                                outflows and         Outflows          Cumulative                                               Cumulative
                                                               outflows that     determined under       outflows      Inflows that have       Inflows            inflows
                                                              have a maturity    sections 32(g),    determined under   a maturity date    determined under      determined
                                                              date pursuant to   (h)(1), (h)(2),    sections 32(g),      pursuant to      sections 33(c),      pursuant to       Net cumulative
                                                              section 31, but   (h)(5), (j), (k),   (h)(1), (h)(2),    section 31, but     (d), (e), and     sections 33(c),        maturity
                                                                 not under      and (l) that have  (h)(5), (j), (k),      not under       (f) that have a   (d), (e), and (f)       outflows
                                                              sections 32(g),    a maturity date   and (l) that have   sections 33(c),     maturity date       that have a
                                                              (h)(1), (h)(2),      pursuant to      a maturity date   (d), (e), and (f)     pursuant to       maturity date
                                                             (h)(5), (j), (k),      section 31        pursuant to                            section 31        pursuant to
                                                                    (l)                                section 31                                               section 31
                                                                             A                  B                  C                  D                  E                  F                  G
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day 1......................................................  .................                100                100  .................                 90                 90                 10
Day 2......................................................  .................                 20                120  .................                  5                 95                 25
Day 3......................................................  .................                 10                130  .................                  5                100                 30
Day 4......................................................  .................                 15                145  .................                 20                120                 25
Day 5......................................................  .................                 20                165  .................                 15                135                 30
Day 6......................................................  .................                  0                165  .................                  0                135                 30
Day 7......................................................  .................                  0                165  .................                  0                135                 30
Day 8......................................................  .................                 10                175  .................                  8                143                 32
Day 9......................................................  .................                 15                190  .................                  7                150                 40
Day 10.....................................................  .................                 25                215  .................                 20                170                 45
Day 11.....................................................  .................                 35                250  .................                  5                175                 75
Day 12.....................................................  .................                 10                260  .................                 15                190                 70
Day 13.....................................................  .................                  0                260  .................                  0                190                 70
Day 14.....................................................  .................                  0                260  .................                  0                190                 70
Day 15.....................................................  .................                  5                265  .................                  5                195                 70
Day 16.....................................................  .................                 15                280  .................                  5                200                 80
Day 17.....................................................  .................                  5                285  .................                  5                205                 80
Day 18.....................................................  .................                 10                295  .................                  5                210                 85
Day 19.....................................................  .................                 15                310  .................                 20                230                 80
Day 20.....................................................  .................                  0                310  .................                  0                230                 80
Day 21.....................................................  .................                  0                310  .................                  0                230                 80
Day 22.....................................................  .................                 20                330  .................                 45                275                 55
Day 23.....................................................  .................                 20                350  .................                 40                315                 35
Day 24.....................................................  .................                  5                355  .................                 20                335                 20
Day 25.....................................................  .................                 40                395  .................                  5                340                 55
Day 26.....................................................  .................                  8                403  .................                125                465                -62
Day 27.....................................................  .................                  0                403  .................                  0                465                -62
Day 28.....................................................  .................                  0                403  .................                  0                465                -62
Day 29.....................................................  .................                  5                408  .................                 10                475                -67
Day 30.....................................................  .................                  2                410  .................                  5                480                -70
                                                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................................                300                410  .................                100                480  .................  .................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Net Cash Outflows = Aggregated Outflows - MIN (.75*Aggregated Outflows,Aggregated Inflows) + Add-On.
= 300 + 410-MIN (100 + 480, .75 * (300 + 410)) + (MAX (0,85) - MAX(0,-70)).
= 710 - 532.5 + (85 - 0).
= 262.5.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Inflow Cap
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company's total cash inflow 
amount would have been capped at 75 percent of its total cash outflows. 
This was designed to ensure that covered companies would hold a minimum 
HQLA amount equal to at least 25 percent of total cash outflows. The 
agencies received a number of comments on this provision of the 
proposed rule, including requests for modifications to the cap. 
However, for the reasons discussed below, the agencies are adopting 
this provision of the rule largely as proposed, except for a 
modification relating to the netting of certain foreign currency 
derivative transactions.
    One commenter noted that while there is a recognizable policy 
rationale for the 75 percent inflow cap, application of the rule in all 
circumstances may result in unwarranted or unintended outcomes. Some 
commenters suggested application of the inflow cap to individual types 
of inflows rather than as a restriction on the entire LCR denominator. 
For instance, one commenter recommended that the agencies make a 
distinction between contractual and contingent inflows, and only apply 
the inflow cap to the latter category. The commenter also noted that 
the application of the cap could cause asymmetric treatment of certain 
categories of transactions that may be perceived as being linked in the 
normal course of business. For example, the commenter suggested that 
the inflow leg of a foreign exchange swap transaction should not be 
subject to the 75 percent inflow cap. Rather, the full amount of the 
inflow leg should be counted and netted against the

[[Page 61478]]

corresponding outflow leg in the net derivative outflow amount (under 
Sec.  _.32(c) of the proposed rule). Other commenters requested that 
loans of securities to cover customer short positions be exempt from 
the 75 percent inflow cap in the final rule where the covered company 
obtains the security through a repurchase agreement because all related 
transactions would unwind simultaneously and net out. Commenters opined 
that the application of the proposed rule's inflow cap would result in 
a net liquidity outflow across the secured transactions despite the 
transactions' symmetry and result in an overestimation of net outflows, 
instead of full recognition of secured lending inflows where the 
banking organization has the contractual right and practical ability to 
terminate the loan and receive cash back from a counterparty in 
response to a change in offsetting customer positions.
    Other commenters indicated that the release of previously 
segregated funds held to comply with Rule 15c3-3 should not be subject 
to the 75 percent inflow cap, but should be given full inflow 
credit.\58\ Another commenter noted that certain covered nonbank 
companies cannot deposit excess cash in Federal Reserve Banks, and 
instead tend to deposit such funds in third-party commercial banks. 
This commenter recommended that the inflows from such deposits should 
not be subject to the 75 percent cap. Several commenters requested that 
the agencies eliminate the application of inflow caps for covered 
subsidiaries of covered companies in the calculation of the 
subsidiaries' own LCR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies continue to believe the total inflow cap is a key 
requirement of the LCR calculation because it ensures covered companies 
hold a minimum HQLA amount equal to 25 percent of total cash outflows 
that will be available during a stress period. The agencies believe it 
is critical for firms to maintain on-balance sheet assets to meet 
outflows and not be overly reliant on inflows that may not materialize 
in a stress scenario. The agencies decline to significantly modify this 
provision to relax the cap on inflows because, without it, a covered 
company may be holding an amount of HQLA that is not commensurate with 
the risks of its funding structure under stress conditions. Reducing 
the inflow cap and allowing covered companies to rely more heavily on 
inflows to offset outflows likely would increase the interconnectedness 
of the financial system, as a substantial amount of inflows are from 
other financial institutions. Consequently, the agencies are retaining 
the limitation of inflows at 75 percent of total cash outflows in the 
final rule. No inflow cap will apply to the calculation of the maturity 
mismatch add-on.
    Notwithstanding the agencies' general view regarding the inflow 
cap, the agencies have made a change to the proposed rule in response 
to the comments received. Certain foreign currency exchange derivative 
cash flows are to be treated on a net basis and have therefore 
effectively been removed from the gross inflow cap calculation. This 
change is described in more detail in section II.C.3.c of this 
Supplementary Information section.
2. Determining Maturity
    Section _.31 of the proposed rule would have required a covered 
company to identify the maturity date or date of occurrence of a 
transaction that is the most conservative when calculating inflow and 
outflow amounts; that is, the earliest possible date for outflows and 
the latest possible date for inflows. In addition, under Sec.  _.30 of 
the proposed rule, a covered company's total net outflow amount as of a 
calculation date would have included outflow amounts for certain 
instruments that do not have contractual maturity dates and outflows 
and inflows that mature prior to or on a day 30 calendar days or less 
after the calculation date. Section _.33 of the proposed rule would 
have expressly excluded instruments with no maturity date from a 
covered company's total inflow amount.
    The proposed rule described how covered companies would have 
determined whether certain instruments mature or transactions occur 
within the 30 calendar-day period when calculating outflows and 
inflows. The proposed rule also would have required covered companies 
to take the most conservative approach when determining maturity with 
respect to any options, either explicit or embedded, that would have 
modified maturity dates and with respect to any notice periods. If such 
an option existed for an outflow instrument or transaction, the 
proposed rule would have directed a covered company to assume that the 
option would be exercised at the earliest possible date. If such an 
option existed for an inflow instrument or transaction, the proposed 
rule would have required covered companies to assume that the option 
would be exercised at the latest possible date. In addition, the 
proposed rule would have provided that if an option to adjust the 
maturity date of an instrument is subject to a notice period, a covered 
company would have been required to either disregard or take into 
account the notice period, depending upon whether the instrument was an 
outflow or inflow instrument and whether the notice requirement 
belonged to the covered company or its counterparty.
    Many commenters expressed concern that the proposed requirements 
for determining maturity with respect to options may conflict with the 
legal agreements underlying those transactions. One commenter argued 
that the proposed rule would have assumed that covered companies would 
disregard customer contractual 30-day notice periods. The commenter 
requested that commitment outflows that are subject to a mandatory 
notice period of more than 30 days not be subject to an outflow amount 
because the notice period practically prevents an outflow and therefore 
the notice period should be recognized. Other commenters requested 
clarification as to whether an acceleration provision that may be 
exercised in the event of a default or other remote contingencies, such 
as the right to call certain funding facilities, would count as an 
option for the purposes of determining maturity. Another commenter 
argued that the proposed requirements for determining maturity should 
have taken into account the timing of a redemption period and whether 
or not the period had lapsed. Commenters also objected to the 
application of the ``nearest possible date'' assumption to commitment 
outflows supporting debt maturing within a 30 calendar-day period 
because it would assume that such commitment outflows would occur on 
the first day of a 30 calendar-day period rather than the debt 
instrument's actual maturity date.
    Several commenters indicated that the assumptions underlying the 
requirements in Sec.  _.31 of the proposed rule were counterintuitive 
and not consistent with economic behavior. For instance, one commenter 
argued that requiring a covered company to assume that options are 
always exercised would imply that the covered company must always 
disadvantage itself in a stress scenario. Another commenter observed 
that no market expectation exists for a covered company to exercise a 
call option on long-term debt in a stressed environment and such 
behavior was not evident in the recent financial crisis, and therefore 
should not be an assumption of the final rule.
    Several commenters requested that the agencies clarify the 
treatment of legal notice periods for obligations such

[[Page 61479]]

as wholesale deposit agreements or revolving credit facilities. Another 
commenter argued that in times of stress, certain customers with non-
maturity obligations, including retail or operational deposits, engage 
in ``flight to quality behavior,'' making it unlikely that all such 
customers would liquidate their positions simultaneously. Other 
commenters recognized that while covered companies might make certain 
disadvantageous decisions to benefit retail customer relations, they 
and their wholesale counterparties should be assumed to act rationally 
with respect to exercising options, and should be assumed to abide by 
their contractual obligations.
    Commenters expressed concern that the maturity assumptions employed 
in the proposed rule overstated near-term liquidity risk. Several 
commenters argued that the maturity assumptions of the proposed rule 
would require that certain maturity deposits, including brokered time 
deposits, be treated as non-maturity deposits because the customer was 
provided an accommodation to allow for early withdrawal. These 
commenters requested that the agencies undertake an empirical analysis 
of the maturity assumptions for such instruments. Another commenter 
argued that the combination of a peak cumulative net cash outflow or 
``worst day'' denominator requirement with the maturity assumptions 
were unrealistic and would have overstated a banking organization's 
liquidity risk. Several commenters requested clarification that a 
covered company would not be required to assume to have exercised call 
options or rights to redeem its own debt on wholesale funding 
instruments and long-term debt issued by the covered company.
    The agencies have considered the comments and have modified the 
provisions on determining maturity in the final rule to ensure that all 
option types are addressed. The modifications result in a more accurate 
reflection of likely market behavior during a time of liquidity stress, 
based on comments and the agencies' observations. The provisions in the 
final rule for determining maturity remain conservative. The final rule 
contains the following maturity assumptions for options: (a) For an 
investor or funds provider holding an option to reduce the maturity of 
a transaction subject to Sec.  _--.32, assume the option will be 
exercised; (b) for an investor or funds provider holding an option to 
extend the maturity of a transaction subject to Sec.  _.32, assume the 
option will not be exercised; (c) for a covered company holding an 
option to reduce the maturity of a transaction subject to Sec.  _.32, 
assume the option will be exercised; (d) for a covered company holding 
an option to extend the maturity of a transaction subject to Sec.  
_.32, assume the option will not be exercised; (e) for a borrower 
holding an option to extend the maturity of a transaction subject to 
Sec.  _.33, assume the option will be exercised; (f) for a borrower 
holding an option to reduce the maturity of a transaction subject to 
Sec.  _.33, assume the option will not be exercised; (g) for a covered 
company holding an option to reduce the maturity of a transaction 
subject to Sec.  _.33, assume the option will not be exercised; and (h) 
for a covered company holding an option to extend the maturity of a 
transaction subject to Sec.  _.33, assume the option will be exercised.
    The final rule makes an exception for longer-term callable bonds 
and treats the original maturity of the instrument as the maturity for 
purposes of the LCR. The final rule provides that when a bond issued by 
a covered company has an original maturity greater than one year and 
the call option held by the covered company does not go into effect 
until at least six months after the issuance, the original maturity of 
the bond will determine the maturity for purposes of the LCR. The 
agencies have adjusted this provision in the final rule because they 
have concluded that covered companies would not likely be susceptible 
during a period of liquidity stress to significant market pressure to 
exercise these call options. Similarly, the agencies are amending the 
maturity provisions of the final rule so that a covered company does 
not have to presume acceleration of the maturity of its obligation 
where the covered company holds an option permitting it to repurchase 
its obligation from a sovereign entity, U.S. GSE, or public sector 
entity. In those circumstances, the maturity of the obligation under 
the final rule will be the original maturity of the obligation. This 
change reflects the fact that, for example, the agencies believe there 
is less reputational pressure to exercise an option to redeem FHLB 
advances early.
    Another of the final rule's modifications of the proposed maturity 
determination requirements clarifies how a covered company should 
address certain outflows and inflows that do not have maturity dates, 
as these were not explicitly addressed in the proposed rule. Under the 
proposed rule, all non-maturity inflows would have been excluded from 
the LCR. Under the final rule, transactions, except for operational 
deposits, subject to Sec.  _.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k), or Sec.  
_.33(d) or (f) that do not have maturity dates will be considered to 
have a maturity date on the first calendar day after the calculation 
date. This change will primarily affect certain transactions with 
financial sector entities. The maturity of these transactions is often 
referred to as ``open.'' The agencies believe these transactions are 
similar to overnight deposits from financial institutions and for 
purposes of the LCR, are treating them the same. Therefore, for these 
types of ``open'' transactions with financial sector entities and other 
transactions subject to Sec.  _.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k), or Sec.  
_.33(d) or (f) that do not have maturity dates and are not operational 
deposits, the final rule provides that for purposes of the LCR, the 
maturity date will be the first calendar day after the calculation 
date.
    An additional change in the final rule for determining maturity 
pertains to matched secured lending transactions or asset exchanges 
with a contractual maturity of 30 days or less that generate an inflow 
to the covered company in the form of collateral (inflow-generating 
asset exchange) and the company then uses the received collateral in a 
secured funding transaction or asset exchange with a contractual 
maturity of 30 days or less that results in an outflow from the covered 
company in the form of collateral (outflow-generating asset exchange) 
(see section II.C.4.f below). In the final rule, the maturity date of 
secured lending transactions or inflow-generating asset exchanges will 
be the later of the contractual maturity date of the secured lending 
transaction or inflow-generating asset exchange and the maturity date 
of the secured funding transaction or outflow-generating asset exchange 
for which the received collateral was used. This treatment is a 
clarifying change consistent with the intent of the proposed rule, 
which was to prevent a covered company from recognizing inflows 
resulting from secured lending transactions or asset exchanges earlier 
in the 30 calendar-day period than outflows resulting from secured 
funding transactions or asset exchanges, even though the collateral 
needed to cover the maturing secured lending transaction or asset 
exchange will not be available until the related outflow occurs.
    The final rule also adds to the maturity provisions of the proposed 
rule a clarification that any inflow amount available under Sec.  
_.33(g) will be deemed to occur on the day on which the covered company 
or its consolidated subsidiary calculates the release of assets under 
statutory or regulatory

[[Page 61480]]

requirements for the protection of customer trading assets, such as 
Rule 15c3-3, consistent with the covered company's or consolidated 
subsidiary's past practice with respect to such calculation. Under the 
final rule, this inflow will be assumed to occur on the date of the 
next regular calculation. Therefore if, for example, a broker-dealer 
performs this calculation on a daily basis, the inflow would occur on 
the first day of the 30 calendar-day period, but if a broker-dealer 
typically performs the calculation on a weekly basis, the inflow would 
occur on the date of the next regularly scheduled calculation. This 
maturity determination provision is necessary because of the inclusion 
of the related inflow under Sec.  _.33(g) of the final rule, which was 
added in response to comments received by the agencies, as discussed 
below in section II.C.4.g.
    Several commenters requested that the agencies clarify that time 
deposits that can be withdrawn at any time (subject to the forfeiture 
of interest) would be subject to the earliest possible maturity date 
assumption under the proposal, while deposits that cannot be withdrawn 
(but for death or incompetence) would be assumed to mature on the 
applicable maturity date. The agencies are clarifying that, for 
purposes of the final rule, deposits that can only be withdrawn in the 
event of death or incompetence are assumed to mature on the applicable 
maturity date, and deposits that can be withdrawn following notice or 
the forfeiture of interest are subject to the rule's assumptions for 
non-maturity transactions.
    Though not resulting in a change in the final rule, the agencies 
are clarifying that remote contingencies in funding contracts that 
allow acceleration, such as withdrawal rights arising solely upon death 
or incompetence or material adverse condition clauses, are not 
considered options for determining maturity. The agencies did not 
change the treatment of notice periods in the final rule as commenters 
requested because reputational considerations may drive a covered 
company's behavior with regard to notice periods. Further, these 
reputational considerations exist for all types of counterparties, 
including wholesale and not just retail, and regardless of whether 
there are contractual provisions favoring the covered company. 
Regarding commenters' arguments that the proposed requirements for 
determining maturity do not reflect a likely flight to quality during a 
period of liquidity stress, the agencies believe that such behavior 
cannot be relied upon and may not occur for all institutions, so the 
conservative assumptions in the proposed and final rule with respect to 
maturity are appropriate. The agencies understand that the requirements 
for determining maturity may not comport with the stated requirements 
for call options in some legal agreements, but believe that the 
conservative assumptions in the final rule ensure a more accurate 
assessment of a covered company's liquidity resiliency through the LCR. 
Similarly, the agencies believe that taking a more conservative view of 
likely behavior during a liquidity stress event is critical to 
achieving this goal. With respect to commenters' request that the 
agencies provide data for the maturity assumptions in the final rule, 
the agencies note that during the recent financial crisis, many options 
were exercised in a manner that was disadvantageous to the banking 
organization or financial institution to protect its market reputation.
3. Outflow Amounts
    The proposed rule set forth outflow categories for calculating cash 
outflows and their respective outflow rates, each as described below. 
The outflow rates were designed to reflect the 30 calendar-day stress 
scenario that formed the basis of the proposed rule, and included 
outflow assumptions for the following categories: (a) Unsecured retail 
funding; (b) structured transactions; (c) net derivatives; (d) mortgage 
commitments; (e) commitments; (f) collateral; (g) brokered deposits for 
retail customers or counterparties; (h) unsecured wholesale funding; 
(i) debt securities; (j) secured funding; (k) foreign central bank 
borrowing; (l) other contractual outflows; and (m) excluded amounts for 
intragroup transactions. The agencies proposed outflow rates for each 
category, ranging from zero percent to 100 percent, in a manner 
generally consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. 
Under the proposed rule, the outstanding balance of each category of 
funding or obligation that matured within 30 calendar days of the 
calculation date (under the maturity assumptions described above in 
section II.C.2) would have been multiplied by these outflow rates to 
arrive at the applicable outflow amount.
a. Retail Funding Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule defined retail customers or counterparties to 
include individuals and certain small businesses. Under the proposal, a 
small business would have qualified as a retail customer or 
counterparty if its transactions had liquidity risks similar to those 
of individuals and were managed by a covered company in a manner 
comparable to the management of transactions of individuals. In 
addition, to qualify as a small business, the proposed rule would have 
required that the total aggregate funding raised from the small 
business be less than $1.5 million. If an entity provides $1.5 million 
or more in total funding, has liquidity risks that are not similar to 
individuals, or the covered company manages the customer like a 
corporate customer rather than an individual customer, the entity would 
have been a wholesale customer under the proposed rule.
    The proposed rule included in the category of unsecured retail 
funding retail deposits (other than brokered deposits) that are not 
secured under applicable law by a lien on specifically designated 
assets owned by the covered company and that are provided by a retail 
customer or counterparty. The proposed rule divided unsecured retail 
funding into subcategories of: (i) Stable retail deposits, (ii) other 
retail deposits, and (iii) funding from a retail customer or 
counterparty that is not a retail deposit or a brokered deposit 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty, each of which would have 
been subject to the outflow rates set forth in Sec.  _.32(a) of the 
proposed rule, as explained below. Outflow rates would have been 
applied to the balance of each unsecured retail funding outflow 
category regardless of maturity date.
i. Stable Retail Deposits
    The proposed rule defined a stable retail deposit as a retail 
deposit, the entire amount of which is covered by deposit insurance, 
and either: (1) Held in a transactional account by the depositor, or 
(2) where the depositor has another established relationship with a 
covered company, such that withdrawal of the deposit would be 
unlikely.\59\ Under the proposed rule, the established relationship 
could have been another deposit account, a loan, bill payment services, 
or any other service or product provided to the depositor, provided 
that the banking organization demonstrates to the satisfaction of its 
appropriate Federal banking agency that the relationship would make 
withdrawal of the deposit highly unlikely during a liquidity stress 
event. The proposed rule assigned stable retail deposit balances an 
outflow rate of 3 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ For purposes of the proposed rule, ``deposit insurance'' 
was defined to mean deposit insurance provided by the FDIC and did 
not include other deposit insurance schemes.

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[[Page 61481]]

ii. Other Retail Deposits
    The proposed rule categorized all deposits from retail customers 
that are not stable retail deposits, as described above, as other 
retail deposits. Supervisory data supported a higher outflow rate for 
deposits that are partially FDIC-insured as compared to entirely FDIC-
insured. The agencies proposed an outflow rate of 10 percent for those 
retail deposits that are not entirely covered by deposit insurance or 
that otherwise do not meet the proposed criteria for a stable retail 
deposit.
iii. Other Unsecured Retail Funding
    Under the proposed rule, the other unsecured retail funding 
category included funding provided by retail customers or 
counterparties that is not a retail deposit or a retail brokered 
deposit and received an outflow rate of 100 percent. This outflow 
category was intended to capture all other types of retail funding that 
were not stable retail deposits or other retail deposits, as defined by 
the proposal.
iv. Comments on Retail Funding Outflows
    Comments related to the unsecured retail funding outflow category 
addressed applicable definitions, the types of transactions that would 
qualify as retail funding, the treatment of retail maturities, 
requirements related to deposit insurance, applicable outflow rates, 
and requests for additional information from the agencies.
    Several commenters requested a broadening of the definition of 
retail customer or counterparty to include additional entities and to 
exclude certain transactions from the other unsecured retail funding 
category. For example, two commenters argued that the proposed $1.5 
million limit on aggregate funding, which would apply to small 
businesses in the retail customer or counterparty definition, should be 
raised to $5 million, which would be consistent with annual receipts 
criteria used by the U.S. Small Business Administration's definition 
for small business. Other commenters requested a broadening of the 
retail funding category to include certain trusts and other personal 
fiduciary accounts, such as personal and charitable trusts, estates, 
certain payments to minors, and guardianships formed by retail 
customers, because they exhibit characteristics of retail funding. 
Another commenter argued that revocable trusts should qualify as retail 
funding because such trusts have risk characteristics similar to that 
of individuals, in that the grantor keeps control of the assets and has 
the option to terminate the trust at any point in the future.
    One commenter stated that a 3 percent outflow rate in cases where 
the entire deposit is covered by deposit insurance was appropriately 
low, but that a 10 percent outflow rate did not sufficiently reflect 
the stability of deposits partially covered by deposit insurance. 
Another commenter requested zero outflows relating to prepaid cards 
issued by nonbank money transmitter subsidiaries because they are 
functionally regulated by individual states and are subject to 
collateral requirements similar to those for secured transactions. This 
commenter indicated that certain non-deposit, prepaid retail products 
covered by FDIC insurance that is deemed to ``pass-through'' the holder 
of the account to the owner of the funds should merit an outflow rate 
significantly less than 100 percent, as these products are similar to 
retail deposits and have exhibited stability throughout economic 
cycles, including during the recent financial crisis.
    Some commenters also requested that the definition of deposit 
insurance be expanded beyond FDIC insurance to include foreign deposit 
insurance programs where (i) insurance is prefunded by levies on the 
institutions that hold insured deposits; (ii) the insurance is backed 
by the full faith and credit of the national government; (iii) the 
obligations of the national government are assigned a zero percent risk 
weight under the agencies' risk-based capital rules; and (iv) 
depositors have access to their funds within a reasonable time frame. 
The commenters also requested that the outflow rate assigned to 
partially-insured deposits reflect the benefit of partial insurance, 
rather than treating the entire deposit as uninsured. This would lead 
to treatment of the portion of a deposit that is below the $250,000 
FDIC insurance limit as a stable retail deposit subject to a 3 percent 
outflow, and any excess balance as a less stable retail deposit subject 
to the 10 percent outflow rate.
    Finally, some commenters requested the agencies share the empirical 
data that was the basis for the proposed rule's retail funding outflow 
requirements. Specifically, commenters requested information regarding 
the stability of insured deposits, partially insured deposits, term 
deposits, and deposits without a contractual term during the recent 
financial crisis.
v. Final Rule
    In considering the comments on retail funding outflows, the 
agencies continue to believe that the outflow rates applicable to 
stable deposits and other retail deposits, 3 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively, are appropriate based on supervisory data and for the 
reasons outlined in the proposed rule and, accordingly, have retained 
those outflow rates in the final rule.\60\ The agencies used 
substantial supervisory data, including data reflecting the recent 
financial crisis, to inform the outflow rates. This data indicated that 
depositors withdrawing funds usually withdraw the entire amount, and 
not just the amount that is not covered by FDIC insurance. As a result, 
the agencies are retaining the treatment of partially insured retail 
deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 78 FR 71835-71836.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments received about other retail funding, the 
agencies have reconsidered the 100 percent outflow rate in Sec.  
_.32(a)(3) of the proposed rule. In the final rule, the agencies have 
lowered the outflow rate to 20 percent for deposits placed at the 
covered company by a third party on behalf of a retail customer or 
counterparty that are not brokered deposits, where the retail customer 
or counterparty owns the account and where the entire amount is covered 
by deposit insurance. In addition, partially insured deposits placed at 
the covered company by a third party on behalf of a retail customer or 
counterparty that are not brokered deposits and where the retail 
customer or counterparty owns the account receive a 40 percent outflow 
rate under the final rule. The 20 percent and 40 percent outflow rates 
are designed to be consistent with the final rule's treatment of 
wholesale deposits, which the agencies believe have similar liquidity 
risk as deposits placed on behalf of a retail customer or counterparty. 
Finally, all other funding from a retail customer or counterparty that 
is not a retail deposit, a brokered deposit provided by a retail 
customer or counterparty, or a debt instrument issued by the covered 
company that is owned by a retail customer or counterparty, which 
includes items such as unsecured prepaid cards, receives a 40 percent 
outflow rate. The agencies believe these changes better reflect the 
liquidity risks of categories of unsecured retail funding that have 
liquidity characteristics that more closely align with certain types of 
third-party funding in Sec.  _.32(g) of the proposed rule.
    Additionally, the final rule clarifies that the outflow rates for 
retail funding apply to all retail funding, regardless of whether that 
funding is unsecured or secured. This reflects the nature of retail

[[Page 61482]]

funding, which is less likely to involve a secured transaction, and the 
relatively low outflow rates already assigned to the funding.
    The agencies decline to revise most of the definitions and key 
terms employed in the retail funding section of the proposed rule. With 
respect to the commenters' request to raise the limit on aggregate 
funding that applies to small businesses, the annual receipts criteria 
within the U.S. Small Business Administration's definition for small 
business would include businesses that are large and sophisticated and 
should not be treated similarly to retail customers or counterparties 
in terms of liquidity risks. The agencies therefore continue to believe 
that $1.5 million is the appropriate limit. The agencies considered 
whether foreign deposit insurance systems should be given the same 
treatment as FDIC deposit insurance in the final rule. The agencies 
believe there would be operational difficulties in evaluating a foreign 
deposit insurance system for the purposes of a U.S. regulatory 
requirement. For the reasons discussed in the preamble to the proposed 
rule, the agencies are recognizing only FDIC deposit insurance in 
defining stable retail deposits.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 78 FR 71836.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the agencies have concluded that certain trusts pose 
liquidity risks substantially similar to those posed by individuals, 
and the agencies are modifying the final rule to clarify that living or 
testamentary trusts that have been established for the benefit of 
natural persons, that do not have a corporate trustee, and that 
terminate within 21 years and 10 months after the death of grantors or 
beneficiaries of the trust living on the effective date of the trust or 
within 25 years (in states that have a rule against perpetuities) can 
be treated as retail customers or counterparties. The agencies believe 
that these trusts are ``alter egos'' of the grantor and thus should be 
treated the same as an individual for purposes of the LCR. If the 
trustee is a corporate trustee that is an investment adviser, whether 
or not required to register as an investment adviser under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1, et seq.), however, 
the trust will be treated as a financial sector entity.
    Apart from the changes to the final rule discussed above, the 
agencies have finalized the rule as proposed with regard to retail 
funding and believe that the changes incorporated appropriately capture 
the key liquidity characteristics of the retail funding market.
b. Structured Transaction Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule's structured transaction outflow amount, set 
forth in Sec.  _.32(b) of the proposed rule, would have captured 
obligations and exposures associated with structured transactions 
sponsored by a covered company, without regard to whether the 
structured transaction vehicle that is the issuing entity is 
consolidated on the covered company's balance sheet. The proposed rule 
assigned as an outflow rate for each structured transaction sponsored 
by the covered company the greater of: (1) 100 Percent of the amount of 
all debt obligations of the issuing entity that mature 30 days or less 
from a calculation date and all commitments made by the issuing entity 
to purchase assets within 30 calendar days or less from the calculation 
date, and (2) the maximum contractual amount of funding the covered 
company may be required to provide to the issuing entity 30 calendar 
days or less from such calculation date through a liquidity facility, a 
return or repurchase of assets from the issuing entity, or other 
funding agreement. The agencies proposed the 100 percent outflow rate 
because such transactions, including potential obligations arising out 
of commitments to an issuing entity, whether issued directly or 
sponsored by covered companies, caused severe liquidity demands at 
covered companies during times of stress as observed during the recent 
financial crisis.
    Comments regarding Sec.  _.32(b) of the proposed rule focused on 
specific structured transactions (such as bank customer securitization 
credit facilities and those vehicles where a banking organization 
securitizes its own assets) and requested clarification around which 
types of transactions should be treated as a structured transaction 
under Sec.  _.32(b) and which transactions should be treated as 
facilities under Sec.  _.32(e)(1)(vi) of the proposed rule. A commenter 
noted that the agencies did not draw a distinction between a structured 
transaction vehicle that is consolidated on the covered company's 
balance sheet and transactions that are sponsored, but not owned by the 
covered company. The commenter argued that the proposed rule would 
impact all private label MBS that are sponsored by a covered company by 
assigning a 100 percent outflow rate to the obligations of the issuing 
entity that mature in 30 calendar days or less. Moreover, the commenter 
also requested clarification as to whether variable interest entity 
(VIE) liabilities relating to SPEs that are to be included in the net 
cash outflow of a covered company can be offset with cash flows from 
the assets in the SPE even if they are not consolidated on the covered 
bank's balance sheet.
    Some commenters also indicated that those securitizations that meet 
the definition of ``traditional securitization'' in the agencies' 
regulatory capital rules, where the sponsor securitizes its own assets, 
should be exempt from the outflow amount in Sec.  _.32(b), so long as 
the covered company does not extend credit or liquidity support. These 
commenters relied on the fact that the issuing entity would have no 
legal obligation to make a payment on a security as a result of a 
shortfall of cash from underlying assets, irrespective of whether the 
covered company is required to consolidate the issuing entity onto its 
balance sheet to justify the exemption request.
    Several commenters also expressed concern regarding the proposed 
rule's assumption of a significant cash outflow on the first day of the 
30 calendar-day period (without a corresponding inflow that would be 
assumed to occur at a later date) and that the proposed rule did not 
include a clear explanation for this assumption. Commenters requested 
that the outflow be deemed to occur on the scheduled maturity date of 
the debt. Several commenters also expressed concern that potential 
double counting of outflow amounts could occur in that transactions 
captured under Sec.  _.32(e)(1)(vi) of the proposed rule could also be 
subject to Sec.  _.32(b) without further clarification.
    The agencies continue to believe the 100 percent outflow rate 
applicable to structured transactions sponsored by a covered company is 
generally reflective of the liquidity risks of such transactions. 
Structured transactions can be a source of unexpected funding 
requirements during a liquidity crisis, as demonstrated by the 
experience of various financial firms during the recent financial 
crisis. This outflow rate is also generally consistent with the outflow 
for commitments made to financial counterparties and SPEs that issue 
commercial paper and other securities, as provided in Sec.  _.32(e) of 
the final rule and discussed below.
    The agencies recognize that banking regulations may prohibit some 
covered companies from providing certain forms of support to funds that 
are sponsored by covered companies.\62\ However, the

[[Page 61483]]

100 percent outflow rate recognizes that covered companies may still 
provide significant support to structured transactions that they 
sponsor while complying with regulatory requirements that prohibit 
certain forms of support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See, e.g., OCC, Board, FDIC, and SEC, ``Prohibitions and 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Certain Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds,'' 
79 FR 5536, 5790 (January 31, 2014); OCC, Board, and FDIC, 
``Interagency Policy on Banks/Thrifts Providing Financial Support to 
Funds Advised by the Banking Organization or its Affiliates,'' OCC 
Bulletin 2004-2, Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter 04-1, FDIC FIL-
1-2004 (January 5, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address the commenters' concern regarding potential double 
counting of outflow amounts, the final rule excludes from the outflows 
in Sec.  _.32(e)(1)(vii) through (viii) those commitments described in 
the structured transaction outflow amount section. Although the 
structured transaction outflow amount and the commitment outflow amount 
sections (Sec.  _.32(b) and Sec.  _.32(e), respectively) are similar in 
that both apply outflow rates to commitments made to an SPE, the 
structured transaction outflow amount also includes outflows beyond 
contractual commitments because a sponsor may provide support despite 
the absence of such a commitment.
    The agencies are making a clarifying change in the final rule by 
applying the structured transaction outflow amount provision only to 
issuing entities that are not consolidated with the covered company. If 
the issuing entity is consolidated with the covered company, then the 
commitments from the covered company to that entity would be excluded 
under Sec.  _.32(m) as intragroup transactions. However, even though 
the commitments would be excluded, any outflows and inflows of the 
issuing entity would be included in the covered company's outflow and 
inflows because they are consolidated.
    The agencies did not define the term ``sponsor'' in the proposed 
rule and are not defining it in the final rule because the agencies 
believe that the term is generally understood within the marketplace. 
Furthermore, the agencies intend Sec.  _.32(b) to apply to all covered 
companies that would have explicit or implicit obligations to support a 
structured transaction of an issuing entity that is not consolidated by 
the covered company during a period of liquidity stress. Generally, the 
agencies consider covered companies to be sponsors when they have 
significant control or influence over the structuring, organization, or 
operation of a structured transaction.
    The agencies agree with commenters' concern that the maturity 
assumptions in the proposed rule would cause structured transaction 
payments to fall on the first day of the 30 calendar-day period and 
that this treatment would not be appropriate. The changes to the peak 
day approach described above in section II.C.1 of this Supplementary 
Information section would result in structured transaction payments not 
being assumed to occur on the first day of a 30 calendar-day window 
because they are not included in the calculation of the add-on. 
Instead, these commitments would be assumed to occur on the 
transaction's scheduled maturity date. Finally, the agencies believe 
that the definitions and key terms employed in this section of the 
proposed rule accurately capture the key characteristics related to 
structured transactions sponsored by a covered company and decline to 
provide a different treatment for the funding of VIE liabilities that 
are part of a structured securitization, structured securitizations 
involving SPEs, structured securitization credit facilities to finance 
the receivables owned by a corporate entity, or where the sponsor 
securitizes its own assets. Likewise, private label MBS that meet the 
definition of a structured transaction will be subject to this 
provision because of the liquidity risks incumbent in such 
transactions. Accordingly, the agencies are adopting as final this 
provision of the rule as proposed with the clarifying change regarding 
consolidated issuing entities.
c. Net Derivative Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule would have defined a covered company's net 
derivative cash outflow amount as the sum of the payments and 
collateral that a covered company would make or deliver to each 
counterparty under derivative transactions, less the sum of payments 
and collateral due from each counterparty, if subject to a valid 
qualifying master netting agreement.\63\ This calculation would have 
incorporated the amounts due to and from counterparties under the 
applicable transactions within 30 calendar days of a calculation date. 
Netting would have been permissible at the highest level permitted by a 
covered company's contracts with a counterparty and could not include 
offsetting inflows where a covered company is already including assets 
in its HQLA that the counterparty has posted to support those inflows. 
If the derivative transactions were not subject to a qualifying master 
netting agreement, then the derivative cash outflows for that 
counterparty would be included in the net derivative cash outflow 
amount and the derivative cash inflows for that counterparty would be 
included in the net derivative cash inflow amount, without any netting 
and subject to the proposed rule's cap on total inflows. Under the 
proposed rule, the net derivative cash outflow amount would have been 
calculated in accordance with existing valuation methodologies and 
expected contractual derivatives cash flows. In the event that the net 
derivative cash outflow for a particular counterparty was less than 
zero, such amount would have been required to be included in a covered 
company's net derivative cash inflow amount for that counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Under the proposal, a ``qualifying master netting 
agreement'' was defined as a legally binding agreement that gives 
the covered company contractual rights to terminate, accelerate, and 
close out transactions upon the event of default and liquidate 
collateral or use it to set off its obligation. The agreement also 
could not be subject to a stay under bankruptcy or similar 
proceeding and the covered company would be required to meet certain 
operational requirements with respect to the agreement, as set forth 
in section 4 of the proposed rule. This is the same definition as 
under the agencies' regulatory capital rules. See 12 CFR part 3 
(OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A covered company's net derivative cash outflow amount would not 
have included amounts arising in connection with forward sales of 
mortgage loans or any derivatives that are mortgage commitments subject 
to Sec.  _.32(d) of the proposed rule. However, net derivative cash 
outflows would have included outflows related to derivatives that hedge 
interest rate risk associated with mortgage loans and commitments.
    Many commenters were concerned that the treatment of derivative 
transactions created an asymmetric treatment for certain offsetting 
derivative transactions (such as foreign exchange swaps) because 
covered companies would be required to compute the cash flows on a 
gross basis with a cash outflow and a cash inflow subject to the 75 
percent inflow cap as described above, even if in practice the 
settlement occurred on a net basis. Accordingly, these commenters 
proposed that foreign exchange transactions that are part of the same 
swap should be treated as a single transaction on a net basis.
    For the reasons discussed in the proposal, the agencies continue to 
believe the 100 percent outflow rate applicable to net derivative 
outflows is reflective of the liquidity risks of these transactions and 
therefore are retaining this outflow rate in the final rule. The 
agencies are, however, making a significant change to how this outflow 
rate is applied to foreign currency exchange derivative transactions to 
address concerns raised by commenters.
    Specifically, foreign currency exchange derivative transactions 
that meet certain criteria can be netted under

[[Page 61484]]

the provisions of Sec.  _.32(c)(2) of the final rule. Cash flows 
arising from foreign currency exchange derivative transactions that 
involve a full exchange of contractual cash principal amounts in 
different currencies between a covered company and a counterparty 
within the same business day may be reflected in the net derivative 
cash outflow amount for that counterparty as a net amount, regardless 
of whether those transactions are covered by a qualifying master 
netting agreement. Thus, the inflow leg of a foreign currency exchange 
derivative transaction in effect is not subject to the 75 percent 
inflow cap as long as it settles on the same date as the corresponding 
outflow payment of that derivative transaction.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ This treatment is consistent with the Frequently Asked 
Questions on Basel III's January 2013 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
framework (April 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs284.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Mortgage Commitment
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to apply an 
outflow rate of 10 percent for all commitments for mortgages primarily 
secured by a first or subsequent lien on a one-to-four family property 
that can be drawn upon within 30 calendar days of a calculation date.
    One commenter was concerned about the treatment of VIE liabilities 
(and particularly non-consolidated VIEs). Specifically, this commenter 
requested that MBS VIE liabilities be excluded from the outflow 
calculation or if included, that these outflow amounts be netted 
against the estimated cash inflows from linked assets in the 
securitization trust, even if those assets are not on the company's 
balance sheet. Additionally, the commenter requested that mortgage 
commitment outflows be netted against sales from projected to-be-
announced inflows. Further, the commenter requested clarification 
regarding cash outflows for commercial and multifamily loans and 
whether outflows for partially funded loans would be limited to the 
amount of the loan that is scheduled to be funded during the 30 
calendar-day period or the entire unfunded amount of the loan.
    The agencies are adopting the mortgage commitment outflow rates of 
the proposed rule, with the following clarifications that address 
concerns raised by commenters. For the reasons discussed in the 
proposal, the agencies continue to believe that the 10 percent outflow 
rate applicable to mortgage commitments reflects the liquidity risks of 
these transactions and have adopted this outflow rate in the final 
rule. In response to the comment regarding the netting of mortgage 
commitment amounts against certain transactions, such as VIE 
liabilities, the forward sale of projected to-be-announced mortgage 
inflows, and GSE standby facilities, the agencies are clarifying that 
such inflows may not be netted against the overall mortgage commitment 
amount. The agencies believe that in a crisis, such inflows may not 
fully materialize, and thus do not believe that such inflows should be 
allowed under the final rule or netted against the mortgage commitment 
outflow amount.
    Also, the agencies are confirming that the outflow amount for 
mortgage commitments is based upon the amount the covered company has 
contractually committed for its own originations of retail mortgages 
that can be drawn upon 30 calendar days or less from the calculation 
date and not the entire unfunded amount of commitments that cannot be 
drawn within 30 calendar days.
e. Commitments Outflow Amount
    The commitment category of outflows under the proposed rule would 
have included the undrawn portion of committed credit and liquidity 
facilities provided by a covered company to its customers and 
counterparties that could have been drawn down within 30 calendar days 
of the calculation date. The proposed rule would have defined a 
liquidity facility as a legally binding agreement to extend funds at a 
future date to a counterparty that is made expressly for the purpose of 
refinancing the debt of the counterparty when it is unable to obtain a 
primary or anticipated source of funding. A liquidity facility also 
would have included an agreement to provide liquidity support to asset-
backed commercial paper by lending to, or purchasing assets from, any 
structure, program, or conduit in the event that funds are required to 
repay maturing asset-backed commercial paper. Liquidity facilities 
would have excluded general working capital facilities, such as 
revolving credit facilities for general corporate or working capital 
purposes. Facilities that have aspects of both credit and liquidity 
facilities would have been deemed to be liquidity facilities for the 
purposes of the proposed rule. An SPE would have been defined as a 
company organized for a specific purpose, the activities of which are 
significantly limited to those appropriate to accomplish a specific 
purpose, and the structure of which is intended to isolate the credit 
risk of the SPE.
    The proposed rule would have defined a credit facility as a legally 
binding agreement to extend funds upon request at a future date, 
including a general working capital facility such as a revolving credit 
facility for general corporate or working capital purposes. Under the 
proposed rule, a credit facility would not have included a facility 
extended expressly for the purpose of refinancing the debt of a 
counterparty that is otherwise unable to meet its obligations in the 
ordinary course of business. Under the proposed rule, a liquidity or 
credit facility would have been considered committed when the terms 
governing the facility prohibited a covered company from refusing to 
extend credit or funding under the facility, except where certain 
conditions specified by the terms of the facility--other than customary 
notice, administrative conditions, or changes in financial condition of 
the borrower--had been met. The undrawn amount for a committed credit 
or liquidity facility would have been the entire undrawn amount of the 
facility that could have been drawn upon within 30 calendar days of the 
calculation date under the governing agreement, less the fair value of 
level 1 liquid assets or 85 percent of the fair value of level 2A 
liquid assets, if any, that secured the facility. In the case of a 
liquidity facility, the undrawn amount would not have included the 
portion of the facility that supports customer obligations that mature 
more than 30 calendar days after the calculation date. A covered 
company's proportionate ownership share of a syndicated credit facility 
would have been included in the appropriate category of wholesale 
credit commitments.
    Section _--.32(e) of the proposed rule would have assigned various 
outflow amounts to commitments that are based on the counterparty type 
and facility type. First, in contrast to the outflow rates applied to 
other commitments, those commitments between affiliated depository 
institutions that are subject to the proposed rule would have received 
an outflow rate of zero percent because the agencies expect that such 
institutions would hold sufficient liquidity to meet their obligations 
and would not need to rely on committed facilities. In all other cases, 
the outflow rates assigned to committed facilities were meant to 
reflect the characteristics of each class of customers or 
counterparties under a stress scenario, as well as the reputational and 
legal risks that covered companies face if they were to try to 
restructure a commitment during a crisis to avoid drawdowns by 
customers.
    An outflow rate of 5 percent was proposed for retail facilities 
because

[[Page 61485]]

individuals and small businesses would likely have a lesser need for 
committed credit and liquidity facilities in a stress scenario when 
compared to institutional or wholesale customers (that is, the 
correlation between draws on such facilities and the stress scenario of 
the LCR is considered to be lower). An outflow rate of 10 percent was 
proposed for credit facilities and 30 percent for liquidity facilities 
to entities that are not financial sector entities based on their 
typically longer-term funding structures and lower correlation of 
drawing down the commitment during times of stress. The proposed rule 
would have assigned a 50 percent outflow rate to credit and liquidity 
facilities committed to depository institutions, depository institution 
holding companies, and foreign banks (other than commitments between 
affiliated depository institutions). Commitments to all other regulated 
financial companies, investment companies, non-regulated funds, pension 
funds, investment advisers, or identified companies (or to a 
consolidated subsidiary of any of the foregoing) would have been 
assigned a 40 percent outflow rate for credit facilities and 100 
percent for liquidity facilities. The agencies proposed a 100 percent 
outflow rate for a covered company's credit and liquidity facility 
commitments to SPEs given SPEs' sensitivity to emergency cash and 
backstop needs in a short-term stress environment, such as those 
experienced during the recent financial crisis.
    The agencies also proposed that the amount of level 1 or level 2A 
liquid assets securing the undrawn portion of a commitment would have 
reduced the outflow associated with the commitment if certain 
conditions were met. The amount of level 1 or level 2A liquid assets 
securing a committed credit or liquidity facility would have been the 
fair value (as determined under GAAP) of all level 1 liquid assets and 
85 percent of the fair value (as determined under GAAP) of level 2A 
liquid assets posted or required to be posted upon funding of the 
commitment as collateral to secure the facility, provided that: (1) The 
pledged assets had met the criteria for HQLA as set forth in Sec.  
_--.20 of the proposed rule during the applicable 30 calendar-day 
period; and (2) the covered company had not included the assets in its 
HQLA amount as calculated under subpart C of the proposed rule during 
the applicable 30 calendar-day period.
    The comments on Sec.  _--.32(e) were generally focused on: (i) 
SPEs; (ii) dual use facilities; and (iii) other concerns such as 
calibration of the outflow rates. At a high level, commenters asserted 
that the treatment for SPEs was overly harsh, that the approach for 
financing vehicles that employed both credit and liquidity facilities 
should conform to the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, and that a 
host of specific entities, such as central counterparties (CCPs) and 
financial market utilities, deserved unique treatments.
i. Special Purpose Entities Comments
    Overall, commenters asserted that the agencies had defined SPEs too 
broadly for purposes of Sec.  _--.32(e) of the proposed rule, and 
argued that a 100 percent outflow rate was too high, recommending 
instead a ``look-through'' approach depending on the type of 
counterparty that sponsors or owns the SPE; for example, whether the 
counterparty is an operating company that develops or manages real 
estate, a securitization facility that functions as a financing 
vehicle, a CCP, a Tender Option Bond (TOB) issuer, a fund subject to 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (40 Act Fund), or a commercial paper 
facility. Commenters argued that funding provided through an SPE should 
receive the outflow specified in Sec.  _--.32(e) for the ``underlying'' 
counterparty rather than the 100 percent outflow rate applied to SPEs. 
A few commenters also requested that the agencies distinguish between 
those SPEs intended to be captured by Sec.  _--.32(e)(vi) of the 
proposed rule that were a source of liquidity stress in the last 
financial crisis and those SPEs that a borrower uses to finance, 
through a securitization credit facility, the receivables owned by a 
corporate entity (a so-called ``bank customer securitization credit 
facility''). These commenters proposed the agencies look through to the 
sponsor or owner of the SPE and set the outflow rates for the undrawn 
amounts based on the sponsor at: 50 percent for depository 
institutions, depository institution holding companies, or foreign 
banks; 40 percent for regulated financial companies, investment 
companies, non-regulated funds, pension funds, investment advisers, or 
identified companies; and 10 percent for other wholesale customers. 
Commenters proposed specific criteria to define bank customer 
securitization credit facilities, which provided guidelines related to 
the sponsor, financing, customers, underlying exposures, and other 
particular aspects of this type of SPE. These commenters also stated 
that failure to implement their suggestion and retention of the 
proposed rule's treatment of SPEs would reduce the provision of credit 
in the U.S. economy by restricting access to securitized lines of 
credit, a major source of funding.
    Other commenters requested that the look-through approach be 
applied to the undrawn amount of credit commitments of any bank 
customer securitization credit facility irrespective of whether it is 
funded by the bank or through an asset-backed commercial paper conduit 
facility that is set up by the sponsoring borrower for the sole purpose 
of purchasing and holding financial assets, because these facilities 
function as a substitute or complement to traditional revolving credit 
facilities. These commenters argued that such securitizations act as a 
``credit enhancement'' by allowing the borrower to borrow against a 
pool of bankruptcy remote assets. Further, these commenters argued that 
such borrowing structures left lenders less exposed to counterparty 
credit risk than a traditional revolving facility because the amount 
drawn on such facilities in a stressed environment would be wholly 
limited by a borrowing base derived from the underlying eligible 
financial assets.
    Commenters argued that certain SPEs, such as SPEs established to 
hold specific real estate assets, have a similar risk profile to 
conventional commercial real estate borrowers and therefore should 
receive a lower outflow rate. Commenters argued that these SPE 
structures are passive, with all decisions made by the operating 
company parent, rather than the SPE itself. They further argued that 
this structure enhances the ability to finance a real estate project 
because the lender receives greater comfort that the primary asset will 
be shielded from many events that might prevent the lender from 
foreclosing on its loan and that the punitive treatment in the proposed 
rule will hamper this type of financing. Some commenters requested that 
SPEs that own and operate commercial and multi-family real estate be 
assigned a much lower outflow rate or no outflow rate. Moreover, 
commenters further argued that commitments to SPEs established to ring-
fence the liabilities of a real estate development project do not merit 
a 100 percent outflow rate because in practice, the drawdowns (in 
crises and in normal times) could only amount to a modest portion of 
the overall unfunded commitment over a 30 calendar-day period due to 
contractual milestones reflected in the loan documentation (e.g., 
obtaining permits, completing a certain percentage of the project, 
selling or renting a certain percentage of units, or that a certain 
stage of the real estate development project has been completed). These 
commenters requested that the agencies limit the

[[Page 61486]]

undrawn amount of such facilities to the amount that could legally be 
withdrawn during the next 30 calendar days.
    Another commenter expressed concern over the outflow rate applied 
to TOBs, stating that TOBs did not draw on liquidity facilities during 
the recent crisis because they rely on the remarketing process for the 
liquidity needed to satisfy TOB holders exercising the tender option. 
The commenter argued that the outflow rate should be lower for TOBs 
because such programs are significantly over-collateralized, and a 
liquidation of underlying bonds would cover liquidity needed to satisfy 
TOB investors, even in an environment when bond prices are falling. The 
commenter requested that the outflow rate be set at a maximum of 30 
percent. Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule 
assigned unduly high outflow rates to mutual funds and their foreign 
equivalents, which are subject to statutory limitations on borrowed 
funds, and suggested that the outflow rate for non-financial sector 
companies (10 percent and 30 percent for committed credit and liquidity 
facilities, respectively) would be more appropriate for such funds.
ii. Dual Use Facilities Comments
    Some commenters were concerned about key terms and definitions 
referenced in Sec.  _--.32(e) of the proposed rule. For example, one 
commenter requested clarity regarding how to treat certain commercial 
paper backup facilities arguing that it was unclear how the proposed 
rule should be applied because most commercial paper backup facilities 
(that is, liquidity facilities) can also serve other general corporate 
purposes (akin to credit facilities). Commenters requested that 
multipurpose commitment facilities (which have aspects of both 
liquidity and credit facilities) should not automatically default to a 
liquidity facility and argued for employing the treatment of the Basel 
III Revised Liquidity Framework, which sets a portion of the undrawn 
amount of a commitment as a committed credit facility. Another 
commenter requested that the outflow rate for commitment outflows be 
applied to the borrowing base (rather than the commitment amount) where 
a covered company would not as a practical matter fund the full amount 
of the commitment beyond the amount of collateral that is available in 
the LCR's 30-day measurement period.
iii. Other Commitment Outflows Comments
    Commenters also expressed concern that the treatment of commitment 
outflows in the proposed rule could have adverse effects on the U.S. 
economy by reducing the provision of credit to businesses. In 
particular, commenters stated that the proposed rule's 10 percent 
outflow rate for undrawn, committed credit facilities, regardless of 
borrower rating, was far higher than necessary and would negatively 
impact a covered company's LCR due to the underlying size of the 
commitments. According to these commenters, this outflow rate could 
have a ``far-reaching'' impact on a covered company's ability to lend 
to small and medium enterprises. Accordingly, the commenters requested 
a zero percent outflow assumption for commitments to highly rated 
companies.
    Some commenters requested that a number of other specific 
commitment facilities receive a lower outflow rate than provided in 
Sec.  _--.32(e) of the proposed rule. For instance, one commenter noted 
that 40 Act Funds and their foreign equivalents have aspects that limit 
liquidity risks such as tenor, asset quality, diversification minimums 
and repayment provisions. Accordingly, the commenter argued, such 
commitments should be assigned a 10 percent outflow rate. One commenter 
requested that the outflow rate assigned to commitments used for the 
issuance of commercial paper be raised in light of the fact that 
commercial paper was a significant liquidity strain during the most 
recent crisis. The same commenter suggested that the outflow rate for 
liquidity facilities used to support the issuance of certain types of 
securities, such as auction rate securities, should be raised to 100 
percent due to the drawdown rates of such facilities observed during 
the crisis.
    A few commenters requested that commitments provided to CCPs should 
be treated in the same manner as commitments to regulated financial 
companies due to the requirement that CCPs comply with the principles 
for financial market infrastructures, which require CCPs to establish 
and maintain sufficient liquidity resources.\65\ Two commenters 
requested that committed facilities offered by covered companies to 
CCPs be separately categorized with an outflow rate below the proposed 
rate of 100 percent due to their low historical drawdown rates and the 
Dodd-Frank Act's express clearing mandate, requiring that certain 
transactions be cleared through a CCP.\66\ One commenter noted that the 
Basel III leverage ratio provides a specific delineation of commitments 
to CCPs and credit conversion factors and indicated that these reflect 
the operational realities of these commitments and requested the 
agencies to make a similar delineation in the LCR. This commenter also 
proposed to define credit facility as ``a legally binding agreement to 
extend funds if requested at a future date, including a general working 
capital facility such as a revolving credit facility for general 
corporate or working capital purposes and a qualified central 
counterparty facility for general operational purposes such as managing 
a clearing member unwind or disruption of services by a depository or 
payment system. Credit facilities do not include facilities extended 
expressly for the purpose of refinancing the debt of a counterparty 
that is otherwise unable to meet its obligations in the ordinary course 
of business (including through its usual sources of funding or other 
anticipated sources of funding).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and 
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Principles for financial market infrastructures (April 
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf.
    \66\ Pursuant to sections 723(a)(3) and 763(a) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, certain swaps must be cleared through a CCP. 7 U.S.C. 2(h), 15 
U.S.C. 78c-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter requested that the agencies conduct an empirical 
analysis of historic drawdown rates to calibrate drawdown assumptions. 
Another commenter requested that the agencies, at a minimum, clarify 
that commitments to financial market utilities that have not been 
designated by the Council as systemically important ``be treated no 
worse than commitments to `regulated financial companies' for purposes 
of LCR outflow assumptions.''
    In addition, one commenter claimed that bonds backed by letters of 
credit cannot be properly valued for purposes of the 30 calendar-day 
period because the process of drawing upon such a letter of credit 
usually requires notice of 30 days or more. The commenter requested 
that only the value of the debt maturing within the 30-day window be 
included in the outflow estimate.
v. Final Rule
    The agencies are clarifying the definition of liquidity facility in 
the final rule by eliminating the requirement that the liquidity 
facility be made ``expressly'' for the purpose of refinancing debt. The 
definition in the final rule is intended to include

[[Page 61487]]

commitments that are being used to refinance debt, regardless of 
whether there is an express contractual clause. This change captures 
the intent of the proposed rule by focusing on the function of the 
commitment.
    The agencies are clarifying the treatment of letters of credit 
issued by a covered company. To the extent a letter of credit meets the 
definition of credit facility or liquidity facility, it will be treated 
as such. Thus, a covered company will have to review letters of credit 
to determine whether they should be treated as commitments in the LCR.
    The agencies are also clarifying the differences among the types of 
commitments that are covered by Sec.  _--.32(b), (d), and (e) of the 
proposed rule, which are consistent with the final rule. Section 
_--.32(b) relates to a covered company's commitments to structured 
transactions that the covered company itself has sponsored. These 
commitments may take the form of committed liquidity facilities, but 
may also take the form of less formal support. In the final rule, Sec.  
_--.32(b) commitments have been expressly carved out of Sec.  
_--.32(e)(vii) and (viii). Section _--.32(d) relates only to a covered 
company's commitments to originate retail mortgage loans. All other 
outflow amounts related to committed credit and liquidity facilities 
are subject to the provisions in Sec.  _--.32(e) of the final rule.
    In response to the aforementioned comments about commitment 
outflows amounts, the agencies have adopted changes in the final rule 
to the outflow amounts for commitments to SPEs (Sec.  _--.32(e)(1)) and 
the treatment for assessing the undrawn amount of a credit or liquidity 
facility (Sec.  _--.32(e)(2)).
    The agencies agree with commenters that not all SPEs are exposed to 
the highest degree of liquidity risk. To that end, the agencies are 
clarifying that certain SPEs can be treated with an approach similar to 
the treatment for the other referenced commitments in Sec.  
_--.32(e)(1). Under the final rule, the agencies have limited the 
application of the 100 percent outflow rate to committed credit and 
liquidity facilities to SPEs that issue or have issued securities or 
commercial paper to finance their purchases or operations. These SPEs 
are highly susceptible to stressed market conditions during which they 
may be unable to refinance their maturing securities and commercial 
paper. As such, under the final rule:
     For SPEs that do not issue securities or commercial paper:
    [cir] The outflow amount for a committed credit facility extended 
by the covered company to such SPE that is a consolidated subsidiary of 
a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not a financial sector 
entity is 10 percent of the undrawn amount;
    [cir] The outflow amount for a committed liquidity facility 
extended by the covered company to such SPE that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not a 
financial sector entity is 30 percent of the undrawn amount;
    [cir] The outflow amount for a committed credit facility extended 
by the covered company to such SPE that is a consolidated subsidiary of 
a financial sector entity is 40 percent of the undrawn amount; and
    [cir] The outflow amount for a committed liquidity facility 
extended by the covered company to an SPE that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity is 100 percent of the undrawn 
amount.
     The outflow amount for either a committed credit or 
liquidity facility extended by the covered company to an SPE that 
issues or has issued commercial paper or securities, other than equity 
securities issued to a company of which the SPE is a consolidated 
subsidiary, to finance its purchases or operations is 100 percent of 
the undrawn amount.
    The agencies agree with commenters that SPEs that are formed to 
manage and invest in real estate should not all be treated with a 100 
percent outflow rate, provided that such SPEs do not issue securities 
or commercial paper. Instead, the agencies are employing the ``look 
through'' approach as described above. For example, under the final 
rule, funding provided to a non-financial sector entity for real estate 
activities via a committed credit facility to an SPE would receive a 10 
percent outflow rate, and funding provided to a financial sector entity 
for real estate activities via a committed liquidity facility to an SPE 
would receive a 100 percent outflow rate.
    The agencies also agree that the assessment of the undrawn amount 
for committed liquidity facilities should be narrowed to only include 
commitments that support obligations that mature in the 30 calendar-day 
period following the calculation date; however, pursuant to Sec.  
_--.31, notice periods for draws on commitments are not recognized. The 
agencies are thus clarifying that, if the underlying commitment's 
contractual terms are so limiting, the amount supporting obligations 
with maturities greater than 30 days would not be considered undrawn 
because they would not be available to be drawn within the 30 calendar-
day period following the calculation date. In addition, if the 
underlying commitment's contractual terms do not permit withdrawal but 
for the occurrence of a contractual milestone that cannot occur within 
30-calendar days, such amounts would not be included in the undrawn 
amount of the facility. Thus, with respect to undrawn amounts for all 
facilities, the agencies are clarifying in the final rule that the 
undrawn amount would only include the portion of the facility that a 
counterparty could contractually withdraw within the 30 calendar-day 
period following the calculation date.
    The agencies have not included Sec.  _--.32(e)(2)(ii)(B) of the 
proposed rule in the final rule. This provision that the undrawn amount 
of a committed facility is less that portion of the facility that 
supports obligations of a covered company's customer that do not mature 
30 calendar days or less from such calculation date, and further 
provided that if facilities have aspects of both credit and liquidity 
facilities, the facility must be classified as a liquidity facility. 
First, the principle in the first clause of the deleted language is 
duplicative of the rule text set forth in Sec.  _--.32(e)(2)(ii) of the 
final rule and therefore not only unnecessary but potentially 
confusing. Second, the second sentence of the deleted language has been 
included in the final rule's definition of liquidity facility, rather 
than in the section on outflows, where the agencies think it is more 
appropriate and will be easier for readers to find. Accordingly, the 
agencies have streamlined the text in the final rule.
    The agencies are retaining the approach for those financing 
vehicles that employ both credit and liquidity facilities and treating 
those entities as liquidity facilities. The agencies believe it would 
be problematic to assess which portion of the assets securing the 
facility are meant to serve the liquidity facility and which portion of 
the assets are meant to serve the credit facility. At the same time, 
this treatment provides the agencies with a conservative approach for 
assessing dual purpose facilities. The agencies are also clarifying 
that facilities that may provide liquidity support to asset-backed 
commercial paper by lending to, or purchasing assets from, any 
structure, program, or conduit should be treated as a liquidity 
facility and not be treated as a credit facility.
    The agencies disagree with commenters' recommendation that 40 Act 
Funds and their foreign equivalents be treated with an outflow rate 
equivalent to unsecured retail funding because the nature of the 
counterparty and the corresponding liquidity risks

[[Page 61488]]

are more akin to the liquidity risks of financial sector entities. 
Thus, the agencies decline to apply a unique rate for this category of 
commitments. The agencies also decline to create special exceptions for 
commitments related to TOBs, mutual funds, and other commitments to 
investment companies, because similar to other SPEs that issue, or have 
issued, securities or commercial paper, such entities have liquidity 
risks that are commensurate with a financial sector entity and their 
draws on commitments likely will be highly correlated with stress in 
the financial sector.
    The agencies are not providing special treatment for CCPs or 
certain financial market utilities. The agencies believe it is critical 
for covered companies to maintain appropriate HQLA to support 
commitments that may necessitate the provision of liquidity in a crisis 
and believe that to be the case with respect to commitments to CCPs and 
certain financial market utilities. Further, the agencies understand 
that commitments to these entities generally require HQLA to be posted 
and because the commitment outflow amount is reduced by the amount of 
Level 1 and 2A HQLA required to support the commitment, the agencies 
have determined that special treatment for CCPs or certain financial 
market utilities is not necessary.
f. Collateral Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to 
recognize outflows related to changes in collateral positions that 
could arise during a period of financial stress. Such changes could 
include being required to post additional or higher quality collateral 
as a result of a change in derivative collateral values or in 
underlying derivative values, having to return excess collateral, or 
accepting lower quality collateral as a substitute for already-posted 
collateral, all of which could have a significant impact upon a covered 
company's liquidity profile.
    Various requirements of proposed Sec.  _.32(f) were of concern to 
certain commenters who generally believed that the provisions relating 
to changes in financial condition, potential collateral valuation 
changes, collateral substitution, and derivative collateral change 
required clarification or did not accurately reflect liquidity risks 
around the posting of collateral for derivative transactions. The 
following describes the subcategories of collateral outflows discussed 
in the preamble to the proposed rule.
i. Changes in Financial Condition
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to include 
in its collateral outflow amount 100 percent of all additional amounts 
that the covered company would have needed to post or fund as 
additional collateral under a contract as a result of a change in its 
own financial condition. A covered company would have calculated this 
outflow amount by evaluating the terms of such contracts and 
calculating any incremental additional collateral or higher quality 
collateral that would have been required to be posted as a result of 
triggering clauses tied to a change in the covered company's financial 
condition. If multiple methods of meeting the requirement for 
additional collateral were available (for example, providing more 
collateral of the same type or replacing existing collateral with 
higher quality collateral) the covered company was permitted to use the 
lower calculated outflow amount in its calculation.
    Some commenters requested additional clarification regarding the 
requirements of Sec.  _--.32(f)(1) of the proposed rule. One commenter 
requested that the agencies clarify that they do not view the existence 
of a material adverse change (MAC) clause in a contract as a provision 
that would be expected to impact the calculation of collateral outflows 
because these clauses by themselves do not necessarily trigger 
additional collateral, but require subjective analysis to determine 
whether they have been triggered. Another commenter noted that the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework provides for credit ratings 
downgrades of up to three notches and requested clarity as to how to 
calculate the collateral outflow amount given the absence of an 
explicit downgrade threshold in the proposed rule. The same commenter 
urged the agencies to employ a standard approach (as opposed to 
allowing banking organizations to choose the lower outflow amount) in 
cases where multiple methods are available.
    The agencies are clarifying in the final rule that when calculating 
the collateral outflow amount, a covered company should review all 
contract clauses related to transactions that could contractually 
require the posting or funding of collateral as a result of a change in 
the covered company's financial condition, including downgrade 
triggers, but not including general MAC clauses, which is consistent 
with the intent of the proposed rule. The agencies also are clarifying 
that covered companies should count all amounts of collateral in the 
collateral outflow amount that could be posted in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the downgrade trigger clauses found in all 
applicable legal agreements. Covered companies should not look solely 
to credit ratings to determine collateral outflows from changes in 
financial condition, but the agencies note that collateral requirements 
based on credit rating changes constitute collateral requirements based 
on changes in financial condition under the final rule. The final rule 
continues to allow a covered company to choose the method for posting 
collateral that results in the lowest outflow amount, as the agencies 
believe a covered company will likely post collateral in the most 
economically advantageous way that it can. The agencies are finalizing 
the provision addressing changes in financial condition collateral 
outflow as proposed.
ii. Derivative Collateral Potential Valuation Changes
    The proposed rule would have applied a 20 percent outflow rate to 
the fair value of any assets posted as collateral that were not level 1 
liquid assets, in recognition that a covered company could be required 
to post additional collateral as the market price of the posted 
collateral fell. The agencies did not propose to apply outflow rates to 
level 1 liquid assets that are posted as collateral, as these are not 
expected to face substantial mark-to-market losses in times of stress.
    Commenters requested that the agencies change and clarify certain 
requirements in Sec.  _.32(f)(2) of the proposed rule. For instance, 
one commenter requested that the agencies revise Sec.  _.32(f)(2) to 
base outflow rates on a net calculation on a security-by-security basis 
(for non-level 1 liquid assets) and only to include collateral posted 
on a net basis, not the pre-netting gross amount. Commenters also 
requested that, consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, the agencies clarify that Sec.  _.32(f)(2) only applies to 
collateral securing derivative transactions and not to collateral 
pledged for the secured funding transactions contemplated in Sec.  
_.32(j) of the proposed rule. Another commenter requested that the 
agencies impose a 20 percent outflow rate for collateral value changes 
due to market stress.
    The agencies have reviewed comments about potential valuation 
changes in Sec.  _.32(f)(2) of the proposed rule and are generally 
finalizing this

[[Page 61489]]

section of the rule as proposed. However, the agencies are clarifying 
in the final rule that, when determining the outflow amount for the 
potential valuation change of collateral, only collateral securing 
derivative transactions should be assessed, and not collateral 
supporting other transactions, such as that securing secured funding 
transactions under Sec.  _.32(j) of the proposed rule. Also, consistent 
with other derivative netting provisions employed in the proposal, the 
agencies are clarifying that covered companies can apply the rate to 
netted collateral, not the pre-netted gross amount, but only if the 
collateral can be netted under the same qualifying master netting 
agreement.
iii. Excess Collateral Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule would have applied an outflow rate of 100 percent 
to the fair value of collateral posted by counterparties that exceeds 
the current collateral requirement in a governing contract. Under the 
proposed rule, this category would have included unsegregated excess 
collateral that a covered company may have been required to return to a 
counterparty based on the terms of a derivative or other financial 
agreement and which is not already excluded from the covered company's 
eligible HQLA.
    There were no substantive comments received by the agencies 
regarding Sec.  _.32(f)(3) of the proposed rule. For the same reasons 
outlined in the proposed rule, the agencies are finalizing the excess 
collateral outflow requirements substantially as proposed.
iv. Contractually-Required Collateral Outflow
    The proposed rule would have imposed a 100 percent outflow rate 
upon the fair value of collateral that a covered company was 
contractually obligated to post, but had not yet posted. Where a 
covered company has not yet posted such collateral, the agencies 
believe that, in stressed market conditions, a covered company's 
counterparties may demand all contractually required collateral.
    There were no substantive comments about Sec.  _.32(f)(4) of the 
proposed rule. For the same reasons outlined in the proposed rule, the 
agencies are finalizing the contractually-required collateral outflow 
requirements substantially as proposed.
v. Collateral Substitution
    The proposed rule's collateral substitution outflow amount would 
have equaled the difference between the post-haircut fair value of 
eligible HQLA collateral posted by a counterparty to a covered company 
and the post-haircut fair value of lower quality eligible HQLA 
collateral, or non-HQLA collateral, a counterparty could substitute 
under an applicable contract. Thus, if a covered company had received 
as collateral a level 1 liquid asset that counted towards its level 1 
liquid asset amount, and the counterparty could have substituted it 
with an eligible level 2A liquid asset collateral, the proposed rule 
imposed an outflow rate of 15 percent, which resulted from applying the 
standardized haircut value of the level 2A liquid assets. Similarly, if 
a covered company had received as collateral a level 1 liquid asset 
that counted towards its level 1 liquid asset amount and under an 
agreement the collateral could have been substituted with assets that 
are not HQLA, a covered company would have been required to include in 
its outflow amount 100 percent of the collateral's market value. The 
proposed rule provided outflow rates for all permutations of collateral 
substitution.
    One commenter stated that Sec.  _.32(f)(5) of the proposed rule was 
excessively conservative because it did not take into account that a 
counterparty's right to substitute non-HQLA collateral is generally 
subject to an increase in a market haircut designed to mitigate the 
liquidity risk associated with the substitution. The commenter further 
stated that such substitutions are infrequent, and the requirement 
introduces an asymmetry by ignoring the reuse of the substituted 
collateral which could be posted to another counterparty. Accordingly, 
the commenter argued that collateral substitution outflows occur 
infrequently and do not warrant inclusion in the proposed rule.
    The agencies are finalizing this section of the rule substantially 
as proposed. The agencies recognize that collateral related to 
transactions is subject to market haircuts. However, the standardized 
haircuts provided in the proposed rule permit the agencies to design a 
generally consistent standard that addresses certain potential risks 
that covered companies may face under a stressed environment. The 
agencies are clarifying that Sec.  _.32(f)(5) only applies to 
collateral that a counterparty has posted to the covered company as of 
the calculation date, and does not apply to collateral a covered 
company has posted to a counterparty, nor to any collateral that the 
covered company could repost to a counterparty after a collateral 
substitution has taken place.
vi. Potential Derivative Valuation Change
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to use a 
two-year look-back approach in calculating its market valuation change 
outflow amounts for derivative positions. Under the proposed rule, the 
derivative collateral outflow amount would have equaled the absolute 
value of the largest consecutive 30 calendar-day cumulative net mark-
to-market collateral outflow or inflow resulting from derivative 
transactions realized during the preceding 24 months.
    One commenter indicated that the two-year look-back approach 
ofSec.  _.32(f)(6) of the proposed rule was not a forward-looking 
estimate of potential collateral flows in a period of market stress, 
and that historic collateral outflows may be more indicative of closing 
out positions rather than liquidity strains. The same commenter 
requested that the agencies provide an alternative forward-looking 
approach that would replace the requirement of the proposed rule. 
Another commenter expressed concern that Sec.  _.32(f)(6) did not take 
into account current conventions regarding margin requirements that 
greatly reduce a covered company's exposure to derivative valuation 
changes, thereby making the proposed rule an onerous data exercise 
without an obvious benefit. Further, according to this commenter, there 
would be operational challenges as banking organizations have not 
previously retained this data.

[[Page 61490]]

    While the agencies recognize the operational challenges raised by 
commenters, the agencies are finalizing this section of the rule 
largely as proposed because of the important liquidity risk it 
addresses. When a covered company becomes subject to the LCR, it should 
have relevant records related to derivatives to compute this amount. To 
the extent that the covered company's data is not complete, it should 
be able to closely estimate its potential derivative valuation change. 
Once subject to the LCR, the agencies expect that a covered company 
will collect data to make a precise calculation in the future. The 
agencies recognize that the calculation is not forward-looking and may 
not be entirely indicative of the covered company's derivative 
portfolio at the time of the calculation date, but the historical 
experience of the covered company with its derivatives portfolio should 
be a reasonable proxy for potential derivative valuation changes. 
Additionally, while the margin requirements in recent regulatory 
proposals may provide certain protections in derivatives transactions, 
this rule specifically addresses the risk of the potential future 
liquidity stress from derivative valuation changes. One clarifying 
change has been made to highlight that the look-back should only 
include collateral that is exchanged based on the actual valuation 
changes of derivative transactions (generally referred to as variation 
margin), and not collateral exchanged based on the initiation or close 
out of derivative transactions (generally referred to as initial 
margin).
    Table 2 below illustrates how a covered company should calculate 
this collateral outflow amount. Note that Table 2 only presents a 
single 30-day period within a prior two-year calculation window. A 
covered company is required to repeat this calculation for each 
calendar day within every two-year calculation window, and then 
determine the maximum absolute value of the net cumulative collateral 
change, which would be equal to the largest 30-consecutive calendar day 
cumulative net mark-to-market collateral outflow or inflow realized 
during the preceding 24 months resulting from derivative transactions 
valuation changes.

                          Table 2--Potential Derivative Valuation Change Outflow Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Net mark-to-   Cumulative net
                                     Mark-to-        Mark-to-         market         mark-to-     Absolute value
                                      market          market        collateral        market       of cumulative
                                    collateral      collateral    change due  to    collateral    net collateral
                                  inflows due to   outflows due     derivative     change due to   change due to
                                    derivative     to derivative    transaction     derivative      derivative
                                    transaction     transaction      valuation      transaction     transaction
                                     valuation       valuation     changes (A)-      valuation       valuation
                                      changes         changes           (B)           changes         changes
                                               A               B               C               D               E
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day 1...........................              72              78              -6              -6               6
Day 2...........................              78               0              78              72              72
Day 3...........................              35              85             -50              22              22
Day 4...........................              18              30             -12              10              10
Day 5...........................              77              59              18              28              28
Day 6...........................               9              53             -44             -16              16
Day 7...........................              53              24              29              13              13
Day 8...........................              81              92             -11               2               2
Day 9...........................              66               2              64              66              66
Day 10..........................              56              58              -2              64              64
Day 11..........................               7              32             -25              39              39
Day 12..........................              62              10              52              91              91
Day 13..........................              96              90               6              97              97
Day 14..........................              54              83             -29              68              68
Day 15..........................              73              45              28              96              96
Day 16..........................              11              62             -51              45              45
Day 17..........................              65              55              10              55              55
Day 18..........................              87              55              32              87              87
Day 19..........................               1              43             -42              45              45
Day 20..........................              96              99              -3              42              42
Day 21..........................               3              89             -86             -44              44
Day 22..........................              95              49              46               2               2
Day 23..........................              18              90             -72             -70              70
Day 24..........................              48              54              -6             -76              76
Day 25..........................              18             100             -82            -158             158
Day 26..........................              86              74              12            -146             146
Day 27..........................              51              65             -14            -160             160
Day 28..........................              48              19              29            -131             131
Day 29..........................              40              74             -34            -165             165
Day 30..........................              52              32              20            -145             145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Brokered Deposit Outflow Amount for Retail Customers and 
Counterparties
    The proposed rule provided several outflow rates for retail 
brokered deposits held by covered companies. The proposed rule defined 
a brokered deposit as any deposit held at the covered company that is 
obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through the mediation or 
assistance of a deposit broker, as that term is defined in section 
29(g) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act).\67\ The agencies' 
proposed outflow rates for brokered deposits from retail customers or 
counterparties was based on the type of account, whether

[[Page 61491]]

deposit insurance was in place, and the maturity date of the deposit 
agreement. Outflow rates for retail brokered deposits were further 
subdivided into reciprocal brokered deposits, brokered sweep deposits, 
and all other brokered deposits. The agencies received several comments 
arguing that: (i) The proposed outflow rates for each category of 
brokered deposits were too high; (ii) the applicable definitions and 
key terms lacked clarity and precision; and (iii) the proposed rule 
would have a number of unintended consequences, including potentially 
disrupting an important, stable funding source for many banking 
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ 12 U.S.C. 1831f(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are adopting many aspects of the proposed rule, with 
revisions to certain elements in response to commenters and to better 
reflect the liquidity risks of brokered funding, as described in this 
section. The agencies continue to believe that brokered deposits have 
the potential to exhibit greater volatility than funding from stable 
retail deposits, even in cases where the deposits are fully or 
partially insured, and thus believe that higher outflow rates, relative 
to some other retail funding, are appropriate. Brokered deposits are 
more easily moved from one institution to another, as customers search 
for higher interest rates. Additionally, brokered deposits can be 
subject to both regulatory limitations and limitations imposed by the 
facilitating deposit broker when an institution's financial condition 
deteriorates, and these limitations can become especially problematic 
during periods of economic stress when a banking organization may be 
unable to renew such deposits.
i. Retail Brokered Deposit Outflow Rates
    Several commenters contended that the outflow rates for all 
categories of retail brokered deposits were too high, that they were 
inconsistent with the liquidity risks posed by these transactions, and 
that they should be lowered. Commenters argued that the liquidity 
characteristics of most brokered deposits warranted outflow rates 
consistent with the unsecured retail outflow rates specified in Sec.  
_.32(a) of the proposed rule (for example, 3 percent for fully insured 
retail deposits and 10 percent for all other retail deposits).
    As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the agencies 
consider brokered deposits for retail customers or counterparties to be 
a more volatile form of funding than stable retail deposits, even if 
deposit insurance coverage is present, because of the structure of the 
attendant third-party relationship and the potential instability of 
such deposits during a liquidity stress event. The agencies also are 
concerned that statutory restrictions on certain brokered deposits make 
this form of funding less stable than other deposit types under certain 
stress scenarios. Specifically, a covered company that becomes less 
than ``well capitalized'' is subject to restrictions on accepting 
deposits through a deposit broker. Additionally, the agencies disagree 
with commenters' views that brokered deposits are as low risk as other 
unsecured retail deposits. During the recent crisis, the FDIC found 
that: (i) Failed and failing banking organizations were more likely to 
have brokered deposits than other banking organizations; (ii) replacing 
core deposits with brokered deposit funding tended to raise a banking 
organization's default probability, and (iii) banking organizations 
relying on brokered deposits were more costly to resolve.\68\ Because 
banking organizations that rely heavily on brokered deposits have been 
shown to engage in relatively higher-risk lending than institutions 
with more core deposits, banking organizations that rely heavily on 
brokered deposits are more likely to experience significant losses 
during stress conditions, which, in turn, may cause these banking 
organizations' capital levels to fall and, in turn, restrict their 
ability to replace brokered deposits that run off or mature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ``Study on Core 
Deposits and Brokered Deposits,'' Submitted to Congress pursuant to 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (FDIC 
Brokered Deposit Study), at pages 34-45 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/coredeposit-study.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies continue to have the concerns noted above and are 
finalizing the treatment of retail brokered deposits largely as 
proposed. However, in response to commenters, the final rule modifies 
the treatment of certain non-maturity brokered deposits in retail 
transactional accounts to provide for a lower outflow rate, as 
described below.
(a). Non-Maturity Brokered Deposits in Transactional Accounts
    Under the proposed rule, brokered deposits that mature within 30 
calendar days of a calculation date that are not reciprocal deposits or 
brokered sweep deposits would have been subject to a 100 percent 
outflow rate. Several commenters argued this outflow rate was 
unrealistic and would disrupt a valuable source of funding. In 
particular, commenters argued that certain non-maturity brokered 
checking and transactional account deposits, such as affinity group 
deposits, are as stable as traditional retail deposits and should not 
be subject to the proposed rule's 100 percent outflow rate. According 
to the commenters, in many instances these deposits involve direct 
relationships between the banking organization and the retail customer 
with little continued involvement of the deposit broker. Likewise, 
commenters stressed that the LCR generally provides for lower treatment 
of retail-related outflows, and argued that this 100 percent outflow 
assumption is higher than the 40 percent outflow assumption for 
wholesale brokered deposits.
    To address these commenters' concerns about the outflow rate 
applied to such deposits, the agencies are providing separate outflow 
rates for non-maturity brokered deposits in transactional accounts. 
Under the final rule, retail brokered deposits held in a transactional 
account with no contractual maturity date receive a 20 percent outflow 
rate if the entire amount is covered by deposit insurance and a 40 
percent outflow rate if less than the entire amount is covered by 
deposit insurance. This outflow rate covers brokered deposits that are 
in traditional retail banking accounts and are used by the customers 
for their transactional needs, and would include non-maturity affinity 
group referral deposits and third-party marketer deposits where the 
deposit is held in a transactional account with the bank. The agencies 
believe these deposits have lower liquidity risk than other types of 
brokered deposits, but nevertheless warrant higher outflow treatment 
than the unsecured retail deposits in Sec.  _.32(a) due to the presence 
of third-party intermediation by the deposit broker, which may result 
in higher outflows during periods of stress. The outflow rates under 
the final rule are intended to be consistent with the outflow rates for 
unaffiliated brokered sweep deposits, discussed below, and the 
agencies' treatment of professionally managed deposits that do not 
qualify as brokered deposits, discussed above under section II.C.3.a.
(b). Other Brokered Deposits
    As noted above, under the proposed rule, all other brokered 
deposits would have been defined to include those brokered deposits 
that are not reciprocal brokered deposits or are not part of a brokered 
sweep arrangement. These deposits were subject to an outflow rate of 10 
percent for deposits maturing more than 30 calendar days from the 
calculation date or 100 percent for deposits maturing within 30 
calendar days of the calculation date. With respect to other brokered 
deposits

[[Page 61492]]

maturing within 30 calendar days of the calculation date, commenters 
argued that the 100 percent outflow rate for such deposits was 
unnecessarily high due to the rollover rates banking organizations 
observed for such deposits. In addition, one commenter argued that the 
agencies' treatment of deposits entirely covered by deposit insurance 
was inconsistent because a brokered sweep deposit that is not entirely 
insured is subject to a 40 percent outflow rate while an entirely 
insured brokered time deposit is subject to a 100 percent outflow rate 
if it matures within the 30-day period. The commenter suggested that 
all deposits that are fully insured (retail or wholesale) should 
receive the same treatment for the purposes of the LCR. Several 
commenters requested clarification regarding the treatment of retail 
brokered deposits that allow for early withdrawal upon the payment of a 
financial penalty, such as a certain amount of accrued interest.
    As discussed in the proposal, the agencies believe the 100 percent 
outflow rate is appropriate for other brokered deposits maturing within 
the 30 calendar-day period because under stress, there is a greater 
probability that counterparties will not renew and that covered 
companies will not be able to renew brokered deposits due to associated 
regulatory restrictions. Therefore, the agencies believe covered 
companies should not rely on the renewal or rollover of such funding as 
a source of liquidity during a stress period. Accordingly, other than 
the changes for non-maturity brokered deposits in transactional 
accounts discussed above, the agencies are adopting this provision of 
the rule as proposed. The agencies are clarifying that, under the final 
rule, all retail brokered deposits, regardless of contractual 
provisions for withdrawal, are subject to the outflow rates provided in 
the proposed rule, including the 10 percent outflow rate for brokered 
deposits maturing more than 30 calendar-days after the calculation 
date.
    In addition, several commenters suggested that the 10 percent 
outflow rate for other brokered deposits maturing outside the 30 
calendar-day period was unnecessarily conservative, and urged the 
agencies to recognize the contractual terms in retail brokered deposit 
agreements that restrict early withdrawal. Several commenters requested 
clarification regarding the treatment of retail brokered deposits that 
allow for early withdrawal upon the payment of a financial penalty, 
such as a certain amount of accrued interest. A commenter requested 
that the agencies provide a rationale for diverging from the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework, which applies a zero percent outflow rate 
to deposits that have a stated contractual maturity date longer than 30 
days. Although many agreements for brokered deposits with contractual 
maturity provide for limited contractual withdrawal rights, as with 
non-brokered term retail deposits, the agencies believe that covered 
companies may agree to waive such contractual maturity dates for retail 
deposits. The agencies believe a brokered deposit should not obtain 
more favorable treatment than a non-brokered deposit because the 
relationship between the brokered deposit customer and the covered 
company is not as strong as the relationship between a direct retail 
customer and the covered company, as a brokered deposit interposes a 
third party. Accordingly, the agencies are adopting this provision of 
the rule as proposed.
(c). Brokered Sweep Deposits
    Brokered sweep deposits involve securities firms or investment 
companies that ``sweep'' or transfer idle customer funds into deposit 
accounts at one or more depository institutions. Under the proposed 
rule, such deposits would have been defined as those that are held at 
the covered company by a customer or counterparty through a contractual 
feature that automatically transfers funds to the covered company from 
another regulated financial company at the close of each business day. 
The definition of ``brokered sweep deposit'' under the proposed rule 
would have covered all deposits under such arrangements, regardless of 
whether the deposit qualified as a brokered deposit under the FDI Act.
    The proposed rule would have assigned these deposits progressively 
higher outflow rates depending on deposit insurance coverage and the 
affiliation between the bank and the broker sweeping the deposits. 
Under the proposed rule, brokered sweep deposits that are entirely 
covered by deposit insurance, and that are deposited in accordance with 
a contract between a retail customer or counterparty and a covered 
company, a covered company's consolidated subsidiary, or a company that 
is a consolidated subsidiary of the same top-tier company (affiliated 
brokered sweep deposits), would have been assigned a 10 percent outflow 
rate. Brokered sweep deposits that are entirely covered by deposit 
insurance but that do not originate with a covered company, a covered 
company's consolidated subsidiary, or a company that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of the same top-tier company of a covered company 
(unaffiliated brokered sweep deposits), would have been assigned a 25 
percent outflow rate. All brokered sweep deposits that are not entirely 
covered by deposit insurance, regardless of the affiliation between the 
bank and the broker, would have been assigned a 40 percent outflow rate 
because they have been observed to be more volatile during stressful 
periods, as customers seek alternative investment vehicles or use those 
funds for other purposes. The agencies received a number of comments on 
the outflow rates for brokered sweep deposits. However, for the reasons 
discussed below and in the proposal, other than changing the level of 
affiliation required for the 10 percent affiliated brokered sweep 
deposit outflow rate to apply, the agencies are adopting in the final 
rule the proposed rule's treatment of brokered sweep deposits with 
respect to outflow amounts.
    Several commenters maintained that the outflow rates applied to 
fully-insured brokered deposits (10 percent for reciprocal and 
affiliated brokered sweep deposits, and 25 percent for non-affiliated 
brokered sweep deposits) should be lowered to be more consistent with 
the fully insured rate of 3 percent to unsecured stable retail 
deposits. Similarly, commenters asserted that the outflow rates 
applicable to partially insured brokered deposits (25 percent for 
reciprocal brokered deposits and 40 percent for brokered sweep 
deposits) were too high and should be lowered to be more closely 
aligned with the corresponding outflow rate for less-stable unsecured 
retail deposits (10 percent). The agencies believe that the outflow 
rates for brokered sweep deposits as set forth in the proposed rule are 
appropriate in light of the additional liquidity risk arising as a 
result of deposit intermediation. In addition, in contrast to retail 
deposit accounts which are typically composed of funds used by the 
depositor for transactional purposes (for example, checking accounts), 
brokered sweep accounts are composed of deposits that are used for the 
purchase or sale of securities. During a period of significant market 
volatility and distress, customers may be more likely to purchase or 
sell securities and withdraw funds from such accounts. Moreover, the 
agencies believe that customers would be more likely to withdraw funds 
from their ancillary accounts, such as the brokered sweep accounts, 
prior to depleting resources in accounts used for day-to-day 
transactions. Accordingly, the

[[Page 61493]]

agencies are adopting in the final rule the relevant outflow rates as 
proposed.
    Several commenters requested that the agencies not distinguish 
between affiliate and non-affiliate relationships in applying outflow 
rates to brokered sweep deposits. In particular, commenters argued that 
unaffiliated sweep arrangements operated by a program operator, where 
the customer controls the selection of the banking organizations in 
which deposits may be placed, have far lower outflow rates due to the 
limited intermediation of the program operator. According to these 
commenters, the program operator is required to place deposits in 
accordance with levels set forth in the contractual agreements with the 
banking organizations and broker-dealers, and in many cases, is 
required to reduce overall volatility in the deposits to amounts below 
the outflow rates in the proposed rule. Commenters requested a lower 
outflow rate for unaffiliated brokered sweep deposits that are subject 
to a contractual non-volatility requirement or a contractual 
arrangement that obligates a deposit broker to maintain a minimum 
amount with the depository institution. In addition, these commenters 
requested that the agencies recognize the impact of a depository 
institution's contracts with broker-dealers and treat outflows more 
favorably if that depository institution would contractually receive 
funds ahead of other institutions. One commenter requested that the 
agencies require that affiliated brokered sweep deposits be subject to 
agreements providing for substantial termination and withdrawal 
penalties to minimize accelerated client-driven withdrawal. Finally, 
one commenter stated that data from its own proprietary program shows 
that fully insured, unaffiliated brokered sweep deposits and fully 
insured, reciprocal brokered deposits are stickier than would be 
implied by the outflow rates assigned in the proposed rule. The 
commenter argued that customers could be deprived access to these 
insured sweep deposit programs if banking organizations reduce or 
eliminate their use of these deposits as a funding source because of 
application of a higher outflow rate to them. The commenter further 
stated that a substantial portion of these funds, which currently flow 
to these banking organizations, would be diverted to money market 
mutual funds or other investments outside the banking system were they 
subject to a higher outflow rate.
    The agencies believe that affiliated brokered sweep deposits are 
more reflective of an overall relationship with the underlying retail 
customer, while non-affiliated sweep deposits are more reflective of a 
relationship associated with wholesale operational deposits. Affiliated 
brokered sweep deposits generally exhibit a stability profile 
associated with retail customers, because the affiliated sweep 
providers generally have established relationships with the retail 
customer that in many circumstances include multiple products with both 
the covered company and the affiliated broker-dealer. Affiliated 
brokered sweep deposit relationships are usually developed over time. 
Additionally, the agencies believe that because such deposits are swept 
by an affiliated company, the affiliated company would be incented to 
minimize harm to any affiliated depository institution.
    In contrast, depository institutions in unaffiliated brokered sweep 
deposit programs have relationships only with a third-party 
intermediary, rather than with retail customers. Balances in an 
unaffiliated brokered sweep accounts are purchased and can fluctuate 
significantly depending on the type of contractual relationship the 
banking organization has with the unaffiliated broker. Additionally, 
the introduction of the third-party intermediary adds volatility to the 
deposit relationship in times of stress, as it is possible the third-
party intermediary will move entire balances away from the bank. With 
respect to contractual requirements for the amount to be swept, 
although such requirements may add additional stability during normal 
market conditions, the agencies believe that during a period of 
significant market distress and volatility, deposit brokers may be 
unable to abide by such commitments as market transaction volumes rise.
    One commenter requested clarification regarding the treatment of 
the agreement between the bank and a deposit broker relating to minimum 
balances over a period longer than 30 days, and whether such agreements 
cause brokered sweep deposits to be treated as deposits maturing 
greater than 30 days because of the aggregate balance requirement. The 
agencies are clarifying that such provisions do not alter the 
contractual maturity of the underlying deposit, which are typically 
non-maturity or overnight deposits, and do not cause such deposits to 
become deposits that mature more than 30 calendar days from a 
calculation date. Accordingly, other than the change to the level of 
affiliation required under the affiliated sweep deposit outflow rate, 
discussed below, the agencies are adopting this provision of the final 
rule as proposed.
(d). Reciprocal Brokered Deposits
    The proposed rule would have applied a 10 percent outflow rate to 
all reciprocal brokered deposits at a covered company that are entirely 
covered by deposit insurance. Any reciprocal brokered deposits not 
entirely covered by deposit insurance received an outflow rate of 25 
percent. A reciprocal brokered deposit was defined in the proposed rule 
as a brokered deposit that a covered company receives through a deposit 
placement network on a reciprocal basis such that for any deposit 
received, the covered company (as agent for the depositor) places the 
same amount with other depository institutions through the network and 
each member of the network sets the interest rate to be paid on the 
entire amount of funds it places with other network members. Reciprocal 
brokered deposits generally have been observed to be more stable than 
certain other brokered deposits because each institution within the 
deposit placement network typically has an established relationship 
with the retail customer or counterparty that is making the initial 
over-the-insurance-limit deposit that necessitates distributing the 
deposit through the network.
    Several commenters contended that the outflow rate applied to 
fully-insured reciprocal deposits (10 percent) should be lowered to be 
more consistent with the fully insured rate of 3 percent to unsecured 
stable retail deposits, and that the rate for partially insured 
reciprocal deposits (25 percent) should be lowered to more closely 
align with the outflow rate for less-stable unsecured retail deposits 
(10 percent). The agencies continue to believe that reciprocal 
deposits, like other brokered deposits, present elevated liquidity 
risks. During periods of material financial distress or an 
idiosyncratic event involving a particular institution, depositors or 
program operators may terminate their relationships with a banking 
organization, resulting in a significant loss of funding. Accordingly, 
the agencies have adopted in the final rule the proposed definition and 
outflow rates for reciprocal brokered deposits.
(e). Empirical Data
    Several commenters requested that the agencies provide data or an 
empirical analysis to support the proposed outflow rates for reciprocal 
and other brokered deposits. Many commenters concurred with the FDIC 
Brokered Deposit Study's conclusion that comprehensive, industry-wide 
data for different types of brokered deposits

[[Page 61494]]

is not available. As one commenter noted, while banking organizations 
are required to report their total brokered deposits on the 
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call Report), there is no 
breakdown by type of deposit account, specific maturity of CDs, or 
interest rates. Thus, the commenter stated that banking organizations 
currently do not report the information necessary for a comprehensive 
examination of the brokered deposit market and its component parts. 
Some commenters submitted data to show that the proposed brokered 
deposit outflow rates were too conservative.
    The agencies believe a conservative approach to setting brokered 
deposit outflow rates for the purposes of the LCR is appropriate in 
light of limited available data, the findings of the FDIC Brokered 
Deposit Study showing that increased reliance on brokered deposit rates 
is correlated with higher overall risk, and the strong incentives 
third-party brokers have to provide the highest possible returns for 
their clients by seeking accounts paying the highest interest rates. 
Moreover, the agencies believe the assumptions and provisions of Sec.  
_--.32(g) are consistent with the available sources of information, 
including the FDIC Brokered Deposit Study, guidelines provided in the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, and supervisory information 
reviewed by the agencies. Based on the information available to the 
agencies, the agencies continue to believe that brokered deposits 
represent a more volatile source of funding than typical retail 
deposits, thus warranting the outflow rates that were proposed.
(f). Other Comments
    One commenter suggested that the agencies allow covered companies 
to use internal models to determine outflow rates instead of using the 
proposed rule's standardized outflow rates. While the internal stress-
testing requirements of certain covered companies under the Board's 
Regulation YY \69\ permit firms to use internally-developed models for 
liquidity stress testing, the LCR is a standardized metric that 
provides for comparability across all institutions subject to the rule. 
Accordingly, the agencies are not adopting provisions in the final rule 
that would allow covered companies to determine outflow rates using 
their internal models as an alternative to the standardized outflow 
rates outlined in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See 12 CFR part 252.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Definitions and Key Terms
    In connection with the treatment of brokered deposits, several 
commenters requested that key definitions and terms in the proposed 
rule be modified or updated to reflect a number of key characteristics. 
Specifically, commenters requested that the agencies modify the 
definitions of brokered deposit and consolidated subsidiary and 
requested that the agencies clarify the meaning of fully insured 
deposits, pass-through insurance, penalties for withdrawal, and a 
number of other terms.
(a). Definition of Brokered Deposit
    A commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule incorporated 
the definition of brokered deposit from the FDI Act and the FDIC's 
regulations, which the commenter stated were developed many years ago 
for a different purpose and at a time when views of liquidity risks 
were different. Another commenter requested clarification whether the 
Board and the OCC would be interpreting the FDI Act's brokered deposit 
definitions for purposes of the LCR and whether the FDIC's prior 
interpretations remained binding. Two commenters stated that the FDI 
Act's definition of brokered deposit and the FDIC's interpretations 
would cover arrangements that would generally be considered retail 
stable deposits such as deposits placed by employees of affiliates of a 
bank. Finally, one commenter requested additional clarity regarding 
what type of deposits (those from affinity groups, affiliates or third 
parties) would count as other brokered deposits for purposes of Sec.  
_--.32(g)(1) and Sec.  _--.32(g)(2) of the proposed rule.
    The definition of brokered deposit is adopted as proposed because 
it continues to sufficiently capture the types of funding with 
increased liquidity risk that the LCR is designed to capture, including 
deposits provided by: (a) Persons engaged in the business of placing 
deposits, or facilitating the placement of deposits, of third parties 
with insured depository institutions or the business of placing 
deposits with insured depository institutions for the purpose of 
selling interests in those deposits to third parties; and (b) an agent 
or trustee who establishes a deposit account to facilitate a business 
arrangement with an insured depository institution to use the proceeds 
of the account to fund a prearranged loan. As noted by a commenter, 
this would include the placement or facilitation of the placement of 
deposits by an employee of an affiliate of a bank. The agencies believe 
that such intermediation by nonbank employees, like intermediation by 
third-parties, could result in greater liquidity risks.
    In response to the comment about what types of transactions would 
be captured under Sec.  _--.32(g)(1) and Sec.  _--.32(g)(2) of the 
proposed rule, the agencies are clarifying that these provisions 
include all brokered deposits that are not reciprocal brokered 
deposits, brokered sweep deposits, or, under the new provision included 
in the final rule as discussed above, non-maturity brokered deposits 
that are in transaction accounts, which would include transactional 
accounts with no maturity date that are placed through certain 
marketers, affinity groups, and Internet deposit broker entities.
    Finally, the agencies are clarifying that the FDIC's longstanding 
guidance and interpretations will remain in effect. The FDIC will 
remain the Federal banking agency primarily responsible for matters of 
interpretation relating to section 29(g) of the FDI Act, and will 
continue to work closely with the Board and OCC to ensure consistent 
application of the LCR to covered companies.
(b). Definition of ``Consolidated Subsidiary''
    One commenter requested that the agencies change the definition of 
``consolidated subsidiary'' for purposes of the affiliated brokered 
sweep deposit outflow rate so that subsidiaries that are controlled 
under the BHC Act or affiliates that are under common control under the 
BHC Act are subject to the lower outflow rate rather than solely 
subsidiaries and affiliates that are consolidated under GAAP. This 
commenter argued that the BHC Act affiliate relationship is well 
recognized in the U.S. bank regulatory scheme, notably Federal Reserve 
Act sections 23A and 23B, as implemented by the Board's Regulation W, 
and further noted that the commenter had structured its brokered sweep 
deposit arrangement with its affiliate to comply with these regulatory 
restrictions.
    The agencies have concluded that it would be consistent with the 
purposes of the LCR to extend the scope of affiliated brokered sweep 
arrangements under the final rule to include relationships between 
affiliates that are ``controlled'' under the BHC Act. Such affiliates 
would be subject to all the requirements of the BHC Act, sections 23A 
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, and the Board's Regulation W, and 
thus such deposits are indistinguishable from those where the 
subsidiary or affiliated is consolidated. Accordingly, the agencies 
have modified the provision of

[[Page 61495]]

the rule relating to affiliated sweep arrangements such that any fully 
insured brokered sweep deposits that are deposited in accordance with a 
contract between the retail customer or counterparty and the bank, a 
controlled subsidiary of the bank, or a company that is a controlled 
subsidiary of the same top-tier company of which the bank is a 
controlled subsidiary are subject to a 10 percent outflow rate, while 
brokered sweep deposits not subject to such an agreement are subject to 
a 25 percent outflow rate.
(c). ``Fully Covered by Insurance''
    One commenter raised the concern that it would be difficult to 
distinguish between fully insured and partially insured or uninsured 
deposits because, in the case of brokered sweep deposits, the covered 
company would not necessarily know the identity of the depositor and 
because recordkeeping would be done by the deposit provider and would 
be provided to the covered company only in the event of a bank failure. 
Another commenter requested that the agencies assess the cost for 
determining whether deposits are fully insured, particularly those 
deposits that receive pass-through insurance, and requested that the 
agencies clarify the level of certainty a covered company is required 
to have prior have in determining whether a deposit is below the 
deposit insurance threshold.
    The agencies believe that a covered company should be able to 
identify the applicable treatment for all of its deposits under the 
proposed rule by obtaining the applicable information through the 
deposit provider, irrespective of a bank failure. The agencies note 
that banking organizations are expected to have adequate policies and 
procedures in place for determining whether deposits are above the 
applicable FDIC-insurance limits. Therefore, the agencies are adopting 
this provision as proposed.
(d). Pass-Through Insurance
    Commenters raised the issue of the proposed rule's treatment of 
brokered deposits that are held in custody for a depositor by a conduit 
financial entity, such as a trust corporation, where the depositor, but 
not the custodial entity, is eligible for deposit insurance on a pass-
through basis. Commenters noted that the proposed rule only looks to 
the identity of the custodial entity, but ignores the pass-through 
insurance to which such deposit accounts are subject. These commenters 
asserted that such brokered deposits should be treated as fully-insured 
retail deposits under the LCR.
    The agencies are clarifying that the final rule does not alter the 
treatment of pass-through insurance for deposits, such that deposits 
owned by a principal or principals and deposited into one or more 
deposit accounts in the name of an agent, custodian or nominee, shall 
be insured to the same extent as if deposited in the name of the 
principal(s) if certain requirements are satisfied.\70\ Under FDIC 
regulations, to qualify for pass-through insurance, the account records 
of a covered company must disclose the agency relationship among the 
parties. Second, the identities and interests of the actual owners must 
be ascertainable either from the account records of the covered company 
or records maintained by the agent or other party. Third, the agency or 
custodial relationship must be genuine.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ 12 CFR 330.7.
    \71\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to brokered deposits held by a fiduciary or an agent 
on behalf of a retail customer or counterparty, the agencies are 
clarifying that under the final rule, such deposits would be subject, 
as applicable, to the outflow rate of non-maturity brokered deposits in 
a transactional account, reciprocal deposits, brokered sweep deposits, 
or any other type of brokered deposits.
    With respect to deposits that are held by a fiduciary, but do not 
qualify as brokered deposits under certain exceptions to the FDIC's 
brokered deposit regulations, the agencies have added Sec.  
_--.32(a)(3) and Sec.  _--.32(a)(4) to reflect that a trustee or 
similar third party may deposit funds at a covered company as trustee 
for the benefit of retail customers or counterparties. These provisions 
complement the newly added provisions for non-maturity brokered 
deposits in a transactional account. In those cases, where the criteria 
of Sec.  _--.32(a)(3) and Sec.  _--.32(a)(4) are satisfied, a covered 
company may look through to the retail customer or counterparty and 
apply the 20 percent outflow rate to deposits that are fully covered by 
deposit insurance and the 40 percent outflow rate where less than the 
entire amount of the deposit is covered by deposit insurance.
(e). Penalties Versus Contractual Restrictions for Withdrawal
    Similar to the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, commenters 
requested that the agencies differentiate between brokered deposits 
that are subject to withdrawal penalties (such as the loss of accrued 
interest), and those brokered deposits where no contractual right 
exists to withdraw the deposit or such rights are strictly limited.
    As noted above, the agencies have clarified for purposes of the 
final rule that deposits that can only be withdrawn in the event of 
death or incompetence are assumed to mature on the applicable maturity 
date, and deposits that can be withdrawn following notice or the 
forfeiture of interest are subject to the rule's assumptions for non-
maturity transactions. The agencies decline to treat the assessment of 
deposit penalties the same as contractual prohibitions to withdrawal, 
but for the occurrence of a remote contingency, because the assessment 
of the liquidity characteristics of such fees, and whether they deter 
withdrawal, would be difficult to undertake and could have unintended 
consequences for retail customers. Additionally, while typical 
agreements for brokered deposits that mature in more than 30 calendar 
days provide for more limited contractual withdrawal rights, the 
agencies decline to provide more favorable treatment for these deposits 
relative to similar retail deposits. Therefore, the agencies are 
adopting this provision of the rule as proposed.
(f). Additional Brokered Deposit Categories
    One commenter requested that the agencies establish categories for 
additional types of brokered deposits, namely brokered checking 
accounts, brokered savings accounts, and deposits referred by affinity 
groups, affiliates, or third party marketers.
    The agencies did not attempt to specifically identify every type of 
retail brokered deposit in the proposed rule. As discussed above, the 
agencies have included an additional category of outflows for non-
maturity brokered deposits in transactional accounts. The agencies 
believe that all other types of brokered deposits are appropriately 
captured in Sec.  _--.32(g)(1) of the final rule.
iii. Deposit Market Consequences
    Several commenters asserted that the proposed requirements of Sec.  
_--.32(g) could adversely impact the brokered deposit markets, preclude 
covered companies from obtaining key sources of funding, affect 
investor perceptions about the risks of brokered deposits, and allocate 
funds away from the banking system as a result of elevated brokered 
deposit outflow rates, among other unintended consequences. One 
commenter suggested that the proposed rule would harm retail investing 
by broker-dealer clients, who would be

[[Page 61496]]

faced with elevated costs without any additional consumer protection 
benefit, and requested that the final rule exempt depository 
institution holding companies with substantial retail brokerage 
activities. Another commenter suggested that the proposed treatment for 
reciprocal deposits could impact community banks not subject to the LCR 
by distorting the market standards and pricing for these types of 
deposits. One commenter suggested that the proposal's treatment of 
brokered sweep deposits would cause the cost of such products to 
increase, leading investors to seek products outside of the banking 
sector, such as money market mutual funds, at a greater cost to 
financial stability. Another commenter suggested that applying the 
existing definition of brokered deposit in FDIC regulations would have 
unintended consequences, such as having employees who are primarily 
compensated by commissions versus salary being considered deposit 
brokers. One commenter stated that the FDI Act's treatment of brokered 
deposits at well-capitalized institutions, which allows for those 
institutions to accept brokered deposits without limit, warrants the 
same outflow rate as applicable to stable retail deposits. The 
commenter stated that the proposed rule appears to stigmatize brokered 
deposits and requested that the FDIC clarify its liquidity guidance. 
One commenter argued that the uniqueness of deposit insurance (for 
example, the relatively high insurance coverage, pass-through 
insurance, quick and orderly resolution of failed banks) should result 
in lower outflow rates for insured brokered deposits. This commenter 
stated that brokered deposits qualifying for full pass-through 
insurance should be subject to the same outflow rate as fully insured 
stable retail deposits. Finally, one commenter stated that the 
distinction between affiliated and unaffiliated brokered sweep deposits 
would create an unfair disadvantage for small broker-dealers and 
commercial banks without affiliated broker-dealers, which will face 
relatively higher pricing to place their swept deposits.
    Despite the changes that the retail brokered deposit market will 
likely need to undertake in response to the application of the LCR, the 
agencies believe that the provisions and assumptions underlying Sec.  
_--.32(g) of the proposed rule are consistent with the potential risks 
posed by retail brokered deposits.\72\ As noted above, the agencies 
continue to believe that brokered deposits have the potential to 
exhibit volatility, are more easily moved from one institution to 
another, and can be risky to rely upon as a source of liquidity on 
account of regulatory limitations. In sum, the agencies believe that 
the standard set forth in Sec.  _--.32(g) will serve to strengthen the 
overall financial system as well as the retail brokered deposit market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ 78 FR 71840.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

h. Unsecured Wholesale Funding Outflow Amount
    The proposed rule included three general categories of unsecured 
wholesale funding: (i) Unsecured wholesale funding transactions; (ii) 
operational deposits; and (iii) other unsecured wholesale funding which 
would, among other things, encompass funding from a financial company. 
The proposed rule defined each of these categories of funding 
instruments as being unsecured under applicable law by a lien on 
specifically designated assets. Under the proposed rule, unsecured 
wholesale funding instruments typically would have included: Wholesale 
deposits; \73\ federal funds purchased; unsecured advances from a 
public sector entity, sovereign entity, or U.S. GSE; unsecured notes; 
bonds, or other unsecured debt securities issued by a covered company 
(unless sold exclusively in retail markets to retail customers or 
counterparties), brokered deposits from non-retail customers, and any 
other transactions where an on-balance sheet unsecured credit 
obligation has been contracted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Certain small business deposits are included within 
unsecured retail funding. See section II.C.3.a. supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Non-Financial Wholesale Counterparties and Financial Sector Entities
    The agencies proposed to assign three separate outflow rates to 
non-operational unsecured wholesale funding, reflecting the stability 
of these obligations based on deposit insurance and the nature of the 
counterparty. Under the proposed rule, unsecured wholesale funding 
provided by an entity that is not a financial sector entity generally 
would have been subject to an outflow rate of 20 percent where the 
entire amount is covered by deposit insurance. Deposits that are less 
than fully covered by deposit insurance, or where the funding is a 
brokered deposit from a non-retail customer, would have been assigned a 
40 percent outflow rate. However, the proposed rule would have required 
all unsecured wholesale funding provided by financial sector entities, 
including funding provided by a consolidated subsidiary or affiliate of 
the covered company, be subject to an outflow rate of 100 percent. This 
higher outflow rate is associated with the elevated refinancing or 
roll-over risk in a stressed situation and the agencies' concerns 
regarding the interconnectedness of financial institutions.
    Two commenters suggested that wholesale reciprocal brokered 
deposits are as stable as retail reciprocal brokered deposits, and 
should be subject to the same outflow rates. These commenters stated 
that the impact of insurance coverage should be reflected in the case 
of wholesale brokered deposits (including wholesale reciprocal 
deposits) by assigning such deposits the same outflow rates that apply 
to non-brokered deposits; that is, 20 percent if fully-insured and 40 
percent if not fully-insured.
    One commenter argued that the proposed rule defines the term 
wholesale deposits broadly and improperly categorizes deposits placed 
by pension funds on behalf of a retail counterparty as wholesale 
deposits placed by a financial sector entity. The commenter argued that 
under FDIC regulations, deposit accounts held by employee benefit plans 
are insured on a pass-through basis to the benefit of plan 
beneficiaries and in many plans, a beneficiary can direct the 
investment of the funds, which merits retail treatment for such funds 
rather than wholesale treatment.
    In addition, several commenters disagreed with the agencies' 
proposed outflow rate for unsecured wholesale funding provided by 
financial sector entities. One commenter recognized the agencies' 
concern regarding the interconnectivity of financial institutions, but 
cautioned against potential increased costs for correspondent banking 
and other services and for holding financial institution deposits for 
banks required to comply with the LCR. A commenter argued that the 
proposed rule's 100 percent outflow rate for wholesale deposits by 
financial sector entities effectively eliminates any incentive for a 
banking organization to take such deposits and that they would 
therefore cease doing so. The commenter further argued that this would 
severely disrupt the availability of correspondent deposit options for 
depository institutions. Another commenter suggested the agencies 
reconsider the 100 percent outflow rate that would apply to 
correspondent banking deposits in excess of amounts required for 
operational services, suggesting that the 40 percent outflow rate 
applicable to non-financial unsecured wholesale

[[Page 61497]]

corporate deposits would be more appropriate. Another commenter 
suggested treating correspondent banking relationships as operational 
and argued that assigning a 25 percent outflow rate to such deposits 
would help support the provision of correspondent banking services to 
client banks, thereby ensuring the ability of client banks to continue 
to service the cash management needs of organizations that drive the 
real economy. The commenter asked that the agencies take an activity-
based approach to the classification of correspondent banking outflows, 
such that outflows generated by correspondent transactions with 
underlying commercial operations relating to banks and their customers 
would be classified as operational because they behave in a similar 
fashion to those of corporate operational relationship accounts. One 
commenter requested that all corporate trust deposits receive a 25 
percent outflow rate regardless of whether the deposit qualified as an 
operational deposit.
    Another commenter requested that the agencies re-examine the 
treatment of funding provided by a subsidiary of a covered company and: 
(i) Not treat as an outflow funding provided by a subsidiary of the 
covered company; (ii) not treat as an inflow amounts owed to the 
covered company by a subsidiary; and (iii) not treat as an outflow or 
an inflow funding provided by one consolidated subsidiary of the 
covered company to another consolidated subsidiary.
    For the reasons discussed in the proposal, the agencies continue to 
believe the proposed outflow rates assigned to unsecured wholesale 
funding are appropriate. As evidenced in the recent financial crisis, 
funding from wholesale counterparties, which are generally more 
sophisticated than retail counterparties, presents far greater 
liquidity risk to covered companies during a stress period. With 
respect to wholesale brokered deposits (including wholesale reciprocal 
brokered deposits), the agencies continue to believe that the 40 
percent outflow rate for all such deposits (regardless of insurance) is 
appropriate given the intermediation or matchmaking by the deposit 
broker. The 100 percent outflow rate applicable to other unsecured 
wholesale funding provided by financial sector entities mirrors the 
treatment for unsecured wholesale cash inflows contractually payable to 
the covered company from financial sector entities. The agencies note, 
however, that Sec.  _--.32(a)(3) and Sec.  _--.32(a)(4) have been added 
to the final rule to address the commenter's concern regarding pension 
fund deposits where the beneficiary can direct the investment of the 
funds. Such non-brokered deposits placed by a third party on behalf of 
a retail customer or counterparty may be treated as retail funding, as 
discussed above. In addition, as discussed above, to the extent such 
deposits placed by a pension fund meet the definition of retail 
brokered deposit, such deposits would be eligible for the retail 
brokered deposit outflow rates under Sec.  _--.32(g) of the final rule.
    With respect to funding provided by an affiliate of a covered 
company, to address commenters' concerns, the agencies are clarifying 
in the final rule that the 100 percent outflow rate for unsecured 
wholesale funding applies only to funding from a company that is a 
consolidated subsidiary of the same top-tier company of which the 
covered company is a consolidated subsidiary. This outflow rate does 
not apply to funding from a consolidated subsidiary of the covered 
company, which is entirely excluded from the LCR calculation in the 
final rule under Sec.  _--.32(m), as discussed below. The agencies also 
have added paragraph (h)(2)(ii) to the final rule to clarify that debt 
instruments issued by a covered company that mature within a 30 
calendar-day period, whether owned by a wholesale or retail customer or 
counterparty, will receive a 100 percent outflow rate.
    The final rule is adopting the 100 percent outflow rate for 
unsecured wholesale funding provided by financial sector entities as 
proposed. The agencies continue to believe that the liquidity risk 
profile of financial sector entities are significantly different from 
that of traditional corporate entities. Based on the agencies' 
supervisory experience, during a period of material financial distress, 
financial sector entities tend to withdraw large amounts of funding 
from the financial system to meet their obligations. The agencies 
believe the outflow rates properly reflect the liquidity risk present 
in the types of products offered to financial sector entities. The 
agencies also are adopting in the final rule the 20 percent and 40 
percent outflow rates for non-financial sector unsecured wholesale 
funding, as proposed.
ii. Operational Services and Operational Deposit
    The proposed rule would have recognized that some covered companies 
provide services, such as those related to clearing, custody, and cash 
management, that increase the likelihood that their customers will 
maintain certain deposit balances with the covered company. These 
services would have been defined in the proposed rule as operational 
services and a deposit required for each of their provision was termed 
an operational deposit. The proposed rule would have applied a 5 
percent outflow rate to an operational deposit fully covered by deposit 
insurance (other than an escrow deposit) and a 25 percent outflow rate 
to an operational deposit not fully covered by deposit insurance.
    The agencies received a number of comments regarding: (1) The 
proposed rule's definition of operational deposit and operational 
services; (2) the operational criteria required to be met for a covered 
company to treat a particular deposit as an operational deposit; and 
(3) the proposed rule's outflow rates for operational deposits. In 
response to the comments received, the agencies have made certain 
modifications to these requirements, as discussed below.
    Although many commenters appreciated the agencies' recognition of 
the provision of key services by many covered companies in the form of 
lower outflow rates for operational deposits, two commenters suggested 
that a model that segregates operational deposits from other deposits 
is inconsistent with how covered companies and their customers 
structure their banking operations. One commenter suggested that 
application of this model could lead to unnecessary confusion and could 
push excess depository balances into shadow banking. Another commenter 
argued that the proposed rule's broad definition of operational deposit 
could result in a lack of consistent application among covered 
companies, as they would reflect their own clients and product mixes in 
applying the definition. One commenter called for a simplified 
definition that could be applied uniformly across the industry, stating 
that it would be preferable to have a slightly higher outflow rate in 
exchange for such simplicity.
    For the reasons discussed in the proposal and below, the agencies 
continue to believe that the underlying structure of the proposal's 
approach to defining an operational deposit, which is consistent with 
the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, is appropriate. As noted by 
commenters, many customers place deposits with covered companies as a 
result of their provision of key services, such as payroll processing 
and cash management. Because such deposits are tied to the provision of 
specific services to the customer, these deposits present less 
liquidity risk during a stress period. The agencies

[[Page 61498]]

have made some changes to the definition of operational deposit, but 
have retained the definition's structure as proposed because it 
unambiguously aligns a particular operational deposit with an 
operational service, thereby providing a standardized method for 
identifying operational deposits. Accordingly, the agencies are 
adopting in the final rule the structure for defining operational 
deposit as proposed with the modifications discussed below.
(a). Definition of ``Operational Deposit''
    The proposed rule would have defined an operational deposit as 
unsecured wholesale funding that is required to be in place for a 
covered company to provide operational services as an independent 
third-party intermediary to the wholesale customer or counterparty 
providing the unsecured wholesale funding.
    Many commenters indicated that an operational deposit should be one 
that is ``necessary'' rather than ``required'' for the banking 
organization to provide in light of the operational services enumerated 
in the proposed rule, which would better align with industry practice. 
The commenters stated that using ``necessary'' would make clear that 
such deposits are functionally necessary as opposed to contractually 
required. Commenters also requested that the agencies recognize that 
certain operational services may be provided by a covered company not 
only as an independent third-party intermediary, but also as an agent 
or administrator. Finally, several commenters requested that certain 
collateralized deposits that otherwise meet the eligibility criteria 
for treatment as an operational deposit, such as preferred public 
sector deposits or corporate trust deposits, be subject to the outflow 
rates applicable to operational deposits.
    In response to commenters' concerns, the agencies have revised the 
definition of operational deposit to state that the deposit is 
``necessary'' for the provision of operational services rather than 
``required.'' The term ``required'' implied that the deposit was a 
contractual requirement as opposed to incidental to the provision of 
the operational services, and may have inadvertently limited the 
definition's application. The agencies also have added ``agent'' and 
``administrator'' as capacities in which a covered company may provide 
operational services that give rise to a need for an operational 
deposit, as there are circumstances, such as the provision of custody 
services, where a covered company acts as an agent or administrator, 
rather than merely as an independent third-party intermediary. Finally, 
the agencies have clarified in the final rule that secured funding 
transactions that are collateralized deposits, as defined under the 
final rule, are eligible for the operational deposit outflow rates if 
the deposits otherwise meet the final rule's criteria. However, as 
discussed in section II.C.3.j. below, such deposits would still be 
considered secured funding transactions and could be subject to lower 
outflow rates if the deposits are secured by level 1 liquid assets or 
level 2A liquid assets.
(b). Definition of ``Operational Services''
    The proposed rule would have included eleven categories of 
operational services provided by covered companies that would 
correspond to an operational deposit. Consistent with the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework, the operational services would have 
included: (1) Payment remittance; (2) payroll administration and 
control over the disbursement of funds; (3) transmission, 
reconciliation, and confirmation of payment orders; (4) daylight 
overdraft; (5) determination of intra-day and final settlement 
positions; (6) settlement of securities transactions; (7) transfer of 
recurring contractual payments; (8) client subscriptions and 
redemptions; (9) scheduled distribution of client funds; (10) escrow, 
funds transfer, stock transfer, and agency services, including payment 
and settlement services, payment of fees, taxes, and other expenses; 
and (11) collection and aggregation of funds.
    Several commenters argued that the list of operational services 
should be expanded to include trustee services, the administration of 
investment assets, collateral management services, settlement of 
foreign exchange transactions, and corporate trust services. Other 
commenters requested that the agencies specifically include a number of 
operational services that are specific to the business of custody 
banks. One commenter requested that the final rule recognize that a 
covered company may provide these services as a trustee. One commenter 
suggested that the rule define operational services as those normal and 
customary operational services performed by a covered company, and use 
the rule's enumerated services as illustrative examples. Commenters 
also recommended that operational deposits include all deposits 
obtained under correspondent banking relationships. Another commenter 
requested that the final rule better align the criteria for operational 
services with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework to avoid 
excluding a substantial amount of deposits that are truly operational 
in nature.
    After consideration, to address commenters' requests that services 
relating to the business of custody banks be included, the agencies 
have added a new subparagraph 2 to the definition of operational 
services to include the administration of payments and cash flows 
related to the safekeeping of investment assets, not including the 
purchase or sale of assets. This is intended to encompass certain 
collateral management payment processing provided by covered companies. 
Such operational services solely involve the movement of money, and not 
the transfer of collateral, and are limited to cash flows, and not the 
investment, purchase, or sale of assets. Moreover, the agencies wish to 
make clear that this prong of the operational services definition does 
not encompass any activity that would constitute prime brokerage 
services, as any deposit provided in connection with the provision of 
prime brokerage services by a covered company could not be treated as 
an operational deposit, as discussed in more detail below.
    The agencies also have added ``capital distributions'' to the now 
renumbered subparagraph 8 of the operational services definition. This 
addition was necessary to clarify the intention of the agencies to 
include such payments as an operational service along with recurring 
contractual payments when performed as part of cash management, 
clearing, or custody services.
    The agencies believe the final rule appropriately addresses the 
concerns of commenters while also treating as operational services 
those services that are truly operational in nature. Defining 
operational services as the customary operational services performed by 
a covered company, as suggested by one commenter, would have been 
overly broad and could have led to wide variations in the treatment of 
operational services across covered companies. Moreover, it is not 
necessary to add the entire suite of corporate trust services to the 
list of enumerated defined operational services in order to include 
those aspects of such business lines that have the inherent or 
essential qualities of operational services. The existing twelve 
categories of services, when performed as part of cash management, 
clearing, or custody services, will adequately capture those corporate 
trust services that should be captured by the operational service 
definition. With respect to correspondent banking and foreign exchange 
settlement activity, neither of

[[Page 61499]]

those services in isolation enhance the stability of the funding to 
warrant a lower outflow rate; however, to the extent that operational 
services are utilized by customers engaged in those activities, 
associated deposits may be included as operational deposits. With 
respect to the remaining operational services identified in the 
proposed rule, the agencies have adopted the final rule as proposed.
(c). Operational Requirements for Recognition of Operational Deposits
    In addition to stipulating that the deposit be required for the 
provision of operational service by the covered company to the 
customer, the proposed rule would have required that an operational 
deposit meet eight qualifying criteria, each described below. The 
agencies received a number of comments on these operational criteria, 
and have made certain modifications to these criteria in their adoption 
of the final rule.
(d). Deposit Held Pursuant to Agreement and Subject to Termination or 
Switching Costs
    Section _.4(b)(1) of the proposed rule would have required that an 
operational deposit be held pursuant to a legally binding written 
agreement, the termination of which was subject to a minimum 30 
calendar-day notice period or significant termination costs to have 
been borne by the customer providing the deposit if a majority of the 
deposit balance was withdrawn from the operational deposit prior to the 
end of a 30 calendar-day notice period.
    Many commenters stated that operational deposits are typically held 
in demand deposit accounts with no notice or termination restrictions. 
Instead, the associated operational services are provided pursuant to a 
written contract that contains the relevant termination and notice 
provisions. Commenters requested that the final rule require that the 
operational services, not the operational deposits, be subject to a 
legally binding written agreement. In addition, several commenters 
suggested that the agencies recognize, in addition to termination costs 
such as fees or withdrawal penalties, switching costs that would be 
borne by a customer transitioning operational services from one covered 
company to another and could inhibit the transfer of operational 
services to another provider.
    In response to the comments, the agencies have revised Sec.  
_.4(b)(1) of the final rule to require that the operational services, 
rather than the operational deposit, be provided pursuant to a written 
agreement. Additionally, the agencies have revised Sec.  _.4(b)(1) to 
reflect that, in addition to or in lieu of termination costs set forth 
in the written agreement covering the operational services, the final 
rule's criterion would be satisfied if a customer bears significant 
switching costs to obtain operational services from another provider. 
Switching costs include costs external to the contract for operational 
services, such as the significant information technology, 
administrative, and legal service costs that would be incurred in 
connection with the transfer of operational services to a new service 
provider. Switching costs, however, would not include the routine costs 
of moving an account from one financial institution to another, such as 
notifying counterparties of new account numbers or setting up recurring 
transactions. Rather, the favorable treatment for operational deposits 
under the final rule is premised on strong incentives for a customer to 
keep its deposits with the covered company.
(e). Lack of Significant Volatility in Average Deposit Balance
    Section _.4(b)(2) of the proposed rule would have required that an 
operational deposit not have significant volatility in its average 
balance. The agencies proposed this requirement with the intent to 
exclude surges in balances in excess of levels that customers have 
historically held to facilitate operational services.
    Commenters found the proposed requirement in Sec.  _--.4(b)(2) 
confusing. One commenter questioned how the concept of ``average 
balance'' could be reconciled with ``significant volatility,'' as 
averaging would in practice subsume the variability. Several commenters 
observed that an operational deposit account, by definition, would 
experience volatility, as cash flows into and out of such an account 
over the course of a 30 calendar-day period. Commenters expressed 
concern that the ``significant volatility'' language could disqualify 
deposits based on these normal variations in deposit balances. 
Commenters suggested that the agencies' concerns regarding excess funds 
would be better addressed through the provisions of Sec.  _--.4(b)(6), 
and that Sec.  _--.4(b)(2) should be deleted.
    To address these concerns, the agencies have eliminated significant 
volatility as a standalone criterion for qualification as an 
operational deposit in the final rule, but have incorporated 
consideration of volatility into the methodology that a covered company 
must adopt for identifying excess balances, as discussed below. Covered 
companies are still expected to assess whether there are operational 
reasons for any notable shifts in the average balances that occur over 
time.
(f). Deposit Must Be Held in Operational Account
    In Sec.  _--.4(b)(3) of the proposed rule, the agencies proposed 
that an operational deposit be held in an account designated as an 
operational account. Two commenters expressed the view that this 
provision was too restrictive because cash management practices allow 
customers to transfer funds across their entire banking relationship 
between sweep accounts, interest bearing accounts, investment accounts, 
and zero balance accounts. These commenters argued that a customer's 
funds need not be maintained in a transactional account specified as an 
operational account so long as the funds are liquid and available for 
operational use without penalty when needed.
    After consideration of the comments, the agencies have retained the 
requirement in the final rule. The agencies believe this requirement 
allows covered companies to clearly identify the deposits that are 
eligible for operational deposit's lower outflow rate, and to prevent 
the intermingling of operational deposits with other deposits. 
Accordingly, under the final rule, an operational deposit must be held 
in an account designated as an operational account, which can be one or 
more linked accounts. Such an account need not take a specific form, 
but must be designated as an operational account for a specific 
customer so that it can be considered in identifying excess balances 
required under Sec.  _--.4(b)(5) of the final rule and discussed 
further below.
(g). Primary Purpose of Obtaining Operational Services
    Section _--.4(b)(4) of the proposed rule would have required that 
an operational deposit be held by a customer at a covered company for 
the primary purpose of obtaining operational services from the covered 
company. Commenters suggested that the best way to address the 
relationship between the operational deposits and operational services 
would be to disqualify deposit balances that are in excess of amounts 
necessary to perform operational services; that is, through Sec.  
_--.4(b)(6) of the proposed rule. Accordingly, these commenters 
requested the deletion of this requirement from the final rule. 
Alternatively, one commenter suggested that the agencies use the 
language from paragraph 94 of the Basel III Revised

[[Page 61500]]

Liquidity Framework and allow a deposit to be treated only as an 
operational deposit to the extent that the customer depends on the 
covered company to perform the associated operational services.
    After considering the comments, the agencies have adopted this 
requirement of the proposed rule without change. Based on their 
supervisory experience, the agencies understand that covered companies 
already review various characteristics, such as customer type, business 
line, product, and service, when classifying deposits as operational. 
The agencies expect that covered companies would review these same 
characteristics to categorize the primary purpose of the deposit in 
order to satisfy this provision of the rule.
(h). Prohibition of Economic Incentives To Maintain Excess Funds
    Section _.4(b)(5) of the proposed rule would have required that an 
operational deposit account not be designed to incent customers to 
maintain excess funds therein through increased revenue, reduction in 
fees, or other economic incentives. Commenters remarked that a common 
feature of most operational deposit accounts, the earnings credit rate 
(ECR), would seem to violate this criterion and, therefore, disqualify 
many deposits from being treated as operational.\74\ Commenters 
suggested that the ECR increases the strength of the relationship 
between a covered company and a customer, as it encourages the customer 
to continue to obtain operational services from the covered company. 
This, in turn, results in more stable operational deposit levels. 
Several commenters requested that the agencies remove this proposed 
criterion on the grounds that it essentially aims to limit excess 
balances, and this is already addressed in the proposed rule's Sec.  
_.4(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ An ECR is a rate used by certain banking organizations in 
noninterest bearing accounts to reduce the amount of fees a customer 
would be required to pay for bank services. The ECR would be applied 
to the entire balance of the account, and thus, a larger balance 
would provide for a greater reduction in fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies believe this criterion better ensures that a deposit 
is truly necessary for an operational service, and is not the result of 
an ancillary economic incentive. For that reason, the agencies are 
retaining this criterion in the final rule. However, the agencies are 
clarifying that some economic incentives, such as an ECR to offset 
expenses related to operational services, are acceptable, so long as 
they do not incent the maintenance of excess deposits. If an ECR or 
other economic incentive causes a customer to maintain deposit balances 
in excess of the amount necessary to serve the customer's operational 
needs, then those excess balances would not qualify as operational 
deposits.
(i). Exclusion of ``Excess'' Amounts
    Section _.4(b)(6) of the proposed rule would have required that a 
covered company demonstrate that an operational deposit is empirically 
linked to an operational service and that the covered company has a 
methodology for identifying any deposits in excess of the amount 
necessary to provide the operational services, the amount of which 
would be excluded from the operational deposit amount. Commenters 
generally supported this criterion but requested clarification as to 
whether covered companies would be allowed to calculate excess balances 
on an aggregate basis rather than on a deposit-by-deposit or account-
by-account basis. Commenters argued that absent such clarification, 
assessing operational deposits at an unnecessarily granular level would 
be overly burdensome for covered companies and supervisors. One 
commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule would have required 
covered companies to develop models for determining the excess amount 
and requested that the agencies provide clear criteria for determining 
excess deposits. One commenter suggested, however, that allowing each 
banking organization to have its own methodology could lead to 
protracted negotiation with local supervisors and inconsistent 
implementation. Commenters also expressed concerns regarding the 
identification of excess deposits in connection with particular 
operational services, such as cash management and corporate trust 
services and argued that the agencies should exempt such deposits from 
the excess operational deposit methodology.
    The agencies believe it would be inappropriate to give excess 
operational deposit amounts the same favorable treatment as deposits 
that are truly necessary for operational purposes, as doing so could 
lead to regulatory arbitrage or distort the amount of unsecured 
wholesale cash outflows in the LCR calculation. Further, operational 
deposits are afforded a lower outflow rate due to their perceived 
stability arising from the nature of the relationship between a 
customer and covered company and the operational services provided, as 
well as factors, such as the switching costs associated with moving 
such deposits, as discussed above. In contrast, excess deposits are not 
necessary for the provision of operational services and therefore do 
not exhibit these characteristics.
    The agencies are of the view that there is no single methodology 
for identifying excess deposits that will work for every covered 
company, as there is a range of operational deposit products offered 
and covered company data systems processing those products. Aggregation 
may be undertaken on a customer basis, a service basis, or both, but in 
all instances, a covered company's analysis of operational deposits 
must be conducted at a sufficiently granular level to adequately assess 
the risk of withdrawal in an idiosyncratic stress. The agencies expect 
covered companies to be able to provide supporting documentation that 
justifies the assumptions behind any aggregated calculations of excess 
deposits and expect that the higher (that is, the further from the 
individual account or customer) the level of aggregation, the more 
conservative the assumptions related to excess deposit amounts will be. 
A covered company's methodology must also take into account the 
volatility of the average deposit balance to ensure the proper 
identification of excess balances. Moreover, the agencies believe that 
it is inappropriate to exempt deposits received in connection with 
particular operational services from the requirement to identify excess 
balances because all excess balances may exhibit greater volatility 
than those that are necessary for the provision of operational services 
by a covered company. Accordingly, the agencies are adopting this 
provision of the rule as proposed, with a modification to explicitly 
require a covered company to take into account the volatility of the 
average operational deposit balance when designing its methodology for 
identifying excess deposit amounts.
(j). Exclusion of Deposits Relating to Prime Brokerage Services
    Section _.4(b)(7) of the proposed rule would have excluded deposits 
provided in connection with the covered company's provision of prime 
brokerage services from the operational deposit outflow rates.\75\ The 
agencies defined prime brokerage services as the provision of 
operational services to an investment company, non-regulated fund, or 
investment adviser. The agencies defined prime brokerage in this manner 
to cover the primary recipients of prime brokerage services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework at ] 99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters disagreed with the agencies' approach in the 
proposed rule,

[[Page 61501]]

stating that defining prime brokerage services in terms of customer 
type resulted in an operational deposit exclusion that was too broad, 
and several argued that it would likely exclude a broad range of 
operational deposits from custody banks, which provide safekeeping and 
asset administration services to investment companies that are wholly 
unrelated to prime brokerage services, as well as clearly operational 
services such as employee compensation payroll services for a mutual 
fund complex. Several commenters suggested that rather than focus on 
the type of client, the final rule should focus on the specific prime 
brokerage services to be excluded from the definition of operational 
services. One commenter argued that this proposed alternative treatment 
would be beneficial in that, consistent with the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, it would not exclude stable deposits related to 
operational servicing relationships with mutual funds and their foreign 
equivalents. Commenters noted that while many prime brokerage services 
overlap with core operational services such as cash management, 
clearing, or custody, prime brokerage services differ from those 
services in that a prime broker generally facilitates the clearing, 
settling, and carrying of client trades that are executed by an 
executing broker. A second distinguishing feature of prime brokerage 
services identified by these commenters is the provision of financing 
(for example, margin lending) by the prime broker to facilitate the 
investment strategies of the client. According to commenters, these 
financing agreements require the client to authorize the prime broker 
to rehypothecate client assets pledged to secure margin lending, as 
contrasted with investment company assets held by a custodian for safe-
keeping, which by law must be segregated.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-17(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the exclusion of non-regulated funds, one commenter 
requested that the rule be revised to instead apply a higher outflow 
rate to the types of non-regulated funds that are likely to withdraw 
deposits in a period of stress. The commenter further suggested that 
closed-end funds that do not issue redeemable securities be excluded 
from the definition of non-regulated funds, as well as a consolidated 
subsidiary of a non-regulated fund.\77\ Another commenter argued that 
investment companies, such as U.S. mutual funds and their foreign 
equivalents, should not be included in this category because they do 
not use prime brokerage services in their ordinary business operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ With respect to commenters' requests regarding non-
regulated funds, the agencies have addressed these comments in 
section II.B.2.b.iv above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies have concluded that the proposed rule's approach of 
defining prime brokerage services by counterparty could have been 
overly broad in application, potentially excluding many types of truly 
operational services from the proposed rule's preferential treatment of 
operational deposits. Therefore, in response to concerns raised by 
commenters, the agencies have defined prime brokerage services in the 
final rule using the key aspects of the prime brokerage relationship. 
In addition to the execution, clearing and settling of transactions, 
the agencies believe it is the financing services and the retention of 
rehypothecation rights by the prime broker that distinguish prime 
brokerage from other operational services. This financing and 
rehypothecation aspect of prime brokerage services merits exclusion 
from operational services, as highly-levered customers and the reuse of 
assets can expose covered companies to significant liquidity risk. 
Under the final rule, prime brokerage services are those services 
offered by a covered company whereby the covered company executes, 
clears, settles, and finances transactions entered into by a customer 
with the covered company or a third-party entity on behalf of the 
customer (such as an executing broker). The covered company must also 
have a right to use or rehypothecate assets provided to the covered 
company by the customer, including in connection with the extension of 
margin lending or other financing to the customer. The final rule 
clarifies that prime brokerage services would include operational 
services provided to a non-regulated fund. The final rule explicitly 
states that prime brokerage services include those provided to non-
regulated funds because of the higher liquidity risks posed by the 
provision of these services to hedge and private equity funds. The 
agencies believe these changes capture the intent of the proposed rule, 
in that deposits that are less stable do not qualify as operational 
deposits under the final rule. Accordingly, all deposits of a non-
regulated fund will not be eligible for treatment as an operational 
deposit, regardless of the provision of operational services by the 
covered company.
(k). Exclusion of Certain Correspondent Banking Activities
    Section _.4(b)(8) of the proposed rule would have excluded from the 
definition of operational deposits a subset of correspondent banking 
arrangements pursuant to which a covered company (as correspondent) 
holds deposits owned by another depository institution (as respondent) 
and the respondent temporarily places excess funds in an overnight 
deposit with the covered company. The agencies specifically excluded 
these deposits from treatment as an operational deposit under the 
proposed rule because, although they may meet some of the requirements 
applicable to operational deposits, they historically have exhibited 
instability during stressed liquidity events. In doing so, the agencies 
did not intend to exclude all banking arrangements with correspondents, 
only those specifically described in Sec.  _.4(b)(8) of the proposed 
rule.
    Several commenters argued that the agencies' proposed exclusion is 
broader than that in the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework and 
requested that the agencies clarify that the exclusion for deposits 
provided in connection with correspondent banking services is limited 
to the settlement of foreign currency transactions. In addition, 
several commenters argued that this exclusion would exclude all 
deposits under correspondent banking relationships from application of 
the operational deposit outflow rate.
    The agencies continue to believe that excess funds from a 
depository institution placed in an overnight deposit account are not 
stable, and have retained the exclusion of them from operational 
deposits. However, the agencies have modified the final rule to remove 
the phrase ``correspondent banking'' from the proposed provision in 
Sec.  _.4(b)(8) to address commenters' concerns that the exclusion 
applies to all correspondent banking arrangements.
    The proposed rule would have allowed correspondent banking deposits 
that meet all operational requirements to be included as operational 
deposits; however, deposits arising from correspondent banking 
relationships that were not operational in nature would not have been 
categorized as operational. The proposal would not have excluded from 
operational deposits those correspondent banking arrangements under 
which a correspondent bank held deposits owned by respondent banks and 
provided payment and other services in order to settle foreign currency 
transactions. The final rule provides for the same treatment.

[[Page 61502]]

(l). Operational Deposit Outflow Rates
    As noted above, the proposed rule would have applied a 5 percent 
outflow rate to operational deposits fully covered by deposit insurance 
(other than escrow deposits) and a 25 percent outflow rate to 
operational deposits not fully covered by deposit insurance and all 
escrow deposits. One commenter argued that operational deposits are 
unlikely to run off during a 30 calendar-day period because customers 
likely would not terminate the attendant operational services, which 
are provided via legal contracts with notice and termination 
provisions, and thus requested that the agencies adopt lower outflow 
rates for such deposits. The commenter further argued that certain 
operational services, such as investment company custody services, are 
mandated by law, and providers of operational services generally have a 
diverse customer base. Other commenters argued that operational 
deposits should be subject to lower outflow rates on the basis of 
evidence indicating that such deposit amounts tend to increase during 
times of stress.
    A commenter provided data to justify lowering the 25 percent 
outflow rate for operational deposits where less than the entire amount 
of the deposit is covered by deposit insurance, requesting that the 
treatment of operational deposits be consistent with the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework. Commenters also argued for the inclusion 
of both fully insured accounts and the insured portions of accounts 
that are over the FDIC insurance limits in the 5 percent outflow 
category of operational deposits. Throughout the final rule, the 
agencies are drawing a distinction between fully insured deposits on 
the one hand and less than fully insured deposits on the other, 
because, as discussed above, based on the agencies' supervisory 
experience, the entire balance of partially insured deposits behave 
more like uninsured deposits, with customers withdrawing the entire 
deposit amount, including amounts below the deposit insurance limit. 
Thus, the agencies have adopted this provision of the rule as proposed.
    The agencies recognize the stable nature of operational deposits, 
which is reflected in the proposed and final rule's 5 percent outflow 
rate for fully insured operational deposits. However, the agencies 
continue to believe that deposits that are not fully covered by 
insurance will experience higher outflow rates in a macroeconomic 
stress scenario as covered companies' counterparties will likely find 
themselves subject to the same stress, thereby reducing their 
operational deposit balances as their business slows. While operational 
deposits are more stable than non-operational funding, the agencies 
believe that in the event of idiosyncratic stress, counterparties 
likely would reduce the amount of their operational deposits. 
Accordingly, all other unsecured operational deposits are assigned a 25 
percent outflow rate in the final rule, as in the proposed rule.
    One commenter criticized the agencies' decision not to assign fully 
insured escrow deposits a 5 percent outflow rate that other fully 
insured operational deposits would have received, arguing that deposits 
in mortgage escrow accounts are no more likely to be withdrawn in a 
period of financial stress than any other operational deposits at the 
same bank from the same depositor.
    The agencies believe that, although escrow deposits are 
operational, it is their nature that there will be outflows based on 
the occurrence of a specified event, regardless of the amount of 
deposit insurance coverage. Thus, during a period of overall 
macroeconomic distress, the amount of operational escrow deposits would 
shrink as business slowed, regardless of deposit insurance. Further, 
the agencies believe that given the general volatility of escrow 
deposits, affording them a 3 or 10 percent outflow rate would not 
properly reflect the lack of funding stability in these deposits. The 
25 percent outflow rate appropriately reflects the outflow risk of 
escrow deposits, and has therefore been adopted in the final rule as 
proposed.
iii. Other Unsecured Wholesale Funding
    The proposed rule would have assigned an outflow rate of 100 
percent to all other unsecured wholesale funding. This category was 
designed to capture all other funding not given a specific outflow rate 
elsewhere in the proposed rule, including funding provided to a 
financial sector entity as described above. The agencies have adopted 
this category in the final rule as proposed.
i. Debt Security Outflow Amount
    The agencies proposed that where a covered company is the primary 
market maker for its own debt securities, the outflow rate for such 
funding would equal 3 percent for all debt securities that are not 
structured securities that mature outside of a 30 calendar-day period 
and 5 percent for all debt securities that are structured debt 
securities that mature outside of a 30 calendar-day period. This 
outflow amount was proposed in addition to any debt security-related 
outflow amounts maturing within a 30 calendar-day period that must have 
been included in net cash outflows. Based on historical experience, 
including the recent financial crisis during which institutions went to 
significant lengths to ensure the liquidity of their debt securities, 
the agencies proposed what they considered to be relatively low outflow 
rates for a covered company's own debt securities. The proposed rule 
differentiated between structured and non-structured debt on the basis 
of data from stressed institutions indicating the likelihood that 
structured debt requires more liquidity support. In such cases, a 
covered company may be called upon to provide liquidity to the market 
by purchasing its debt securities without having an offsetting sale 
through which it can readily recoup the cash outflow.
    A few commenters suggested that these proposed outflow rates were 
too high, arguing that the actual volume of any repurchases made by a 
banking organization may be lower than the proposed outflow rates 
because investors may not be willing to have the banking organization 
repurchase the debt securities during a stress scenario at a price 
which would result in the investor recognizing a significant loss. A 
commenter suggested that covered companies be allowed to set their own 
outflow rates, reflecting the fact that different covered companies 
might take different approaches to addressing franchise or reputational 
risk. This commenter argued that, in any event, while outflow rates of 
3 and 5 percent seem low, once one takes into account the amount of 
securities that a covered company may have outstanding, a materially 
significant outflow amount is possible, which the commenter found 
unreasonable. Two other commenters requested clarification regarding 
how the debt security outflow amount would work in practice. A 
commenter argued that the scope of debt securities subject to this 
section should be modified to apply an outflow rate only to the senior 
unsecured debt of the covered company in which it is the primary market 
maker. The commenter also argued that to the extent that a covered 
company's offering documents disclose that it is not obligated to 
provide liquidity for such securities, the securities should not be 
subject to a predetermined outflow rate.
    Another commenter argued that the proposed rule's provision of cash 
outflow rates for primary market makers would likely discourage covered 
companies from supporting their own or other covered companies' debt 
securities and asked that the agencies clarify the definition and the 
intent of

[[Page 61503]]

this provision. After considering the comments received on this section 
of the proposed rule, the agencies are finalizing Sec.  _.32(i) as 
proposed with one minor change. Recognizing that a limited number of 
covered companies are primary market makers for their own debt 
securities, the agencies have clarified that the debt security buyback 
outflow will be triggered when either a covered company or its 
consolidated subsidiary is the primary market maker for debt securities 
issued by the covered company.
    The agencies are adopting the outflow rates as proposed for several 
reasons. First, one purpose of the LCR is to implement a standardized 
quantitative liquidity stress measure and this, in turn, counsels 
toward not allowing covered companies discretion in determining outflow 
rates. Second, these outflow rates are not intended to measure the cost 
to a covered company of addressing franchise or reputational risk 
through participation in the market. Rather, as the primary market 
maker for a security, the market expects that the covered company or 
its consolidated subsidiary will continue to purchase the securities, 
especially if they issued the securities. Thus, the 3 percent and 5 
percent rates are reasonable. Third, with regard to investors not being 
willing to repurchase securities at a given price, the price will be 
the then-market price, which reflects the outflow the market maker will 
have if it is required to purchase securities from a counterparty that 
it cannot then re-sell. That reduced price is reflected in the outflow 
rate. Historical experience in past bear markets and the recent 
financial crisis shows that market makers will continue to make markets 
in most debt issuances, particularly when such market makers or their 
consolidated subsidiaries are the issuers of a particular security.
    The agencies further believe that these outflow rates are 
appropriate to address the potential future support a covered company 
will provide with regard to its primary market making role for its own 
debt, and would not directly discourage any such support. In addition, 
the outflow rates only apply to debt securities issued by a covered 
company or its consolidated subsidiary. It would not apply to a covered 
company's efforts to provide secondary market liquidity to the 
securities of other banking organizations.
    Moreover, a covered company would not be required to calculate this 
outflow amount unless it or its consolidated subsidiary is the primary 
market maker for its own debt securities. While the final rule does not 
define the term market maker, the agencies generally expect that if a 
covered company or its consolidated subsidiary routinely stands ready 
to purchase and sell its debt securities and is willing and available 
to quote, purchase and sell, or otherwise to enter into long and short 
positions in its debt securities, in commercially reasonable amounts 
and throughout market cycles on a basis appropriate for the liquidity, 
maturity, and depth of the market for such debt securities, that it is 
a market maker for those debt securities. The market will know who the 
primary market makers are for a particular security, and a covered 
company should know if it is the primary market maker for a particular 
security.
j. Secured Funding Transactions and Asset Exchange Outflow Amounts
i. Definitions and Outflow Rates
    The proposed rule would have defined a secured funding transaction 
as a transaction giving rise to a cash obligation of a covered company 
that is secured under applicable law by a lien on specifically 
designated assets owned by the covered company that gives the 
counterparty, as holder of the lien, priority over the assets in the 
case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, or resolution. As defined, 
secured funding transactions would have included repurchase 
transactions, FHLB advances, secured deposits, loans of collateral to 
effect customer short positions, and other secured wholesale funding 
arrangements with Federal Reserve Banks, regulated financial companies, 
non-regulated funds, or other counterparties.
    Under the proposed rule, secured funding transactions maturing 
within 30 calendar days of the calculation date would have given rise 
to cash outflows during the stress period. This outflow risk, together 
with the potential for additional outflows in the form of collateral 
calls to support a given level of secured funding transactions, was 
reflected in the proposed secured funding transaction outflow rates. 
The agencies believed that rather than applying an outflow rate based 
on the nature of the funding provider, the proposed rule should 
generally apply an outflow rate based on the quality and liquidity of 
the collateral securing the funding. For secured funding transactions, 
the quality of the assets securing the transaction is a significant 
factor in determining the likelihood that a covered company will be 
able to roll over the transaction at maturity with a range of market 
participants and maintain the associated funding over time. In the 
proposed rule, secured funding outflow rates would have progressively 
increased depending upon whether the secured funding transaction was 
secured by level 1 liquid assets, level 2A liquid assets, level 2B 
liquid assets, or by assets that were not HQLA. These outflow rates 
were proposed as zero percent, 15 percent, 50 percent and 100 percent, 
respectively. Additionally, the proposed rule would have applied a 25 
percent outflow rate to secured funding transactions with sovereigns, 
multilateral development banks, or U.S. GSEs that are assigned a risk 
weight of 20 percent under the agencies' risk-based capital rules, to 
the extent such transactions were secured by assets other than level 1 
or level 2A liquid assets. Under the proposed rule, loans of collateral 
to facilitate customer short positions were secured funding 
transactions, subject to outflow rates generally as described above for 
other types of secured funding transactions.
    Secured funding transactions in the form of customer short 
positions give rise to liquidity risk because the customer may abruptly 
close its positions, removing funding from the covered company. 
Further, customers may remove their entire relationship with the 
covered company, causing the firm to lose the funding associated with 
the short position. In the particular case where customer short 
positions were covered by other customers' collateral that does not 
consist of HQLA, the proposed rule would have applied an outflow rate 
of 50 percent, rather than the generally applicable 100 percent outflow 
rate for other secured funding transactions secured by assets that are 
not HQLA. The 50 percent outflow rate reflected the agencies' 
recognition of there being some interrelatedness between such customer 
short positions and other customer long positions within the covered 
company, and that customers in aggregate may not be able to close all 
short positions without also significantly reducing leverage. In the 
case of customers moving their relationships, closing short positions 
would also be associated with moving long positions for which the 
covered company may have been providing funding in the form of margin 
loans. The 50 percent outflow rate for these customer short positions 
was designed to recognize potential symmetry with the inflows generated 
from margin loans secured by assets that are not HQLA, to which the 
proposed rule applied an inflow rate of 50 percent, and that are 
described in section II.C.4.f. of this Supplementary Information 
section.
    The agencies proposed to treat borrowings from Federal Reserve 
Banks the same as other secured funding

[[Page 61504]]

transactions because these borrowings are not automatically rolled 
over, and a Federal Reserve Bank may choose not to renew the borrowing. 
Therefore, the agencies believed an outflow rate based on the quality 
and liquidity of the collateral posted was most appropriate for such 
transactions. The agencies noted in the proposed rule that should the 
Federal Reserve Banks offer alternative facilities with different terms 
than the current primary credit facility, or modify the terms of the 
primary credit facility, outflow rates for the LCR may be modified.
    In addition to secured funding transactions, which relate solely to 
a secured cash obligation, an asset exchange would have been defined 
under the proposed rule as a transaction that requires the 
counterparties to exchange non-cash assets. Asset exchanges can give 
rise to a change in a covered company's liquidity, such as where the 
covered company is obligated to provide higher-quality assets in return 
for less liquid, lower-quality assets. The proposal would have 
reflected this risk through the proposed asset exchange outflow rates, 
which would have been based on the HQLA levels of the assets exchanged 
and would have progressively increased as the assets to be relinquished 
by a covered company increased in quality relative to those to be 
received from the asset exchange counterparty. Sec.  _.32(j)(2) of the 
proposed rule set forth the outflow rates for various asset exchanges.
    In general, commenters' concerns with the outflow rates for secured 
funding transactions pertained to perceptions of the relative liquidity 
of various asset classes and whether particular types of assets should 
have been classified as HQLA in the proposed rule, as described in 
section II.B above. For example, one commenter argued that a 
transaction secured by government MMFs should receive the same outflow 
rate as a transaction that is secured by level 1 liquid assets and, 
similarly, a transaction secured by other types of MMFs should have the 
same outflow rate as a transaction secured by level 2A liquid assets 
because MMFs have high credit quality and are liquid. Some commenters 
noted that, under the proposed rule, level 2B liquid assets that are 
common equity securities were limited to shares in the S&P 500 index, 
common shares recognized by local regulatory authorities in other 
jurisdictions, and, potentially, shares in other indices. These 
commenters requested that the agencies consider a narrow expansion of 
this asset category for the purposes of secured funding outflow rates 
(and secured lending inflow rates). These commenters also argued that 
all major indices in G-20 jurisdictions should qualify as level 2B 
liquid assets for the purposes of secured funding transaction cash 
flows.
    Other commenters recommended applying an outflow rate that would 
ensure that secured funding transactions secured by assets that are not 
HQLA would not have an outflow rate that was greater than the outflow 
rate applied to an unsecured funding transaction with the same 
counterparty in order to avoid inconsistency. One commenter requested 
that the agencies limit the definition of secured funding transaction 
to only include repurchase agreements.
    With respect to the definition of a secured funding transaction, 
the agencies continue to believe that the principle liquidity 
characteristics of an asset which were considered when determining the 
inclusion of an asset as HQLA also are applicable to the determination 
of the outflow rates for any transactions that are secured by those 
assets and that the definition of such transactions should include more 
than repurchase agreements. Accordingly, the agencies are adopting the 
definition of secured funding transaction largely as proposed, with a 
clarification that the definition of secured funding transaction only 
includes transactions that are subject to a legally binding agreement 
as of the calculation date. In addition and as described above under 
section II.C.3.a, the agencies have opted to treat secured retail 
transactions under Sec.  _.32(a) of the final rule. Accordingly, the 
secured funding transaction and asset exchange outflow rates under 
Sec.  _.32(j) of the final rule would apply only to transactions with a 
wholesale counterparty.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule's outflow rates 
for secured funding transactions that mature within 30 calendar days of 
the calculation date are based upon the HQLA categorization of the 
assets securing the transaction and are generally as proposed (see 
Table 3a). Consistent with this treatment and as discussed in section 
II.B above, MMFs do not meet the definition of HQLA under the final 
rule and a secured funding transaction that is secured by an MMF 
generally will receive the 100 percent outflow rate associated with 
collateral that is not HQLA. Further, the agencies believe it would be 
inappropriate to establish an exception to this principle, whereby, for 
example, secured funding transactions secured by non-U.S. equity 
securities that are not level 2B liquid assets would be subject to the 
outflow rate applicable to level 2B liquid asset collateral. As 
discussed above in section II.B.2.f, the agencies believe that assets 
that are not HQLA may not remain liquid during a stress scenario. 
Accordingly, any secured funding transaction maturing in less than 30 
calendar days that is secured by assets that are not HQLA may not roll 
over or could be subject to substantial haircuts. Thus, secured funding 
transactions that are secured by assets that are not HQLA under the 
final rule receive the outflow rate appropriate for this type of 
collateral and the relevant counterparty.
    Although a covered company may have the option of reallocating the 
composition of the collateral that is securing a portfolio of 
transactions at a future date, the outflow rates for a secured funding 
transaction or asset exchange is based on the collateral securing the 
transaction as of the calculation date.
    The agencies agree with certain commenters that, as a general 
matter, the outflow rate for a secured funding transaction should not 
be greater than that applicable to an equivalent wholesale unsecured 
funding transaction (that is not an operational deposit) from the same 
counterparty. Under Sec.  _.32(j)(2) of the final rule, in instances 
where the outflow rate applicable to a secured funding transaction 
(conducted with a counterparty that is not a retail customer or 
counterparty) would exceed that of an equivalent wholesale unsecured 
funding transaction (that is not an operational deposit) with the same 
counterparty, the covered company may apply the lower outflow rate to 
the transaction.\78\ The reduced outflow rate would not, however, be 
applicable if the secured funding transaction was secured by collateral 
that was received by the covered company under a secured lending 
transaction or asset exchange. Additionally, the reduced outflow would 
still be considered a secured funding transaction outflow amount under 
Sec.  _.32(j) of the final rule for the purposes of reporting and 
determining the applicable maturity date (see Table 3a). Furthermore 
and as discussed below, for collateralized deposits as defined in the 
final rule, the outflow rate applicable to part or all of the

[[Page 61505]]

secured funding transaction amount may potentially be the outflow rate 
applicable to a wholesale operational deposit from the same 
counterparty, for the portion of the deposit that meets the remaining 
criteria for classification as an operational deposit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ The agencies note that, for counterparties that are 
financial sector entities, the applicable non-operational deposit 
unsecured wholesale funding outflow rate would be 100 percent under 
Sec.  _.32(h)(5) of the final rule. Thus, for such counterparties, 
the secured funding transaction outflow rates would be equivalent or 
higher depending on the collateral securing the transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the final rule, the treatment of asset exchange outflows is 
adopted generally as proposed (see Table 3b). However, the agencies are 
clarifying that in the case where a covered company will not have the 
required collateral to deliver to the counterparty upon the maturity of 
an asset exchange, the covered company should assume it will be 
required to make a cash purchase of the necessary security prior to the 
maturity of the asset exchange. Accordingly, and consistent with the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the covered company should 
include in its outflow amount an outflow for the purchase of the 
security. As reflected in Sec.  _.32(j)(3)(x)-(xiii) of the final rule 
and in Table 3b, below, under these provisions, the outflow rate would 
be the fair value of the asset that the covered company would be 
required to purchase in the open market minus the value of the 
collateral that the covered company would receive on the settlement of 
the asset exchange, which is determined by the rule's haircuts for HQLA 
and non-HQLA.
    The agencies are clarifying that assets collateralizing secured 
funding transactions as of a calculation date are encumbered and 
therefore cannot be considered as eligible HQLA at the calculation 
date. However, because outflow rates are applied to the cash 
obligations of a covered company under secured funding transactions 
subject to a legally binding agreement as of a calculation date, these 
outflow rates do not depend on whether the collateral securing the 
transactions at the calculation date was or was not eligible HQLA prior 
to the calculation date.
    The agencies recognize that certain assets that are collateralizing 
a secured funding transaction (or a derivative liability or other 
obligation) as of a calculation date, and certain assets that have been 
delivered to a counterparty in an asset exchange, may be rehypothecated 
collateral that was made available to the covered company from a 
secured lending, asset exchange, or other transaction. As described in 
section II.C.2 above, the maturity date of any such secured lending 
transaction or asset exchange determined under Sec.  _.31 of the final 
rule cannot be earlier than the maturity date of the secured funding 
transaction or asset exchange for which the collateral has been reused. 
Furthermore, the agencies recognize that the remaining term of secured 
lending transactions, asset exchanges or other transactions that are 
secured by rehypothecated assets may extend beyond 30 calendar days 
from a calculation date, meaning that the covered company will have a 
continuing obligation to return collateral at a future date. The inflow 
rates that are to be applied to secured lending transactions and asset 
exchanges where received collateral has been reused to secure other 
transactions are described in section II.C.4 below.
    In addition to comments broadly relating to definitions and outflow 
rates for secured funding transactions, commenters raised specific 
concerns regarding the treatment of collateralized municipal and other 
deposits as secured funding transactions, the outflow rates associated 
with certain prime brokerage transactions, and the treatment of FHLB 
secured funding.
ii. Collateralized Deposits
    Under the proposed rule, all secured deposits would have been 
treated as secured funding transactions. Some commenters objected to 
the proposed rule's inclusion of collateralized public sector deposits 
as secured funding transactions on the grounds that such deposits are 
relationship-based, were more stable during the recent financial 
crisis, and are typically secured by a more stable portfolio of 
collateral than the collateral that secures secured funding 
transactions such as repurchase agreements. Commenters argued that 
during the recent financial crisis, state and local governments that 
placed deposits secured by municipal securities with banking 
organizations did not withdraw such funds due to concern over the 
quality of the collateral underlying their deposits. These commenters 
further argued that it is often the case that the collateral used to 
secure a government's deposits can be that government's own bonds.
    As discussed in section II.B.5 of this Supplementary Information 
section, commenters argued that collateralized public sector deposits, 
which are required by law to be collateralized with high-quality 
assets, should not be treated like short-term, secured funding 
transactions, because collateralized public sector deposits are not the 
type of transactions susceptible to the risk of manipulation that 
commenters believed was the focus of the proposed rule. Commenters 
further argued that this classification would lead to unnecessary 
distortions that could increase the cost of these deposits for bank 
customers.
    Commenters also contended that during a period of financial market 
distress, it is not plausible that a state or local government could 
withdraw a lower amount of unsecured deposits than secured public 
sector deposits, as contemplated by the outflow rates assigned to the 
applicable unsecured wholesale funding and secured funding 
categories.\79\ Many commenters also argued that applying a higher 
outflow rate to collateralized municipal deposits versus unsecured 
municipal deposits could discourage banking organizations from 
accepting collateralized public sector deposits. Thus, several 
commenters requested that if collateralized public sector deposits are 
categorized as secured funding transactions in the final rule, the 
agencies should assign a lower outflow rate to these deposits. These 
commenters suggested that the agencies provide the same treatment for 
collateralized deposits as they do for unsecured deposits and take into 
consideration the historical behavior of the depositor to determine the 
appropriate outflow rate. Other commenters pointed out that the 
unsecured deposits of municipalities would have been subject to outflow 
rates in the range of 20 percent to 40 percent under the proposed rule, 
in contrast to the more stringent outflow rates applicable to secured 
funding transactions backed by lower quality collateral.\80\ 
Additionally, some commenters stated that the secured funding 
transaction outflow rates that would have applied to collateralized 
public sector deposits under the proposed rule would have diverged from 
the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. These commenters argued that 
the Basel standard assigned a 25 percent outflow rate for secured 
funding transactions with public sector entities that have a risk-
weight of 20 percent under the Basel capital standards. Likewise, one 
commenter recommended assigning collateralized public sector deposits 
an outflow rate of no more than 15 percent because, according to the 
commenter, bank Call Report data suggests that, even during the recent 
financial crisis, the peak secured municipal deposit outflow rates 
generally did not exceed approximately 15 percent. Another commenter 
also recommended that the agencies adopt a

[[Page 61506]]

30 percent maximum outflow rate assumption for deposits collateralized 
by municipal securities. Finally, other commenters requested 
clarification as to whether collateralized public sector deposits that 
otherwise meet the criteria for operational deposits would be eligible 
for the operational deposit outflow rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Under the proposed rule, secured funding transactions that 
are secured by collateral that is not HQLA, would have received a 
100 percent outflow rate while unsecured non-operational wholesale 
funding that is not fully covered by deposit insurance would have 
received an outflow rate of 40 percent.
    \80\ However, other commenters also argued that the outflow rate 
for unsecured deposits of 40 percent under the proposed rule was 
unduly punitive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, because municipal securities would not have been included 
as HQLA under the proposed rule, commenters were concerned that in 
certain cases a banking organization could be required to hold HQLA 
equal to the deposits that a public entity had placed with the banking 
organization in addition to the collateral specified to be held against 
the deposit as a matter of state law in order to meet the outflow rates 
that the proposed rule would have assumed. A commenter proposed that 
the outflow rate for a collateralized deposit should only be applied to 
the deposit amount less the value of collateral posted by the covered 
company. A few commenters inquired as to whether preferred deposits 
secured by FHLB letters of credit would be assigned the same 15 percent 
outflow rate as secured funding transactions secured with U.S. GSE 
obligations or if those that satisfy the operational deposit criteria 
would receive an outflow rate no higher than 25 percent.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ As discussed above under section II.B.2.f.iv, FHLB letters 
of credit would not qualify as HQLA under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters requested the exclusion of collateralized public 
sector deposits from the secured transaction unwind mechanism used to 
determine adjusted liquid assets amounts as addressed in section 
II.B.5.d above.
    In addition to comments relating to public sector deposits, the 
agencies received a number of comments relating to corporate trust 
deposits. Commenters argued that funds in corporate trust accounts are 
very stable due to the specialized nature of the banking relationship 
and constraints imposed by governing documents. Moreover, due to the 
specialized nature of indentured trustee and agency engagements 
associated with corporate trust deposits, withdrawal and disbursements 
of funds may be strictly limited. However, certain corporate trust 
deposits would have met the definition of secured funding transactions 
under the proposed rule. Consistent with other comments received 
relating to secured funding transactions in general, commenters were 
concerned that the outflow rate applicable to a collateralized 
corporate trust deposit may be higher than that applied to an unsecured 
deposit from the same depositor. Other commenters requested 
clarification as to whether collateralized corporate trust deposits 
that otherwise met the criteria for operational deposits would be 
eligible for the operational deposit outflow rate. One commenter 
requested that collateralized corporate trust deposits be excluded from 
the LCR requirements entirely. A few commenters requested that 
collateralized corporate trust deposits be excluded from the unwind 
mechanism used to determine the adjusted excess HQLA amount as 
addressed in section II.B.5.d above.
    The agencies recognize the particular characteristics of 
collateralized public sector and certain collateralized corporate trust 
deposits. The agencies acknowledge that a covered company's 
collateralized public sector deposits may, in part, be related to 
longer-term relationships with its counterparties, established through 
a public bidding process that is specific to the counterparties' 
requirements. The agencies also recognize that certain corporate trust 
deposits are required by federal law to be collateralized.\82\ Such 
deposits are governed by complex governing documents, such as trust 
indentures, that may limit the customer's discretion to withdraw, pay, 
or disburse funds. The agencies further acknowledge that there may be 
relationship characteristics that influence the availability, volume, 
and potential stability of collateralized public sector and corporate 
trust deposits placed at covered companies. However, given the 
collateral requirements and potential collateral flows associated with 
such deposits, whether required by law or otherwise, the agencies 
continue to believe that the liquidity risk of collateralized public 
sector deposits, collateralized corporate trust deposits, and all other 
secured deposits is appropriately addressed through their treatment as 
secured funding transactions where the deposits meet the definition of 
such transactions. Under the final rule, the outflow rate assigned to 
all secured deposits, including collateralized public sector and 
corporate trust deposits, with a maturity as determined under Sec.  
_.31 of the final rule of 30 calendar days or less will be principally 
based on the quality of the collateral used to secure the deposits. The 
outflow rate applicable to all secured deposits meeting the definition 
of a secured funding transaction that are secured by level 1 liquid 
assets will be zero percent, while the outflow rate for deposits 
secured by level 2A liquid assets will be 15 percent. As described 
above for secured funding transactions in general, the agencies are 
amending the final rule so that the outflow rate applicable to a 
secured deposit is not greater than the equivalent outflow rate for an 
unsecured deposit from the same counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ 12 CFR 9.10 (national banks) and 12 CFR 150.300-150.320 
(Federal savings associations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies believe this amendment addresses a number of the 
concerns expressed by commenters with respect to collateralized 
deposits. For example, while public sector deposits secured by level 2A 
liquid assets would be assigned a 15 percent outflow rate, similar 
deposits secured by FHLB letters of credit (which are not HQLA under 
the final rule) may receive the 40 percent outflow rate applicable to 
unsecured deposits from a wholesale counterparty that is not a 
financial sector entity (versus a 100 percent outflow rate). The 
agencies believe the application of outflow rates in this manner is 
appropriate and that a further reduced outflow rate specific to public 
sector deposits would not be appropriate. Additionally, because the 
secured funding transaction outflow rates are derived from the quality 
and liquidity profile of the collateral securing the deposit in a 
manner which is consistent with the liquidity value of that collateral 
if it were held unencumbered by the covered company, the agencies do 
not believe that it is appropriate to net the amount of the deposit by 
the collateral posted by the covered company.
    Furthermore, specifically and solely in the case of a secured 
funding transaction that meets the definition of a collateralized 
deposit under the final rule, a covered company may assess whether such 
a collateralized deposit meets the criteria for an operational deposit 
under Sec.  _.4 of the final rule.\83\ If such collateralized deposits 
meet the criteria for an operational deposit, the covered company may 
determine the amount of the collateralized deposit that would receive 
the 25 percent outflow rate applicable to an unsecured operational 
deposit that is not fully covered by deposit insurance (see Table 3a). 
Any portion of the collateralized deposit that is not an operational 
deposit under the covered company's excess operational deposit amount 
methodology will receive the outflow rate applicable to a wholesale 
unsecured non-operational deposit from the same counterparty. With 
respect to the requests by commenters to apply the 25 percent outflow 
rate to all collateralized

[[Page 61507]]

public sector deposits that are secured by level 2B liquid assets or 
non-HQLA, the agencies believe that deposits not meeting the criteria 
for operational deposits would be less stable during a period of market 
stress due to the lack of an operational relationship tying the funds 
to the service provided by the covered company. Accordingly, the 
agencies have not made secured funding transactions with public sector 
entities eligible for the 25 percent outflow rate applicable to secured 
funding transactions with sovereign entities, multilateral development 
banks, and U.S. GSEs subject to a 20 percent risk-weight under the 
agencies' risk-based capital rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ All other secured deposits would not be eligible for the 
operational deposit outflow rates under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Prime Brokerage Secured Funding Transactions Outflows
    The agencies received several comments regarding the outflow 
treatment of secured funding transactions in the context of prime 
brokerage activities. As described above, in general under the proposed 
rule secured funding transactions, including certain loans of 
collateral to cover customer short positions, that are secured by 
assets that are not HQLA would have required an outflow rate of 100 
percent. However, certain secured funding transactions that are 
customer short positions of collateral that do not consist of HQLA and 
are covered by another customer's collateral would have received a 50 
percent outflow rate. As explained above, the 50 percent outflow rate 
reflected the agencies' recognition of some interrelatedness between 
such customer short positions and other customer long positions within 
the covered company, and the fact that customers in aggregate may not 
be able to close all short positions without also significantly de-
leveraging, or in the case of moving their relationship, also moving 
the long positions for which the covered company may have been 
providing funding in the form of margin loans. Commenters argued that 
this section of the proposed rule did not address a covered company's 
internal process for deciding how to source collateral to cover short 
positions, such as the process for choosing between utilizing inventory 
securities, external borrowings, or using other customers' collateral. 
Commenters argued that when customer short positions are covered by 
inventory securities, these securities are frequently held as hedges to 
other customer positions. These commenters indicated that the source of 
the collateral covering the customer short position is irrelevant, and 
recommended applying a 50 percent outflow rate to all customer shorts 
that are covered by any collateral that is not HQLA, irrespective of 
the source, and also to customer short positions that are covered by 
other methods, such as hedges to customer swaps and securities 
specifically obtained by a prime broker to cover the customer short 
positions. These commenters argued that this treatment would better 
capture risk management practices that rely on symmetrical treatment of 
customer long and short positions. These commenters also argued that 
applying this approach to closing customer short positions would 
reflect customers' offsetting reduction in leverage irrespective of the 
source of collateral and would capture the risks related to internal 
coverage of short positions. One commenter suggested that the funding 
risk created by internalization, where collateral is provided by and 
utilized for various secured transactions within the covered company 
without being externally sourced, is more accurately assessed by 
measuring customer and CUSIP concentrations, rather than looking at the 
asset class or the type of long-short pair because more concentrated 
ownership impacts the risk of internalization providing stable funding.
    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
final rule prescribes the outflow amount for each secured funding 
transaction individually, while taking into account the potential 
dependency of certain secured transactions upon the source of the 
collateral securing the transaction. Cash obligations of a covered 
company to a counterparty that are generated through loans of 
collateral to cover a customer short position pose liquidity risks that 
are similar to other secured funding transactions as described above. 
For this reason, the agencies believe that funding from a customer 
short position should be treated as a secured funding transaction, and 
that the outflow associated with this funding should, in general, be 
consistent with all other forms of secured funding transactions. In the 
case where a covered company has received funding from, for example, 
the cash proceeds of a customer's short sale of an asset that is not 
HQLA, the closing out of the short position by the customer at its 
discretion may lead to the covered company being required to relinquish 
cash in return for the receipt of the borrowed asset. In general, the 
outflow rate applicable to an individual secured funding transaction 
secured by assets that are not HQLA is 100 percent under the final 
rule. The agencies believe that it would be inappropriate to apply an 
outflow rate of 50 percent to all customer short positions covered by 
assets that are not HQLA, irrespective of the source of the collateral. 
While the standardized framework of the final rule is not designed to 
reflect the individual collateral allocation or risk management 
practices of covered companies, the agencies expect that covered 
companies will have in place liquidity risk management practices 
commensurate with the complexity of their prime brokerage business 
activities, including collateral tracking, collateral concentration 
monitoring, and potential exposure resulting from the exercise of 
customer options to withdraw funding.
    The outflow rate applicable to customer short positions that are 
covered by other customers' collateral that does not consist of HQLA is 
specifically intended to parallel the inflow rate applicable to secured 
lending transactions that are margin loans secured by assets that are 
not HQLA under Sec.  _.33(f)(1)(vii) of the final rule.\84\ This 50 
percent outflow rate reflects the agencies' recognition of some 
correlation between such customer short positions and other customer 
long positions within a covered company, and the fact that customers in 
aggregate may not be able to close all short positions without also 
significantly de-leveraging, or in the case of moving their 
relationship, also moving the long positions for which the covered 
company may have been providing funding in the form of margin loans. In 
contrast, if a customer short position is covered by the covered 
company's long positions of assets that are not HQLA, the outflow rate 
assigned to the customer short position would be that applicable to 
other secured funding transactions under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Margin loans that are secured by assets that are not HQLA 
are assigned an inflow rate of 50 percent under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the agencies recognize that prime brokerage activities 
may entail significant rehypothecation of assets to secure certain 
secured funding transactions. The agencies emphasize the treatment for 
determining the maturity of such transactions under Sec.  _.31 of the 
final rule and the inflows rates applicable to secured lending 
transactions and assets exchanges under Sec.  _.33(f) of the final 
rule.
iv. Federal Home Loan Bank Secured Funding Transactions
    Under the proposed rule, secured funding transactions with 
sovereign entities, multilateral development banks, and U.S. GSEs that 
are assigned a 20 percent risk weight under the agencies' risk-based 
capital rules and

[[Page 61508]]

that are not secured by level 1 or level 2A liquid assets would have 
received a 25 percent outflow rate. Several commenters requested 
clarification as to whether this 25 percent proposed outflow rate would 
have applied to all secured FHLB advances or only those secured by 
level 2B liquid assets. Some commenters stated that if the agencies 
intended to apply the 25 percent outflow rate only to advances secured 
by level 2B liquid assets, it would significantly increase the cost of 
FHLB advances to member institutions because such advances are 
typically secured by mortgages or mortgage-related securities that are 
not HQLA. Commenters recommended reducing the outflow rate applicable 
to FHLB advances to 3 percent, the outflow rate for stable retail 
deposits. Other commenters requested confirmation that FHLB advances 
are subject to a maximum outflow rate of 25 percent and posited that 
involuntary outflow rates for FHLB advances have approached zero 
historically. The agencies were also asked to clarify whether FHLB 
guarantees, including letters of credit that secure public sector 
deposits, would be subject to the same outflow rate as FHLB advances.
    The agencies are aware of the important contribution made by the 
FHLB system in providing funding to banking organizations and of the 
general collateral used to support FHLB borrowings. The agencies are 
clarifying that, under the final rule, the preferential 25 percent 
outflow rate applicable to secured funding transactions with certain 
sovereigns, multilateral development banks and U.S. GSEs applies to 
secured funding transactions that are secured by either level 2B liquid 
assets or assets that are not HQLA and that mature within 30 calendar 
days of a calculation date. FHLB advances that mature more than 30 
calendar days from a calculation date are excluded from net cash 
outflows. Given the broad range of collateral accepted by FHLBs and the 
possibility of collateral quality deterioration or increased collateral 
haircuts, the agencies do not believe that a lower outflow rate for 
FHLB advances, such as the 3 percent outflow rate proposed by a 
commenter, would be appropriate. The agencies recognize that FHLB 
advances may be secured by diverse pools of collateral, and that this 
collateral may potentially include HQLA. Under Sec.  _.22(b)(1)(ii) of 
the final rule, HQLA that is pledged to a central bank or U.S. GSE to 
secure borrowing capacity but is not securing existing borrowings may 
be treated as unencumbered for the purposes of identifying eligible 
HQLA. The agencies acknowledge that in cases where advances and undrawn 
FHLB capacity are secured by a pool of collateral, covered companies 
may wish to exercise the flexibility of designating which collateral 
pledged to a FHLB is securing currently outstanding borrowings and also 
designating which subset of such collateral is securing those advances 
maturing within 30 calendar days of a calculation date. The agencies 
believe allowing covered companies this flexibility is appropriate, but 
emphasize that no asset may be double counted as eligible HQLA and as 
securing a borrowing as of a calculation date.
    Tables 3a and 3b summarize the secured funding transaction and 
asset exchange outflow rates under the final rule.

           Table 3a--Secured Funding Transaction Outflow Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Categories for maturing secured funding      Secured funding outflow
                 transactions                             rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secured by level 1 liquid assets.............  0%.
Secured by level 2A liquid assets............  15%.
Transactions with sovereigns, multilateral     25%.
 development banks and U.S. GSEs subject to a
 20% risk weight not secured by level 1 or
 level 2A liquid assets.
Secured by level 2B liquid assets............  50%.
Customer short positions covered by other      50%.
 customers' collateral that is not HQLA.
Secured by assets that are not HQLA, except    100%.
 as above.
If the outflow rate listed above is greater    Apply to the secured
 than that for a wholesale unsecured            funding transaction
 transaction (that is not an operational        amount the wholesale
 deposit) with the same wholesale               unsecured non-
 counterparty.                                  operational outflow rate
                                                for that counterparty.
For collateralized deposits where the secured  Apply to each portion of
 funding transaction outflow rate listed        the secured funding
 above is greater than that for a wholesale     transaction amount the
 unsecured transaction with the same            wholesale unsecured
 wholesale counterparty.                        outflow rate applicable
                                                to that portion, for
                                                that counterparty,
                                                including amounts that
                                                may be operational
                                                deposits or excess
                                                operational deposit
                                                amounts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                 Table 3b--Asset Exchange Outflow Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Covered company must deliver    Covered company will    Asset exchange
          at maturity             receive at maturity     outflow rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where a covered company has the asset that it will be required to
 deliver at the maturity of an asset exchange or where the asset has
 been reused in a transaction that will mature no later than the
 maturity date of the asset exchange such that the asset required to be
 delivered will be available at the maturity date, and where the:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 1 liquid assets.........  Level 1 liquid assets.                0%
Level 1 liquid assets.........  Level 2A liquid assets               15%
Level 1 liquid assets.........  Level 2B liquid assets               50%
Level 1 liquid assets.........  Assets that are not                 100%
                                 HQLA.
Level 2A liquid assets........  Level 2A liquid assets                0%
Level 2A liquid assets........  Level 2B liquid assets               35%
Level 2A liquid assets........  Assets that are not                  85%
                                 HQLA.
Level 2B liquid assets........  Level 2B liquid assets                0%
Level 2B liquid assets........  Assets that are not                  50%
                                 HQLA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 61509]]

 
Where a covered company does not have the asset that it will be required
 to deliver at the maturity of an asset exchange and where the asset has
 not been reused in a transaction that will mature no later than the
 maturity date of the asset exchange, and where the:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 1, 2A, 2B liquid assets,  Level 1 liquid assets.                0%
 or assets that are not HQLA.   Level 2A liquid assets               15%
                                Level 2B liquid assets               50%
                                Assets that are not                 100%
                                 HQLA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

k. Foreign Central Bank Borrowings Outflow Amount
    The agencies recognize central banks' lending terms and 
expectations differ by jurisdiction. Accordingly, for a covered 
company's borrowings from a particular foreign jurisdiction's central 
bank, the proposed rule would have assigned an outflow rate equal to 
the outflow rate that such jurisdiction has established for central 
bank borrowings under a minimum liquidity standard. The proposed rule 
would have provided further that if such an outflow rate has not been 
established in a foreign jurisdiction, the outflow rate for such 
borrowings would be treated as secured funding pursuant to Sec.  
_.32(j) of the proposed rule.
    The agencies received no comments on this section and have adopted 
proposed Sec.  _.32(k) without change in the final rule.
l. Other Contractual Outflow Amounts
    The proposed rule would have applied a 100 percent outflow rate to 
amounts payable within 30 calendar days of a calculation date under 
applicable contracts that are not otherwise specified in the proposed 
rule. Some commenters argued that the 100 percent outflow rate would 
have applied to some contractual expenses payable within 30 calendar 
days of a calculation date, such as operating costs and salaries that 
are operational expenses and should be excluded from outflows. One 
commenter also argued that the proposed rule's treatment of such 
expenses was not consistent with the examples of ``other outflows'' 
illustrated in Paragraph 141 of the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, which includes outflows to cover unsecured collateral 
borrowings, uncovered short positions, dividends or contractual 
interest payments and specifically excludes from this category 
operating costs. The commenter requested that the final rule be 
consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. Further, one 
commenter argued that including contractual expenses that are 
operational in nature would result in such expenses being included as 
outflows, yet the inflows from non-financial revenues would be 
excluded. Therefore, this commenter argued, the final rule should 
exclude operational costs from outflows and exclude from inflows non-
financial revenues that are not enumerated in Sec.  _.33(b)-(f) of the 
proposed rule and excluded under Sec.  _.33(g) of the proposed rule 
(other cash inflows). One commenter requested clarification that there 
was no outflow rate associated with trade finance instruments and 
letters of credit with performance requirements under the proposed 
rule. Another commenter asked for clarification of the treatment of 
contingent trade finance obligations under the final rule. Another 
commenter asked for guidance on the treatment of projected cash 
outflows for certain contingency funding obligations such as variable 
rate demand notes, stable value funds, and other similarly structured 
products, noting that while the proposed rule did not provide outflow 
rates for these categories, the Basel III Liquidity Framework provided 
for national discretion when determining rates for such products.
    The agencies are clarifying that the final rule excludes from 
outflows operational costs, because the agencies believe that assets 
specifically designated to cover costs, such as wages, rents, or 
facility maintenance, generally would not be available to cover 
liquidity needs that arise during stressed market conditions.
    The final rule does not provide a specific outflow rate for trade 
finance obligations that are subject to the movement of goods or the 
provision of services. This would include documentary trade letters of 
credit; documentary and clean collection; import and export bills; and 
guarantees directly related to trade finance obligations, such as 
shipping guarantees. Instead, a covered company should calculate 
outflow amounts for lending commitments, such as direct import or 
export financing for non-financial firms, in accordance with Sec.  
_.32(e) of the final rule.
    Under the final rule, variable rate demand note amounts payable 
within 30 calendar days of a calculation date will be treated as a 
committed liquidity facility to a financial sector entity and will 
receive a 100 percent outflow rate pursuant to Sec.  _.32(e)(1)(vii) of 
the final rule. The agencies believe that this treatment is appropriate 
because such payments would likely be made by a covered company to 
support amounts coming due within 30 calendar days of a calculation 
date. With respect to an implicit agreement to guarantee a covered 
company's sponsored product, covered companies may be prohibited from 
doing so under Sec.  _.13 of the BHC Act, and such support has long 
been discouraged by the agencies.\85\ If, however, a covered company's 
guarantee is in the form of a guaranteed investment contract (GIC) or a 
synthetic GIC (commonly referred to as a wrapper), then it will be 
treated as a commitment to a financial sector entity or SPE as 
appropriate under Sec.  _.32(e)(1)(vii) or (viii) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See, e.g., OCC, Board, FDIC, and SEC, ``Prohibitions and 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Certain Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds,'' 
79 FR 5536, 5790 (January 31, 2014); ``Interagency Policy on Banks/
Thrifts Providing Financial Support to Funds Advised by the Banking 
Organization or its Affiliates,'' OCC Bulletin 2004-2, Federal 
Reserve Supervisory Letter 04-1, FDIC FIL-1-2004 (January 5, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

m. Excluded Amounts for Intragroup Transactions
    The proposed rule would have excluded from a covered company's 
outflows and inflows all transactions between the covered company and a 
consolidated subsidiary or between consolidated subsidiaries of a 
covered company. Such transactions were excluded on the grounds that 
they would not result in a net liquidity change for a covered company 
on a consolidated basis.
    One commenter expressed concern that section 32(h) of the proposed 
rule was contrary to the symmetrical treatment of funding provided by 
and to

[[Page 61510]]

covered companies and its subsidiaries and between its subsidiaries in 
section 32(m)(1), which would have entirely excluded outflows arising 
from transactions between the covered company and its consolidated 
subsidiary. Consistent with the proposed rule's section 32(m), the 
final rule excludes from a covered company's outflows and inflows all 
transactions between the covered company and a consolidated subsidiary 
or between consolidated subsidiaries of a covered company. As discussed 
above under II.C.3.h, to address commenters concerns, the agencies have 
clarified that the 100 percent affiliate outflow rate under Sec.  
_.32(h)(2) of the final rule applies solely to funding from a 
consolidated subsidiary of the same top-tier company of which the 
covered company is a consolidated subsidiary, but that is not a 
consolidated subsidiary of the covered company, due to the lack of the 
consolidation of the inflows and outflows with the covered company 
under applicable accounting standards. Accordingly, the agencies have 
removed the language from proposed Sec.  _.32(h)(2) that would have 
applied the outflow rate to funding from a consolidated subsidiary of 
the covered company.
4. Inflow Amounts
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company's total cash inflow 
amount would be the lesser of: (1) the sum of the cash inflow amounts 
as described in Sec.  _.33 of the proposed rule; and (2) 75 percent of 
the expected cash outflows as calculated under Sec.  _.32 of the 
proposed rule. Similar to the total cash outflow amount, the total cash 
inflow amount would have been calculated by multiplying the outstanding 
balances of contractual receivables and other cash inflows as of a 
calculation date by the inflow rates described in Sec.  _.33 of the 
proposed rule. In addition, the proposed rule would have excluded 
certain inflows from the cash inflow amounts, as described immediately 
below. The agencies have adopted this structure for calculating total 
cash inflows in the final rule, with certain updates to the proposed 
inflow rates to address comments received.
a. Items Not Included as Inflows
    Under the proposed rule, the agencies identified six categories of 
items that would have been explicitly excluded from cash inflows. These 
exclusions were meant to ensure that the denominator of the proposed 
LCR would not be influenced by potential cash inflows that may not be 
reliable sources of liquidity during a stressed scenario. The first 
excluded category would have consisted of any inflows derived from 
amounts that a covered company holds in operational deposits at other 
regulated financial companies. Because these deposits are made for 
operational purposes, the agencies reasoned that it would be unlikely 
that a covered company would be able to withdraw these funds in a 
crisis to meet other liquidity needs, and therefore excluded them. The 
final rule adopts this provision as proposed. The agencies expect 
covered companies to understand what deposits they have placed at other 
financial companies that are operational in nature and to use the same 
methodology to assess the operational nature of its deposits at other 
financial companies as it uses to assess the operational nature of 
their deposit liabilities from other financial companies.
    A commenter requested clarification as to whether cash held at 
agent banks for other than operational purposes can count towards a 
covered company's HQLA or inflow amount. The agencies are clarifying 
that, depending on the manner in which the cash is held, it may qualify 
as an unsecured payment contractually payable to the covered company by 
a financial sector entity under Sec.  _.33(d)(1) of the final rule, in 
which case it would be subject to a 100 percent inflow rate. As 
discussed in section II.B.2.c above such placements do not meet the 
criteria for inclusion as HQLA.
    The second category would have excluded amounts that a covered 
company expects to receive or is contractually entitled to receive from 
derivative transactions due to forward sales of mortgage loans and any 
derivatives that are mortgage commitments.
    Two commenters recommended that the agencies distinguish forward 
sales of mortgage loans under GSE standby programs from other warehouse 
facilities, reasoning that the nature of the commitments provided under 
those programs and the creditworthiness of the GSEs should permit each 
covered company to include 100 percent of its notional balances under 
GSE standby programs as an inflow. Commenters argued that, unlike a 
warehouse facility, which involves the counterparty risk of a non-
government-sponsored enterprise and the potential that loans will not 
close or will have incomplete loan documents, GSE standby programs 
include only closed and funded loans with the liquidity option provided 
directly by FNMA and FHLMC. According to the commenters, the loans are 
always eligible to be delivered to FNMA and FHLMC regardless of credit 
deterioration. Another commenter remarked on the asymmetry of the 
proposed rule's treatment of commitments, noting that if a covered 
company must include loan commitments in its outflows, then it should 
be allowed to include forward commitments to sell loans to GSEs in its 
inflows.
    A commenter argued that the proposed rule would discourage covered 
companies from investing in the housing industry or GSE-backed 
securities because these would be subject to a 15 percent haircut when 
counted as HQLA and any expected inflow from mortgage commitments 
within the next 30 days would be excluded from the net outflow 
calculation. This commenter noted that it is unclear what impact this 
treatment would have on the mortgage markets.
    The agencies recognize that covered companies may receive inflows 
as a result of the sale of mortgages or derivatives that are mortgage 
commitments within 30 days after the calculation date. However, the 
agencies believe that there are some potential liquidity risks from 
mortgage operations that should be captured in the LCR. During the 
recent financial crisis, it was evident that many institutions were 
unable to rapidly reduce mortgage lending pipelines even as market 
demand for mortgages slowed. Because of these liquidity risks, the 
final rule requires an outflow rate for mortgage commitments of 10 
percent, with an exclusion of inflows. On balance, the agencies believe 
the 10 percent outflow rate for commitments coupled with no recognition 
of inflows is appropriate due to the risks evidenced in the recent 
financial crisis. The agencies are therefore finalizing this aspect of 
the rule as proposed.
    The third excluded category would have comprised amounts arising 
from any credit or liquidity facility extended to a covered company. 
The agencies believe that in a stress scenario, inflows from such 
facilities may not materialize due to restrictive covenants or 
termination clauses. Furthermore, reliance by covered companies on 
inflows from credit facilities with other financial entities would 
materially increase the interconnectedness within the system. Thus, the 
material financial distress at one institution could result in 
additional strain throughout the financial system as the company draws 
down its lines of credit. Because of these likelihoods, the proposed 
rule would not have counted a covered company's credit and liquidity 
facilities as inflows.

[[Page 61511]]

    Some commenters recommended that at least 50 percent of the unused 
portions of a covered company's committed borrowing capacity at a FHLB 
be treated as an inflow under the final rule. Commenters requested that 
the agencies allow a banking organization to increase its inflow 
amounts and thus decrease the denominator of its LCR by an amount equal 
to at least 50 percent of the unused borrowing commitments from an 
FHLB. The agencies have considered the role that FHLB borrowings played 
in the recent crisis and have decided not to recognize collateralized 
lines of credit in favor of promoting on-balance sheet liquidity.
    A commenter requested that the agencies revisit the assumptions 
about asymmetric outflows and inflows under credit and liquidity 
facilities. The commenter proposed that a covered nonbank company be 
permitted to include amounts from committed credit and liquidity 
facilities extended to covered companies as inflows at the same rates 
at which it would be required to assume outflows if it extended the 
same facilities to the same counterparties, but only if the facilities 
do not contain material adverse change clauses, financial covenants, or 
other terms that could allow a counterparty to cancel the facility if 
the covered company experienced stress. According to the commenter, the 
balance sheet and funding profile of covered nonbank companies are 
substantially different from other covered companies.
    The agencies continue to emphasize the importance of on-balance 
sheet liquidity and not the capacity to draw upon a facility, which, as 
stated above, may or may not materialize in a liquidity stress scenario 
even where the facilities do not contain material adverse change 
clauses or financial covenants. During a period of material financial 
distress, companies may not be in a position to extend funds under the 
facilities. Therefore, the agencies are adopting this provision in the 
final rule as proposed.
    The fourth excluded category of inflows would have consisted of 
amounts included in a covered company's HQLA amount under Sec.  _.21 of 
the proposed rule and any amount payable to the covered company with 
respect to those assets. The agencies reasoned that because HQLA is 
already included in the numerator at fair market value, including such 
amounts as inflows would result in double counting. Consistent with the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, this exclusion also would have 
included all HQLA that mature within 30 calendar days of a calculation 
date. The agencies received no comments on this provision of the 
proposed rule and have adopted it in the final rule without change.
    The fifth excluded category of inflows would have comprised amounts 
payable to the covered company or any outstanding exposure to a 
customer or counterparty that is a nonperforming asset as of a 
calculation date or that the covered company has reason to expect will 
become a nonperforming exposure 30 calendar days or less from a 
calculation date. Under the proposed rule, a nonperforming exposure was 
defined as any exposure that is past due by more than 90 calendar days 
or on nonaccrual status. This provision recognized the potential that a 
covered company will not receive the full inflow amounts due from a 
nonperforming customer. The agencies received no comments on this 
provision of the proposed rule and have retained it in the final rule 
as proposed.
    The sixth excluded category of inflows would have comprised items 
that have no contractual maturity date or items that mature more than 
30 calendar days after a calculation date. The agencies are concerned 
that in a time of liquidity stress a covered company's counterparties 
will not pay amounts that are not contractually required in order to 
maintain their own liquidity or balance sheet. Items that mature more 
than 30 calendar days after a calculation date generally fall outside 
of the scope of the net cash outflow denominator.
    The agencies received several comments relating to the treatment of 
the term of margin loans and, more generally, the maturity treatment of 
secured transactions that may be interrelated. The treatment of these 
secured transactions is described in section II.C.4.f, below.
    Another commenter stated that loans that are offered on an open 
maturity basis and contractually due on demand, such as trade 
receivables, should be included as inflows rather than excluded as 
items that do not have a contractual maturity date under proposed Sec.  
_.33(a)(6).
    Section _.31 of the final rule describes how a covered company must 
determine the maturity date of a transaction for the purposes of the 
rule. The agencies have revised this provision to provide a maturity 
date for certain non-maturity transactions that would have otherwise 
been excluded as inflows under the final rule. Thus, as discussed 
below, certain unsecured wholesale cash inflows (including non-maturity 
deposits at other financial sector entities) and secured lending 
transactions, are treated as maturing on the first calendar day after 
the calculation date. The agencies recognize these specific inflows as 
day-one inflows to reflect symmetry in the outflow assumptions. Any 
other non-maturity inflow would be excluded under this provision.
b. Net Derivatives Cash Inflow Amount
    In Sec.  _.33(b) of the proposed rule, the agencies proposed that a 
covered company's net derivative cash inflow amount would equal the sum 
of the payments and collateral that a covered company will receive from 
each counterparty to its derivative transactions, less, for each 
counterparty, if subject to a qualifying master netting agreement, the 
sum of payments and collateral that the covered company will make or 
deliver to each counterparty. This calculation would have incorporated 
the amounts due from and to counterparties under applicable 
transactions within 30 calendar days of a calculation date. Netting 
would have been permissible at the highest level permitted by a covered 
company's contracts with a counterparty and could not include off-
setting inflows where a covered company has included as eligible HQLA 
any assets that the counterparty has posted to support those inflows. 
If the derivatives transactions are not subject to a qualifying master 
netting agreement, then the derivative cash inflows for that 
counterparty would have been included in the net derivative cash inflow 
amount and the derivative cash outflows for that counterparty would 
have been included in the net derivative cash outflow amount, without 
any netting. Under the proposed rule, the net derivative cash inflow 
amount would have been calculated in accordance with existing valuation 
methodologies and expected contractual derivative cash flows. In the 
event that the net derivative cash inflow for a particular counterparty 
was less than zero, such amount would have been required to be included 
in a covered company's net derivative cash outflow amount for that 
counterparty.
    As with the net derivative cash outflow amount, pursuant to Sec.  
_.33(a)(2), the net derivative cash inflow amount would not have 
included amounts arising in connection with forward sales of mortgage 
loans and derivatives that are mortgage commitments. The net derivative 
cash inflow amount would have included derivatives that hedge interest 
rate risk associated with a mortgage pipeline.
    The agencies received no comments unique to this provision of the 
proposed

[[Page 61512]]

rule. All related comments focused on the net derivatives cash outflow 
amount provision. This provision was intended to complement the net 
derivatives cash outflow amount provision, and the provision that would 
apply at any given time would depend on whether the covered company had 
a net ``due to'' or ``due from'' position with the counterparty. In the 
final rule, the agencies have made changes to Sec.  _.33(b) that are 
consistent with the changes described above in section II.C.3.c that 
the agencies made to Sec.  _.32(c). In both cases, the agencies have 
permitted the netting of foreign currency exchange derivative 
transactions that result in the full exchange of cash principal 
payments in different currencies within the same business day. As with 
all net cash inflows, any resulting net derivatives cash inflow amount 
would be subject to the overall 75 percent cap on total net inflows.
c. Retail Cash Inflow Amount
    The proposed rule would have allowed a covered company to count as 
an inflow 50 percent of all contractual payments it expects to receive 
within 30 calendar days from retail customers and counterparties. This 
inflow rate reflected the agencies' expectation that covered companies 
will need to maintain a portion of their retail lending activity even 
during periods of liquidity stress. The agencies received no comments 
on this provision of the proposed rule and have retained it in the 
final rule as proposed.
d. Unsecured Wholesale Cash Inflow Amount
    The agencies believed that for purposes of the proposed rule, all 
wholesale inflows (for example, principal and interest receipts) from 
financial sector entities (and consolidated subsidiaries thereof) and 
from central banks generally would have been available to meet a 
covered company's liquidity needs. Therefore, the agencies proposed to 
assign such inflows a rate of 100 percent.
    The agencies also expect covered companies to maintain ample 
liquidity to sustain core businesses lines, including continuing to 
extend credit to retail customers and wholesale customers and 
counterparties that are not financial sector entities. Indeed, one 
purpose of the proposed rule was to ensure that covered companies would 
have sufficient liquidity to sustain such business lines during a 
period of liquidity stress. While the agencies acknowledge that, in 
times of liquidity stress, covered companies can curtail some activity 
to a limited extent, covered companies would likely continue to renew 
at least a portion of maturing credit and extend some new loans due to 
reputational and business considerations. Therefore, the agencies 
proposed to apply an inflow rate of 50 percent for inflows due from 
wholesale customers or counterparties that are not financial sector 
entities, or consolidated subsidiaries thereof. With respect to 
revolving credit facilities, already drawn amounts would not have been 
included in a covered company's inflow amount, and undrawn amounts 
would be treated as outflows under Sec.  _.32(e) of the proposed rule. 
This is based upon the agencies' assumption that a covered company's 
counterparty would not repay funds it is not contractually obligated to 
repay in a stressed scenario.
    A commenter requested that the final rule provide a 100 percent 
inflow treatment for inflows due from trade financing activities with a 
residual maturity of 30 calendar days or less as of the calculation 
date, rather than the overall 50 percent outflow for non-financial 
sector entities. Trade finance receivables coming due from non-
financial corporate entities that are contractually due within 30 days 
receive the same treatment as other loans coming due from non-financial 
counterparties and that is a 50 percent inflow. This recognizes that 
the covered company will likely have new lending and loan renewals for 
at least a portion of loans coming due within the next 30 days. The 
agencies continue to believe that these inflow rates accurately reflect 
the effect of material liquidity stress upon an institution, as 
described above, and are thus adopting this provision of the final rule 
as proposed.
    One commenter requested clarification regarding the proposed rule's 
treatment of fee income. The commenter argued that unless fee income is 
included under wholesale payments, there appeared to be no provision or 
discussion of the possibility that fee income will greatly decline 
during market stress. The agencies consider fee income to be a 
contractual payment and its inflow rate would depend on whether the 
counterparty owing the fee is a retail customer or counterparty (in 
which case the inflow rate would be 50 percent under Sec.  _.33(c)), a 
financial sector entity or central bank (in which case the inflow rate 
would be 100 percent under Sec.  _.33(d)(1)), or a non-financial sector 
wholesale customer or counterparty (in which case the inflow rate would 
be 50 percent under Sec.  _.33(d)(2)).
e. Securities Cash Inflow Amount
    The proposed rule would have provided that inflows from securities 
owned by a covered company that were not included in a covered 
company's HQLA amount and that would mature within 30 calendar days of 
the calculation date would have received a 100 percent inflow rate. 
Such amounts would have included all contractual dividend, interest, 
and principal payments due and expected to be paid to a covered company 
within 30 calendar days of a calculation date, regardless of their 
liquidity. The agencies received no comments on this provision of the 
proposed rule and have retained it in the final rule.
f. Secured Lending and Asset Exchange Cash Inflow Amounts
i. Definitions and Inflow Rates
    The proposed rule provided that a covered company would be able to 
recognize cash inflows from secured lending transactions that matured 
within 30 calendar days of a calculation date. The proposed rule would 
have defined a secured lending transaction as any lending transaction 
that gave rise to a cash obligation of a counterparty to a covered 
company that was secured under applicable law by a lien on specifically 
designated assets owned by the counterparty and included in the covered 
company's HQLA amount that gave the covered company, as a holder of the 
lien, priority over the assets in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, or resolution. Secured lending transactions would have 
included reverse repurchase transactions, margin loans, and securities 
borrowing transactions.
    The proposed rule would have assigned inflow rates to all 
contractual payments due to the covered company under secured lending 
transactions based on the quality of the assets securing the 
transaction. These inflow rates generally would have complemented the 
outflow rates on secured funding transactions under Sec.  _.32(j)(1) of 
the proposed rule. Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, the inflow amount from secured lending transactions or the 
outflow amount from secured funding transactions would have been 
calculated on the basis of each transaction individually. However, the 
symmetry between the proposed inflow and outflow rates recognized the 
benefits of a matched book approach to managing secured transactions, 
where applicable. The proposed rule also would have assigned a 50 
percent inflow rate to the contractual payments

[[Page 61513]]

due from customers that had borrowed on margin, where such margin loans 
were collateralized by assets that were not HQLA.
    While the provisions relating to secured lending transactions 
governed the cash obligations of counterparties, the proposed rule 
would have defined asset exchanges as the transfer of non-cash assets. 
A covered company's liquidity position may improve in instances where a 
counterparty is contractually obligated to deliver higher quality 
assets to the covered company in return for less liquid, lower-quality 
assets. The proposed rule would have reflected this through the 
proposed asset exchange inflow rates, which were based on a comparison 
of the quality of the asset to be delivered by a covered company with 
the quality of the asset to be received from a counterparty. Asset 
exchange inflow rates progressively increased on a spectrum that ranged 
from a zero percent inflow rate where a covered company would be 
receiving assets that are the same HQLA level as the assets that it 
would be required to deliver through a 100 percent inflow rate where a 
covered company would be receiving assets that are of significantly 
higher quality than the assets that it would be required to deliver.
    Many commenters noted that a contradiction existed between the 
definition of a secured lending transaction under the proposed rule, 
which would have been limited to transactions that were secured by 
assets included in the covered company's HQLA amount, and the proposed 
secured lending transaction cash inflow amounts which would have 
recognized inflows for secured lending transactions that are secured by 
assets that are not HQLA. Commenters therefore requested that the final 
rule clarify that the 100 percent inflow rate would be applied to 
transactions secured by assets that are not eligible HQLA. In addition, 
other commenters objected to the fact that the proposed rule applied 
inflow rates for secured lending transactions secured by level 1, level 
2A, and level 2B liquid assets only when the assets were eligible HQLA. 
These commenters argued that the difference in phrasing could lead to 
uncertainty about the treatment of transactions secured by liquid 
assets that are not included in a company's eligible HQLA because the 
operational requirements are not satisfied. Moreover, the commenters 
argued that the perceived matched book parity of the proposed rule 
would not apply to a large number of transactions that actually have 
matched maturities.
    As described in section II.B.3 of this Supplementary Information 
section, the agencies recognized the need to clarify the distinction 
between the criteria for assets identified as HQLA in Sec. _.20 of the 
final rule and the requirements for eligible HQLA set forth in 
Sec. _.22 of the final rule. The agencies recognize that secured 
lending transactions may be secured by assets that are not eligible 
HQLA and agree with commenters that the definition of secured lending 
transaction was too narrow and that it should be revised to remove the 
requirement that the collateral securing a secured lending transaction 
must be eligible HQLA. Therefore, under the final rule, secured lending 
transactions include the cash obligations of counterparties to the 
covered company that are secured by assets that are HQLA regardless of 
whether the HQLA is eligible HQLA and also include the cash obligations 
of counterparties that are secured by assets that are not HQLA. 
Accordingly, the agencies have amended the requirements for the secured 
lending transaction inflow amounts under Sec. _.33(f) of the final rule 
to remove the references to the requirement that the assets securing a 
secured lending transaction be eligible HQLA.
    The agencies continue to believe that the inflow rate for a secured 
lending transaction that has a maturity date (as determined under Sec.  
_.31 of the final rule) within 30 calendar days should be based on the 
type of collateral that is used to secure that transaction. Generally, 
the agencies assume that upon the maturity of a secured lending 
transaction, the covered company may be obligated to return the 
collateral to the counterparty and receive cash from the counterparty 
in fulfilment of the counterparty's cash obligation. Therefore, for the 
purpose of recognizing a cash inflow, it is crucial that the collateral 
securing a secured lending transaction be identified as being available 
for return to the counterparty at the maturity of the transaction.
    Under the final rule, the secured lending transaction inflow rates 
are designed to complement the outflow rates for secured funding 
transactions (that are not secured funding transactions conducted with 
sovereigns, multilateral development banks, or U.S. GSEs and are not 
customer short positions facilitated by other customers' collateral) 
secured by the same quality of collateral and, for collateral that is 
held by the covered company as eligible HQLA,\86\ the haircuts for the 
various categories of HQLA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ The agencies reiterate that a covered company cannot treat 
an asset as eligible HQLA that it received with rehypothecation 
rights if the owner has the contractual right to withdraw the asset 
without an obligation to pay more than de minimis remuneration at 
any time during the prospective 30 calendar-day period per 
Sec. _.22(b)(5) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the case of a secured lending transaction that matures within 30 
calendar days of a calculation date that is secured by an asset that is 
not held by the covered company as eligible HQLA, but where the 
collateral has not been rehypothecated such that the asset is still 
held by the covered company and is available for immediate return to 
the counterparty, the agencies have adopted a 100 percent inflow rate 
(except for margin loans secured by assets that are not HQLA, which 
will receive a 50 percent inflow rate). Unlike secured lending 
transactions where collateral is held as eligible HQLA and is therefore 
included in the calculation of the HQLA amount at the calculation date, 
the agencies determined that the inflow for transactions where 
collateral is not held as eligible HQLA but is available for immediate 
return to the counterparty should receive a 100 percent inflow 
reflecting the settlement of the counterparty's cash obligation at the 
maturity date.
    Section II.C.4.ii below discusses instances where the collateral 
securing the secured lending transaction has been rehypothecated in 
another transaction as of a calculation date. The inflow rates applied 
to maturing secured lending transactions are shown in Table 4a.
    With respect to asset exchange inflows, the agencies did not 
receive significant comments on the proposed rule's treatment of asset 
exchanges and are adopting them in the final rule largely as proposed 
(Table 4b.). However, the agencies are clarifying for purposes of the 
final rule that where a covered company has rehypothecated an asset 
received from a counterparty in an asset exchange transaction, a zero 
percent inflow rate would be applied to the transaction under the final 
rule, reflecting the agencies' concern that the covered company would 
be required to purchase the asset on the open market to settle the 
asset exchange, as described for assets exchange outflows in section 
II.C.3.j above.
ii. The Reuse of Collateral and Certain Prime Brokerage Transactions
    The proposed rule would have applied a 50 percent inflow rate to 
inflows from collateralized margin loans that are secured by assets 
that are not HQLA and that are not reused by the covered company to 
cover any of its short positions. Several commenters

[[Page 61514]]

requested that the agencies expand this inflow rate to also apply to 
collateralized margin loans that are secured by collateral that is 
eligible HQLA or otherwise held at the covered company and not reused 
in any other transaction.\87\ These commenters also suggested this 
proposed 50 percent inflow rate should be applied regardless of the 
maturity of the loan because, although such margin loans may have a 
contractual maturity date that is more than 30 calendar days from a 
calculation date, the contractual agreements would require the customer 
to repay the loan in the event the customer's portfolio composition 
materially changes. Commenters argued that the agencies had not taken 
into account that a significant portion of prime brokerage business 
consists of short-term secured financing, such as margin loans and 
loans of securities to effect customer short positions. Commenters also 
expressed concern that the terms of certain contracts, such as term 
margin agreements, require customers to maintain market neutral 
portfolios with increasing margin requirements and reduced leverage or 
financing based on the level of asymmetry between customer long and 
short positions. In particular, commenters requested that the agencies 
recognize collateralized term margin loans not secured by HQLA as 
generating inflows regardless of maturity because financings under term 
margin loans are designed to be treated as overnight transactions that 
are due on demand if the customer does not satisfy the loan terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ As discussed above, the agencies have adopted a 100 percent 
inflow rate for all secured lending transactions that are secured by 
assets that are not eligible HQLA, have not been rehypothecated by 
the bank, and are available for the immediate return to the 
counterparty at any time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More generally, commenters asked that the agencies revise the 
proposed rule such that it more fully capture the matched secured 
lending and secured funding transactions that occur in prime brokerage 
and matched book activity. As addressed in section II.C.1. b of this 
Supplementary Information section, commenters also requested that 
certain related inflow amounts be excluded from the aggregate cap on 
inflows in calculating the net cash inflow amount. Commenters asked the 
agencies to reevaluate the treatment of matched transactions based on 
whether the collateral is rehypothecated or remains in inventory and 
based on the term of the secured funding transaction to determine the 
covered company's net cash outflow over a 30 calendar-day period.
    The agencies recognize that prime brokerage, matched book, and 
other activities conducted at covered companies make significant use of 
the rehypothecation of collateral that may have been provided for use 
by the covered company through secured lending transactions and asset 
exchanges (together with derivative assets, other secured counterparty 
obligations, or other transactions). Beyond the reuse of specific 
collateral, the agencies also recognize the potential interrelationship 
of certain transactions within prime brokerage activities, both at an 
individual customer level (for example, through market neutrality 
requirements) and in the aggregate portfolio of customers. Consistent 
with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the agencies do not 
believe that a 100 percent inflow rate for all margin loans secured by 
assets that are not HQLA and that mature within 30 calendar days of a 
calculation date is appropriate. The 50 percent inflow rate on these 
margin loans recognizes that not all margin loans may pay down during a 
stress period and covered companies may have to continue to fund a 
proportion of margin loans over time. In requiring the 50 percent 
inflow rate on such margin loans, the agencies note the symmetry with 
the secured funding transaction outflow rate required for customer 
short positions that are covered by other customers' collateral that is 
not HQLA. The agencies believe this symmetrical treatment balances the 
general treatment of individual secured funding and secured lending 
transactions under the rule with certain relationships that may 
potentially apply within prime brokerage activities, including 
contractual market neutrality clauses applicable to certain customers 
and certain aggregate customer behaviors. The agencies are further 
clarifying that margin loans secured by HQLA are required to apply the 
inflow rates applicable to any other type of secured lending 
transaction secured by the same collateral, including inflow rates 
applicable to collateral that is eligible HQLA. As discussed in section 
II.C.1.b above, although the final rule permits the use of specified 
netting in the determination of certain transaction amounts, no 
individual inflow categories are exempt from the aggregate cap of 
inflows at 75 percent of gross outflows in the net cash inflow amount 
calculation.
    The agencies believe that, consistent with other foundational 
elements of the final rule, secured lending transactions that have a 
maturity date as determined under the final rule of greater than 30 
calendar days from a calculation date should be excluded from the LCR 
calculation. Similarly, the agencies believe this principle should be 
maintained in respect to margin loans with remaining contractual terms 
of greater than 30 calendar days from a calculation date because a 
covered company may not rely on inflows that are not required, by 
relevant contractual terms, to occur within the 30 calendar-day period 
of the LCR calculation. With respect to margin loans that are secured 
by HQLA, the agencies believe that the inflow rates applied to secured 
lending transactions, which are complementary to the outflow rates for 
secured funding transactions that are secured by HQLA, are appropriate 
given the cash obligation of the counterparty. Moreover, where margin 
loans are secured by assets that the covered company includes as 
eligible HQLA, the inflow rates applied to the secured lending 
transactions would be complementary to the haircut assumptions for the 
various categories of HQLA and also are appropriate given the cash 
obligation of the counterparty and the covered company's obligation to 
return the value of the HQLA.
    The agencies are aware that collateral may be rehypothecated to 
secure a secured funding transaction or other transaction or obligation 
(or delivered in an asset exchange) that matures either within 30 
calendar days of a calculation date, or that matures more than 30 
calendar days after a calculation date. In either case, different 
inflow rates are applied under the final rule to the secured lending 
transaction (or asset exchange) that provides the collateral in order 
to address the interdependency with the secured funding transaction (or 
asset exchange) for which the collateral was reused.
    If the transaction or obligation for which the collateral has been 
reused has a maturity date (as determined under Sec.  _.31 of the final 
rule) within 30 calendar days of a calculation date, the covered 
company may anticipate receiving, or regaining access to, the 
collateral within the 30-day period. Assuming that the maturities are 
matched or that the maturity of the secured lending transaction is 
later than that of the secured funding transaction, the covered company 
may therefore anticipate having the collateral available at the 
maturity of the secured lending transaction (or asset exchange) from 
which the collateral was originally obtained. Accordingly, under the 
final rule, if collateral obtained from a secured lending transaction 
(or received from a prior asset exchange) that

[[Page 61515]]

matures within 30 calendar days of a calculation date is reused in a 
secured funding transaction (or delivered in a second asset exchange) 
that matures within 30 calendar days of a calculation date, the covered 
company may recognize an inflow from the secured lending transaction 
(or prior asset exchange) as occurring at the maturity date.\88\ As 
required under Sec.  _.31 of the final rule, the maturity of this 
secured lending transaction (or prior asset exchange) must be no 
earlier than the secured funding transaction (or second asset 
exchange). This treatment will generally apply a symmetric treatment 
for outflows and inflows occurring within a 30 calendar-day period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ The amount of the inflow would be determined by whether the 
collateral that the covered company received in the secured lending 
transaction or prior asset exchange was HQLA or non-HQLA as 
summarized in Tables 4a and 4b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
final rule will not recognize inflows from secured lending transactions 
(or asset exchanges) that mature within 30 calendar days from a 
calculation date where the collateral received is reused in a secured 
funding transaction (or asset exchange) that matures more than 30 
calendar days from the calculation date, or where the collateral is 
otherwise reused in a transaction or to cover any obligation that could 
extend beyond 30 calendar days from a calculation date. This is because 
a covered company should assume that such secured lending transaction 
(or asset exchange) may need to be rolled over and will not give rise 
to a cash (or net collateral) inflow, reflecting its need to continue 
to cover the secured funding transaction (or asset exchange or other 
transaction or obligation). For example, a covered company would not 
recognize an inflow from a margin loan that matures within 30 calendar 
days of a calculation date if the loan was secured by collateral that 
had been reused in a term repurchase transaction that matured more than 
30 calendar days from a calculation date.
    Tables 4a and 4b summarize the inflow rates for secured lending 
transactions and asset exchanges.

           Table 4a--Secured Lending Transaction Inflow Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Secured lending
                                                          inflow rate
Categories for secured lending transactions maturing      applied to
   within 30 calendar days of the calculation date        contractual
                                                       amounts due from
                                                       the counterparty
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset securing the secured lending transaction is included in
 the covered company's eligible HQLA as of the calculation date, and the
 transaction is:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secured by level 1 liquid assets....................                  0%
Secured by level 2A liquid assets...................                 15%
Secured by level 2B liquid assets...................                 50%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset securing the secured lending transaction is not included
 in the covered company's eligible HQLA as of the calculation date but
 is still held by the covered company and is available for immediate
 return to the counterparty, and the transaction is:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secured by level 1, level 2A or level 2B liquid                     100%
 assets.............................................
A collateralized margin loan secured by assets that                  50%
 are not HQLA.......................................
Not a collateralized margin loan and is secured by                  100%
 assets that are not HQLA...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset securing the secured lending transaction has been
 rehypothecated and used to secure, or has been delivered into, any
 transaction or obligation which:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Will not mature or expire within 30 calendar days or                  0%
 may extend beyond 30 calendar days of the
 calculation date...................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset securing the secured lending transaction has been
 rehypothecated and used to secure any secured funding transaction or
 obligation, or delivered in an asset exchange, that will mature within
 30 calendar days of the calculation date,* and the secured lending
 transaction is:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secured by level 1 liquid assets....................                  0%
Secured by level 2A liquid assets...................                 15%
Secured by level 2B liquid assets...................                 50%
A collateralized margin loan secured by assets that                  50%
 are not HQLA.......................................
Not a collateralized margin loan and is secured by                  100%
 assets that are not HQLA...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Under Sec.  --.31(a)(3) of the final rule, the maturity date of the
  secured lending transaction cannot be earlier than the maturity date
  of the secured funding transaction or asset exchange.


                  Table 4b--Asset Exchange Inflow Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Covered company
 Covered company will receive at       must post at      Asset exchange
             maturity                    maturity          inflow rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset originally received in the asset exchange has not been
 rehypothecated to secure any transaction or obligation, or delivered in
 an asset exchange, that will mature or expire more than 30 calendar
 days from a calculation date or may extend beyond 30 calendar days of a
 calculation date: **
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 1 liquid assets............  Level 1 liquid                     0%
                                    assets.
Level 1 liquid assets............  Level 2A liquid                   15%
                                    assets.
Level 1 liquid assets............  Level 2B liquid                   50%
                                    assets.
Level 1 liquid assets............  Assets that are not              100%
                                    HQLA.

[[Page 61516]]

 
Level 2A liquid assets...........  Level 1 or level 2A                0%
                                    liquid assets.
Level 2A liquid assets...........  Level 2B liquid                   35%
                                    assets.
Level 2A liquid assets...........  Assets that are not               85%
                                    HQLA.
Level 2B liquid assets...........  Level 1 or level 2A                0%
                                    or level 2B liquid
                                    assets.
Level 2B liquid assets...........  Assets that are not               50%
                                    HQLA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the asset originally received in the asset                      0%
 exchange has been rehypothecated to secure any
 transaction or obligation, or delivered in an asset
 exchange, which will mature or expire more than 30
 calendar days from the calculation date or may extend
 beyond 30 calendar days of the calculation date:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
** Under Sec.  --.31(a)(3) of the final rule, the maturity date of the
  asset exchange cannot be earlier than the maturity date of the
  transaction or obligation for which the collateral was reused.

g. Segregated Account Inflow Amount
    Several commenters noted that unlike the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, the proposed rule did not recognize inflows from 
the release of assets held in segregated accounts in accordance with 
regulatory requirements for the protection of customer trading assets, 
such as Rule 15c3-3.\89\ A few commenters argued that Rule 15c3-3 is, 
in effect, a liquidity rule that ensures that broker-dealers have 
sufficient liquid assets to meet their obligations to customers. 
Another commenter argued that by failing to address these assets in the 
proposed rule, the agencies had failed to consider the SEC's functional 
regulation of broker-dealers. Commenters noted that because these 
inflows are not specifically addressed in the proposed rule, the assets 
would be treated as encumbered and would not be eligible to offset 
deposits subject to the outflow rate applicable to affiliated sweep 
deposits. A commenter argued that because of the regulatory regime that 
governs these segregated assets, there is no market risk to the banking 
organization. One commenter requested that the release of balances held 
in segregated accounts be subject to a 100 percent inflow rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies recognize that segregated accounts required for the 
protection of customer trading assets are designed to meet potential 
outflows to customers under certain circumstances. The agencies also 
recognize, however, that such segregated amounts held as of an LCR 
calculation date will be amounts calculated by the covered company at 
or prior to the calculation date and generally on a net basis across 
existing customer free cash, loans, and short positions. The agencies 
acknowledge that these segregated amounts will necessarily be 
recalculated within a 30 calendar-day period, which could potentially 
lead to a reduction in the amount that is required to be segregated, 
and a corresponding release of a portion of the amount held as of a 
calculation date. Accordingly, the agencies have included a provision 
in the final rule that permits a covered company to recognize certain 
inflows from broker-dealer segregated account releases based on the 
change in fair value of the customer segregated account balances 
between the calculation date and 30 calendar days following the 
calculation date.
    The agencies do not believe that 100 percent of the value of 
segregated accounts held as of a calculation date would be an 
appropriate inflow amount because this inflow amount may not, in fact, 
be realized by the covered company. As a general matter, the final rule 
requires outflow amounts and inflow amounts to be calculated by using 
only the balances and transaction amounts at a calculation date, and 
not based on anticipated future balances or obligation amounts. 
However, consistent with the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework, the 
agencies have determined that the appropriate inflow amount for the 
release of broker-dealer segregated account assets is dependent on the 
anticipated amount of broker-dealer segregated account assets that may 
need to be held by the covered company 30 calendar days from a 
calculation date. The anticipated amount of broker-dealer segregated 
account assets that may need to be held 30 calendar days from a 
calculation date should be based on the impact of those outflow and 
inflow amounts described under the final rule that are specifically 
relevant to the calculation of the segregated amount under applicable 
law. The covered company must therefore calculate the anticipated 
required balance of the broker-dealer segregated account assets as of 
30 calendar days from a calculation date, assuming that customer cash 
and collateral positions have changed consistent with the outflow and 
inflow calculations required under Sec.  _.32 and Sec.  _.33 of the 
final rule as applied to any transaction affecting the calculation of 
the segregated balance. If the calculated future balance of the 
segregated account assets is less than the balance at the calculation 
date, then the broker-dealer segregated account inflow amount is the 
value of assets that would be released from the segregated accounts.
    In addition and as discussed above, the agencies have added a 
provision to the maturity date calculation requirements of Sec.  
_.31(a)(5) of the final rule to clarify that broker-dealer segregated 
account inflow under Sec.  _.33(g) will not be deemed to occur until 
the date of the next scheduled calculation of the amount as required 
under applicable legal requirements for the protection of customer 
assets with respect to each broker-dealer segregated account, in 
accordance with the covered company's normal frequency of recalculating 
such requirements. If, for example, a broker-dealer performs this 
calculation on a daily basis, the inflow may occur on the day following 
a calculation date. If a broker-dealer typically performs the 
calculation on a weekly basis, the inflow would be deemed to occur the 
day of the next regularly scheduled calculation.
h. Other Cash Inflow Amounts
    Under the proposed rule, the covered company's inflow amount, as of 
the calculation date, would have included zero percent of other cash 
inflow amounts not described elsewhere in the proposed rule. The 
agencies continue to believe that limiting inflow amounts in the final 
rule to those categories specified, which reflect certain stressed 
assumptions, is important to the calculation of the total cash inflow 
amount and the LCR as a whole. The agencies received no comments on 
this provision of the proposed rule and have retained it in the final 
rule as proposed.

[[Page 61517]]

i. Excluded Amount for Intragroup Transactions
    Under the proposed rule, inflow amounts would not have included 
amounts arising out of transactions between a covered company and its 
consolidated subsidiary or amounts arising out of transactions between 
a consolidated subsidiary of a covered company and another consolidated 
subsidiary of that covered company. The agencies received no comments 
on this provision of the proposed rule and have retained it in the 
final rule.

III. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Shortfall

    Although the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework provides that a 
banking organization is required to maintain an amount of HQLA 
sufficient to meet its liquidity needs within a 30 calendar-day stress 
period, it also makes clear that it may be necessary for a banking 
organization to fall below the requirement during a period of liquidity 
stress. The Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework therefore provides 
that any supervisory decisions in response to a reduction of a banking 
organization's LCR should take into consideration the objectives of the 
Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. This provision of the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework indicates that supervisory actions should 
not discourage or deter a banking organization from using its HQLA when 
necessary to meet unforeseen liquidity needs arising from financial 
stress that exceeds normal business fluctuations.
    The proposed rule included a supervisory framework for addressing a 
shortfall with respect to the rule's LCR that is consistent with the 
intent of having HQLA available for use during stressed conditions, as 
described in the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. This 
supervisory framework included notice and response procedures that 
would have required a covered company to notify its appropriate Federal 
banking agency of any LCR shortfall on any business day, and would have 
provided the appropriate Federal banking agency with flexibility in its 
supervisory response. In addition, if a covered company's LCR fell 
below the minimum requirement for three consecutive business days or if 
its supervisor determined that the covered company is otherwise 
materially noncompliant with the proposed rule, the proposed rule would 
have required the covered company to provide to its supervisor a plan 
for remediation of the liquidity shortfall.
    Some commenters stated that the requirement in the proposed rule to 
report non-compliance to the appropriate Federal banking agency appears 
to contradict the BCBS premise that the stock of HQLA should be 
available for use during periods of stress. Other commenters requested 
that the agencies take into consideration that when an institution's 
LCR falls below 100 percent, it is not necessarily indicative of any 
real liquidity concerns. Commenters expressed concern that disclosure 
requirements under securities laws or stock exchange listing rules 
could require an institution to immediately and publicly report an LCR 
below 100 percent or the adoption of a remediation plan, which would 
make the HQLA de facto unusable during times of stress and could 
exacerbate any burgeoning liquidity stress being experienced. 
Similarly, commenters expressed concern that media reports of an 
institution's LCR falling below100 percent would not necessarily 
reflect the underlying reasons and complexities in the case of a 
temporary LCR shortfall and may create liquidity instability. 
Accordingly, such commenters recommended that any public disclosure at 
the bank holding company level be carefully tailored. Alternatively, 
one commenter requested that any supervisory procedures be triggered 
only when a covered company's LCR has fallen by at least 5 percent for 
a period of at least 3 business days. In order to accommodate normal 
fluctuations in a firm's day-to-day liquidity position, the commenter 
encouraged the agencies to consider providing more flexibility in the 
final rule. One commenter requested that the agencies clarify whether, 
in addition to monitoring a covered company's compliance with the LCR, 
the agencies would be taking other indicators of financial health into 
account. Another commenter noted that daily notification requirements 
to a covered company's appropriate Federal banking agency for non-
compliance with the LCR would detract from the company's critical 
operating duties. Several commenters requested that the agencies 
reconsider the negative connotation of falling below the target ratio 
and the requirement to provide a written remediation plan, which they 
stated would cause the LCR to become a bright line requirement to be 
met each day instead of serving as a cushion for stressful times. One 
commenter requested that the agencies consider making greater use of 
the countercyclical potential of liquidity regulation by permitting 
liquidity requirements to be adjusted upward during periods where 
markets are overheated, similar to the countercyclical capital 
requirements under the Basel III capital framework.
    In the proposed rule, consistent with the Basel III Revised 
Liquidity Framework, the agencies affirmed the principle that a covered 
company's HQLA amount is expected to be available for use to address 
liquidity needs in a time of stress. The agencies believe that the 
proposed LCR shortfall framework would provide them with the 
appropriate amount of supervisory flexibility to respond to LCR 
shortfalls. Depending on the circumstances, an LCR shortfall would not 
have necessarily resulted in supervisory action, but, at a minimum, 
would have resulted in heightened supervisory monitoring. The 
notification procedures that were to be followed whenever a covered 
company dropped below the required LCR were intended to enable 
supervisors to monitor and respond appropriately to the unique 
circumstances that are giving rise to a covered company's LCR 
shortfall. This supervisory monitoring and response would be hindered 
if such notification were only to occur when a covered company dropped 
a specified percentage below the LCR requirement. Such notification may 
give rise to a supervisory or enforcement action, depending on 
operational issues at a covered company, whether the violation is a 
part of a pattern or practice, whether the liquidity shortfall was 
temporary or caused by an unusual event, and the extent of the 
shortfall or noncompliance. The agencies believe the proposed LCR 
shortfall framework provides appropriate supervisory flexibility and 
are adopting it in the final rule substantially as proposed.
    The agencies recognize that there will be a period of time during 
which covered companies will be calculating their LCR on the last day 
of each calendar month, rather than on each business day. Accordingly, 
the final rule requires that during that period, if a covered company's 
LCR is below the required minimum when it is calculated on the last day 
of each calendar month, or if its supervisor has determined that the 
covered company is otherwise materially noncompliant, the covered 
company must promptly consult with the appropriate Federal banking 
agency to determine whether the covered company must provide a written 
remediation plan.
    A covered company dropping below the LCR requirement will 
necessitate allocating resources to address the LCR shortfall. However, 
the agencies believe this allocation of resources is appropriate to 
promote the overall

[[Page 61518]]

safety and soundness of the covered company. As with all supervisory 
monitoring, the agencies will monitor a covered company's compliance 
with the final rule in conjunction with the agencies' overall 
supervisory framework. If necessary, the agencies will adjust the 
supervisory response to address any deterioration in the financial 
condition of a covered company.
    With regard to counter cyclicality, by requiring that ample liquid 
assets be held during favorable conditions such that a covered company 
can use them in times of stress, the LCR effectively works as a 
countercyclical requirement. The agencies are not adding additional 
countercyclical elements to the final rule.
    As noted elsewhere in this Supplementary Information section, the 
proposed rule did not include disclosure requirements for the LCR and 
the agencies anticipate that they will seek comment on reporting 
requirements through a future notice, which will be tailored to 
disclose the appropriate level of information. The agencies are 
clarifying that, other than any public disclosure requirements that may 
be proposed in a separate notice, reports to the agencies of any 
decline in a covered company's LCR below 100 percent, and any related 
supervisory actions would be considered and treated as confidential 
supervisory information.

IV. Transition and Timing

    The proposed rule included a transition period for the LCR that 
would have required covered companies to maintain a minimum LCR as 
follows: 80 percent beginning on January 1, 2015, 90 percent beginning 
on January 1, 2016, and 100 percent beginning on January 1, 2017, and 
thereafter. The proposed transition period accounted for the potential 
implications of the proposed rule on financial markets, credit 
extension, and economic growth and sought to balance these concerns 
with the proposed LCR's important role in promoting a more robust and 
resilient banking sector.
    Commenters expressed concern with: (i) The proposed transition 
period with regard to the operational requirements necessary to meet 
the proposed rule, (ii) the fact that the transition period differs 
from the timetable published in the Basel III Revised Liquidity 
Framework, and (iii) the HQLA shortfall amount that the financial 
system faces. One commenter expressed concern that the proposal was 
premature because the BCBS is currently reviewing ways to reduce the 
complexity and opaqueness of the Basel III capital framework.
    Several commenters stated that compliance with the proposed 
transition timeline would require comprehensive information technology 
improvements and governance processes over a short period of time. One 
commenter noted that covered companies will need to make operational 
changes to comply with the new requirement and that some covered 
companies will need to adjust their asset composition significantly. 
One commenter argued that certain covered companies have not 
historically been subject to formal regulatory reporting requirements 
at the holding company level and that the agencies should consider this 
in determining whether to impose accelerated implementation on these 
companies. The commenter further stated that the implementation 
challenges posed by the proposal would be particularly acute for these 
covered companies and requested that the final rule provide an extended 
transition period for those companies that have not traditionally been 
subject to the regulatory reporting regimes that are applicable to bank 
holding companies. Similarly, two commenters noted that U.S. banking 
organizations that have not been identified as G-SIBs by the Financial 
Stability Board have not been previously required to report their 
liquidity positions on a daily basis under the Board's FR 2052a 
reporting form, and thus these banking organizations have not had time 
to upgrade data and systems to be in a position to comply with the 
proposed rule and its daily reporting requirements. Additionally, 
according to commenters, accelerated implementation would compress the 
full cost and burden of compliance into an extremely brief period for 
these organizations.
    A few commenters requested that the agencies consider that the 
implementation of the proposed LCR requirements would happen 
contemporaneously with the implementation of other resource-intensive 
regulatory requirements, all of which would require changes to the 
infrastructure of banking organizations. Several commenters requested 
that the implementation date of the rule be delayed, with some 
specifically requesting delay by 12 months to begin no earlier than 
January 1, 2016, one commenter requesting a delay by 24 months to begin 
no earlier than January 1, 2017, and another commenter requesting a 
phase-in period of three years.
    Several commenters requested that the proposed transition time 
frame follow the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework. One commenter 
stated that this approach would minimize the likelihood of an adverse 
impact on the financial markets. One commenter stated that an 
accelerated implementation timeline would make it impossible for there 
to be a level playing field for LCR comparison across all 
internationally active banking organizations until 2019 when the Basel 
III Revised Liquidity Framework becomes fully implemented in other 
jurisdictions, and that asymmetrical treatment between the United 
States and Europe will advantage foreign lenders and borrowers, as well 
as their economies.
    A few commenters expressed concern that the proposed transition 
timeline was in part predicated on a level of shortfall in HQLA 
estimated by the agencies. One commenter argued that the empirical 
evidence justifying the agencies' aggregate HQLA amount shortfall 
conclusion on which the implementation timing was based is very limited 
and requested that the agencies revisit the conclusion regarding the 
amount of shortfall. The commenter expressed concern that the shortfall 
assumption may be based on the less stringent approach of the Basel III 
Revised Liquidity Framework. The commenter also expressed concern that 
the estimate of the LCR shortfall does not take into account any 
shortfall that may be present in foreign banking organizations that 
will be required to form an intermediate holding company under the 
Board's Regulation YY,\90\ and thus the estimate of the shortfall is 
likely significantly underestimated.\91\ A commenter stated that its 
analysis indicated that a number of institutions would find it 
difficult to reach a LCR of 80 percent by 2015. Several commenters 
requested that a quantitative impact study be conducted before the 
agencies implement an accelerated implementation schedule. Several 
commenters requested that the agencies clarify the interaction between 
the daily calculation requirement under the proposed rule, and the 
current liquidity reporting that certain firms are undertaking under 
the Board's FR 2052a and Liquidity Monitoring Report (FR 2052b) 
reporting forms. In particular, the commenters expressed concern that 
the agencies would be requiring multiple daily calculations and reports 
with respect to the same data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See 12 CFR 252.153.
    \91\ As noted above, the agencies have not applied the 
requirements of the rule to foreign banking organizations or 
intermediate holding companies that are not otherwise covered 
companies.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 61519]]

    With respect to commenters' concerns regarding the proposed rule's 
deviation from the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework phase-in, the 
agencies believe the accelerated phase-in properly reflects the 
significant progress covered companies have made since the financial 
crisis in enhancing their overall liquidity positions. The agencies 
continue to believe that the minimum level of the LCR that would be 
applicable in each calendar year specified in the proposed transition 
periods is appropriate to ensure that the financial stability benefits 
presented by the standard are appropriately realized. Accordingly, as 
with the proposed rule, the final rule requires covered companies to 
maintain a LCR as follows: 80 percent beginning on January 1, 2015, 90 
percent beginning on January 1, 2016, and 100 percent beginning on 
January 1, 2017, and thereafter. These transition periods are intended 
to facilitate compliance with a new minimum liquidity requirement and 
the agencies expect that covered companies with LCRs at or near 100 
percent generally would not reduce their liquidity coverage during the 
transition period. The agencies emphasize that the final rule's LCR is 
a minimum requirement and that companies should have internal liquidity 
management systems and policies in place to ensure they hold liquid 
assets sufficient to meet their institution-specific liquidity needs 
that could arise in a period of stress.
    In determining the proposed transition time frame, the agencies 
were aware that covered companies may face a range of implementation 
issues in coming into compliance with the proposed rule. The agencies 
asked in the proposal whether the proposed transition periods were 
appropriate for all covered companies in respect to the proposed LCR. 
Recognizing commenters' concerns regarding the operational difficulty 
for organizations that were not already subject to daily liquidity 
reporting requirements, and the systems changes necessary to calculate 
the LCR accurately on a daily basis, the agencies believe it is 
appropriate to differentiate the transition periods for calculation of 
the liquidity coverage ratio based on the size, complexity, and 
potential systemic impact of covered companies. The final rule 
therefore requires covered depository institution holding companies 
with $700 billion or more in total consolidated assets or $10 trillion 
or more in assets under custody, and any depository institution that is 
a consolidated subsidiary of such depository institution holding 
companies that has total consolidated assets equal to $10 billion or 
more, to conform to transition periods that are different from those 
for other covered companies. The agencies expect these largest, most 
complex firms to have the most sophisticated liquidity risk monitoring 
procedures, commensurate with their size and complexity,\92\ and these 
firms are currently submitting daily liquidity reports. Under the final 
rule, these covered companies are required to calculate the LCR on the 
last business day of each calendar month from January 1, 2015, to June 
30, 2015, and on each business day from July 1, 2015, onwards. All 
other covered companies must calculate the LCR on the last business day 
of each calendar month beginning January 1, 2015, and on each business 
day from July 1, 2016, onwards. The transition provisions of the final 
rule are also set forth in Table 5 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ For example, the Board's Regulation YY requires large 
domestic bank holding companies to develop internal liquidity risk-
management and stress testing practices that are tailored to the 
risk profile and business model of the particular institution. See 
12 CFR 252.33-35. The firm-specific liquidity requirements set forth 
in the Board's Regulation YY are intended to complement the 
standardized approach of the U.S. liquidity coverage ratio 
framework, which provides for comparability across firms within the 
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing these transition periods, the agencies analyzed data 
received from several institutions under a quantitative impact study as 
well as supervisory data from each of the institutions that would be 
subject to the final rule. Based on the review of this data, the 
agencies believe that the transition periods set forth in the rule are 
appropriately tailored to the size, complexity, and potential systemic 
impact of covered companies. The agencies do not currently believe that 
additional data is necessary for the adjustment of the transition 
periods, but will monitor the implementation of the final rule by 
covered companies during the transition periods.
    Although the agencies have not proposed the regulatory or public 
reporting requirements for the final rule, the agencies anticipate that 
they will seek comment on reporting requirements through a future 
notice.

                           Table 5--Transition Period for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Transition period                                     Liquidity coverage ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2015...........................  .80
Calendar year 2016...........................  .90
Calendar year 2017 and thereafter............  1.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Calculation Frequency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Covered depository institution holding
 companies with $700 billion or more in total
 consolidated assets or $10 trillion or more
 in assets under custody, and any depository
 institution that is a consolidated
 subsidiary of such depository institution
 holding companies that has total
 consolidated assets equal to $10 billion or
 more:
    Last business day of the calendar month..  Beginning January 1, 2015.
    Each business day........................  Beginning July 1, 2015 and thereafter.
All other covered companies:
    Last business day of the calendar month..  Beginning January 1, 2015.
    Each business day........................  Beginning July 1, 2016 and thereafter.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Modified Liquidity Coverage Ratio

    Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Board to tailor 
the application of its enhanced prudential standards, including 
differentiating among covered companies on an individual basis or by 
category of institution.\93\ When differentiating among companies for 
purposes of applying the Board's standards established under section 
165, the Board may consider the companies' size,

[[Page 61520]]

capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities, and any 
other risk-related factor the Board deems appropriate.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(a) and (b).
    \94\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework was developed for 
internationally active banking organizations, taking into account the 
complexity of their funding sources and structure. Although depository 
institution holding companies with at least $50 billion in total 
consolidated assets that are not covered companies (modified LCR 
holding companies) are large financial companies with extensive 
operations in banking, brokerage, and other financial activities, they 
generally are smaller in size, less complex in structure, and less 
reliant on riskier forms of market funding than covered companies. On a 
relative basis, the modified LCR holding companies tend to have simpler 
balance sheets, better enabling management and supervisors to take 
corrective actions more quickly in a stressed scenario than is the case 
with a covered company.
    Accordingly, the Board proposed to tailor the proposed rule's 
application of the liquidity coverage ratio requirement to modified LCR 
holding companies pursuant to its authority under section 165 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Although the Board believes it is important for all 
bank holding companies subject to section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(and similarly situated savings and loan holding companies) to be 
subject to a quantitative liquidity requirement as an enhanced 
prudential standard, it recognizes that these smaller companies would 
likely not have as great a systemic impact as larger, more complex 
companies if they experienced liquidity stress. Therefore, because the 
options for addressing their liquidity needs under such a scenario (or, 
if necessary, for resolving such companies) would likely be less 
complex and therefore more likely to be implemented in a shorter period 
of time, the Board proposed a modified LCR incorporating a shorter (21 
calendar-day) stress scenario for modified LCR holding companies.
    The proposed modified LCR would have been a simpler, less stringent 
form of the proposed rule's liquidity coverage ratio (for the purposes 
of this section V., unmodified LCR) and would have imposed outflow 
rates based on a 21 calendar-day rather than a 30 calendar-day stress 
scenario. As a result, outflow rates for the proposed modified LCR 
generally would have been 70 percent of the unmodified LCR's outflow 
rates. In addition, modified LCR holding companies would not have been 
required to calculate a maximum cumulative peak net outflow day for 
total net cash outflows as required for covered companies subject to 
the unmodified LCR.\95\ The requirements of the modified LCR standard 
would have otherwise been the same as the unmodified LCR as described 
in the proposal, including the proposed HQLA criteria and the 
calculation of the HQLA amount, and modified LCR holding companies 
would have to comply with all unmodified aspects of the standard to the 
same extent as covered companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See supra section II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Threshold for Application of the Modified Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
Requirement

    One commenter expressed support for the modified LCR, stating that 
modified LCR holding companies have substantially less complex funding 
and risk profiles than covered companies. The commenter stated that 
operating under the modified LCR will allow such a holding company to 
remain competitive without compromising its commitment to liquidity 
risk management or drastically limiting the amount of maturity 
transformation it undertakes on behalf of its customers. A commenter 
further expressed support for the Board's use of cumulative net cash 
outflows over the stress period in the modified LCR compared to the net 
cumulative peak calculation in the unmodified LCR requirement's 
proposed rule.
    As discussed above in section I.D., several commenters requested 
that the agencies apply the modified LCR to all banking organizations 
with limited international operations regardless of asset size. The 
commenters argued that the risk and funding profile of banking 
organizations with balance sheets of $250 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets and limited international operations is more 
consistent with that of modified LCR holding companies than with 
internationally active G-SIBs, for which the commenters say the LCR was 
originally intended. A commenter stated that deposit pricing may be 
adversely affected by the threshold for application of the modified LCR 
requirement and expressed concerns regarding an unlevel playing field 
across banking organizations. Another commenter stated that the 
proposed rule's tiered approach to assessing liquidity risks among U.S. 
banking organizations raises the potential unintended consequence that 
certain risks the agencies wish to ensure are backed by adequate 
liquidity will migrate to those institutions that are not required to 
hold as much liquidity. One commenter requested that the Federal 
Reserve articulate the justification for applying the LCR to the 
selected institutions, particularly in light of other supervisory 
efforts to monitor and strengthen liquidity management.
    As discussed in section I of this Supplementary Information 
section, the agencies believe that the unmodified LCR is appropriate 
for the size, complexity, risk profile, and interconnectedness of 
covered companies. Consistent with the enhanced prudential standards 
requirements in Regulation YY, the Board continues to believe that bank 
holding companies and savings and loan holding companies with total 
consolidated assets of at least $50 billion dollars that are not 
covered companies should be subject to the modified LCR. Further, the 
Board believes that tailoring the requirements of the quantitative 
minimum standard for organizations that are not covered companies under 
the rule is consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act and that it is 
appropriate for modified LCR holding companies with less complex 
funding structures to be required to hold lower amounts of HQLA under 
the rule.

B. 21 Calendar-Day Stress Period

    Several commenters noted that the 21 calendar-day stress period is 
operationally challenging because banking organizations typically 
manage and operate on a month-end or 30-day cycle. Thus, commenters 
suggested that the modified LCR be based on a calendar month stress 
period, rather than the 21 calendar-day stress period in the proposal, 
and argued that the 21 calendar-day basis of the modified LCR would 
have made it difficult to fully embed the calculation into internal 
processes including liquidity stress testing and balance sheet 
forecasts. One commenter argued that the benefits of a 21 calendar-day 
measurement period would typically be small because most holding 
companies that would be subject to the modified LCR do not generally 
rely on short-term funding; however, the same commenter requested the 
70% outflow rate for non-maturity cash outflows be retained. Commenters 
argued that the 21 calendar-day forward-looking stress period required 
under the modified LCR would consistently omit key recurring payment 
activity that occurs on the calendar-month cycle and would force the 
banks to manage cash flows in an abnormal manner. Commenters also

[[Page 61521]]

argued that the 21 calendar-day measurement period would make the 
modified LCR holding companies' LCR extremely volatile. One commenter 
requested that the agencies give such firms the option to utilize a 30 
calendar-day measurement period, whereas others requested that the 
modified LCR be based on 30 calendar-day time frame and outflow rates 
be set at 70 percent of the outflow rate in the unmodified liquidity 
coverage ratio. One commenter stated that many of the calibrations in 
the rule, such as the treatment of operational deposits, municipal 
deposits, and level 2A securities, overstate the liquidity risk of the 
institutions covered by the modified LCR. The commenter requested that 
the agencies consider a lower LCR compliance threshold, such as 50 
percent, to better align with the more stable funding profile of 
modified LCR holding companies.
    Commenters suggested that the modified LCR be based on a monthly 
cycle so that 31-day, 30-day, and 28-day months are all treated as a 
cycle for the modified LCR. Two commenters stated that the 21 calendar-
day measurement period would create additional measurement and 
reporting burdens and inconsistencies, because it deviates from other 
similar liquidity standards proposed by the BCBS and by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
    The Board agrees with commenters that there is merit in using a 
stress period that is consistent with periods over which liquidity risk 
is monitored by modified LCR holding companies as part of their 
internal practices. Thus, consistent with the risk management practices 
required under the Board's Regulation YY, the Board is applying a 
stress period of 30 days to the calculation of the modified LCR. To 
tailor the minimum quantitative standard for modified LCR holding 
companies while generally maintaining the amount of HQLA required for 
these firms under the proposal, the Board is amending the modified LCR 
denominator such that the net cash outflows shall be the net cash 
outflows calculated under the unmodified liquidity coverage ratio 
requirements over a 30 calendar-day stress period (excluding step 2 of 
the peak day approach described in section II.C.1 of this Supplementary 
Information section) multiplied by a factor of 0.7.

C. Calculation Requirements and Comments on Modified LCR Reporting

    The proposed rule would have applied the modified LCR to depository 
institution holding companies domiciled in the United States that have 
total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more based on the average 
of the total asset amount reported on the institution's four most 
recent FR Y-9Cs. One commenter requested that the agencies clarify when 
companies subject to the modified LCR are required to start meeting the 
requirement: The day on which the company files the fourth FR Y-9C 
showing that it is subject to the rule, the day of the quarter 
following the filing of that report, or another date.
    One commenter requested that the agencies clarify the mechanics for 
calculating the modified LCR and reporting to the regulators. 
Specifically, the commenter asked whether the modified LCR requires a 
daily calculation. One commenter recommended that regional banking 
organizations be required to calculate the LCR monthly and to report 
the information on a delayed basis, for example on the 20th day of the 
calendar month following the calculation date. The Board recognizes 
that the calculation requirements under the modified LCR present 
certain operational challenges to modified LCR holding companies. The 
Board is delaying the earliest date upon which a modified LCR holding 
company must comply with this rule to January 1, 2016. In addition, the 
Board is adopting in the final rule a monthly calculation requirement, 
rather than the daily calculation requirement in the proposed rule. 
This monthly calculation requirement reflects the difference in size, 
complexity, and funding profile of the institutions subject to the 
modified LCR. Modified LCR holding companies will be subject to the 
transition periods set forth in Table 6 below. If a modified LCR 
holding company's LCR is below the required minimum when it is 
calculated on the last day of each calendar month, or if its supervisor 
has determined that the covered company is otherwise materially 
noncompliant, the covered company must promptly consult with the Board 
to determine whether the covered company must provide a written 
remediation plan.
    As discussed in section I of this Supplementary Information 
section, the agencies anticipate proposing reporting requirements in a 
future notice. This future notice would contain the reporting 
requirements for institutions subject to the Board's modified LCR, 
including any applicable reporting date requirements.
    The Board is clarifying that a modified LCR holding company is 
required to comply with the modified LCR on the first day of the 
quarter following the date at which the average total consolidated 
assets of the holding company equal or exceed $50 billion.

  Table 6--Transition Period for the Modified Liquidity Coverage Ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Transition period                   Liquidity coverage
                                                             ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2016                                            .90
Calendar year 2017 and thereafter                            1.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Calculation Frequency
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All modified LCR holding          Last business day   Beginning January
 companies.                        of the calendar     1, 2016 and
                                   month.              thereafter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act \96\ requires the 
agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies sought to present the 
proposed rule in a simple and straightforward manner and did not 
receive any comments on the use of plain language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Pub L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471, 12 U.S.C. 4809.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Section 4 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act \97\ (RFA), requires an 
agency to prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) when 
an agency promulgates a final rule unless,

[[Page 61522]]

pursuant to section 5(b) of the RFA, the agency certifies that the 
final rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities \98\ (defined for purposes of 
the RFA to include banking entities with total assets less than or 
equal to $550 million and trust companies with total assets less than 
or equal to $38.5 million (small banking entities)).\99\ Pursuant to 
section 5(b) of the RFA, the OCC and the FDIC are certifying that the 
final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ 5 U.S.C. 604.
    \98\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
    \99\ See 79 FR 33647 (June 12, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OCC

    As discussed previously in this Supplementary Information section, 
the final rule generally will apply to national banks and Federal 
savings associations with: (i) Total consolidated assets equal to $250 
billion or more; (ii) consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign 
exposure equal to $10 billion or more; or (iii) total consolidated 
assets equal to $10 billion or more if a national bank or Federal 
savings association is a consolidated subsidiary of a company subject 
to the proposed rule. As of December 31, 2013, the OCC supervises 1,231 
small entities. The only OCC-supervised institutions subject to the 
final rule have $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. 
Accordingly, no OCC-supervised small banking entities meet the criteria 
to be a covered institution under the final rule. Therefore, the final 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small OCC-supervised banking entities.
    Pursuant to section 5(b) of the RFA, the OCC certifies that the 
final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small national banks and small Federal savings associations.

Board

    The Board is providing a final regulatory flexibility analysis with 
respect to this final rule. As discussed above, this final rule would 
implement a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the 
liquidity coverage ratio established by the BCBS. The Board received no 
public comments related to the initial Regulatory Flexibility Act 
analysis in the proposed rule from the Chief Council for Advocacy of 
the Small Business Administration or from the general public.
    As discussed previously in this Supplementary Information section, 
the final rule generally would apply to Board-regulated institutions 
with (i) total consolidated assets equal to $250 billion or more; (ii) 
total consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposure equal to $10 
billion or more; or (iii) total consolidated assets equal to $10 
billion or more if that Board-regulated institution is a depository 
institution subsidiary of a company subject to the proposed rule. The 
modified version of the liquidity coverage ratio would apply to top-
tier bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies 
domiciled in the United States that have total consolidated assets of 
$50 billion or more. The modified version of the liquidity coverage 
ratio would not apply to: (i) A grandfathered unitary savings and loan 
holding company that derived 50 percent or more of its total 
consolidated assets or 50 percent of its total revenues on an 
enterprise-wide basis from activities that are not financial in nature 
under section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act; (ii) a top-tier 
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company that is an 
insurance underwriting company; or (iii) a top-tier bank holding 
company or savings and loan holding company that has 25 percent or more 
of its total consolidated assets in subsidiaries that are insurance 
underwriting companies and either calculates its total consolidated 
assets in accordance with GAAP or estimates its total consolidated 
assets, subject to review and adjustment by the Board. The final rule 
focuses on these financial institutions because of their complexity, 
funding profiles, and potential risk to the financial system.
    As of June 30, 2014, there were approximately 657 small state 
member banks, 3,716 small bank holding companies, and 254 small savings 
and loan holding companies. No small top-tier bank holding company, 
top-tier savings and loan holding company, or state member bank would 
be subject to the rule, so there would be no additional projected 
compliance requirements imposed on small bank holding companies, 
savings and loan holding companies, or state member banks.
    The Board believes that the final rule will not have a significant 
impact on small banking organizations supervised by the Board and 
therefore believes that there are no significant alternatives to the 
rule that would reduce the economic impact on small banking 
organizations supervised by the Board.

FDIC

    As described previously in this Supplementary Information section, 
the final rule generally will establish a quantitative liquidity 
standard for internationally active banking organizations with $250 
billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more of on-balance 
sheet foreign exposure (internationally active banking organizations), 
and their consolidated subsidiary depository institutions with $10 
billion or more in in total consolidated assets. One FDIC-supervised 
institution will satisfy the foregoing criteria as of the effective 
date of the final rule, and it is not a small entity. As of December 
31, 2013, based on a $550 million threshold, the FDIC supervises 3,353 
small state nonmember banks, and 51 small state savings associations. 
The only FDIC-supervised institutions subject to the final rule have 
$10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. Therefore, the FDIC 
does not believe that the proposed rule will result in a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under its 
supervisory jurisdiction.
    Pursuant to section 5(b) of the RFA, the FDIC certifies that the 
final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small FDIC-supervised institutions.

VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act

Request for Comment on Proposed Information Collection

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S. C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number.
    The OCC and FDIC submitted this collection to OMB at the proposed 
rule stage. The information collection requirements contained in this 
joint final rule are being submitted by the FDIC and OCC to OMB for 
approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA and section 1320.11 of OMB's 
implementing regulations (5 CFR part 1320). The Board reviewed the 
final rule under the authority delegated to the Board by OMB. The 
agencies received no comments regarding the collection at the proposed 
rule stage.
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the agencies' functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the agencies' estimates of the burden of the

[[Page 61523]]

information collections, including the validity of the methodology and 
assumptions used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    (e) Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    All comments received, including attachments and other supporting 
materials, are part of the public record and subject to public 
disclosure. Do not enclose any information in your comment or 
supporting materials that you consider confidential or inappropriate 
for public disclosure.
    Commenters may submit comments on aspects of this notice that may 
affect burden estimates at the addresses listed in the ADDRESSES 
section. A copy of the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk 
officer for the agencies: By mail to U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, 725 17th Street NW., 10235, Washington, DC 20503; by facsimile 
to 202-395-6974; or by email to: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. 
Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk Officer.
Proposed Information Collection
    Title of Information Collection: Reporting and Recordkeeping 
Requirements Associated with Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring.
    Frequency of Response: Annual and event generated.
    Affected Public:
    FDIC: Insured state non-member banks, state savings associations, 
and certain subsidiaries of these entities.
    OCC: National banks, Federal savings associations, or any operating 
subsidiary thereof.
    Board: Insured state member banks, bank holding companies, savings 
and loan holding companies, and any subsidiary thereof.
    Abstract:
    The final rule implements a quantitative liquidity requirement 
consistent with the LCR standard established by the BCBS and contains 
requirements subject to the PRA. The reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements are found in Sec. Sec.  _.22 and _.40. Compliance with the 
information collections will be mandatory. Responses to the information 
collections will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by law, 
and there would be no mandatory retention period for the proposed 
collections of information.
    Section _.22 will require that, with respect to each asset eligible 
for inclusion in a covered company's HQLA amount, the covered company 
must implement policies that require eligible HQLA to be under the 
control of the management function in the covered company responsible 
for managing liquidity risk. The management function must evidence its 
control over the HQLA by segregating the HQLA from other assets, with 
the sole intent to use the HQLA as a source of liquidity, or 
demonstrating the ability to monetize the assets and making the 
proceeds available to the liquidity management function without 
conflicting with a business or risk management strategy of the covered 
company. In addition, Sec.  _.22 will require that a covered company 
must have a documented methodology that results in a consistent 
treatment for determining that the covered company's eligible HQLA meet 
the requirements of Sec.  _.22.
    Section _.40 will require that a covered company must notify its 
appropriate Federal banking agency on any day when its liquidity 
coverage ratio is calculated to be less than the minimum requirement in 
Sec.  _.10. If a covered company's liquidity coverage ratio is below 
the minimum requirement in Sec.  _--.10 for three consecutive days, or 
if its appropriate Federal banking agency has determined that the 
institution is otherwise materially noncompliant, the covered company 
must promptly provide a plan for achieving compliance with the minimum 
liquidity requirement in Sec.  _.10 and all other requirements of this 
part to its appropriate Federal banking agency.
    The liquidity plan must include, as applicable, (1) an assessment 
of the covered company's liquidity position; (2) the actions the 
covered company has taken and will take to achieve full compliance, 
including a plan for adjusting the covered company's risk profile, risk 
management, and funding sources in order to achieve full compliance and 
a plan for remediating any operational or management issues that 
contributed to noncompliance; (3) an estimated time frame for achieving 
full compliance; and (4) a commitment to provide a progress report to 
its appropriate Federal banking agency at least weekly until full 
compliance is achieved.

Estimated Paperwork Burden

    Estimated Burden per Response:
Reporting Burden
    Sec.  _.40(a)--0.25 hours.
    Sec.  _.40(b)--0.25 hours.
    Sec.  _.40(b)(4)--0.25 hours.
Recordkeeping Burden
    Sec.  _.22(a)(2) and (5)--20 hours.
    Sec.  _.40(b)--100 hours.

FDIC

    Estimated Number of Respondents: 2.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 249 hours.

OCC

    Estimated Number of Respondents: 20 national banks and Federal 
savings associations.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 2,485 hours.

Board

    Estimated Number of Respondents: 42 for Sec.  _.22; 3 for Sec.  
_.40.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 1,153 hours.

IX. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC has analyzed the final rule under the factors set forth in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). For 
purposes of this analysis, the OCC considered whether the final rule 
includes a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in 
any one year.
    The OCC has determined that this final rule is likely to result in 
the expenditure by the private sector of $100 million or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any one year. When the final rule is 
published in the Federal Register, the OCC's UMRA written statement 
will be available at: http://www.regulations.gov, Docket ID OCC-2013-
0016.

Text of Common Rule

(All Agencies)

PART [_--]--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

Subpart A General Provisions
Sec.
_.1 Purpose and applicability.
_.2 Reservation of authority.
_.3 Definitions.
_.4 Certain operational requirements.
Subpart B Liquidity Coverage Ratio
_.10 Liquidity coverage ratio.
Subpart C High-Quality Liquid Assets
_.20 High-quality liquid asset criteria.

[[Page 61524]]

_.21 High-quality liquid asset amount.
_.22 Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.
Subpart D Total Net Cash Outflow
_.30 Total net cash outflow amount.
_.31 Determining maturity.
_.32 Outflow amounts.
_.33 Inflow amounts.
Subpart E Liquidity Coverage Shortfall
_.40 Liquidity coverage shortfall: Supervisory framework.
Subpart F Transitions
_.50 Transitions.

Subpart A--General Provisions


Sec.  _.1  Purpose and applicability.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes a minimum liquidity standard for 
certain [BANK]s on a consolidated basis, as set forth herein.
    (b) Applicability. (1) A [BANK] is subject to the minimum liquidity 
standard and other requirements of this part if:
    (i) It has total consolidated assets equal to $250 billion or more, 
as reported on the most recent year-end [REGULATORY REPORT];
    (ii) It has total consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposure at 
the most recent year-end equal to $10 billion or more (where total on-
balance sheet foreign exposure equals total cross-border claims less 
claims with a head office or guarantor located in another country plus 
redistributed guaranteed amounts to the country of the head office or 
guarantor plus local country claims on local residents plus revaluation 
gains on foreign exchange and derivative transaction products, 
calculated in accordance with the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure Report);
    (iii) It is a depository institution that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a company described in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) or (ii) of 
this section and has total consolidated assets equal to $10 billion or 
more, as reported on the most recent year-end Consolidated Report of 
Condition and Income; or
    (iv) The [AGENCY] has determined that application of this part is 
appropriate in light of the [BANK]'s asset size, level of complexity, 
risk profile, scope of operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic 
covered entities, or risk to the financial system.
    (2) Subject to the transition periods set forth in subpart F of 
this part:
    (i) A [BANK] that is subject to the minimum liquidity standard and 
other requirements of this part under paragraph (b)(1) of this section 
on September 30, 2014, must comply with the requirements of this part 
beginning on January 1, 2015;
    (ii) A [BANK] that becomes subject to the minimum liquidity 
standard and other requirements of this part under paragraphs (b)(1)(i) 
through (iii) of this section after September 30, 2014, must comply 
with the requirements of this part beginning on April 1 of the year in 
which the [BANK] becomes subject to the minimum liquidity standard and 
other requirements of this part, except:
    (A) From April 1 to December 31 of the year in which the [BANK] 
becomes subject to the minimum liquidity standard and other 
requirements of this part, the [BANK] must calculate and maintain a 
liquidity coverage ratio monthly, on each calculation date that is the 
last business day of the applicable calendar month; and
    (B) Beginning January 1 of the year after the first year in which 
the [BANK] becomes subject to the minimum liquidity standard and other 
requirements of this part under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and 
thereafter, the [BANK] must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage 
ratio on each calculation date; and
    (iii) A [BANK] that becomes subject to the minimum liquidity 
standard and other requirements of this part under paragraph (b)(1)(iv) 
of this section after September 30, 2014, must comply with the 
requirements of this part subject to a transition period specified by 
the [AGENCY].
    (3) This part does not apply to:
    (i) A bridge financial company as defined in 12 U.S.C. 5381(a)(3), 
or a subsidiary of a bridge financial company; or
    (ii) A new depository institution or a bridge depository 
institution, as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813(i).
    (4) A [BANK] subject to a minimum liquidity standard under this 
part shall remain subject until the [AGENCY] determines in writing that 
application of this part to the [BANK] is not appropriate in light of 
the [BANK]'s asset size, level of complexity, risk profile, scope of 
operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic covered entities, or 
risk to the financial system.
    (5) In making a determination under paragraphs (b)(1)(iv) or (4) of 
this section, the [AGENCY] will apply notice and response procedures in 
the same manner and to the same extent as the notice and response 
procedures in [12 CFR 3.404 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202 (Board), and 12 CFR 
324.5 (FDIC)].


Sec.  _.2  Reservation of authority.

    (a) The [AGENCY] may require a [BANK] to hold an amount of high-
quality liquid assets (HQLA) greater than otherwise required under this 
part, or to take any other measure to improve the [BANK]'s liquidity 
risk profile, if the [AGENCY] determines that the [BANK]'s liquidity 
requirements as calculated under this part are not commensurate with 
the [BANK]'s liquidity risks. In making determinations under this 
section, the [AGENCY] will apply notice and response procedures as set 
forth in [12 CFR 3.404 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202 (Board), and 12 CFR 324.5 
(FDIC)].
    (b) Nothing in this part limits the authority of the [AGENCY] under 
any other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or 
enforcement action, including action to address unsafe or unsound 
practices or conditions, deficient liquidity levels, or violations of 
law.


Sec.  _.3  Definitions.

    For the purposes of this part:
    Affiliated depository institution means with respect to a [BANK] 
that is a depository institution, another depository institution that 
is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company or savings and 
loan holding company of which the [BANK] is also a consolidated 
subsidiary.
    Asset exchange means a transaction in which, as of the calculation 
date, the counterparties have previously exchanged non-cash assets, and 
have each agreed to return such assets to each other at a future date. 
Asset exchanges do not include secured funding and secured lending 
transactions.
    Bank holding company is defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.).
    Brokered deposit means any deposit held at the [BANK] that is 
obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through the mediation or 
assistance of a deposit broker as that term is defined in section 29 of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)), and includes a 
reciprocal brokered deposit and a brokered sweep deposit.
    Brokered sweep deposit means a deposit held at the [BANK] by a 
customer or counterparty through a contractual feature that 
automatically transfers to the [BANK] from another regulated financial 
company at the close of each business day amounts identified under the 
agreement governing the account from which the amount is being 
transferred.
    Calculation date means any date on which a [BANK] calculates its 
liquidity coverage ratio under Sec.  _.10.
    Client pool security means a security that is owned by a customer 
of the [BANK] that is not an asset of the

[[Page 61525]]

[BANK], regardless of a [BANK]'s hypothecation rights with respect to 
the security.
    Collateralized deposit means:
    (1) A deposit of a public sector entity held at the [BANK] that is 
secured under applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the [BANK] 
and that gives the depositor, as holder of the lien, priority over the 
assets in the event the [BANK] enters into receivership, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding; or
    (2) A deposit of a fiduciary account held at the [BANK] for which 
the [BANK] is a fiduciary and sets aside assets owned by the [BANK] as 
security under 12 CFR 9.10 (national bank) or 12 CFR 150.300 through 
150.320 (Federal savings associations) and that gives the depositor 
priority over the assets in the event the [BANK] enters into 
receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or 
similar proceeding.
    Committed means, with respect to a credit facility or liquidity 
facility, that under the terms of the legally binding written agreement 
governing the facility:
    (1) The [BANK] may not refuse to extend credit or funding under the 
facility; or
    (2) The [BANK] may refuse to extend credit under the facility (to 
the extent permitted under applicable law) only upon the satisfaction 
or occurrence of one or more specified conditions not including change 
in financial condition of the borrower, customary notice, or 
administrative conditions.
    Company means a corporation, partnership, limited liability 
company, depository institution, business trust, special purpose 
entity, association, or similar organization.
    Consolidated subsidiary means a company that is consolidated on the 
balance sheet of a [BANK] or other company under GAAP.
    Controlled subsidiary means, with respect to a company or a [BANK], 
a consolidated subsidiary or a company that otherwise meets the 
definition of ``subsidiary'' in section 2(d) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(d)).
    Covered depository institution holding company means a top-tier 
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company domiciled in 
the United States other than:
    (1) A top-tier savings and loan holding company that is:
    (i) A grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding company as 
defined in section 10(c)(9)(A) of the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 
1461 et seq.); and
    (ii) As of June 30 of the previous calendar year, derived 50 
percent or more of its total consolidated assets or 50 percent of its 
total revenues on an enterprise-wide basis (as calculated under GAAP) 
from activities that are not financial in nature under section 4(k) of 
the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(k));
    (2) A top-tier depository institution holding company that is an 
insurance underwriting company; or
    (3)(i) A top-tier depository institution holding company that, as 
of June 30 of the previous calendar year, held 25 percent or more of 
its total consolidated assets in subsidiaries that are insurance 
underwriting companies (other than assets associated with insurance for 
credit risk); and
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph 3(i) of this definition, the company 
must calculate its total consolidated assets in accordance with GAAP, 
or if the company does not calculate its total consolidated assets 
under GAAP for any regulatory purpose (including compliance with 
applicable securities laws), the company may estimate its total 
consolidated assets, subject to review and adjustment by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    Covered nonbank company means a designated company that the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has required by rule or 
order to comply with the requirements of 12 CFR part 249.
    Credit facility means a legally binding agreement to extend funds 
if requested at a future date, including a general working capital 
facility such as a revolving credit facility for general corporate or 
working capital purposes. A credit facility does not include a legally 
binding written agreement to extend funds at a future date to a 
counterparty that is made for the purpose of refinancing the debt of 
the counterparty when it is unable to obtain a primary or anticipated 
source of funding. See liquidity facility.
    Customer short position means a legally binding written agreement 
pursuant to which the customer must deliver to the [BANK] a non-cash 
asset that the customer has already sold.
    Deposit means ``deposit'' as defined in section 3(l) of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(l)) or an equivalent liability of 
the [BANK] in a jurisdiction outside of the United States.
    Depository institution is defined in section 3(c) of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    Depository institution holding company means a bank holding company 
or savings and loan holding company.
    Deposit insurance means deposit insurance provided by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq.).
    Derivative transaction means a financial contract whose value is 
derived from the values of one or more underlying assets, reference 
rates, or indices of asset values or reference rates. Derivative 
contracts include interest rate derivative contracts, exchange rate 
derivative contracts, equity derivative contracts, commodity derivative 
contracts, credit derivative contracts, forward contracts, and any 
other instrument that poses similar counterparty credit risks. 
Derivative contracts also include unsettled securities, commodities, 
and foreign currency exchange transactions with a contractual 
settlement or delivery lag that is longer than the lesser of the market 
standard for the particular instrument or five business days. A 
derivative does not include any identified banking product, as that 
term is defined in section 402(b) of the Legal Certainty for Bank 
Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), that is subject to section 
403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    Designated company means a company that the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council has determined under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act (12 U.S.C. 5323) shall be supervised by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and for which such determination is still in 
effect.
    Dodd-Frank Act means the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    Eligible HQLA means a high-quality liquid asset that meets the 
requirements set forth in Sec.  _.22.
    Fair value means fair value as determined under GAAP.
    Financial sector entity means an investment adviser, investment 
company, pension fund, non-regulated fund, regulated financial company, 
or identified company.
    Foreign withdrawable reserves means a [BANK]'s balances held by or 
on behalf of the [BANK] at a foreign central bank that are not subject 
to restrictions on the [BANK]'s ability to use the reserves.
    GAAP means generally accepted accounting principles as used in the 
United States.
    High-quality liquid asset (HQLA) means an asset that is a level 1 
liquid asset, level 2A liquid asset, or level 2B liquid asset, in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in Sec.  _--.20.
    HQLA amount means the HQLA amount as calculated under Sec.  _.21.

[[Page 61526]]

    Identified company means any company that the [AGENCY] has 
determined should be treated for the purposes of this part the same as 
a regulated financial company, investment company, non-regulated fund, 
pension fund, or investment adviser, based on activities similar in 
scope, nature, or operations to those entities.
    Individual means a natural person, and does not include a sole 
proprietorship.
    Investment adviser means a company registered with the SEC as an 
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 
80b-1 et seq.) or foreign equivalents of such company.
    Investment company means a person or company registered with the 
SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) 
or foreign equivalents of such persons or companies.
    Liquid and readily-marketable means, with respect to a security, 
that the security is traded in an active secondary market with:
    (1) More than two committed market makers;
    (2) A large number of non-market maker participants on both the 
buying and selling sides of transactions;
    (3) Timely and observable market prices; and
    (4) A high trading volume.
    Liquidity facility means a legally binding written agreement to 
extend funds at a future date to a counterparty that is made for the 
purpose of refinancing the debt of the counterparty when it is unable 
to obtain a primary or anticipated source of funding. A liquidity 
facility includes an agreement to provide liquidity support to asset-
backed commercial paper by lending to, or purchasing assets from, any 
structure, program or conduit in the event that funds are required to 
repay maturing asset-backed commercial paper. Liquidity facilities 
exclude facilities that are established solely for the purpose of 
general working capital, such as revolving credit facilities for 
general corporate or working capital purposes. If a facility has 
characteristics of both credit and liquidity facilities, the facility 
must be classified as a liquidity facility. See credit facility.
    Multilateral development bank means the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank, the European Investment Fund, the Nordic 
Investment Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Islamic 
Development Bank, the Council of Europe Development Bank, and any other 
entity that provides financing for national or regional development in 
which the U.S. government is a shareholder or contributing member or 
which the [AGENCY] determines poses comparable risk.
    Non-regulated fund means any hedge fund or private equity fund 
whose investment adviser is required to file SEC Form PF (Reporting 
Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity 
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors), other than a small 
business investment company as defined in section 102 of the Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).
    Nonperforming exposure means an exposure that is past due by more 
than 90 days or nonaccrual.
    Operational deposit means unsecured wholesale funding or a 
collateralized deposit that is necessary for the [BANK] to provide 
operational services as an independent third-party intermediary, agent, 
or administrator to the wholesale customer or counterparty providing 
the unsecured wholesale funding or collateralized deposit. In order to 
recognize a deposit as an operational deposit for purposes of this 
part, a [BANK] must comply with the requirements of Sec.  _.4(b) with 
respect to that deposit.
    Operational services means the following services, provided they 
are performed as part of cash management, clearing, or custody 
services:
    (1) Payment remittance;
    (2) Administration of payments and cash flows related to the 
safekeeping of investment assets, not including the purchase or sale of 
assets;
    (3) Payroll administration and control over the disbursement of 
funds;
    (4) Transmission, reconciliation, and confirmation of payment 
orders;
    (5) Daylight overdraft;
    (6) Determination of intra-day and final settlement positions;
    (7) Settlement of securities transactions;
    (8) Transfer of capital distributions and recurring contractual 
payments;
    (9) Customer subscriptions and redemptions;
    (10) Scheduled distribution of customer funds;
    (11) Escrow, funds transfer, stock transfer, and agency services, 
including payment and settlement services, payment of fees, taxes, and 
other expenses; and
    (12) Collection and aggregation of funds.
    Pension fund means an employee benefit plan as defined in 
paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income 
and Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), a ``governmental 
plan'' (as defined in 29 U.S.C. 1002(32)) that complies with the tax 
deferral qualification requirements provided in the Internal Revenue 
Code, or any similar employee benefit plan established under the laws 
of a foreign jurisdiction.
    Public sector entity means a state, local authority, or other 
governmental subdivision below the U.S. sovereign entity level.
    Publicly traded means, with respect to an equity security, that the 
equity security is traded on:
    (1) Any exchange registered with the SEC as a national securities 
exchange under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78f); or
    (2) Any non-U.S.-based securities exchange that:
    (i) Is registered with, or approved by, a national securities 
regulatory authority; and
    (ii) Provides a liquid, two-way market for the security in 
question.
    Qualifying master netting agreement (1) Means a legally binding 
written agreement that:
    (i) Creates a single obligation for all individual transactions 
covered by the agreement upon an event of default, including upon an 
event of receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, 
or similar proceeding, of the counterparty;
    (ii) Provides the [BANK] the right to accelerate, terminate, and 
close out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to 
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default, 
including upon an event of receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding, of the counterparty, 
provided that, in any such case, any exercise of rights under the 
agreement will not be stayed or avoided under applicable law in the 
relevant jurisdictions, other than in receivership, conservatorship, 
resolution under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, or under any similar insolvency law applicable to U.S. 
government-sponsored enterprises; and
    (iii) Does not contain a walkaway clause (that is, a provision that 
permits a non-defaulting counterparty to make a lower payment than it 
otherwise would make under the agreement, or no

[[Page 61527]]

payment at all, to a defaulter or the estate of a defaulter, even if 
the defaulter or the estate of the defaulter is a net creditor under 
the agreement); and
    (2) In order to recognize an agreement as a qualifying master 
netting agreement for purposes of this part, a [BANK] must comply with 
the requirements of Sec.  _.4(a) with respect to that agreement.
    Reciprocal brokered deposit means a brokered deposit that a [BANK] 
receives through a deposit placement network on a reciprocal basis, 
such that:
    (1) For any deposit received, the [BANK] (as agent for the 
depositors) places the same amount with other depository institutions 
through the network; and
    (2) Each member of the network sets the interest rate to be paid on 
the entire amount of funds it places with other network members.
    Regulated financial company means:
    (1) A depository institution holding company or designated company;
    (2) A company included in the organization chart of a depository 
institution holding company on the Form FR Y-6, as listed in the 
hierarchy report of the depository institution holding company produced 
by the National Information Center (NIC) Web site,\1\ provided that the 
top-tier depository institution holding company is subject to a minimum 
liquidity standard under 12 CFR part 249;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/NicHome.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) A depository institution; foreign bank; credit union; 
industrial loan company, industrial bank, or other similar institution 
described in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as 
amended (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.); national bank, state member bank, or 
state non-member bank that is not a depository institution;
    (4) An insurance company;
    (5) A securities holding company as defined in section 618 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 1850a); broker or dealer registered with the 
SEC under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78o); 
futures commission merchant as defined in section 1a of the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.); swap dealer as defined in 
section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a); or security-
based swap dealer as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78c);
    (6) A designated financial market utility, as defined in section 
803 of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5462); and
    (7) Any company not domiciled in the United States (or a political 
subdivision thereof) that is supervised and regulated in a manner 
similar to entities described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this 
definition (e.g., a foreign banking organization, foreign insurance 
company, foreign securities broker or dealer or foreign financial 
market utility).
    (8) A regulated financial company does not include:
    (i) U.S. government-sponsored enterprises;
    (ii) Small business investment companies, as defined in section 102 
of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.);
    (iii) Entities designated as Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) under 12 U.S.C. 4701 et seq. and 12 CFR part 1805; 
or
    (iv) Central banks, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, or multilateral development banks.
    Reserve Bank balances means:
    (1) Balances held in a master account of the [BANK] at a Federal 
Reserve Bank, less any balances that are attributable to any respondent 
of the [BANK] if the [BANK] is a correspondent for a pass-through 
account as defined in section 204.2(l) of Regulation D (12 CFR 
204.2(l));
    (2) Balances held in a master account of a correspondent of the 
[BANK] that are attributable to the [BANK] if the [BANK] is a 
respondent for a pass-through account as defined in section 204.2(l) of 
Regulation D;
    (3) ``Excess balances'' of the [BANK] as defined in section 
204.2(z) of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.2(z)) that are maintained in an 
``excess balance account'' as defined in section 204.2(aa) of 
Regulation D (12 CFR 204.2(aa)) if the [BANK] is an excess balance 
account participant; or
    (4) ``Term deposits'' of the [BANK] as defined in section 204.2(dd) 
of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.2(dd)) if such term deposits are offered 
and maintained pursuant to terms and conditions that:
    (i) Explicitly and contractually permit such term deposits to be 
withdrawn upon demand prior to the expiration of the term, or that
    (ii) Permit such term deposits to be pledged as collateral for term 
or automatically-renewing overnight advances from the Federal Reserve 
Bank.
    Retail customer or counterparty means a customer or counterparty 
that is:
    (1) An individual;
    (2) A business customer, but solely if and to the extent that:
    (i) The [BANK] manages its transactions with the business customer, 
including deposits, unsecured funding, and credit facility and 
liquidity facility transactions, in the same way it manages its 
transactions with individuals;
    (ii) Transactions with the business customer have liquidity risk 
characteristics that are similar to comparable transactions with 
individuals; and
    (iii) The total aggregate funding raised from the business customer 
is less than $1.5 million; or
    (3) A living or testamentary trust that:
    (i) Is solely for the benefit of natural persons;
    (ii) Does not have a corporate trustee; and
    (iii) Terminates within 21 years and 10 months after the death of 
grantors or beneficiaries of the trust living on the effective date of 
the trust or within 25 years, if applicable under state law.
    Retail deposit means a demand or term deposit that is placed with 
the [BANK] by a retail customer or counterparty, other than a brokered 
deposit.
    Retail mortgage means a mortgage that is primarily secured by a 
first or subsequent lien on one-to-four family residential property.
    Savings and loan holding company means a savings and loan holding 
company as defined in section 10 of the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 
U.S.C. 1467a).
    SEC means the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    Secured funding transaction means any funding transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement as of the calculation date and 
gives rise to a cash obligation of the [BANK] to a counterparty that is 
secured under applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the [BANK], 
which gives the counterparty, as holder of the lien, priority over the 
assets in the event the [BANK] enters into receivership, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured 
funding transactions include repurchase transactions, loans of 
collateral to the [BANK]'s customers to effect short positions, other 
secured loans, and borrowings from a Federal Reserve Bank.
    Secured lending transaction means any lending transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement of the calculation date and 
gives rise to a cash obligation of a counterparty to the [BANK] that is 
secured under applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the 
counterparty, which gives the [BANK], as holder of the lien, priority 
over the assets in the event the counterparty enters into receivership, 
bankruptcy,

[[Page 61528]]

insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding, including 
reverse repurchase transactions and securities borrowing transactions.
    Securities Exchange Act means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
    Sovereign entity means a central government (including the U.S. 
government) or an agency, department, ministry, or central bank of a 
central government.
    Special purpose entity means a company organized for a specific 
purpose, the activities of which are significantly limited to those 
appropriate to accomplish a specific purpose, and the structure of 
which is intended to isolate the credit risk of the special purpose 
entity.
    Stable retail deposit means a retail deposit that is entirely 
covered by deposit insurance and:
    (1) Is held by the depositor in a transactional account; or
    (2) The depositor that holds the account has another established 
relationship with the [BANK] such as another deposit account, a loan, 
bill payment services, or any similar service or product provided to 
the depositor that the [BANK] demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 
[AGENCY] would make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely during a 
liquidity stress event.
    Structured security means a security whose cash flow 
characteristics depend upon one or more indices or that has embedded 
forwards, options, or other derivatives or a security where an 
investor's investment return and the issuer's payment obligations are 
contingent on, or highly sensitive to, changes in the value of 
underlying assets, indices, interest rates, or cash flows.
    Structured transaction means a secured transaction in which 
repayment of obligations and other exposures to the transaction is 
largely derived, directly or indirectly, from the cash flow generated 
by the pool of assets that secures the obligations and other exposures 
to the transaction.
    Two-way market means a market where there are independent bona fide 
offers to buy and sell so that a price reasonably related to the last 
sales price or current bona fide competitive bid and offer quotations 
can be determined within one day and settled at that price within a 
relatively short time frame conforming to trade custom.
    U.S. government-sponsored enterprise means an entity established or 
chartered by the Federal government to serve public purposes specified 
by the United States Congress, but whose debt obligations are not 
explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States 
government.
    Unsecured wholesale funding means a liability or general obligation 
of the [BANK] to a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not 
secured under applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the [BANK], 
including a wholesale deposit.
    Wholesale customer or counterparty means a customer or counterparty 
that is not a retail customer or counterparty.
    Wholesale deposit means a demand or term deposit that is provided 
by a wholesale customer or counterparty.


Sec.  _--.4  Certain operational requirements.

    (a) Qualifying master netting agreements. In order to recognize an 
agreement as a qualifying master netting agreement as defined in Sec.  
_.3, a [BANK] must:
    (1) Conduct sufficient legal review to conclude with a well-founded 
basis (and maintain sufficient written documentation of that legal 
review) that:
    (i) The agreement meets the requirements of the definition of 
qualifying master netting agreement in Sec.  _.3; and
    (ii) In the event of a legal challenge (including one resulting 
from default or from receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding) the relevant judicial and 
administrative authorities would find the agreement to be legal, valid, 
binding, and enforceable under the law of the relevant jurisdictions; 
and
    (2) Establish and maintain written procedures to monitor possible 
changes in relevant law and to ensure that the agreement continues to 
satisfy the requirements of the definition of qualifying master netting 
agreement in Sec.  _.3.
    (b) Operational deposits. In order to recognize a deposit as an 
operational deposit as defined in Sec.  _.3:
    (1) The related operational services must be performed pursuant to 
a legally binding written agreement, and:
    (i) The termination of the agreement must be subject to a minimum 
30 calendar-day notice period; or
    (ii) As a result of termination of the agreement or transfer of 
services to a third-party provider, the customer providing the deposit 
would incur significant contractual termination costs or switching 
costs (switching costs include significant technology, administrative, 
and legal service costs incurred in connection with the transfer of the 
operational services to a third-party provider);
    (2) The deposit must be held in an account designated as an 
operational account;
    (3) The customer must hold the deposit at the [BANK] for the 
primary purpose of obtaining the operational services provided by the 
[BANK];
    (4) The deposit account must not be designed to create an economic 
incentive for the customer to maintain excess funds therein through 
increased revenue, reduction in fees, or other offered economic 
incentives;
    (5) The [BANK] must demonstrate that the deposit is empirically 
linked to the operational services and that it has a methodology that 
takes into account the volatility of the average balance for 
identifying any excess amount, which must be excluded from the 
operational deposit amount;
    (6) The deposit must not be provided in connection with the 
[BANK]'s provision of prime brokerage services, which, for the purposes 
of this part, are a package of services offered by the [BANK] whereby 
the [BANK], among other services, executes, clears, settles, and 
finances transactions entered into by the customer or a third-party 
entity on behalf of the customer (such as an executing broker), and 
where the [BANK] has a right to use or rehypothecate assets provided by 
the customer, including in connection with the extension of margin and 
other similar financing of the customer, subject to applicable law, and 
includes operational services provided to a non-regulated fund; and
    (7) The deposits must not be for arrangements in which the [BANK] 
(as correspondent) holds deposits owned by another depository 
institution bank (as respondent) and the respondent temporarily places 
excess funds in an overnight deposit with the [BANK].

Subpart B--Liquidity Coverage Ratio


Sec.  _.10  Liquidity coverage ratio.

    (a) Minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement. Subject to the 
transition provisions in subpart F of this part, a [BANK] must 
calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio that is equal to or 
greater than 1.0 on each business day in accordance with this part. A 
[BANK] must calculate its liquidity coverage ratio as of the same time 
on each business day (elected calculation time). The [BANK] must select 
this time by written notice to the [AGENCY] prior to the effective date 
of this rule. The [BANK] may not thereafter change its elected 
calculation time without prior written approval from the [AGENCY].
    (b) Calculation of the liquidity coverage ratio. A [BANK]'s 
liquidity coverage ratio equals:

[[Page 61529]]

    (1) The [BANK]'s HQLA amount as of the calculation date, calculated 
under subpart C of this part; divided by
    (2) The [BANK]'s total net cash outflow amount as of the 
calculation date, calculated under subpart D of this part.

Subpart C--High-Quality Liquid Assets


Sec.  _.20  High-quality liquid asset criteria.

    (a) Level 1 liquid assets. An asset is a level 1 liquid asset if it 
is one of the following types of assets:
    (1) Reserve Bank balances;
    (2) Foreign withdrawable reserves;
    (3) A security that is issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as 
to the timely payment of principal and interest by, the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury;
    (4) A security that is issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as 
to the timely payment of principal and interest by, a U.S. government 
agency (other than the U.S. Department of the Treasury) whose 
obligations are fully and explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and 
credit of the U.S. government, provided that the security is liquid and 
readily-marketable;
    (5) A security that is issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as 
to the timely payment of principal and interest by, a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Central Bank, European Community, or a multilateral 
development bank, that is:
    (i) Assigned a zero percent risk weight under subpart D of [AGENCY 
CAPITAL REGULATION] as of the calculation date;
    (ii) Liquid and readily-marketable;
    (iii) Issued or guaranteed by an entity whose obligations have a 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in repurchase or sales 
markets during stressed market conditions; and
    (iv) Not an obligation of a financial sector entity and not an 
obligation of a consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity; 
or
    (6) A security issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as to the 
timely payment of principal and interest by, a sovereign entity that is 
not assigned a zero percent risk weight under subpart D of [AGENCY 
CAPITAL REGULATION], where the sovereign entity issues the security in 
its own currency, the security is liquid and readily-marketable, and 
the [BANK] holds the security in order to meet its net cash outflows in 
the jurisdiction of the sovereign entity, as calculated under subpart D 
of this part.
    (b) Level 2A liquid assets. An asset is a level 2A liquid asset if 
the asset is liquid and readily-marketable and is one of the following 
types of assets:
    (1) A security issued by, or guaranteed as to the timely payment of 
principal and interest by, a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise, that 
is investment grade under 12 CFR part 1 as of the calculation date, 
provided that the claim is senior to preferred stock; or
    (2) A security that is issued by, or guaranteed as to the timely 
payment of principal and interest by, a sovereign entity or 
multilateral development bank that is:
    (i) Not included in level 1 liquid assets;
    (ii) Assigned no higher than a 20 percent risk weight under subpart 
D of [AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION] as of the calculation date;
    (iii) Issued or guaranteed by an entity whose obligations have a 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in repurchase or sales 
markets during stressed market conditions, as demonstrated by:
    (A) The market price of the security or equivalent securities of 
the issuer declining by no more than 10 percent during a 30 calendar-
day period of significant stress, or
    (B) The market haircut demanded by counterparties to secured 
lending and secured funding transactions that are collateralized by the 
security or equivalent securities of the issuer increasing by no more 
than 10 percentage points during a 30 calendar-day period of 
significant stress; and
    (iv) Not an obligation of a financial sector entity, and not an 
obligation of a consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity.
    (c) Level 2B liquid assets. An asset is a level 2B liquid asset if 
the asset is liquid and readily-marketable and is one of the following 
types of assets:
    (1) A corporate debt security that is:
    (i) Investment grade under 12 CFR part 1 as of the calculation 
date;
    (ii) Issued or guaranteed by an entity whose obligations have a 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in repurchase or sales 
markets during stressed market conditions, as demonstrated by:
    (A) The market price of the corporate debt security or equivalent 
securities of the issuer declining by no more than 20 percent during a 
30 calendar-day period of significant stress, or
    (B) The market haircut demanded by counterparties to secured 
lending and secured funding transactions that are collateralized by the 
corporate debt security or equivalent securities of the issuer 
increasing by no more than 20 percentage points during a 30 calendar-
day period of significant stress; and
    (iii) Not an obligation of a financial sector entity and not an 
obligation of a consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity; 
or
    (2) A publicly traded common equity share that is:
    (i) Included in:
    (A) The Russell 1000 Index; or
    (B) An index that a [BANK]'s supervisor in a foreign jurisdiction 
recognizes for purposes of including equity shares in level 2B liquid 
assets under applicable regulatory policy, if the share is held in that 
foreign jurisdiction;
    (ii) Issued in:
    (A) U.S. dollars; or
    (B) The currency of a jurisdiction where the [BANK] operates and 
the [BANK] holds the common equity share in order to cover its net cash 
outflows in that jurisdiction, as calculated under subpart D of this 
part;
    (iii) Issued by an entity whose publicly traded common equity 
shares have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in 
repurchase or sales markets during stressed market conditions, as 
demonstrated by:
    (A) The market price of the security or equivalent securities of 
the issuer declining by no more than 40 percent during a 30 calendar-
day period of significant stress, or
    (B) The market haircut demanded by counterparties to securities 
borrowing and lending transactions that are collateralized by the 
publicly traded common equity shares or equivalent securities of the 
issuer increasing by no more than 40 percentage points, during a 30 
calendar day period of significant stress;
    (iv) Not issued by a financial sector entity and not issued by a 
consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity;
    (v) If held by a depository institution, is not acquired in 
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted (DPC); and
    (vi) If held by a consolidated subsidiary of a depository 
institution, the depository institution can include the publicly traded 
common equity share in its level 2B liquid assets only if the share is 
held to cover net cash outflows of the depository institution's 
consolidated subsidiary in which the publicly traded common equity 
share is held, as calculated by the [BANK] under subpart D of this 
part.


Sec.  _.21  High-quality liquid asset amount.

    (a) Calculation of the HQLA amount. As of the calculation date, a 
[BANK]'s HQLA amount equals:
    (1) The level 1 liquid asset amount; plus
    (2) The level 2A liquid asset amount; plus

[[Page 61530]]

    (3) The level 2B liquid asset amount; minus
    (4) The greater of:
    (i) The unadjusted excess HQLA amount; and
    (ii) The adjusted excess HQLA amount.
    (b) Calculation of liquid asset amounts. (1) Level 1 liquid asset 
amount. The level 1 liquid asset amount equals the fair value of all 
level 1 liquid assets held by the [BANK] as of the calculation date 
that are eligible HQLA, less the amount of the reserve balance 
requirement under section 204.5 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5).
    (2) Level 2A liquid asset amount. The level 2A liquid asset amount 
equals 85 percent of the fair value of all level 2A liquid assets held 
by the [BANK] as of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA.
    (3) Level 2B liquid asset amount. The level 2B liquid asset amount 
equals 50 percent of the fair value of all level 2B liquid assets held 
by the [BANK] as of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA.
    (c) Calculation of the unadjusted excess HQLA amount. As of the 
calculation date, the unadjusted excess HQLA amount equals:
    (1) The level 2 cap excess amount; plus
    (2) The level 2B cap excess amount.
    (d) Calculation of the level 2 cap excess amount. As of the 
calculation date, the level 2 cap excess amount equals the greater of:
    (1) The level 2A liquid asset amount plus the level 2B liquid asset 
amount minus 0.6667 times the level 1 liquid asset amount; and
    (2) 0.
    (e) Calculation of the level 2B cap excess amount. As of the 
calculation date, the level 2B excess amount equals the greater of:
    (1) The level 2B liquid asset amount minus the level 2 cap excess 
amount minus 0.1765 times the sum of the level 1 liquid asset amount 
and the level 2A liquid asset amount; and
    (2) 0.
    (f) Calculation of adjusted liquid asset amounts. (1) Adjusted 
level 1 liquid asset amount. A [BANK]'s adjusted level 1 liquid asset 
amount equals the fair value of all level 1 liquid assets that would be 
eligible HQLA and would be held by the [BANK] upon the unwind of any 
secured funding transaction (other than a collateralized deposit), 
secured lending transaction, asset exchange, or collateralized 
derivatives transaction that matures within 30 calendar days of the 
calculation date where the [BANK] will provide an asset that is 
eligible HQLA and the counterparty will provide an asset that will be 
eligible HQLA; less the amount of the reserve balance requirement under 
section 204.5 of Regulation D (12 CFR 204.5).
    (2) Adjusted level 2A liquid asset amount. A [BANK]'s adjusted 
level 2A liquid asset amount equals 85 percent of the fair value of all 
level 2A liquid assets that would be eligible HQLA and would be held by 
the [BANK] upon the unwind of any secured funding transaction (other 
than a collateralized deposit), secured lending transaction, asset 
exchange, or collateralized derivatives transaction that matures within 
30 calendar days of the calculation date where the [BANK] will provide 
an asset that is eligible HQLA and the counterparty will provide an 
asset that will be eligible HQLA.
    (3) Adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount. A [BANK]'s adjusted 
level 2B liquid asset amount equals 50 percent of the fair value of all 
level 2B liquid assets that would be eligible HQLA and would be held by 
the [BANK] upon the unwind of any secured funding transaction (other 
than a collateralized deposit), secured lending transaction, asset 
exchange, or collateralized derivatives transaction that matures within 
30 calendar days of the calculation date where the [BANK] will provide 
an asset that is eligible HQLA and the counterparty will provide an 
asset that will be eligible HQLA.
    (g) Calculation of the adjusted excess HQLA amount. As of the 
calculation date, the adjusted excess HQLA amount equals:
    (1) The adjusted level 2 cap excess amount; plus
    (2) The adjusted level 2B cap excess amount.
    (h) Calculation of the adjusted level 2 cap excess amount. As of 
the calculation date, the adjusted level 2 cap excess amount equals the 
greater of:
    (1) The adjusted level 2A liquid asset amount plus the adjusted 
level 2B liquid asset amount minus 0.6667 times the adjusted level 1 
liquid asset amount; and
    (2) 0.
    (i) Calculation of the adjusted level 2B excess amount. As of the 
calculation date, the adjusted level 2B excess liquid asset amount 
equals the greater of:
    (1) The adjusted level 2B liquid asset amount minus the adjusted 
level 2 cap excess amount minus 0.1765 times the sum of the adjusted 
level 1 liquid asset amount and the adjusted level 2A liquid asset 
amount; and
    (2) 0.


Sec.  _.22  Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.

    (a) Operational requirements for eligible HQLA. With respect to 
each asset that is eligible for inclusion in a [BANK]'s HQLA amount, a 
[BANK] must meet all of the following operational requirements:
    (1) The [BANK] must demonstrate the operational capability to 
monetize the HQLA by:
    (i) Implementing and maintaining appropriate procedures and systems 
to monetize any HQLA at any time in accordance with relevant standard 
settlement periods and procedures; and
    (ii) Periodically monetizing a sample of HQLA that reasonably 
reflects the composition of the [BANK]'s eligible HQLA, including with 
respect to asset type, maturity, and counterparty characteristics;
    (2) The [BANK] must implement policies that require eligible HQLA 
to be under the control of the management function in the [BANK] that 
is charged with managing liquidity risk, and this management function 
must evidence its control over the HQLA by either:
    (i) Segregating the HQLA from other assets, with the sole intent to 
use the HQLA as a source of liquidity; or
    (ii) Demonstrating the ability to monetize the assets and making 
the proceeds available to the liquidity management function without 
conflicting with a business or risk management strategy of the [BANK];
    (3) The fair value of the eligible HQLA must be reduced by the 
outflow amount that would result from the termination of any specific 
transaction hedging eligible HQLA;
    (4) The [BANK] must implement and maintain policies and procedures 
that determine the composition of its eligible HQLA on each calculation 
date, by:
    (i) Identifying its eligible HQLA by legal entity, geographical 
location, currency, account, or other relevant identifying factors as 
of the calculation date;
    (ii) Determining that eligible HQLA meet the criteria set forth in 
this section; and
    (iii) Ensuring the appropriate diversification of the eligible HQLA 
by asset type, counterparty, issuer, currency, borrowing capacity, or 
other factors associated with the liquidity risk of the assets; and
    (5) The [BANK] must have a documented methodology that results in a 
consistent treatment for determining that the [BANK]'s eligible HQLA 
meet the requirements set forth in this section.
    (b) Generally applicable criteria for eligible HQLA. A [BANK]'s 
eligible HQLA must meet all of the following criteria:
    (1) The assets are unencumbered in accordance with the following 
criteria:

[[Page 61531]]

    (i) The assets are free of legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restrictions on the ability of the [BANK] to monetize the assets; and
    (ii) The assets are not pledged, explicitly or implicitly, to 
secure or to provide credit enhancement to any transaction, but the 
assets may be considered unencumbered if the assets are pledged to a 
central bank or a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise where:
    (A) Potential credit secured by the assets is not currently 
extended to the [BANK] or its consolidated subsidiaries; and
    (B) The pledged assets are not required to support access to the 
payment services of a central bank;
    (2) The asset is not:
    (i) A client pool security held in a segregated account; or
    (ii) An asset received from a secured funding transaction involving 
client pool securities that were held in a segregated account;
    (3) For eligible HQLA held in a legal entity that is a U.S. 
consolidated subsidiary of a [BANK]:
    (i) If the U.S. consolidated subsidiary is subject to a minimum 
liquidity standard under this part, the [BANK] may include the eligible 
HQLA of the U.S. consolidated subsidiary in its HQLA amount up to:
    (A) The amount of net cash outflows of the U.S. consolidated 
subsidiary calculated by the U.S. consolidated subsidiary for its own 
minimum liquidity standard under this part; plus
    (B) Any additional amount of assets, including proceeds from the 
monetization of assets, that would be available for transfer to the 
top-tier [BANK] during times of stress without statutory, regulatory, 
contractual, or supervisory restrictions, including sections 23A and 
23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1) 
and Regulation W (12 CFR part 223); and
    (ii) If the U.S. consolidated subsidiary is not subject to a 
minimum liquidity standard under this part, the [BANK] may include the 
eligible HQLA of the U.S. consolidated subsidiary in its HQLA amount up 
to:
    (A) The amount of the net cash outflows of the U.S. consolidated 
subsidiary as of the 30th calendar day after the calculation date, as 
calculated by the [BANK] for the [BANK]'s minimum liquidity standard 
under this part; plus
    (B) Any additional amount of assets, including proceeds from the 
monetization of assets, that would be available for transfer to the 
top-tier [BANK] during times of stress without statutory, regulatory, 
contractual, or supervisory restrictions, including sections 23A and 
23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1) 
and Regulation W (12 CFR part 223);
    (4) For HQLA held by a consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK] that 
is organized under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, the [BANK] may 
include the eligible HQLA of the consolidated subsidiary organized 
under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction in its HQLA amount up to:
    (i) The amount of net cash outflows of the consolidated subsidiary 
as of the 30th calendar day after the calculation date, as calculated 
by the [BANK] for the [BANK]'s minimum liquidity standard under this 
part; plus
    (ii) Any additional amount of assets that are available for 
transfer to the top-tier [BANK] during times of stress without 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions;
    (5) The [BANK] must not include as eligible HQLA any assets, or 
HQLA resulting from transactions involving an asset that the [BANK] 
received with rehypothecation rights, if the counterparty that provided 
the asset or the beneficial owner of the asset has a contractual right 
to withdraw the assets without an obligation to pay more than de 
minimis remuneration at any time during the 30 calendar days following 
the calculation date; and
    (6) The [BANK] has not designated the assets to cover operational 
costs.
    (c) Maintenance of U.S. eligible HQLA. A [BANK] is generally 
expected to maintain as eligible HQLA an amount and type of eligible 
HQLA in the United States that is sufficient to meet its total net cash 
outflow amount in the United States under subpart D of this part.

Subpart D--Total Net Cash Outflow


Sec.  _.30  Total net cash outflow amount.

    (a) Calculation of total net cash outflow amount. As of the 
calculation date, a [BANK]'s total net cash outflow amount equals:
    (1) The sum of the outflow amounts calculated under Sec.  _.32(a) 
through (l); minus
    (2) The lesser of:
    (i) The sum of the inflow amounts calculated under Sec.  _.33(b) 
through (g); and
    (ii) 75 percent of the amount calculated under paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section; plus
    (3) The maturity mismatch add-on as calculated under paragraph (b) 
of this section.
    (b) Calculation of maturity mismatch add-on. (1) For purposes of 
this section:
    (i) The net cumulative maturity outflow amount for any of the 30 
calendar days following the calculation date is equal to the sum of the 
outflow amounts for instruments or transactions identified in Sec.  
_.32(g), (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(5), (j), (k), and (l) that have a maturity 
date prior to or on that calendar day minus the sum of the inflow 
amounts for instruments or transactions identified in Sec.  _.33(c), 
(d), (e), and (f) that have a maturity date prior to or on that 
calendar day.
    (ii) The net day 30 cumulative maturity outflow amount is equal to, 
as of the 30th day following the calculation date, the sum of the 
outflow amounts for instruments or transactions identified in Sec.  
_.32(g), (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(5), (j), (k), and (l) that have a maturity 
date 30 calendar days or less from the calculation date minus the sum 
of the inflow amounts for instruments or transactions identified in 
Sec.  _.33(c), (d), (e), and (f) that have a maturity date 30 calendar 
days or less from the calculation date.
    (2) As of the calculation date, a [BANK]'s maturity mismatch add-on 
is equal to:
    (i) The greater of:
    (A) 0; and
    (B) The largest net cumulative maturity outflow amount as 
calculated under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section for any of the 30 
calendar days following the calculation date; minus
    (ii) The greater of:
    (A) 0; and
    (B) The net day 30 cumulative maturity outflow amount as calculated 
under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section.
    (3) Other than the transactions identified in Sec.  _.32(h)(2), 
(h)(5), or (j) or Sec.  _.33(d) or (f), the maturity of which is 
determined under Sec.  _.31(a), transactions that have no maturity date 
are not included in the calculation of the maturity mismatch add-on.


Sec.  _.31  Determining maturity.

    (a) For purposes of calculating its liquidity coverage ratio and 
the components thereof under this subpart, a [BANK] shall assume an 
asset or transaction matures:
    (1) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
_.32, on the earliest possible contractual maturity date or the 
earliest possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account 
any option that could accelerate the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction as follows:
    (i) If an investor or funds provider has an option that would 
reduce the maturity, the [BANK] must assume that the investor or funds 
provider will

[[Page 61532]]

exercise the option at the earliest possible date;
    (ii) If an investor or funds provider has an option that would 
extend the maturity, the [BANK] must assume that the investor or funds 
provider will not exercise the option to extend the maturity;
    (iii) If the [BANK] has an option that would reduce the maturity of 
an obligation, the [BANK] must assume that the [BANK] will exercise the 
option at the earliest possible date, except if either of the following 
criteria are satisfied, in which case the maturity of the obligation 
for purposes of this part will be the original maturity date at 
issuance:
    (A) The original maturity of the obligation is greater than one 
year and the option does not go into effect for a period of 180 days 
following the issuance of the instrument; or
    (B) The counterparty is a sovereign entity, a U.S. government-
sponsored enterprise, or a public sector entity.
    (iv) If the [BANK] has an option that would extend the maturity of 
an obligation it issued, the [BANK] must assume the [BANK] will not 
exercise that option to extend the maturity; and
    (v) If an option is subject to a contractually defined notice 
period, the [BANK] must determine the earliest possible contractual 
maturity date regardless of the notice period.
    (2) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
_.33, on the latest possible contractual maturity date or the latest 
possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account any 
option that could extend the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction as follows:
    (i) If the borrower has an option that would extend the maturity, 
the [BANK] must assume that the borrower will exercise the option to 
extend the maturity to the latest possible date;
    (ii) If the borrower has an option that would reduce the maturity, 
the [BANK] must assume that the borrower will not exercise the option 
to reduce the maturity;
    (iii) If the [BANK] has an option that would reduce the maturity of 
an instrument or transaction, the [BANK] must assume the [BANK] will 
not exercise the option to reduce the maturity;
    (iv) If the [BANK] has an option that would extend the maturity of 
an instrument or transaction, the [BANK] must assume the [BANK] will 
exercise the option to extend the maturity to the latest possible date; 
and
    (v) If an option is subject to a contractually defined notice 
period, the [BANK] must determine the latest possible contractual 
maturity date based on the borrower using the entire notice period.
    (3) With respect to a transaction subject to Sec.  _.33(f)(1)(iii) 
through (vii) (secured lending transactions) or Sec.  _.33(f)(2)(ii) 
through (x) (asset exchanges), to the extent the transaction is secured 
by collateral that has been pledged in connection with either a secured 
funding transaction or asset exchange that has a remaining maturity of 
30 calendar days or less as of the calculation date, the maturity date 
is the later of the maturity date determined under paragraph (a)(2) of 
this section for the secured lending transaction or asset exchange or 
the maturity date determined under paragraph (a)(1) of this section for 
the secured funding transaction or asset exchange for which the 
collateral has been pledged.
    (4) With respect to a transaction that has no maturity date, is not 
an operational deposit, and is subject to the provisions of Sec.  
_.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k) or Sec.  _.33(d) or (f), the maturity 
date is the first calendar day after the calculation date. Any other 
transaction that has no maturity date and is subject to the provisions 
of Sec.  _.32 must be considered to mature within 30 calendar days of 
the calculation date.
    (5) With respect to a transaction subject to the provisions of 
Sec.  _.33(g), on the date of the next scheduled calculation of the 
amount required under applicable legal requirements for the protection 
of customer assets with respect to each broker-dealer segregated 
account, in accordance with the [BANK]'s normal frequency of 
recalculating such requirements.
    (b) [Reserved]


Sec.  _.32  Outflow amounts.

    (a) Retail funding outflow amount. A [BANK]'s retail funding 
outflow amount as of the calculation date includes (regardless of 
maturity or collateralization):
    (1) 3 percent of all stable retail deposits held at the [BANK];
    (2) 10 percent of all other retail deposits held at the [BANK];
    (3) 20 percent of all deposits placed at the [BANK] by a third 
party on behalf of a retail customer or counterparty that are not 
brokered deposits, where the retail customer or counterparty owns the 
account and the entire amount is covered by deposit insurance;
    (4) 40 percent of all deposits placed at the [BANK] by a third 
party on behalf of a retail customer or counterparty that are not 
brokered deposits, where the retail customer or counterparty owns the 
account and where less than the entire amount is covered by deposit 
insurance; and
    (5) 40 percent of all funding from a retail customer or 
counterparty that is not:
    (i) A retail deposit;
    (ii) A brokered deposit provided by a retail customer or 
counterparty; or
    (iii) A debt instrument issued by the [BANK] that is owned by a 
retail customer or counterparty (see paragraph (h)(2)(ii) of this 
section).
    (b) Structured transaction outflow amount. If the [BANK] is a 
sponsor of a structured transaction where the issuing entity is not 
consolidated on the [BANK]'s balance sheet under GAAP, the structured 
transaction outflow amount for each such structured transaction as of 
the calculation date is the greater of:
    (1) 100 percent of the amount of all debt obligations of the 
issuing entity that mature 30 calendar days or less from such 
calculation date and all commitments made by the issuing entity to 
purchase assets within 30 calendar days or less from such calculation 
date; and
    (2) The maximum contractual amount of funding the [BANK] may be 
required to provide to the issuing entity 30 calendar days or less from 
such calculation date through a liquidity facility, a return or 
repurchase of assets from the issuing entity, or other funding 
agreement.
    (c) Net derivative cash outflow amount. The net derivative cash 
outflow amount as of the calculation date is the sum of the net 
derivative cash outflow amount for each counterparty. The net 
derivative cash outflow amount does not include forward sales of 
mortgage loans and any derivatives that are mortgage commitments 
subject to paragraph (d) of this section. The net derivative cash 
outflow amount for a counterparty is the sum of:
    (1) The amount, if greater than zero, of contractual payments and 
collateral that the [BANK] will make or deliver to the counterparty 30 
calendar days or less from the calculation date under derivative 
transactions other than transactions described in paragraph (c)(2) of 
this section, less the contractual payments and collateral that the 
[BANK] will receive from the counterparty 30 calendar days or less from 
the calculation date under derivative transactions other than 
transactions described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, provided 
that the derivative transactions are subject to a qualifying master 
netting agreement; and
    (2) The amount, if greater than zero, of contractual principal 
payments that the [BANK] will make to the

[[Page 61533]]

counterparty 30 calendar days or less from the calculation date under 
foreign currency exchange derivative transactions that result in the 
full exchange of contractual cash principal payments in different 
currencies within the same business day, less the contractual principal 
payments that the [BANK] will receive from the counterparty 30 calendar 
days or less from the calculation date under foreign currency exchange 
derivative transactions that result in the full exchange of contractual 
cash principal payments in different currencies within the same 
business day.
    (d) Mortgage commitment outflow amount. The mortgage commitment 
outflow amount as of a calculation date is 10 percent of the amount of 
funds the [BANK] has contractually committed for its own origination of 
retail mortgages that can be drawn upon 30 calendar days or less from 
such calculation date.
    (e) Commitment outflow amount. (1) A [BANK]'s commitment outflow 
amount as of the calculation date includes:
    (i) Zero percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit and 
liquidity facilities extended by a [BANK] that is a depository 
institution to an affiliated depository institution that is subject to 
a minimum liquidity standard under this part;
    (ii) 5 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit and 
liquidity facilities extended by the [BANK] to retail customers or 
counterparties;
    (iii) 10 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit 
facilities extended by the [BANK] to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof, including a special purpose entity (other than 
those described in paragraph (e)(1)(viii) of this section) that is a 
consolidated subsidiary of such wholesale customer or counterparty;
    (iv) 30 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed liquidity 
facilities extended by the [BANK] to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof, including a special purpose entity (other than 
those described in paragraph (e)(1)(viii) of this section) that is a 
consolidated subsidiary of such wholesale customer or counterparty;
    (v) 50 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit and 
liquidity facilities extended by the [BANK] to depository institutions, 
depository institution holding companies, and foreign banks, but 
excluding commitments described in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section;
    (vi) 40 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit 
facilities extended by the [BANK] to a financial sector entity or a 
consolidated subsidiary thereof, including a special purpose entity 
(other than those described in paragraph (e)(1)(viii) of this section) 
that is a consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity, but 
excluding other commitments described in paragraph (e)(1)(i) or (v) of 
this section;
    (vii) 100 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed liquidity 
facilities extended by the [BANK] to a financial sector entity or a 
consolidated subsidiary thereof, including a special purpose entity 
(other than those described in paragraph (e)(1)(viii) of this section) 
that is a consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity, but 
excluding other commitments described in paragraph (e)(1)(i) or (v) of 
this section and liquidity facilities included in paragraph (b)(2) of 
this section;
    (viii) 100 percent of the undrawn amount of all committed credit 
and liquidity facilities extended to a special purpose entity that 
issues or has issued commercial paper or securities (other than equity 
securities issued to a company of which the special purpose entity is a 
consolidated subsidiary) to finance its purchases or operations, and 
excluding liquidity facilities included in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section; and
    (ix) 100 percent of the undrawn amount of all other committed 
credit or liquidity facilities extended by the [BANK].
    (2) For the purposes of this paragraph (e), the undrawn amount of a 
committed credit facility or committed liquidity facility is the entire 
unused amount of the facility that could be drawn upon within 30 
calendar days of the calculation date under the governing agreement, 
less the amount of level 1 liquid assets and the amount of level 2A 
liquid assets securing the facility.
    (3) For the purposes of this paragraph (e), the amount of level 1 
liquid assets and level 2A liquid assets securing a committed credit or 
liquidity facility is the fair value of level 1 liquid assets and 85 
percent of the fair value of level 2A liquid assets that are required 
to be pledged as collateral by the counterparty to secure the facility, 
provided that:
    (i) The assets pledged upon a draw on the facility would be 
eligible HQLA; and
    (ii) The [BANK] has not included the assets as eligible HQLA under 
subpart C of this part as of the calculation date.
    (f) Collateral outflow amount. The collateral outflow amount as of 
the calculation date includes:
    (1) Changes in financial condition. 100 percent of all additional 
amounts of collateral the [BANK] could be contractually required to 
pledge or to fund under the terms of any transaction as a result of a 
change in the [BANK]'s financial condition;
    (2) Derivative collateral potential valuation changes. 20 percent 
of the fair value of any collateral securing a derivative transaction 
pledged to a counterparty by the [BANK] that is not a level 1 liquid 
asset;
    (3) Potential derivative valuation changes. The absolute value of 
the largest 30-consecutive calendar day cumulative net mark-to-market 
collateral outflow or inflow realized during the preceding 24 months 
resulting from derivative transaction valuation changes;
    (4) Excess collateral. 100 percent of the fair value of collateral 
that:
    (i) The [BANK] could be required by contract to return to a 
counterparty because the collateral pledged to the [BANK] exceeds the 
current collateral requirement of the counterparty under the governing 
contract;
    (ii) Is not segregated from the [BANK]'s other assets such that it 
cannot be rehypothecated; and
    (iii) Is not already excluded as eligible HQLA by the [BANK] under 
Sec.  _.22(b)(5);
    (5) Contractually required collateral. 100 percent of the fair 
value of collateral that the [BANK] is contractually required to pledge 
to a counterparty and, as of such calculation date, the [BANK] has not 
yet pledged;
    (6) Collateral substitution. (i) Zero percent of the fair value of 
collateral pledged to the [BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral 
qualifies as level 1 liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under 
the contract governing the transaction, the counterparty may replace 
the pledged collateral with other assets that qualify as level 1 liquid 
assets, without the consent of the [BANK];
    (ii) 15 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty, where the collateral qualifies as level 1 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that qualify as level 2A liquid assets, without the consent 
of the [BANK];
    (iii) 50 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 1 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where under, the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged

[[Page 61534]]

collateral with assets that qualify as level 2B liquid assets, without 
the consent of the [BANK];
    (iv) 100 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 1 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that do not qualify as HQLA, without the consent of the 
[BANK];
    (v) Zero percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 2A 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that qualify as level 1 or level 2A liquid assets, without 
the consent of the [BANK];
    (vi) 35 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 2A 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that qualify as level 2B liquid assets, without the consent 
of the [BANK];
    (vii) 85 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 2A 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that do not qualify as HQLA, without the consent of the 
[BANK];
    (viii) Zero percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 2B 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with other assets that qualify as HQLA, without the consent of the 
[BANK]; and
    (ix) 50 percent of the fair value of collateral pledged to the 
[BANK] by a counterparty where the collateral qualifies as level 2B 
liquid assets and eligible HQLA and where, under the contract governing 
the transaction, the counterparty may replace the pledged collateral 
with assets that do not qualify as HQLA, without the consent of the 
[BANK].
    (g) Brokered deposit outflow amount for retail customers or 
counterparties. The brokered deposit outflow amount for retail 
customers or counterparties as of the calculation date includes:
    (1) 100 percent of all brokered deposits at the [BANK] provided by 
a retail customer or counterparty that are not described in paragraphs 
(g)(5) through (9) of this section and which mature 30 calendar days or 
less from the calculation date;
    (2) 10 percent of all brokered deposits at the [BANK] provided by a 
retail customer or counterparty that are not described in paragraphs 
(g)(5) through (9) of this section and which mature later than 30 
calendar days from the calculation date;
    (3) 20 percent of all brokered deposits at the [BANK] provided by a 
retail customer or counterparty that are not described in paragraphs 
(g)(5) through (9) of this section and which are held in a 
transactional account with no contractual maturity date, where the 
entire amount is covered by deposit insurance;
    (4) 40 percent of all brokered deposits at the [BANK] provided by a 
retail customer or counterparty that are not described in paragraphs 
(g)(5) through (9) of this section and which are held in a 
transactional account with no contractual maturity date, where less 
than the entire amount is covered by deposit insurance;
    (5) 10 percent of all reciprocal brokered deposits at the [BANK] 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty, where the entire amount 
is covered by deposit insurance;
    (6) 25 percent of all reciprocal brokered deposits at the [BANK] 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty, where less than the 
entire amount is covered by deposit insurance;
    (7) 10 percent of all brokered sweep deposits at the [BANK] 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty:
    (i) That are deposited in accordance with a contract between the 
retail customer or counterparty and the [BANK], a controlled subsidiary 
of the [BANK], or a company that is a controlled subsidiary of the same 
top-tier company of which the [BANK] is a controlled subsidiary; and
    (ii) Where the entire amount of the deposits is covered by deposit 
insurance;
    (8) 25 percent of all brokered sweep deposits at the [BANK] 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty:
    (i) That are not deposited in accordance with a contract between 
the retail customer or counterparty and the [BANK], a controlled 
subsidiary of the [BANK], or a company that is a controlled subsidiary 
of the same top-tier company of which the [BANK] is a controlled 
subsidiary; and
    (ii) Where the entire amount of the deposits is covered by deposit 
insurance; and
    (9) 40 percent of all brokered sweep deposits at the [BANK] 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty where less than the 
entire amount of the deposit balance is covered by deposit insurance.
    (h) Unsecured wholesale funding outflow amount. A [BANK]'s 
unsecured wholesale funding outflow amount, for all transactions that 
mature within 30 calendar days or less of the calculation date, as of 
the calculation date includes:
    (1) For unsecured wholesale funding that is not an operational 
deposit and is not provided by a financial sector entity or 
consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity:
    (i) 20 percent of all such funding, where the entire amount is 
covered by deposit insurance and the funding is not a brokered deposit;
    (ii) 40 percent of all such funding, where:
    (A) Less than the entire amount is covered by deposit insurance; or
    (B) The funding is a brokered deposit;
    (2) 100 percent of all unsecured wholesale funding that is not an 
operational deposit and is not included in paragraph (h)(1) of this 
section, including:
    (i) Funding provided by a company that is a consolidated subsidiary 
of the same top-tier company of which the [BANK] is a consolidated 
subsidiary; and
    (ii) Debt instruments issued by the [BANK], including such 
instruments owned by retail customers or counterparties;
    (3) 5 percent of all operational deposits, other than operational 
deposits that are held in escrow accounts, where the entire deposit 
amount is covered by deposit insurance;
    (4) 25 percent of all operational deposits not included in 
paragraph (h)(3) of this section; and
    (5) 100 percent of all unsecured wholesale funding that is not 
otherwise described in this paragraph (h).
    (i) Debt security buyback outflow amount. A [BANK]'s debt security 
buyback outflow amount for debt securities issued by the [BANK] that 
mature more than 30 calendar days after the calculation date and for 
which the [BANK] or a consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK] is the 
primary market maker in such debt securities includes:
    (1) 3 percent of all such debt securities that are not structured 
securities; and
    (2) 5 percent of all such debt securities that are structured 
securities.
    (j) Secured funding and asset exchange outflow amount. (1) A

[[Page 61535]]

[BANK]'s secured funding outflow amount, for all transactions that 
mature within 30 calendar days or less of the calculation date, as of 
the calculation date includes:
    (i) Zero percent of all funds the [BANK] must pay pursuant to 
secured funding transactions, to the extent that the funds are secured 
by level 1 liquid assets;
    (ii) 15 percent of all funds the [BANK] must pay pursuant to 
secured funding transactions, to the extent that the funds are secured 
by level 2A liquid assets;
    (iii) 25 percent of all funds the [BANK] must pay pursuant to 
secured funding transactions with sovereign entities, multilateral 
development banks, or U.S. government-sponsored enterprises that are 
assigned a risk weight of 20 percent under subpart D of [AGENCY CAPITAL 
REGULATION], to the extent that the funds are not secured by level 1 or 
level 2A liquid assets;
    (iv) 50 percent of all funds the [BANK] must pay pursuant to 
secured funding transactions, to the extent that the funds are secured 
by level 2B liquid assets;
    (v) 50 percent of all funds received from secured funding 
transactions that are customer short positions where the customer short 
positions are covered by other customers' collateral and the collateral 
does not consist of HQLA; and
    (vi) 100 percent of all other funds the [BANK] must pay pursuant to 
secured funding transactions, to the extent that the funds are secured 
by assets that are not HQLA.
    (2) If an outflow rate specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this 
section for a secured funding transaction is greater than the outflow 
rate that the [BANK] is required to apply under paragraph (h) of this 
section to an unsecured wholesale funding transaction that is not an 
operational deposit with the same counterparty, the [BANK] may apply to 
the secured funding transaction the outflow rate that applies to an 
unsecured wholesale funding transaction that is not an operational 
deposit with that counterparty, except in the case of:
    (i) Secured funding transactions that are secured by collateral 
that was received by the [BANK] under a secured lending transaction or 
asset exchange, in which case the [BANK] must apply the outflow rate 
specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this section for the secured funding 
transaction; and
    (ii) Collateralized deposits that are operational deposits, in 
which case the [BANK] may apply to the operational deposit amount, as 
calculated in accordance with Sec.  _.4(b), the operational deposit 
outflow rate specified in paragraph (h)(3) or (4) of this section, as 
applicable, if such outflow rate is lower than the outflow rate 
specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this section.
    (3) A [BANK]'s asset exchange outflow amount, for all transactions 
that mature within 30 calendar days or less of the calculation date, as 
of the calculation date includes:
    (i) Zero percent of the fair value of the level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive level 1 liquid assets from the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (ii) 15 percent of the fair value of the level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive level 2A liquid assets from the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (iii) 50 percent of the fair value of the level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive level 2B liquid assets from the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (iv) 100 percent of the fair value of the level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive assets that are not HQLA from the asset 
exchange counterparty;
    (v) Zero percent of the fair value of the level 2A liquid assets 
that [BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, 
where [BANK] will receive level 1 or level 2A liquid assets from the 
asset exchange counterparty;
    (vi) 35 percent of the fair value of the level 2A liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive level 2B liquid assets from the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (vii) 85 percent of the fair value of the level 2A liquid assets 
the [BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive assets that are not HQLA from the asset 
exchange counterparty;
    (viii) Zero percent of the fair value of the level 2B liquid assets 
the [BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive HQLA from the asset exchange counterparty; and
    (ix) 50 percent of the fair value of the level 2B liquid assets the 
[BANK] must post to a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraphs (j)(3)(x) through (xiii) of this section, where 
the [BANK] will receive assets that are not HQLA from the asset 
exchange counterparty;
    (x) Zero percent of the fair value of the level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to an asset exchange 
where the [BANK] has rehypothecated the assets posted by the asset 
exchange counterparty, and, as of the calculation date, the assets will 
not be returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar days;
    (xi) 15 percent of the fair value of the level 2A liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to an asset exchange 
where the [BANK] has rehypothecated the assets posted by the asset 
exchange counterparty, and, as of the calculation date, the assets will 
not be returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar days;
    (xii) 50 percent of the fair value of the level 2B liquid assets 
the [BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to an asset 
exchange where the [BANK] has rehypothecated the assets posted by the 
asset exchange counterparty, and, as of the calculation date, the 
assets will not be returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar days; and
    (xiii) 100 percent of the fair value of the non-HQLA the [BANK] 
will receive from a counterparty pursuant to an asset exchange where 
the [BANK] has rehypothecated the assets posted by the asset exchange 
counterparty, and, as of the calculation date, the assets will not be 
returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar days.
    (k) Foreign central bank borrowing outflow amount. A [BANK]'s 
foreign central bank borrowing outflow amount is, in a foreign 
jurisdiction where the [BANK] has borrowed from the jurisdiction's 
central bank, the outflow amount assigned to borrowings from central 
banks in a minimum liquidity standard established in that jurisdiction. 
If the foreign jurisdiction has not specified a central bank borrowing 
outflow amount in a minimum liquidity standard, the foreign central 
bank borrowing outflow amount must be calculated in accordance with 
paragraph (j) of this section.
    (l) Other contractual outflow amount. A [BANK]'s other contractual 
outflow amount is 100 percent of funding or amounts, with the exception 
of

[[Page 61536]]

operating expenses of the [BANK] (such as rents, salaries, utilities, 
and other similar payments), payable by the [BANK] to counterparties 
under legally binding agreements that are not otherwise specified in 
this section.
    (m) Excluded amounts for intragroup transactions. The outflow 
amounts set forth in this section do not include amounts arising out of 
transactions between:
    (1) The [BANK] and a consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK]; or
    (2) A consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK] and another 
consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK].


Sec.  _.33  Inflow amounts.

    (a) The inflows in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section do 
not include:
    (1) Amounts the [BANK] holds in operational deposits at other 
regulated financial companies;
    (2) Amounts the [BANK] expects, or is contractually entitled to 
receive, 30 calendar days or less from the calculation date due to 
forward sales of mortgage loans and any derivatives that are mortgage 
commitments subject to Sec.  _.32(d);
    (3) The amount of any credit or liquidity facilities extended to 
the [BANK];
    (4) The amount of any asset that is eligible HQLA and any amounts 
payable to the [BANK] with respect to that asset;
    (5) Any amounts payable to the [BANK] from an obligation of a 
customer or counterparty that is a nonperforming asset as of the 
calculation date or that the [BANK] has reason to expect will become a 
nonperforming exposure 30 calendar days or less from the calculation 
date; and
    (6) Amounts payable to the [BANK] with respect to any transaction 
that has no contractual maturity date or that matures after 30 calendar 
days of the calculation date (as determined by Sec.  _.31).
    (b) Net derivative cash inflow amount. The net derivative cash 
inflow amount as of the calculation date is the sum of the net 
derivative cash inflow amount for each counterparty. The net derivative 
cash inflow amount does not include amounts excluded from inflows under 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. The net derivative cash inflow amount 
for a counterparty is the sum of:
    (1) The amount, if greater than zero, of contractual payments and 
collateral that the [BANK] will receive from the counterparty 30 
calendar days or less from the calculation date under derivative 
transactions other than transactions described in paragraph (b)(2) of 
this section, less the contractual payments and collateral that the 
[BANK] will make or deliver to the counterparty 30 calendar days or 
less from the calculation date under derivative transactions other than 
transactions described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, provided 
that the derivative transactions are subject to a qualifying master 
netting agreement; and
    (2) The amount, if greater than zero, of contractual principal 
payments that the [BANK] will receive from the counterparty 30 calendar 
days or less from the calculation date under foreign currency exchange 
derivative transactions that result in the full exchange of contractual 
cash principal payments in different currencies within the same 
business day, less the contractual principal payments that the [BANK] 
will make to the counterparty 30 calendar days or less from the 
calculation date under foreign currency exchange derivative 
transactions that result in the full exchange of contractual cash 
principal payments in different currencies within the same business 
day.
    (c) Retail cash inflow amount. The retail cash inflow amount as of 
the calculation date includes 50 percent of all payments contractually 
payable to the [BANK] from retail customers or counterparties.
    (d) Unsecured wholesale cash inflow amount. The unsecured wholesale 
cash inflow amount as of the calculation date includes:
    (1) 100 percent of all payments contractually payable to the [BANK] 
from financial sector entities, or from a consolidated subsidiary 
thereof, or central banks; and
    (2) 50 percent of all payments contractually payable to the [BANK] 
from wholesale customers or counterparties that are not financial 
sector entities or consolidated subsidiaries thereof, provided that, 
with respect to revolving credit facilities, the amount of the existing 
loan is not included in the unsecured wholesale cash inflow amount and 
the remaining undrawn balance is included in the outflow amount under 
Sec.  _.32(e)(1).
    (e) Securities cash inflow amount. The securities cash inflow 
amount as of the calculation date includes 100 percent of all 
contractual payments due to the [BANK] on securities it owns that are 
not eligible HQLA.
    (f) Secured lending and asset exchange cash inflow amount. (1) A 
[BANK]'s secured lending cash inflow amount as of the calculation date 
includes:
    (i) Zero percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions, including margin loans 
extended to customers, to the extent that the payments are secured by 
collateral that has been rehypothecated in a transaction and, as of the 
calculation date, will not be returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar 
days;
    (ii) 100 percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions not described in paragraph 
(f)(1)(vii) of this section, to the extent that the payments are 
secured by assets that are not eligible HQLA, but are still held by the 
[BANK] and are available for immediate return to the counterparty at 
any time;
    (iii) Zero percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions not described in paragraphs 
(f)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section, to the extent that the payments are 
secured by level 1 liquid assets;
    (iv) 15 percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions not described in paragraphs 
(f)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section, to the extent that the payments are 
secured by level 2A liquid assets;
    (v) 50 percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions not described in paragraphs 
(f)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section, to the extent that the payments are 
secured by level 2B liquid assets;
    (vi) 100 percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to secured lending transactions not described in paragraphs 
(f)(1)(i), (ii), or (vii) of this section, to the extent that the 
payments are secured by assets that are not HQLA; and
    (vii) 50 percent of all contractual payments due to the [BANK] 
pursuant to collateralized margin loans extended to customers, not 
described in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this section, provided that the 
loans are secured by assets that are not HQLA.
    (2) A [BANK]'s asset exchange inflow amount as of the calculation 
date includes:
    (i) Zero percent of the fair value of assets the [BANK] will 
receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, to the extent 
that the asset received by the [BANK] from the counterparty has been 
rehypothecated in a transaction and, as of the calculation date, will 
not be returned to the [BANK] within 30 calendar days;
    (ii) Zero percent of the fair value of level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where

[[Page 61537]]

the [BANK] must post level 1 liquid assets to the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (iii) 15 percent of the fair value of level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post level 2A liquid assets to the asset exchange counterparty;
    (iv) 50 percent of the fair value of level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, not 
described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] must 
post level 2B liquid assets to the asset exchange counterparty;
    (v) 100 percent of the fair value of level 1 liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post assets that are not HQLA to the asset exchange counterparty;
    (vi) Zero percent of the fair value of level 2A liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post level 1 or level 2A liquid assets to the asset exchange 
counterparty;
    (vii) 35 percent of the fair value of level 2A liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post level 2B liquid assets to the asset exchange counterparty;
    (viii) 85 percent of the fair value of level 2A liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post assets that are not HQLA to the asset exchange counterparty;
    (ix) Zero percent of the fair value of level 2B liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post assets that are HQLA to the asset exchange counterparty; and
    (x) 50 percent of the fair value of level 2B liquid assets the 
[BANK] will receive from a counterparty pursuant to asset exchanges, 
not described in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, where the [BANK] 
must post assets that are not HQLA to the asset exchange counterparty.
    (g) Broker-dealer segregated account inflow amount. A [BANK]'s 
broker-dealer segregated account inflow amount is the fair value of all 
assets released from broker-dealer segregated accounts maintained in 
accordance with statutory or regulatory requirements for the protection 
of customer trading assets, provided that the calculation of the 
broker-dealer segregated account inflow amount, for any transaction 
affecting the calculation of the segregated balance (as required by 
applicable law), shall be consistent with the following:
    (1) In calculating the broker-dealer segregated account inflow 
amount, the [BANK] must calculate the fair value of the required 
balance of the customer reserve account as of 30 calendar days from the 
calculation date by assuming that customer cash and collateral 
positions have changed consistent with the outflow and inflow 
calculations required under Sec. Sec.  _.32 and _.33.
    (2) If the fair value of the required balance of the customer 
reserve account as of 30 calendar days from the calculation date, as 
calculated consistent with the outflow and inflow calculations required 
under Sec. Sec.  _.32 and _.33, is less than the fair value of the 
required balance as of the calculation date, the difference is the 
segregated account inflow amount.
    (3) If the fair value of the required balance of the customer 
reserve account as of 30 calendar days from the calculation date, as 
calculated consistent with the outflow and inflow calculations required 
under Sec. Sec.  _.32 and _.33, is more than the fair value of the 
required balance as of the calculation date, the segregated account 
inflow amount is zero.
    (h) Other cash inflow amounts. A [BANK]'s inflow amount as of the 
calculation date includes zero percent of other cash inflow amounts not 
included in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section.
    (i) Excluded amounts for intragroup transactions. The inflow 
amounts set forth in this section do not include amounts arising out of 
transactions between:
    (1) The [BANK] and a consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK]; or
    (2) A consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK] and another 
consolidated subsidiary of the [BANK].

Subpart E--Liquidity Coverage Shortfall


Sec.  _.40  Liquidity coverage shortfall: Supervisory framework.

    (a) Notification requirements. A [BANK] must notify the [AGENCY] on 
any business day when its liquidity coverage ratio is calculated to be 
less than the minimum requirement in Sec.  _.10.
    (b) Liquidity plan. (1) For the period during which a [BANK] must 
calculate a liquidity coverage ratio on the last business day of each 
applicable calendar month under subpart F of this part, if the [BANK]'s 
liquidity coverage ratio is below the minimum requirement in Sec.  _.10 
for any calculation date that is the last business day of the 
applicable calendar month, or if the [AGENCY] has determined that the 
[BANK] is otherwise materially noncompliant with the requirements of 
this part, the [BANK] must promptly consult with the [AGENCY] to 
determine whether the [BANK] must provide to the [AGENCY] a plan for 
achieving compliance with the minimum liquidity requirement in Sec.  
_.10 and all other requirements of this part.
    (2) For the period during which a [BANK] must calculate a liquidity 
coverage ratio each business day under subpart F of this part, if a 
[BANK]'s liquidity coverage ratio is below the minimum requirement in 
Sec.  _.10 for three consecutive business days, or if the [AGENCY] has 
determined that the [BANK] is otherwise materially noncompliant with 
the requirements of this part, the [BANK] must promptly provide to the 
[AGENCY] a plan for achieving compliance with the minimum liquidity 
requirement in Sec.  _.10 and all other requirements of this part.
    (3) The plan must include, as applicable:
    (i) An assessment of the [BANK]'s liquidity position;
    (ii) The actions the [BANK] has taken and will take to achieve full 
compliance with this part, including:
    (A) A plan for adjusting the [BANK]'s risk profile, risk 
management, and funding sources in order to achieve full compliance 
with this part; and
    (B) A plan for remediating any operational or management issues 
that contributed to noncompliance with this part;
    (iii) An estimated time frame for achieving full compliance with 
this part; and
    (iv) A commitment to report to the [AGENCY] no less than weekly on 
progress to achieve compliance in accordance with the plan until full 
compliance with this part is achieved.
    (c) Supervisory and enforcement actions. The [AGENCY] may, at its 
discretion, take additional supervisory or enforcement actions to 
address noncompliance with the minimum liquidity standard and other 
requirements of this part.

[[Page 61538]]

Subpart F--Transitions


Sec.  _--.50  Transitions.

    (a) Covered depository institution holding companies with $700 
billion or more in total consolidated assets or $10 trillion or more in 
assets under custody. For any depository institution holding company 
that has total consolidated assets equal to $700 billion or more, as 
reported on the company's most recent Consolidated Financial Statements 
for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C), or $10 trillion or more in assets 
under custody, as reported on the company's most recent Banking 
Organization Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15), and any depository 
institution that is a consolidated subsidiary of such depository 
institution holding company that has total consolidated assets equal to 
$10 billion or more, as reported on the most recent year-end 
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income:
    (1) Beginning January 1, 2015, through June 30, 2015, the [BANK] 
must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio monthly, on each 
calculation date that is the last business day of the applicable 
calendar month, in accordance with this part, that is equal to or 
greater than 0.80.
    (2) Beginning July 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015, the [BANK] 
must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio on each 
calculation date in accordance with this part that is equal to or 
greater than 0.80.
    (3) Beginning January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, the 
[BANK] must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio on each 
calculation date in accordance with this part that is equal to or 
greater than 0.90.
    (4) On January 1, 2017, and thereafter, the [BANK] must calculate 
and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio on each calculation date that 
is equal to or greater than 1.0.
    (b) Other [BANK]s. For any [BANK] subject to a minimum liquidity 
standard under this part not described in paragraph (a) of this 
section:
    (1) Beginning January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, the 
[BANK] must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio monthly, 
on each calculation date that is the last business day of the 
applicable calendar month, in accordance with this part, that is equal 
to or greater than 0.80.
    (2) Beginning January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016, the [BANK] 
must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio monthly, on each 
calculation date that is the last business day of the applicable 
calendar month, in accordance with this part, that is equal to or 
greater than 0.90.
    (3) Beginning July 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, the [BANK] 
must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio on each 
calculation date in accordance with this part that is equal to or 
greater than 0.90.
    (4) On January 1, 2017, and thereafter, the [BANK] must calculate 
and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio on each calculation date that 
is equal to or greater than 1.0.

[End of Common Rule Text]

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 50

    Administrative practice and procedure; Banks, banking; Liquidity; 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; Savings associations.

12 CFR Part 249

    Administrative practice and procedure; Banks, banking; Federal 
Reserve System; Holding companies; Liquidity; Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

12 CFR Part 329

    Administrative practice and procedure; Banks, banking; Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC; Liquidity; Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

Adoption of Common Rule

    The adoption of the common rules by the agencies, as modified by 
the agency-specific text, is set forth below:

Department of the Treasury

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Chapter I

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, the OCC adds the 
text of the common rule as set forth at the end of the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION as part 50 of chapter I of title 12 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations and further amends part 50 as follows:

PART 50--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 50 is added to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 93a, 481, 1818, and 1462 et 
seq.


0
2. Part 50 is amended by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``OCC'' in its place, wherever it 
appears;
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``(12 CFR part 
3)'' in its place, wherever it appears;
0
c. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``national bank or Federal savings 
association'' in its place, wherever it appears;
0
d. Removing ``[BANK]s'' and adding ``national banks and Federal savings 
associations'' in its place, wherever it appears;
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'s'' and adding ``national bank's or Federal 
savings association's'' in its place, wherever it appears;
0
f. Removing ``[REGULATORY REPORT]'' and adding ``Consolidated Reports 
of Condition and Income'' in its place, wherever it appears; and
0
g. Removing ``[12 CFR 3.404 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202 (Board), and 12 CFR 
324.5 (FDIC)]'' and adding ``12 CFR 3.404'' in its place, wherever it 
appears.

0
3. Section 50.1 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b)(1)(iii);
0
b. Removing the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
c. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (b)(3)(ii) and adding 
``; or'' in its place; and
0
d. Adding paragraph (b)(3)(iii).
    The addition and revision read as follows:


Sec.  50.1  Purpose and applicability.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (iii) It is a depository institution that has total consolidated 
assets equal to $10 billion or more, as reported on the most recent 
year-end Consolidated Report of Condition and Income and is a 
consolidated subsidiary of one of the following:
    (A) A covered depository institution holding company that has total 
consolidated assets equal to $250 billion or more, as reported on the 
most recent year-end Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding 
Companies reporting form (FR Y-9C), or, if the covered depository 
institution holding company is not required to report on the FR Y-9C, 
its estimated total consolidated assets as of the most recent year-end, 
calculated in accordance with the instructions to the FR Y-9C;
    (B) A depository institution that has total consolidated assets 
equal to $250 billion or more, as reported on the most recent year-end 
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income; or
    (C) A covered depository institution holding company or depository 
institution that has consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign 
exposure at the most recent year-end equal to $10 billion or more 
(where total on-balance sheet foreign exposure equals total cross-
border claims less claims with a head office or guarantor located in

[[Page 61539]]

another country plus redistributed guaranteed amounts to the country of 
the head office or guarantor plus local country claims on local 
residents plus revaluation gains on foreign exchange and derivative 
transaction products, calculated in accordance with the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure 
Report); or
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) A Federal branch or agency as defined by 12 CFR 28.11.
* * * * *

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, the Board adds 
the text of the common rule as set forth at the end of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION as part 249 of chapter II of title 12 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations and further amends part 249 as follows:

PART 249--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS (REGULATION WW)

0
4. The authority citation for part 249 is added to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1467a(g)(1), 
1818, 1828, 1831p-1, 1831o-1, 1844(b), 5365, 5366, 5368.


0
5. Revise the heading for part 249 as set forth above.

0
6. Part 249 is amended by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``Board'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``Regulation Q 
(12 CFR part 217)'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
c. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``Board-regulated institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
d. Removing ``[BANK]s'' and adding ``Board-regulated institutions'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'s'' and adding ``Board-regulated institution's'' 
in its place wherever it appears.
0
f. Removing``[12 CFR 3.404 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202 (Board), and 12 CFR 
324.5 (FDIC)]'' and adding ``12 CFR 263.202'' in its place wherever it 
appears.

0
7. Amend Sec.  249.1 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b)(1)(i);
0
b. Removing the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph (b)(1)(iii);
0
c. Redesignating paragraph (b)(1)(iv) as paragraph (b)(1)(vi);
0
d. Adding new paragraphs (b)(1)(iv) and (v);
0
e. Revising paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (5); and
0
f. Adding new paragraph (c).
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  249.1  Purpose and applicability.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) It has total consolidated assets equal to $250 billion or more, 
as reported on the most recent year-end (as applicable):
    (A) Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies 
reporting form (FR Y-9C), or, if the Board-regulated institution is not 
required to report on the FR Y-9C, its estimated total consolidated 
assets as of the most recent year end, calculated in accordance with 
the instructions to the FR Y-9C; or
    (B) Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call Report);
* * * * *
    (iv) It is a covered nonbank company;
    (v) It is a covered depository institution holding company that 
meets the criteria in Sec.  249.60(a) but does not meet the criteria in 
paragraphs (b)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section, and is subject to 
complying with the requirements of this part in accordance with subpart 
G of this part; or
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution that becomes subject to the 
minimum liquidity standard and other requirements of this part under 
paragraph (b)(1)(vi) of this section after September 30, 2014, must 
comply with the requirements of this part subject to a transition 
period specified by the Board.
* * * * *
    (5) In making a determination under paragraphs (b)(1)(vi) or (4) of 
this section, the Board will apply, as appropriate, notice and response 
procedures in the same manner and to the same extent as the notice and 
response procedures set forth in 12 CFR 263.202.
    (c) Covered nonbank companies. The Board will establish a minimum 
liquidity standard for a designated company under this part by rule or 
order. In establishing such standard, the Board will consider the 
factors set forth in sections 165(a)(2) and (b)(3) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and may tailor the application of the requirements of this part to 
the designated company based on the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, mix of the activities of the 
designated company or any other risk-related factor that the Board 
determines is appropriate.


0
8. In Sec.  249.3, add definitions for ``Board'', ``Board-regulated 
institution'', and ``State member bank'' in alphabetical order, to read 
as follows:


Sec.  249.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Board means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    Board-regulated institution means a state member bank, covered 
depository institution holding company, or covered nonbank company.
* * * * *
    State member bank means a state bank that is a member of the 
Federal Reserve System.
* * * * *

0
9. In Sec.  249.22, revise paragraph (b)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.22  Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) For eligible HQLA held in a legal entity that is a U.S. 
consolidated subsidiary of a Board-regulated institution:
    (i) If the U.S. consolidated subsidiary is subject to a minimum 
liquidity standard under this part, 12 CFR part 50, or 12 CFR part 329, 
the Board-regulated institution may include the eligible HQLA of the 
U.S. consolidated subsidiary in its HQLA amount up to:
    (A) The amount of net cash outflows of the U.S. consolidated 
subsidiary calculated by the U.S. consolidated subsidiary for its own 
minimum liquidity standard under this part, 12 CFR part 50, or 12 CFR 
part 329; plus
    (B) Any additional amount of assets, including proceeds from the 
monetization of assets, that would be available for transfer to the 
top-tier Board-regulated institution during times of stress without 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions, 
including sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 
371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1) and Regulation W (12 CFR part 223);
    (ii) If the U.S. consolidated subsidiary is not subject to a 
minimum liquidity standard under this part, or 12 CFR part 50, or 12 
CFR part 329, the Board-regulated institution may include the eligible 
HQLA of the U.S. consolidated subsidiary in its HQLA amount up to:
    (A) The amount of the net cash outflows of the U.S. consolidated 
subsidiary as of the 30th calendar day

[[Page 61540]]

after the calculation date, as calculated by the Board-regulated 
institution for the Board-regulated institution's minimum liquidity 
standard under this part; plus
    (B) Any additional amount of assets, including proceeds from the 
monetization of assets, that would be available for transfer to the 
top-tier Board-regulated institution during times of stress without 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions, 
including sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 
371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1) and Regulation W (12 CFR part 223); and
* * * * *

0
10. In Sec.  249.40, revise paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.40  Liquidity coverage shortfall: Supervisory framework.

* * * * *
    (b) Liquidity plan. (1) For the period during which a Board-
regulated institution must calculate a liquidity coverage ratio on the 
last business day of each applicable calendar month under subparts F or 
G of this part, if the Board-regulated institution's liquidity coverage 
ratio is below the minimum requirement in Sec.  249.10 for any 
calculation date that is the last business day of the applicable 
calendar month, or if the Board has determined that the Board-regulated 
institution is otherwise materially noncompliant with the requirements 
of this part, the Board-regulated institution must promptly consult 
with the Board to determine whether the Board-regulated institution 
must provide to the Board a plan for achieving compliance with the 
minimum liquidity requirement in Sec.  249.10 and all other 
requirements of this part.
* * * * *

0
11. Add subpart G to read as follows:

Subpart G--Liquidity Coverage Ratio for Certain Bank Holding 
Companies

Sec.
249.60 Applicability.
249.61 Liquidity coverage ratio.
249.62 High-quality liquid asset amount.
249.63 Total net cash outflow.


Sec.  249.60  Applicability.

    (a) Scope. This subpart applies to a covered depository institution 
holding company domiciled in the United States that has total 
consolidated assets equal to $50 billion or more, based on the average 
of the Board-regulated institution's four most recent FR Y-9Cs (or, if 
a savings and loan holding company is not required to report on the FR 
Y-9C, based on the average of its estimated total consolidated assets 
for the most recent four quarters, calculated in accordance with the 
instructions to the FR Y-9C) and does not meet the applicability 
criteria set forth in Sec.  249.1(b).
    (b) Applicable provisions. Except as otherwise provided in this 
subpart, the provisions of subparts A through E of this part apply to 
covered depository institution holding companies that are subject to 
this subpart.
    (c) Applicability. Subject to the transition periods set forth in 
Sec.  249.61:
    (1) A Board-regulated institution that meets the threshold for 
applicability of this subpart under paragraph (a) of this section on 
September 30, 2014, must comply with the requirements of this subpart 
beginning on January 1, 2015; and
    (2) A Board-regulated institution that first meets the threshold 
for applicability of this subpart under paragraph (a) of this section 
after September 30, 2014, must comply with the requirements of this 
subpart beginning on the first day of the first quarter after which it 
meets the threshold set forth in paragraph (a).


Sec.  249.61  Liquidity coverage ratio.

    (a) Calculation of liquidity coverage ratio. A Board-regulated 
institution subject to this subpart must calculate and maintain a 
liquidity coverage ratio in accordance with Sec.  249.10 and this 
subpart, provided however, that such Board-regulated institution shall 
only be required to maintain a liquidity coverage ratio that is equal 
to or greater than 1.0 on last business day of the applicable calendar 
month. A Board-regulated institution subject to this subpart must 
calculate its liquidity coverage ratio as of the same time on each 
calculation day (elected calculation time). The Board-regulated 
institution must select this time by written notice to the Board prior 
to the effective date of this rule. The Board-regulated institution may 
not thereafter change its elected calculation time without prior 
written approval from the Board.
    (b) Transitions. For any Board-regulated institution subject to a 
minimum liquidity standard under this subpart:
    (1) Beginning January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, the 
Board-regulated institution must calculate and maintain a liquidity 
coverage ratio monthly, on each calculation date, in accordance with 
this subpart, that is equal to or greater than 0.90.
    (2) Beginning January 1, 2017 and thereafter, the Board-regulated 
institution must calculate and maintain a liquidity coverage ratio 
monthly, on each calculation date, in accordance with this subpart, 
that is equal to or greater than 1.0.


Sec.  249.62  High-quality liquid asset amount.

    A covered depository institution holding company subject to this 
subpart must calculate its HQLA amount in accordance with subpart C of 
this part.


Sec.  249.63  Total net cash outflow.

    (a) A covered depository institution holding company subject to 
this subpart must calculate its cash outflows and inflows in accordance 
with subpart D of this part, provided, however, that as of the 
calculation date, the total net cash outflow amount of a covered 
depository institution subject to this subpart equals 70 percent of:
    (1) The sum of the outflow amounts calculated under Sec.  249.32(a) 
through (l); less:
    (2) The lesser of:
    (i) The sum of the inflow amounts under Sec.  249.33(b) through 
(g); and
    (ii) 75 percent of the amount in paragraph (a)(1) of this section 
as calculated for that calendar day.
    (b) [Reserved]

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

12 CFR Chapter III

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation amends chapter III of title 12 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 329--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

0
12. The authority citation for part 329 is added to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1815, 1816, 1818, 1819, 1828, 1831p-1, 
5412.


0
13. Part 329 is added as set forth at the end of the common preamble.


0
14. Part 329 is amended by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``FDIC'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``12 CFR part 
324'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
c. Removing ``A [BANK]'' and adding ``An FDIC-supervised institution'' 
in its place wherever it appears.
0
d. Removing ``a [BANK]'' and add ``an FDIC-supervised institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``FDIC-supervised institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
f. Removing ``[BANK]s'' and adding ``FDIC-supervised institutions'' in 
its place wherever it appears.

[[Page 61541]]

0
g. Removing ``[BANK]'s'' and adding ``FDIC-supervised institution's'' 
in its place wherever it appears.
0
h. Removing ``[REGULATORY REPORT]'' and adding ``Consolidated Report of 
Condition and Income'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
i. Removing ``[12 CFR 3.404 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202 (Board), and 12 CFR 
324.5 (FDIC)]'' and adding ``12 CFR 324.5'' in its place wherever it 
appears.


0
15. In Sec.  329.1, revise paragraph (b)(1)(iii) to read as follows:


Sec.  329.1  Purpose and applicability.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (iii) It is a depository institution that has total consolidated 
assets equal to $10 billion or more, as reported on the most recent 
year-end Consolidated Report of Condition and Income and is a 
consolidated subsidiary of one of the following:
    (A) A covered depository institution holding company that has total 
assets equal to $250 billion or more, as reported on the most recent 
year-end Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies 
reporting form (FR Y-9C), or, if the covered depository institution 
holding company is not required to report on the FR Y-9C, its estimated 
total consolidated assets as of the most recent year-end, calculated in 
accordance with the instructions to the FR Y-9C;
    (B) A depository institution that has total consolidated assets 
equal to $250 billion or more, as reported on the most recent year-end 
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income;
    (C) A covered depository institution holding company or depository 
institution that has total consolidated on-balance sheet foreign 
exposure at the most recent year-end equal to $10 billion or more 
(where total on-balance sheet foreign exposure equals total cross-
border claims less claims with a head office or guarantor located in 
another country plus redistributed guaranteed amounts to the country of 
the head office or guarantor plus local country claims on local 
residents plus revaluation gains on foreign exchange and derivative 
transaction products, calculated in accordance with the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure 
Report); or
    (D) A covered nonbank company.
* * * * *

0
16. In Sec.  329.3, add definitions for ``FDIC'' and ``FDIC-supervised 
institution'' in alphabetical order, to read as follows:


Sec.  329.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    FDIC means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    FDIC-supervised institution means any state nonmember bank or state 
savings association.
* * * * *

    Dated: September 3, 2014.
Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency.
    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Secretary of the Board.
    Dated at Washington, DC, this 3rd day of September 2014.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-22520 Filed 10-9-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P