Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Continue to Collect
and Provide Information on Tests and on Potentially Exposed
Personnel (14-MAY-04, GAO-04-410).
In the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD)
conducted a classified chemical and biological warfare test
program--Project 112--that might have exposed service members and
civilian personnel to chemical or biological agents. In 2000 the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began obtaining information
from DOD about the program. Concerned that veterans and others
might have health problems from exposure during Project 112 and
similar DOD tests, Congress required DOD in the 2003 Defense
Authorization Act to identify Project 112 tests and personnel
potentially expose--service members and the number of civilian
personnel--and other chemical and biological tests that might
have exposed service members. GAO was required by the act and
subsequent guidance from the congressional requesters to evaluate
(1) DOD's process to identify the Project 112 tests and the
service members and the number of civilian personnel potentially
exposed, (2) DOD's progress in identifying similar tests outside
Project 112, and (3) VA's progress in notifying DOD identified
veterans.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-410
ACCNO: A10006
TITLE: Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Continue to
Collect and Provide Information on Tests and on Potentially
Exposed Personnel
DATE: 05/14/2004
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Chemical and biological agents
Chemical warfare
Civilian employees
Health hazards
Military personnel
Military personnel records
Records (documents)
Testing
Reporting requirements
Veterans
DOD Project 112 Program
******************************************************************
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GAO-04-410
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services
May 2004
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
DOD Needs to Continue to Collect and Provide Information on Tests and
Potentially Exposed Personnel
GAO-04-410
Highlights of GAO-04-410, a report to Senate and House Committees on Armed
Services
In the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a
classified chemical and biological warfare test program-Project 112-that
might have exposed service members and civilian personnel to chemical or
biological agents. In 2000 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began
obtaining information from DOD about the program. Concerned that veterans
and others might have health problems from exposure during Project 112 and
similar DOD tests, Congress required DOD in the 2003 Defense Authorization
Act to identify Project 112 tests and personnel potentially
exposed-service members and the number of civilian personnel-and other
chemical and biological tests that might have exposed service members. GAO
was required by the act and subsequent guidance from the congressional
requesters to evaluate (1) DOD's process to identify the Project 112 tests
and the service members and the number of civilian personnel potentially
exposed, (2) DOD's progress in identifying similar tests outside Project
112, and (3) VA's progress in notifying DODidentified veterans.
GAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's responsiveness to the
legislative requirement. DOD concurred with all of our recommendations and
agreed to implement them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-410.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Raymond J. Decker at
[email protected] or (202) 5126020.
May 2004
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
DOD Needs to Continue to Collect and Provide Information on Tests and
Potentially Exposed Personnel
DOD appears to have accurately identified all major chemical and
biological tests associated with Project 112. DOD identified 134 planned
tests of which 50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests, 19 were ship-based and
31 were landbased. GAO found no evidence of any other Project 112 tests.
DOD performed a reasonable investigation of service members potentially
exposed to agents in the tests. However, GAO believes that there likely
are service members and civilian personnel potentially exposed to agents
who have not been identified for various reasons. First, DOD was unable to
identify any service members for 21 land-based tests because it was unable
to find the needed records. Second, although DOD addressed the basic
mandate requirement regarding civilian personnel by estimating that 350
had been potentially exposed, it did not specifically search for
individual civilian personnel exposures or foreign national exposures. DOD
limited its investigation of specific exposures to identifying military
veterans who might be eligible for medical services from VA. Third, DOD
did not pursue all possible sources of information during its
investigation, and additional identifications continue. DOD recently
identified 51, and VA, 172 more military personnel. GAO identified 167
additional service members and civilian personnel who might have been
exposed, plus additional sources of information. DOD has not determined
the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.
In February 2004, following GAO inquiries, another DOD office began
preparing a plan to identify tests outside Project 112 that might have
exposed service members. Since World War II, DOD has conducted hundreds of
classified tests within the 48 contiguous states. Although not required by
the act, DOD also plans to identify service members and civilian personnel
who were potentially exposed by these tests. However, that office has not
yet completed its plan for doing this.
As of March 2004, VA had notified 3,397, or 58 percent, of the 5,842
service members DOD reported in June 2003, including 751 VA determined to
be deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases but is having
difficulty making these notifications due to the absence of key needed
information such as military service numbers. VA is developing a plan to
resolve these more difficult cases and expects to complete its
notification process by September 1, 2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of
316 benefit claims related to Project 112. Recent changes to VA's
eligibility requirements could increase the number of Project 112-related
medical visits.
DOD has not designated an office to act as a single point of contact for
collecting and providing information regarding the results of its
investigations of DOD chemical and biological tests conducted inside or
outside of Project 112.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
DOD Accurately Identified Project 112 Tests, Performed a
Reasonable Investigation for Service Members, and Estimated
Civilian Personnel Potentially Exposed DOD Plans to Investigate Tests
outside Project 112 VA Notified the Majority of Service Members Identified
by DOD Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation 1
3 6
8 18 20 22 23 23
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
Appendix II Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 37
Table
Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of June 30, 2003
Figures
Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test 9 Figure
2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests 10 Figure 3: Results
of DOD's Investigation of Service Members and
Others Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests 15
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
GAO General Accounting Office
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
May 14, 2004
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
During the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD)
conducted a classified chemical and biological warfare test program,
called Project 112, that might have exposed U.S. service members and
others-including DOD civilian personnel, DOD contractors, and foreign
nationals-to chemical or biological agents1 employed in these tests. As a
result of questions raised by Members of Congress and veterans, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began working with DOD in
September 2000 to obtain information about the test program and possible
military participants. Subsequently, concerned that veterans and other
individuals might have experienced health problems as a result of being
exposed while participating in Project 112 and other classified chemical
and biological tests, Congress required DOD, through the Defense
Authorization Act for 2003,2 to develop and implement a plan (1) to
identify the Project 112 tests and the service members and the number of
civilian personnel3 who were potentially exposed by the tests and (2) to
work with veterans and veterans' service organizations to identify other
1 In this report, the term "agent" is used to mean chemical and biological
agents, simulants (a substitute for a more-toxic agent), and tracers.
2 Pub. L. No. 107-314, section 709 (Dec 2, 2002).
3 For this report, we have interpreted the act's use of "civilian
personnel" to mean DOD employees, DOD contractors, and foreign government
participants who took part in Project 112 tests.
chemical and biological projects or tests that may have exposed service
members to chemical or biological agents. The act also mandated that we
evaluate DOD's efforts to identify the tests and potential service members
and number of civilian personnel exposed, as well as VA's progress in
notifying potentially exposed service members.4 Thus, our objectives for
this review were to (1) evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's process for
identifying chemical and biological tests conducted under Project 112 and
the service members and number of civilian personnel who might have been
exposed to agents employed under these tests, (2) determine DOD's progress
in identifying projects or tests conducted outside of Project 112 that
might have exposed service members to chemical or biological agents, and
(3) review VA's progress in notifying service members whom DOD determined
might have been exposed.
We assessed the reliability of DOD and VA data by interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing
information about the data and the systems that produced them. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives.
To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's identification process for Project
112 tests and potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel,
we visited repositories of DOD test records, analyzed test reports, and
selected a representative sample of conducted tests for more detailed
analyses. In addition, we reviewed other available documents and
interviewed DOD officials and scientists, including those involved in
developing and conducting Project 112 tests. We systematically
corroborated the information we developed independently from various
sources before assessing whether DOD's Project 112 identification
methodology was effective. To determine DOD's progress in identifying
chemical and biological tests or projects outside Project 112, we
interviewed DOD officials concerning DOD's process for assigning
responsibilities for such legislative mandates and its current oversight
of such DOD testing. To review VA's progress in notifying potentially
4 The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated that we prepare two
reports: one on DOD's plan for identifying tests and a second one on DOD's
implementation of its plan. Because DOD conducted the planning and
identification simultaneously, we agreed with your office to prepare one
report. The mandate also specified Project 112 tests for the 196369
period. However, because some Project 112 tests did not conclude until
1974 and DOD reported on tests conducted from 1962 through 1974, we
included the longer period in our review.
Results in Brief
exposed service members, we gathered and analyzed statistics concerning VA
notifications and its identifications of deceased service members and
interviewed VA officials about the process and likely impact on future
medical treatment. For a more complete discussion of our scope and
methodology, see appendix I.
We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government audit standards.
We believe that DOD accurately identified all tests associated with
Project 112.5 We also believe that although DOD performed a reasonable
investigation of service members potentially exposed to agents employed in
these tests, in view of the fact that many records were unavailable owing
to the passage of time, DOD likely has not identified all potentially
exposed military or civilian personnel. From October 2000 through June
2003, DOD identified 134 planned chemical and biological tests associated
with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests that were
conducted, 19 were Shipboard Hazard and Defense, or ship-based tests, 6
and 31 were land-based. These tests were conducted primarily on or near
U.S. territory, although some tests were in Canada, Panama, and the United
Kingdom. DOD's methodology for identifying planned and conducted tests
under Project 112 appears sound, and we found no evidence of additional
Project 112 tests, planned or conducted. With regard to the identification
of personnel potentially exposed during testing, DOD reported in its final
report to Congress on June 30, 2003, that it had determined that 5,842
service members had been potentially exposed to chemical or biological
agents. Because of its extensive comparison of test and other documents in
conjunction with other actions, we believe that DOD's methodology and
efforts to identify potentially exposed military personnel as required by
the mandate appear sound. Furthermore, DOD addressed another mandate
requirement by estimating that 350 civilian personnel might have been
exposed but did not focus on civilian personnel during its investigation.
Nevertheless, we believe that it is likely that service members and
civilian personnel who participated in these tests have not been
identified for the following reasons:
5 The DOD organization that investigated the Project 112 tests was a small
element of the Under Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the
Deployment Health Support Directorate.
6 DOD public documents, such as fact sheets, refer to Shipboard Hazard and
Defense tests as ship-based.
o DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
land-based tests because it was unable to locate the needed records. DOD
identified no service members who were potentially exposed during 21 of
the 31 land-based tests, and in the remaining 10 land-based tests, fewer
than the total known to have participated were identified. Approximately
94 percent of the identified service members were from the 19 ship-based
tests that comprised about one-third of all the tests conducted.
o DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel-DOD civilian
employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants-in its
investigation. The department's rationale for not including such
individuals was that it believed the scope of its investigation was
limited to military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits
from VA. However, the act requires DOD to report the number of civilian
personnel potentially exposed, and following our inquiries, DOD reported
that an additional 350 civilian personnel (250 identified in records and
100 more estimated) might have been exposed.
o DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information during its
investigation, and additional potentially exposed personnel continue to be
identified. On January 20, 2004, DOD reported 51 additional potentially
exposed service members to VA. Furthermore, through our research we
identified and reported to DOD a total of 167 additional potentially
exposed personnel-39 service members, 125 civilian DOD employees, and 3
contractors-who participated in the tests. In addition, 172 other
veterans, not identified by DOD, who reported a Project 112 connection,
have contacted VA. We also identified and reported several possible new
sources of additional Project 112 exposure information.
Since issuance of its final report in June 2003, DOD has curtailed its
efforts to identify service members and civilian personnel who were
potentially exposed. However, DOD has continued to respond to inquiries
from VA and individual service members concerning issues such as test
participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not determined
the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.
Although the Defense Authorization Act for 2003 requires DOD to work with
veterans and veterans' service organizations to identify projects or tests
outside Project 112 that might have exposed members of the armed forces to
chemical or biological agents, DOD has not yet begun this investigation.
As a result of our review questions about DOD's progress in
responding to this requirement, in February 2004 an office under the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics7 began preparing a plan to fulfill this mandated requirement,
but has not yet determined such essential plan elements as the scope,
reporting requirements, milestones, and responsibilities for those
involved in completing the effort. This is an entirely different DOD
office from the one that investigated the Project 112 tests, and
coordination between these investigations has only recently begun.
Although not required by the act, DOD plans to attempt to identify service
member and civilian personnel who were potentially exposed by these tests.
We determined that since World War II DOD conducted hundreds of other
classified tests within the 48 contiguous states outside the scope of
Project 112.
As of March 2004, VA had sent notification letters to 58 percent of the
5,842 veterans identified by DOD, of which 751 were determined to be
deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases, but it is having
difficulty making further notifications owing to the absence of key
information such as military service numbers. VA is planning to resolve
these more difficult cases and expects to complete its notification
process by September 1, 2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of 316 benefit
claims related to Project 112. The passage of Public Law 108-170,8 title
1, on December 6, 2003, changed the eligibility requirements for medical
services, which in turn could increase the number of medical visits
associated with Project 112 tests.
DOD has not designated what office will serve as the primary point of
contact for providing information relating to tests in and outside Project
112. The DOD office that is involved in identifying tests outside Project
112 had not begun its work and DOD has designated no entity, including the
Project 112 investigative office, to provide information about tests
outside Project 112. This situation could result in DOD's having no single
point of contact for providing information-including the additional
identification of personnel potentially exposed-to VA, individuals, and
other interested parties, such as foreign countries.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate
DOD office(s) to (1) determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved
7 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical
and Biological Defense.
8 Veterans Health Care, Capital Asset, and Business Improvement Act of
2003.
Background
issues associated with Project 112, such as identifying and contacting
potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel; (2) finalize
and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests conducted
outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to chemical or
biological agents; and (3) designate a single point of contact to provide
information relating to tests and potential exposures in and outside of
Project 112 to VA, individuals, and other interested parties such as
foreign countries, as appropriate. The report contains no recommendations
for VA.
In commenting on this report, both DOD and VA concurred with our findings.
DOD concurred with our recommendations and established dates for their
implementation. Both DOD and VA also provided suggested technical changes
and updated information, which we incorporated in the final report where
appropriate.
Project 112 encompassed a series of classified operational chemical and
biological warfare tests from 1962 through 1974 that DOD initiated under
the auspices of the Army's Deseret Test Center, Fort Douglas, Utah. The
project was so named because in 1962 it was the 112th project of 150
delineated by the then Secretary of Defense and involved the classified
testing of chemical and biological agents. Annually, the armed services
and the commanders in chief of the combatant commands submitted their
testing requirements to Deseret Test Center where they were discussed at
annual planning conferences and, when possible, incorporated in the test
program for the following year.
Project 112 included both ship-based and land-based tests. Ship-based
tests were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of protective measures
against chemical and biological agents, and risks to U.S. forces.
Landbased tests were generally conducted to learn how chemical or
biological warfare agents behaved in different environmental conditions,
e.g., frigid or tropical climates. The ship-based tests involved service
members from the Navy and Army and to a lesser extent personnel from the
Marine Corps and Air Force. According to a Project 112 chief scientist we
interviewed, test teams consisted largely of military and civilian
personnel from DOD's Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, with an Army, Air Force,
or Naval officer as test director. Ship-based tests were conducted in the
open waters of the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and near the Marshall
Islands, the Islands of Hawaii, Baker Island (a U.S. possession located
1,650 miles southwest of Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean), Puerto Rico, and
the California coast. Land-based tests took place in the states of Alaska,
Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Maryland, and Utah, as well as in Panama, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. These land-based tests sometimes included foreign personnel
observers-both military and civilian.
In August 2000, following occasional veteran and congressional contacts
concerning veterans' involvement in Project 112 tests, VA's Acting
Secretary wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting information on
ship-based testing conducted by DOD. In October 2000 DOD assigned
responsibility for this action to its Deployment Health Support
Directorate. DOD committed to obtaining information about three
tests-Autumn Gold, Copper Head, and Shady Grove (see app. II)-such as
dates, locations, chemical or biological agents used, and names of
military personnel aboard the ships during the testing. DOD investigators,
representing only a small element of the Directorate, discovered and
provided information on these as well as on the remaining Project 112
tests, planned or conducted, despite having a number of difficulties to
overcome with respect to the availability of test records. The available
records were stored in multiple locations, not easily searchable, and
still largely classified because of operational concerns.
When the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act was passed, it expanded
the requirements beyond what DOD envisioned when it began its
investigation. The act required DOD to provide VA with the information
developed concerning Project 112 tests VA for its use in notifying service
members who might have been exposed. The act also required DOD to submit
to Congress reports, which were to include the test names, test
objectives, chemical or biological agents involved, number of service
members and civilian personnel potentially affected by each test, and
other information. The act also required us to review and report to
Congress on DOD's test and personnel identification efforts, its
procedures for providing VA with information and VA's notification
efforts. As mandated by the act, DOD concluded its investigation of
Project 112 with a report to Congress on June 30, 2003. In addition, the
act required DOD to work with veterans and veterans' service organizations
to identify other DOD projects or tests that might have similarly exposed
service members. While this second investigation had not started when we
began our work, an office under the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is now preparing a plan
for doing so. This second investigation is being envisioned as completely
separate from and is being conducted by a different office from the one
that investigated Project 112.
DOD Accurately Identified Project 112 Tests, Performed a Reasonable
Investigation for Service Members, and Estimated Civilian Personnel
Potentially Exposed
The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 required DOD to identify Project
112 tests, as well as the service members and the number of civilians who
might have been exposed to agents employed in these tests. A small office
of the Deployment Health Support Directorate that reports to the Under
Secretary for Health Affairs conducted this investigation. We believe that
DOD accurately identified the tests associated with Project 112 and, given
the unavailability of many records due to the passage of time, performed a
reasonable investigation of service members who were potentially exposed
to the agents employed in these tests. DOD identified 134 planned Project
112 tests of which 50 were conducted-either on land or on ships. Some
tests were conducted on or near U.S. territory, although some were in
foreign countries. We found no evidence of any additional Project 112
tests. Because of its extensive comparison of test documents and ship
personnel rosters, in conjunction with other actions, we believe that DOD
used a sound methodology to identify 5,842 service members who were
potentially exposed to agents employed in these tests. DOD addressed
another mandate requirement with respect to reporting the number of
civilian personnel who might have been exposed to agents by these tests by
including in its final report an estimate that 350 DOD civilian personnel
were potentially exposed. For several reasons, we believe it is likely
that both service members and civilian personnel remain unidentified.
First, DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
landbased tests because it was unable to find much of the needed
documentation. Second, DOD did not specifically search for civilian
personnel-DOD employees, contractors, and foreign government
participants-in its investigation because it considered civilian personnel
beyond the scope of its investigation. Third, DOD did not identify all
possible sources of information such as additional Project 112
repositories, and substantial numbers of potentially exposed personnel
continue to be identified. We identified 167 additional potentially
exposed personnel mostly associated with land-based tests.9 DOD identified
an additional 51 and VA, an additional 172. Nevertheless, DOD has not
determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify
additional potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.
9 On the basis of our document search, which went beyond the records DOD
reviewed, these personnel appear to be in addition to the 350 potentially
exposed civilian personnel that DOD estimated in its June 2003 report to
Congress.
Identification of Project 112 Tests
As required by the legislative mandate, DOD accurately identified the 134
planned tests associated with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. DOD
believes that the systematic approach it used to identify these tests
provides a high degree of assurance that it has captured all of the
Project 112 tests, and we agree. We did not find any evidence of
additional Project 112 tests, planned or conducted, during our review.
Of the 50 Project 112 tests that DOD conducted, 19 were ship-based and 31
were land-based. (See fig. 1 for an example of land-based testing.)
According to information provided to VA, the ship-based tests occurred,
among other places, in the Pacific Ocean off the Hawaiian Islands and off
the coast of San Diego, California; in the Atlantic Ocean off
Newfoundland; in the Pacific off the Marshall Islands; and off Vieques
Island, Puerto Rico. The land-based tests were conducted in Alaska, Utah,
Canada, the Panama Canal Zone, and the United Kingdom. The tests were
conducted from December 1962 through May 1974. (See app. II for a summary
of the 50 conducted tests.)
Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test
In the absence of distinct overall program documents, DOD relied on a
myriad of documents from various sources to identify Project 112 tests. As
shown in figure 2, DOD (1) determined the repositories of potential test
records, (2) performed electronic and physical searches of the documents
contained at each repository to identify applicable documents, (3)
reviewed each document to determine its relevance to Project 112, and (4)
interviewed selected scientists and test participants. In addition, DOD
conducted outreach programs to veterans and veterans'groups and
corroborated the evidence obtained from the various sources.
Figure 2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests
Repositories of Project 112 test records included but were not limited to
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; and the
Navy's Surface Warfare Center located at Dahlgren, Virginia. Using this
approach, according to DOD officials, DOD located documents that addressed
tests planned and conducted for each of the years during which Project 112
tests were being performed. In particular, DOD officials noted
the corroboration of evidence from the annual and semiannual reports from
the Deseret Test Center, Utah, the organization responsible for the tests;
the planning documents for each of the tests; and the final test reports.
This enabled them to close the "information gaps," thus providing a high
level of assurance that virtually all of the tests were identified. The
annual reports, for example, typically discussed not only the plans for
the coming year but also included information on the tests that had been
conducted during the previous year. DOD supplemented the evidence it
gathered from documents and discussions with former managers of the
Deseret Test Center.
We did not identify any additional Project 112 tests in our review of DOD
documents and our discussions with DOD and former officials and managers
of the Deseret Test Center. It appears that DOD used a reasonable approach
for identifying the locations of records and source documents,
particularly since some of the Project 112 tests were conducted more than
40 years ago and the record-keeping systems were much less sophisticated
than today's.
DOD's determination of whether Project 112 tests were conducted was
complicated by the fact that a number of tests were postponed, had name
changes, or were combined with other tests. DOD essentially used an
iterative approach to track each test from its first mention in a test
document until its final resolution-conducted or canceled. Determinations
were made on a case-by-case basis whenever possible, on the basis of the
evidence that was gathered for each test. The existence of a final test
report was considered to be sufficient evidence that a test had been
conducted; DOD obtained final test reports for each of the 50 tests that
it concluded were conducted. DOD located specific documentation for 62 of
the 84 tests it determined were canceled. The determination that the
remaining 22 tests had been canceled was based on a combination of
factors. The moratorium on biological tests that was issued on November
25, 1969, for example, was the partial basis for the determination that
eight tests were canceled. Other cancellation determinations were based on
(1) the decommissioning of the fleet used for the ship-based tests, (2)
test requirements canceled or met by other tests, and (3) the Deseret Test
Center's closure. We agree with DOD's conclusions regarding tests that
were conducted or canceled.
DOD developed unclassified fact sheets that described each conducted
Project 112 test, which were provided to VA, and made available on the DOD
Web site. These fact sheets provide available information concerning the
test objectives, dates, and locations as well as the names of
participating units or ships. The fact sheets also provide information
concerning the agents used and current information concerning the medical
implications of exposure.
Potentially Exposed Service Members and Civilian Personnel Remain
Unidentified
Although the methodology to identify potentially exposed service members
appears to be sound, we believe that the service members that DOD
identified and the number of civilian personnel it estimated do not
represent all of the service members and civilian personnel who might have
been exposed for the following reasons:
o DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
land-based tests because it was unable to find much of the needed
documentation.
o DOD did not specifically search for individual civilian personnel-DOD
employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants-in its
investigation because it considered such personnel outside its scope.
o DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of pertinent information, and
additional potentially exposed personnel continue to be identified.
Nevertheless, DOD has not evaluated the feasibility of addressing
unresolved Project 112 issues, such as identifying additional potentially
exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, and foreign
nationals who participated in the tests. DOD has also not determined what
office has responsibility for reporting new information to VA,
individuals, or other interested parties, such as foreign countries, as
appropriate.
In its last report to Congress on June 30, 2003, DOD identified 5,842
service members who had been potentially exposed during Project 112 tests;
some during more than one test. DOD reported an additional 51 potentially
exposed service members to VA on January 20, 2004. Owing to the absence of
important documentation, DOD had limited success in identifying service
members exposed to land-based tests. DOD did not identify any potentially
exposed service members in 21 of the 31 landbased tests and limited
numbers in the remainder. Ship-based tests commonly had 1,000 or more
participants. Land-based tests, according to a former Deseret Test Center
scientist, generally involved fewer than 200 participants. Because of the
aforementioned reasons, almost all those identified--94 percent-were from
ship-based tests that comprised about one-third of the total number of
tests conducted. Also, fewer service
members were identified for some land-based tests than the number known to
have participated. For example, in Elk Hunt I, a land-based test that
involved personnel from at least seven Army units of various sizes, DOD
identified only six service members.
DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel in its
investigation- such as DOD civilian employees, DOD contractors, or foreign
nationals- because it believed that the scope of its investigation was
limited to military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits
from VA. DOD addressed the basic mandate requirement with respect to
identifying the number of civilian personnel by including in its final
report an estimate that 350 DOD civilian and contractor personnel were
potentially exposed. However, during the course of its investigation, DOD
did not focus on DOD civilian personnel. In April 2003, when we inquired
about the progress DOD had made in determining the number of DOD civilians
who might have been exposed, DOD had not performed any work to make this
determination. Subsequently, DOD identified 250 DOD civilians using the
records it had gathered in its investigation of service members. Since it
had not reviewed any civilian records, it increased the aforementioned
number by 100 to cover additional civilian participants who might not have
been included in the records that had been gathered. Although not required
by the legislative mandate, we noted during the course of our review that
DOD had not disseminated information concerning civilian personnel or
attempted to notify them about the investigation into the Project 112
tests. A records-holding area at Dugway Proving Ground contained 1,300
boxes with approximately 9 million historical records, but it is unclear
how many of these relate to Project 112. Our examination of the records
contained in 12 of the boxes that we believed might be useful resulted in
the identification of the names of 128 civilians (DOD employees and
contractors) who might have been exposed during Project 112 testing.
The problems DOD experienced in making the identifications of service
members appear to have been largely due to the lack of available
documentation, given that some of these tests were conducted more than 40
years ago and given the unsophisticated records systems that existed at
that time. DOD officials indicated that there was no requirement for DOD
during the Project 112 test period to document Project 112 test
participants, service members, or any others who might have been exposed
to agents employed in these tests, and it did not do so. The test plans
and reports, for example, include quantitative data on personnel and
equipment support requirements but do not identify the names of test
conductors or participants. Absent this information, DOD had the rather
complex task of collecting information from various sources, even
informal test notes, to make these identifications. DOD's methodology used
the information contained in the fact sheets for each test, such as the
names of the ships or units involved, and then searched available
documentation for service members who might have been involved. For
ship-based tests, for example, DOD obtained archived rosters of
participating ships for the appropriate time frames, along with messages
regarding ship personnel changes. DOD analyzed this information to
determine the personnel who likely participated in the ship-based tests.
According to DOD officials, the identification of land-based test
participants was more difficult and, for many tests, even impossible. DOD
took several steps to identify these participants including (1) requesting
personnel rosters of participating units, (2) conducting key word searches
of computer databases, and (3) performing general searches of boxes
containing test records. For example, DOD reviewed the contents of a
number of classified and unclassified boxes of test data at Dugway Proving
Ground, Utah seeking participant data. In addition, DOD contacted service
members who had sought assistance from VA and former employees of the
Deseret Test Center. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Results of DOD's Investigation of Service Members and Others
Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests
Despite some success, DOD encountered a number of difficulties in locating
information concerning participants in land-based tests. According to DOD,
a number of commonly available military records were not useful in its
investigation. For example, unit history records typically did not include
useful information because units participating in these tests were platoon
sized or smaller and unit history records are generally not recorded for
units of this size.10 Also, most test participants traveled to
10 A platoon is typically fewer than 50 service members.
the test locations from their home unit. However, the documents needed to
identify individuals who traveled to the test sites, such as travel orders
and vouchers, were not retained. For some tests, DOD was able to locate
participant names and, in other cases, it could not. Ultimately, DOD
electronically provided to VA with the names of service members who were
deemed likely participants in either ship-based or land-based tests. These
included the 5,842 service members that DOD reported to Congress in June
2003 and 51 that were reported to VA in January 2004. Since issuance of
its final report in June 2003, DOD has sharply curtailed its efforts to
identify service members and civilian personnel who were potentially
exposed. However, the DOD has continued to respond to inquiries from VA
and individual service members concerning issues such as test
participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not determined
the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.
Additional Potentially Exposed Personnel and Source Material Identified
During our review, both we and VA discovered additional service members,
previously unidentified by DOD, who had been potentially exposed during
Project 112 tests. We identified and reported to DOD a total of 167
additional personnel potentially exposed-39 service members, 125 civilian
DOD employees, and 3 contractors, as well as several possible new sources
of additional Project 112 exposure information. VA identified an
additional 172 service members. DOD is currently processing these
additional service member identifications. We also learned of additional
potential sources of information including films taken of all land-based
tests and other repositories of possible Project 112 documentation.
o Unidentified service members: In a records-holding area at Dugway
Proving Ground containing 1,300 boxes with approximately 9 million
historical records, including Project 112-related test records, our
examination of the records contained in 12 of the boxes uncovered
approximately 39 additional potentially exposed service members' names not
identified on DOD's list. Since we examined only a few dozen records, it
is very likely that more service members potentially exposed to Project
112 testing could be identified from this recordsholding area. According
to Dugway officials, in July 2003 a contract was negotiated to scan and
digitize the 9 million records being held there. Once this process is
completed, access to the records will be greatly facilitated.
o Unidentified civilian participants in Project 112 tests: Our
examination of the test records in 12 of the 1,300 boxes of historical
records at the Dugway records-holding area also enabled us to identify
civilian personnel not previously identified by DOD. We identified 125
civilian DOD employees and 3 contractors who had participated in
land-based Project 112 tests, such as the 1967 Green Mist test on the Big
Island of Hawaii and the 1965 West Side II test in Canada for which DOD
identified no service members. According to a former scientist responsible
for conducting the tests, Dugway Proving Ground furnished over half of the
personnel, mostly civilians, who remain unidentified. This official also
stated that the civilians employed at Deseret Test Center and Dugway
Proving Ground were exposed to 100 times more agents than the military
personnel who participated.
o VA-reported unidentified service members: Since VA began notifying
DOD-identified service members potentially exposed during Project 112
tests, other veterans have contacted VA directly indicating connections to
the tests. These veterans learned of the VA interest mainly by
word-of-mouth according to VA officials. As of January 2, 2004, 172
veterans, in addition to those identified by DOD, have themselves reported
a Project 112 connection directly to VA.
o Project 112 films as test documentation: According to Dugway
officials, films were made of every land-based Project 112 test; and most
tests involved multiple phases or trials. As these trials were conducted,
an Army photography and film team recorded the test activities, and a
total of 109 films were made. These films, which were done in what is now
an obsolete format, are being converted to a format that can now be
viewed. As of January 2004, about 25 percent of the films had been
converted. These films might be useful in identifying participating units
as well as service members and civilian personnel. The films might show,
for example, ships or helicopters that participated in the tests and were
not previously identified.
o Other record-holding repositories identified: During the course of our
interview process, we were informed of additional locations containing
possible Project 112-related documents that were not included in DOD's
investigation. Two such locations are the Army Corps of Engineers, St.
Louis, Missouri, and the National Personnel Records Center, also in St.
Louis. However, investigating these repositories would likely be difficult
and costly because these records might be voluminous, unorganized, and
general in nature. In addition, these records might not be easily
searchable by topics related to Project 112.
DOD Plans to Investigate Tests outside Project 112
The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated DOD to work with veterans
and veterans' service organizations to identify DOD projects or tests
conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to
chemical or biological agents. DOD has not yet begun its investigation to
identify such projects or tests. However, the Office of the Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense
(Chemical and Biological Defense Office)11 began preparing a plan for
doing so after our inquiry about the investigation's status. According to
DOD officials, the office plans to identify the primary projects and tests
conducted, attempt to identify service members and civilian personnel who
might have been exposed to agents during the tests, and provide VA or
other interested organizations with this information. Our current review
and prior work from the mid-1990s have shown that extensive chemical and
biological tests and projects were conducted during the Project 112
1962-74 time period and that much greater numbers of service members and
civilian personnel than DOD has reported for Project 112 were potentially
exposed.
DOD Has Not Begun Investigating Other Projects or Tests
While DOD has aggressively investigated the Project 112 tests, it has not
yet begun its investigation of projects or tests outside Project 112 as
also mandated by the 2003 act. On the basis of an internal DOD agreement
in November 2002, the identification of tests and projects outside Project
112 became the responsibility of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics because this
organization has overall responsibility within DOD for chemical and
biological defense. Subsequent to our inquiries, in February 2004, DOD's
Chemical and Biological Defense Office began preparing a plan for
accomplishing this mandated requirement.
Officials of the Chemical and Biological Defense Office stated that they
plan to identify major chemical and biological tests and projects
conducted outside the scope of Project 112 since World War II and will
attempt to locate repositories of information concerning these tests and
projects. Using these and other sources of information, they plan to
identify service members and civilian personnel who might have been
exposed to the agents employed in these tests. These officials indicated
that they plan to coordinate with the Deployment Health Support
11 This office ultimately reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology.
Directorate, the DOD office that investigated Project 112, and use the
experience gained during the Project 112 investigation to facilitate their
own efforts. As information concerning these tests and projects is
developed, DOD plans to provide VA and to other interested organizations
with this information, as appropriate. DOD anticipates that it might take
up to 5 years to complete the investigation of tests outside Project 112.
However, this approach does not provide a single DOD focal point for
providing VA, individuals, and other interested parties with information
related to chemical and biological testing. Responsibility for completing
the investigation of Project 112 tests remains with the Deployment Health
Directorate, which reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs. Responsibility for investigations of tests outside the scope of
Project 112 now resides with the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, which ultimately
reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. Under this arrangement, no one office has overall
responsibility for providing oversight and coordination for these
investigations. Also, neither office is currently designated to serve as
the primary point of contact for administering the identification and
reporting of additional potentially exposed service members and DOD
civilian personnel. This situation could result in DOD's having no single
official point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and other
interested parties, such as foreign countries, as appropriate, with
information, including the additional identification of personnel
potentially exposed.
Hundreds of Classified Tests outside Project 112 Were Conducted with
Thousands of Potentially Exposed Personnel
While there is no database that contains information concerning the
biological and chemical tests that have been conducted, we determined that
hundreds of such classified tests and research projects were conducted
outside Project 112 while it was ongoing. In addition, information from
various sources shows that personnel from all services were involved in
chemical and biological testing.
We learned during this review that hundreds of chemical and biological
tests similar to those conducted under Project 112 were conducted during
the same time period. A former Deseret Test Center scientist estimated
that the number of chemical and biological tests conducted at just one
location-Dugway Proving Ground, Utah-was over 100, or more than double the
number of tests conducted under Project 112 during the same
time period. According to an Army study, some of these tests reflected the
same objectives as Project 112.12 This study listed 31 biological field
tests performed at various military installations including Dugway Proving
Ground, Utah; Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Detrick, Maryland; and
Edwards Air Force Base, California.13 The study did not quantify the
number of test participants nor did it identify them.
In addition, we reported in 1993 and 1994 that hundreds of radiological,
chemical, and biological tests were conducted in which hundreds of
thousands of people were used as test subjects. 14 We also reported that
the Army Chemical Corps conducted a classified medical research program
for developing incapacitating agents. This program involved testing nerve
agents, nerve agent antidotes, psycho chemicals, and irritants. The
chemicals were given to volunteer service members at Edgewood Arsenal,
Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Forts Benning, Bragg, and
McClellan. In total, Army documents identified 7,120 Army and Air Force
personnel who participated in these tests.15 Further, GAO concluded that
precise information on the scope and the magnitude of tests involving
human subjects was not available, and the exact number of human subjects
might never be known.
VA Notified the Majority of Service Members Identified by DOD
Of the 5,842 Project 112 service members identified by DOD in its final
report on June 30, 2003, VA sent notification letters to the majority-
3,397-from May, 2002 through March, 2004. However, 751 of these veterans
were determined to be deceased, and notification efforts regarding the
remaining potentially exposed veterans-over 2,400-are ongoing. These
numbers do not include recent additional identifications of potentially
exposed service members by DOD, VA, or us during our review. VA is having
difficulty making the remaining more than 2,400 notifications largely
because of incomplete data. VA officials said that the information
provided by DOD concerning service members was in many cases missing key
data, such as service numbers. To resolve these more
12 U.S. Army Activity in the U. S. Biological Warfare Programs (Feb. 24,
1977).
13More than 80 of these tests were conducted prior to Project 112, dating
as far back as 1949.
14 GAO/NSIAD-93-89 and GAO/T-NSIAD-94-266. This work covered testing
performed by the services between 1942 and 1975.
15 The medical research program began in 1952 and continued until 1975.
difficult cases, VA is developing a plan involving the use of Social
Security, the National Personnel Records Center, and other databases to
obtain additional needed information. VA plans to complete its
notification of the remaining service members by September 1, 2005. As of
March 31, 2004, VA had granted 10 of 316 claims for benefits directly
related to Project 112 tests. However, recent changes to the eligibility
requirements for medical services could increase the number of medical
visits.
As of March 2004, VA had identified the addresses of and mailed at least
one outreach letter to 3,397-or 58 percent-of the 5,842 Project 112
veterans identified in DOD's June 2003 final report. To accomplish this,
VA matched the list of potentially exposed service members from DOD
against its own database to find a Social Security number. If no Social
Security number was located, VA matched the available service member's
information to the information contained in the National Personnel Records
Center. Once VA received a Social Security number, it used the services of
the Internal Revenue Service and credit bureaus to locate the veteran's
current address, or if applicable, the date of death. According to VA,
many additional veterans alerted by word of mouth have in turn contacted
VA through the use of toll-free numbers, submission of benefit claims, and
calls or visits to health-care facilities. In addition, VA has sponsored a
number of outreach efforts to veterans and veterans' groups, including
establishing a Web site containing Project 112 information and issuing
press releases. According to VA officials, VA received 2,217 Project
112-related calls since the May 2002 activation of its toll-free helpline.
VA's notification efforts are ongoing but have slowed recently owing to
difficulties in obtaining Social Security numbers and addresses for the
potentially exposed service members who have not yet been notified. As of
March 2004, more than 2,400 service members-or more than 40 percent-remain
to be processed. VA officials said that the information provided by DOD
concerning service members was in many cases missing key data, such as
service numbers. While it is still possible to locate service members
without this information, VA officials said that it is difficult to do so.
To complete these more difficult cases, VA is developing a plan involving
the use of Social Security, the National Personnel Records Center, and
other databases to obtain additional needed information. VA plans to
complete its notification of the remaining service members that DOD
identified by September 1, 2005.
The VA notification letters, or "outreach letters," include the name of
the specific test(s) in which DOD indicated that the service member was a
participant and information on the type of agent employed in the test. In
addition, a copy of a DOD fact sheet concerning each test that the service
member participated in was enclosed with each letter. These fact sheets
provided available information concerning the objectives, dates, and
locations of the tests, as well as the participating units or ships. In
addition, the fact sheet provided information concerning the agents used,
as well as current information concerning the medical implications of
exposure to them.
As of March 2004, VA had received 316 claims for benefits related to
Project 112 tests. Of the 316 claims, 88 are pending, 168 have been
denied, 50 have been granted for a condition not connected to Project 112,
and 10 were granted for a condition connected to Project 112.
VA does not anticipate significant increases in approved claims as a
result of notifying service members who were potentially exposed during
Project 112 testing. Notably, the requirement of eligibility has
traditionally been that the illness or injury was service connected.
Consequently, only 10 notified service members had met this
service-connected requirement for Project 112-related exposures as of
January 2004. However, the passage of Public Law 108-170 on December 6,
2003, allows service members who participated in Project 112 tests to be
eligible for hospital care, medical services and nursing home care from
the VA for any illness until December 31, 2005-without having to establish
that their illness was connected to Project 112 testing. Nevertheless, VA
officials still do not anticipate any significant increase in the number
of medical visits.
DOD has made a reasonable effort to identify Project 112 tests and the
service members who might have been exposed to chemical or biological
agents during these tests. However, DOD has not exhausted the
possibilities for identifying additional service members and, although not
required by the mandate, individual DOD civilian employees, DOD
contractors, and foreign government participants. Additional
identifications will likely result if DOD continues this investigation.
DOD is also only in the preliminary planning stages of a mandated second
investigation identifying tests outside Project 112 that might have
exposed service members. DOD officials have stated their intention to
include the identification of both service members and civilian personnel
in its second investigation. The completion of both DOD investigations
would mean the review of all reasonably available documentary evidence in
an attempt to identify those service members and civilian personnel who
might have been exposed to chemical and biological agents. However, DOD
has not designated a single official focal point for providing information
from the
Conclusions
investigations to VA, individuals, and other interested parties.
Furthermore, VA is having difficulty notifying more than 1,700 of the
5,842 identified service members and recently formulated a plan for
dealing with this problem. A single DOD focal point could be helpful not
only for DOD's coordination with VA but also for VA's efforts to continue
service member notifications. Without a committed effort to identify and
notify all potentially exposed personnel, some participants, especially
civilian personnel, might not be aware of their potential exposure to
chemical and biological agents or be able to use this information to seek
medical assistance, if needed.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the following three
actions be taken by the appropriate office(s):
o determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved issues associated
with Project 112 and the appropriateness of and responsibility for
reporting new information, such as the identification of additional
potentially exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, and
foreign nationals who participated in the tests;
o finalize and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests
conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to
chemical or biological agents and ensure that the plan addresses the
scope, reporting requirements, milestones, and responsibilities for those
involved in completing this effort; and
o designate a single point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and
other interested parties such as foreign governments, as appropriate, with
information related to tests and potential exposures in and outside
Project 112.
DOD concurred with our report findings and recommendations and agreed to
implement our recommendations. In commenting on our report, DOD
acknowledged our recognition of its aggressive investigation of Project
112 tests and agreed to address the unresolved issues with these tests as
well as investigate the chemical and biological testing programs conducted
since World War II. While we did not make recommendations to VA, the
department concurred with our report findings. Both DOD and VA also
provided suggested technical changes and updated information, which we
incorporated in the final report where appropriate. DOD's comments are
shown in appendix III, and VA's comments are provided in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6020, or my Assistant
Director,
William W. Cawood, at (202) 512-3959. Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Harry A.
Knobler, M. Jane Hunt, Rebecca Shea, and David A. Mayfield were major
contributors to this report.
Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We assessed the reliability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the
Department of Veterans' Affairs' (VA) data by interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing
information about the data and the systems that produced them. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives.
We reviewed and analyzed available reports, briefings, documents, and
records and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of Veterans Affairs,
Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.
To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's process to identify chemical and
biological tests conducted under Project 112 and the service members and
number of civilians who might have been exposed to agents employed under
Project 112 tests, we (1) interviewed officials at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of Veterans
Affairs, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and
the Deployment Health Support Directorate, Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (hereafter referred to as DOD), who were
responsible for conducting DOD's investigation of Project 112 tests. In
addition, we (1) reviewed the methodology and process that DOD used to
locate, declassify, and review appropriate sources of Project 112 data,
(2) obtained and systematically analyzed Project 112 data; (3) interviewed
former employees and test participants, and (4) corroborated the evidence
from documents and interviews.
We evaluated DOD's methodology by reviewing the work it had performed,
retracing its steps, and doing independent research and analysis to
develop the universe of Project 112 tests and identify the service members
and civilians who might have been exposed to the agents employed under
these tests. We visited the primary repository for Project 112 records at
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. At Dugway, we interviewed officials,
performed data searches,and reviewed available documentation. The
documentation we reviewed included test plans and reports, the Deseret
Test Center's annual and semiannual reports, and unorganized boxes of test
materials in storage. In addition, we interviewed scientists who lived in
Salt Lake City, Utah, who were former employees of the Deseret Test
Center, the organization that conducted the Project 112 tests. We reviewed
the files of the DOD investigative team, as well as the
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
periodic and final report of its investigation to Congress, to determine
if there were "information gaps" for the time period during which the
Project 112 tests were conducted. We developed a data collection
instrument to systematically document the tests that DOD concluded were
conducted. With the use of the data collection instrument, we collected
specific, uniform information concerning test location, dates, agents
employed, and the number of service members identified who might have been
potentially exposed. We selected a sample of tests for more detailed
analysis and included, in our data collection instrument, information on
DOD's basis for determining that the test was conducted, whether specific
participating units or ships were identified, the documents or sources
used to determine service members who might have been exposed, and the
likelihood that indirect exposures occurred. We also reviewed DOD's
outreach efforts and the extent to which DOD coordinated with other
agencies that might have useful information, including the Department of
Veterans' Affairs. We reviewed and analyzed our prior reports as well as
reports of other organizations to provide a historical and contextual
framework for evaluating DOD's efforts. In formulating our conclusion as
to whether DOD's methodology was effective, we systematically corroborated
the information we developed independently and from various sources to
make this determination.
To determine DOD's progress in identifying projects or tests conducted
outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members, we held
discussions with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which oversees current chemical
and biological testing. We also contacted the OSD Office of Legislative
Affairs, as well as the DOD Office of the Inspector General, to determine
the process for assigning responsibilities for fulfilling mandates of this
type within DOD.
To determine VA's progress in notifying service members whom DOD
determined might have been exposed, we interviewed VA officials, gathered
statistics concerning their success in making the notifications; and, in
response to our data request, received information in writing concerning
pertinent issues. In particular, we documented the number of service
members whose names had been provided to VA by DOD, and the extent to
which notification letters were sent and service members were deceased, or
cases where sufficient documentation was not available to make the
notifications. In addition, we discussed with VA officials the likely
impact of service members seeking medical treatment as a result of being
potentially exposed and the passage of Public Law 108-170, which allows
service members who were potentially exposed to these tests to
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
receive medical treatment from VA until December 31, 2005, without proof
of service connection.
We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government audit standards.
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
Table 1 below shows the 50 tests conducted, with the locations and dates
of the tests, the agents employed, participating units or organizations,
and the number of service members identified who were potentially exposed.
There are gaps in the test numbers for several reasons, including that
tests were combined with other tests, cancelled, or had name changes.
Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of June 30, 2003
U.S. Date of
service
Test members Test submission
number
Date Units/Ships
and name identified of involved location(s) Agent to VA
test
63-3, Dec. Oct. 3,
Whistle 1962- Unidentified U.S. Ft. Greely, GB, VX 2002
Down AK
Feb. Army, DTC
1963 personnel
63-1, Eager Belle I (ship-based)
119 Jan.-Mar. 1963 USS George Eastman Pacific Ocean BG Jan. 31, 2002
Eager Belle II
1,076 Jan, Mar., June USS Carpenter, USS Pacific Ocean BG Dec. 2, 2003
(ship-based)
1963
George Eastman
USS Granville S. Hall
USS Navarro
USS Tioga County
63-4, Big Jack A Feb-Mar. 1963 VMA 225, Marine Near Ft. BG, FP Oct. 31, 2002
Aircraft Group 14 (A-4)
Sherman, Panama Canal Zone
Big Jack B Feb.-Mar. 1963 VMA 225, Marine Aircraft Group 14 (A-4)
Near Ft. Sherman, Panama Canal Zone
TOF Oct. 31, 2002 63-2, Autumn Gold 1, 536 May 1963 Marine Air Group 13, Pacific
Ocean BG Sept. 13, 2001
(ship-based)
USS Carpenter, USS Granville S. Hall, USS Hoel, USS Navarro, USS Tioga
County
(60 mi. from Oahu, Hawaii)
64-1, Errand Boy 95 Sept. 1963 USS George Eastman Near Pearl BG, June 30, 2003
(ship-based)
(YAG-39)
Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii
betapropriolactone
64-5, Night Ft. BG, Oct.
Train Nov. 1963- Not identified Greely, AK FP 9,
2002
Jan. 1964
64-5, Night (F-105, F-100, and
Train an
(continued) Army personnel
carrier)
Pacific May
268 Ocean GB, 23,
64-2, Flower Feb.-Apr.1964 USS George Eastman S02 2002
Drum I
(ship-based)
USS Granville S.
Hall MAA
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
U.S. service Date of Test number members Test submission and name
identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA
Flower Drum II 5 Aug.-Sept. Navy tug ATF-105 Pacific Ocean VX, phosphorous
May 23, 2002 (ship-based) 1964 (off coast of 32
Hawaii) Navy covered lighter BIS (barge),YFN-811
64-6, Yellow Leaf 184 Feb. 1964 DTC personnel, other Ft. Sherman, BG Oct.
31, 2002 units or ships not Panama identified
Apr.-May 1966 DTC personnel, other Island of Hawaii Tiara units or ships
not identified
65-14, Elk Hunt I, 6 July-Aug. 1964 171ST Infantry Brigade Ft. Greely, AK VX
Oct. 9, 2002
Elk Hunt II 111 June-July 1965 15TH Artillery Battalion Ft. Greely, AK,
VX Oct. 9, 2002 & Oct.-Dec., Edgewood 1965 Arsenal, Md.
40TH Armor Battalion Canada
4th Battalion
9th Infantry
1st Battalion
47th Infantry
538th Ordnance Company & Selected Personnel Assigned to HHC
65-1, Copper Jan.-Feb. USS Atlantic Sept.
Head 289 1965 Power Ocean BG, FP, 13,
2002
(ship-based) (off coast of betapropiolactone
Newfoundland)
65-3, West Jan.-Feb. F-105D Ft. Greely, Oct.
Side I 29 1965 (Air AK BG, FP 9,
Force) 2002
Jan.-Mar. F-105D Central Oct.
66-8, West 1965 (Air Canada 9,
Side II Force) BG, FP 2002
JHC-47 (contractor aircraft), DTC personnel
65-13, High Low 1,120 Jan.-Feb. 1965 USS Berkeley, Pacific Ocean MAA Mar.
31, 2002 (ship-based) USS Granville S. Hall (off coast of
San Diego)
USS Fechteler
USS Okanogan
USS Wexford County
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
U.S. Date of
service
Test number members Test submission
and name identified Date of Units/Ships location(s) Agent to VA
test involved
Pacific BG,
64-4, Shady 223 Jan.-Apr. Army light Ocean, OU, Sept. 13,
Grove 1965 tugs 2080, UL 2001
(ship-based) 2081, 2085, Eglin Air
2086, and Force
2087 Base, FL
Marine Aviation Group 13
USS Granville S. Hall
65-4, Magic Sword 129 May 1965 Dugway Proving Baker Island, Unaffected
Aedes Oct. 9, 2002 (ship-based) Ground Pacific Ocean Aegypti
(mosquitoes)
USS George Eastman
May-June USS Carbonero, Oct.
65-6, Big Tom 236 1965 USS Oahu, Hawaii, BG, FP 9,
2002
(ship-based) Granville S. and surround-
Hall
ing waters
and
airspace
A-4, F-105, and an Aero Commander
65-12, Devil Hole 151 Summer 1965 Not Ft. Greely, AK GB, FP Oct. 9,
I identified 2002
261 Aug.-Sept.1965 USS Pacific Ocean VX, May 23,
65-17, Fearless George Eastman diethylphthlate 2002
Johnny (ship-
based)
USS Granville S. Hall (SW of Oahu,
Hawaii)
310 Jan.-Feb. 1966 USS Pacific Ocean MAA May 23,
66-5, Purple Sage Thomas 2002
(ship-based) (off coast of
San Diego)
Feb-Mar. 1966 USS Jan.
66-6, Scarlet 356 Thomas Pacific Ocean BG 31,
Sage 2002
(ship-based) (off coast of San
Diego)
65-11, Sun Down Feb.-Apr. 1966 Not Ft. Greely, AK GB, Oct. 9,
identified MAA, Tiara 2002
135 Apr.-June 1966 Not Oct. 9,
64-8, Tall Timber identified SW of Hilo, BZ 2002
Hawaii
90 May-June 1966 Not Oct. 9,
65-16, Pine Ridge identified SW of Hilo, GB, BZ 2002
Hawaii
66-1, Devil Hole July-Sept. 1966 Not Oct. 9,
II 16 identified Ft. Greely, AK VX 2002
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
U.S. Date of
service
Test number members Test submission
and name identified Date of Units/Ships location(s) Agent to VA
test involved
66-12, Half 367 Light tug Pacific BG, E. Oct. 9,
Note Aug.-Sept. 2085 Ocean coli, SM, 2002
USS (80 FP,
(ship-based) 1966 Barbonero nautical calcofluor
mi.
SSW of
Oahu)
Light tug 2080
Light tug 2081
Light tug 2086
Light tug 2087
USS George Eastman
USS Granville S. Hall
67-7, Red Cloud Nov. 1966-Feb. Not identified Ft. Greely, AK BG, E. coli,
SM, Oct. 9, 2002 1967 TT, ZZ
66-10, Pin Point 1966 U.S. Army Unknown CS Oct. 31, 2002 U.S. Air Force
U.S. Marine Corps
DTC personnel
68-52, Cliff Rose Sept. 1967-U.S. Army Ft. Stewart, Ga., CS2 Dec. 9, 2002
Jan. 1968 U.S. Air Force and Panama Canal Zone
DTC personnel
66-4, Green Mist 46 Mar.-Apr. 1967 Not identified Island of Hawaii GB, MAA Oct.
9, 2002
67-2, Dew Point June-July 1967 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK GB Oct. 9, 2002
U.S. Army DTC personnel
68-13, Rapid July-Aug. 1967 Not Porton Down, GA, GB, GD, Oct. 9,
Tan identified VX 2002
England
(Phases I &
III),
May-June 1968 DTC Ralston,
personnel
Aug-Sept. 1968 Canada
(Phase II)
67-8, Watch Summer 1967 U.S. Army, Near Ft. BG, E. Oct. 9,
Dog DTC Greely, coli, SM, 2002
personnel AK TT, ZZ
66-2, Red Oak 24 Apr.-May 1967 U.S. Island of GB Oct. 31,
I Army, DTC Hawaii 2002
personnel and the
Panama Canal
Zone
67-6, Blue 30 Jan.-Feb. 1967 Not Island of BG, SM, E. June 30,
Tango identified Hawaii coli, 2003
FP
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
U.S. Date of
service
Test number members Test submission
and name identified Date of Units/Ships location(s) to VA
test involved Agent
USS Oahu, Hawaii, June 30,
68-71 Folded 252 Apr.-May Carbonero, BG 03
1968 USS
Arrow Granville S. and
(ship-based) Hall surrounding
waters
69-31 313 USS Herbert Pacific Ocean Oct. 9,
(ship-based) Aug.-Sept. J. BG, MAA 2002
1968 Thomas (off San
Diego)
69-75 Oct.-Dec. F-4 aircraft Near Yeehaw Oct. 9,
1968 (U.S. TX 2002
Air Force) Junction,
and DTC Fla.
personnel
68-50, (68-11) 127 Sept.-Oct. USS Granville Eniwetok Atoll, May 23,
S. Hall BG, PG2, uranine 2002
Speckled Start 1968 Marshall Islands
dye
(ship-based)
69-32 150 USS Granville Pacific Ocean BG, May 23,
(ship-based) Apr.-June 1969 S. Hall E. coli, SM, 2002
(SW of Hawaii)
calcofluor
69-10 (ship-based) 786 May 1969 Landing Force Vieques TOF Oct. 9,
Carib1- Islands 2002
69/BLT 1/8, 2nd (near Puerto
Marine Div., Rico)
VMA-325,
MAG-32, 2nd
Marine
Aircraft Wing,
USS
Fort Snelling
(LSD-30)
69-12 Spring 1969 DTC personnel Edgewood GA, GB, GD, VX Oct. 9,
2002
Arsenal, Md.
68-53 Not identified Oct. 9,
Apr.-Dec. 1969 Dugway Proving CS2 2002
Ground, Utah
70-73 Oct. 9,
July-Dec. 1970 DTC personnel Dugway Proving BG, FP 2002
Ground, Utah
June
70-11, Phase June 1972- Not identified 30,
I, Dugway Proving BG, FP 2002
Subtest 3 Nov. 1973 Ground, Utah
June
70-74 Not identified 30,
Aug. 1972-Jan. Dugway Proving BG, SM 2003
1973 Ground, Utah
June
74-10, Phase Not identified Dugway Proving DMMP, 30,
I Sept.-Oct. BIS, 2003
1973 Ground, Utah
trichloropropane
70-C (ship-based) Oct. 1972, USNS Samuel Phillips Pacific Ocean Passive
collection June 30, 2003
Feb.-Mar. 1973 Lee (T-AGS 31), (off San Diego) of naturally USNS Silas
Bent (T-and Pacific occurring particles AGS 26) Ocean in a marine
(between San environment
Diego and
Panama Canal
Zone)
73-30 Jan.-Feb. 1973 Not identified Dugway Proving BG, SM,
P June 30, 2003
Ground, Utah
TA-4F Aircraft Dugway Proving BIS June
70-11, Phase I, May 1974 30, 2002
Subtest 4 (U.S. Navy) Ground, Utah
Sources: DOD (data):
GAO (analysis).
GAO-04-410 DOD's
Chemical and Biological
Page 32 Tests
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted
Legend:
BG = Bacillus globigii
BIS = (2 ethyl-hexyl) hydrogen phosphite
BZ = Ester of benzilic acid
CS/CS2 = Riot-Control Agent
DEHP= Di (2 ethyl-hexyl) phthalate
DMMP = Dimethylmethylphosphonate
E. coli = Escherichia coli
FP = Zinc Cadmium sulfide
GA = Tabun Nerve Agent
GB = Sarin Nerve Agent
GD = Soman Nerve Agent
MAA = Methylacetoacetate
OU = Coxiella burnetii
P = T-3 coliphage viruses
PG2 = Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Type B
SM = Serratia marcescens
SO2 = Sulfur Dioxide
Tiara = luminescent gelatinous material
TOF = trioctyl phosphate (tri [2 ethyl-hexyl] phosphate)
TT = Francisella tularensis (wet)
TX = Puccinia graminis tritici
UL = Pasteurella tularensis
VX = VX Nerve Agent (phosphonothioic acid)
ZZ = Francisella tularensis (dry)
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
Note: The enclosure to this letter provided technical comments, which we
considered and incorporated in our report as appropriate.
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