Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency
Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened (21-SEP-06,
GAO-06-1015).
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and
radiological threats in the United States. This capability has
taken on increased significance after the attacks of September
11, 2001, because there is heightened concern that terrorists may
try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S.
city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological
attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures
in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and
whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the
benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to
enhance emergency response capabilities.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-1015
ACCNO: A61247
TITLE: Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond
to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency
Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened
DATE: 09/21/2006
SUBJECT: Contamination
Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
Emergency response
Facility security
Homeland security
Physical security
Policy evaluation
Radiation monitoring
Strategic planning
Terrorism
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-1015
* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives
* September 2006
* COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
* Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be
Strengthened
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to
a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States
* DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and
Equipment to Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack
* DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the
Consequences of a Nuclear or Radiological Attack
* DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
* DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with
the Lowest Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under
DOE Guidance Because Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been
Dispersed
* DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at
These Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper
DOE's Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
* Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
Protect the Facilities against Terrorist Attack
* Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation
Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS
Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them
* Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect
Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation
Levels in the Event of a Radiological Attack
* DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City
* Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
Responsibility for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from Informing Cities
about the Surveys
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Comments from the Department of Energy
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House
of Representatives
September 2006
COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened
Contents
Table
Figure
September 21, 2006Letter
The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Committee on
Government Reform House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has maintained an emergency response
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological
threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is
heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or a
radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a major
U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have serious
consequences for our national and economic interests, including
potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens' confidence
in the government's ability to protect the homeland.
To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise to
search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S.
cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a radiological
incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of contamination.
After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response
capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical
capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two key facilities,
known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air Force Base,
Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two facilities house,
among other things, specialized search teams that locate and identify
nuclear and radiological devices; planes and helicopters used to measure
contamination; and research and development laboratories that design
specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be adequately
protected with security measures to defend against potential terrorist
attacks.1
One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial
background radiation surveys. These surveys are conducted by using
helicopters or planes equipped with radiation detectors to fly over an
area and collect information on existing background radiation sources,
such as granite statues in a city or medical isotopes located at
hospitals. This can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels against
which future radiation levels can be compared in order to more easily
detect new radiation sources that may pose a security or public health
threat.
DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear and
radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to detect
and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at U.S.
points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is also
responsible for helping state and local governments improve their
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological
materials. If DHS cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or radiological
materials into the United States, it relies on DOE's emergency response
capabilities to search for and locate the materials.
In this context, this report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks
in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's
two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with
DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background
radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.
To address these objectives, we collected and analyzed documentation
related to DOE's emergency response capabilities and assets and the
physical security guidelines and plans for its two key emergency response
facilities. We interviewed officials from DOE's Office of Emergency
Response and the Office of Independent Oversight. We also interviewed
program managers and security officials from the Remote Sensing
Laboratories at Nellis and Andrews Air Force Bases, and we received a tour
of these facilities to view the physical security measures and obtain a
demonstration of their radiation detection equipment. In addition, we
analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOE's national
laboratories at Brookhaven (in New York), Sandia (in New Mexico), and
Savannah River (in South Carolina), where emergency response assets have
been dispersed. To obtain information on aerial surveys, we analyzed
documents and interviewed officials from the Counter Terrorism Bureau of
the New York City Police Department who requested an aerial background
radiation survey of New York City. We also collected documentation and
interviewed officials from DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and
Office of Grants and Training to obtain information on DHS's role in
conducting and funding aerial background radiation surveys. We conducted
our work from January to August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological
devices and to help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological
attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency
response facilities-the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE also draws upon
the technical expertise of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the
national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence
Livermore. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of clandestine
and discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors carried in
backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect and locate
radiological sources. In fiscal year 2005, DOE conducted about 30 search
missions to address potential radiological threats or to assist local and
state officials in monitoring large public events such as the Super Bowl
and the State of the Union address. DOE officials cautioned, however, that
it may be difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded
radiological materials. In order to deploy teams more quickly, since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability
beyond the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include eight other emergency
response sites across the country. In the event of a nuclear or
radiological attack, DOE also maintains capabilities to minimize the
consequences. DOE can deploy teams that use radiation-monitoring
equipment, including sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect
and measure radiation contamination levels and provide information to
state and local officials on what areas need to be evacuated. DOE can also
coordinate federal activities related to monitoring contamination levels
and mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from radiation
exposure.
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the
country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE policy
guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005,
DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of physical security
if their capabilities and assets exist at other locations and can be
easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we found that there are a
number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories and their loss would significantly hamper DOE's
ability to quickly prevent or respond to a nuclear or radiological
emergency. Specifically, the capabilities and assets that are located only
at the laboratories include, among other things, the most highly trained
teams that help manage and minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily
help locate nuclear or radiological devices and measure contamination
levels after a radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets
have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not
be sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but
no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing
Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, vehicle
barriers, or any other protective measures around the building, but DOE
has determined that it meets physical security requirements. Furthermore,
while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide
an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with federal government
identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the
bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their identification.
Security officials told us that the laboratories are not designed to
withstand certain types of terrorist attacks. However, officials have not
taken any steps to strengthen security because of DOE's assumption that
their capabilities and assets are fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has
not developed contingency plans that would identify capabilities and
assets that would be used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing
Laboratories were attacked.
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare
changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in
U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.
Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey of a major U.S. city
because neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting the
surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat, if a city had a completed
survey, DOE could then conduct a new survey and compare baseline radiation
data from the previous survey to identify locations with new sources of
radiation. Focusing their attention on these new locations, law
enforcement officials may be able to locate a nuclear or radiological
device more quickly. In addition, using baseline information from a prior
survey, DOE could assess contamination levels after a radiological attack
to assist cleanup efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from
the surveys could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because
cleanup efforts could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other
areas up to pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing
all traces of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys,
law enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating
pre-existing sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time
and cost of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE
officials explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it
is difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed may
also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices.
Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of the
survey-about $800,000-was funded through DHS grants. NYPD officials
indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because it identified
more than 80 locations with radiological sources that required further
investigation to determine their risk. In addition to identifying
potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us that a secondary
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. While
investigating the 80 locations, they found an old industrial site
contaminated with radium-a radiological material linked to diseases such
as bone cancer-and used this information to close the area and protect the
public. Despite these benefits, neither DOE nor DHS have embraced mission
responsibility for funding and conducting surveys or notifying city
officials that such a capability exists. DOE officials told us they are
reluctant to conduct additional surveys because they have a limited number
of helicopters that are needed for emergency response functions, and told
us that it is DHS's mission to protect cities from potential terrorist
attacks. DHS officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the
expertise or capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a
program to help state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and
radiological materials, and in fiscal year 2006, approximately $2.5
billion was available in grant funding to state and local governments for
terrorism preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility,
there are no plans to conduct additional surveys, in part, because DOE and
DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys.
We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DHS for comment. DHS agreed
with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we
incorporated, as appropriate. DOE neither agreed nor disagreed with the
report's recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our findings.
In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that physical
security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be sufficient to
protect them against terrorist attacks. While we recognize that DOE is
complying with physical security requirements, the Remote Sensing
Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security, even
though the laboratories have unique capabilities and assets that exist at
no other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. DOE also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
Background
DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in
1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in
Boston unless he received $200,000.2 Even though the threat turned out to
be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond
to a nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC
established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide technical
assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department
of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism response outside
the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for
investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear materials
within the United States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program
was designed to assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and deactivating
nuclear and radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams
were large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to
threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device.
With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001,
DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and
radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from
detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE's
emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to minimize
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For example, DOE
maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track radioactive
material to determine contamination levels at the site of an emergency.
DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation surveys of
most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident
at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to
help determine the location and amount of contamination.
There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from
the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories dedicated to
preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal
year 2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for emergency response
activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's efforts to prevent and respond
to nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that
terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the
United States. These materials could be used to produce either an
improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a
dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made with
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate
that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in the 10 to
20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). A
20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that
destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S.
city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination
over a wider area.
A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
radioactive material,3 using explosive force to disperse the radioactive
material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of
contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of
the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and
weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised nuclear
device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness
for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and
social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of
the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in
a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a
Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no
radioactive material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that
terrorists have the capability and willingness to use radiological
materials as weapons of terror.
DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear
or Radiological Attack in the United States
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
teams and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or
radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of
clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors
carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect
and locate radiological sources. In the event of a nuclear or radiological
attack, DOE would, among other things, use radiation-monitoring equipment,
including sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure
radiation contamination levels and provide information to state and local
officials on what areas need to be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE's
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or
radiological attack.
Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear
or Radiological Attack
Purpose
Capabilities Mission Prevent a Respond to and
nuclear or manage the
radiological consequences of
attack or an attack
detonation
Search Search for and identify X
nuclear or radiological
devices with radiation
detectors mounted in
backpacks, vehicles, and
helicopters
Deactivation Deactivate and dispose of X
nuclear or radiological
devices by viewing the
components of a bomb with
specialized equipment,
deactivating booby traps,
and packaging the devices
for safe transport
Recovery of U.S. In the event of an accident X
nuclear weapons involving a U.S. nuclear
weapon, assess the damage,
stabilize internal
components, and package the
weapon for safe transport
Radiological First responders to search X X
Assistance for devices with radiation
Program detectors mounted in
backpacks and on vehicles or
to measure contamination
levels after an attack or
accident with environmental
sampling and specialized
devices
Aerial detection Planes and helicopters with X X
radiation detection
equipment and sophisticated
onboard computers to search
for devices, conduct
background radiation
surveys, or measure
contamination after a
nuclear or radiological
incident
Computer Prediction of the extent of X
modeling of contamination with advanced
radiation computer modeling of wind,
release topography, and atmospheric
conditions
Consequence Monitor and assess X
management contamination from a
large-scale nuclear or
radiological attack and set
up an operations center to
coordinate response
activities in the field
Medical support Quickly mobilize medical X
personnel to provide advice
and assistance for treating
injuries resulting from
radiation exposure
Source: GAO analysis of DOE information.
DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and Equipment to
Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack
To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams to
search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These teams are
manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on either
civilian or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing Laboratories within
4 hours of notification from the FBI. To detect and locate nuclear or
radiological devices, the teams use a variety of clandestine and discreet
methods, including the use of radiation detectors carried in backpacks
that silently transmit information to the searcher's earphone and
radiation detectors mounted in vehicles and helicopters.
While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify
devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation
detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of
time-which is particularly important when the exact location of a device
is unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once deployed, the
searchers can also send information they are collecting from radiation
detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and technicians at the
national laboratories to help them identify nuclear or radiological
material and determine whether the material poses a threat. If the search
teams need additional support to cover a large area, they can train and
equip local responders, such as law enforcement and firefighters, to
conduct search missions. Up to 16 people can become proficient in basic
search techniques in less than an hour.
Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons scientists,
technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories as well as the
FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be deployed to deactivate
the device and prepare it for safe transport away from populated areas to
the Nevada Test Site.4 This would involve, among other things, clearing
booby traps and separating the high explosives from the nuclear material.
It also would involve the use of specialized equipment, such as a portable
X-ray machine, to peer under a bomb's outer shell and view the bomb's
components, identify the device, and determine the best way of
deactivating it. This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of
nuclear and radiological weapon design information for identifying and
properly deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely
transported, scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site
would disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances,
the team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be
necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential spread
of radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a nylon tent
around the device and filling it with thick foam.
Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond
the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other emergency
response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the country.5
These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams traditionally have
assisted state and local governments with responding to facility or
transportation accidents involving radioactive material that may cause
contamination and affect public health. Since these teams have experience
and expertise in responding to nuclear emergencies-and are located in
different regions across the country-their mission was expanded to include
searching for nuclear or radiological devices. The RAP teams can drive to
most cities in their geographic area and do not have to rely on air
transport. In addition, since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are
located on the East and West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster
response to cities located in the center of the country.
In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote Sensing
Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search missions. Most of
these missions involved assisting local and state officials in monitoring
large public events, such as the Super Bowl and the State of the Union
address, to provide assurance that no devices were hidden in the stands or
inside the building before the event. A number of these missions also
involved intelligence-driven searches to address potential radiological
threats in U.S. cities. Despite the teams' expertise and specialized
equipment, DOE officials cautioned that it may still be difficult to
detect nuclear or radiological devices. Radiation detection equipment may
not detect nuclear materials with relatively low levels of radioactivity
or radiological materials that are well-shielded. In addition, without
good intelligence on the location of the device, search teams may not have
time to find the device.
In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also
responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon.
A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians, health
physicists, and safety professionals from the national laboratories and
nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to respond within 4 hours
of notification of an accident, such as the crash of a military airplane
transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario, the team would assess
the damage, if any, to the weapon by using, among other things,
radiography to examine the weapon's internal structure, and how best to
recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons contain chemically reactive
materials and radioactive elements, great care must be taken in gaining
access to them. For damaged weapons, the team has special techniques to
stabilize the internal components. After weapons are safe to move, they
can be packaged and prepared for transport.
DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the Consequences of a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack
DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to
respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from a
terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine different
parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the situation and
determining what additional resources would be necessary to manage the
emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site of an emergency
within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological assessment of the
area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial assistance to
minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, and the
environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use radiation
detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination and help
state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination.
Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would
require the deployment of consequence management teams from the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are responsible
for setting up an operations center near the site of the emergency to
coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment activities, conduct
monitoring and assessment activities with specialized equipment, and
collect and analyze data from the field on the type, amount, and extent of
radiological release. This information would be used by state and local
governments to determine what areas should be evacuated and how to
properly respond to the emergency and by other federal agencies involved
in decontamination and other cleanup activities. These teams would monitor
the area where radioactivity was released until the area was fully
evaluated and the effects known.
In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would collect
information on the extent of contamination, using not only planes and
helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also sophisticated
computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and helicopters at the
Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure, and track radioactive
materials to determine contamination levels. The aircraft can provide
real-time measurement of low levels of ground contamination. They can also
provide detailed imagery analysis of an accident site. The planes are
deployed first to determine the location and extent of ground
contamination. The helicopters are then used to perform detailed surveys
of any ground contamination.6 This information is used to decide where to
send ground monitoring teams. Based on information from the aircraft,
scientists are able to develop maps of the ground hazards. In addition to
their ability to track radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the
aircraft have also been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material
and to locate medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as
occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not
endanger the public.
Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences of a
radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes. Based
on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions, the model
can predict the extent to which the material can spread and estimate the
amount of the release. As technicians receive information from field
teams, they can update the model.
Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting
from radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours a
day and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and local
governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts also
track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct medical
follow-ups.
DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect
Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, their
emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the
country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a
number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets that exist
only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly
hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological
threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully
dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for
protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest
Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under DOE Guidance Because
Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed
DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level
of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance
for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005 required
a review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security
to determine whether they were "mission critical." Mission critical
facilities have capabilities and assets that are not available at any
other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE
guidance, facilities designated as mission critical must be protected at a
higher level of physical security. For example, DOE Headquarters was
designated as mission critical because the loss of decision makers during
an emergency would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE
resources. As a result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures
around DOE Headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers
around the facility.
In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities
and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found that they were not
mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were attacked
and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their capabilities
and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has
dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found exclusively at
the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search
mission to include the RAP teams that are located at eight sites across
the country. These teams receive training and equipment similar to the
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation
detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also participated
in a number of search missions, including addressing potential threats at
sporting events and national political conventions, or assisting customs
officials with investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings.
DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These
Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to
Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories'
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly
undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat.
The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories
include (1) the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure
contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or
radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks
contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities.
Furthermore, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching
for nuclear or radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams.
The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote
Sensing Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized
equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of
contamination. They are responsible for establishing an operations center
near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE's radiological
monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze information coming
from the field, including aerial survey data provided by helicopters,
planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation levels. Without this
capability, state and local governments would not receive information
quickly about the extent of contamination to assess the impact on public
health and private property and how best to reduce further contamination.
DOE's emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect,
measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or
radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a limited
number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a sophisticated
radiation detection system to gather radiological information and produce
maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It is anticipated that the
planes would arrive at an emergency scene first and be used to determine
the location and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters would
then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any contamination.
According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can gather
information on a wide area without placing ground teams at risk. Without
this capability, DOE would not be able to quickly obtain comprehensive
information about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be
used by search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S.
cities. The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of
time than teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can
conduct secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels
identified by the helicopter.
The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses this
system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of contamination
in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to quickly analyze
the information collected by various emergency response capabilities and
determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or radiological
attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find nuclear or
radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated.
DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are
unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's ability to
respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments
would not receive information-such as the location and extent of
contamination-that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the
consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and
property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has
not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at
other locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote
Sensing Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified
which RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating contamination
monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the consequence
management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly
defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts.
DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets
of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize
and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national
laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as
Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure contamination
in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing Laboratories were
destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories would not have
planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale contamination monitoring and
assessment. The RAP teams also do not have the equipment or expertise to
set up an operations center and analyze data that field teams would
collect on contamination levels. In April 2006, DOE's Office of
Independent Oversight, which is responsible for independently evaluating,
among other things, the effectiveness of DOE's programs, reported that the
RAP teams, during performance tests, could not quickly provide state and
local governments with recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or
reduce the public's exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate
contaminated areas.7 In addition, DOE officials told us that, based on
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous nuclear
or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to manage the
consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence management
teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple, simultaneous
attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
radiological attack would be significantly hampered.
DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked,
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the
aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE
policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at
Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government
decision makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or
radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne
capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were
multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in
providing information to state and local governments about the extent of
contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.
Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available to
provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with
radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE would
face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed for
measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a memorandum
of understanding with the Department of Defense and other federal and
state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport and other
mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any other agency
would provide them with aircraft during an emergency because those
agencies' priority would be to carry out their own missions, not to assist
DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, DOE does not have spare
radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters, and even if
it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation detectors on
the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation
detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an
airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.
Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all
of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence
management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote Sensing
Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be able to
accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets of the
Remote Sensing Laboratories.
Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for
nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the most
highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the search teams
at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams trained to conduct
physically demanding maritime searches to locate potential nuclear or
radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S. port. The search
teams can also repair radiation equipment for search missions in the
field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared than the RAP
teams to enter environments where there is a threat of hazards other than
those associated with radiological materials, such as explosives. If there
is a threat of explosives in an area where a search mission would be
conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to detect explosives and
can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to
complete their search mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent
Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not always complete their search
missions when there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team
members from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams refused to
perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device was
removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety
criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams had
to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team members
against their ability to complete the search mission because there was a
lack of guidance on how to respond.
Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect the
Facilities against Terrorist Attack
Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in the
lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences, walls, and
doors.8 According to DOE officials, a facility can have, at a minimum,
walls and doors and be in compliance with the guidance. Adding additional
measures, such as fences and vehicle barriers, are under the discretion of
the security officer in charge of the facilities. According to DOE
security officials, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base
exceeds current physical security requirements because DOE placed a fence
around the facility and a vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These
additional measures were taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing
Laboratory was built, these measures were required.
In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does
not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located along the
executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries when they
land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this route must
meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of certain
physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these limitations, DOE
security officials told us that the laboratory still meets the minimum
security requirements. According to these officials, the Office of
Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing DOE's emergency
response capabilities, would have to classify the facilities as mission
critical before more stringent measures would be required.
While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE guidance
and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of classified
government documents, these measures may not be sufficient to protect the
facilities against a terrorist attack. Security officials told us that
current physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories have
not been hardened or designed to withstand certain types of terrorist
attacks. Security officials told us that the physical security measures
protecting these facilities have not been strengthened because, if there
were credible intelligence that the facilities faced the risk of terrorist
attack, DOE could take additional measures to protect the facility, such
as deploying protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access
to the parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials
would have to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In
addition, under DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or
substantial quantities of special nuclear material that could be used in
nuclear weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other protective
measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have nuclear
weapons or special nuclear material, additional security measures are not
required unless the facilities are classified as mission critical.
While the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide
an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government
identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards do not
inspect every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air Force
security guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should be
searched. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple times
with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their vehicles
were never searched.
Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after
a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup
efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major
U.S. city. Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for
funding and conducting surveys, there are no plans to conduct additional
surveys or to inform cities about their benefits.
Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect Radiological
Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the Event of a
Radiological Attack
DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the location
of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation levels
within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of
sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in buildings, statues, or
cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with
high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters
mounted with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global
position system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid
pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and
collecting information on radiation sources in a city.
Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
Radiation Survey
Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and
scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses helicopters
rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permits
a more precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE ground
teams and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot spots to
determine whether the source of radiation is used for industrial, medical,
or other routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline
information would be beneficial for all major cities because law
enforcement officials could immediately investigate any potentially
dangerous nuclear or radiological source and DOE could later use the data
in the event of an emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in
cleanup efforts. For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the
National Mall in Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations.
Law enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.
Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new
sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or
radiological device would focus their attention on these new locations and
might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential
threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly.
Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE
personnel. DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep
job performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists,
and the technicians who analyze the data.
DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD
funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in
order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological
attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup costs of a
dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up
after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological device may
cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated
that information from background radiation surveys could save several
million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts could be focused
on decontaminating buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of
radiation. Without a baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not
know the extent to which they would have to decontaminate the area.
Efforts to completely clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation,
such as granite buildings or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.
DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have limitations
and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological devices.
Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded
radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being
surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection systems.
Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a device.
Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to narrow
the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE
officials, baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted
on a periodic basis because radiation sources may change over time,
especially in urban areas. For example, new construction using granite,
the installation of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all
could change a city's radiation background. Despite these limitations,
without baseline survey information, law enforcement officials may lose
valuable time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by
investigating pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In
addition, if there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of
baseline radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and
time consuming.
DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City
In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to conduct a
survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that DOE
had the capability to measure background radiation and locate hot spots by
helicopter because DOE used this capability at the World Trade Center site
in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided the city with about
$30 million in grant money to develop a regional radiological detection
and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend part of this money on a
complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. DOE conducted the survey in
about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, requiring over 100 flight hours to
complete at a cost of about $800,000.
According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey,
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources.
Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians
investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a
danger to the public. While most of these were medical isotopes located at
medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials, awareness
of these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms from real
radiological threats and locate a radiological device more quickly.
Second, NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots and they
have real-life experience in locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD
officials now have a baseline radiological survey of the city to assist
with cleanup efforts in the event of a radiological release.
In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the
over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was
once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the
survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities
of radium.9 Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public
health because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable
debris into the middle of the park could release radiological
contamination into the air. Investigating locations with unexplained
radiological sources identified by the aerial background radiation survey
alerted NYPD officials to this threat, and they were able to prevent
public exposure to the material.
Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to get
a better understanding of how and to what extent background radiation
changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue identifying
radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training to their
officers.
Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for
Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies
from Informing Cities about the Surveys
Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE
nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting
surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city officials of the
potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a capability exists.
According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where a
background radiation survey has been completed.
DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of
additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that
are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies.
Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient funding to
conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the
emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was approximately
$11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft maintenance,
personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on federal agencies
and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys. However, even if
DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New York's case, DOE
officials stated that payment would need to include costs associated with
the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the extra costs could
not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to the city because,
according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate money from year to year
to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, DOE officials view
background radiation surveys as part of the homeland security mission to
prepare state and local officials against terrorist attacks, not as part
of their emergency response mission. However, DOE officials told us that
because they possess the assets and expertise, they would be willing to
conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost of the surveys and
covered the wear and tear on DOE's equipment.
DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have the
expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are DOE's
responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state and local
governments' efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear and
radiological materials and to develop mobile detection systems. DNDO has
not evaluated the benefits and limitations of background surveys and does
not plan to conduct background surveys as part of this effort. DHS
officials also told us that it is DHS's responsibility to advise cities
about different radiation detection technology and to help state and local
officials decide which technologies would be most beneficial. However,
DNDO does not currently advise cities and states on the potential benefits
of background surveys.
DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events,
including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2006, there was
about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state and local
governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could be used
for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, according to DHS
officials, the agency has not received any requests for funding other than
the 2005 request by New York City. While it is DHS's responsibility to
inform state and local governments about radiation detection technology,
it has neither an outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database
for informing cities and states about background radiation surveys. DHS
maintains a lessons-learned information-sharing database, which is a
national online network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan
and prepare for a terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of
state and local governments to enter information into this database, and
DHS officials told us they were not aware if New York City officials had
added any information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS
officials, it is DOE's responsibility to inform cities and states about
the surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them.
In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to
conduct additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in part,
because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these
surveys.
Conclusions
Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or injure
many people and severely disrupt the nation's economy depends, in part, on
DOE's ability to search for and deactivate a device with little or no
warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure and the spread
of contamination in the event of a nuclear or radiological explosion also
depends, in part, on DOE's capability to determine what parts of a U.S.
city have been contaminated and provide this information to local and
state governments to help evacuate citizens that are at risk of exposure
and to administer medical aid. A number of critical capabilities and
assets for preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks
reside at DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to
disperse emergency response capabilities and assets to other regions, the
Remote Sensing Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE's ability
to search for and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and
assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence management
teams that provide information to state and local governments about the
extent of contamination; the planes and helicopters used to locate lost or
stolen nuclear or radiological materials and measure contamination levels;
and a sophisticated mapping system that contains information on the
locations of radiological sources in U.S. cities. In addition, the Remote
Sensing Laboratories house specialized teams that are highly trained in
clandestine search techniques and can conduct physically demanding search
missions, such as maritime boarding. Despite the importance of the assets
and capabilities located at these facilities, the Remote Sensing
Laboratories are protected at DOE's lowest level of physical security. If
DOE's emergency response capabilities were fully dispersed, then providing
only minimal security may be sufficient. However, since several DOE
emergency response capabilities remain unique to the Remote Sensing
Laboratories, we believe that the physical security measures around those
facilities may not be sufficient to protect their capabilities. We
recognize that physical protection measures may be costly and that DOE
security officials must prioritize where to spend limited resources in a
fiscally constrained environment. However, in our view, a modest
improvement in security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as
installing vehicle barriers, would significantly enhance the protection of
highly valuable assets against a terrorist attack.
In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on all
of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that
remains underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These
surveys establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to
more quickly detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure
changes in contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to
better focus and reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and
relatively low cost, there has been a survey of only one major
metropolitan area. Since neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission
responsibility for performing the surveys, they have not evaluated the
costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting the surveys for
metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist attack. While
DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the department is reluctant
to encourage cities to request the surveys because it has a limited number
of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally reserved for
emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for assisting state
and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or radiological attack
and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve state and local
governments' capacity to do so, has not considered aerial surveys to be
part of its efforts to protect cities against such an attack. With no
agency assuming responsibility for informing cities about the benefits of
these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an opportunity to be better
prepared for a terrorist attack.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and used
to prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or radiological
attack, we are making the following three recommendations:
o The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response program
within DOE, should review the physical security measures at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional measures should be
taken to protect the facilities against a loss of critical emergency
response capabilities or whether it is more cost-effective to fully
disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the country.
o The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security should
evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting aerial
background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially those that
are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack; determine whether
they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack;
and report the results to the Congress.
o If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security
determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or
radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop a
strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing this
strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1) the costs
and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing grant program
for state and local governments or through other means and (2) ways to
inform state and local government officials about the benefits and
limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that these
government officials can make their own decision about whether they would
benefit from the surveys.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their review
and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither agreed nor
disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our
findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that the
physical security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be sufficient
to protect them against terrorist attacks. According to DOE, physical
security measures at these two facilities are sufficient because (1) two
senior-level managers diligently reviewed the physical security measures
around the facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2) the
laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these
rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge that
current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing Laboratories
are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are protected at the
lowest level of physical security. This means that a facility can meet the
requirements by having walls and doors but no other physical security
measures. For example, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force
Base does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers, but security officials
told us that it still meets the minimum security requirements. Further,
DOE's justification for protecting the laboratories at the lowest level of
physical security is that their emergency response capabilities and assets
have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the
laboratories. However, although we found that DOE had dispersed some of
its emergency response capabilities and assets, a number of critical
emergency response capabilities and assets still exist only at the
laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully
dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for
protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
Second, the security officials responsible for developing security plans
for the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force personnel
to protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we reported, while
the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide an
additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government
identification may gain entry. Furthermore, guards at these installations
do not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as discussed in our report, GAO
staff gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny
of their identification, and their vehicles were never searched.
In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in performing
additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE was concerned
that existing mission requirements may limit DOE's ability to conduct
aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has limited resources to
conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency does have the expertise
and that there is funding potentially available under DHS's grant program
for state and local governments. If neither DOE nor DHS assume mission
responsibility for conducting the aerial surveys and do not inform cities
about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities will miss an important
opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack.
DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have limitations.
For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-shielded
radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in our report.
However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey information from
an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating
pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, the lack of baseline
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time
consuming.
DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE's NNSA are reprinted
in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the
Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
are listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix II
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath,
Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea, and
Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.
(360657)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1015 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-1015 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee
on Government Reform, House of Representatives
September 2006
COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response capability
to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the
United States. This capability has taken on increased significance after
the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened concern
that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a
major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks
in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's
two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with
DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background
radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) DOE review the physical
security measures at its two key emergency response facilities to
determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the
facilities and (2) DOE and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of making greater use of
aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. DHS agreed and DOE
neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. DOE raised concerns
about our finding on security measures.
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological
devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological
attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency
response facilities-the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological
emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not
concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical
capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent
and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities
include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a
nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that
can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure
contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these
capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical
security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities
against a terrorist attack.
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare
changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in
U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.
Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE
nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there
are no plans to conduct additional surveys.
DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey
*** End of document. ***