Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to
Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty
for Operational Support (31-OCT-06, GAO-07-93).
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed
concern with the frequency and length of time that volunteer
reservists serve on active duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly
doubled its fiscal year 2005 estimate for the total maximum
levels of reservists volunteering to be on active duty for
operational support. Congress required GAO to review the reasons
behind the increases and expressed an interest in understanding
which reservists were being included or excluded from these
numbers. In this report, GAO (1) identified the factors that led
to the increase in DOD's requests for the maximum number of
volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for
operational support since DOD's initial request in fiscal year
2005 and (2) assessed the extent to which the reserve components
have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an
operational support capacity since 2005. In conducting this
review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed DOD
officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-93
ACCNO: A62744
TITLE: Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to
Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty
for Operational Support
DATE: 10/31/2006
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserves
Data integrity
Military operations
Military reserve personnel
Policy evaluation
Reporting requirements
Volunteer forces
Government agency oversight
Defense Manpower Data Center
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GAO-07-93
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Authorization Levels Increased Due to Inaccurate Information
* DOD Based Its Initial Request on Data That Did Not Accuratel
* DOD Lacked a Definition of Operational Support Prior to its
* Fiscal Year 2007 Estimates Match Fiscal Year 2006 Maximum Le
* Reserve Components Are Not Identifying Numbers of Active Dut
* Conclusions
* Recommendation for Executive Action
* Agency Comments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
October 2006
MILITARY PERSONNEL
Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account
for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support
GAO-07-93
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 5
Conclusions 13
Recommendation for Executive Action 14
Agency Comments 14
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 16
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 18
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20
Table
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for
Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006 10
Abbreviations
DMDC Defense Manpower and Data Center DOD Department of Defense FY fiscal
year NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
October 31, 2006
The Honorable John C. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Since the end of the Cold War, the reserve components1 have become an
integral part of military operations. As of May 2006, the Ready Reserve
comprised roughly 44 percent of the total military force. The Department
of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on both involuntarily mobilized
and volunteer reservists since the first Gulf War, as well as in a series
of military operations from 1994 through 2001 for contingencies in Haiti,
Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo. Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, DOD has depended more heavily on the reserves for
overseas operations and homeland missions. The department and Congress
have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time that
volunteer reservists are mobilized or voluntarily serve on active duty,
which can lead to overuse of reservists and stress on the reserve force,
impairing the availability and ability of reservists to respond quickly to
contingency missions.2
1 The Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National
Guard, Navy Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve comprise the DOD reserve
components or reserves.
Prior to October 2004, the extent to which reservists could volunteer to
serve in military operations was restricted by legislation, which became
known as the 180-day rule. The rule stated that DOD must count in its
congressionally authorized, active duty, annual end strength levels any
reservist serving in an active duty role and performing special work for
longer than 180 days. As a result of the rule, DOD could use reservists to
perform mission-essential tasks for a limited period of time without
considering them as a permanent addition to the force. DOD officials
believed this rule limited volunteerism, service continuity, and their
flexibility in using volunteer reservists in a variety of missions. To
work around this rule, the services allowed reservists to volunteer
multiple times in succession as long as each active duty service tour
lasted fewer than 180 days. These actions resulted in volunteer reservists
serving on active duty for extended periods of time without being
accounted for under the active duty end strength numbers.
Enacted in October 2004, the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) included a mechanism to provide oversight
over the number of reservists volunteering to be on active duty for
operational support. The act eliminated the 180-day rule and created a
requirement for Congress to annually authorize the maximum number of
volunteer reserve personnel to be on active duty for operational support
purposes. The act did not define the term operational support, but
provided for the Secretary of Defense to define operational support in a
separately published regulation. The act also provided that a reservist on
active or full-time National Guard duty for a period greater than 3 years
or for a cumulative period of more than 3 years within the past 4 years
was to be counted against the active duty end strength authorization. DOD
then required the reserve components to report their monthly highest
numbers of these reservists in order to monitor that they did not exceed
their maximum authorized levels. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, most of
the reserve components had significantly increased their estimates for the
maximum number of reserves authorized to be on active duty for operational
support. The total authorization level nearly doubled compared to the
fiscal year 2005 authorization level. DOD's fiscal year 2007 requested
authorization for volunteer reservists remained consistent with the fiscal
year 2006 maximum levels.
2 GAO has also issued a number of reports and testimonies reviewing the
increased use of reserve forces related to mobilization, availability, and
readiness: Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-Term Reserve
Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Reserve Forces: Actions
Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and
Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004); Military
Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-Term Guard and
Reserve Force Availability, GAO-05-285T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005);
and Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and
Equipment Need to Be Reexamined, GAO-06-170T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20,
2005).
Congress required that we review the reasons behind the increases from
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, as well as the factors used to
develop the fiscal year 2007 levels.3 Congress also expressed an interest
in understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from the
number of reservists activated for operational support purposes. The
objectives of this report are to (1) identify the factors that led to the
increase in requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel
authorized to be on active duty for operational support since fiscal year
2005 and (2) assess the extent to which the reserve components have
consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational
support capacity since 2005.
To identify the factors that led to the increase in the number of
authorized personnel, we reviewed policies, implementing guidance, and
regulations, analyzed key legislation, and interviewed Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs and reserve component
officials to gain an understanding of their roles and effectiveness in
developing the authorization levels for reservists on active duty for
operational support. To determine the reliability of the estimates for the
maximum authorization levels for the reserve components, we gathered
reserve component officials' perspectives on their data systems in the
collecting and reporting of reserve numbers to DOD. To determine the
extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity, we
obtained documentation and discussed with reserve officials the
consistency in application of the guidelines, including information on the
structure of reserve data systems and the process for collecting and
recording the numbers of reservists. The components and DOD also provided
the highest number of reservists each month as reported to DOD. We found
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, based in part on
definitional problems of categories of reservists to be included in
reported numbers, generating data that we believe are not sufficiently
reliable. As a result, we make a recommendation for executive action to
improve the accuracy and consistency of information that is reported
across the components. We conducted our review from June 2006 through
September 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described
further in appendix I.
3 H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, Title IV, at 310 (2005).
Results in Brief
DOD's request for volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active
duty for operational support grew between fiscal years 2005 and 2006
primarily due to two key factors: data used by DOD to prepare its fiscal
year 2005 estimate did not accurately reflect all the reservists
voluntarily serving in operational support capacities and DOD had not
defined what constituted operational support prior to submitting the
fiscal year 2005 estimate. According to DOD officials, when it developed
its initial submission for maximum authorization levels, the department
based its estimates on data reported annually by the reserve components
for other purposes. The data excluded some reservists serving in
operational support capacities. Once the numbers requested for fiscal year
2005 were approved by Congress and communicated throughout the reserve
components, reserve officials with greater insight over the reservists
serving in an operational support role realized that the estimates were
too low and did not reflect the actual numbers of reservists serving in
this capacity. Further complicating the issue, DOD's definition of
operational support was not agreed upon or distributed until April 26,
2005, approximately 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized maximum
levels were in place. Based on the published definition and greater
outreach to gather appropriate data from the personnel responsible for
monitoring the number of individuals who volunteered for this type of
active duty, most reserve components revised the fiscal year 2005 numbers
and submitted higher estimates for the maximum authorized levels for
fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same maximum levels for fiscal year
2007 as in fiscal year 2006 because there were no significant increases or
decreases.
The reserve components have not consistently or accurately identified the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this
monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve
components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in
their reported numbers, and components had different definitions of the
personnel included within some reported categories. For example, the Army
Reserve and the Army National Guard do not include personnel that are
serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their reported
amounts, even though this category is listed in DOD's definition of
operational support. Army personnel stated that these reservists are
included in their active duty end strength numbers. In addition, only
three of the six reserve components include in their reported numbers
reservists who are serving on extended active duty missions, and two of
these components have different definitions of the personnel included in
this category. We also found that instead of reporting the highest number
of these reservists each month, the Navy Reserve submitted cumulative
numbers of reservists for 6 months, which led to erroneously reporting
that it exceeded its maximum authorized level three times. According to
Navy officials, these errors were caused by lack of access to personnel
data due to Hurricane Katrina, and the errors were ultimately corrected.
To help address these inconsistencies and errors, DOD is implementing a
change in its Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) to enable DOD to
systematically generate the number of each component's operational support
reservists. However, the effectiveness of this automated reporting change
depends on the components, which are responsible for updating and aligning
their policies and systems to provide accurate data to DMDC. DOD is still
in the process of developing a draft instruction and only four of the
reserve components have updated or have plans in place to update their
guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories of reservist
to include when accounting for those performing operational support
duties. Inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational
support reservists may continue until DOD and the reserve components
uniformly update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what
categories of reservist to include in their reported numbers. Until this
is accomplished, DOD and Congress do not have a clear picture of how many
volunteer reservists are currently on active duty serving in an
operational support capacity. We are recommending that DOD and the reserve
components develop guidance that clarifies and defines the categories of
operational support that should be included in the reported numbers so
that accurate and consistent information is reported across the
components. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
our recommendation.
Background
Although reserve personnel have been used for contingency and emergency
operations through the involuntary "Presidential Reserve Call-up" and
"Partial Mobilization" authorities, a significant number of reserve
personnel on active duty for these and other missions have been provided
on a voluntary basis.4 Agency officials stated that these volunteer
reservists' roles could include filling in for an existing active duty
mission temporarily (such as an infantryman or pilot), providing needed
special skills (civil affairs or engineer), or participating in training
exercises that result in support to active duty missions. Legislation has
evolved since 1980 to provide DOD with more flexibility in managing these
volunteer reservists.
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act5 was passed in 1980 to amend
Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The act required that Congress annually
authorize total strength levels for each military service for active duty
personnel, with some exceptions. The act also established the 180-day rule
for reserve members serving on active duty for special work. Reserve
members on active duty who performed special work for 180 days or fewer
were excluded from being counted against active duty personnel
end-strengths.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code at Section 115, which governs personnel
strengths for the military, gave authority to the Secretary of Defense to
vary active duty and Selected Reserve end-strengths above the level
authorized by Congress. Prior to October 2004, the Secretary of Defense
could increase active duty end strength paid by active duty funds by up to
3 percent, increase the end strength for active duty and National Guard
paid by reserve funds by up to 2 percent, and vary the end strength
authorized for the Selected Reserve by up to 2 percent.6
On October 28, 2004, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 was enacted.7 The act
amended 10 U.S.C. S: 115 by establishing an annual authorization
requirement for the maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to be
on active duty for operational support, thus creating a new accounting
category. It also added a provision that allows the Secretary of Defense
to increase the maximum strength authorized for certain reservists
voluntarily on active duty to perform operational support by up to 10
percent.8
4 Section 12301(d) of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the
service secretaries to order a reservist to active duty with the consent
of that member, as opposed to being called up or mobilized involuntarily
in a time of war or other national emergency.
5 Pub. L. No. 96-513, S:102 (1980).
6 10 U.S.C. S: 115(e) (2003).
7 Pub. L. No. 108-375.
Authorization Levels Increased Due to Inaccurate Information and Lack of an
Operational Support Definition
DOD's estimates for the maximum number of volunteer reservists authorized
to be on active duty for operational support increased between fiscal year
2005 and fiscal year 2006 as a result of two key factors. First, DOD
developed its fiscal year 2005 estimates using inaccurate data from a data
source that could not distinguish volunteer reservists on active duty for
missions that would be considered operational support from other
reservists. Second, DOD did not formally define operational support prior
to establishment of its fiscal year 2005 maximum authorized levels and did
not release a definition of operational support until 6 months after the
maximum authorized levels were passed under the NDAA. DOD increased its
estimates for fiscal year 2006 after the reserve components reviewed
historical numbers of these reservists based on the published operational
support definition. For the fiscal year 2007 estimates, the reserve
components submitted the same maximum levels as fiscal year 2006 because
there were no substantial increases or decreases in their numbers,
according to DOD officials.
DOD Based Its Initial Request on Data That Did Not Accurately Reflect the Number
of Volunteer Reservists on Active Duty for Operational Support
One key factor that contributed to the increase in authorization levels
requested for fiscal year 2006 was that DOD's initial request for fiscal
year 2005 was not developed using data that accurately reflected the
maximum number of reservists on voluntary active duty for operational
support. In developing the estimate submitted for the fiscal year 2005
NDAA, DOD used data that was provided by the reserve components for other
purposes. DOD derived its estimates from an annual data call where reserve
components provide information about reservists' activities throughout the
year. These data identified reservists involved in such missions as
domestic emergencies, counter-drug activities, major exercises, and
mobilizations. According to a DOD official, they compiled the estimates
from various categories that represented what they considered operational
support. They automatically eliminated some categories from their count,
such as some counter-drug activities and mobilizations, because they
assumed that the reported data in these categories only included
involuntary active duty reservists. DOD informally provided the estimates
to the reserve components for their review, but had to submit the
estimates before some reserve components could respond.
8 Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 416 (c)(4).
After the authorized levels were approved by Congress in the fiscal year
2005 NDAA and communicated throughout the reserve components, reserve
officials with greater insight over the reservists serving in an
operational support role realized that the estimates did not reflect the
actual numbers of reservists serving in this capacity. Officials from the
reserve components informed DOD that the maximum numbers requested were
too low for force requirements. According to a DOD official, they
scrutinized their initial data review and found that the information
extracted from the data did not distinguish involuntarily activated
reservists from voluntarily activated reservists. Once they realized that
the data did not separate out voluntary and involuntary reservists, they
recognized that some of the data from categories that had been excluded,
such as mobilizations, should not have been completely excluded since it
contained some volunteers. DOD's lack of formal coordination with the
reserve components and its reliance upon existing data that did not
specifically identify volunteer reservists on active duty for operational
support contributed to DOD submitting a low estimate for fiscal year 2005.
DOD Lacked a Definition of Operational Support Prior to its Fiscal Year 2005
Estimate
Another key factor that contributed to the increase in DOD's fiscal year
2006 estimate for the maximum number of reservists authorized was that DOD
did not have a definition of operational support prior to its initial
estimate for fiscal year 2005. When the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted
on October 28, 2004, the act did not provide a definition for operational
support to apply to the maximum authorization levels, but instead required
the Secretary of Defense to prescribe by regulation the meaning of the
term operational support.9
After the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted, DOD met with reserve
component officials in response to their concerns about the low
authorization levels and also to develop a definition for operational
support. In collaboration with the components, DOD established a
definition for operational support, and on April 26, 2005-approximately 6
months after the fiscal year 2005 authorization levels for reserve
personnel were made law-released the official definition with some
accounting and reporting guidelines. DOD defined operational support as:
active duty, other than mobilized active guard and reserve duty,
voluntarily performed by reservists; full-time duty, other than mobilized
active guard and reserve duty, voluntarily performed by National Guard
members; and active duty for training performed at the request of an
operational commander, or as the result of reimbursable funding. The
definition of operational support included
9 Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 416(m).
o active duty for special work,10
o active duty and active duty for training performed as the
result of reimbursable funding,
o funeral honors duty performed not in an inactive duty status,
o voluntary active duty performed by recall reserve retirees not
receiving regular retired pay, and
o active duty training performed as a result of a request of an
operational commander to provide support.
The guidelines created a requirement for components to report to
DOD the highest number of operational support reservists each
month. Once the definition for operational support was
established, reserve component officials that had direct
responsibility for monitoring reserve personnel end strength
reviewed historical data from their internal systems on the number
of volunteer reservists serving in the areas included under the
definition. The components determined that the numbers that were
in fiscal year 2005 NDAA did not accurately reflect the number of
reservists performing operational support. Most of the reserve
components then submitted higher estimates for the maximum
authorized levels in the fiscal year 2006 NDAA. Table 1 shows that
five out of six reserve components provided larger maximum levels
for fiscal year 2006, and the total authorization level nearly
doubled compared to the fiscal year 2005 authorization level.
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve
Personnel for Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Fiscal Year 2007 Estimates Match Fiscal Year 2006 Maximum Levels
For its fiscal year 2007 estimates, DOD submitted a request for
the same maximum levels as in fiscal year 2006. The reserve
components reviewed their historical data as they did for the
fiscal year 2006 estimates and updated them with data from fiscal
year 2006. The reserve components found that there were no
substantial increases or decreases in their fiscal year 2006
numbers that required changes in their estimated maximum levels
for fiscal year 2007.
Reserve Components Are Not Identifying Numbers of Active Duty
Reservists for Operational Support Consistently across Components
The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity
since this requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. In its
April 2005 memorandum that provided a definition for operational
support, DOD directed the components to report the highest number
of volunteer reservists serving in an operational support capacity
each month so that DOD could monitor the amounts to ensure that
components did not exceed the maximum levels authorized. On the
basis of our analyses, we found that the reserve components
inconsistently include various categories of personnel in their
reported numbers because the components have different
interpretations about what is included under DOD's operational
support definition and how it applies to their existing
categories. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard do not include voluntary active duty performed by recalled
retired reservists in their accounting amounts, even though this
is one of the five categories listed under DOD's definition of
operational support. According to Army personnel, the Army Reserve
and the Army National Guard do not include these reservists
because they consider them active duty and include them in their
active duty end strength numbers. In addition, the reserve
components are inconsistent on whether they include volunteer
reservists serving on extended active duty in their reported
operational support numbers. The definition of operational support
provided by DOD does not specifically address extended active duty
reservists. We found that three of the six reserve components-Navy
Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Army National Guard-include
extended active duty reservists in their reported operational
support numbers, although the Navy and Air Force define the length
of service for extended active duty reservists differently. The
Navy Reserve defines them as voluntary recall reservists on 2 to 5
year tours. The Air Force considers them to be reservists
volunteering to fill an existing, funded active duty position for
3 years or less. The Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air
National Guard do not include extended active duty reservists in
their reported operational support numbers because they are
currently being accounted for under active duty end-strengths.
In addition to these inconsistencies, we also found that one
component's monthly reports of volunteer reservists serving on
active duty for operational support have not provided DOD with an
accurate accounting of the number of these individuals due to
errors in the numbers reported. We found that in each month from
January through June 2006, the Navy Reserve erroneously reported
to DOD cumulative totals instead of the highest number of
reservists in each month. A Navy Reserve official stated that they
did not have complete access to personnel data during these months
because they had to relocate their personnel database after
Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the Navy Reserve appeared to
exceed its maximum authorized level for 3 months-in January,
February, and June 2006. The Navy Reserve did not discover this
error until late July 2006, at which time they retroactively
corrected the erroneously reported amounts.
To help address these inconsistencies and errors, the Defense
Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) is in the process of implementing
a system change that would allow DOD to have automated access to
the number of volunteer operational support reservists. We
reported in September 2006 that DMDC can extract some reserve
personnel data, such as a reservist's number of deployments and
citizenship, but it could not provide data specifically on
volunteer status from all six reserve components.11 According to a
DMDC official, the proposed change would only provide information
from systems already aligned with DMDC that can distinguish
volunteer reservists for operational support. DMDC also does not
have the authority to direct the services to correct data errors
and inconsistencies.
As of early October 2006, we found that each reserve component
collected its operational support numbers from accounting systems
that did not provide all this information to DMDC. For example,
the Navy Reserve obtained its reported numbers from the Navy
Reserve Order Writing System, which currently feeds into DMDC, but
this system does not distinguish the highest amount of volunteer
reservists each month. The Marine Corps Reserve's systems can
provide volunteer information to DMDC, but it reported end of the
month numbers, not the highest number of reservists during the
month. The Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard
each pull key data from external databases managed by the Defense
Finance and Accounting System, but the Army Reserve's database did
not provide the monthly highest number of volunteers. The Army
National Guard compiles its number of volunteer reservists from
its own systems and the Army Human Resource Command, which do not
provide this information on volunteers. The DMDC official stated
that the effectiveness of the proposed change to automate
reporting on volunteer operational support reservists still
depends on the components, which are responsible for aligning
their policies and systems to provide the appropriate information
according to changes in data reporting requirements. As a result,
we do not believe that this system change will provide DOD with
accurate information about the peak monthly number of volunteer
reservists serving in an operational support capacity, unless the
components align their policies and systems to conform to
reporting requirements.
We found that DOD and the reserve components have not updated and
aligned their guidance to clearly and consistently articulate and
define what categories of reservists to include in accounting for
and reporting on operational support levels. DOD released
preliminary guidance in its April 2005 memorandum that defined the
five categories of reservists that comprise operational support;
however, they have not yet updated their instruction that governs
the use of and accounting for reservists. DOD is in the process of
developing an instruction on accounting and reporting procedures
in the new DOD Instruction 1215.6, which it plans to officially
release in late October 2006. Even though DOD has not released its
updated instruction, the Army National Guard published updated
guidance based on DOD's April 2005 memorandum that provides
examples of missions specific to the Army National Guard that are
considered operational support. Another three components-the Army
Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard-have plans in
place to update their guidance to reflect operational support
reporting requirements. The Department of the Army expects to
release its updated guidance for the Army Reserve within the year.
The Air Force Reserve plans to update its implementing regulations
in March or April 2007 and, in the interim, has issued a policy
memorandum that applies operational support requirements to its
policies. The Air National Guard expects to update its guidance in
the near future, and has an interim policy that addresses
operational support similar to the Air Force Reserve. The two
remaining components-the Marine Corps Reserve and Navy
Reserve-have not updated their existing guidance to incorporate
operational support accounting and reporting and do not appear to
have immediate plans to do so until DOD releases new guidance.
Until DOD and all of the reserve components update and uniformly
align their implementing guidance, inconsistencies and errors in
the reporting of the number of operational support reservists may
continue. As a result, DOD and the components cannot ensure that
they will not exceed the maximum authorized levels, which may
impair the ability of DOD and Congress to oversee the use of
volunteer reservists serving on active duty in an operational
support capacity.
Conclusions
With DOD's growing demand for reserve personnel to augment its
active duty forces to accomplish its missions overseas and at
home, stress on the reserve force is a significant issue.
Reservists have been serving on increasingly longer and more
frequent tours of duty. However, reserve personnel are a part-time
force and DOD must take care in managing the frequency with which
it uses the reserves to complete its missions. It is critical that
DOD and Congress have oversight over DOD's forces to ensure that
its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
In eliminating the 180-day rule, Congress gave DOD flexibility in
managing its volunteer reservists to serve in a variety of
missions, without limiting volunteerism and continuity of service.
However, the reserve components continue to struggle with
accurately and consistently identifying these reservists each
month. Updated guidance that clearly articulates what should be
included and excluded from this accounting would help the
components eliminate the inconsistent interpretations that
currently exist. Until DOD and all of the reserve components
update their implementing guidance in a uniform manner,
inconsistencies and errors in the reporting of the number may
continue and DOD will be unable to ensure that reported numbers
are accurate and that maximum levels are not being exceeded. Lack
of an accurate accounting of the number of voluntary reserve
personnel serving in an operational support capacity defeats the
purpose for establishing the reporting requirement, which in turn
hampers DOD's ability to manage its forces and to minimize lengthy
activations and stress on the reserve forces. This lack of
visibility also limits Congress's oversight over the use,
availability, and readiness of the reserve force to ensure that
its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the components can report accurate and consistent
information about the number of reservists serving in an
operational support capacity, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and the reserve components to develop guidance to
clarify and consistently define the categories of operational
support that should be included in the reported numbers.
Agency Comments
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided
written comments on a draft of this report. The department
concurred with the recommendation. DOD stated that it will develop
guidance that specifically addresses what is to be included when
accounting for operational support. The department's comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition, the
department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed
Services. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense;
the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Others
making significant contributions to this report are included in
appendix III.
Derek B. Stewart
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the factors leading to the increase in the maximum
number of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for
operational support from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, we
reviewed and analyzed the authorization levels for fiscal years
2005 and 2006, and the requested authorization levels for fiscal
year 2007. We also obtained documentation of the highest number of
reservists each month that is reported to DOD and analyzed figures
to identify any trends or patterns of change. To determine what
categories of reservists should be represented by the numbers of
reservists serving on operational support, we obtained
documentation on the definition of operational support given to
the components. We also interviewed DOD and reserve officials to
gain an understanding of their roles and effectiveness in
implementing Sections 415 and 416 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005. We interviewed
officials from DOD Reserve Affairs, Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy Reserve, and
Marine Corps Reserve. To determine DOD's authority and role in
management of the reservists under the NDAA, we reviewed
legislation and the history of relevant provisions of the law. To
determine the reliability of the estimates for the maximum
authorization levels for the reserve components, we gathered
reserve component officials' perspectives on their data systems in
the collecting and reporting of reserve strength to DOD.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components have
consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an
operational support capacity, we obtained DOD's memorandums,
implementing guidance, and regulations. We obtained documentation
from DOD and reserve components to determine the categories
included and excluded from operational support. We interviewed DOD
officials to determine its definition for operational support, how
DOD intended its implementing guidelines to be applied, and to
determine its interpretation of relevant legislation. We also
interviewed officials to determine the consistency in application
of the guidelines. From our interviews, we obtained information on
categories of reservists that were being excluded from operational
support. We reviewed and analyzed legislation to determine what
was required to be included in operational support. Officials also
provided information on the structure of their data systems and
the process for collecting and recording the numbers of
reservists. The components and DOD also provided the highest
number of reservists each month that was reported to DOD. Due to
definitional problems of categories of reservists to be included
in reported numbers, we found some inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in the data, which produced data that we believe
are not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we make a
recommendation for executive action to improve the accuracy and
consistency of reported monthly information.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559
Acknowledgments
n addition to the contact named above, Geraldine Beard, Renee
Brown, Tracy Burney, Pawnee Davis, Laura Durland, Meredith
Georges, George Poindexter, Terry Richardson, Gina Ruidera, and
Karen Thornton made significant contributions to the report.
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10 DOD previously defined active duty for special work as "a tour of
active duty for reserve personnel authorized from military or reserve
personnel appropriations for work on active component or reserve component
programs. The purpose of active duty for special work is to provide the
necessary skilled manpower assets to support existing or emerging
requirements." Department of Defense Directive 1215.6, Uniform Reserve,
Training and Retirement Categories, paragraph E 1.1.2 (Mar. 14, 1997).
11 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to Take Additional
Steps to Improve Mobilization Data for Reserve Components, GAO-06-1068
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2006).
(350864)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-07-93 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-07-93 , a report to congressional committees
October 2006
MILITARY PERSONNEL
Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account
for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed concern with
the frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists serve on active
duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly doubled its fiscal year 2005
estimate for the total maximum levels of reservists volunteering to be on
active duty for operational support, as shown in the table. Congress
required GAO to review the reasons behind the increases and expressed an
interest in understanding which reservists were being included or excluded
from these numbers. In this report, GAO (1) identified the factors that
led to the increase in DOD's requests for the maximum number of volunteer
reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support
since DOD's initial request in fiscal year 2005 and (2) assessed the
extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since
2005. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed agency documents and
interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and the reserve components develop guidance to
clarify and consistently define the categories of operational support that
should be included in the reported amounts. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD concurred with the recommendation.
DOD's requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily on
active duty for operational support grew substantially between fiscal
years 2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its fiscal
year 2005 estimate, DOD used data reported annually that excluded some
reservists serving in operational support capacities. Second, the
definition of operational support was not included with the legislation
and DOD did not distribute an official definition until 6 months after the
fiscal year 2005 authorized levels were in place. Based on the published
definition and greater outreach to personnel responsible for monitoring
the number of volunteers for this type of active duty, most reserve
components submitted higher estimates for maximum levels for fiscal year
2006. DOD submitted the same estimates in fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year
2006 because the number of volunteers did not change greatly.
The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number
of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this
monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve
components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in
their reported numbers. For example, two of the six reserve components do
not include personnel serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists
in their reported totals, even though this category is listed in DOD's
definition of operational support. In addition, only three of the six
components include reservists serving on extended active duty missions in
their reported numbers. GAO also found that the Navy Reserve erroneously
submitted cumulative amounts instead of the highest amount of volunteer
reservists each month for 6 months, so that it appeared to exceed its
maximum authorized level three times. DOD is implementing a change to its
Defense Manpower and Data Center to systematically generate the highest
count of reservists each month, but the effectiveness of this change
depends on whether the components update and align their policies and
systems to provide these data. DOD is in the process of developing an
instruction and only four of the reserve components have updated or have
plans to update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what
categories to include when accounting for these operational support
reservists. Without updating and aligning their guidance, inconsistencies
and errors in the reported numbers of operational support reservists may
continue.
Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for Operational
Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
*** End of document. ***