Force Structure--Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan (18-JAN-08, GAO-08-354R).
In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative
to expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active
and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200
military personnel--in order to meet increasing strategic demands
and to help reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion
includes building six additional active modular brigade combat
teams and additional modular support units, which will require a
substantial increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and
infrastructure. Currently, the Army estimates this expansion may
require about $70 billion in increased funding through fiscal
year 2013 and a significant amount in annual funding thereafter
to sustain the expanded Army. The President's fiscal year 2008
budget request contained $7.7 billion for Department of the Army
funding related to the Grow the Force initiative. During the
course of our review of Army modularity as required by the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
we analyzed the $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative funding
plan. We are submitting this letter to Congressional staff at
this time to provide the results of our analysis for
Congressional consideration as Congressional committees evaluate
DOD's fiscal year 2009 defense budget submission, which will
request additional funding to grow the force. Specifically, we
examined the supporting documentation and comprehensiveness of
the $70.2 billion funding plan. We will issue a separate report
in spring 2008 in response to the authorization act's requirement
for GAO to report on the Army's transformation to the modular
force in fiscal year 2008. We will also be reporting on the
Army's planning and budgeting process for Grow the Force
facilities.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-354R
ACCNO: A79973
TITLE: Force Structure--Need for Greater Transparency for the
Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan
DATE: 01/18/2008
SUBJECT: Army personnel
Army reservists
Cost analysis
Cost control
Defense cost control
Federal funds
Force structure
Military cost control
Military forces
Military personnel
Military personnel deployment
Military procurement
Military reserve personnel
Strategic planning
Transparency
Army Grow the Force Initiative
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GAO-08-354R
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January 18, 2008
Congressional Committees
Subject: Force Structure -- Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan
In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to
expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and reserve
soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200 military personnel--in
order to meet increasing strategic demands and to help reduce stress on
the force. This planned expansion includes building six additional active
modular brigade combat teams and additional modular support units,^1 which
will require a substantial increase in funding for personnel, equipment,
and infrastructure. Currently, the Army estimates this expansion may
require about $70 billion in increased funding through fiscal year 2013
and a significant amount in annual funding thereafter to sustain the
expanded Army. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request contained
$7.7 billion for Department of the Army funding related to the Grow the
Force initiative.
During the course of our review of Army modularity as required by the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,^2 we
analyzed the $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative funding plan. We are
submitting this letter to you at this time to provide the results of our
analysis for your consideration as your committees evaluate DOD's fiscal
year 2009 defense budget submission, which will request additional funding
to grow the force. Specifically, we examined the supporting documentation
and comprehensiveness of the $70.2 billion funding plan. We will issue a
separate report in spring 2008 in response to the authorization act's
requirement for GAO to report on the Army's transformation to the modular
force in fiscal year 2008. We will also be reporting on the Army's
planning and budgeting process for Grow the Force facilities.^3
To assess the Army's supporting documentation for its funding plan to Grow
the Force, we analyzed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) budget
materials and discussed the key assumptions and cost estimating
methodology used to develop the funding plan with relevant Department of
the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials. We also
assessed the extent to which the Army documented its cost estimate by
reviewing Army and best practices guidance on cost estimating and by
analyzing the Army's documentation for its cost estimate. We conducted our
work at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Department of the Army Headquarters, U.S. Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve Command. We conducted this performance audit from April 2007
to January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We determined
that the Army budget data we used were sufficiently reliable for our
review.
^1 The modular support units are the following: two combat support
brigades, one fires brigade, one air defense brigade, one engineer
brigade, and two sustainment brigades.
^2 Pub. L. No. 109-364, S 323 (2006).
^3 H.R. Rep. No. 110-186, (2007) at 12.
Results in Brief
The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to
understand the full magnitude of the funds needed and weigh competing
defense priorities. First, the Army's Grow the Force funding plan lacks
transparency because Army budget materials and other documentation do not
indicate how the Army developed the cost estimates that served as the
basis of its $70.2 billion funding plan to grow the force. Army budget
officials told us that they had limited time to prepare the funding plan
before the President submitted the budget in February 2007. However,
according to best practices, cost estimates should be transparent,
comprehensive, and easily replicated and updated to help ensure the
validity of the estimate. Second, the Army's funding plan is not
comprehensive and may be somewhat understated because some costs were
excluded and some factors are still evolving that could potentially affect
the Grow the Force funding plan. For example, the $70.2 billion funding
plan did not include over $2.5 billion for health care and educational
support assistance associated with increasing personnel levels. In
addition,
in October 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active Army
and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010, which
could increase costs such as budgeting for the hiring of military and
civilian personnel sooner than programmed. The Army has an opportunity to
update its Grow the Force initiative funding plan to reflect a more
transparent and comprehensive approach. Without more complete information,
decision makers could have difficulty understanding the basis for any
future estimates the Army submits and weighing competing priorities. We
are recommending that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to (1)
develop and provide Congress with an updated Grow the Force funding plan
to support congressional oversight of the fiscal year 2009 budget
submission, and (2) document the steps and sources of information used to
develop an updated funding plan. DOD generally agreed with these
recommendations.
Background
The Chief of Staff of the Army stated in September 2007 that increasing
the size of the Army will allow the Army to revitalize and balance the
force, reduce deployment periods, increase time soldiers spend at home
station in between deployments, increase capability, and strengthen the
systems that support the forces.^4 The February 2007 force structure plan
sought to increase by six the number of active brigade combat teams from
70 to 76 and the number of support brigades from 212 to 225. The
initiative proposes to permanently increase Army end strength by about
74,200 in the active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve by fiscal
year 2013, as identified in table 1.
Table 1: Proposed Increases in Army End Strength by Component in Fiscal
Years 2007--2013
Army Component: Active Army;
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000;
Fiscal year 2008: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2009: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2010: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2011: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2012; 1,000;
Fiscal year 2013: 0;
Total: 65,000.
Army Component: Army National Guard;
Fiscal year 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: 1,319;
Fiscal year 2009: 1,247;
Fiscal year 2010: 1,335;
Fiscal year 2011: 1,432;
Fiscal year 2012; 1,487;
Fiscal year 2013: 1,381;
Total: 8,201.
Army Component: Army Reserve;
Fiscal year 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0;
Fiscal year 2009: 0;
Fiscal year 2010: 0;
Fiscal year 2011: 0;
Fiscal year 2012; 0;
Fiscal year 2013: 1,010;
Total: 1,010.
Army Component: Total;
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000;
Fiscal year 2008: 8,319;
Fiscal year 2009: 8,247;
Fiscal year 2010: 8,335;
Fiscal year 2011: 8,432;
Fiscal year 2012; 2,487;
Fiscal year 2013: 2,391;
Total: 74,211.
Source: President's 2008 Budget Submission, February 2007.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
The Grow the Force initiative represents a shift in DOD's force structure
plans outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In fiscal
year 2004, the Army's authorized active end strength was 482,400 active
military personnel. Since that time, the Army was granted authority to
increase its active end strength by 30,000. The rationale for this
increase was to provide flexibility to implement its transformation to a
modular force while continuing to deploy forces to overseas operations.
Rather than return the active Army end strength to the 482,400 level by
fiscal year 2011, as decided in the 2006 QDR, DOD's 2007 proposal calls
for increasing the active Army's permanent end strength by 65,000 to
547,400 by fiscal year 2013.
Army budget materials identify the $70.2 billion funding plan by
appropriation through fiscal year 2013 (see table 2). DOD budget officials
told us that the $70.2 billion funding plan was included in DOD's
2008--2013 Future Years Defense Program but was not identified as a
separate program. Rather, the funding was included within the total for
each respective appropriation because the Army developed its program
budget based on the total Army end strength. The Grow the Force funding
plan includes onetime costs for procurement and military construction and
recurring costs associated with military and civilian personnel and
operation and maintenance.
^4 Statement by General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives,
September 26, 2007.
Table 2: Army Fiscal Year 2007--2013 Funding Plan for the Grow the Force
Initiative as of January 2007
Dollars in billions
Appropriations: Military Personnel;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0.7;
Fiscal year 2009: 3.9;
Fiscal year 2010: 4.6;
Fiscal year 2011: 5.2;
Fiscal year 2012: 5.5;
Fiscal year 2013: 5.6;
Total: 25.4.
Appropriations: Operation and Maintenance;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0.6;
Fiscal year 2009: 2.6;
Fiscal year 2010: 2.9;
Fiscal year 2011: 3.1;
Fiscal year 2012: 4.3;
Fiscal year 2013: 2.6;
Total: 16.1.
Appropriations: Procurement;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.9;
Fiscal year 2008: 4.1;
Fiscal year 2009: 4.2;
Fiscal year 2010: 5.1;
Fiscal year 2011: 3.0;
Fiscal year 2012: 0.6;
Fiscal year 2013: 0.0;
Total: 17.9.
Appropriations: Military Construction;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.4;
Fiscal year 2008: 2.4;
Fiscal year 2009: 4.3;
Fiscal year 2010: 2.4;
Fiscal year 2011: 0.7;
Fiscal year 2012: 0.5;
Fiscal year 2013: 0.1;
Total: 10.8.
Appropriations: Total;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 1.3;
Fiscal year 2008: 7.7;
Fiscal year 2009: 15.0;
Fiscal year 2010: 15.0;
Fiscal year 2011: 12.0;
Fiscal year 2012: 10.9;
Fiscal year 2013: 8.3;
Total: 70.2.
Source: U.S. Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management
and Comptroller, February 2007.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
^a Funds for fiscal year 2007 were contained in the Department of Defense
Fiscal Year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on
Terror.
The Army's Grow the Force Funding Plan Is Not Transparent or Comprehensive
The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to
understand the full magnitude of the costs and weigh competing priorities.
There is a lack of transparency in how the Army developed the cost
estimate that served as the basis for the $70.2 billion funding plan. The
Army estimated the costs to implement the Grow the Force initiative at
$70.2 billion, according to Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense
budget officials. However, based on our review of Army budget materials
and other documentation, it is not clear how the Army developed this
estimate. For example, Army documents do not identify key assumptions,
limitations, or the steps used to develop the estimates. Army budget
officials told us that they had limited time to prepare the cost estimates
and funding plan before the President submitted the budget in February
2007. However, according to best practices, high quality cost estimates
use repeatable methods that will result in estimates that are
comprehensive and can also be easily and clearly traced, replicated, and
updated.^5 The Army Cost Analysis Manual states that cost analysts must
document all steps in the development of a cost estimate, including ground
rules and assumptions. The analyst must also state the source of all data
and the processes used to analyze the data.^6 The Army has not
demonstrated that it followed its guidance for developing its Grow the
Force cost estimate.
In addition to a lack of transparency, the Army's February 2007 Grow the
Force funding plan is not comprehensive and may be understated because
some costs were excluded and some factors are still evolving that could
potentially affect this funding plan:
^5 GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing
Program Costs, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, DC.: July 2007).
^6 Department of the Army, Cost Analysis Manual, U.S. Army Cost and
Economic Analysis Center, May 2002.
The $70.2 billion funding plan provided to Congress excluded
operation and maintenance funds for health care and educational
support assistance totaling over $2.5 billion. According to the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army's
funding plan did not include about $2.3 billion in health care
support assistance and about $217 million in educational
assistance associated with increasing personnel levels. Army
officials told us these costs were excluded from the Army's
funding plan because the funds are provided respectively in the
Defense Health Program appropriation and Defense-wide Department
of Defense Education Activity appropriation. Nonetheless, Congress
needs to understand the full magnitude of costs to DOD as it
considers the Army's Grow the Force initiative.
The number of Army civilians to be hired is likely understated. A
senior Army civilian personnel official said the Army's funding
plan included only a small number of civilians needed to be hired
because there was limited time to develop the estimate. Army major
commands are conducting a detailed mission needs analysis to
identify overall civilian personnel requirements. As a result,
this official expects the number of civilians needed to be hired
to increase, thereby further increasing costs.
The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 2007 a plan to
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the
active Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to
fiscal year 2010. The Army initially identified the completion
date of this initiative for all Army components as fiscal year
2013. However, in October 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army
announced a plan to accelerate the Grow the Force implementation
timelines for the active Army and Army National Guard from fiscal
year 2013 to fiscal year 2010. An Army official in the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army is
currently reviewing the cost estimates for accelerating its
planned force expansion. Accelerating the implementation timeline
could incur additional costs for reasons such as the following:
o The Army would have to budget for the hiring of
military and civilian personnel sooner than
programmed.
o The Army may have to increase recruitment and
retention incentives to meet end strength goals.
o Procuring equipment sooner than planned could
require renegotiating contracts, keeping production
lines open longer, and paying overtime to workers to
meet increased production goals.
The locations of the active and reserve units to be built were
unknown when the funding plan was developed. Because the locations
of the new units were unknown when the Army developed its cost
estimate, the Army used standard cost calculations to determine
its military construction estimate, which excluded environmental
costs. Out of concern about the lack of an overall plan to station
and accommodate permanent additional soldiers with the necessary
facilities, Congress restricted the Army from spending certain
military construction funds for the Grow the Force initiative
until the Secretary of Defense submits a detailed stationing plan
to support Army end-strength growth to the Committees on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate.^7 In
response to this reporting requirement, on December 18, 2007, the
Army submitted to Congress a Grow the Force stationing plan that
identifies facilities necessary for brigade combat teams, combat
service and combat service support units, training, and quality of
life support facilities such as barracks, unit operations
facilities, maintenance facilities, and family housing.^8 In
particular, the Army plans to build facilities for six infantry
brigade combat teams: two at Fort Carson, Colorado; two at Fort
Stewart, Georgia; and two at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Army stated it
will revise its initial $10.8 billion military construction cost
estimate based on the announced stationing locations and will
include a full cost determination and resource strategy as part of
the fiscal year 2009 President's budget request and the fiscal
years 2009--2013 Future Years Defense Program. The Army noted that
because the process of land acquisition for federal agencies
requires multiple approvals, and a series of environmental and
real estate planning studies, the December 2007 Army Stationing
Plan did not identify installation expansion actions. As a result,
there could be additional land acquisition and environmental costs
that may not be included in the updated estimates.
Changes to the force structure that served as the basis of the
$70.2 billion funding plan could affect overall costs. The Army's
$70.2 billion funding plan was based on a force structure plan of
six infantry brigade combat teams and additional support brigades,
but Army officials were still working on the specific force
structure requirements of the expanded Army in February 2007 when
they developed the funding plan. As a result, changes to the
initial force structure plan could increase costs. For example,
the costs to procure heavy or stryker brigade combat team--related
equipment are more expensive than for infantry brigades. An Army
procurement official provided us standard equipment estimates for
brigade combat teams: Infantry ($590 million); Stryker ($1.7
billion to 1.9 billion); and Heavy ($1.2 billion to 2.5 billion).
Army officials stated the force structure plan has been revised
since February 2007 but the Department of the Army has not
approved a final force structure document.
Given the magnitude of the Army's funding plan and potential changes to
the plan since DOD submitted its budget in February 2007, the Army should
be prepared to fully explain and document the basis for its funding plan.
The Army has an opportunity to update its Grow the Force funding plan to
reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach, given that the Army
plans to request future funding. Without complete information on the
Army's $70.2 billion funding plan, decision makers will have difficulty
understanding the full magnitude of costs and weighing competing
priorities.
^7 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 126
(2007).
^8 The December 2008 Army Stationing Plan incorporates the acceleration of
the implementation timelines for active and National Guard end strength
from fiscal year 2013 to 2010.
Conclusion
Because the Army's funding request lacks transparency, and is not
well-documented and comprehensive, the Congress may not have the
information needed to consider the long-term costs and benefits associated
with increasing Army personnel levels or gauge the amount of funding that
should be appropriated to implement the initiative each year. To help
illuminate the basis for its request, the Army needs to describe its
process for documenting and revising its Grow the Force cost estimate, the
proposed force structure plan, implementation timelines, and how it plans
to manage and implement this initiative given competing priorities for
funding. The Army has an opportunity to address these issues and
facilitate congressional oversight of DOD's fiscal year 2009 budget
request. Without more complete information on the Army's $70.2 billion
funding plan, decision makers will have difficulty understanding the full
magnitude of costs and weighing competing priorities.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To support congressional oversight of the Army's Grow the Force initiative
and DOD's upcoming fiscal year 2009 budget request, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the
following two actions:
Provide Congress with additional information on the Army's Grow
the Force initiative at the earliest possible date, but not later
than March 30, 2008. This information should include the
following:
o The force structure to be created by this
initiative and associated implementation timelines.
o A revised Grow the Force funding plan.
o The cost estimating methodology used to develop the
Grow the Force funding plan, including (1) key
assumptions, (2) key factors that could affect the
Grow the Force funding plan, and (3) a clear
definition of costs that were excluded from the
estimate.
Maintain a transparent audit trail including documentation of the
steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding plan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
recommendations. DOD comments are presented in their entirety in appendix
I.
Specifically, DOD agreed to (1) provide Congress with additional
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative not later than March
30, 2008, and (2) maintain a transparent audit trail including
documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding
plan. In explaining how it planned to address our first recommendation,
DOD stated that it would identify the Army's Grow the Force implementation
timelines, force structure, and funding plan in the Army's December 2007
Grow the Army Stationing Plan, the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report
on Army Progress, the Army Campaign Plan, and its revised funding
estimates. We believe these are positive steps. However, until DOD and the
Army issue all of the stated documents, we cannot determine the extent to
which these actions will improve the transparency of the Army's Grow the
Force cost estimates and funding plan. Identifying the Army's cost
estimating methodology as well as DOD-wide Grow the Force requirements as
part of an updated Grow the Force funding plan would provide a more
transparent basis for understanding the full magnitude of related
requirements and costs.
In explaining how it planned to address our second recommendation, DOD
stated that although the Army's year-to-year staffing, equipping, and
facilities are not identified as a separate budget activity, the Army will
identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the Force plan
in the development of the fiscal year 2010/2011 defense budget and
preparations for the fiscal year 2010--2015 Future Years Defense Program.
While we recognize the Army will not develop a separate budget activity
for the Army's Grow the Force funding plan, there is a need for
transparency of the Army's Grow the Force funding plan given the
significant amount of funding requested ($70.2 billion). In addition to
identifying requirements and funding plans to complete this initiative, we
believe the Army needs to maintain a transparent audit trail to
demonstrate how its Grow the Force funding request is linked to Army
requirements.
- - - - -
We are providing this letter today to relevant congressional defense
committees. If you or your have staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at
[8][email protected] . Key contributors to this report were Wendy Jaffe,
Assistant Director, Kelly Baumgartner, Grace Coleman, Barbara Gannon,
Terry Richardson, Kathryn Smith, and Karen Thornton.
Janet A. St. Laurent
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management
List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
January 18, 2008:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report "Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force
Initiative Funding Plan," dated December 18, 2007 (GAO Code 351128/GAO-
08-354R). The Department concurs with the two GAO recommendations and
our comments are enclosed.
The Army's Grow the Force initiative is not a discrete budget element
of Army equipping, staffing, operations, and facilities. This
initiative was framed in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 defense budget. The
Department is increasing the Army end-strength by more than 74,000 and
is addressing the manning, equipping, and facilities needs for the new
and augmented combat and support brigades for those personnel. In
December, the Department provided to Congress the Army's end-strength
growth stationing plan. This, with the Army's FY2008 Annual Report on
Army Progress and revised funding estimates provide the force
structure, timelines, and funding plan for the Army's Grow the Force
initiative.
The Army's year to year equipping, staffing, and readiness plans are
considered Department resourcing priorities and are based on: (1)
deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army equipment and
personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4) emerging needs.
Oversight of equipping, manning, and readiness plans comes through
existing Department requirements, readiness, acquisition, and
resourcing entities including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
Senior Readiness Oversight Council, Defense Acquisition Board, and the
Comptroller. The Department continually seeks to improve these
management and oversight processes for better overall efficiency.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report � Dated December 18, 2007:
GAO Code 351128/GAO-08-354R:
"Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force Initiative
Funding Plan"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with additional
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative at the earliest
possible date, but not later than March 30, 2008. This information
should include:
* The force structure to be created by this initiative and associated
implementation timelines;
* A revised Grow the Force funding plan and;
* The cost estimating methodology used to develop the Grow the Force
funding plan, including: (1) key assumptions, (2) key factors that
could affect the Grow the Force funding plan; and (3) a clear
definition of costs that were excluded from the estimate.
DOD Response: Concur. In December the Department provided the Army's
end-strength growth stationing plan to the Congress. This, in
conjunction with the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report on Army
Progress, submitted in accordance with section 323 of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army
Campaign Plan, and revised funding estimates will frame the Grow the
Army force structure, implementation timelines, and funding plan.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to maintain a transparent audit trail
including documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force
funding plan.
DOD Response: Concur. Although the Army's year-to-year equipping,
staffing, and facilities plans are not discretely segregated in the
budget by initiatives such as the Army's Grow the Force, the Army will
identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the Army
plan in the development of the Fiscal Year 2010/2011 Defense Budget and
preparations of the Fiscal Year 2010-2015 Future Years Defense Program.
(351128)
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