Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for
Successful Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft
System (19-MAY-06, GAO-06-593).
Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20
billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army's
"Warrior." Because of congressional concerns that some systems
have been more costly and taken more time to produce than
predicted, GAO reviewed the Warrior program. This report (1)
describes the Army's requirements underlying its decision to
acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air
Force's Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has
established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-593
ACCNO: A54499
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed
for Successful Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned
Aircraft System
DATE: 05/19/2006
SUBJECT: Air defense systems
Army procurement
Comparative analysis
Military aircraft
Procurement planning
Unmanned aerial systems
Weapons research and development
Weapons systems
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Army Extended Range Multi-Purpose
Unmanned Aircraft System
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GAO-06-593
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders' N
* Army Operational Requirement Focuses on Control by Commander
* Army Expects Warrior to Address Operational Needs with Key T
* Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practi
* Some Warrior Critical Technologies Have Yet to Reach Maturit
* Warrior Design Stability Uncertain
* Aggressive Schedule and Concurrent Activities Increase Progr
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Scope and Methodology
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to the Committee on Armed
GAO
Services, U.S. Senate
May 2006
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the Army's
Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System
GAO-06-593
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the
Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System
What GAO Found
The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned
aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with
existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator A. The Army believes
that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with
other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing
soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior's key technical features
include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster
tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for
weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army projects that
Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A.
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based
acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior's critical
technologies were immature at the contract award for system development
and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies
still have some risk associated with them because neither has previously
been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule
allows 32 months from award of the development and demonstration contract
to the initial production decision. Achieving this schedule will require
concurrency of technology and product development, testing, and
production. Once developmental aircraft are available for testing, the
Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead items in August 2007.
Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes
during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected
cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter Results in Brief BackgroundWarrior Capability Is Targeted to 1 2
Support Army Commanders' Needs Warrior Acquisition Strategy 3 6
Not Consistent with Best Practices Conclusions 10
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our 17
Evaluation Scope and Methodology 17
18
19
Appendix Comments from the Department of Defense 21
Table Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical 9
Features
Figures Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program Figure 2:
Concurrency in Warrior's Technology Development, Product
Development, Testing, and Production Compared to Best
Practices Model 5 15
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
SDD System Development and Demonstration
TRL Technology Readiness Level
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
May 19, 2006
The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
Unmanned aircraft systems1 are being developed and fielded in growing
numbers and the diversity of designs and applications is also increasing.
Through 2011, the Department of Defense plans to spend $20 billion to
develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing inventory of such
systems. Among the new developments is the Army's Extended Range
Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, also known as "Warrior." The Army
intends for Warrior to fill what it terms a capability gap for an unmanned
aircraft system at the division level. Warrior is being developed and
produced by the contractor also involved in the Air Force's Predator A and
Predator B unmanned aircraft systems. Warrior is to some degree similar to
those systems, a fact recognized by the Air Force and Army. In January
2006, both services signed a memorandum of understanding that recognized
that complementary/joint requirements exist between the Predator and
Warrior systems, and they committed to reaching agreement on how to
develop and use these capabilities.
Because of the growth in requirements and new technologies for unmanned
aircraft systems and your concerns that some unmanned aircraft systems
have not produced the expected cost and schedule outcomes, you asked us to
review the Army's Warrior program. Specifically, this report (1) describes
the Army's requirements underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead
of existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator; and (2) assesses
whether the Army has established a sound acquisition strategy for the
Warrior program.
To address the first objective, we reviewed Army requirements documents as
well as compared key technical features of the planned Warrior and
1
Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as "unmanned aerial
vehicles." "Unmanned aircraft" is consistent with the Federal Aviation
Administration's classification and emphasizes other components of the
aircraft system, such as payload, ground stations, and communications
equipment.
Page 1 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Results in Brief
Predator. We also reviewed the process the Army used to select the Warrior
system. To address the second objective, we reviewed the Warrior
acquisition strategy and evaluated it according to best practices criteria
utilizing GAO's "Methodology for Assessing Risks on Major Weapons Systems
Acquisition Programs." We also analyzed budget-related, programmatic, and
planning information to determine the soundness of the Army's acquisition
strategy. For both objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained
information on Army requirements and acquisition strategy for Warrior. We
also leveraged other recent GAO work on the Air Force's Predator system2
and our overall body of work on best practices of leading companies. We
conducted our review from September 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
The Army has determined that the Warrior is the best option available to
meet its operational requirement, which requires an unmanned aircraft
system dedicated to direct operational control by its field commanders.
The Army believes that the Predator A is operationally and technically
mismatched with its needs. The Army intends to use Warrior to enhance
overall force capability by teaming it with other of its assets such as
the Apache helicopter, using common ground control equipment to network
with other unmanned aircraft systems, and allowing soldiers in the field
to operate the aircraft. The Army expects Warrior to have several key
technical features that the Army believes will better meet its operational
needs, including a heavy fuel engine that uses a single Army-wide fuel, an
automatic take-off and landing system to improve safety, a faster tactical
common data link for interoperability with other Army assets, an ethernet
for quicker communications within the Warrior system, greater carrying
capacity for weapons, and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army
estimates that each Warrior aircraft and associated basic equipment will
cost about $4.4 million, less than the aircraft and similar equipment for
the Predator A at $4.8 million. While the Predator B system is expected to
meet or exceed some of the Warrior's capabilities, it is estimated to cost
$9 million for similar equipment.
2
GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past
Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447
( Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
Page 2 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not established a sound, knowledge-based
acquisition strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best acquisition
practices. The Army contracted for Warrior system development and
demonstration in August 2005 even though two of four critical technologies
were not mature. These two critical technologies still are not mature as
of early 2006, and the two that are mature have some risk associated with
them because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned
aircraft. The Army does have backups in place for the two immature
critical technologies, but use of these would result in a less capable
system. It is uncertain if the Army will be able to complete maturation of
technologies and achieve Warrior's overall design stability by the time of
the planned design readiness review in July 2006. Overall, the Warrior
schedule is very aggressive, with 32 months from the award of the
development and demonstration contract to the initial production decision.
Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product
development, testing, and production. For example, the Army is
establishing production capabilities while the first 17 developmental
aircraft are being designed and fabricated. Within months of these
aircraft becoming available for developmental testing, the Army plans to
commit funding for procurement of long-lead items as early as August 2007.
Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes
during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected
cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks.
We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army take action to ensure
that a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy guides the future of
the Warrior program. Specifically, we recommend that the Army not approve
long-lead items for Warrior low-rate initial production until it can
clearly demonstrate that the program is proceeding based on accumulated
knowledge such as technology maturity and design stability.
DOD concurred with only one part of our recommendation and did not concur
with the other two parts. DOD stated that delaying the procurement of
long-lead items will increase program costs and delay fielding of Warrior.
Our prior work shows that proceeding into the latter stages of acquisition
without needed knowledge on technologies and design ultimately takes
longer and costs individual programs more money.
Currently, DOD has five major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air
Force's Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps' Pioneer, and the
Army's Hunter and Shadow. The services also have developmental efforts
underway, for example, the Air Force's Predator B, the Army and Navy's
vertical take-off and landing system, and the Army's Warrior. Overall, DOD
now has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to increase its
inventory to 675 by 2010 and 1,400 by 2015.3 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review reached a number of decisions that would further expand investments
in unmanned systems, including accelerating production of Predator and
Global Hawk. It also established a plan to develop a new land-based,
long-strike capability by 2018 and set a goal that about 45 percent of the
future long-range strike force be unmanned.
DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with
innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as take on the
socalled "dull, dirty, and dangerous missions" without putting pilots in
harm's way. Potential missions for unmanned systems have expanded from the
original focus on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to
limited tactical strike capabilities. Projected plans call for unmanned
aircraft systems to perform persistent ground attack, electronic warfare,
and suppression of enemy air defenses.
Unmanned aircraft fly at altitudes ranging from below 10,000 feet up to
50,000 feet and are typically characterized by approximate altitude-"low
altitude" if operating at 10,000 feet or less, "medium altitude" if flying
above 10,000 but below 35,000 feet, and "high altitude" if operating above
35,000 feet. The Army's classifies Warrior as a medium-altitude system, in
the same category as its Hunter system, its Warrior prototype known as
I-GNAT, and the Air Force's Predator A. The Air Force's Predator B is
expected to operate at both medium and high altitudes.
The Warrior as envisioned by the Army shares some similarities with the
Air Force's Predator A and B models. First, all three systems share the
same contractor, General Atomics. Second, Predator A and Warrior are
expected to be somewhat similar in physical characteristics. In
particular, the build of the main fuselage, the location of fuel bays, and
design of the tailspar are alike. According to Army program officials, the
Predator B and Warrior are expected to share the same flight controls and
avionics. Predator A and Warrior are anticipated to perform some similar
missions, including reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
and attack.
These numbers are the larger systems and do not count numerous small and
handlaunched systems used by ground forces.
Page 4 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
The development of the Warrior program began in late 2001 when the Army
started defining requirements for a successor to its Hunter system. In
September 2004, the Army released a request for a "systems capabilities
demonstration" so that companies could demonstrate the capabilities of
their existing aircraft. In December 2004, the Army awarded demonstration
contracts worth $250,000 each to two contractors, Northrup Grumman and
General Atomics. Subsequently, the Army evaluated, among other things, the
demonstrated capabilities of the competitors' existing aircraft in
relation to Warrior technical requirements. The Army did not perform a
formal analysis of the alternatives comparing expected capabilities of
Warrior with current capabilities offered by existing systems; rather, its
rationale was that the Warrior is needed nearterm for commanders' missions
and considered this competition to be a rigorous analysis of available
alternatives.
Based on the competition, the Army concluded that General Atomics'
proposal (based on Warrior) provided the best value solution. In August
2005, the Army awarded the system development and demonstration (SDD)
contract to General Atomics. The contract is a cost plus incentive fee
contract with an award fee feature. It has a base value of about $194
million, with approximately another $15 million available to the
contractor in the form of incentive fees, and about an additional $12
million available as award fees. The time line in figure 1 illustrates the
sequence of past and planned events for the Warrior program.
Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program
December February/March August July April November
2004 2005 2005 2006 2008 2009
� � � � � �
Capabilities Demonstration SDD Design Low-Rate Full-Rate
Demonstration Contract Readiness Production Production
Contract Award Review Decision Decision
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysisand presentation).
The Army plans for a full Warrior system to entail 12 aircraft as well as
5 ground control stations, 5 ground data terminals, 1 satellite
communication ground data terminal, 12 air data terminals/air data relays,
6 airborne satellite communication terminals, 2 tactical automatic
take-off and landing systems, 2 portable ground control stations, 2
portable ground data terminals and associated ground support equipment.
The Army expects to buy 1 developmental system with 17 aircraft and 11
complete production systems with a total of 132 production aircraft
through 2015. However, the Army has not yet decided on the number of
systems it might buy beyond that date.
The Army is employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy to produce
Warrior. The Army expects the current Warrior program of record to provide
for immediate warfighting needs and plans to build on the capabilities of
this increment as evolving technology allows.
The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system dedicated
to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The Army has
determined that the Warrior was the best option available to meet this
operational requirement. Army program officials believe that the Predator
is operationally and technically mismatched with Army needs. The Army
expects Warrior to offer key technical features that will better meet Army
operational needs than Predator A.
Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders' Needs
Army Operational Requirement Focuses on Control by Commanders in the Field
According to the Army, the Predator is operationally mismatched with its
division-level needs. Army program officials noted that one of the Army's
current operational difficulties with Predator is that frontline
commanders cannot directly task the system for support during tactical
engagements. Rather, Predator control is allocated to Theater and Joint
Task Force Commands, and the system's mission is to satisfy strategic
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance needs as well as joint
needs. Army programmatic and requirements documents maintain that Army
division commanders in the field need direct control of a tactical
unmanned aircraft asset capable of satisfying operational requirements for
dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, communications
relay, teaming with other Army assets, and target acquisition and attack.4
Army program officials also indicated that Predator's time is apportioned
among various users, and the Army typically does not receive a large
portion of that time. According to Warrior program documents, the Army has
historically been able to draw only limited operational support from
theater assets such as Predator. For example, a program office briefing
noted that overall Iraq theater-level support was neither consistent nor
responsive to Army needs, and that division level support was often denied
or cancelled entirely. The briefing also said that the shortfall was
expected to continue, even with the addition of more Predators and Global
Hawks.
Army program officials also told us that they expect Warrior to enhance
overall force capability in ways that Predator cannot. Specifically, the
Army expects Warrior to support teaming with Army aviation assets and aid
these assets in conducting missions that commanders were previously
reluctant to task to manned platforms. Under this teaming concept, manned
assets, including the Apache helicopter, Army Airspace Command and Control
system, and Aerial Common Sensor, would work jointly with Warrior to
enhance target acquisition and attack capabilities. The Army plans for the
manned platforms to not only receive data and video communications from
Warrior but also control its payloads and flight. The Army also plans to
configure Warrior for interoperability with the Army One System Ground
Control Station, an Army-wide common ground control network for unmanned
aircraft systems. According to Army documents, Warrior's incorporation
into this network will better support the Army ground commander by
allowing control of Warrior aircraft to be handed off among ground
stations, provide better battlefield coverage for Joint Forces, and ensure
common operator training among unmanned aircraft systems, including the
Army's Warrior, Shadow, and Hunter and Marine Corps' unmanned aircraft
systems. Additionally, Army program officials pointed out that Warrior
will be physically controlled by an enlisted soldier deployed in the
theater where Warrior is being used. They contrast this with Predator,
which is typically flown from a location within the continental United
States by a pilot trained to fly manned aircraft.
The Army requirements document for Warrior was approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council in April 2005. The Council, among other
responsibilities, conducts requirements analyses and validates mission
needs and performance objectives and thresholds.
Page 7 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Army Expects Warrior to Address Operational Needs with Key Technical
Features
The Army believes that the Warrior design will offer key technical
features to address Army operational requirements and maintains that these
features will better meet its operational needs than those found on
Predator A. The technical features include:
o multi-role tactical common data link,
o ethernet,
o heavy fuel engine,
o automatic take-off and landing system,
o more weapons,
o interoperability with Army One System Ground Control Station, and
o dual-redundant avionics.
Table 1 shows the respective purpose of each technical feature, describes
whether or not a particular feature is planned for Warrior and exists now
on Predator A, and provides the Army's assessment of operational impact
provided by each feature.
Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical Features
Technical Feature Purpose Warrior Army'sAssessment of Operational
Predator A Impact
Tactical o Communications Yes - digital Ku-No - o Faster Common
between ground band data linka analog C-external data Data Link control
station and band data transmission aircraft link o Improved
o Interoperability with control of Army aviation aircraft
platforms o Teaming with Army aviation
Ethernet o Real-time internal Yes No o Faster internal
communications, data
including among transmission
avionics, payloads,
weapons
Heavy Fuel o Powers aircraft Yes No o Single Army Engine fuel on
battlefield
o Improved endurance and take-off weight
Automatic o Launch and Take-off and recovery Landing
Yes No - pilot o Safer using o Reduced manual chance for controls
operator error
Weapons o Target attack Yes - 4 Hellfire Yes - 2 o Prosecute
Hellfire more targets
Dual o Improve Yes No o More reliable
Redundant airworthiness
Avionics
Ground o Control of Yes -common Yes - o Single control Control
unmanned aircraft with other unique to of several Station system
Army/Marine Predator unmanned
Corps systems aircraft
systems
o Broader battlefield coverage
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
a
Ku-band and C-band are ranges of radio frequencies used in wireless
communications.
A February 2006 Warrior program office comparison of costs for Warrior and
Predator A projects that Warrior's unit cost will be $4.4 million for
Page 9 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices
each aircraft, including its sensors, satellite communications, and
Hellfire launchers and associated electronics. The cost comparison
indicates that Predator A's unit cost for the same elements is $4.8
million. Although the Air Force's Predator B is planned to be more capable
than Warrior in such areas as physical size and payload and weapons
capacity, the Warrior program office estimates that it will have a unit
cost of $9.0 million-about double the anticipated cost for Warrior. The
Army's cost estimates for the Warrior are, of course, predicated on Army
plans for successful development and testing.
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based
acquisition strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best practices
for successful acquisition. Warrior is expected to rely on critical
technologies that were not mature at the time of the system development
and demonstration contract award in August 2005 and were still not mature
in March 2006. Furthermore, it appears that the Army may be unable to
complete development of these technologies and achieve overall design
stability by the time of the design readiness review scheduled for July
2006. Moreover, the Warrior schedule is very aggressive and overlaps
technology development, product development, testing, and production. For
example, the Army plans to consider awarding a contract for procurement of
longlead items at a time when it is still unclear if Warrior will be
technologically mature and have a stable design. Such concurrency adds
more risk, including the potential for costly design changes after
production begins, to the already compressed schedule.
In the last several years, we have undertaken a best practices body of
work on how leading developers in industry and government use a
knowledge-based approach to develop high-quality products on time and
within budget. A knowledge-based approach to product development employs a
process wherein a high level of knowledge about critical facets of a
product is achieved at key junctures known as "knowledge points."5 This
event-driven approach, where each point builds on knowledge
5
Best practices for successful product development include three knowledge
points (KP). Knowledge Point 1 should occur at development start and is
attained when a technologies and resources match requirements; KP 2 should
occur at the mid-point between development and production and is attained
when product design performs as expected; and KP 3 should occur at
production start and is attained when production can meet cost, schedule,
and quality targets.
Page 10 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Some Warrior Critical Technologies Have Yet to Reach Maturity
attained in the previous point, enables developers to be reasonably
certain that their products are more likely to meet established cost,
schedule, and performance baselines. A key to such successful product
development is an acquisition strategy that matches requirements to
resources and includes, among other elements, a high level of technology
maturity in the product at the start of system development and
demonstration, design maturity at the system's design readiness review
usually held about halfway through the system's development phase, and
adequate time to deliver the product.
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is an important indicator that a match has been made between
the customer's requirements and the product developer's resources in term
of knowledge, money, and time. This means that the technologies needed to
meet essential requirements-known as "critical technologies"-have been
demonstrated to work in their intended environment. Our best practices
work has shown that technology readiness levels (TRL) 6 can be used to
assess the maturity of individual technologies and that a TRL of
7-demonstration of a technology in an operational environment-is the level
that constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program.
As identified by the Army, the Warrior program contains four critical
technologies: (1) ethernet, (2) multi-role tactical common data link, (3)
heavy fuel engine, and (4) automatic take-off and landing system. Two of
the four critical technologies-ethernet and data link-were not mature at
the time the Army awarded the Warrior system development and demonstration
contract in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature at TRLs of 4.
Army program officials told us that they project the ethernet to be at TRL
6 and the data link at TRL 5 or 6 by the time of the design readiness
review scheduled for July 2006. However, it is not certain that these two
technologies will be as mature at design readiness review as the Army
anticipates. Army program officials indicated that the data link hardware
is still in development and expect its integration with other Warrior
components to be a challenge. As such, they rated data link integration
status as a moderate risk to the Warrior program. While they
6
Technology readiness levels characterize the readiness of technologies for
hand-off to project implementers. Nine levels are defined, representing
concepts from fundamental research level (TRL 1) through technologies
fully qualified and demonstrated in flight (TRL 9).
Page 11 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
stated that use of the ethernet has been demonstrated on Army helicopters
and should not be a technical integration challenge, the officials also
said that neither the ethernet nor specific data link technologies to be
used on Warrior has been integrated previously onto an unmanned aircraft
platform. Further, if the technologies are demonstrated at TRL 6 by design
readiness review, they will meet DOD's standard for maturity
(demonstration in a relevant environment) but not the best practices
maturity standard of TRL 7 (demonstration in an operational environment).
The Army has technologies in place as backups for the data link and
ethernet, but these technologies would result in a less capable system
than the Army originally planned. According to Army program officials,
there are several potential backups for the data link that could be used
on the Warrior aircraft. Among the backups they cited is the same data
link used on the Predator A-analog C-band. However, as we noted in a
report last year, C-band is congested, suffers from resulting delays in
data transmission and relay, and the Department of Defense has established
a goal of moving Predator payloads from this data link.7 Similarly, the
other data link backups cited by the officials either had slower data
transmission rates or also were not yet mature. Program officials
indicated that the backup for the ethernet is normal ground station
control of the on-board communication among such components as the
payloads, avionics, and weapons. While they stated that there would be no
major performance penalty if the backup was used, they did note that the
ethernet would significantly improve ease of integrating payloads and of
integrating with other Army assets that might need control of a Warrior
payload to support missions.
The other two critical technologies, the automatic take-off and landing
system and the heavy fuel engine, are mature at respective TRLs of 7 and
9. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these technologies
as well. The contractor has never fielded an automatic take-off and
landing component on an unmanned aircraft system. Army program officials
told us that they are confident about the take-off and landing system
because a similar landing system had been fielded on the Shadow unmanned
aircraft, but they also indicated that the take-off component has not been
fielded
GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments , GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C. ; Dec. 13, 2005).
Page 12 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Warrior Design Stability Uncertain
on an unmanned aircraft. The officials also expressed confidence in the
heavy fuel engine because it is certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration and is in use on civilian manned aircraft. However, like
the complete take-off and landing system, it has not previously been
integrated onto an unmanned aircraft.
Best practices for successful acquisition call for a program's design
stability to be demonstrated by having at least 90 percent of engineering
drawings completed and released to manufacturing at the time of the design
readiness review. If a product's design is not stable as demonstrated by
meeting this best practice, the product may not meet customer requirements
and cost and schedule targets. For example, as we reported previously, the
Army's Shadow unmanned aircraft system did not meet best practices
criteria because it had only 67 percent of its design drawings completed
when the system entered low-rate production. Subsequent testing revealed
examples of design immaturity, especially relating to system reliability,
and ultimately the Army delayed Shadow's full-rate production by about 6
months.8
The Warrior program also faces increased risk if design drawings do not
meet standards for best acquisition practices. The Warrior program office
projects that Warrior's design will be stable and that 85 percent of
drawings will have been completed and released to manufacturing by the
time of the design readiness review in July 2006. However, it seems
uncertain whether the Warrior program will meet this projection because
percentages of drawings complete for some sub-components were still quite
low in early 2006 and, in some cases, have declined since the system
development and demonstration contract award. For example, according to an
Army program official, the percentage of completed design drawings for the
aircraft and ground control equipment dropped after contract award because
the Army made modifications to the planned aircraft and also decided that
it needed a larger transport vehicle for the Warrior's ground control
equipment.
8
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
Page 13 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Aggressive Schedule and Concurrent Activities Increase Program Risk
The Warrior program appears driven largely by schedule rather than the
attainment of event-driven knowledge points that would separate technology
development from product development. The latter approach is
characteristic of both best practices and DOD's own acquisition policy.
Warrior's schedule is compressed and aggressive and includes concurrency
among technology development, product development, testing, and
production. Concurrency-the overlapping of technology and product
development, testing, and production schedules-is risky because it can
lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a useable
capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes are necessary
to achieve expected system performance. As shown in figure 2, the Warrior
schedule overlaps technology development, product development, testing,
and production.
Figure 2: Concurrency in Warrior's Technology Development, Product
Development, Testing, and Production Compared to Best Practices Model
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysisand presentation).
The following examples highlight some of the concurrency issues within the
Warrior program:
o Thirty-two months have been allotted from the system development and
demonstration contract award in August 2005 to the low-rate production
decision in April 2008. Out of that, 10 months-from July 2006 to May
2007-are set aside for integrating system components (including all
four critical technologies) into the aircraft. Two of these
technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the
specific technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously
been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Army plans to
continue integration through May 2007 would seem to undermine the
design stability expected to be achieved at the July 2006 design
readiness review. Ideally, system integration is complete by that
time.
o Delivery of 17 developmental aircraft is to take place within a
12-month period from April 2007 to April 2008, and the Army plans for
them to undergo developmental testing as they are delivered. It is
unclear whether all components will be fully integrated for this
testing, but the results of some tests should be available when the
Army considers approval of long-lead items for the first lot of
low-rate initial production in August 2007. The Army is requesting
about $31 million in fiscal 2007 to procure long-lead items, including
items associated with the automatic take-off and landing system, heavy
fuel engine assembly, and ground control. Prior to the planned
approval of the first lot in fiscal 2008, the developmental aircraft
will be evaluated in a limited user test.
The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk.
Additionally, according to Army program officials, both the program office
and contractor recognize that there are areas of moderate to high risk
within the program, including integration of the tactical common data link
as well as timely availability of a modified Hellfire missile and
synthetic aperture radar used for visibility in poor atmospheric
conditions. Army program officials told us that they are trying to manage
Warrior as more of a knowledge-based, event-driven rather than
schedule-driven program. As an example, they stated that the contractor is
currently building two offcontract aircraft to help mitigate risk by
proving out design, development, and manufacturing. However, they also
told us that these two aircraft would not include the tactical common data
link, Hellfire missile, synthetic aperture radar, or satellite
communications used for relay purposes. They noted that some of these
items are still in development so are not expected to be available, but
they do plan for the two aircraft to
Conclusions
have the ethernet, heavy fuel engine, and automatic take-off and landing
system.
In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its
operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the
Predator. In practice, however, the Warrior might very well encounter
cost, schedule, and performance problems that would hinder it from
attaining the Army's goals. Half of its critical technologies are not yet
mature, and its design is not yet stable. Compounding this, its aggressive
schedule features extensive concurrency among technology development and
demonstration, design integration, system demonstration and test, and
production, leaving little time to resolve technology maturity and design
stability issues by testing. If the Warrior program continues forward
prior to attaining adequate technology and design, it may well produce
underperforming Warrior aircraft that will not meet program
specifications. The program may then experience delays in schedule and
increased costs.
The next key program event with significant financial implications is the
scheduled approval of long-lead items for the initial lot of Warrior
low-rate initial production in August 2007. That will be the first use of
procurement funding for Warrior. We believe that is a key point at which
the Army needs to demonstrate that the Warrior program is knowledge-based
and better aligned to meet program goals within available resources than
it currently appears.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Army not approve long-lead items for Warrior
low-rate initial production until it can clearly demonstrate that the
program is proceeding based on accumulated knowledge and not a
predetermined schedule. In particular, we recommend that, prior to
approving the Warrior long-lead items for low-rate initial production, the
Secretary of the Army require that
o critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated;
o Warrior design integration is complete and at least 90 percent of
design drawings be completed and released to manufacturing; and
o fully-integrated Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and
involved in development testing.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments are reprinted in Appendix I. DOD concurred with one part of our
recommendation but not with the other two parts. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DOD concurred with the part of our recommendation that it should seek to
have at least 90 percent of design drawings completed and released to
manufacturing prior to procuring long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate
initial production. However, DOD also said that the decision to procure
long-lead items will not be based solely on the percentage of drawings
completed, but also on the schedule impact of unreleased drawings.
DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to
approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production, the
Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior technologies
are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated Warrior
developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in development testing.
Although DOD agreed that two critical technologies are less mature than
the others within the Warrior system, it also stated that these
technologies are at the correct levels to proceed with integration.
However, the Warrior program is nearing the end of integration and is
about to begin system demonstration, signified by the July 2006 design
readiness review. In that review, the design is set to guide the building
of developmental aircraft for testing. These developmental aircraft will
be used to demonstrate the design in the latter half of System Development
and Demonstration. While DOD stated that risk mitigation steps are in
place, including possible use of back-up technologies, if either of the
two critical technologies is not ready for integration, the decisions on
whether to use back-up technologies in the design would ideally have been
made by the design readiness review. Even if the two critical technologies
mature by that point, they would still have to be integrated into the
design, as would the back-up technologies if DOD chose to use those
instead. To the extent that technology maturation and integration extend
beyond the design readiness review, the program will incur the risk of
integrating the design at the same time it is attempting to build
developmental aircraft to demonstrate the design. Our recommendation to
make the technology decision before committing to long-lead items provides
a reasonable precaution against letting the technology risks proceed
further into the demonstration of the developmental aircraft and into the
purchase of production items. Making the technology decision as early as
possible is particularly important given that the program schedule allows
no more than a year to demonstrate the design with the developmental
aircraft before committing to production. Our past work has shown that
Scope and Methodology
increased costs and schedule slippages may accrue to programs that are
still maturing technologies well into system development when they should
be focused on stabilizing system design and preparing for production.
With regards to the part of our recommendation that fully integrated
development aircraft are fabricated and involved in developmental testing
prior to approval of long-lead items, DOD indicated that modeling and
simulation, block upgrades, early operational deployments, and early
testing will enable the Department to mitigate design and performance
risks while remaining on schedule. While we agree that these activities
help reduce risk, the most effective way to reduce risk is to verify the
design through testing of fully-integrated developmental aircraft before
committing to production. Our recommendation underscores the value of
conducting such testing, which can still be done if technology decisions
are made early.
Our work over the past several years has shown that a knowledge-based
acquisition strategy consistent with best practices can lead to successful
outcomes. Specifically, proceeding without mature technologies and a
stable design can lead to costly design changes after production is
underway and negatively impact funding in other Department programs,
ultimately affecting DOD's ability to respond to other warfighter needs.
To address the first objective, to identify the requirements that led to
the Army's decision to acquire Warrior, we reviewed Army operational
requirements, acquisition strategy, and other programmatic documents and
briefings. We did not assess the validity of the Army's requirements for
Warrior. We also reviewed the process the Army used in selecting Warrior.
In comparing Warrior to existing unmanned systems in the inventory, we
limited our review to comparable medium-altitude systems within the
military services. To assess differences in operational capabilities for
Warrior and Predator, we reviewed operations-related documents for
Predator A and B. We also reviewed critical technologies as well as other
key technical features of the respective systems that highlighted
differences in Warrior and Predator A capabilities.
To address the second objective, whether the Army established a sound
acquisition strategy for Warrior, we reviewed planning, budget, and
programmatic documents. We also utilized GAO's "Methodology for Assessing
Risks on Major Weapon System Programs" to assess the Army's acquisition
strategy with respect to best practices criteria. The methodology is
derived from the best practices and experiences of leading commercial
firms and successful defense acquisition programs. We also used this
methodology to review risks within the Warrior program, but we did not
focus our assessment on all risk areas the Army and Warrior contractor
identified within the program. Instead, we focused on those risk areas
that seemed most critical to the overall soundness of the Army's
acquisition strategy.
To achieve both objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained
their views of the Army's requirements and soundness of the Army's
acquisition strategy. We also incorporated information on Warrior from
GAO's recent Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.9
We performed our review from September 2005 to April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. Additionally, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact me on 202-512-7773. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Principal contributors to this report were William R.
Graveline, Tana Davis, and Beverly Breen.
John Hutton Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-06-391 ( Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
Page 20 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
(120485)
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